[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 115 (Wednesday, September 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9507-S9518]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

 NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--
                               Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. What is the pending business before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the nomination of 
Porter Goss.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in reference to that 
nomination.
  Mr. President, I will vote against the nomination of Congressman 
Porter Goss to serve as the next Director of Central Intelligence. I do 
so reluctantly. I have known Congressman Goss for a number of years, 
and I consider him a good person and a good public servant. But we are 
on the verge of enacting significant, historic, and much needed reform 
of the U.S. intelligence community. It is more important than ever that 
the next leader of the intelligence community be nonpartisan and firmly 
committed to meaningful intelligence reform.
  Based on his record and his public statements, and on the 
confirmation hearings before the Intelligence Committee on which I 
serve, I do not believe Mr. Goss is the right person at this moment in 
time for this vitally important national security position.
  Mr. Goss has served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee 
for almost 8 years, the second longest tenure in that position in the 
almost 30 years since its creation. The chairman of a congressional 
committee has considerable power in determining on which issues the 
committee will focus,

[[Page S9508]]

and the manner in which they will conduct their oversight. I believe 
this oversight record is a reasonable measure of Mr. Goss's likely 
effectiveness in managing the intelligence community during this highly 
challenging transitional period.
  Despite having served on the Aspin-Brown-Rudman commission on the 
roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community in 1996, 8 
years ago, and cochairing, along with Senator Bob Graham, a joint 
inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and serving on the House 
Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence for almost 10 years, Congressman 
Goss's record demonstrates that he has been more a protector of the 
status quo than an agent of meaningful reform. Only a few months ago 
did Congressman Goss introduce, for the first time, legislation to 
reform the intelligence community. It should be noted that on July 25, 
2002, Mr. Goss voted against the amendment of Congressman Tim Roemer of 
Indiana on the House floor creating the independent National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 
Commission. That is an incredible fact that must be taken into 
consideration.
  The man who is seeking to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
at this moment, when significant reform is about to take place, voted 
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission, which has inspired both 
parties and the President to our current state.
  This 9/11 Commission Report is the foundation upon which current 
intelligence reform efforts are being undertaken. I met personally with 
Congressman Goss because I do respect him, and I wanted to hear his 
explanation. How can he ask to be head of the CIA, when he voted 
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission?

  His argument was not convincing. He argued it was a matter of timing; 
that while he was undertaking a joint inquiry about 9/11, the creation 
of a separate commission might, in fact, lead to the executive branch 
stalling information or refusing to cooperate. That was hardly a 
satisfying answer.
  In addition, it appears that as chairman of the House Intelligence 
Oversight Committee, Congressman Goss has been reluctant to conduct 
aggressive oversight of Intelligence Committee issues, particularly 
when they appear to deal with issues that may be embarrassing to the 
current administration. For example, although the Senate Intelligence 
Committee completed the first phase of its inquiry into the 
intelligence community's performance regarding prewar intelligence 
related to Iraq, and issued a public report, the House Intelligence 
Committee, under Mr. Goss's leadership, has yet to complete a similar 
thorough investigation, despite starting it last year.
  As another example, in June of this year during the House 
Intelligence Committee's markup of the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence 
Authorization Act, Mr. Goss led a party-line vote to reject an 
amendment that would have required the Department of Defense to provide 
an accounting of the nature and extent of its contacts with the Iraqi 
exile leader, Ahmed Chalabi.
  Why is that significant? I hope that people who are following this 
debate remember Ahmed Chalabi. He was the self-proclaimed leader of an 
Iraqi national congress. He was the one you couldn't miss on talk shows 
before the invasion of Iraq. He was the one spreading the information 
far and wide across America and around the world about the threats of 
Saddam Hussein. He was the person who was the favored and trusted ally 
of our Department of Defense when they made critical decisions about 
committing thousands of American soldiers and their lives to the cause 
of Iraq.
  What do we know of Ahmed Chalabi? We know that some 5 years ago, the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State stopped dealing 
with Mr. Chalabi because they did not believe he was credible. They 
didn't trust his judgment. They wouldn't bring him into the councils to 
make important decisions.
  But Department of Defense Under Secretary Rumsfeld and his special 
assistant, Mr. Douglas Feith, thought Chalabi was just what the doctor 
ordered. He was there to confirm the fears that they spread across 
America about Saddam Hussein. He was there to confirm the presence of 
weapons of mass destruction, which became the clarion call of this 
administration, drawing us into an invasion of Iraq. He was the one 
constantly suggesting that there was a connection between the 9/11 
terrorism in the United States and Saddam Hussein.
  What happened to Ahmed Chalabi? Those who follow news know what 
happened. He went to Iraq, became a somewhat controversial figure in 
the provisional government, returned to the United States, and was 
treated by some in the administration as a conquering hero.
  In fact, at one moment in time, to the embarrassment, I am sure, of 
everyone involved today, Ahmed Chalabi was positioned behind the First 
Lady at one of President Bush's State of the Union Addresses so that he 
would be on camera, showcased before the American people.
  Fast forward just a few months. Ahmed Chalabi has now been the 
subject of extensive searches by the American Government because of our 
suspicion that he has not only misled us about information on Iraq but 
has had some connection with Iran of an entirely dubious nature. Ahmed 
Chalabi is persona non grata in this country. We are no longer sending 
him some $350,000 to $360,000 a month to subsidize his lifestyle. He 
virtually has been banished from his role as prime adviser to the 
United States.
  When Mr. Goss was confronted with this and asked by his own committee 
for an investigation as to how Mr. Chalabi, discredited by the CIA, 
discredited by the State Department, became the darling and favorite of 
the Department of Defense, peddled bad information to the United States 
and the American people, and may have betrayed us to Iran--when he was 
asked to investigate this, he declined. He refused. You have to ask 
yourself: If Mr. Goss was unable or unwilling to ask the most basic 
questions about Ahmed Chalabi, how aggressive, how objective will he be 
as Director of the CIA?
  That is not the only thing. One of the most important issues we have 
to keep in mind is that the men and women of our intelligence community 
are dedicated, patriotic, hard-working people committed to the security 
of our Nation. Occasionally, there will be those who will disappoint 
us, but that is true of virtually every institution in America. But 
remembering their patriotism and the fact that many of them put their 
lives on the line, there came a moment in time when columnist Robert 
Novak outed the identity of a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. This is not 
only disgraceful, it is dangerous. It meant that her life and her 
career were in danger. It sent ripples through the intelligence 
community of men and women in similar positions wondering who would 
step forward in Washington to stand up for the integrity of our agents 
in the intelligence community. Mr. Goss was then chairman of the House 
Select Committee on Intelligence. He was asked in October 2003 whether 
he would investigate the purposeful identification of covert CIA agent 
Valerie Plame. Mr. Goss responded, ``If somebody sends me a blue dress 
and some DNA, I'll have an investigation.''

  Mr. Goss apologized publicly and privately for that statement, but 
the fact remains that he was loathe to challenge any intelligence-
related decision of this administration.
  That is not at all reassuring when we consider the well-documented 
intelligence failures leading up to 9/11 and prior to the invasion of 
Iraq.
  This is not a routine appointment. This is not a routine position. 
Intelligence is the first line of defense in our war against terrorism. 
It is the first line of defense for the American people and our 
national security. Having the best intelligence network and the best 
intelligence agency will be critical if we want our children to live in 
peace and safety. That is why it is so essential that we bring a person 
to this job who understands what we have lived through during the past 
4 years.
  Lengthy reports by the 9/11 Commission, as well as the Joint 
Intelligence Committee's inquiry, have come to the conclusion that our 
intelligence agency failed us before the 9/11 attack. We know now that 
they should have gathered more information, shared more information, 
drawn obvious conclusions, and done something proactive to protect 
America. They did not and 3,000

[[Page S9509]]

innocent Americans died in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York.
  Similarly, there came a point in time when we had to make a critical 
decision in America whether to launch a preemptive attack against 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the first such preemptive attack in our 
history. We were told it was essential that we do so. We were told by 
the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and virtually every 
spokesman of the Government that it was essential we attack Saddam 
Hussein because he had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction which 
could be used against the Middle East, other countries in the region 
and the United States, that he was developing nuclear weapons that 
would be a danger to the world, that he possessed unmanned aerial 
vehicles that could even strike the United States, that he was linked 
with the al-Qaida attacks of 9/11, and the list goes on and on. Today, 
a year and a half after the invasion, we have found that intelligence 
information was wrong, just plain wrong.
  Think of it. Depending on the intelligence community as our first 
line of defense, it failed. It failed to alert us of the danger of 9/
11, it failed to accurately assess the state of one nation, Iraq, 
before we launched an invasion which has cost us over 1,000 American 
soldiers' lives, over 7,000 seriously wounded, and literally billions 
of dollars.
  Can the intelligence community continue with business as usual? No. 
If there was ever a time in our history when we needed someone clearly 
nonpartisan, someone who would stand up to a President of either 
political party and tell them the sober, cold truth, even if it wasn't 
popular, if there was ever a time that we needed a Director of the 
CIA determined to reform that agency and the other intelligence 
agencies under his supervision, that time is today. This is not a 
routine nomination. This is a nomination as important as any to be 
considered by the Senate.

  I will not go into the lengthy partisan statements made by Mr. Goss 
so many times in the past where he has taken to task my political 
party, members of it, suggesting that we were weak on defense, weak on 
intelligence. In fact, he was drawn into this Presidential campaign in 
a role now which he has neither explained nor given us much to work 
with.
  When we went to Mr. Goss and said, You have criticized Senator Kerry 
and Democrats for intelligence spending but back in 1995 you were the 
cosponsor of a budget proposal that would have had a minimum 20-percent 
cut in our intelligence community personnel, he wouldn't answer the 
question. When confronted by Senator Rockefeller with his obvious 
contradiction between his accusations and his actions, Mr. Goss refused 
to acknowledge the obvious. The best he could tell us was, ``The record 
is the record.'' I don't know what that means. I have never before 
heard it from another witness nor nominee. But it basically told the 
Intelligence Committee he wasn't about to discuss the issue with us.
  I am sorry. I think Mr. Goss should have been open and candid and 
told us exactly what he meant, and if he made a mistake to concede that 
point. It would have put him in a much better position to be a credible 
agent for nonpartisan leadership and for change as Director of the CIA.
  Because I have serious doubts about Mr. Goss's commitment to reform, 
his ability to be independent and nonpartisan, I do not believe he is 
the right person to be serving at the helm of the intelligence 
community during this extraordinarily challenging time and I will 
oppose his nomination.
  I concede the outcome of the vote on this nomination. I assume he 
will be comfortably confirmed by the Senate.
  I sincerely hope Mr. Goss will take my comments and the comments of 
those who vote against him as a challenge to him in his new role at the 
CIA. I hope he proves me wrong. I hope that I stand before this Chamber 
in the future and say he was nonpartisan, he was committed to reform, 
he was prepared to tell this administration and any administration he 
served the truth, even if it was politically painful. I hope that day 
will come.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I have listened with interest 
to the comments of my good friend from Illinois, as I did earlier today 
by my friend from West Virginia. I respect their analysis of this 
nomination. I hope they respect my disagreement with that analysis.
  I rise today to support the nomination of a friend, a man with whom I 
have worked for over 25 years, a fellow Floridian whose judgment and 
integrity I highly regard.
  I support the confirmation of Porter Goss as the next Director of the 
CIA. I have known Congressman Goss and his wonderful family for more 
than two decades. I commend them for their willingness to delay the 
well-earned retirement which they thought would lie before them at the 
end of this session of Congress to take on this very difficult and 
important responsibility.
  My colleagues know that I have been extremely critical of this 
administration for, among other things, its failure to hold anyone 
accountable for the intelligence failures that allowed terrorists to 
strike our Nation on September 11, 2001, and for the failure that led 
us into the war in Iraq.
  I have been extremely critical of the President and the Vice 
President for allowing America to be distracted from the real war 
against terror in Afghanistan and to call upon us to retreat from that 
real war against the real terrorists who had killed 3,000 Americans and 
using fabricated intelligence to draw us into the war in Iraq.
  I have repeatedly questioned why the President has waited more than 3 
years since September 11 to begin a serious discussion of 
restructuring, reorienting, and reforming our intelligence 
capabilities.
  I am here today to support the nomination of Porter Goss precisely 
because of these concerns. From my personal experience, I can tell you 
that Porter Goss is the right man for this job. He is uniquely 
qualified to serve as America's Director of Central Intelligence. He is 
a man of great character, exceptional intelligence, a tremendous work 
ethic, and outstanding personal and professional integrity.
  Let me share a story.
  As Governor of Florida, I had known of Porter Goss as he served as a 
distinguished mayor of the town of Sanibel Island, FL. In the early 
1980s, the county in which Sanibel is located, Lee County, FL, was in 
the midst of probably the largest public works project in the history 
of that county, a major new airport which is now known as the 
Southwestern Florida International Airport.
  In the midst of that, three of the five members of the county 
commission were indicted for corruption, largely relating to activities 
involving the construction of the airport. The county government was in 
disarray. Public confidence in the county government had sunk to a new 
low, and this major, critically important project to the future of the 
citizens of southwest Florida had come into question. It was my 
responsibility as Governor of Florida to first suspend from office 
those individuals who had been indicted, and then to look for three 
citizens of Lee County who could assume the important responsibility of 
restoring the integrity of county government and completing the 
important airport project.
  Although I am a Democrat, and had just been reelected as a Democrat, 
and Porter is a Republican, it was my feeling that his personal 
characteristics were more important than his party label, and so I 
appointed him to one of those three positions. And from that 
appointment, he quickly became the chair of the Lee County commission.
  Party affiliation did not matter then. I do not believe party 
affiliation should matter today in determining who should be the next 
Director of our Central Intelligence operation. What mattered then was 
the fact that Porter, with his clear commitment to public service, his 
integrity and his leadership skills, at a time when his community 
desperately needed all of them, was able to recapture the confidence of 
the people, was able to restart this important airport project, which 
now is one of the most important economic assets of the community.
  When it comes to the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has the 
balanced perspective of having been

[[Page S9510]]

both an insider and an outsider. For a decade early in his career, he 
served the Nation both in Army Intelligence and the CIA. He knows from 
personal, firsthand experience the value and the risks of clandestine 
operations.
  Since he has been in Congress--elected in 1988--and especially as a 
member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, he has 
come to know the agencies from an oversight capacity.
  Now, some have said he is too close to the intelligence agencies, 
that he is too protective of the status quo. But from my partnership 
with him as cochairmen of the congressional joint inquiry into the 
events of September 11, it is my firm belief, and my assurance to my 
colleagues, that Porter Goss can and will be independent in his 
judgments. Porter Goss will also be clear and tough minded in 
determining where there are needed reforms and leading us to those 
reforms.
  If any of my colleagues or citizens of this great Nation wish to have 
an indication of where those reforms are likely to take us, I would 
direct you to the 19 reforms recommended by that congressional joint 
inquiry, upon which our Presiding Officer participated with great 
distinction.
  As we move to implement much-needed reforms in our intelligence 
community, I am confident Porter Goss will not be part of the problem 
but will be a leader in taking us toward principled and effective 
solutions which will make Americans safer.
  This time the President got it right. I strongly urge the 
confirmation of his nominee to be the Director of Central Intelligence, 
Porter Goss.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I intend to vote today to confirm the 
nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the Director of Central 
Intelligence. I recognize the deep experience that Representative Goss 
brings to this position as the recent Chairman of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and as a former CIA officer and Army 
intelligence officer. I also understand the unique role the DCI plays 
in providing the President with intelligence and advising him on 
intelligence matters. Thus, I believe that on balance Mr. Goss's 
qualifications are sufficient to confirm the President's choice for 
this position.
  However, I want to express concerns about Porter Goss and the very 
partisan way in which he has conducted himself. His statements 
mischaracterizing Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry's 
positions on intelligence and accusing Congressional Democrats of being 
weak on intelligence are not the sort of rhetoric we want associated 
with the leader of our intelligence community. As former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger testified in the Appropriations Committee 
yesterday, the ideal leader for our Nation's intelligence community 
should be as non-partisan as possible. Mr. Goss has acknowledged that 
as DCI he will need to be non-partisan and objective if he is to 
provide the President with independent judgments about the intelligence 
he provides, and during his nomination hearings, he made a commitment 
to do just that. We must hold him to his commitment.
  Many of my colleagues have come to the floor today to speak of Porter 
Goss's integrity and his strong qualifications. He will no doubt be 
confirmed and will take on one of the most critical jobs in our 
government at a time of uncertainty about how his very job will be 
structured. The 9/11 Commission has made a compelling case for making 
major changes to the organization of our intelligence community. The 
new threats which confront us require a more cohesive intelligence 
effort that emphasizes shared intelligence over turf battles. To meet 
this challenge, we need a leader at the helm of the intelligence 
community who embraces the spirit of reform--even if not all the 
specifics of the 9/11 Commission recommendations--and who is willing to 
implement the reforms that all agree are sorely needed. I have no doubt 
that Porter Goss is capable of managing the changes that need to take 
place and I am hopeful that he will dedicate himself to these efforts.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most important quality I am looking for 
in a Director of Central Intelligence is someone who can be relied upon 
to provide objective intelligence assessments independent of the policy 
and political agenda of the White House. Too often we haven't had that.
  The massive intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a 
significant degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to 
support administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one 
direction, making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent, 
thereby promoting the administration's decision to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. Nuances, qualifications and caveats were dropped; a 
``slam-dunk'' was the assessment. The CIA was saying to the 
administration, to the Congress, and to the American people what it 
thought the administration wanted to hear.
  The problem of intelligence being manipulated and politicized is not 
new. Forty years ago, Secretary of Defense McNamara used classified 
communications intercepts, later proved to be very dubious, to push for 
passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was then used by 
President Johnson as the legislative foundation to expand the war in 
Vietnam.
  Intelligence was manipulated by then-DCI William Casey during the 
Iran Contra period. The bipartisan Iran-Contra report cited evidence 
that Director Casey ``misrepresented or selectively used available 
intelligence to support the policy he was promoting.''
  We need a different kind of DCI, one who is not going to be 
influenced by the policy choices or politics of whatever administration 
is in power. After reviewing Congressman Goss's record, I am not 
convinced that he would be that kind of DCI. For example, the 
Washington Post reported that in 2002, when asked about intelligence 
failures in Iraq, Congressman Goss said ``I don't like to see the left-
wingers splattering mud on an agency that's done some very fine work.'' 
The Senate Intelligence Committee produced a unanimous 500-page report 
on the massive CIA failures leading up to the Iraq war. I would not 
characterize the committee as ``a bunch of left wingers.'' We need 
someone who is committed to independence and reform, not an ideology.
  During his nomination hearing, Congressman Goss was very reluctant to 
admit there had been intelligence failures on the part of the 
intelligence community during the most recent Iraq War. And, when asked 
questions about some of his partisan comments, Congressman Goss 
answered many of them by simply saying ``the record is the record.'' 
Whatever that means, it is not an acceptable answer from a nominee for 
Director of Central Intelligence.
  I will vote against Congressman Goss. I hope that, if confirmed, he 
will prove me wrong.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the nomination 
of Porter Goss to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
CIA. Yesterday the Senate Intelligence Committee voted 12-to-4 to send 
Representative Goss' nomination to the Senate floor. I welcome the 
opportunity to say a few words about this important nomination and 
about the state of our Nation's intelligence community.
  As my colleagues know, in 1947, President Harry Truman signed 
legislation which provided for the establishment of the CIA. This 
important agency supports the President, the National Security Council, 
and American officials who play a role in shaping or executing the 
national security policy of the United States. The CIA engages in 
research and analysis of information, as well as a host of other 
activities related to foreign intelligence and national security.
  However, as every American knows all too well, times have changed 
since 1947. We are now engaged in new battles. We are facing new 
threats. The Soviet Union is no longer our arch enemy. Instead we face 
an enemy that is dispersed throughout the world in small cells--
sometimes connected, sometimes acting independently. The new threat--
terrorism--is an asymmetrical one.
  Nonetheless, we must remember that terrorism alone is not our enemy. 
It is a tactic used by our enemies. Therefore, our task is twofold. 
First, we must defeat soundly those who would attack our country and 
endanger the security of Americans. But secondly, we must also defeat 
the murderous ideology of terrorism. That is because terrorism is the 
enemy of all humankind.

[[Page S9511]]

It knows no faces, names, or nationalities. And I am confident that a 
strong America, which is respected by our friends and allies, can 
defeat this scourge.
  Indeed, one thing we can all agree upon in this body is that a strong 
and capable intelligence effort has never been more important to the 
security of our Nation. That brings me to the nomination before us 
today. At the best of times the job of Director of Central Intelligence 
is a difficult one. And we all know that these are not the best of 
times. Our intelligence infrastructure failed this Nation when we 
needed it most.
  There are two important traits that the next Director of the CIA 
needs to possess in order to be successful in restoring the 
effectiveness of our intelligence capabilities.
  First, it is of the utmost importance that the Director of the CIA be 
nonpartisan. The safety of the American people is not a matter of 
political parties. National security is an issue that must unite us in 
a common cause. To that end, I share the deep concerns of several of my 
colleagues that some of Representative Goss's comments during his 
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee were overly 
partisan and blindly supportive of the Bush administration.
  Moreover it is critical to recognize that he chose to become involved 
in the political process. That decision was not forced on him. He chose 
it freely. And I believe that it has undermined his ability to be a 
nonpartisan Director of Central Intelligence, DCI. There is no question 
that intelligence has been politicized in this administration. I know 
it. The American people know it. And the civil servants who work at the 
CIA know it. To rush to confirm an individual who has played a role in 
politicizing intelligence is extremely unwise and only serves to 
further demoralize the individuals who are working so hard to protect 
our national security.
  Second, he or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary to 
lead some of our most critical intelligence efforts. We cannot ignore 
the fact that the most egregious lapses in history by our Nation's 
intelligence community happened while Mr. Goss was chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee--the committee responsible for ensuring 
that US intelligence agencies function effectively. If he failed in his 
oversight responsibilities, as I believe he has, how then can we have 
any confidence that he is capable of accomplishing an even more 
difficult task--the fundamental reform of the entire intelligence 
apparatus? I do not believe that we can.
  We all know that the 9/11 Commission has recommended a major overhaul 
of our intelligence operations. Much of that will have to be done at 
the CIA. It is going to take an individual with very strong management 
skills to carry out the restructuring of that agency. He will have to 
have credibility within the institution of the CIA if he is to be 
successful. Institutions resist change. Based upon Mr. Goss' weak 
oversight of the agency, I am not confident that he has the wherewithal 
to overcome the resistance he will confront to the fundamental reforms 
being contemplated.
  Actions always speak louder than words. Unfortunately, we don't know 
what Mr. Goss's actions will be as director, but we do know what his 
actions have been as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. In 
my opinion, to confirm Mr. Goss with such uncertainty about his ability 
to get the job done would be irresponsible.
  This position is too critical to leave to chance. The agency is 
currently being led by a very able career intelligence director. He is 
already working with the committees of Congress to devise a plan to 
restore the effectiveness and credibility of the US intelligence 
community. In the immediate future, he will continue to do so.
  For those reasons, I will oppose this nomination when the Senate 
votes today.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the nomination 
of Porter Goss to serve as Director of Central Intelligence.
  The American people have learned much since 9/11 about the vital role 
of objective, nonpolitical intelligence in keeping us safe at home and 
in protecting American interests abroad. We also have witnessed the 
disastrous consequences of the administration's manipulation of 
intelligence in its rush to war in Iraq--disastrous for our brave 
troops on the ground, for their families, for our country, and for our 
standing in the world.
  When it comes to intelligence, this is no time for politics. As we 
reorganize and strengthen our intelligence structures, we need a leader 
of the CIA whose only loyalty is speaking truth to power.
  We need an unbiased advisor to the President, not a partisan--someone 
who will deliver the good news and the bad with candor, foresight, and 
authority. With Porter Goss, however, we get not only a partisan, but a 
cheerleader for the Bush campaign.
  What is most disturbing about the Porter Goss nomination is that he 
has offered no explanation for his partisan behavior as chairman of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  He has made partisan attacks on John Kerry for cutting intelligence 
budgets, when Mr. Goss himself voted 7 out of 10 years to scale back 
intelligence appropriations.
  He was initially unwilling to pursue the administration's vengeful 
leak of the name of CIA agent Valerie Plame to the press, which ended 
her career as a covert CIA officer and endangered her life.
  He rushed to discredit former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke 
after Mr. Clarke's testimony to the 9/11 Commission became so 
embarrassing to the White House.
  He did not support an inquiry into Ahmad Chalabi, even after 
allegations that Chalabi had leaked American secrets to Iran, because 
the Chalabi affair was embarrassing to White House and the Pentagon.
  Mr. Goss waited until June of this year to introduce legislation to 
reform our intelligence community a full 18 months after the initial 
joint congressional inquiry that he helped lead uncovered massive 
structural problems the resulted in the intelligence failures before 9/
11. That is not leadership. That is not vision.
  In his confirmation hearing, when asked repeatedly about his partisan 
statements and actions, he offered no explanation. He repeatedly 
offered the same unsatisfactory response: ``the record is the record.''
  If the record is the record for Mr. Goss, then it is a record that 
puts politics above the national interest. If the record is the record, 
then it is one that places partisan gain ahead of the facts. If the 
record is the record, then Mr. Goss is the wrong person to serve as our 
Nation's Director of Central Intelligence.
  Mr. Goss cannot, even now, cite a single instance in which public 
statements of Bush administration policymakers mischaracterized the 
available intelligence prior to the Iraq war. If he can't speak the 
plain truth about such an obvious fact, how can the American people 
have any confidence in him as the head of our intelligence community?
  The challenges of 9/11 and the administration's misuse of 
intelligence in rushing to war in Iraq demand that any reforms to our 
intelligence community be rooted firmly in the principle that 
intelligence must be completely insulated from partisan politics and 
ideology. The confirmation of Porter Goss as Director of Central 
Intelligence violates that principle in the most fundamental sense.
  We owe it to our fellow citizens to do better. I oppose the 
nomination of Porter Goss.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will vote for the nomination of Porter 
Goss to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  I served with Porter Goss during my time in the House of 
Representatives. He is a good, intelligent man with a tremendous work 
ethic. He has served his country honorably in the Army, as a CIA 
officer, and as a congressman from Florida.
  He is the President's choice and I am willing to give the benefit of 
the doubt. However, the two days of nomination hearings held by the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence highlighted several areas of 
concern, and my vote today should not be seen as support for 
Congressman Goss to become the National Intelligence Director.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Congressman Porter Goss will become 
Director

[[Page S9512]]

of Central Intelligence at a difficult and important time for the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. In the coming months, he must help both 
Congress and the administration to take sensible steps on intelligence 
reform. In the years to come, if he remains in office, Mr. Goss must 
lead our intelligence agencies into a new era of flexibility, skill, 
and inter-agency cooperation.
  I will vote in favor of confirming Mr. Goss to this position, 
although not without some misgivings. I will support his confirmation 
in part because I know him to be a gentleman and a man with a deep and 
sincere interest in intelligence, as well as substantial background in 
the field. I will support him because many others who know him well, 
including our colleagues from Florida and others whose views I respect, 
have contacted me and testified to his integrity and capabilities.
  And I will support Mr. Goss because the President wants him. A CIA 
Director cannot succeed unless the President likes and respects him 
enough to take seriously the facts and warnings the Director conveys to 
him. The President must be willing to accept advice when the Director 
says that something is not ``a slam dunk,'' and I hope that this 
President will be willing to accept such advice from this nominee.
  As a matter of general policy, however, I have real concerns about 
appointing a partisan politician to such sensitive positions as 
Director of Central Intelligence or Director of the FBI. In 1976, I 
voted against George H. W. Bush as Director of Central Intelligence for 
precisely that reason. I suggested: ``The chances for forceful 
integrity will be infinitely greater if the Director of Central 
Intelligence is a highly respected nonpolitical figure.''
  The need for a DCI to transcend partisan politics is crystal clear. 
He is the person who must be able to tell the President that the world 
is not as the President might wish it, that a cherished policy proposal 
will not work, or that some unforeseen development poses a threat to 
our national security. As we remove the walls between domestic and 
foreign intelligence, moreover, the DCI--like the FBI Director--will be 
handling and presenting sensitive information on American citizens.
  The next DCI will preside, moreover, over great and perhaps wrenching 
transition in U.S. intelligence. The report of the 9/11 Commission 
highlighted a series of long-standing shortfalls in our intelligence 
agencies. Although the particulars regarding the fight against al-Qaida 
may have been new, the challenges facing U.S. intelligence are ones 
that go back many years:
  We need to provide instant and accurate intelligence to our military 
forces, and this drives much of our intelligence collection and 
analysis today. At the same time, however, we need to provide a wide 
range of so-called ``national'' intelligence to the rest of the 
national security community. Balancing those needs is a continuing 
challenge, especially as the funds for intelligence will often compete 
against other defense priorities.
  We need intelligence collectors and analysts with a wider range of 
linguistic and cultural skills than ever before. Once we fought a 
communist enemy that was worldwide, but centrally directed. Now we must 
vanquish the twin perils of radical Islamic terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which are nearly 
world-wide, but no longer controlled by a central, well-defined enemy.
  And we need technical intelligence collection systems that are ever 
more powerful, that provide more real-time information, and that will 
be effective in a world where technology often favors secrecy over 
transparency.
  We need seamless sharing of very sensitive intelligence information--
between agencies, between countries, and between Washington and the 
State and local forces that guard us from terrorism on a daily basis. 
``Stovepipes'' and ``rice bowls'' are outmoded and in need of a real 
make-over to meet the needs of the 21st century.
  At the same time, however, we need strong protections for our civil 
liberties, which are the very foundation of our society. When the most 
recognizable member of this Senate is denied an airline ticket in his 
home town because his name shows up on some Government list, we know 
that the intelligence feeding into our homeland security programs 
leaves a lot to be desired.
  That is quite a menu of challenges, and they must all be addressed. 
There is no ``pick one from column A'' option in heading U.S. 
intelligence.
  In addition to all that, the Director must be willing and able to 
``speak truth to power.'' He must have the stature and Presidential 
trust that leads top officials to accept his warnings and advice. And 
he must be an able defender of the independence of intelligence 
analysis, while still insuring that it is relevant to the needs and 
concerns of policy-makers.
  I will support the confirmation of Mr. Goss in the hope that he will 
transition successfully from a serious congressman and a leading 
partisan figure to a clear-eyed, independent Director of Central 
Intelligence who is able to rally his troops, to make them as effective 
as possible, and to keep policy-makers from misusing or ignoring the 
work of the thousands of skilled and patriotic men and women who work 
in U.S. intelligence today. The perilous times in which we live demand 
nothing less than complete dedication to those objectives.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, after much deliberation, I have decided 
to vote against the confirmation of Porter Goss to be Director of 
Central Intelligence. The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, as well 
as the failures of our pre-war intelligence on Iraq, have demonstrated 
the enormous challenges we face in restructuring, reforming and 
improving our intelligence capabilities. At this critical moment, we 
should be focusing our efforts on enacting into law the recommendations 
of the commission, including the creation of the position of National 
Intelligence Director. The confirmation of a new Director of Central 
Intelligence, when the role of the DCI has yet to even be defined, does 
not advance the hard reform work yet to be done. Nor does the 
appointment of Porter Goss, whose objectivity, capacity to work across 
party lines, and openness to reform are subject to serious question.
  The National Intelligence Director envisioned by the 9/11 Commission 
will oversee our intelligence community, including the DCI. It is 
critical that we clarify, in law, the relationship between these two 
positions. Unfortunately, the administration, by prioritizing the 
nomination of the DCI over the restructuring of our intelligence 
community, seems to be signaling an attachment to the status quo.
  Congressman Goss's record, in which he has repeatedly rejected 
independent efforts to improve our intelligence whenever those efforts 
were perceived to be contrary to the interests of the Bush 
administration, is also cause for concern. He opposed the establishment 
of the 9/11 Commission, he attacked the integrity of Richard Clarke, 
the former coordinator for counter-terrorism at the National Security 
Council, he opposed an investigation into the disclosure of the 
identity of a CIA operative, and he referred to the bipartisan Senate 
investigation into the abuse of Iraqi detainees as a ``circus.''
  Congressman Goss has also opposed investigations into intelligence on 
Iraq, in particular the use of intelligence by the administration. He 
dismissed Senators who called for an examination of the circumstances 
that led us to war as ``attack dogs'' and charged that they were 
expressing ``artificial outrage.'' He has also implied that open 
discussions of the challenges facing our intelligence damage the morale 
of our armed forces and aid our enemies. These are not the statements 
of someone who appears prepared to undertake the difficult work of 
reform, without regard to political considerations.
  This reform will require cooperation between the administration and 
the Congress and between Republicans and Democrats. Unfortunately, 
Congressman Goss has made repeated, incendiary charges, including 
allegations that the Democratic Party does not support the intelligence 
community and that Senator Kerry seeks to ``dismantle the nation's 
intelligence capabilities.'' These charges are not only flat wrong, 
they are completely counterproductive to the bipartisan effort that is 
urgently needed at this moment.
  Repairing our intelligence capabilities is critical to fighting the 
war on

[[Page S9513]]

terrorism and is an urgent priority. We must enact into law the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We must examine the failures of 
our intelligence related to Iraq. We must begin the work of 
restructuring our intelligence community so that it is more effective 
and less politicized. These challenges require the utmost objectivity, 
independence, and nonpartisanship from the Director of Central 
Intelligence. Any reluctance on the part of the DCI to fully engage in 
the reform process, for whatever reason, could set us back at a moment 
when we can least afford it.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I speak today in support of the 
nomination of Representative Porter J. Goss to the Director of Central 
Intelligence. He is a good man and a good friend. President Bush could 
not have selected a more capable and qualified man for the job. He 
brings to the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence 
community what they have needed for years--intelligence experience, 
political experience, an open mind, and forward thinking.
  I first met Representative Goss shortly after he was elected to the 
House of Representatives in 1988. We served together for 10 years 
before I was elected to this body. Representative Goss and his wife, 
Mariel, are personal friends of my wife and myself to this day. I know 
his personal character and I am confident he will bring integrity, 
honesty, and forthrightness to his new job.
  The Director of Central Intelligence holds one of the most important 
and unforgiving jobs in our Government. All his actions and decisions 
are analyzed and criticized by politicians, the press, and the public. 
And the pressures on the intelligence community are immense. They must 
be right 100 percent of the time, while the terrorists only have to be 
right once. That is a heavy burden for one man to bear, but I believe 
Representative Goss is up to the challenge.
  I cannot think of anyone with more experience for this job. 
Representative Goss has extensive experience in intelligence, on both 
the practical and policy sides. He knows firsthand the importance of 
human intelligence, serving as an intelligence officer in the Army and 
as a case officer in the agency he will now lead. At that time the 
United States was promoting freedom and fighting the evil of communism. 
Though the evil we now face takes a different form, the value of 
information and power of knowledge remain the same.
  We are in the midst of a review and reform of our intelligence 
organizations, and, going forward, one of the most important jobs for 
the Director of Central Intelligence will be working with Congress. 
Again, Representative Goss's experiences will be an asset to the 
intelligence community and the Congress. For the last 8 years he has 
been chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 
In that position he has worked fairly with both parties and both bodies 
of Congress without compromising his beliefs. I am confident he will 
continue to work honestly and fairly with Representatives and Senators 
of both parties in his new job.
  Representative Goss's practical and political experience will also 
pay dividends as the entire intelligence community is reformed in the 
coming weeks and months. He has proven his openmindedness in constantly 
seeking to improve our intelligence capabilities and structures during 
his tenure in Congress. He has held dozens of hearings on problems in 
the intelligence community and how to fix them. He was a member of the 
Aspin-Brown Commission, which took a deep look at our intelligence 
community and provided some of the recommendations that we are 
currently reviewing. He also cochaired the bicameral investigation on 
intelligence issues surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His open 
mind and willingness to think critically about the status quo will 
serve us all well.
  I have seen firsthand his dedication, integrity, and character, and I 
support Representative Goss's nomination without reservation. I wish 
him well in that extremely important job and I look forward to seeing 
him in briefings and hearings in the coming months.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the nomination of Porter 
Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. I served with Porter Goss 
in the House of Representatives and I respect him. However, I do not 
believe he is the best choice for the position in these times.
  On September 11, 2001, our country suffered a devastating attack. Now 
our country is in the midst of a war on terror and a war in Iraq. There 
have been many examinations of our intelligence leading up to September 
11, leading up to the war in Iraq, and as we continue to wage the war 
on terror. There are many unanswered questions about whether the 
intelligence was accurate, whether it was manipulated, whether our 
soldiers and leaders can rely on it each and every day as they make 
difficult decisions.
  I recognize that members of the President's Cabinet, like the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, must weigh political 
considerations as they develop policy. However, the Director of Central 
Intelligence is a unique position. It should stand above politics. The 
citizens of the United States have the right to assume that the 
Director of Central Intelligence is providing objective information and 
analysis to allow the President to make the best possible decisions.
  When Director Tenet resigned, the President had an opportunity to 
appoint a nominee who was nonpartisan, nonpolitical. He did not do so. 
Instead he chose Mr. Goss, who clearly knows the intelligence community 
well, but is also clearly partisan and political.
  The CIA is in turmoil. The hardworking men and women of the Agency 
need a strong leader who will reform the system to make sure that the 
information they offer is used in a proper and timely fashion. The 
people of this country need to know that the U.S. intelligence 
community is doing its best to protect and serve U.S. national 
interests.
  I do not believe that Mr. Goss is the best candidate to lead the 
intelligence community through a difficult task of reform and restoring 
confidence in the midst of a war.
  It is important that our intelligence not be partisan, yet Mr. Goss 
has been partisan in his comments over the past year. He has been 
fiercely critical of former President Clinton, our colleague Senator 
Kerry, and the Democratic Party. His comments do not lead me to believe 
that he will now abandon his partisanship or his political approach as 
the Director of CIA.
  No greater task lies before us today than to reform the intelligence 
community so that it is effective as the leading weapon in the war on 
terrorism. Mr. Goss certainly knows the CIA and the intelligence 
community, but in these times, experience is simply not enough. A 
leader committed to reform without regard to politics is also critical. 
Those attributes, I fear, Mr. Goss does not have, and therefore I 
oppose his nomination.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the swift 
confirmation of Congressman Porter Goss as Director of Central 
Intelligence. I have been privileged to know Mr. Goss for a number of 
years, and I can attest that he is a leader, a man of personal 
intelligence and integrity, and a true patriot. He is also extremely 
well qualified for the position to which he has been nominated.
  I do not believe I am divulging any state secrets when I mention that 
Porter Goss knows the intelligence community from the ground up--
beginning with his service as a young case officer and most recently as 
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. His 10-year career with 
the Central Intelligence Agency gave him a thorough understanding of 
how that large organization operates--invaluable background as the 
Congress and the executive branch proceed with various plans for 
reorganizing the intelligence community. His experience on the CIA 
staff, combined with his oversight responsibilities in the House, makes 
him perhaps uniquely qualified to understand the challenges and 
opportunities facing the community today. Congressman Goss has 
demonstrated time and again his commitment to the needs and goals of 
the intelligence community in its service to our Nation and the 
American people. He is not merely qualified. He was meant for this 
position.
  When he takes up his duties, he will do so at a time of great change 
in the intelligence community. Reeling from the intelligence failures 
of 9/11 and

[[Page S9514]]

Iraq, and faced with comprehensive reorganization, the community's 
leadership has rarely been so important. I am confident that Mr. Goss 
will lead the CIA in an independent and nonpolitical manner as he has 
committed to do, ensuring that policymakers receive the best 
intelligence and analysis that our government can provide. I am also 
confident that he will be helpful as the Congress reorganizes itself in 
order to better conduct oversight over the intelligence community. We 
in the Congress sometimes forget that intelligence failures the Nation 
has experienced are not limited to the agencies alone. Congressional 
oversight has been, as the
9/11 Commission put it, ``dysfunctional,'' and must be changed.
  As we face the national security challenges that are so evident to 
all of us, the Nation will be privileged to have Porter Goss at the 
helm of the CIA. America needs an individual who will help lead our 
intelligence agencies into a new era. I wholeheartedly support his 
confirmation.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the 
nomination of Porter Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. Few 
people are as eminently qualified as he to lead the CIA at this 
critical time in our Nation's history.
  Porter Goss combines experience as both a U.S. Army Intelligence and 
CIA officer with 15 years as a Member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. During his time in Congress he has used his knowledge 
and experience to serve as chairman of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. He is a public servant who has earned our 
confidence and that of the President to lead the dedicated men and 
women of the CIA who work tirelessly to preserve our Nation's security.
  Now at this time when Congress is working hard to reshape our 
intelligence services, I applaud the President for nominating a man 
like Porter Goss who understands what is working with intelligence and 
that which needs to be improved. And based on his experience, he will 
undoubtedly be as well prepared as any DCI to communicate with Congress 
concerning the needs of the CIA, and to understand the oversight 
responsibilities of the legislative branch as it pertains to the 
intelligence community.
  The challenges we face in defeating global terrorism remain great. 
Porter Goss understands where we have made mistakes in both 
intelligence operations and assessment. He understands that we need 
improved human intelligence capabilities, as well as a culture of 
competition among intelligence analysts, to ensure that policymakers 
have objective information and a range of options to choose from in 
meeting the terrorist challenge. Porter Goss is committed to making 
these changes on behalf of the American people.
  In conclusion, I believe the President has chosen the right man to 
lead the CIA in its very important work, and I strongly support the 
nomination of Porter Goss.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, we have two speakers. I inform the 
distinguished leader, the minority whip, a man from Searchlight, that 
we have two speakers.
  If I could ask Senator Snowe how much time she would like to have.
  Ms. SNOWE. About 12 minutes. And I would like to yield 2 minutes to 
the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. ROBERTS. All right. So a total of what, 15 or 20 minutes?
  Ms. SNOWE. Yes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I am assuming by about 4:45--I am not anticipating any 
further speakers on our side. That could change.
  Mr. REID. If my friend will yield?
  Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield.
  Mr. REID. We could not have a vote before 5 o'clock.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Right.
  Mr. REID. We have a couple people off campus doing other things.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Could we agree to have a UC request in regard to a vote 
certain at 5 o'clock?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would be happy to agree to having a vote 
at 5 o'clock and having the time between now and then evenly divided. I 
frankly don't think we are going to be using any more time, so if you 
need more time on your side, you could have part of ours.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 5 
o'clock and that the time between now and then be evenly divided.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I have no objection. I think that is an excellent 
suggestion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield whatever time she may consume to 
the Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kansas, and I am glad to 
yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine.
  Let me make a couple comments about this man.
  First of all, before he leaves the Chamber, I want to thank the 
Senator from Florida for his comments and for his efforts in this 
nomination. I also thank the chairman of our select committee in the 
Senate, the Senator from Kansas.
  Two years after I was elected to the House--I believe it was 2 years 
afterward--Porter Goss was elected to the House from Florida. It took 
us no time at all to figure out this guy was one of the foremost 
authorities on the intelligence community. He had experience with the 
CIA, with Army Intelligence. We relied on him. I am talking about way 
back 16 years ago.
  When I went from the House to the Senate in 1994, I took the place of 
Senator David Boren, who is now the president of Oklahoma University. 
He is a very close friend of mine. He was my predecessor in this Senate 
seat. He was also chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. The thing he warned me of when I first came in was: You 
are going to have to do something about this mess we have in 
intelligence. He said: You have the DIA and the CIA and the FBI and the 
NSA, and nobody is talking to each other.
  I found out before too long that was the case. He said he had been 
working on this for about 6 or 7 years and had not been able to achieve 
it. It became a turf battle. On one occasion I found there was a 
listening device the NSA had that they would not even share with the 
FBI for some of their investigations. This was wrong.
  We have come a long way since that time. It has been my experience in 
both Kosovo and Bosnia that you have a lot of these agencies around the 
table sharing information and working together that did not do so 
before. So I believe we have come a long way.
  One of the reasons I have been resisting a lot of changes within our 
intelligence system is I wanted to wait until Porter Goss came on 
board. I believe Porter Goss has more knowledge on intelligence than 
anybody else who could have been nominated.
  I think the President made an excellent nomination. I think we see by 
this bipartisan support that we are going to be able to overcome the 
obstacles and move ahead aggressively in achieving quality intelligence 
to protect the American people.
  I thank the Senator from Maine for yielding to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the nomination of 
Porter Goss as our next Director of Central Intelligence. I commend the 
President for his timely submission of this nomination as Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency. Given our war on terror and the 
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, now is not the time to leave a vacuum 
in leadership for our Nation's intelligence.
  On that note, I also commend our chairman, Senator Roberts, for his 
leadership in conducting the hearings and shepherding the entire 
process so we can complete this confirmation and ensure our 
intelligence apparatus has the direction it deserves and the leadership 
it must have in order to move forward.
  As we all know, this nomination arrived during a time in which we are 
compelled to undertake the most profound, sweeping reform of our entire 
intelligence community in nearly 60 years, 3 years after the worst 
attack ever on American soil. Indeed, there is no longer a question 
whether we are at the threshold of the single most comprehensive and 
critical restructuring of

[[Page S9515]]

the manner in which intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and 
disseminated in at least a generation. The questions are: What shape 
will this reform take? How will the leadership of the intelligence 
community implement and execute these changes? And how will the 
nominee, Porter Goss, synthesize and translate his knowledge and depth 
of experience into specific, tangible changes in how the intelligence 
community performs? Because the person who is asked to implement this 
type of reform must be firm, bold, visionary, and lay the foundation 
for our intelligence community for the 21st century.
  Many of us who serve on the Intelligence Committee--indeed, 
throughout the Senate--have been advocating for comprehensive 
improvements in the intelligence community structures and methods. 
Shortly, the Senate will have the opportunity to deliberate with 
respect to overall and fundamental reform. It is absolutely the type of 
change and reform not only this Senate, this Congress, and the 
President must embrace; this permanent reform is essential to address 
the grave failures in communication, coordination, and cooperation that 
certainly the 9/11 Joint Inquiry, the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
the 9/11 Commission, and others have found with respect to the attacks 
on September 11, 2001, as well as the pre-Iraq-war assessment of 
weapons of mass destruction that failed to reconcile with the realities 
in the postwar chapter. Indeed, with the new reality in which we live, 
delaying reforming the intelligence community is no longer an option.
  As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, this last year we 
have undertaken a major review of the prewar intelligence of Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction, the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam 
Hussein's human rights abuses, and his regime's impact on regional 
stability. That report was a detailed, comprehensive cataloguing not 
only of the facts but also a stunning revelation of systemic, pervasive 
flaws in our intelligence community that coalesced to produce broad 
failures in intelligence gathering and analysis. It revealed a 
pervasive complacency as well as a lack of accountability throughout 
the chain of command that allowed outdated assumptions about 
intelligence to be carried forward for years unquestioned and that 
tolerated an absence of rigorous analysis and a kind of monolithic 
grouping.

  From that report, we now know that even after the lack of information 
sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence 
failures of 9/11, intelligence reporting continues to be highly 
compartmentalized, and analysts with a need to know are not given 
access to information. Essentially, the intelligence community 
continues to operate in a ``stovepiped'' manner, preventing critical 
information sharing essential for sound analysis. There was a lack of 
analytic rigor on one of the most critical and defining issues spanning 
more than a decade: the question of the preponderance of weapons of 
mass destruction within Iraq. The community had failed to do its 
analysis for more than a decade, we soon discovered.
  Moreover, there was a lack of human intelligence that is so critical 
to assessing the enemy's capabilities and intentions. They were forced 
to rely on outdated, vague intelligence from less than credible 
sources.
  I say all of this because that is the reality that our next Director 
of Central Intelligence must not only confront, but he also must 
address. It is in that light that our committee, during the 
confirmation process, reviewed the qualifications, the credentials, and 
the qualities that Porter Goss possesses in order to address some of 
the most systemic and profound changes this intelligence community is 
going to face since its inception in 1947.
  I have come to believe that Porter Goss, in examining his record, his 
testimony before the committee, his responses to the committee, has the 
experience, the character, the credibility, the knowledge, the 
disposition, and the predilection for reform to lead this comprehensive 
overhaul and restructuring of our entire intelligence community.
  Let me first say that I worked with Congressman Goss in the House of 
Representatives for 6 years. I have no doubt about his competence, 
certainly his intelligence, his character, his unimpeachable integrity, 
or his bipartisanship. He was far from a polarizing or partisan force 
in the House of Representatives. Rather, what I discovered in working 
with him in the House, he was interested in solving problems rather 
than creating political points or sound bites. He was interested in 
reaching a consensus on the issues.
  I know there had been some questions during the course of the hearing 
as to whether Porter Goss would be able to be sufficiently independent 
minded in a position where he will be the President's chief adviser on 
intelligence issues. Certainly this was an issue that was thoroughly 
explored in the confirmation hearings just concluded. At the opening of 
that hearing, Congressman Goss addressed the issue directly when he 
told the committee:

     . . . I understand completely the difference in obligations 
     the position of [director of Central Intelligence agency] 
     carries with it and that which the role of a Congressman 
     carries. These are two completely distinct jobs in our form 
     of government. I understand these distinctions and if 
     confirmed commit myself to a nonpartisan approach to the job 
     of [director of Central Intelligence agency].

  That is important to underscore.
  Moreover, in response to questions about some specific political 
statements that Porter Goss had mentioned a few months ago on the floor 
of the House of Representatives, he expressed regret and apologized if 
he sounded any partisan notes in the past on any issues or matters of 
national security.

  I know others have raised the question of whether Porter Goss will be 
willing to inform administration officials if or when public statements 
deviate from or distort available intelligence. In responding to this 
question, I would refer directly to the House Intelligence Committee's 
2003 interim assessment of the pre-Iraq-war intelligence when then-
Chairman Goss stated that if public officials cite intelligence 
incorrectly, the intelligence community has a responsibility to address 
that policymaker on any mischaracterization of available intelligence. 
I expect that not only would Porter Goss be held to that assessment as 
DCI but that he would hold himself to that assessment.
  We must also recognize the unique qualifications that Porter Goss 
brings to the position. As I mentioned earlier, he is a product of 
service in the intelligence community, while he also later served as 
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He can view the 
intelligence community through the eyes of a former CIA officer and 
intelligence officer and also as someone who has stood outside of that 
world looking in with his oversight of the intelligence apparatus as 
chair of the House Intelligence Committee.
  I know there has been some concern expressed that maybe Porter Goss 
will be too wedded to the CIA or that he is too CIA-centric and, 
therefore, would not have the independent vision necessary to institute 
the required changes and the reforms that surely are to come. I would 
argue that it is precisely because of his past work within the 
community that he is best suited to take it into the future, all the 
more so as his service imbues him with an indispensable credibility 
that would engender the kind of trust within a community where some 
continue to believe that necessary changes have already been made, that 
we should not identify the failures that we did in our comprehensive 
report within the intelligence community in the prewar assessments as 
egregious or systemic or broad or comprehensive failures. That is the 
kind of atmosphere that he will be entering as the new Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and trying to bring about the kind of 
reform that is absolutely vital.
  His own record of reform initiatives is also important to explore 
because it also will belie the claim that somehow he will not be 
predisposed or have a predilection for the type of reform we certainly 
are going to be considering, hopefully next week, and enacting in 
Congress, and also the reform that has also been brought about as a 
result of the President's Executive orders.
  Still others have questioned whether Porter Goss could have done more 
to institute intelligence reform prior to the attacks of 9/11. Again, I 
think as we review the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, we can see 
much could

[[Page S9516]]

have been done in all spheres. Whether it was on the part of former 
Presidents, on the part of Congress, committees, individuals, agencies, 
and bureaucracies, we know that the history documented in the 9/11 
report was replete with examples of what could have been and should 
have been done differently.
  What is required now is that we look at the totality of the record of 
the nominee we are considering today. In so doing, I believe we will 
see an individual who is wholly committed to providing the impetus and 
the leadership required to institute critical reform. Indeed, who 
better than someone who has not only been a member of the intelligence 
world but also one who has investigated that world to understand why 
change is necessary.
  The most glaring of problems--those we identified in the Senate 
Intelligence Committee report, such as the poor state of human 
intelligence, operations, intelligence collection in general, analysis, 
and the pervasive problems with information sharing--these have all 
been issues that Porter Goss has been committed to addressing 
throughout his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. 
Indeed, Mr. Goss has held over 62 hearings on intelligence community 
reform just this year. So I do believe that he shows a predisposition 
and indeed a drive for reform.
  I think we also see that commitment reflected in Mr. Goss's 
contributions as a member of the Aspin-Brown commission, which was 
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the 
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. This commission made 
a number of recommendations including looking at how to streamline the 
DCI's responsibilities and provide him with additional flexibility in 
managing the community.
  He provided insights and leadership in the ``Joint Inquiry Into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001''--a report that contained 19 
recommendations, including the creation of a director of national 
intelligence among the many changes that we have now been debating in 
Congress.
  So all of this undoubtedly served as a catalyst for Congressman Goss 
authoring his own reform legislation, which he introduced this past 
June, that calls for significant reform of the intelligence community's 
structure, as well as enhanced DCI, with critically needed personnel 
and budgetary authority--going beyond even what the President issued in 
his own Executive orders.
  But I think Porter Goss also understands, in response to many of the 
questions that were raised during the course of the confirmation 
hearing, that a director of national intelligence will need to possess 
both the budgetary and personnel authorities that will be vital to a 
newly created director of national intelligence in order for that 
individual to be effective in implementing the kinds of changes that 
need to be brought about within the overall intelligence community.
  Finally, there is further evidence of the extent to which Porter Goss 
is compelled to remedy our intelligence shortcomings. He has 
recognized--after his committee's investigation into the failures that 
occurred prior to the Iraq war--that the intelligence community has 
repeatedly fallen short in the area of information collection, most 
notably in the area of human intelligence.

  For those who are not convinced he understands what is required to be 
done--particularly in this regard--as Porter Goss himself has said, the 
CIA's human spy operation was headed ``over a proverbial cliff'' and in 
danger of becoming only a fleeting memory of ``the nimble, flexible, 
core, mission-oriented enterprise'' it once was. Sounds like a person 
who is convinced of the need for change.
  He has also stated that the intelligence community failed to provide 
the best possible intelligence to policymakers, and that the requisite, 
both from a collection and analytical viewpoint, was not provided.
  I believe Porter Goss embodies the credibility and credentials that 
will be required to lead the intelligence community agencies and the 
professionals within that community in implementing the types of 
reforms from within--by Executive order or through congressional 
enactment. He brings unique and exceptional experience both in the 
field and behind the gavel. I believe he is well prepared to see our 
intelligence apparatus as it undergoes the major transformation 
necessary for a new era.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a vital member 
of the Intelligence Committee, be recognized for 5 minutes. Senator 
Warner is a previous member of the Intelligence Committee, now again on 
the Intelligence Committee, and he is chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee. He has a unique perspective to offer my colleagues. Is 5 
minutes appropriate?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I hope the Senate appreciates 
the thoroughness with which Chairman Roberts has gone into this 
nomination. He has provided the members of the committee and many 
others with an opportunity to express their views with regard to the 
nomination. An extensive series of hearings have been held--more than 
have been held on a nominee in a long time. Maybe only Supreme Court 
Justices occasionally see the volume and thoroughness with which this 
nomination has been carefully viewed by the Senate. I compliment the 
chairman, and indeed the ranking member who participated very actively 
in this, as well as the members of the committee.
  I first came to know the nominee about a decade ago. I remember one 
of our most revered, distinguished contemporary colleagues, Senator 
Moynihan, who sat right back there. I was on the floor and he stood and 
said it was time to abolish the CIA. He had a lot of concerns about the 
Agency. At that time, I was the vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee. Together, with Porter Goss and some others, we put together 
a piece of legislation establishing a commission to examine some of the 
concerns of our distinguished late colleague from New York. Porter Goss 
and I served on that commission. Les Aspin was the first chairman. He 
had an untimely early death and he was followed by Harold Brown. That 
was my initiation to work with this fine, able individual.

  I commend the President for selecting him to take on this important 
assignment. I thank Representative Goss, his wife, and family for 
undertaking another chapter of public life.
  All of his credentials have been carefully reviewed. I would like to 
talk about somewhat of a different aspect of the challenges that will 
face Porter Goss. We just concluded a very extensive briefing upstairs 
with the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Negroponte, the commander of 
CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Deputy Secretary of 
State, almost three-quarters of the Senate being present. The briefing 
was about the situations primarily in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater, 
but it was about terrorism on the whole.
  As part of our discussion, we talked about the ongoing work in the 
Congress of the United States with regard to the 9/11 report, which all 
of us believe is a very significant contribution by a conscientious 
group of tried, tested, and able public servants. But we worked through 
these equations and options. The Governmental Affairs Committee is 
doing the markup of what will be the primary vehicle. Senator Roberts 
contributed his views on it.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee had a hearing with the Secretary 
of Defense, as well as the Acting Director of the CIA. So the Senate 
has done a lot of work in preparation.
  How does that relate to Porter Goss? I cannot predict, and I don't 
think anyone can, at this time what will eventually evolve with regard 
to the legislative achievements of this body and the House in a 
conference. Perhaps a lot of people have high expectations that a bill 
will be before our President shortly.
  I intend to work conscientiously, as I have, and will continue to 
work, forgetting any question of turf, to try to achieve a strong bill 
that clearly improves and strengthens our intelligence system.
  I brought in a reference to the briefing today because in some 
discussion

[[Page S9517]]

with our colleagues--and it was a classified briefing, but I can share 
this--General Abizaid said he is acting on intelligence daily to 
conduct his mission. Lives are at risk, and he clearly, drawing on his 
extensive experience in the Army said: Today the intelligence 
collection that my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need and have 
and use is vastly improved over what we had in gulf war 1 in 1991.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak 
for another 4 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there has been steady progress in the 
improvements in our intelligence system. The Department of Defense is 
the largest user, and these senior people in the Department of 
Defense--civilian and military alike--have not tried to tell the 
Congress what to do but respectfully told us what not to do: Don't do 
anything to weaken the improvements that we have achieved--I say we, 
working with the Congress and the President--we have achieved to date 
since 1991 in the first gulf war and, indeed, since 9/11 with President 
Bush and Executive orders, a wide range of implementation of important 
things that have been done to improve our intelligence system, 
particularly from the standpoint of the tactical use by the U.S. 
military.
  If confirmed and if we pass a new law signed by the President, Porter 
Goss will be the man entrusted to implement that law. And I say to my 
colleagues with the deepest respect, that is a daunting task--to do it 
in a way not to shake the confidence of the tens upon thousands of 
conscientious employees in the various departments and agencies, the 
CIA, the Department of Defense who are concerned about their jobs, 
concerned about their futures. We need to hold the team in place. We 
need to keep what is working now going as we phase in such new laws and 
provisions as this body, working with the House and signed by the 
President, may enact.
  I do not know of another individual who has the experience of Porter 
Goss or is better qualified to take on the task of implementing such 
new laws as the Congress and the President may enact.
  I urge my colleagues to give this very fine, outstanding American 
who, once again, was thinking about a quieter form of life the 
opportunity to move into this job.
  There was printed in the Record a report that was issued by the CSIS, 
prepared by a number of former colleagues and others in the 
intelligence community trying to say to the Congress we best move with 
considerable caution as we enact this new legislation. I found this 
very helpful in my work participating in drawing up this bill, and I 
commend it to my colleagues.
  Mr. President, again I thank the distinguished chairman and the 
distinguished vice chairman of the committee for their work in making 
it possible for this nomination to have been carefully reviewed by the 
Senate in terms of a series of hearings and a very active and thorough 
debate on the Senate floor.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with this debate and the vote certain at 
5 o'clock, I think there has been an extraordinary level of examination 
of this nomination. Two days of open hearings were held. By way of 
comparison, that is one day more than Secretary of State Powell had 
during his confirmation in early 2001.
  It is certainly understandable that an official of the DCI stature 
would be the subject of close Senate scrutiny. I think we have achieved 
that level of scrutiny, and members of the Intelligence Committee on 
both sides have expressed satisfaction with the way this process has 
unfolded. It was not by accident. It was in close conference and 
cooperation with the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, the Senator from West Virginia.
  I think Mr. Goss has been forthcoming. I think he has been candid 
with the committee. He provided literally dozens of written answers to 
questions sent to him by the committee, both before and after his 
confirmation hearings. He also provided complete and exhaustive details 
about his background and his professional life in connection with his 
nomination.
  In short, I believe the examination of this nomination has been 
thorough and informative. The nominee and Members on both sides should 
be complimented for the way it has unfolded.
  Expressions of support for his nomination have come from both sides 
of the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill. This nominee is ready to 
go to work, and he is needed.
  I urge the Senate to vote for his confirmation, and I look forward to 
working with Porter Goss as the next and, by the way, possibly last 
DCI.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, at the proper time, which I believe 
will be at 5 o'clock, I will call for the yeas and nays, or can I do 
that now before I make a statement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can do it any time he chooses.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I wish to make a short statement, and then I will 
call for the yeas and nays.
  Porter Goss has been very well vetted. What has come from this 
discussion back and forth are several things.
  One, he is a very good man. Second, he knows the intelligence 
business. Third, I think there is still a question of whether he has 
run any larger organizations, and that becomes a factor. The third had 
to do with partisanship. It was interesting to me that a number of 
people said everybody around here is partisan. Of course, that is true. 
But this has to do with a nomination for the Central Intelligence 
Agency. That is a position where the national security law forbades a 
nominee from being political in any way, shape, or form.
  I think the question really is with him. I want to believe it is 
true, but based upon the record, I cannot accept it as true to this 
point, and I have to look at what has happened as opposed to what he 
says will happen; that he has been very partisan and very partisan 
within the field of intelligence and very partisan within the field of 
intelligence very recently at a time, obviously, when we are engaged in 
a broad election.
  I think it is probable that he will be confirmed, but that does not 
take away from my responsibility to point out what I think is critical: 
That now, more than ever, it is important for a CIA Director or for 
anybody in intelligence to tell the truth, to make sure that if there 
was a reference in a Cincinnati October 2 speech about Niger and 
uranium enrichment and the possible seeking of it by Iraq, and then 
when it comes to the State of the Union that somehow that the CIA 
Director disappeared and never said, Oh, no, that shouldn't be in the 
State of the Union because it was never true--I don't want to get into 
that now. The point is we need somebody who is independent and takes 
pride, who describes himself, defines himself as being independent and 
standing up for the intelligence business and, therefore, is speaking 
the truth. I hope that person will be Porter Goss. That is not yet 
proven, and based upon the record it is not possible for me to vote 
anything but no at this time.

  It being very close to 5, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination 
of Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence? 
On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Santorum) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter) are 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Vermont 
(Mr. Jeffords), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 77, nays 17, as follows:

[[Page S9518]]

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 187 Ex.]

                                YEAS--77

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reid
     Roberts
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--17

     Bingaman
     Byrd
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Harkin
     Kennedy
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Reed
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Akaka
     Edwards
     Jeffords
     Kerry
     Santorum
     Specter
  The nomination was confirmed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the President will 
be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

                          ____________________