[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 115 (Wednesday, September 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9507-S9518]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--
Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. What is the pending business before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the nomination of
Porter Goss.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in reference to that
nomination.
Mr. President, I will vote against the nomination of Congressman
Porter Goss to serve as the next Director of Central Intelligence. I do
so reluctantly. I have known Congressman Goss for a number of years,
and I consider him a good person and a good public servant. But we are
on the verge of enacting significant, historic, and much needed reform
of the U.S. intelligence community. It is more important than ever that
the next leader of the intelligence community be nonpartisan and firmly
committed to meaningful intelligence reform.
Based on his record and his public statements, and on the
confirmation hearings before the Intelligence Committee on which I
serve, I do not believe Mr. Goss is the right person at this moment in
time for this vitally important national security position.
Mr. Goss has served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
for almost 8 years, the second longest tenure in that position in the
almost 30 years since its creation. The chairman of a congressional
committee has considerable power in determining on which issues the
committee will focus,
[[Page S9508]]
and the manner in which they will conduct their oversight. I believe
this oversight record is a reasonable measure of Mr. Goss's likely
effectiveness in managing the intelligence community during this highly
challenging transitional period.
Despite having served on the Aspin-Brown-Rudman commission on the
roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community in 1996, 8
years ago, and cochairing, along with Senator Bob Graham, a joint
inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and serving on the House
Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence for almost 10 years, Congressman
Goss's record demonstrates that he has been more a protector of the
status quo than an agent of meaningful reform. Only a few months ago
did Congressman Goss introduce, for the first time, legislation to
reform the intelligence community. It should be noted that on July 25,
2002, Mr. Goss voted against the amendment of Congressman Tim Roemer of
Indiana on the House floor creating the independent National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11
Commission. That is an incredible fact that must be taken into
consideration.
The man who is seeking to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency,
at this moment, when significant reform is about to take place, voted
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission, which has inspired both
parties and the President to our current state.
This 9/11 Commission Report is the foundation upon which current
intelligence reform efforts are being undertaken. I met personally with
Congressman Goss because I do respect him, and I wanted to hear his
explanation. How can he ask to be head of the CIA, when he voted
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission?
His argument was not convincing. He argued it was a matter of timing;
that while he was undertaking a joint inquiry about 9/11, the creation
of a separate commission might, in fact, lead to the executive branch
stalling information or refusing to cooperate. That was hardly a
satisfying answer.
In addition, it appears that as chairman of the House Intelligence
Oversight Committee, Congressman Goss has been reluctant to conduct
aggressive oversight of Intelligence Committee issues, particularly
when they appear to deal with issues that may be embarrassing to the
current administration. For example, although the Senate Intelligence
Committee completed the first phase of its inquiry into the
intelligence community's performance regarding prewar intelligence
related to Iraq, and issued a public report, the House Intelligence
Committee, under Mr. Goss's leadership, has yet to complete a similar
thorough investigation, despite starting it last year.
As another example, in June of this year during the House
Intelligence Committee's markup of the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence
Authorization Act, Mr. Goss led a party-line vote to reject an
amendment that would have required the Department of Defense to provide
an accounting of the nature and extent of its contacts with the Iraqi
exile leader, Ahmed Chalabi.
Why is that significant? I hope that people who are following this
debate remember Ahmed Chalabi. He was the self-proclaimed leader of an
Iraqi national congress. He was the one you couldn't miss on talk shows
before the invasion of Iraq. He was the one spreading the information
far and wide across America and around the world about the threats of
Saddam Hussein. He was the person who was the favored and trusted ally
of our Department of Defense when they made critical decisions about
committing thousands of American soldiers and their lives to the cause
of Iraq.
What do we know of Ahmed Chalabi? We know that some 5 years ago, the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State stopped dealing
with Mr. Chalabi because they did not believe he was credible. They
didn't trust his judgment. They wouldn't bring him into the councils to
make important decisions.
But Department of Defense Under Secretary Rumsfeld and his special
assistant, Mr. Douglas Feith, thought Chalabi was just what the doctor
ordered. He was there to confirm the fears that they spread across
America about Saddam Hussein. He was there to confirm the presence of
weapons of mass destruction, which became the clarion call of this
administration, drawing us into an invasion of Iraq. He was the one
constantly suggesting that there was a connection between the 9/11
terrorism in the United States and Saddam Hussein.
What happened to Ahmed Chalabi? Those who follow news know what
happened. He went to Iraq, became a somewhat controversial figure in
the provisional government, returned to the United States, and was
treated by some in the administration as a conquering hero.
In fact, at one moment in time, to the embarrassment, I am sure, of
everyone involved today, Ahmed Chalabi was positioned behind the First
Lady at one of President Bush's State of the Union Addresses so that he
would be on camera, showcased before the American people.
Fast forward just a few months. Ahmed Chalabi has now been the
subject of extensive searches by the American Government because of our
suspicion that he has not only misled us about information on Iraq but
has had some connection with Iran of an entirely dubious nature. Ahmed
Chalabi is persona non grata in this country. We are no longer sending
him some $350,000 to $360,000 a month to subsidize his lifestyle. He
virtually has been banished from his role as prime adviser to the
United States.
When Mr. Goss was confronted with this and asked by his own committee
for an investigation as to how Mr. Chalabi, discredited by the CIA,
discredited by the State Department, became the darling and favorite of
the Department of Defense, peddled bad information to the United States
and the American people, and may have betrayed us to Iran--when he was
asked to investigate this, he declined. He refused. You have to ask
yourself: If Mr. Goss was unable or unwilling to ask the most basic
questions about Ahmed Chalabi, how aggressive, how objective will he be
as Director of the CIA?
That is not the only thing. One of the most important issues we have
to keep in mind is that the men and women of our intelligence community
are dedicated, patriotic, hard-working people committed to the security
of our Nation. Occasionally, there will be those who will disappoint
us, but that is true of virtually every institution in America. But
remembering their patriotism and the fact that many of them put their
lives on the line, there came a moment in time when columnist Robert
Novak outed the identity of a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. This is not
only disgraceful, it is dangerous. It meant that her life and her
career were in danger. It sent ripples through the intelligence
community of men and women in similar positions wondering who would
step forward in Washington to stand up for the integrity of our agents
in the intelligence community. Mr. Goss was then chairman of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence. He was asked in October 2003 whether
he would investigate the purposeful identification of covert CIA agent
Valerie Plame. Mr. Goss responded, ``If somebody sends me a blue dress
and some DNA, I'll have an investigation.''
Mr. Goss apologized publicly and privately for that statement, but
the fact remains that he was loathe to challenge any intelligence-
related decision of this administration.
That is not at all reassuring when we consider the well-documented
intelligence failures leading up to 9/11 and prior to the invasion of
Iraq.
This is not a routine appointment. This is not a routine position.
Intelligence is the first line of defense in our war against terrorism.
It is the first line of defense for the American people and our
national security. Having the best intelligence network and the best
intelligence agency will be critical if we want our children to live in
peace and safety. That is why it is so essential that we bring a person
to this job who understands what we have lived through during the past
4 years.
Lengthy reports by the 9/11 Commission, as well as the Joint
Intelligence Committee's inquiry, have come to the conclusion that our
intelligence agency failed us before the 9/11 attack. We know now that
they should have gathered more information, shared more information,
drawn obvious conclusions, and done something proactive to protect
America. They did not and 3,000
[[Page S9509]]
innocent Americans died in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York.
Similarly, there came a point in time when we had to make a critical
decision in America whether to launch a preemptive attack against
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the first such preemptive attack in our
history. We were told it was essential that we do so. We were told by
the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and virtually every
spokesman of the Government that it was essential we attack Saddam
Hussein because he had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction which
could be used against the Middle East, other countries in the region
and the United States, that he was developing nuclear weapons that
would be a danger to the world, that he possessed unmanned aerial
vehicles that could even strike the United States, that he was linked
with the al-Qaida attacks of 9/11, and the list goes on and on. Today,
a year and a half after the invasion, we have found that intelligence
information was wrong, just plain wrong.
Think of it. Depending on the intelligence community as our first
line of defense, it failed. It failed to alert us of the danger of 9/
11, it failed to accurately assess the state of one nation, Iraq,
before we launched an invasion which has cost us over 1,000 American
soldiers' lives, over 7,000 seriously wounded, and literally billions
of dollars.
Can the intelligence community continue with business as usual? No.
If there was ever a time in our history when we needed someone clearly
nonpartisan, someone who would stand up to a President of either
political party and tell them the sober, cold truth, even if it wasn't
popular, if there was ever a time that we needed a Director of the
CIA determined to reform that agency and the other intelligence
agencies under his supervision, that time is today. This is not a
routine nomination. This is a nomination as important as any to be
considered by the Senate.
I will not go into the lengthy partisan statements made by Mr. Goss
so many times in the past where he has taken to task my political
party, members of it, suggesting that we were weak on defense, weak on
intelligence. In fact, he was drawn into this Presidential campaign in
a role now which he has neither explained nor given us much to work
with.
When we went to Mr. Goss and said, You have criticized Senator Kerry
and Democrats for intelligence spending but back in 1995 you were the
cosponsor of a budget proposal that would have had a minimum 20-percent
cut in our intelligence community personnel, he wouldn't answer the
question. When confronted by Senator Rockefeller with his obvious
contradiction between his accusations and his actions, Mr. Goss refused
to acknowledge the obvious. The best he could tell us was, ``The record
is the record.'' I don't know what that means. I have never before
heard it from another witness nor nominee. But it basically told the
Intelligence Committee he wasn't about to discuss the issue with us.
I am sorry. I think Mr. Goss should have been open and candid and
told us exactly what he meant, and if he made a mistake to concede that
point. It would have put him in a much better position to be a credible
agent for nonpartisan leadership and for change as Director of the CIA.
Because I have serious doubts about Mr. Goss's commitment to reform,
his ability to be independent and nonpartisan, I do not believe he is
the right person to be serving at the helm of the intelligence
community during this extraordinarily challenging time and I will
oppose his nomination.
I concede the outcome of the vote on this nomination. I assume he
will be comfortably confirmed by the Senate.
I sincerely hope Mr. Goss will take my comments and the comments of
those who vote against him as a challenge to him in his new role at the
CIA. I hope he proves me wrong. I hope that I stand before this Chamber
in the future and say he was nonpartisan, he was committed to reform,
he was prepared to tell this administration and any administration he
served the truth, even if it was politically painful. I hope that day
will come.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I have listened with interest
to the comments of my good friend from Illinois, as I did earlier today
by my friend from West Virginia. I respect their analysis of this
nomination. I hope they respect my disagreement with that analysis.
I rise today to support the nomination of a friend, a man with whom I
have worked for over 25 years, a fellow Floridian whose judgment and
integrity I highly regard.
I support the confirmation of Porter Goss as the next Director of the
CIA. I have known Congressman Goss and his wonderful family for more
than two decades. I commend them for their willingness to delay the
well-earned retirement which they thought would lie before them at the
end of this session of Congress to take on this very difficult and
important responsibility.
My colleagues know that I have been extremely critical of this
administration for, among other things, its failure to hold anyone
accountable for the intelligence failures that allowed terrorists to
strike our Nation on September 11, 2001, and for the failure that led
us into the war in Iraq.
I have been extremely critical of the President and the Vice
President for allowing America to be distracted from the real war
against terror in Afghanistan and to call upon us to retreat from that
real war against the real terrorists who had killed 3,000 Americans and
using fabricated intelligence to draw us into the war in Iraq.
I have repeatedly questioned why the President has waited more than 3
years since September 11 to begin a serious discussion of
restructuring, reorienting, and reforming our intelligence
capabilities.
I am here today to support the nomination of Porter Goss precisely
because of these concerns. From my personal experience, I can tell you
that Porter Goss is the right man for this job. He is uniquely
qualified to serve as America's Director of Central Intelligence. He is
a man of great character, exceptional intelligence, a tremendous work
ethic, and outstanding personal and professional integrity.
Let me share a story.
As Governor of Florida, I had known of Porter Goss as he served as a
distinguished mayor of the town of Sanibel Island, FL. In the early
1980s, the county in which Sanibel is located, Lee County, FL, was in
the midst of probably the largest public works project in the history
of that county, a major new airport which is now known as the
Southwestern Florida International Airport.
In the midst of that, three of the five members of the county
commission were indicted for corruption, largely relating to activities
involving the construction of the airport. The county government was in
disarray. Public confidence in the county government had sunk to a new
low, and this major, critically important project to the future of the
citizens of southwest Florida had come into question. It was my
responsibility as Governor of Florida to first suspend from office
those individuals who had been indicted, and then to look for three
citizens of Lee County who could assume the important responsibility of
restoring the integrity of county government and completing the
important airport project.
Although I am a Democrat, and had just been reelected as a Democrat,
and Porter is a Republican, it was my feeling that his personal
characteristics were more important than his party label, and so I
appointed him to one of those three positions. And from that
appointment, he quickly became the chair of the Lee County commission.
Party affiliation did not matter then. I do not believe party
affiliation should matter today in determining who should be the next
Director of our Central Intelligence operation. What mattered then was
the fact that Porter, with his clear commitment to public service, his
integrity and his leadership skills, at a time when his community
desperately needed all of them, was able to recapture the confidence of
the people, was able to restart this important airport project, which
now is one of the most important economic assets of the community.
When it comes to the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has the
balanced perspective of having been
[[Page S9510]]
both an insider and an outsider. For a decade early in his career, he
served the Nation both in Army Intelligence and the CIA. He knows from
personal, firsthand experience the value and the risks of clandestine
operations.
Since he has been in Congress--elected in 1988--and especially as a
member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, he has
come to know the agencies from an oversight capacity.
Now, some have said he is too close to the intelligence agencies,
that he is too protective of the status quo. But from my partnership
with him as cochairmen of the congressional joint inquiry into the
events of September 11, it is my firm belief, and my assurance to my
colleagues, that Porter Goss can and will be independent in his
judgments. Porter Goss will also be clear and tough minded in
determining where there are needed reforms and leading us to those
reforms.
If any of my colleagues or citizens of this great Nation wish to have
an indication of where those reforms are likely to take us, I would
direct you to the 19 reforms recommended by that congressional joint
inquiry, upon which our Presiding Officer participated with great
distinction.
As we move to implement much-needed reforms in our intelligence
community, I am confident Porter Goss will not be part of the problem
but will be a leader in taking us toward principled and effective
solutions which will make Americans safer.
This time the President got it right. I strongly urge the
confirmation of his nominee to be the Director of Central Intelligence,
Porter Goss.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I intend to vote today to confirm the
nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the Director of Central
Intelligence. I recognize the deep experience that Representative Goss
brings to this position as the recent Chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and as a former CIA officer and Army
intelligence officer. I also understand the unique role the DCI plays
in providing the President with intelligence and advising him on
intelligence matters. Thus, I believe that on balance Mr. Goss's
qualifications are sufficient to confirm the President's choice for
this position.
However, I want to express concerns about Porter Goss and the very
partisan way in which he has conducted himself. His statements
mischaracterizing Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry's
positions on intelligence and accusing Congressional Democrats of being
weak on intelligence are not the sort of rhetoric we want associated
with the leader of our intelligence community. As former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger testified in the Appropriations Committee
yesterday, the ideal leader for our Nation's intelligence community
should be as non-partisan as possible. Mr. Goss has acknowledged that
as DCI he will need to be non-partisan and objective if he is to
provide the President with independent judgments about the intelligence
he provides, and during his nomination hearings, he made a commitment
to do just that. We must hold him to his commitment.
Many of my colleagues have come to the floor today to speak of Porter
Goss's integrity and his strong qualifications. He will no doubt be
confirmed and will take on one of the most critical jobs in our
government at a time of uncertainty about how his very job will be
structured. The 9/11 Commission has made a compelling case for making
major changes to the organization of our intelligence community. The
new threats which confront us require a more cohesive intelligence
effort that emphasizes shared intelligence over turf battles. To meet
this challenge, we need a leader at the helm of the intelligence
community who embraces the spirit of reform--even if not all the
specifics of the 9/11 Commission recommendations--and who is willing to
implement the reforms that all agree are sorely needed. I have no doubt
that Porter Goss is capable of managing the changes that need to take
place and I am hopeful that he will dedicate himself to these efforts.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most important quality I am looking for
in a Director of Central Intelligence is someone who can be relied upon
to provide objective intelligence assessments independent of the policy
and political agenda of the White House. Too often we haven't had that.
The massive intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a
significant degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to
support administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one
direction, making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent,
thereby promoting the administration's decision to remove Saddam
Hussein from power. Nuances, qualifications and caveats were dropped; a
``slam-dunk'' was the assessment. The CIA was saying to the
administration, to the Congress, and to the American people what it
thought the administration wanted to hear.
The problem of intelligence being manipulated and politicized is not
new. Forty years ago, Secretary of Defense McNamara used classified
communications intercepts, later proved to be very dubious, to push for
passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was then used by
President Johnson as the legislative foundation to expand the war in
Vietnam.
Intelligence was manipulated by then-DCI William Casey during the
Iran Contra period. The bipartisan Iran-Contra report cited evidence
that Director Casey ``misrepresented or selectively used available
intelligence to support the policy he was promoting.''
We need a different kind of DCI, one who is not going to be
influenced by the policy choices or politics of whatever administration
is in power. After reviewing Congressman Goss's record, I am not
convinced that he would be that kind of DCI. For example, the
Washington Post reported that in 2002, when asked about intelligence
failures in Iraq, Congressman Goss said ``I don't like to see the left-
wingers splattering mud on an agency that's done some very fine work.''
The Senate Intelligence Committee produced a unanimous 500-page report
on the massive CIA failures leading up to the Iraq war. I would not
characterize the committee as ``a bunch of left wingers.'' We need
someone who is committed to independence and reform, not an ideology.
During his nomination hearing, Congressman Goss was very reluctant to
admit there had been intelligence failures on the part of the
intelligence community during the most recent Iraq War. And, when asked
questions about some of his partisan comments, Congressman Goss
answered many of them by simply saying ``the record is the record.''
Whatever that means, it is not an acceptable answer from a nominee for
Director of Central Intelligence.
I will vote against Congressman Goss. I hope that, if confirmed, he
will prove me wrong.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the nomination
of Porter Goss to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
CIA. Yesterday the Senate Intelligence Committee voted 12-to-4 to send
Representative Goss' nomination to the Senate floor. I welcome the
opportunity to say a few words about this important nomination and
about the state of our Nation's intelligence community.
As my colleagues know, in 1947, President Harry Truman signed
legislation which provided for the establishment of the CIA. This
important agency supports the President, the National Security Council,
and American officials who play a role in shaping or executing the
national security policy of the United States. The CIA engages in
research and analysis of information, as well as a host of other
activities related to foreign intelligence and national security.
However, as every American knows all too well, times have changed
since 1947. We are now engaged in new battles. We are facing new
threats. The Soviet Union is no longer our arch enemy. Instead we face
an enemy that is dispersed throughout the world in small cells--
sometimes connected, sometimes acting independently. The new threat--
terrorism--is an asymmetrical one.
Nonetheless, we must remember that terrorism alone is not our enemy.
It is a tactic used by our enemies. Therefore, our task is twofold.
First, we must defeat soundly those who would attack our country and
endanger the security of Americans. But secondly, we must also defeat
the murderous ideology of terrorism. That is because terrorism is the
enemy of all humankind.
[[Page S9511]]
It knows no faces, names, or nationalities. And I am confident that a
strong America, which is respected by our friends and allies, can
defeat this scourge.
Indeed, one thing we can all agree upon in this body is that a strong
and capable intelligence effort has never been more important to the
security of our Nation. That brings me to the nomination before us
today. At the best of times the job of Director of Central Intelligence
is a difficult one. And we all know that these are not the best of
times. Our intelligence infrastructure failed this Nation when we
needed it most.
There are two important traits that the next Director of the CIA
needs to possess in order to be successful in restoring the
effectiveness of our intelligence capabilities.
First, it is of the utmost importance that the Director of the CIA be
nonpartisan. The safety of the American people is not a matter of
political parties. National security is an issue that must unite us in
a common cause. To that end, I share the deep concerns of several of my
colleagues that some of Representative Goss's comments during his
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee were overly
partisan and blindly supportive of the Bush administration.
Moreover it is critical to recognize that he chose to become involved
in the political process. That decision was not forced on him. He chose
it freely. And I believe that it has undermined his ability to be a
nonpartisan Director of Central Intelligence, DCI. There is no question
that intelligence has been politicized in this administration. I know
it. The American people know it. And the civil servants who work at the
CIA know it. To rush to confirm an individual who has played a role in
politicizing intelligence is extremely unwise and only serves to
further demoralize the individuals who are working so hard to protect
our national security.
Second, he or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary to
lead some of our most critical intelligence efforts. We cannot ignore
the fact that the most egregious lapses in history by our Nation's
intelligence community happened while Mr. Goss was chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee--the committee responsible for ensuring
that US intelligence agencies function effectively. If he failed in his
oversight responsibilities, as I believe he has, how then can we have
any confidence that he is capable of accomplishing an even more
difficult task--the fundamental reform of the entire intelligence
apparatus? I do not believe that we can.
We all know that the 9/11 Commission has recommended a major overhaul
of our intelligence operations. Much of that will have to be done at
the CIA. It is going to take an individual with very strong management
skills to carry out the restructuring of that agency. He will have to
have credibility within the institution of the CIA if he is to be
successful. Institutions resist change. Based upon Mr. Goss' weak
oversight of the agency, I am not confident that he has the wherewithal
to overcome the resistance he will confront to the fundamental reforms
being contemplated.
Actions always speak louder than words. Unfortunately, we don't know
what Mr. Goss's actions will be as director, but we do know what his
actions have been as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. In
my opinion, to confirm Mr. Goss with such uncertainty about his ability
to get the job done would be irresponsible.
This position is too critical to leave to chance. The agency is
currently being led by a very able career intelligence director. He is
already working with the committees of Congress to devise a plan to
restore the effectiveness and credibility of the US intelligence
community. In the immediate future, he will continue to do so.
For those reasons, I will oppose this nomination when the Senate
votes today.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the nomination
of Porter Goss to serve as Director of Central Intelligence.
The American people have learned much since 9/11 about the vital role
of objective, nonpolitical intelligence in keeping us safe at home and
in protecting American interests abroad. We also have witnessed the
disastrous consequences of the administration's manipulation of
intelligence in its rush to war in Iraq--disastrous for our brave
troops on the ground, for their families, for our country, and for our
standing in the world.
When it comes to intelligence, this is no time for politics. As we
reorganize and strengthen our intelligence structures, we need a leader
of the CIA whose only loyalty is speaking truth to power.
We need an unbiased advisor to the President, not a partisan--someone
who will deliver the good news and the bad with candor, foresight, and
authority. With Porter Goss, however, we get not only a partisan, but a
cheerleader for the Bush campaign.
What is most disturbing about the Porter Goss nomination is that he
has offered no explanation for his partisan behavior as chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
He has made partisan attacks on John Kerry for cutting intelligence
budgets, when Mr. Goss himself voted 7 out of 10 years to scale back
intelligence appropriations.
He was initially unwilling to pursue the administration's vengeful
leak of the name of CIA agent Valerie Plame to the press, which ended
her career as a covert CIA officer and endangered her life.
He rushed to discredit former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke
after Mr. Clarke's testimony to the 9/11 Commission became so
embarrassing to the White House.
He did not support an inquiry into Ahmad Chalabi, even after
allegations that Chalabi had leaked American secrets to Iran, because
the Chalabi affair was embarrassing to White House and the Pentagon.
Mr. Goss waited until June of this year to introduce legislation to
reform our intelligence community a full 18 months after the initial
joint congressional inquiry that he helped lead uncovered massive
structural problems the resulted in the intelligence failures before 9/
11. That is not leadership. That is not vision.
In his confirmation hearing, when asked repeatedly about his partisan
statements and actions, he offered no explanation. He repeatedly
offered the same unsatisfactory response: ``the record is the record.''
If the record is the record for Mr. Goss, then it is a record that
puts politics above the national interest. If the record is the record,
then it is one that places partisan gain ahead of the facts. If the
record is the record, then Mr. Goss is the wrong person to serve as our
Nation's Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. Goss cannot, even now, cite a single instance in which public
statements of Bush administration policymakers mischaracterized the
available intelligence prior to the Iraq war. If he can't speak the
plain truth about such an obvious fact, how can the American people
have any confidence in him as the head of our intelligence community?
The challenges of 9/11 and the administration's misuse of
intelligence in rushing to war in Iraq demand that any reforms to our
intelligence community be rooted firmly in the principle that
intelligence must be completely insulated from partisan politics and
ideology. The confirmation of Porter Goss as Director of Central
Intelligence violates that principle in the most fundamental sense.
We owe it to our fellow citizens to do better. I oppose the
nomination of Porter Goss.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will vote for the nomination of Porter
Goss to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I served with Porter Goss during my time in the House of
Representatives. He is a good, intelligent man with a tremendous work
ethic. He has served his country honorably in the Army, as a CIA
officer, and as a congressman from Florida.
He is the President's choice and I am willing to give the benefit of
the doubt. However, the two days of nomination hearings held by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence highlighted several areas of
concern, and my vote today should not be seen as support for
Congressman Goss to become the National Intelligence Director.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Congressman Porter Goss will become
Director
[[Page S9512]]
of Central Intelligence at a difficult and important time for the U.S.
Intelligence Community. In the coming months, he must help both
Congress and the administration to take sensible steps on intelligence
reform. In the years to come, if he remains in office, Mr. Goss must
lead our intelligence agencies into a new era of flexibility, skill,
and inter-agency cooperation.
I will vote in favor of confirming Mr. Goss to this position,
although not without some misgivings. I will support his confirmation
in part because I know him to be a gentleman and a man with a deep and
sincere interest in intelligence, as well as substantial background in
the field. I will support him because many others who know him well,
including our colleagues from Florida and others whose views I respect,
have contacted me and testified to his integrity and capabilities.
And I will support Mr. Goss because the President wants him. A CIA
Director cannot succeed unless the President likes and respects him
enough to take seriously the facts and warnings the Director conveys to
him. The President must be willing to accept advice when the Director
says that something is not ``a slam dunk,'' and I hope that this
President will be willing to accept such advice from this nominee.
As a matter of general policy, however, I have real concerns about
appointing a partisan politician to such sensitive positions as
Director of Central Intelligence or Director of the FBI. In 1976, I
voted against George H. W. Bush as Director of Central Intelligence for
precisely that reason. I suggested: ``The chances for forceful
integrity will be infinitely greater if the Director of Central
Intelligence is a highly respected nonpolitical figure.''
The need for a DCI to transcend partisan politics is crystal clear.
He is the person who must be able to tell the President that the world
is not as the President might wish it, that a cherished policy proposal
will not work, or that some unforeseen development poses a threat to
our national security. As we remove the walls between domestic and
foreign intelligence, moreover, the DCI--like the FBI Director--will be
handling and presenting sensitive information on American citizens.
The next DCI will preside, moreover, over great and perhaps wrenching
transition in U.S. intelligence. The report of the 9/11 Commission
highlighted a series of long-standing shortfalls in our intelligence
agencies. Although the particulars regarding the fight against al-Qaida
may have been new, the challenges facing U.S. intelligence are ones
that go back many years:
We need to provide instant and accurate intelligence to our military
forces, and this drives much of our intelligence collection and
analysis today. At the same time, however, we need to provide a wide
range of so-called ``national'' intelligence to the rest of the
national security community. Balancing those needs is a continuing
challenge, especially as the funds for intelligence will often compete
against other defense priorities.
We need intelligence collectors and analysts with a wider range of
linguistic and cultural skills than ever before. Once we fought a
communist enemy that was worldwide, but centrally directed. Now we must
vanquish the twin perils of radical Islamic terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which are nearly
world-wide, but no longer controlled by a central, well-defined enemy.
And we need technical intelligence collection systems that are ever
more powerful, that provide more real-time information, and that will
be effective in a world where technology often favors secrecy over
transparency.
We need seamless sharing of very sensitive intelligence information--
between agencies, between countries, and between Washington and the
State and local forces that guard us from terrorism on a daily basis.
``Stovepipes'' and ``rice bowls'' are outmoded and in need of a real
make-over to meet the needs of the 21st century.
At the same time, however, we need strong protections for our civil
liberties, which are the very foundation of our society. When the most
recognizable member of this Senate is denied an airline ticket in his
home town because his name shows up on some Government list, we know
that the intelligence feeding into our homeland security programs
leaves a lot to be desired.
That is quite a menu of challenges, and they must all be addressed.
There is no ``pick one from column A'' option in heading U.S.
intelligence.
In addition to all that, the Director must be willing and able to
``speak truth to power.'' He must have the stature and Presidential
trust that leads top officials to accept his warnings and advice. And
he must be an able defender of the independence of intelligence
analysis, while still insuring that it is relevant to the needs and
concerns of policy-makers.
I will support the confirmation of Mr. Goss in the hope that he will
transition successfully from a serious congressman and a leading
partisan figure to a clear-eyed, independent Director of Central
Intelligence who is able to rally his troops, to make them as effective
as possible, and to keep policy-makers from misusing or ignoring the
work of the thousands of skilled and patriotic men and women who work
in U.S. intelligence today. The perilous times in which we live demand
nothing less than complete dedication to those objectives.
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, after much deliberation, I have decided
to vote against the confirmation of Porter Goss to be Director of
Central Intelligence. The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, as well
as the failures of our pre-war intelligence on Iraq, have demonstrated
the enormous challenges we face in restructuring, reforming and
improving our intelligence capabilities. At this critical moment, we
should be focusing our efforts on enacting into law the recommendations
of the commission, including the creation of the position of National
Intelligence Director. The confirmation of a new Director of Central
Intelligence, when the role of the DCI has yet to even be defined, does
not advance the hard reform work yet to be done. Nor does the
appointment of Porter Goss, whose objectivity, capacity to work across
party lines, and openness to reform are subject to serious question.
The National Intelligence Director envisioned by the 9/11 Commission
will oversee our intelligence community, including the DCI. It is
critical that we clarify, in law, the relationship between these two
positions. Unfortunately, the administration, by prioritizing the
nomination of the DCI over the restructuring of our intelligence
community, seems to be signaling an attachment to the status quo.
Congressman Goss's record, in which he has repeatedly rejected
independent efforts to improve our intelligence whenever those efforts
were perceived to be contrary to the interests of the Bush
administration, is also cause for concern. He opposed the establishment
of the 9/11 Commission, he attacked the integrity of Richard Clarke,
the former coordinator for counter-terrorism at the National Security
Council, he opposed an investigation into the disclosure of the
identity of a CIA operative, and he referred to the bipartisan Senate
investigation into the abuse of Iraqi detainees as a ``circus.''
Congressman Goss has also opposed investigations into intelligence on
Iraq, in particular the use of intelligence by the administration. He
dismissed Senators who called for an examination of the circumstances
that led us to war as ``attack dogs'' and charged that they were
expressing ``artificial outrage.'' He has also implied that open
discussions of the challenges facing our intelligence damage the morale
of our armed forces and aid our enemies. These are not the statements
of someone who appears prepared to undertake the difficult work of
reform, without regard to political considerations.
This reform will require cooperation between the administration and
the Congress and between Republicans and Democrats. Unfortunately,
Congressman Goss has made repeated, incendiary charges, including
allegations that the Democratic Party does not support the intelligence
community and that Senator Kerry seeks to ``dismantle the nation's
intelligence capabilities.'' These charges are not only flat wrong,
they are completely counterproductive to the bipartisan effort that is
urgently needed at this moment.
Repairing our intelligence capabilities is critical to fighting the
war on
[[Page S9513]]
terrorism and is an urgent priority. We must enact into law the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We must examine the failures of
our intelligence related to Iraq. We must begin the work of
restructuring our intelligence community so that it is more effective
and less politicized. These challenges require the utmost objectivity,
independence, and nonpartisanship from the Director of Central
Intelligence. Any reluctance on the part of the DCI to fully engage in
the reform process, for whatever reason, could set us back at a moment
when we can least afford it.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I speak today in support of the
nomination of Representative Porter J. Goss to the Director of Central
Intelligence. He is a good man and a good friend. President Bush could
not have selected a more capable and qualified man for the job. He
brings to the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
community what they have needed for years--intelligence experience,
political experience, an open mind, and forward thinking.
I first met Representative Goss shortly after he was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1988. We served together for 10 years
before I was elected to this body. Representative Goss and his wife,
Mariel, are personal friends of my wife and myself to this day. I know
his personal character and I am confident he will bring integrity,
honesty, and forthrightness to his new job.
The Director of Central Intelligence holds one of the most important
and unforgiving jobs in our Government. All his actions and decisions
are analyzed and criticized by politicians, the press, and the public.
And the pressures on the intelligence community are immense. They must
be right 100 percent of the time, while the terrorists only have to be
right once. That is a heavy burden for one man to bear, but I believe
Representative Goss is up to the challenge.
I cannot think of anyone with more experience for this job.
Representative Goss has extensive experience in intelligence, on both
the practical and policy sides. He knows firsthand the importance of
human intelligence, serving as an intelligence officer in the Army and
as a case officer in the agency he will now lead. At that time the
United States was promoting freedom and fighting the evil of communism.
Though the evil we now face takes a different form, the value of
information and power of knowledge remain the same.
We are in the midst of a review and reform of our intelligence
organizations, and, going forward, one of the most important jobs for
the Director of Central Intelligence will be working with Congress.
Again, Representative Goss's experiences will be an asset to the
intelligence community and the Congress. For the last 8 years he has
been chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
In that position he has worked fairly with both parties and both bodies
of Congress without compromising his beliefs. I am confident he will
continue to work honestly and fairly with Representatives and Senators
of both parties in his new job.
Representative Goss's practical and political experience will also
pay dividends as the entire intelligence community is reformed in the
coming weeks and months. He has proven his openmindedness in constantly
seeking to improve our intelligence capabilities and structures during
his tenure in Congress. He has held dozens of hearings on problems in
the intelligence community and how to fix them. He was a member of the
Aspin-Brown Commission, which took a deep look at our intelligence
community and provided some of the recommendations that we are
currently reviewing. He also cochaired the bicameral investigation on
intelligence issues surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His open
mind and willingness to think critically about the status quo will
serve us all well.
I have seen firsthand his dedication, integrity, and character, and I
support Representative Goss's nomination without reservation. I wish
him well in that extremely important job and I look forward to seeing
him in briefings and hearings in the coming months.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the nomination of Porter
Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. I served with Porter Goss
in the House of Representatives and I respect him. However, I do not
believe he is the best choice for the position in these times.
On September 11, 2001, our country suffered a devastating attack. Now
our country is in the midst of a war on terror and a war in Iraq. There
have been many examinations of our intelligence leading up to September
11, leading up to the war in Iraq, and as we continue to wage the war
on terror. There are many unanswered questions about whether the
intelligence was accurate, whether it was manipulated, whether our
soldiers and leaders can rely on it each and every day as they make
difficult decisions.
I recognize that members of the President's Cabinet, like the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, must weigh political
considerations as they develop policy. However, the Director of Central
Intelligence is a unique position. It should stand above politics. The
citizens of the United States have the right to assume that the
Director of Central Intelligence is providing objective information and
analysis to allow the President to make the best possible decisions.
When Director Tenet resigned, the President had an opportunity to
appoint a nominee who was nonpartisan, nonpolitical. He did not do so.
Instead he chose Mr. Goss, who clearly knows the intelligence community
well, but is also clearly partisan and political.
The CIA is in turmoil. The hardworking men and women of the Agency
need a strong leader who will reform the system to make sure that the
information they offer is used in a proper and timely fashion. The
people of this country need to know that the U.S. intelligence
community is doing its best to protect and serve U.S. national
interests.
I do not believe that Mr. Goss is the best candidate to lead the
intelligence community through a difficult task of reform and restoring
confidence in the midst of a war.
It is important that our intelligence not be partisan, yet Mr. Goss
has been partisan in his comments over the past year. He has been
fiercely critical of former President Clinton, our colleague Senator
Kerry, and the Democratic Party. His comments do not lead me to believe
that he will now abandon his partisanship or his political approach as
the Director of CIA.
No greater task lies before us today than to reform the intelligence
community so that it is effective as the leading weapon in the war on
terrorism. Mr. Goss certainly knows the CIA and the intelligence
community, but in these times, experience is simply not enough. A
leader committed to reform without regard to politics is also critical.
Those attributes, I fear, Mr. Goss does not have, and therefore I
oppose his nomination.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the swift
confirmation of Congressman Porter Goss as Director of Central
Intelligence. I have been privileged to know Mr. Goss for a number of
years, and I can attest that he is a leader, a man of personal
intelligence and integrity, and a true patriot. He is also extremely
well qualified for the position to which he has been nominated.
I do not believe I am divulging any state secrets when I mention that
Porter Goss knows the intelligence community from the ground up--
beginning with his service as a young case officer and most recently as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. His 10-year career with
the Central Intelligence Agency gave him a thorough understanding of
how that large organization operates--invaluable background as the
Congress and the executive branch proceed with various plans for
reorganizing the intelligence community. His experience on the CIA
staff, combined with his oversight responsibilities in the House, makes
him perhaps uniquely qualified to understand the challenges and
opportunities facing the community today. Congressman Goss has
demonstrated time and again his commitment to the needs and goals of
the intelligence community in its service to our Nation and the
American people. He is not merely qualified. He was meant for this
position.
When he takes up his duties, he will do so at a time of great change
in the intelligence community. Reeling from the intelligence failures
of 9/11 and
[[Page S9514]]
Iraq, and faced with comprehensive reorganization, the community's
leadership has rarely been so important. I am confident that Mr. Goss
will lead the CIA in an independent and nonpolitical manner as he has
committed to do, ensuring that policymakers receive the best
intelligence and analysis that our government can provide. I am also
confident that he will be helpful as the Congress reorganizes itself in
order to better conduct oversight over the intelligence community. We
in the Congress sometimes forget that intelligence failures the Nation
has experienced are not limited to the agencies alone. Congressional
oversight has been, as the
9/11 Commission put it, ``dysfunctional,'' and must be changed.
As we face the national security challenges that are so evident to
all of us, the Nation will be privileged to have Porter Goss at the
helm of the CIA. America needs an individual who will help lead our
intelligence agencies into a new era. I wholeheartedly support his
confirmation.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the
nomination of Porter Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. Few
people are as eminently qualified as he to lead the CIA at this
critical time in our Nation's history.
Porter Goss combines experience as both a U.S. Army Intelligence and
CIA officer with 15 years as a Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives. During his time in Congress he has used his knowledge
and experience to serve as chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. He is a public servant who has earned our
confidence and that of the President to lead the dedicated men and
women of the CIA who work tirelessly to preserve our Nation's security.
Now at this time when Congress is working hard to reshape our
intelligence services, I applaud the President for nominating a man
like Porter Goss who understands what is working with intelligence and
that which needs to be improved. And based on his experience, he will
undoubtedly be as well prepared as any DCI to communicate with Congress
concerning the needs of the CIA, and to understand the oversight
responsibilities of the legislative branch as it pertains to the
intelligence community.
The challenges we face in defeating global terrorism remain great.
Porter Goss understands where we have made mistakes in both
intelligence operations and assessment. He understands that we need
improved human intelligence capabilities, as well as a culture of
competition among intelligence analysts, to ensure that policymakers
have objective information and a range of options to choose from in
meeting the terrorist challenge. Porter Goss is committed to making
these changes on behalf of the American people.
In conclusion, I believe the President has chosen the right man to
lead the CIA in its very important work, and I strongly support the
nomination of Porter Goss.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, we have two speakers. I inform the
distinguished leader, the minority whip, a man from Searchlight, that
we have two speakers.
If I could ask Senator Snowe how much time she would like to have.
Ms. SNOWE. About 12 minutes. And I would like to yield 2 minutes to
the Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. ROBERTS. All right. So a total of what, 15 or 20 minutes?
Ms. SNOWE. Yes.
Mr. ROBERTS. I am assuming by about 4:45--I am not anticipating any
further speakers on our side. That could change.
Mr. REID. If my friend will yield?
Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. REID. We could not have a vote before 5 o'clock.
Mr. ROBERTS. Right.
Mr. REID. We have a couple people off campus doing other things.
Mr. ROBERTS. Could we agree to have a UC request in regard to a vote
certain at 5 o'clock?
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would be happy to agree to having a vote
at 5 o'clock and having the time between now and then evenly divided. I
frankly don't think we are going to be using any more time, so if you
need more time on your side, you could have part of ours.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 5
o'clock and that the time between now and then be evenly divided.
Mr. ROBERTS. I have no objection. I think that is an excellent
suggestion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield whatever time she may consume to
the Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Fifteen minutes.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kansas, and I am glad to
yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine.
Let me make a couple comments about this man.
First of all, before he leaves the Chamber, I want to thank the
Senator from Florida for his comments and for his efforts in this
nomination. I also thank the chairman of our select committee in the
Senate, the Senator from Kansas.
Two years after I was elected to the House--I believe it was 2 years
afterward--Porter Goss was elected to the House from Florida. It took
us no time at all to figure out this guy was one of the foremost
authorities on the intelligence community. He had experience with the
CIA, with Army Intelligence. We relied on him. I am talking about way
back 16 years ago.
When I went from the House to the Senate in 1994, I took the place of
Senator David Boren, who is now the president of Oklahoma University.
He is a very close friend of mine. He was my predecessor in this Senate
seat. He was also chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. The thing he warned me of when I first came in was: You
are going to have to do something about this mess we have in
intelligence. He said: You have the DIA and the CIA and the FBI and the
NSA, and nobody is talking to each other.
I found out before too long that was the case. He said he had been
working on this for about 6 or 7 years and had not been able to achieve
it. It became a turf battle. On one occasion I found there was a
listening device the NSA had that they would not even share with the
FBI for some of their investigations. This was wrong.
We have come a long way since that time. It has been my experience in
both Kosovo and Bosnia that you have a lot of these agencies around the
table sharing information and working together that did not do so
before. So I believe we have come a long way.
One of the reasons I have been resisting a lot of changes within our
intelligence system is I wanted to wait until Porter Goss came on
board. I believe Porter Goss has more knowledge on intelligence than
anybody else who could have been nominated.
I think the President made an excellent nomination. I think we see by
this bipartisan support that we are going to be able to overcome the
obstacles and move ahead aggressively in achieving quality intelligence
to protect the American people.
I thank the Senator from Maine for yielding to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the nomination of
Porter Goss as our next Director of Central Intelligence. I commend the
President for his timely submission of this nomination as Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Given our war on terror and the
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, now is not the time to leave a vacuum
in leadership for our Nation's intelligence.
On that note, I also commend our chairman, Senator Roberts, for his
leadership in conducting the hearings and shepherding the entire
process so we can complete this confirmation and ensure our
intelligence apparatus has the direction it deserves and the leadership
it must have in order to move forward.
As we all know, this nomination arrived during a time in which we are
compelled to undertake the most profound, sweeping reform of our entire
intelligence community in nearly 60 years, 3 years after the worst
attack ever on American soil. Indeed, there is no longer a question
whether we are at the threshold of the single most comprehensive and
critical restructuring of
[[Page S9515]]
the manner in which intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and
disseminated in at least a generation. The questions are: What shape
will this reform take? How will the leadership of the intelligence
community implement and execute these changes? And how will the
nominee, Porter Goss, synthesize and translate his knowledge and depth
of experience into specific, tangible changes in how the intelligence
community performs? Because the person who is asked to implement this
type of reform must be firm, bold, visionary, and lay the foundation
for our intelligence community for the 21st century.
Many of us who serve on the Intelligence Committee--indeed,
throughout the Senate--have been advocating for comprehensive
improvements in the intelligence community structures and methods.
Shortly, the Senate will have the opportunity to deliberate with
respect to overall and fundamental reform. It is absolutely the type of
change and reform not only this Senate, this Congress, and the
President must embrace; this permanent reform is essential to address
the grave failures in communication, coordination, and cooperation that
certainly the 9/11 Joint Inquiry, the Senate Intelligence Committee,
the 9/11 Commission, and others have found with respect to the attacks
on September 11, 2001, as well as the pre-Iraq-war assessment of
weapons of mass destruction that failed to reconcile with the realities
in the postwar chapter. Indeed, with the new reality in which we live,
delaying reforming the intelligence community is no longer an option.
As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, this last year we
have undertaken a major review of the prewar intelligence of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam
Hussein's human rights abuses, and his regime's impact on regional
stability. That report was a detailed, comprehensive cataloguing not
only of the facts but also a stunning revelation of systemic, pervasive
flaws in our intelligence community that coalesced to produce broad
failures in intelligence gathering and analysis. It revealed a
pervasive complacency as well as a lack of accountability throughout
the chain of command that allowed outdated assumptions about
intelligence to be carried forward for years unquestioned and that
tolerated an absence of rigorous analysis and a kind of monolithic
grouping.
From that report, we now know that even after the lack of information
sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence
failures of 9/11, intelligence reporting continues to be highly
compartmentalized, and analysts with a need to know are not given
access to information. Essentially, the intelligence community
continues to operate in a ``stovepiped'' manner, preventing critical
information sharing essential for sound analysis. There was a lack of
analytic rigor on one of the most critical and defining issues spanning
more than a decade: the question of the preponderance of weapons of
mass destruction within Iraq. The community had failed to do its
analysis for more than a decade, we soon discovered.
Moreover, there was a lack of human intelligence that is so critical
to assessing the enemy's capabilities and intentions. They were forced
to rely on outdated, vague intelligence from less than credible
sources.
I say all of this because that is the reality that our next Director
of Central Intelligence must not only confront, but he also must
address. It is in that light that our committee, during the
confirmation process, reviewed the qualifications, the credentials, and
the qualities that Porter Goss possesses in order to address some of
the most systemic and profound changes this intelligence community is
going to face since its inception in 1947.
I have come to believe that Porter Goss, in examining his record, his
testimony before the committee, his responses to the committee, has the
experience, the character, the credibility, the knowledge, the
disposition, and the predilection for reform to lead this comprehensive
overhaul and restructuring of our entire intelligence community.
Let me first say that I worked with Congressman Goss in the House of
Representatives for 6 years. I have no doubt about his competence,
certainly his intelligence, his character, his unimpeachable integrity,
or his bipartisanship. He was far from a polarizing or partisan force
in the House of Representatives. Rather, what I discovered in working
with him in the House, he was interested in solving problems rather
than creating political points or sound bites. He was interested in
reaching a consensus on the issues.
I know there had been some questions during the course of the hearing
as to whether Porter Goss would be able to be sufficiently independent
minded in a position where he will be the President's chief adviser on
intelligence issues. Certainly this was an issue that was thoroughly
explored in the confirmation hearings just concluded. At the opening of
that hearing, Congressman Goss addressed the issue directly when he
told the committee:
. . . I understand completely the difference in obligations
the position of [director of Central Intelligence agency]
carries with it and that which the role of a Congressman
carries. These are two completely distinct jobs in our form
of government. I understand these distinctions and if
confirmed commit myself to a nonpartisan approach to the job
of [director of Central Intelligence agency].
That is important to underscore.
Moreover, in response to questions about some specific political
statements that Porter Goss had mentioned a few months ago on the floor
of the House of Representatives, he expressed regret and apologized if
he sounded any partisan notes in the past on any issues or matters of
national security.
I know others have raised the question of whether Porter Goss will be
willing to inform administration officials if or when public statements
deviate from or distort available intelligence. In responding to this
question, I would refer directly to the House Intelligence Committee's
2003 interim assessment of the pre-Iraq-war intelligence when then-
Chairman Goss stated that if public officials cite intelligence
incorrectly, the intelligence community has a responsibility to address
that policymaker on any mischaracterization of available intelligence.
I expect that not only would Porter Goss be held to that assessment as
DCI but that he would hold himself to that assessment.
We must also recognize the unique qualifications that Porter Goss
brings to the position. As I mentioned earlier, he is a product of
service in the intelligence community, while he also later served as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He can view the
intelligence community through the eyes of a former CIA officer and
intelligence officer and also as someone who has stood outside of that
world looking in with his oversight of the intelligence apparatus as
chair of the House Intelligence Committee.
I know there has been some concern expressed that maybe Porter Goss
will be too wedded to the CIA or that he is too CIA-centric and,
therefore, would not have the independent vision necessary to institute
the required changes and the reforms that surely are to come. I would
argue that it is precisely because of his past work within the
community that he is best suited to take it into the future, all the
more so as his service imbues him with an indispensable credibility
that would engender the kind of trust within a community where some
continue to believe that necessary changes have already been made, that
we should not identify the failures that we did in our comprehensive
report within the intelligence community in the prewar assessments as
egregious or systemic or broad or comprehensive failures. That is the
kind of atmosphere that he will be entering as the new Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and trying to bring about the kind of
reform that is absolutely vital.
His own record of reform initiatives is also important to explore
because it also will belie the claim that somehow he will not be
predisposed or have a predilection for the type of reform we certainly
are going to be considering, hopefully next week, and enacting in
Congress, and also the reform that has also been brought about as a
result of the President's Executive orders.
Still others have questioned whether Porter Goss could have done more
to institute intelligence reform prior to the attacks of 9/11. Again, I
think as we review the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, we can see
much could
[[Page S9516]]
have been done in all spheres. Whether it was on the part of former
Presidents, on the part of Congress, committees, individuals, agencies,
and bureaucracies, we know that the history documented in the 9/11
report was replete with examples of what could have been and should
have been done differently.
What is required now is that we look at the totality of the record of
the nominee we are considering today. In so doing, I believe we will
see an individual who is wholly committed to providing the impetus and
the leadership required to institute critical reform. Indeed, who
better than someone who has not only been a member of the intelligence
world but also one who has investigated that world to understand why
change is necessary.
The most glaring of problems--those we identified in the Senate
Intelligence Committee report, such as the poor state of human
intelligence, operations, intelligence collection in general, analysis,
and the pervasive problems with information sharing--these have all
been issues that Porter Goss has been committed to addressing
throughout his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
Indeed, Mr. Goss has held over 62 hearings on intelligence community
reform just this year. So I do believe that he shows a predisposition
and indeed a drive for reform.
I think we also see that commitment reflected in Mr. Goss's
contributions as a member of the Aspin-Brown commission, which was
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. This commission made
a number of recommendations including looking at how to streamline the
DCI's responsibilities and provide him with additional flexibility in
managing the community.
He provided insights and leadership in the ``Joint Inquiry Into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001''--a report that contained 19
recommendations, including the creation of a director of national
intelligence among the many changes that we have now been debating in
Congress.
So all of this undoubtedly served as a catalyst for Congressman Goss
authoring his own reform legislation, which he introduced this past
June, that calls for significant reform of the intelligence community's
structure, as well as enhanced DCI, with critically needed personnel
and budgetary authority--going beyond even what the President issued in
his own Executive orders.
But I think Porter Goss also understands, in response to many of the
questions that were raised during the course of the confirmation
hearing, that a director of national intelligence will need to possess
both the budgetary and personnel authorities that will be vital to a
newly created director of national intelligence in order for that
individual to be effective in implementing the kinds of changes that
need to be brought about within the overall intelligence community.
Finally, there is further evidence of the extent to which Porter Goss
is compelled to remedy our intelligence shortcomings. He has
recognized--after his committee's investigation into the failures that
occurred prior to the Iraq war--that the intelligence community has
repeatedly fallen short in the area of information collection, most
notably in the area of human intelligence.
For those who are not convinced he understands what is required to be
done--particularly in this regard--as Porter Goss himself has said, the
CIA's human spy operation was headed ``over a proverbial cliff'' and in
danger of becoming only a fleeting memory of ``the nimble, flexible,
core, mission-oriented enterprise'' it once was. Sounds like a person
who is convinced of the need for change.
He has also stated that the intelligence community failed to provide
the best possible intelligence to policymakers, and that the requisite,
both from a collection and analytical viewpoint, was not provided.
I believe Porter Goss embodies the credibility and credentials that
will be required to lead the intelligence community agencies and the
professionals within that community in implementing the types of
reforms from within--by Executive order or through congressional
enactment. He brings unique and exceptional experience both in the
field and behind the gavel. I believe he is well prepared to see our
intelligence apparatus as it undergoes the major transformation
necessary for a new era.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a vital member
of the Intelligence Committee, be recognized for 5 minutes. Senator
Warner is a previous member of the Intelligence Committee, now again on
the Intelligence Committee, and he is chairman of the Armed Services
Committee. He has a unique perspective to offer my colleagues. Is 5
minutes appropriate?
Mr. WARNER. Yes, thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I hope the Senate appreciates
the thoroughness with which Chairman Roberts has gone into this
nomination. He has provided the members of the committee and many
others with an opportunity to express their views with regard to the
nomination. An extensive series of hearings have been held--more than
have been held on a nominee in a long time. Maybe only Supreme Court
Justices occasionally see the volume and thoroughness with which this
nomination has been carefully viewed by the Senate. I compliment the
chairman, and indeed the ranking member who participated very actively
in this, as well as the members of the committee.
I first came to know the nominee about a decade ago. I remember one
of our most revered, distinguished contemporary colleagues, Senator
Moynihan, who sat right back there. I was on the floor and he stood and
said it was time to abolish the CIA. He had a lot of concerns about the
Agency. At that time, I was the vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. Together, with Porter Goss and some others, we put together
a piece of legislation establishing a commission to examine some of the
concerns of our distinguished late colleague from New York. Porter Goss
and I served on that commission. Les Aspin was the first chairman. He
had an untimely early death and he was followed by Harold Brown. That
was my initiation to work with this fine, able individual.
I commend the President for selecting him to take on this important
assignment. I thank Representative Goss, his wife, and family for
undertaking another chapter of public life.
All of his credentials have been carefully reviewed. I would like to
talk about somewhat of a different aspect of the challenges that will
face Porter Goss. We just concluded a very extensive briefing upstairs
with the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Negroponte, the commander of
CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Deputy Secretary of
State, almost three-quarters of the Senate being present. The briefing
was about the situations primarily in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater,
but it was about terrorism on the whole.
As part of our discussion, we talked about the ongoing work in the
Congress of the United States with regard to the 9/11 report, which all
of us believe is a very significant contribution by a conscientious
group of tried, tested, and able public servants. But we worked through
these equations and options. The Governmental Affairs Committee is
doing the markup of what will be the primary vehicle. Senator Roberts
contributed his views on it.
The Senate Armed Services Committee had a hearing with the Secretary
of Defense, as well as the Acting Director of the CIA. So the Senate
has done a lot of work in preparation.
How does that relate to Porter Goss? I cannot predict, and I don't
think anyone can, at this time what will eventually evolve with regard
to the legislative achievements of this body and the House in a
conference. Perhaps a lot of people have high expectations that a bill
will be before our President shortly.
I intend to work conscientiously, as I have, and will continue to
work, forgetting any question of turf, to try to achieve a strong bill
that clearly improves and strengthens our intelligence system.
I brought in a reference to the briefing today because in some
discussion
[[Page S9517]]
with our colleagues--and it was a classified briefing, but I can share
this--General Abizaid said he is acting on intelligence daily to
conduct his mission. Lives are at risk, and he clearly, drawing on his
extensive experience in the Army said: Today the intelligence
collection that my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need and have
and use is vastly improved over what we had in gulf war 1 in 1991.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak
for another 4 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there has been steady progress in the
improvements in our intelligence system. The Department of Defense is
the largest user, and these senior people in the Department of
Defense--civilian and military alike--have not tried to tell the
Congress what to do but respectfully told us what not to do: Don't do
anything to weaken the improvements that we have achieved--I say we,
working with the Congress and the President--we have achieved to date
since 1991 in the first gulf war and, indeed, since 9/11 with President
Bush and Executive orders, a wide range of implementation of important
things that have been done to improve our intelligence system,
particularly from the standpoint of the tactical use by the U.S.
military.
If confirmed and if we pass a new law signed by the President, Porter
Goss will be the man entrusted to implement that law. And I say to my
colleagues with the deepest respect, that is a daunting task--to do it
in a way not to shake the confidence of the tens upon thousands of
conscientious employees in the various departments and agencies, the
CIA, the Department of Defense who are concerned about their jobs,
concerned about their futures. We need to hold the team in place. We
need to keep what is working now going as we phase in such new laws and
provisions as this body, working with the House and signed by the
President, may enact.
I do not know of another individual who has the experience of Porter
Goss or is better qualified to take on the task of implementing such
new laws as the Congress and the President may enact.
I urge my colleagues to give this very fine, outstanding American
who, once again, was thinking about a quieter form of life the
opportunity to move into this job.
There was printed in the Record a report that was issued by the CSIS,
prepared by a number of former colleagues and others in the
intelligence community trying to say to the Congress we best move with
considerable caution as we enact this new legislation. I found this
very helpful in my work participating in drawing up this bill, and I
commend it to my colleagues.
Mr. President, again I thank the distinguished chairman and the
distinguished vice chairman of the committee for their work in making
it possible for this nomination to have been carefully reviewed by the
Senate in terms of a series of hearings and a very active and thorough
debate on the Senate floor.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with this debate and the vote certain at
5 o'clock, I think there has been an extraordinary level of examination
of this nomination. Two days of open hearings were held. By way of
comparison, that is one day more than Secretary of State Powell had
during his confirmation in early 2001.
It is certainly understandable that an official of the DCI stature
would be the subject of close Senate scrutiny. I think we have achieved
that level of scrutiny, and members of the Intelligence Committee on
both sides have expressed satisfaction with the way this process has
unfolded. It was not by accident. It was in close conference and
cooperation with the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, the Senator from West Virginia.
I think Mr. Goss has been forthcoming. I think he has been candid
with the committee. He provided literally dozens of written answers to
questions sent to him by the committee, both before and after his
confirmation hearings. He also provided complete and exhaustive details
about his background and his professional life in connection with his
nomination.
In short, I believe the examination of this nomination has been
thorough and informative. The nominee and Members on both sides should
be complimented for the way it has unfolded.
Expressions of support for his nomination have come from both sides
of the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill. This nominee is ready to
go to work, and he is needed.
I urge the Senate to vote for his confirmation, and I look forward to
working with Porter Goss as the next and, by the way, possibly last
DCI.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, at the proper time, which I believe
will be at 5 o'clock, I will call for the yeas and nays, or can I do
that now before I make a statement?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can do it any time he chooses.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I wish to make a short statement, and then I will
call for the yeas and nays.
Porter Goss has been very well vetted. What has come from this
discussion back and forth are several things.
One, he is a very good man. Second, he knows the intelligence
business. Third, I think there is still a question of whether he has
run any larger organizations, and that becomes a factor. The third had
to do with partisanship. It was interesting to me that a number of
people said everybody around here is partisan. Of course, that is true.
But this has to do with a nomination for the Central Intelligence
Agency. That is a position where the national security law forbades a
nominee from being political in any way, shape, or form.
I think the question really is with him. I want to believe it is
true, but based upon the record, I cannot accept it as true to this
point, and I have to look at what has happened as opposed to what he
says will happen; that he has been very partisan and very partisan
within the field of intelligence and very partisan within the field of
intelligence very recently at a time, obviously, when we are engaged in
a broad election.
I think it is probable that he will be confirmed, but that does not
take away from my responsibility to point out what I think is critical:
That now, more than ever, it is important for a CIA Director or for
anybody in intelligence to tell the truth, to make sure that if there
was a reference in a Cincinnati October 2 speech about Niger and
uranium enrichment and the possible seeking of it by Iraq, and then
when it comes to the State of the Union that somehow that the CIA
Director disappeared and never said, Oh, no, that shouldn't be in the
State of the Union because it was never true--I don't want to get into
that now. The point is we need somebody who is independent and takes
pride, who describes himself, defines himself as being independent and
standing up for the intelligence business and, therefore, is speaking
the truth. I hope that person will be Porter Goss. That is not yet
proven, and based upon the record it is not possible for me to vote
anything but no at this time.
It being very close to 5, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination
of Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence?
On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Santorum) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter) are
necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Vermont
(Mr. Jeffords), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 77, nays 17, as follows:
[[Page S9518]]
[Rollcall Vote No. 187 Ex.]
YEAS--77
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Johnson
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reid
Roberts
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--17
Bingaman
Byrd
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Dodd
Durbin
Harkin
Kennedy
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Reed
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Stabenow
Wyden
NOT VOTING--6
Akaka
Edwards
Jeffords
Kerry
Santorum
Specter
The nomination was confirmed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the President will
be immediately notified of the Senate's action.
____________________