[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 115 (Wednesday, September 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9487-S9507]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

  NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to executive session to begin consideration of Calendar No. 
815, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read the nomination of Porter J. Goss, of 
Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 6 hours of 
debate on the nomination equally divided between the chairman and vice

[[Page S9488]]

chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any quorum 
calls that take place during the consideration of the Goss nomination 
be charged equally to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues in the 
Senate to confirm Mr. Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be the next 
Director of Intelligence.
  On August 10, 2004, President Bush nominated Porter Goss to be the 
next Director of Central Intelligence, or the DCI. In doing so, the 
President stated that Mr. Goss ``is a leader with strong experience in 
intelligence and in the fight against terrorism. He knows the CIA 
inside and out. He is the right man to lead this important agency at 
this critical moment in our Nation's history.''
  The Goss nomination was received in the Senate on September 7. On 
September 14 and September 20, the Select Committee on Intelligence 
held extraordinary open hearings on this nomination that were televised 
and widely covered in the press.
  At the September 14 hearing, Mr. Goss was introduced to the committee 
by both of Florida's distinguished Senators, Bob Graham, former 
chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and Bill Nelson, who 
is well known to the Intelligence Committee as an interested and 
informed supporter of our efforts.
  That both Florida Senators reached across the aisle to support this 
nomination is a testament to the wide bipartisan support that it does 
enjoy.
  After 2 days of thorough and wide-ranging public hearings, the Goss 
nomination was placed before the Intelligence Committee membership for 
a vote yesterday morning.
  In yet another impressive display of bipartisanship, the committee 
approved the Goss nomination and ordered it reported in a vote of 12 to 
4. At this time, I would like to congratulate the Intelligence 
Committee members of both parties for their sober, penetrating, and 
thorough consideration of this nomination. The committee's handling of 
this nomination is very much in keeping with the bipartisan spirit that 
has animated its work during a very difficult year of challenges in the 
global war on terrorism in Iraq and in other areas around the world.

  This bipartisan spirit did produce important steps forward, such as 
the committee's report on Iraq WMD, in understanding intelligence 
problems and gaps and also making recommendations in that regard.
  As such, the committee's work will certainly help Mr. Goss as he 
strives to make the intelligence community better and to produce the 
best possible intelligence product. I want to say I also appreciate Mr. 
Goss's efforts during his 2 days of public hearings to respond to 
members' concerns and questions. He took these hearings very seriously 
and with attention to detail demanded by consideration for a position 
that has in the past been part of the Cabinet.
  In my opinion, during his confirmation hearings Mr. Goss showed the 
qualities we want to see in a good DCI. They are coolness under 
pressure, a willingness to look at alternative views and, very 
importantly, a willingness to ``take a few licks'' for past judgments.
  Most important of all, he demonstrated his ability to put the 
lawmaker's so-called partisan hat aside and take up the strictly 
nonpartisan duties of this critical executive branch office.
  As I noted at Mr. Goss's first public hearing on September 14, the 
role of the Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance 
to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most challenging 
jobs in the executive branch today.
  Obviously, this Nation is currently engaged in a war not only in 
Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere around the globe. In this 
war, for the most part there are no trenches. There is no barbed wire. 
There is no well-defined no man's land. On the contrary, in this war of 
shadows and darkness, intelligence defines the front line and indicates 
its weak points and gaps.
  Recently, a distinguished former National Security Adviser remarked 
to Senators that during the last 3 years our world has changed 
dramatically. In the old world, the threats were posed by nation states 
and organized military forces. In our new world, the greatest threats 
may be domestic. These threats may come from nation states and their 
agents and terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. Organized military 
conflict is only one of many threats.
  In our new world, we are not fighting against nation states but 
against a network of disparate terrorist groups that operate not only 
in the shadows but at times right in our own midst. Whether Afghanistan 
or Iraq or here at home, defeating this enemy depends primarily upon 
the ability of our intelligence services to locate, to penetrate and, 
yes, to destroy the terrorist cells. We are involved in a world war 
which requires timely and actionable intelligence to ensure victory and 
the safety of the American people.
  The Director of Central Intelligence is personally responsible for 
producing this intelligence. As we fight Islamic terror, other global 
threats continue to menace our Nation, and among them are these: The 
development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as those in 
Iran and also North Korea; the steady transformation of the People's 
Republic of China into a power capable of challenging our interests 
broadly and exercising influence over the region; and the continuing 
worldwide expansion of WMD technology.

  The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for 
producing intelligence to keep the President and policymakers informed 
about these threats.
  And if that were not daunting enough, Mr. Goss has been nominated for 
a position which in all probability may not exist for much longer. As 
Senators know, the President and many in the Congress now support the 
creation of a new national intelligence director. There has been a 
great deal of discussion among my colleagues about reform. Above all, 
we must ensure that a national intelligence director is something more 
than a weak and ineffective figurehead.
  Most of the debate outside the Intelligence Committee has centered on 
how to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence 
director while leaving the structural status quo undisturbed.
  Many on the Intelligence Committee believe this is simply unworkable. 
In other words, significant structural change is vital to real reform. 
I believe strongly that we must create a new structure. This new 
structure must accommodate the diverse activities of our intelligence 
agency by giving direct responsibility and control of primary 
intelligence disciplines and the corresponding agencies to a truly 
empowered national intelligence director and his assistants. And true 
empowerment includes both budget authority and line authority to direct 
and control the activities of the intelligence activities. One without 
the other may leave us with an intelligence head who can neither 
succeed nor be held accountable, and that would be a most unfortunate 
outcome.
  We don't know how or when reform will finally be enacted. Until then, 
however, we need a strong Director of Central Intelligence with the 
necessary skills to manage a community which needs reform. Porter Goss 
understands these issues. As chairman of the House Intelligence 
Committee he helped create momentum for reform.
  Porter Goss will be a good man to have in the intelligence community 
driver's seat as Congress, in cooperation with the executive branch, 
goes through the consideration of major reform. His unique background 
will serve him well as he meets these and other challenges while 
directing our intelligence community.
  For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his 
State, and his community. As an Army intelligence officer, a 
clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaper man, a county commissioner, a 
U.S. Representative, and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, 
Porter Goss has done his duty with skill, with honor, and with 
integrity. I believe, and Members on both sides agree, that his 
experience makes him uniquely suited to serve as the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
  I have known Mr. Goss personally for 16 years. I served with him in 
the other body, the House of Representatives. I have worked with him on 
a weekly

[[Page S9489]]

basis since I joined the Intelligence Committee. I have formed a strong 
opinion about his fitness to lead the intelligence community.
  One of Porter Goss's most important characteristics is that he does 
not ride in a partisan posse. In that sense and in many others, the 
President has selected an outstanding public servant to be his 
principal adviser on intelligence.
  In concluding my opening statement on the Goss nomination, I would 
like to underscore an important point. If, as I earnestly hope, the 
Senate approves this nomination today, this body will not simply have 
performed a routine pro forma duty. On the contrary, Porter Goss's 
confirmation as the DCI represents perhaps the most important changing 
of the guard for our intelligence community since 1947. This 
confirmation represents a fresh start for our Nation's intelligence 
community. He will be the first Director of Central Intelligence in a 
new and hopefully better intelligence community. It is not the same 
entity that George Tenet inherited when he was confirmed by this body 7 
years ago.
  It is not the same entity that existed on September 10, 2001. The 
intelligence community has undergone vitally important changes since 
the terrorist attacks of 2001. These changes are the result of many 
factors: statutory requirements, Executive orders, and other major 
changes in policy. That snapshot that we took of the intelligence 
community back on September 10, 2001, and the snapshot today is much 
better in terms of improvement. A key factor is the vigilance and 
dedication of the intelligence community rank and file, to include 
those men and women who, today, as I speak, are putting their lives at 
risk in remote and dangerous places to protect our Nation.
  Still other changes are on the immediate horizon as Congress 
considers major intelligence reform. So let us understand clearly what 
we do here today. Porter Goss, as the new DCI, will lead a new 
intelligence community into a new chapter. Senate confirmation of 
Porter Goss does not mean simply painting a new name on the mailbox at 
Langley. It represents the opening of a new era for the intelligence 
community. The errors and omissions of Iraq are well known. They must 
be corrected.
  Steps have been taken and will be taken to ensure that. The errors 
and the omissions of 9/11 are very clearly and thoroughly described in 
both the joint inquiry that was conducted by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and the 9/11 Commission 
Report.
  These errors and omissions must and will be corrected. Porter Goss's 
task will be to build, inspire, and open a new chapter in our 
intelligence activities. We must never forget the errors of the past or 
their human cost. Likewise, we should not dwell on them or allow them 
to paralyze us. We must grapple with them and overcome them. That is 
what is happening now, with structural intelligence community reform. 
Porter Goss's task will be to open the new chapter and lead the 
intelligence community into that fresh start.
  Today, perhaps our highest legislative priority is to repair what is 
broken in the intelligence community. We must not let this laudable 
desire immobilize us.
  John McLaughlin, the Acting Director, has done a professional and 
commendable job as the Acting DCI. He, no less than the rank and file 
of the intelligence community, needs long-term, permanent leadership, 
and we need it now.
  One of the concerns voiced by the 9/11 Commission was that it takes 
too long to put key intelligence community officials into place. In the 
case of this nomination, I believe the Senate definitely got the 
message. The watch word for this nomination since the beginning has 
been goodwill and bipartisanship. As I stated at the beginning, 
Senators Graham and Nelson of Florida introduced and strongly endorsed 
this nominee at his first confirmation hearing. We had an impressive 
bipartisan vote on this nomination in the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. The ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the 
Honorable Ms. Jane Harman, has pointed with pride to her committee's 
involvement in intelligence reform under Mr. Goss's chairmanship. 
Expressions of support for this nomination have come from both sides of 
the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill.
  This nominee is ready to go to work and he is needed. I urge the 
Senate to confirm him as soon as possible. I, personally, and I think I 
speak for the members of the Intelligence Committee, look forward to 
working with Porter Goss, the next and possibly last DCI.
  I understand the vice chair is waiting to speak, but I ask his 
indulgence to permit Senator Chambliss to speak first.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Yes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. How much time does the Senator request?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I request 7 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield him such time as he would consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator from West 
Virginia allowing me to go before him. The leadership that the chairman 
and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee have 
provided has been unparalleled in this difficult time in the history of 
our country. Both Senators have conducted themselves in a very 
professional way and have brought continued honor and dignity to the 
Senate Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan way, and I want to 
publicly commend both of them for their leadership.
  I rise today in support of the nomination of Porter Goss to be the 
Director of Central Intelligence. There is no more important time in 
the history of our country, from an intelligence perspective, than we 
are in today. Porter Goss has been nominated by the President to be the 
chief intelligence officer for the United States. Porter Goss brings to 
the office an unparalleled wealth of experience and knowledge relative 
to intelligence matters. Porter Goss has been a friend of mine for 10 
years, and I bring to this argument and this debate a little bit 
different perspective than any other Member of this body because I 
served in the House of Representatives for 8 years with Porter Goss, 
the last 2 as a member of the House Intelligence Committee under the 
chairmanship of Porter Goss.
  During the last 2 years as a Member of the Senate and as a member of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have continued a 
relationship with Porter Goss in the intelligence community. Both 
before September 11 and subsequent to September 11, I have seen Porter 
Goss in the trenches doing the kind of work that lawmakers have to do 
relative to their day-to-day jobs. Nobody has provided stronger 
leadership on the issue of intelligence than Porter Goss has, both 
before September 11 as well as after September 11, and more 
significantly after.
  As I think about the arguments that have been brought forth in the 
public hearings over the last couple of weeks regarding Mr. Goss, the 
primary thrust of the negative arguments have been that he is too 
partisan and too political to carry out the job of the DCI.
  Well, I will say this about this man for whom I have so much respect: 
I have seen him in an atmosphere of committee work. I have seen him in 
an atmosphere of social work. I have seen him in an atmosphere of 
operating on the floor of the House of Representatives. Certainly, 
there is nobody who is a stronger advocate for his position on any 
issue than Porter Goss. He is very direct. He is very plain spoken, and 
it is pretty obvious which side of the issue he is on. But he always 
does his arguing in a very respectful way, and in a way which advocates 
his position but does not get into personalities. Unfortunately, that 
is where the partisanship occurs in both this body and the body across 
the U.S. Capitol.
  Porter Goss has conducted himself in a professional and nonpartisan 
way as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, as well 
as a member of the Rules Committee and otherwise in the U.S. House. He 
is a strong advocate for his positions but he is not a partisan person.
  I will discuss very quickly why I feel so strongly about his 
background and what it brings to the table relative to his 
confirmation. Porter Goss started out early in his career as a military 
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. He then moved into the realm of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and was a

[[Page S9490]]

clandestine officer for the CIA in two different overseas posts. He 
knows the people within the CIA. A number of individuals who he served 
with during his CIA years are still employees at the CIA. He knows not 
only the organization, but he knows the personalities, and he knows the 
kinds of people who are led, and the kinds of people who need to lead 
at the Central Intelligence Agency.
  Porter Goss followed his time as an Intelligence Officer in the field 
with 8 years as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. 
He has covered the spectrum from an intelligence perspective. He has 
been on the ground as an Army intelligence officer, and the Department 
of Defense is the largest customer of the CIA. He has been at the 
ground level of the CIA, where the real work is done and where the real 
intelligence is gathered, by being a clandestine officer within the 
CIA. Then in his years as chairman of the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence he has been in a position to provide oversight for the 
work that not only he did as an active member of the intelligence 
community but following, particularly, post-September 11 he has 
provided the oversight and been critical where he needed to be 
critical, and yet complimentary where he needed to compliment the 
intelligence community relative to the work they were doing.
  I don't know of anyone else who has the same diversified background 
as a soldier, a clandestine case officer, and a legislator as does 
Porter. It is pretty obvious that his background and vast experience 
are two of the main reasons why the President selected Mr. Goss to be 
the next Director of Central Intelligence.
  Porter Goss is a personal friend and he is somebody for whom I have 
great respect. I know what kind of family man he is, I know the 
strength of his character, and I know his dedication to duty, which is 
why he accepted the nomination to become our next DCI. I also know the 
wealth of intelligence background he will bring to the table as our 
next DCI.
  The main point I want to conclude with is the fact that we are in a 
very complex world. We are in a world where intelligence matters. We 
are in a world where we need to have the cooperation of our allies 
around the world to collect intelligence against common enemies and 
common threats.
  I have been with Porter Goss when he has had meetings with numerous--
too many to detail--heads of the intelligence communities of our 
allies, both abroad as well as here in Washington. I have seen the 
rapport and the relationship he enjoys with these individuals. I have 
been to other countries around the world to meet with the heads of 
their intelligence agencies, and the first question they will ask is 
not how am I doing but, ``How is my friend Porter Goss doing?'' He has 
an unparalleled relationship with the intelligence community around the 
world--not because he is just a good guy but because they respect him 
for the work he has done and they respect him for the knowledge and the 
experience he brings to the table relative to the intelligence 
community.
  I strongly support the nomination of Porter Goss to be the next 
Director of Central Intelligence. I ask my colleagues to review the 
record on Mr. Goss, listen to the debates, but at the end of the day I 
hope we will send a resounding message to the President, and that is: 
You have picked the right man. Let's confirm Porter Goss as Director of 
Central Intelligence and move forward.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may use to the 
distinguished Senator from Missouri, a member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman.
  It is a pleasure today to rise in support of Porter Goss to be 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Senate Intelligence 
Committee has done its due diligence. It has done its duty with regard 
to examining the nominee's fitness and qualification for the post of 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His nomination should be 
approved without delay.
  Much of the work that goes on in the Intelligence Committee is 
conducted in confidence because of the need to maintain 
confidentiality. But I will say that the thorough hearings we had on 
Congressman Goss were similar to the thorough hearings we have had on 
all of the subjects brought under the jurisdiction and supervision of 
our distinguished chairman from Kansas, along with the ranking 
Democratic member from West Virginia.
  There is no question that there is a lot of important work awaiting 
the new Director of Central Intelligence. Somebody has to be in charge. 
We are at war with those who seek to destroy us and all freedom-loving 
people's way of life.
  Whether we have a new national Director of Intelligence, whether we 
have a CIA Director with expanded powers or limited powers, the fact 
remains that we need to move forward with the nomination of Porter 
Goss.
  We have a long way to go to hash out what kinds of changes we are 
going to make to the organization of the intelligence committee. The 
more I hear, the more I watch other committees working, the more 
divergence of opinions I see. Whatever structure we have, we need 
somebody to control intelligence and make sure we put it on the right 
path.
  A cornerstone of our fight in the war against terrorists, as well as 
other challenges that confront us, is the paramount need for timely and 
actionable intelligence to ensure good policy decisions, to ensure 
adequate preparation for actions that we may take, and to ensure 
victory for our forces that are deployed in the real-life battles 
against those who threaten us or threaten national security. Our 
national security depends on the ability of intelligence services to 
locate, penetrate, identify targets, and/or destroy terrorist cells.
  In addition, we need a Director of Central Intelligence who will keep 
policymakers informed about other global threats facing our Nation. 
And, yes, while we are looking at the war on terrorism, we need to be 
concerned about and following developments about the possible nuclear 
program advances or missile advances in Iran and North Korea, the 
steady growth of troubling developments in other major world powers, 
and the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
technology.
  The intelligence community needs a leader right now, the support of 
the President, and the support of this body who has the experience 
coupled with a commitment to reform. I am convinced that Porter Goss 
possesses these qualities. He was a former intelligence officer, a 
former CIA clandestine officer, and as chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee, where he probably also went in harm's way to 
handle that post, Porter Goss clearly knows the intelligence business 
and has the experience.
  As cochairman of the joint House-Senate inquiry into the 9/11 
intelligence failures, he is intimately aware of the problems currently 
existing within the intelligence community's ability to counter 
terrorists. He is someone who will work with the Congress and the 
administration to implement needed reforms.
  Mr. Goss has also earned the respect of his colleagues and fellow 
policymakers on both sides of the aisle. One of the most, if not the 
most important principles that applies to our intelligence community 
and our oversight should be our nonpartisanship.
  Porter Goss has been praised by his Democratic colleagues year after 
year for being nonpartisan on national security.
  Senator Graham of Florida said of Porter Goss, in our hearing:

       He is uniquely qualified to be here today as the 
     President's nominee to serve as the Director of Central 
     Intelligence. . . . He is a man of great character, unusual 
     intelligence, a tremendous work ethic and an outstanding 
     personal and professional standard of integrity.

  Senator Graham also went on to say:

       In addition to those personal qualities, when it comes to 
     the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has, in my 
     judgment, a balanced perspective, a perspective gained both 
     as an insider and then as an outsider. For a decade, early in 
     his career, Congressman Goss served our Nation in both the 
     Army and the CIA. He knows firsthand the value and the risk 
     of clandestine operations.

  I could cite many other statements by leaders in both bodies. Senator 
Bill Nelson of Florida, last month, said of Representative Goss:


[[Page S9491]]


       He's a class act. Goss combines all of those 
     characteristics, which are kind of somebody I like.

  My colleague and friend from Missouri, Representative Ike Skelton, 
the minority leader on the Armed Services Committee, said, in 1997, 
talking about the work on the intelligence authorization bill:

       I salute both the chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
     Goss], and the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from 
     Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their dedicated and bipartisan 
     work.

  I believe he can work on a bipartisan basis. In addition, Porter Goss 
understands the endemic deficiencies within the intelligence community. 
There can only be true, meaningful changes if there is a solid 
understanding of why change is necessary. Porter Goss understands what 
is broken and is determined to work with us to fix what needs to be 
fixed and not to mess with what does not need to be fixed.
  There are some glaring problems we identified in our report on the 
prewar intelligence on Iraq. One of them was the poor state of human 
intelligence. That is spies on the ground, HUMINT as it is called in 
intel-speak. We did not have any. What a disaster. We also have 
problems in collection in general, analysis, and the consistent 
problems with information sharing. These are problems that Porter Goss 
has, during his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, 
devoted himself to improving.
  As Chairman Roberts mentioned in yesterday's open session, Porter 
Goss held over 62 hearings on intelligence community reform issues this 
year.
  Under Chairman Goss's leadership, the House Intelligence Committee 
advocated changes and added resources annually to address the 
intelligence community's most pressing problems, especially those 
related to HUMINT and analysis.
  His commitment to reform forced the CIA to repeal its restrictive 
internal guidelines that had a ``chilling effect'' on HUMINT 
operations. He attempted to refocus CIA analytic resources toward 
longer term, predictive, strategic intelligence, and directed that more 
attention be paid to language training, breaking down stovepipes, and 
enhancing information sharing.

  I can tell you, the stovepipes still exist. We still have 
bureaucracies that only want to share information up and down within 
their little fiefdoms, and we need somebody in charge who is willing to 
break down those barriers and make sure sensitive information is shared 
on a need-to-know basis.
  Porter Goss was a member of the Aspin-Brown commission which was 
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the 
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. The commission made 
a number of recommendations, including looking how to streamline the 
DCI's responsibilities and give him more flexibility in managing the 
intelligence community.
  Those who question Porter Goss's commitment to change must remember 
that his leadership and dedication to intelligence community reform is 
apparent in his work on the ``Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001.'' This report contained 19 recommendations. It laid the 
foundation for the 9/11 Commission recommendations--the changes that 
have been the subject of much discussion in the press over the last 
several months.
  Those who question Representative Goss's commitment to reform as well 
as his commitment to operate independent of the current administration 
should recall that Mr. Goss took the initiative to introduce his 
intelligence reform legislation on June 16 of this year, H.R. 4584, 
which called for significant changes in the intelligence community 
structure in addition to providing a DCI or DNI the much needed 
personnel and budgetary authority required to be a truly effective 
leader. It should be noted that Porter Goss's legislation did not fall 
in lockstep with the recent Executive order issued by the President, 
thus proving that Mr. Goss will take the necessary bold steps to do 
what is right for the community.
  I quoted Senator Nelson of Florida earlier, but he also said of 
Porter Goss:

     . . . Congressman Goss is someone whose public life has been 
     illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair and independent.

  When Porter Goss was pressed to defend past partisan statements 
before our committee, he acknowledged there are times on Capitol Hill 
when partisanship will rear its head. That is, unfortunately, part of 
the job. However, he told our committee the following:

       I well understand that I am leaving one arena and, if 
     confirmed, heading to another arena that operates completely 
     differently where partisan politics are not part of the job.

  A considerable record has been created, embracing both substantial 
comment on Porter Goss on his nomination and several commitments by him 
on intelligence matters involving counterterrorism and other important 
activities. I stress again the importance of approving Mr. Goss's 
nomination at this time of paramount importance in the intelligence 
community. I hope my colleagues will join with the chairman, with me, 
and other members of the committee in extending him our support.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  Mr. President, the nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the 
next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes, obviously, at 
an absolutely critical time in our Nation's history.
  The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11 and leading up to the war in Iraq have left the 
intelligence community's credibility bruised and their image tarnished, 
which none of us wants.
  The community's objectivity, their independence, and their competency 
have been called into question. That is fair in some cases. As a 
result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the point 
where the Congress is on the threshold of passing landmark legislation, 
I believe and I hope, to create a stronger, better managed intelligence 
community before we adjourn this year. I do not think we should stretch 
it out and wait. I think we should do it, and do it now.
  The next Director of Central Intelligence will be the most important 
person for that position ever confirmed by the Senate. Our decision on 
who should lead the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other 14 
intelligence agencies, according to the law, should not be a 
rubberstamp job.
  The importance of this position requires a thorough examination of 
the nominee's record and his ability to carry out the weighty 
responsibilities of the job.
  As I have indicated, never before in the 57-year history of the 
intelligence community has there been such a need for a Director of 
Central Intelligence with unimpeachable character, proven leadership 
and management experience, and strong national security credentials.
  The new Director will face, in my judgment, no fewer than four major 
challenges: waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine campaign 
against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations around the world; 
supporting ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; 
managing an intelligence community in a state of transition; and, 
restoring the intelligence community's lost credibility.
  The next Director of Central Intelligence must be extraordinarily 
qualified in order to successfully carry out these and other national 
security tasks.
  I simply say all of this to say the stakes are enormous. Perhaps most 
importantly, the next Director of Central Intelligence must be 
nonpartisan, independent, and objective. This standard is not simply 
this Senator's; it is what the law, the National Security Act law, 
requires specifically in language.
  I know of no other position of importance in Government requiring 
that independence, objectivity, and non-partisanship as a requirement 
for confirmation. The very first responsibility of the Director of 
Central Intelligence under the National Security Act--and these are the 
words--says that his advice to the President, the executive branch, the 
military, and the Congress must be timely, must be objective, and must 
be independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources 
available to the intelligence community. That is the law.

[[Page S9492]]

  I have reviewed Representative Goss's record closely. I have gone 
over his writings and his speeches of the past 10 years. We have just 
completed two open hearings, which I thought were good hearings, in the 
Intelligence Committee, where Representative Goss was asked questions 
about his past record, his commitment to reform the intelligence 
community, and his ability to be forthright, objective, and 
independent.
  Representative Goss is, without question, qualified in many respects. 
He is a fine person. I have been able to work with him well over the 
past few years--that is not one of the requirements, but it happens to 
be true--both in the joint congressional inquiry into 9/11, and also in 
House-Senate conferences. His past employment with the Central 
Intelligence Agency, doing extremely dangerous work, and his 7-year 
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, have given him 
both an insider's and outsider's perspective of the intelligence 
community. There is no doubt that he is an extremely knowledgeable 
person with respect to the inner workings of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the other agencies he is nominated to manage.
  But Representative Goss's record is troubling in other regards. I 
wish to speak about them. He has made a number of statements relative 
to intelligence matters--many in the past year--that are, in fact, 
highly partisan and displayed a willingness on his part to use 
intelligence issues as a political broadsword against members of the 
Democratic Party. Again, ordinarily, that is kind of routine around 
here, but with respect to the Director of Central Intelligence, that 
should not be and cannot be according to the law. When taken 
collectively, this list of partisan statements and actions on 
intelligence matters raise a serious doubt in my mind as to whether 
Porter Goss can be the type of nonpartisan, independent, and objective 
national intelligence adviser our country needs.
  What is the public record of the person the President has nominated 
to be the next director of the CIA? Has he been independent, objective, 
and nonpartisan on intelligence issues, again, as required by law?
  In March of this year, Representative Goss coauthored an intelligence 
op-ed piece entitled ``Need Intelligence? Don't ask John Kerry.'' In 
this political attack piece, he made a number of highly charged 
political allegations relating to intelligence spending. These are 
quotes from the Congressman:

     . . . when Democrats controlled the Congress, the cuts were 
     deep, far-reaching, and devastating to the ability of the CIA 
     to do its job to keep America safe.
       . . . during the Clinton years, the Intelligence Community 
     was given a clear message that if they failed in politically 
     risky operations . . . there would be no backing from the 
     Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled Congress.

  And then Representative Goss targeted Senator Kerry, who he claims 
``was leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the 
intelligence community's budget'' and ``was leading efforts in Congress 
to dismantle the Nation's intelligence capabilities.'' Severe 
criticism. A few months later, in a June 23, 2004 statement on the 
floor of the House, Representative Goss claimed that ``the Democratic 
Party did not support the Intelligence Community.'' And in the same 
June floor debate, he offered the following justification for his 
claim:

       My comment is that when there was opposition to 
     intelligence and, year after year, efforts to cut the 
     intelligence budget, they did come from the Democratic side 
     through the period of the 1990s.

  I have gone back over the record and determined that Representative 
Goss's election year claims mischaracterize the intelligence record of 
both the Democratic Party and Senator Kerry, in my judgment. He also 
failed to point out his own record as a member, and eventual chairman, 
of the House Intelligence Committee during this time. Had he stated the 
intelligence record factually, it would have taken the sting out of his 
political attacks and created an entirely different picture than the 
one he painted.
  It is true that during the first two years of the Clinton 
administration, the intelligence budgets declined. That is true. This 
was a period of deep cuts in almost all areas of Government, as we 
tried to grapple with the legacy of the previous 12 years of 
uncontrolled deficits. Over the next 6 years, however, the Clinton 
administration's budget increased every single year for intelligence. 
During that 6-year period, fiscal years 1996 to 2001, Republicans 
controlled both Houses of Congress, and the Congress cut the 
President's request in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001. In 1999, the 
Republican-controlled Congress initially cut the intelligence budget, 
but then passed a large one-time supplemental appropriation.
  In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned to 
its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks, 
Congress once again passed emergency supplemental funding. By that 
point, the Democrats had a majority of the Senate--briefly.
  Representative Goss voted for every Intelligence authorization bill 
and every Defense appropriation bill during this period. So he must 
have thought that the so-called underfunding President Clinton was 
requesting was acceptable.
  Now, I want to look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994, 
and I want to contrast that with a bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by 
Representative Solomon that had as its first cosponsor Congressman 
Goss.
  In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45 
billion over 5 years--at a time when Congress was searching for ways to 
undo the 12 years of uncontrolled deficits under the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. Senator Kerry's proposal would have rescinded $1 
billion from the 1994 Intelligence appropriations and then increased 
intelligence spending over the next 4 years by the inflation rate. 
Representative Goss's proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4 
percent of the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the 
following 5 years. After the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry's 
proposal would have provided significantly more funding for 
intelligence than was appropriated by the Congress controlled by the 
Republicans, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.
  Representative Goss's proposal, on the other hand, would have 
resulted in dramatically lower intelligence funding and, in fact John 
Kerry's proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion more for 
intelligence than Congressman Goss's lead-cosponsored bill.
  And worse, all of the cuts Representative Goss proposed in 1995 would 
have been achieved by firing 20 percent, by law, of America's 
intelligence officers at the very time the terrorist threat from al-
Qaida was growing. In fact, had the Congress followed the Goss plan, 
the intelligence community would have had tens of thousands fewer 
intelligence officers in the year 2000: fewer intelligence collectors 
in the CIA, NSA, and elsewhere; fewer intelligence analysts across the 
community; fewer intelligence officers in the military service; and 
fewer counterterrorism officers in the FBI.
  The Goss plan would have made, using his own words, in fact, ``deep 
and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget.'' But this 
year, an election year, Representative Goss chose to level that charge 
against the Democratic Party as a whole and Senator John Kerry by name. 
Why? When asked at the nomination hearing to reconcile these facts with 
his charge that it was the Democrats who did not support intelligence, 
Representative Goss simply said, ``The record is the record,'' about 
four or five times. He also refused to admit that his accusations might 
have been in error.
  When asked whether anyone from the White House or the President's 
reelection campaign asked him to write the March editorial and to give 
the June floor statement against John Kerry, he said he couldn't 
recall.
  Representative Goss's unwillingness to be forthright in his answers 
on this matter were troubling to me and a number of my colleagues on 
the committee. His dismissive answers to tough, but as I said 
repeatedly, I thought fair questions lacked candor.
  I was left with doubt that as Director of Central Intelligence, he 
would have a forceful and independent voice on intelligence assessments 
that do not necessarily support a political agenda, if there is one, of 
the current President.
  There are other instances where Representative Goss, as chairman of 
the House Intelligence Committee, played the partisan blame game. It is 
against the law for the Director of the CIA to

[[Page S9493]]

be involved in such. That was then. He is being confirmed now. Does 
this man's life change completely after 15 years from partisanship to 
total nonpartisanship?
  In 1999, when it was disclosed that the Chinese espionage efforts 
against our Department of Energy weapons laboratories may have resulted 
in loss of sensitive nuclear weapons design information, a counter-
investigation was begun, eventually resulting in charges being brought 
against Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee.
  Representative Goss repeatedly laid the blame for this espionage 
activity on the Clinton administration's failure to protect national 
security. In the final days of the 2000 Presidential election campaign, 
Representative Goss took to the House floor and stated:

       We have in the Clinton-Gore administration seen a cultural 
     disdain for security.

  Again, Representative Goss's statements on important intelligence 
issues mischaracterized the record in the attempt to score political 
points.
  The Cox Commission, which Porter Goss served on as vice chairman, 
found that the security problems at the Department of Energy weapons 
laboratories predated the Clinton administration and that the Chinese 
espionage collection program against the weapons lab began in the 
1970s.
  The Cox Commission report also noted it was the Clinton 
administration that issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 requiring 
the Department of Energy to improve counterintelligence programs.
  Evidently, mentioning these points was not helpful to Representative 
Goss when he was making sweeping statements about ``a cultural disdain 
for security,'' which is highly offensive to me as a Democrat who is 
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and I think all 
Republicans and all Democrats care desperately, seriously about what 
happens in intelligence.

  In the rush to assign partisan blame, Representative Goss ignored the 
record. In a number of other statements, Representative Goss 
erroneously singled out the Clinton administration and congressional 
Democrats for cutting human intelligence programs in the 1990s that, in 
turn, he said, limited the intelligence community's ability to carry 
out its mission.
  Yet it was Representative Goss himself who said in 1998 that human 
intelligence collection programs needed to be cut by the time the 1990s 
began. His comment specifically was:

       I am convinced that the U.S. clandestine service, the CIA 
     Directorate of Operations was in the mid to late 1980s too 
     large.

  When the identity of Valerie Plame, an intelligence officer with the 
CIA whose clandestine identity is protected by law from unauthorized 
disclosure, was leaked and published by columnist Robert Novak, 
Representative Goss was asked whether the disclosure warranted 
investigation. His response was stunning. He said:

       Someone sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an 
     investigation.

  The whole basis for the law protecting the identity of covered 
intelligence community employees from being disclosed is to protect the 
lives of American intelligence officials that are endangered if their 
true identity is known to our adversaries.
  As a former CIA case officer and chairman of the House Intelligence 
Committee, Representative Goss knows this. For him to make such a 
statement, with its clearly implied shot at President Clinton, was 
wrong, inappropriate, and insensitive to the gravity of the matter. I 
hope Representative Goss, if confirmed by the Senate to lead the CIA, 
will have a more serious attitude toward the outing of CIA employees 
undercover.
  When Richard Clarke, the coordinator for counterterrorism for the 
National Security Council from 1993 to October 2001, provided testimony 
to the 9/11 Commission that was clearly damaging to Bush administration 
claims, Representative Goss, and others, questioned his integrity and 
claimed he may have lied before the joint congressional inquiry in 
closed session, vowing to declassify his testimony to prove it.
  These claims were never substantiated, and when the National Security 
Council forwarded to Chairman Goss, as requested, a declassified 
version of Richard Clarke's testimony on June 25, nearly 3 months ago, 
he took no action to publicly release it so that allegations of perjury 
and the like could be laid to rest.
  While the Senate voted to support the creation of the independent 
National 9/11 Commission, which eventually became the Commission led by 
Governor Tom Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton, Representative Goss 
opposed the measure on the House floor.
  When the Senate and House Intelligence Committees met in the fall of 
2002 to conference this issue, he continued to oppose the creation of 
an independent 9/11 Commission stating that the issue would be decided 
``above my pay grade.''
  When the Senate Intelligence Committee undertook an investigation 
into the use of intelligence--not the collection, analysis, and 
production of intelligence, but when you hand it to policymakers--the 
use of intelligence by the administration officials prior to the war as 
part of our broader Iraq intelligence inquiry, Representative Goss made 
disparaging comments about two Democratic Senators in particular who, 
like many others in this body, are profoundly concerned about the 
veracity of public statements made about the U.S. intelligence agency, 
calling them ``two old attack dogs gumming their way through artificial 
outrage about something they should know a lot more about and be more 
responsible about.''
  What makes this particular criticism curious is Representative Goss's 
lack of action on the issue of pre-war intelligence. Despite assurances 
over a year ago that the House Intelligence Committee was evaluating 
the intelligence community's performance on Iraq since the end of the 
gulf war, Chairman Goss failed to issue the promised report on the 
failures and mistakes leading up to the war.
  Chairman Roberts and I, in a thoroughly bipartisan fashion, did so in 
a 17-to-0 vote. I think we are both proud of that, and justifiably so, 
along with our colleagues on the committee. The House produced nothing. 
They produced press releases, but nothing else.
  When both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, as committees with shared jurisdiction, began 
holding difficult but necessary oversight hearings into the improper 
treatment and interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, Representative Goss 
viewed our actions with disdain, saying:

       I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing . . . I 
     do honestly question whether or not they have balance over 
     there on this issue . . . We've got a circus in the Senate, 
     which is always the likely place to look for this circus.

  Porter Goss chose to denigrate the Senate's investigation, while the 
House chose to largely ignore the matter and not ask the tough 
questions about what happened inside Abu Ghraib prison and at other 
detention facilities in Iraq or elsewhere.
  All too often, Representative Goss's statements and actions as 
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee seemed designed to protect 
the administration by avoiding contentious issues which could be 
embarrassing to the administration and placing blame on Democrats for 
shortcomings in the intelligence community.
  Not surprisingly, one thing missing from Representative Goss's 
records is any public statements on intelligence critical of Members of 
his own party or the administration. During his nomination hearing, 
Representative Goss assured the committee that these partisan 
inclinations of the past would not prevent him from carrying out his 
duties as Director of Central Intelligence. He said he understood the 
Director must be an independent adviser to the President and the 
Congress, beyond reproach and beyond the reach of politics.
  While I appreciate his testimony and commitment to being a 
nonpartisan Director of Intelligence, I cannot say with absolute 
certainty that he will be exactly that. I must vote on his record. I 
cannot vote on his promise, and I do not think the Senate should. His 
record is his record. He said it.
  The truth is, Chairman Goss and I have a very good working 
relationship, one that I expect will continue and improve in the 
future. We had a good exchange in recent days, even during difficult 
nomination hearings. In contrast to those who wish to gloss over this 
issue, Porter Goss himself understands exactly the dilemma that I and

[[Page S9494]]

many of my colleagues face with this nomination. He knows this is one 
of only a handful of positions in the entire U.S. Government that 
requires by law nonpartisanship and objectivity, and in this case the 
demand is all the greater because it is about our national security.
  Porter Goss openly acknowledged in his testimony before the committee 
this week that he has at times approached national security issues with 
excessive partisanship, and he expressed regret about that. And I 
respect that. I believe Porter Goss knows that in essence, on this 
whole question of independence, he is asking us to take it on faith, so 
to speak, that he can make a clean break from the last 10 to 20 years 
of his political career.
  I hope he is right. I very much want him to be right about that, but 
at end of the day I do not think taking it on faith is enough for this 
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee when it comes to such a 
critical position of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not meet 
the legal standard, and it does not meet my obligation, in my judgment, 
as vice chairman.
  These are troubled times for the intelligence community in our 
country. In so many ways, we are still recovering from the tragedy of 
9/11. We are grappling with the tragic impact of flawed and exaggerated 
intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq, and we are struggling still 
to understand the truth about what is happening in the world.
  Just yesterday, our President surprised and shocked many of us by 
dismissing outright the highest level of consensus view of the 
intelligence community when he said they were ``just guessing'' about 
the gravity of the situation in Iraq.
  In light of all of this, I believe I owe it to the men and women of 
the intelligence community to send a clear and strong signal about the 
paramount importance of independence and objectivity. It needs to be 
said not only in words but in action. So I will vote against the 
nomination of Porter Goss to be the next DCI.
  I sincerely hope Porter Goss will prove my vote wrong, and I told him 
that. In fact, I intend to work with him in order to help him prove me 
wrong. But based on his record of partisanship, based on the dictates 
of the law, and based on my own strong conviction against mixing 
politics and intelligence at the CIA, I must vote no.
  I yield the floor.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Oregon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, in beginning my comments, I first want to 
commend the chairman, Senator Roberts, for the way in which he 
conducted the hearing. He was eminently fair. I believe I had five 
rounds of questions myself for the nominee, and I want to express my 
appreciation to the chairman for the way he conducted the hearings, and 
also express my thanks to Senator Rockefeller. His leadership on the 
committee has been invaluable to me.
  I also want to commend the vice chairman for an excellent statement 
this afternoon, much of which I agree with, as he knows.
  Porter Goss is a good man and a good Congressman, but his long record 
of supporting business-as-usual intelligence policies is not good 
enough to warrant his appointment as CIA Director at this dangerous 
hour. Mr. Goss showed that on his watch, as chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee, he passed on virtually every opportunity to 
move aggressively for reform. His commitment to public service is 
unquestioned, but his unwillingness to displease the powerful to force 
change in our intelligence community is unfortunate.
  In the committee, there were three major areas that came up as we 
sought to evaluate the nominee. The first, as the distinguished Senator 
from West Virginia has talked about today, has been the issue of 
partisanship. The second area at which the senior Senator from 
Michigan, Mr. Levin, looked at some length, was the question of the 
nominee's ability to objectively analyze intelligence. The third was 
the area that I focused on, which was why the nominee has been so slow 
to push aggressively for intelligence reform.
  I have come to the conclusion that it is possible--and we have all 
tried, as the Senator from West Virginia has said, to give one the 
benefit of the doubt in these various areas. I have come to the 
conclusion that I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt on the 
issue of partisanship. I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt 
with respect to his pledge to be objective in analyzing intelligence. 
But I just cannot get over the answers we were given during almost 9 
hours of hearings with respect to why the nominee was so slow to be an 
agent for change in the intelligence community.
  It is really that leadership that I find so central. I have tried, as 
a member of the committee, to be as bipartisan as I possibly can. We 
understand politics should stop at our borders. We all stand ready to 
put in place the policies necessary to protect America's security, but 
to do that we need leadership.
  I and others try to be bipartisan. Senator Lott, Senator Snowe, 
Senator Graham, and others sought, for example, to change the way 
Government documents are classified. I think that is an important 
issue, to make the right structural changes in intelligence. But if we 
do not get the right information, information consistent with national 
security and not classified for political purposes, we are still going 
to have problems making reforms in the intelligence area.
  I want to be bipartisan. I listened carefully to the questions that 
were asked in the committee, good questions by Senator Rockefeller, and 
I am willing to give the nominee the benefit of the doubt with respect 
to the partisanship issue.
  But I will tell you, the answers that we were given with respect to 
why it took the nominee so long to push for changes in the intelligence 
community still leave me unconvinced. For example, at one point in our 
hearings the nominee told me it was difficult to get attention to the 
issues of intelligence on his watch. He said the reason he had not 
introduced legislation is that people were not focused on it; it was 
hard to get people's attention.
  Let's think about what happened in those years when we evaluate the 
nominee's response on that question. Porter Goss was chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee in 1998 when al-Qaida bombed our embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania. He was chairman of the Intelligence Committee in 
1999 when the United States was investigating allegations of Chinese 
theft of our nuclear materials. He was chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee when the USS Cole was bombed by al-Qaida in October of 2000. 
And, of course, he was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee 
when we faced 9/11.
  It took him nearly 3 years to introduce reform legislation after 9/
11. I believe that is not good enough. I believe a chairman of a key 
committee can get attention when that chairman wants to use that 
chairmanship as a bully pulpit to be an agent for change. I believe a 
chairman who is committed to intelligence reform has the chance, when 
he bangs his gavel, to speak out for why changes are needed.
  A leader must lead. We all get election certificates, in the U.S. 
Congress, to try to tackle problems, important problems, but chairmen 
have a special opportunity. If you look at the long record--and he said 
the record is the record--the nominee passed on virtually every 
opportunity to use his bully pulpit, to use his gavel, and to work for 
the kind of changes that would make this country as safe as necessary.
  We, all of us, understand it takes courage to rock the boat. It takes 
courage to be an agent for bold change. But if you want an example of 
an individual who did it, an individual who is a prominent Republican, 
you need look no further than former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and 
his performance as the Chair of the 9/11 Commission. This stalwart 
Republican made truth his only goal. He pressed Republicans and 
Democrats alike to do the same. He was more successful and has already 
begun to engineer more change than hardly anybody thought possible in 
this fractured political climate. What a boon it would have been, had 
we had the same commitment to change on the issue of intelligence, 
intelligence reform, by the current nominee to head the CIA.
  The current nominee had a front row seat during all those years, the 
years I

[[Page S9495]]

outlined when those terrible acts of terrorism occurred, when he could 
have pushed for reform. Yet after weeks of going through the nominee's 
record and 2 full days of questioning, I am hard pressed to find 
anywhere--in a bill, a vote, or an inquiry--anything that demonstrates 
the nominee will hold people accountable, for example, rather than just 
going along with the status quo.
  The record shows, to me, again and again, the nominee chose to play 
it safe rather than take the risks necessary to bring about change in 
the intelligence community. When I looked at Mr. Goss's record, the 
first question that occurred to me was could he give us some examples, 
some concrete examples of when he was willing to stand up, to go 
against the popular wisdom and even his own party to bring about 
change; whether he was willing to take the far less dangerous risks 
that we take as Congressmen and elected officials than lots of other 
people do, certainly those wearing the uniform.
  Right now, we need somebody to head the CIA who is willing to stand 
up, who is willing to help this country come up with policies that 
leave the Cold War mentality behind--those are fit for a very different 
kind of threat--and to hold himself and others accountable.

  Mr. Goss has a long, distinguished career as a Member of Congress. I 
know him personally. I served with him in the other body. It would be 
hard to find a more decent individual. I will say there are very few 
jobs in the Government of our country at which I don't think Porter 
Goss would do a good job. But being effective here on Capitol Hill and 
in other parts of the Government is not where I set the bar for this 
key appointment. The bar ought to be set very high because we know we 
have great challenges ahead of us.
  For example, I have come to the conclusion that on the intelligence 
reform legislation we, hopefully, will be dealing with on the floor of 
the Senate shortly, it may not be the structural problems that are our 
greatest challenge in improving intelligence and making our country 
safer. I think there is more to it than moving the boxes around on an 
organizational chart with respect to intelligence. I think this is as 
much a people problem as a structural problem. If you are going to 
solve those problems, in the area of people, human interaction, you 
have to have leadership, you have to have somebody who is willing to 
stick his or her neck out.
  That is where I set the bar. I think the long record and the 
questions I asked established beyond a doubt that Porter Goss is a good 
man. He has been a good legislator. But there simply is no evidence 
that he is willing to rock the boat in the intelligence community, 
which I think is necessary to make this country as safe as it needs to 
be.
  For that reason I join the distinguished vice chairman of our 
committee in opposing the nomination. Like the vice chairman, I am very 
hopeful I will be proved wrong. As I said, on the issue of 
partisanship, on the issue of objectivity of analysis, I give the 
nominee the benefit of the doubt. With respect to his willingness to 
fight aggressively for bold change, I remain unconvinced. For that 
reason I will oppose the nominee.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The distinguished Senator from 
Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield as much time as he may need to a valued member 
of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I believe Porter Goss is the right 
man certainly in this crucial time in the history of our intelligence 
community.

  Porter Goss spent over a decade at the CIA. He had the opportunity to 
see it from the inside, to work there in a distinguished career. For 
the last few years, he has had the opportunity to serve in the 
Congress, to serve on the Intelligence Committee in the House, and then 
for the last few years as the chairman. I think it is significant that 
he has been the chairman for the last few years at the same time many 
of us have served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, when the force 
of history has compelled all of us to examine as we have never done 
before the role of the intelligence community in the world we live in 
today, a world confronted by the failures of the intelligence 
community, where we have taken a magnifying glass for the last several 
years as Members of the House and Members of the Senate to see exactly 
what is wrong with the intelligence community. There has only been a 
handful of people who have had that experience. Some of them are in 
this room today.
  Porter Goss has distinguished himself in that exercise as chairman of 
the House Intelligence Committee, as the leader in the House when we 
went through the joint Senate-House investigation. I had the chance to 
watch him through that endeavor. I had the chance to watch him learn, 
as all of us did, about the tragedy of September 11 and how the 
intelligence community did not function the way we want it to function.
  In Porter Goss we will have someone who knows the community from the 
inside, but also has stood back, been on the other side, been on the 
outside, and has looked at it to see what is wrong, and has looked at 
it in a critical time in our history. I think that is so very important 
as we begin the task as a country and he begins the task as the new 
Director of the CIA to bring about needed reform.
  This is a tough job, but I believe Porter Goss is a tough man. I 
believe he is the right man. Some people might say this is an 
impossible job. I do not know if it is an impossible job, but it is a 
very difficult job. Let us think about it for a moment.
  This is the man who walks in to see the President every morning, 
walks in to the Oval Office and greets him, gives him the intelligence 
report. I think we all understand there has to be a chemistry between 
the President and the Director; that if there isn't, that 
relationship--and we have seen that in the past with Presidents and 
Directors, sometimes there isn't that relationship--if there isn't that 
relationship, they do not talk and the country suffers.
  There has to be a relationship of trust, of confidence. Yet that same 
man who comes in to see the President every morning where there has to 
be that relationship, that trust, that rapport, is also a man who has 
to tell the President what the President does not want to hear; a man 
who has to have the guts to do it; a man who has to look the President 
in the eye and have the guts to tell the President of the United 
States, the most powerful man in the world, Mr. President, that is not 
the way it is; or maybe a more difficult thing to say, Mr. President, 
we messed up, we were wrong 6 months ago or 3 months ago, what we told 
you was not right; or maybe this is the toughest thing of all to say to 
the President, Mr. President, we don't know.

  And when we look at some of the problems, some hypothetical, some 
factual, some of the things that occurred, those have been some of the 
problems. That man has to also be able to look at the President of the 
United States and say, Well, here is what we think it is, but also 
there are people in the intelligence community who have a minority 
view. That man has to have the guts to tell the President that as well. 
That is a difficult job.
  This man also is the person who protects us every day in this world 
because he is the one who has to be in charge of putting together all 
of the intelligence. And today it is the intelligence that protects us 
just as much as our national defense. The facts he comes up with, our 
intelligence community comes up with, are our first line of defense 
today. Yet we are telling this man today, if you get this job, at the 
same time you are carrying on this war on terrorism and you are 
providing these facts, we expect you to go as fast as you can to carry 
out reform.
  Further, we tell this man that he has to deal with whatever today's 
crisis is. What we are focused on, of course, is terrorism today. But 
he has to deal with the long-term crises--nuclear proliferation, what 
is going on in China, you pick the challenge. He has to be 5 years out, 
or 10 or 15 years out, and he had better not get it wrong.
  This is a new era for the CIA, a new era for the intelligence 
community which came to maturity in the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
versus the United States. We sort of understood in those decades when 
we developed that

[[Page S9496]]

intelligence community. Official cover worked pretty well. The new head 
of the intelligence community has to continue that change, continue to 
change away from that. We have to move out from the official cover to a 
nonofficial cover. That is just one of the changes that has to take 
place. It is a tough job.
  I think when you vote on someone's confirmation, a lot of this is 
kind of a gut check. You don't know what the exact issues are going to 
be in the future. This is an intensely personal job, as I have pointed 
out. The person who runs the agency, I suspect we are going to end up 
giving a lot more power. If Porter Goss is confirmed, he may end up 
with an entirely different job later on. He is going to run a big 
intelligence community, but it is also an intensely personal job in 
that relationship with the Congress and that relationship with all of 
the consumers. And the ultimate consumer, of course, being the 
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.
  I think it gets down to a lot of the person. What do you think of 
this guy, or woman if that be the case? Can they handle it?
  I think it is helpful to talk to some of the persons who know this 
person best. I was struck by the testimony of the two Senators from 
Florida, Senator Bob Graham, of course, the senior Senator, but also 
significantly the chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee of the 
Senate, and a pretty harsh critic of the intelligence community and of 
the administration. This is what he had to say:

       Let me say at the beginning that I am not unbiased. I 
     believe that Porter Goss is an exceptional human being and 
     will be an exceptional head of our Central Intelligence.

  Senator Graham also said:

       Mr. Chairman, I have known Porter Goss for well over two 
     decades, and I can tell you from personal experience that he 
     is uniquely qualified to be here today as the President's 
     nominee to serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. He 
     is a man of great character, unusual intelligence, a 
     tremendous work ethic, and an outstanding personal and 
     professional standard of integrity.

  Senator Graham added that as Governor of Florida, when he first met 
the nominee:

       Party affiliation did not matter then. What was necessary, 
     good men and women who could carry out a difficult task.

  My colleagues, I believe party affiliation does not matter today. The 
challenge that Porter Goss, on a much magnified scale, will face as 
Director of Central Intelligence is very analogous to the challenge he 
faced 20 years ago in restoring integrity to his local community and 
completing a very complex project.
  As to Porter Goss's fitness to serve as an independent, unbiased DCI, 
this is what Senator Graham of Florida said.

       . . . when it comes to the intelligence community, 
     Congressman Goss has, in my judgment, a balanced perspective, 
     a perspective gained both as an insider and then as an 
     outsider. For a decade, early in his career, Congressman Goss 
     served our Nation in both the Army and the CIA. He knows 
     firsthand the value and the risk of clandestine operations. 
     Since he has been in Congress, especially as a member and 
     chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, he came to know the agencies from an oversight 
     capacity.

  Senator Graham continued:

       Some have said he is too close to the intelligence 
     agencies, that he would be too protective of the status quo. 
     Well, most of you served with Porter and myself on the joint 
     inquiry into the events of 9/11. I believe you would join me 
     in saying from that experience Porter is a man who will be 
     independent in his judgments and unflinching in his criticism 
     where he believes they are necessary.

  Senator Graham concluded with these words:

       I am confident he will not be a part of the problem but 
     rather a leader in taking us toward principled, thoughtful 
     solutions when it comes to reforming the intelligence 
     community. I strongly recommend the confirmation of Porter 
     Goss.

  Senator Bill Nelson also participated in the September 14 Goss 
confirmation hearing. These are some of the things Senator Nelson had 
to say:

       I think we need intelligence reform. I think we need it 
     now. And I think Porter Goss is the man to lead the effort.

  Senator Nelson also called Porter Goss:

       . . . a uniquely gifted individual whose public life has 
     been illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair, and 
     independent.

  The Senator further pointed out that:

       Those characteristics in this town that is so highly 
     charged with partisanship are sorely needed in a Director of 
     Central Intelligence.

  Those statements are from his two colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle from Florida.
  I think sometimes it is good to know and talk to people who know 
someone best.
  Mr. President and Members of the Senate, let me conclude by saying I 
have known Porter Goss for a long time. I have dealt with him on issues 
not just in the area of intelligence. Sometimes you get to know people 
in the Senate and the House working in Congress on a variety of issues.
  Porter Goss and I had shared a tragic situation when we had 
constituents, hemophiliacs who acquired AIDS because they had to take 
massive amounts of blood because of their condition. The blood was 
tainted. It is a long story. I will not go into it now. But the blood 
was tainted because we thought there was an error made by the Federal 
Government, that the Federal Government did not become involved early 
enough, that the Federal Government made mistakes.
  I had constituents. I listened to their tragic story. Porter Goss 
listened to some constituents of his. So we both moved in our 
respective bodies to try to bring about some help for these folks. I 
saw how compassionate he was and how strongly he felt about the issue 
and what he did about it and how he took that passion and feeling he 
felt for those folks in wanting to do something about it. I worked with 
him. I traveled with him to Haiti, the poorest country in this 
hemisphere. I have seen his compassion for the people of Haiti.
  I have worked with him on the Intelligence Committee. I will be 
honest with you, I have had the occasion, many times, to pick up the 
phone and call across the Capitol and ask Porter: What is really going 
on in the intelligence community? What is really going on at the CIA? I 
will tell you, each time he had an insight that was unrivaled, or 
rivaled by very few people I have talked to, of what was really going 
on inside the intelligence community. That is an insight that came 
about from his years of experience inside the community and his years 
of experience of watching the community in the oversight capacity while 
being on the committee and of being the chairman.
  He has a passion and an understanding of the intelligence community 
and of what needs to be done to change it. He understands the 
importance of human intelligence. Long before it was fashionable in 
this town to be saying, oh, we have to have more human intelligence, 
Porter Goss was pushing, pushing, and pushing the intelligence 
community for more human intelligence.
  It may not have been flashy, it may not have been with a lot of big 
speeches, but he was there. He understood it. He understood what the 
needs were. This man gets it. If you want someone to lead the reform of 
this community, if you want someone who understands what the problems 
are, who can do it from the inside, if you want someone who will have 
the guts to report to the President of the United States and tell it 
like it is, Porter Goss is your man.
  So, Mr. President, I am proud to come to the floor today to recommend 
to my colleagues, based on my personal experience with this man, what I 
have seen over the years, that we vote for his confirmation. He has a 
tough job and, yes, it may be almost an impossible job, but I think he 
is the right man at the right time at this point in our history.

  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is remaining on 
each side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 124 minutes remaining; the 
minority has 128 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe the chairman of the committee had 
indicated a desire to yield 5 minutes, or what time the Senator may 
consume, to Senator Allard of Colorado. It would be my intent to follow 
Senator Allard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.

[[Page S9497]]

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the acting chairman for yielding 5 
minutes.
  Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the comments of 
the distinguished Senator from Ohio. I, too, proudly claim Porter Goss 
as a friend and somebody who I think will do a great job.
  There is no doubt that the intelligence community right now is in 
somewhat disarray, concerned about their jobs and the job they are 
doing and the public perception.
  I say, first, there are a lot of good people at the Central 
Intelligence Agency. I think Congressman Goss recognizes that. I think 
there are some bureaucratic problems over there, too.
  I think he has the temperament to deal with some of those problems. 
Porter Goss is a strong leader. He is a quiet individual. He doesn't 
grandstand. He is a hard worker. He is intelligent and he understands 
the intelligence community.
  I have had an opportunity to serve on the Intelligence Committee in 
the Senate for 4 years, and I even developed a greater appreciation for 
the job Mr. Goss did on the House side in his service on the 
Intelligence Committee.
  For those reasons, I rise to support the President's nomination to 
head the Central Intelligence Agency. That nominee is Representative 
Porter Goss. I believe he is the right man at the right time for the 
job. That has been stated a couple of times already. I truly think that 
is the case. I am glad to see other colleagues recognize that fact. I 
am asking my colleagues to join me in voting for his confirmation.
  The intelligence community is at a critical juncture. It is clear 
that after the horrific attacks of September 11, and the problems 
involved with uncovering weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the 
intelligence community needs firm leadership during a time when reforms 
are needed. The President has heeded that call.
  President Bush has put into motion, through executive order, most of 
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and he is committed to 
strengthening the budget authority given to the intelligence community 
head administrator. The next step in intelligence reform is to bring in 
someone who is committed to reforming the Central Intelligence Agency 
from the inside out. That man is Porter Goss.
  I have had the pleasure of knowing Representative Goss personally and 
professionally. I was lucky enough to serve with him in the House of 
Representatives, and I value his knowledge of national security issues. 
Even then, when I served with him in the House, he was a voice both 
Democrats and Republicans turned to when debating important 
intelligence issues, and he continues to be a leader in the House 
today. More importantly, I got to know Porter Goss on a personal level. 
He is someone I trust and have come to call my friend. There is no one 
I would rather see as director of the agency.
  I am convinced Representative Goss is ready for this challenging 
task. Representative Goss will bring a unique perspective to the 
Director's office in the Central Intelligence Agency. His perspective 
will not only drive the much-needed changes in the CIA, but will also 
bring our concerns as a Congress to the agency.
  Porter Goss has been an Army intelligence officer. He has served as a 
clandestine agent in the CIA and has chaired the House Intelligence 
Committee. There is no one better prepared or qualified to be the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. There should be no doubt 
that the combination of experience Representative Goss has will serve 
the American people well.
  I have heard concerns raised that Mr. Goss is too partisan. I simply 
have to discount those concerns. This is a man who has served as an 
officer in the Army and understands very well his duty to the United 
States and to the citizens he will soon swear to defend.
  I am pleased to see the bipartisan support Representative Goss has 
already received. His nomination was approved by the Senate 
Intelligence Committee by a 12-to-4 vote. His colleague from Florida, 
Bob Graham, has come out strongly in favor of Mr. Goss.

  It is time for the Senate to act on this nomination so we can 
continue the reforms to the intelligence community that are badly 
needed. Representative Goss is prepared to take the agency in a 
direction that will strengthen our collection and analytical 
intelligence activities and provide the information we need to keep 
America safe. He is a man who is truly interested in the needs of our 
country. He is somebody that I feel I can work with on the Armed 
Services Committee. I have some of the intelligence programs under my 
jurisdiction in the subcommittee which I chair, and they are extremely 
important programs. They are programs that are badly needed, they are 
expensive programs, and they do have some problems. We need somebody 
who has the background in intelligence to tackle those, and somebody I 
think I can work with.
  I ask my colleagues to support his nomination because I personally 
think he is the best man for the job.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. I yield to the chairman.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I will be happy to soon yield to the 
distinguished Senator from Mississippi, a valued member of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  On the issue of the HPSCI activity, the House intelligence activity, 
in regard to reform and other intelligence challenges during the last 3 
Congresses, which has been brought up, I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Record the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence During the 107th Congress. I also commend to 
my colleagues the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence during the 106th Congress and the 105th 
Congress.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                       During the 107th Congress

       Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence submitted the following report.
       This report covers the activities of the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence during the One Hundred 
     Seventh Congress. Porter J. Goss (Republican, Florida) served 
     as Chairman; Nancy Pelosi (Democrat, California) served as 
     the Ranking Minority Member.
       The stated purpose of H. Res. 658 of the 95th Congress, 
     which created the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, was to establish a committee ``to oversee and 
     make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities and programs of the United States 
     Government and to submit to the House appropriate proposals 
     for legislation and report to the House concerning such 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities and 
     programs.''
       H. Res. 658 also indicated that the Committee ``shall make 
     every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and 
     agencies of the United States provide informed and timely 
     intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative 
     branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and 
     vital interests of the Nation. It is further the purpose of 
     this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight 
     over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
     the United States to assure that such activities are in 
     conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the United 
     States.''
       In carrying out its mandate from the House regarding 
     oversight of U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities, the Committee created four subcommittees:


 Subcommittee on human intelligence, analysis, and counterintelligence

       Jim Gibbons (R-NV), Chairman,
       Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA), Ranking Member,
       Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY),
       Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
       Ray LaHood (R-IL),
       Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
       Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
       Gary Condit (D-CA),
       Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
       Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
       Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
       Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA)*,
       Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
       Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).


          subcommittee on technical and tactical intelligence

       Michael N. Castle (R-DE), Chairman,
       Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA), Ranking Member,
       Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
       Jane Harman (D-CA),
       Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY),
       Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
       Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
       Silvestre Reyes (D-TX),
       Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
       Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA),
       Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
       Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL),
       Terry Everett (R-AL).


        subcommttee on intelligence policy and national security

       Douglas K. Bereuter (R-Nebraska), Chairman,

[[Page S9498]]

       Gary A. Condit (D-CA), Ranking Member,
       Ray LaHood (R-IL),
       Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA),
       Michael N. Castle (R-DE),
       Tim Roemer (D-IN),
       Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
       Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
       Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
       Terry Everett (R-AL).


            subcommittee on terrorism and homeland security

       Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Chairman,
       Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Member,
       Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
       Gary A. Condit (D-CA),
       Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
       Tim Roemer (D-IN),
       Ray LaHood (R-IL),
       Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
       Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
       Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
       Terry Everett (R-AL),
       Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).

       *Member served on Subcommittee for only part of 107th 
     Congress.


                       scope of committee review

       U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under 
     the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program (NFEP), the Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Department of Defense 
     Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
       The National Foreign Intelligence Program consists of 
     activities in the following departments, agencies or other 
     intelligence elements of the government: 1) the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (CIA); 2) the Department of Defense; 3) 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); 4) the National 
     Security Agency (NSA); 5) the National Reconnaissance Office 
     (NRO); 6) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; 
     7) the Department of State; 8) the Department of Treasury; 9) 
     the Department of Energy; 10) the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation (FBI); 11) the National Imagery and Mapping 
     Agency (NIMA); and, 12) the Coast Guard (USCG).
       The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated 
     program management of defense intelligence elements that 
     support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included 
     within the JMIP are aggregations created for management 
     efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in 
     intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence and 
     Imagery Intelligence) or function (e.g., satellite support 
     and aerial reconnaissance). The programs comprising the JMIP 
     also fall within the jurisdiction of the House Armed Services 
     Committee.
       The TIARA are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target 
     acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic 
     military force structure and provide direct information 
     support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include 
     those military intelligence activities outside the defense 
     intelligence programs that respond to requirements of 
     military commanders for operational support information, as 
     well as to national command, control, and intelligence 
     requirements. The programs comprising TIARA also fall within 
     the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.


                          oversight activities

       During the 107th Congress, the House Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), under the leadership of 
     Chairman Porter Goss--
       -- Responded effectively to the catastrophic attacks on 
     September 11, 2001, by the al Qai'da terrorists by conducting 
     investigations jointly with its sister committee in the 
     Senate, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to 
     determine whether the IC should have been more adept, better 
     resourced and more capable of thwarting the attacks;
       -- Promoted a bipartisan effort to continue rebuilding and 
     refining the nation's intelligence capabilities to meet 
     increasingly complex geopolitical and technological 
     challenges to national security; and
       -- Advanced the education of Members of Congress and the 
     public on matters of vital interest to national security and 
     the distinct role intelligence plays in its defense.
       Although the end of the Cold War warranted a reordering of 
     national priorities, the steady decline in intelligence 
     funding since the mid-1990s left the nation with a diminished 
     ability to address emerging threats--such as global 
     terrorism--and the technical challenges of the 21st Century. 
     Further, the IC's lack of a corporate approach to addressing 
     enduring intelligence problems helped to create a culture 
     that hindered data collection (especially human 
     intelligence collection), data sharing, and collaborative 
     analysis.
       The revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA) 
     was the Committee's top priority during the 107th Congress. 
     Although this continues to be one of the Committee's priority 
     concerns, the focus has turned to information sharing and 
     cross community analysis. The Committee notes that the 
     individual intelligence agencies and, moreover, their 
     extremely talented and dedicated people, labor continuously 
     to provide the absolute best intelligence products possible 
     in defense of the Nation. These efforts are, however, 
     generally conducted in isolation from one another, and, most 
     disturbingly, existing rules and procedures often restrict 
     information from the community's depth and breadth of 
     analytic talent. Therefore, those individual efforts can 
     usually only piece together fragments of the overall 
     intelligence puzzle. Crucial in the post-9/11 era is having a 
     community that is, to the maximum extent possible, liberated 
     from information sharing restrictions and one that fosters a 
     culture focused on greater collaborative analysis. The 
     Authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included 
     detailed language on the need for the IC to breakdown 
     barriers to information sharing and the need to cease the 
     practice of allowing agencies to routinely restrict ``their 
     data'' from other agencies, including law enforcement.
       In order to maximize further the IC's analytic 
     effectiveness and output, we must ensure that the dedicated 
     professionals of the IC are properly trained and provided the 
     skills necessary for the tasks that are required to fight the 
     global war on terrorism and other daunting threats. For a 
     number of years, the Committee has articulated its specific 
     concerns about the dearth of language skills throughout the 
     IC. The lack of depth in the so-called ``low-density' 
     languages was acutely experienced during operations in 
     Afghanistan The Committee finds this situation unacceptable 
     and has emphasized the critical need for a robust effort to 
     improve foreign language capabilities throughout the 
     Intelligence Community.
       The Committee remains concerned about the viability and 
     effectiveness of a future overhead architecture, given the 
     apparent lack of a comprehensive architectural plan for the 
     overhead system of systems, specifically in the area of 
     imagery. For example, the Committee believes the 
     Administration is facing a major challenge in addressing 
     technical and funding problems with the Future Imagery 
     Architecture (FIA) program that could force untenable trades 
     between critical future capabilities and legacy systems. In 
     the Authorization for fiscal year 2003, the Committee has 
     addressed the known FIA problems as well as the need to 
     develop imagery alternatives if developmental problems exist 
     or persist. The Committee noted, however, that the 
     Intelligence Community has engaged in a continuing pattern by 
     which many individual programs have been provided resources 
     with little or no regard to the entire set of IC collection 
     capabilities, including space-based and airborne. The 
     Committee believes that, although individual systems 
     certainly have specific merit, it would be wiser for the 
     Intelligence Community to consider whether the overall 
     collective mix brings the appropriate assets to bear against 
     the range of threats to U.S. national security. Moreover, the 
     ability to fund all legacy, developmental, and desired 
     systems has a finite limit. Therefore, there is a critical 
     need to review each program mindful of the strategic needs so 
     that and necessary tradeoffs are made based on substantive 
     requirements.
       Finally, the Committee continued its focus on a number of 
     enduring IC challenges--the need to improve NSA acquisition 
     efforts, the need to improve the depth and breadth of Human 
     Intelligence (HUMINT), and improving research and development 
     (R&D). With respect to NSA, the Committee has been pleased 
     with the Director's attempts to baseline current capabilities 
     so that future needs can be properly identified and resulting 
     acquisition decisions can be appropriately made. To assist 
     the Director in completing these efforts, the Committee 
     included incentives in the Authorization Act for fiscal year 
     2003. Regarding, HUMINT, the Committee focused on 
     improvements in training, enhancing technical resources to 
     operations, and properly funding analytic efforts. All of 
     these capabilities are supported by R&D efforts. Therefore, 
     the Committee has supported the Administration's increases in 
     basic R&D programs. The Committee believes that the IC must 
     continuously renew itself in this ever-changing world. 
     Intelligence is the first line of defense against elusive and 
     unstructured threats and enemies that use asymmetric means to 
     harm America and her people. Only through providing these 
     much needed resources and a long-term commitment can the IC 
     be prepared for the global challenges that confront us.


       intelligence authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003

       During the 107th Congress, particularly in the aftermath of 
     the September 11th attacks, the Committee continued to pursue 
     its objective of rebuilding and revitalizing our national 
     intelligence capabilities to better meet the threats of the 
     21st century. Finally, after eight years of congressional 
     admonition to the executive branch to develop a long term 
     funding program to correct serious and critical Intelligence 
     Community (IC) deficiencies, the President's budget requests 
     provided a down payment on the resources necessary to ensure 
     that our policymakers and military commanders have timely and 
     reliable intelligence support that is crucial to our nation's 
     security.
       The Committee reviewed extensively the President's budget 
     submissions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, fulfilling its 
     responsibility to closely examine the nation's intelligence 
     programs and proposed expenditures. These reviews included 
     substantive and programmatic hearings, Member briefings, and 
     numerous staff briefings. Testimony on the President's budget 
     submissions was taken from the Director of Central 
     Intelligence (DCI); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
     Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C31); the 
     Directors of DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the FBI; and other 
     major intelligence program managers.

[[Page S9499]]

       The Committee's examination of the President's Fiscal Years 
     2002 and 2003 intelligence budgets included 13 committee 
     budget-related hearings principally on a program level. 
     Additional hearings were held addressing the DCI's overall 
     budget submission, the state of health of the IC, and the 
     DCI's views and plans for the future of intelligence and the 
     IC.
       In reviewing the President's budget requests, the Committee 
     found that the President has begun to aggressively address 
     the lack of investment and years of neglect that has harmed 
     our nation's intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2002 
     budget request, submitted before the tragic events of 
     September 11, 2001, reflected no major improvements or 
     investment in intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2003 
     budget submitted by the President included the most 
     substantial increase for programs funded in the National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program in history, however, the 
     intelligence authorizations for both fiscal years 2002 and 
     2003 reiterated the need for renewed investment by focusing 
     on enhancing programs and information sharing across the 
     various IC agencies.
       In addition to budget-related hearings, the Committee held 
     over 58 committee hearings and briefings on various issues 
     vital to our IC and national security. Among the subjects 
     examined by the Committee were: terrorism, HUMINT, and 
     developments in Colombia, Southeast Asia, and rogue states.
       Given the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
     Committee's immediate priority was, and continues to be, the 
     effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts and the 
     security of our nation. In the last two budget authorization 
     bills, the Committee addressed critical and immediate 
     counterterrorism needs as well as long-term intelligence 
     issues facing the United States.
       The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002'', 
     (P.L. 107-108), in addition to authorizing generally the 
     activities of the U.S. IC, directly addressed IC shortfalls 
     in domestic counterterrorism efforts, intelligence collection 
     and analysis, threat reporting, aggressive recruitment of 
     human assets, foreign language capabilities, and sharing of 
     intelligence information and analysis across the government. 
     For example, the Congress specifically enacted legislation 
     that repealed restrictions on human intelligence sources. In 
     the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, the 
     House and Senate significantly increased spending 
     authorizations for intelligence activities well beyond that 
     level requested by the President. The committee also directed 
     significant resource allocation to countering terrorism.
       The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003'', 
     (P L. 107-306), in addition to authorizing the intelligence 
     activities of the U.S. IC highlighted five priority areas 
     that must receive significant, sustained attention if 
     intelligence is to fulfill its role in our national security 
     strategy. Those areas are: (1) improving information sharing 
     and all-source analysis; (2) improving IC professional 
     training with a major emphasis on developing language skills; 
     (3) ensuring national imagery collection program viability 
     and effectiveness; (4) correcting enduring systemic problems, 
     deficiencies in HUMINT, and rebuilding a robust research and 
     development program; and (5) establishing a budgeting process 
     that no longer relies so heavily on supplemental 
     appropriations. For example, the fiscal year 2003 legislation 
     provided very clear policy direction to the Administration to 
     improve the cross-community sharing of information from 
     material seized as part of the global war on terrorism. This 
     resulted in new processes and procedures being implemented to 
     improve the access that community analysts have to this 
     material. Further, the fiscal year 2003 authorization 
     legislation provided significantly enhanced funding for 
     skills training in areas such as foreign languages, 
     analyst-to-analyst technical exchanges and in-area 
     familiarization travel. And finally, the Committee's 
     legislation also provided critically needed direction and 
     funding to ensure the nation's imagery architecture will 
     be capable of supporting customer needs long into the 
     future.


                        committee investigations

     Terrorism Review
       The Committee, through its THLS Subcommittee at the behest 
     of the Speaker and Minority Leader as the focal point and 
     coordinating mechanism in the House of Representatives for 
     post-9-11 counterterrorism and homeland security oversight 
     activities.''
       Prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the Committee's 
     Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security held 
     numerous classified hearings and briefings on the terrorist 
     threat, gaps in the IC's counterterrorism capabilities, the 
     need for a more focused and better coordinated national 
     effort on homeland security, and a variety of related 
     matters.
       Following 9-11, the Working Group was converted into a full 
     subcommittee with expanded powers of jurisdiction to act as 
     the lead entity in formulating the House's response to the 
     attacks. The new Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland 
     Security held what for the Committee was an unprecedented 
     series of televised hearings culminating in a field hearing 
     with then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York City. A significant 
     number of closed hearings and briefings on all aspects of the 
     attacks followed; along with a report to the Speaker and 
     Minority Leader on the gaps in counterterrorism capabilities 
     at CIA, NSA, and the FBI leading up to 9-11. Following 
     publication of this report, the Committee, in conjunction 
     with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, established 
     a Joint Investigative Staff on 9-11 that conducted a thorough 
     investigation of the Intelligence Community's inability to 
     prevent the 9-11 attacks. The work of the JIS included a 
     series of open and closed hearings, and the publication of a 
     classified report.''
     Committee Investigations
       At the behest of the Speaker and Minority Leader, the 
     Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 
     was directed in the immediate aftermath of 9-11 to evaluate 
     the performance of the CIA, and FBI against the terrorist 
     target. To this end, the Subcommittee issued a report in July 
     2002 that offered the fo11owing conclusions:
       America's intelligence capability shortfalls prior to 9-11 
     were significantly affected by resource constraints imposed 
     during much of the 1990s, but also by a series of 
     questionable Intelligence Community management decisions on 
     funding priorities.
       As a first step, the USG should adopt a single definition 
     of terrorism, which it currently does not have at a cost of 
     significant inefficiencies.
       CIA: The availability and allocation of resources, 
     including the redirection by CIA managers of funds for core 
     field collection and analysis to headquarters bureaucracy, 
     hurt CIA's counterterrorism (CT) capabilities prior to 9-11. 
     Internal human rights guidelines issued in 1995 also had a 
     ``chilling effect'' on CT operations, and these guidelines 
     were only repealed after the Subcommittee's report was 
     released in July 2002. CIA chronically lacks foreign language 
     skills and core CT-specific training, and has become overly 
     reliant on foreign liaison at a cost to its unilateral 
     capability.
       FBI: Preventing terrorism was less important than solving 
     crimes prior to 9-11, when FBI decentralized CT information 
     and investigations. FBI also had insufficient linguists and 
     analytic capability and an outdated IT infrastructure. It 
     paid little attention to financial tracking, and did not 
     share information.
       NSA: The CT mission was not given a high enough priority in 
     the competition for limited resources prior to 9-11, and NSA 
     must reform program management, systems engineering and 
     integration, and budget management for new investments to 
     have a lasting impact. NSA has been chronically short of 
     linguists, and must better leverage industry for technical 
     solutions to collection problems.
       Congressional oversight of counterterrorism is highly 
     duplicative and inefficient. A leadership staff mechanism 
     should be created to streamline the oversight process on both 
     counterterrorism and homeland security matters.''


                      joint inquiry investigations

       In February, 2002, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint 
     Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before 
     and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against 
     the United States. This bicameral investigation, supported by 
     a separate, unified, professional staff, sought to identify 
     what the Community knew or should have known regarding those 
     attacks prior to September 11th, the nature of any systemic 
     problems that may have impeded the Community's ability to 
     prevent those attacks, and recommendations for reform to 
     improve the Community's ability to uncover and prevent 
     similar attacks in the future.
       In the months that followed, the Inquiry's investigative 
     staff reviewed massive amounts of information within the 
     Intelligence Community. This included the review of almost 
     500,000 pages of relevant documents, 300 interviews, and 
     participation in numerous briefings and panel discussions, 
     involving about 600 individuals. Although the inquiry was 
     primarily focused on the Intelligence Community, the 
     investigation also considered relevant information from 
     federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community; from 
     state and local authorities; from foreign government 
     authorities; and from private sector individuals and 
     organizations. Building on the extensive investigative work, 
     the Committees held nine joint public hearings and, given the 
     highly classified nature of much of this information, 
     thirteen joint closed sessions. In December, 2002, both 
     Committees approved, by separate votes, the classified Final 
     Report of the Joint Inquiry. The Committees are currently 
     working with the Intelligence Community in an effort to 
     declassify, consistent with national security interests, as 
     much as possible of the Final Report for public release.
       The work of the Joint Inquiry confirmed that although the 
     Intelligence Community had relevant information that was, in 
     retrospect, significant regarding the September 11th attacks, 
     the Community too often failed to focus on the information 
     and to appreciate its collective significance in terms of a 
     probable terrorist attack. The Inquiry's factual record 
     identified not only the information that was overlooked but 
     also a number of systemic weaknesses that contributed to the 
     Community's inability to detect and prevent the attacks. 
     These included a lack of sufficient focus on the potential 
     for a domestic attack, a lack of a comprehensive 
     counterterrorist strategy, insufficient analytic focus and 
     quality, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical 
     capabilities aggressively, and inadequate sharing of

[[Page S9500]]

     relevant counterterrorism information. To correct such 
     deficiencies, the Final Report includes nineteen 
     recommendations for reform, including such things as the 
     creation of a Cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence 
     and prompt consideration of whether the FBI, or a new agency, 
     should perform the domestic intelligence functions of the 
     U.S. Government.


                             open hearings

       During the 107th Congress, the Committee held 13 open 
     hearings on issues of concern to the Intelligence Community 
     and the American people. While committed to the protection of 
     sources and methods and ensuring the security of our nation's 
     secrets, it is the intention of the Committee, whenever 
     possible, to hold open hearings in an unclassified setting on 
     issues of vital importance and concern to the public.
       The Committee held four open hearings: Defining Terrorism--
     September 26, 2001; Asymmetric Threats to Homeland--October 
     3, 2001; Role of NSC in Current Crisis--October 11, 2001; 
     Domestic Preparedness & Emergency Response--October 29, 2001.
       The Joint Inquiry Committee held nine open hearings: Family 
     Advocates for September 11 Victims--September 18, 2002 and 
     September 19, 2002; Intelligence Community Knowledge of 
     September 11 Hijackers--September 20, 2002; Phoenix Memo--
     September 24, 2002 and September 26, 2002; Counterterrorism 
     Information Sharing--October 1, 2002; Intelligence Community 
     Reform Proposals--October 3, 2002; Past Terrorist Attacks--
     October 8, 2002; Factual Finding of Inquiry--October 17, 
     2002.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as he may consume to 
the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. I also commend the 
chairman and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee for the 
very difficult job they have been performing, leading the Intelligence 
Committee. It has to be one of the toughest jobs that I have witnessed 
in the Senate. It takes time, it takes experience, and it takes 
intellect to be able to deal with the issues that come before this 
committee.
  I also commend them for the way they have handled this particular 
nomination. They were patient. They gave every Senator ample time to 
make their points and ask questions, and they have been commended by 
Members of both sides of the aisle for the way they handled the 
nomination. That is why I think the nomination was approved by the 
Intelligence Committee, and why I believe this nomination will be 
confirmed by a wide margin.
  Before I get into a little more discussion about why I support Porter 
Goss to be head of the CIA and director of intelligence, I will talk 
about my overall concerns regarding the intelligence area.
  As a member of the leadership over the years, I was able to have 
briefings and meet with Director Tenet. There are specific requirements 
in the law that certain Members have to be notified when particular 
actions are taken. I always took those matters very seriously and spent 
the time that was necessary to get those briefings. For the last year 
and a half, I have been on the Intelligence Committee. I must confess 
that when I went on the committee, I thought I would be a big defender 
and big supporter of our intelligence community, because I think that 
what they do is so important. I do support the men and women who work 
in that community.
  But I must say, over the last year and a half, I have developed many 
concerns about how that job is being done, how the Congress does its 
job. I didn't appreciate how important oversight is regarding 
intelligence matters, how important it is that a Senator develop 
expertise to be able to ask the right questions, do the oversight, and 
understand what is going on.
  I have come to the conclusion that our intelligence community is not 
set up properly and we are not doing our job in the Congress. We can 
point fingers and blame somebody else, but a lot of the problem resides 
here in this body and in the Congress--not because we don't try to do 
our job, but we are not organized properly to do it. We have this 
multifaceted process of so many committees claiming jurisdiction, and 
with good reason. Armed Services needs to be aware of what's going on, 
as do Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Governmental Affairs. Is 
there anybody who doesn't have their finger in this intelligence pie a 
little bit? Basically, nobody is doing the oversight job properly, 
because the members of the Intelligence Committee are not there 
permanently; they come and go and are on the Committee maybe 2 years, 4 
years, or 8 years. Once you get to where you know what to ask and what 
is going on, you leave the Committee.
  Frankly, I think the CIA and the intelligence community's attitude 
is: Don't give them anything; give them a little bit of a courtesy, a 
brush-off, and we will get what we want from the appropriators in the 
end.
  I think we have real problems in the intelligence community and in 
the Congress, and we need to fix them. I don't have a magic design. I 
want to hear what the experts have to say and see what legislation is 
proposed. I know this: Something has to be done in the way the 
intelligence community operates. You cannot operate under a construct 
where you have 15 different agencies and 80 percent of the money going 
to the Defense Department, with the director of intelligence having 
little or no control over the money or many of those intelligence 
agencies.
  We need major changes, and we need them now. I am concerned about 
concerns that were raised yesterday that if we do not do this right, if 
we rush to reorganize the intelligence community, we could do damage 
because the job of gathering intelligence has to go on every day. Men 
and women are putting their lives on the line to gather intelligence. 
We need to be careful, but we need to press forward with change.
  I know this body is loath to change anything. Any kind of reform is 
looked at suspiciously: Oh, we can't do that; it has always been done 
this way. I have taken the time over the years to look at a lot of 
these issues, and it has not always been done this way. A lot of what 
we do and say around here, which some say is sacrosanct and cannot be 
changed, is relatively new. It evolved over the years.
  At some point, you have to say there is a higher priority, that there 
is something more important than turf or jurisdiction or the way it was 
or is being done.
  What is most important is how we are going to do the best job for the 
men and women in uniform, men and women in intelligence, and for the 
American people. So I think we need to make necessary changes.
  The important point is that we have to have somebody in charge. We 
have good people in the CIA doing the job. We have an Acting Director 
who is a good man doing a good job. But we do not need an Acting 
Director forever. We need a man or woman in charge making decisions, 
making changes that need to be carried out even without legislation 
that overhauls the whole operation, and we need it now.
  This is a dangerous time we are in. We need to not only confirm this 
nominee right away, but we need to do it overwhelmingly. We need to 
show him, we need to show the agencies, and we need to show the 
departments that he has the confidence of the American people through 
their representatives in the Senate. We are dealing with very important 
issues, and it is so important that we have leadership at the top. We 
need to do it right away.
  We have a good man who has been nominated. A lot of thought went into 
his selection. I know the President sought out the counsel, advice, and 
the thinking of a number of Members of Congress on both sides of the 
aisle, in the House and Senate, before he went forward with this 
nomination. He has nominated a man who is uniquely qualified to be the 
Director of Intelligence.
  Porter Goss is the right age. He is in his mid-sixties, still young 
enough to do the job, and old enough to know what needs to be done. He 
has a background of military experience, where he was in Army 
intelligence for 2 years. He worked in the Directorate of Operations of 
the CIA for many years. Most of this is in the Record, but I think it 
is worth repeating so that my statement will make sense, hopefully, in 
its entirety.
  When he left the CIA, he continued to be involved in trying to serve 
his fellow man and his community. He was a leader in his hometown in 
Florida. He served on the city council, was mayor, was a member of the 
board of commissioners, and has served in Congress since 1988, which is 
a pretty good period of time. He eventually became chairman of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence where I know he did a 
good job.

[[Page S9501]]

  I have watched him. I have watched him deal with difficult issues. I 
have watched him take a leadership role, and I have watched him work 
with the ranking member of that committee and with Democrats, and I 
have been impressed with the job he has done on the Intelligence 
Committee in the House.
  So he knows the CIA. He knows it from having been in Army 
intelligence, he knows it from having been in the CIA, and he knows it 
from the position he held as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He 
knows where the problems are because he was there, and he knows how to 
strengthen the intelligence community and make it better. He is no 
stranger to the difficulty and the complexity of foreign intelligence.
  When I look back on some of the former heads of the CIA, frankly, 
some of them did not have much of a background in that area. But here 
is a man who is uniquely qualified. He has been in the intelligence 
community. I know that some people say that if you are in the 
institution, you are part of the problem. But, my experience leads me 
to ask, how can you solve a problem if you do not really understand an 
institution? There are some in Washington that say, if you know the 
subject, whether it is transportation or oil or intelligence, you 
should not be in government because you have been coopted.
  I think absolutely the opposite is the case. Practical experience is 
invaluable. You have to understand the culture, you have to understand 
the people, and anybody who has paid close attention to the 
intelligence community in recent months and years knows what changes 
should be made and have to be made.
  Porter Goss, a Member of Congress, has been critical of the 
intelligence community. He does not sugar-coat it. He has called the 
human intelligence program dysfunctional. He has spoken the truth about 
the way we have funded the CIA, which he says has not been adequate, it 
has not been done in the right way, and we have not put enough emphasis 
on human intelligence. In fact, Congress stopped this nation from 
having the human intelligence we needed, if we go back and look at the 
results of the Church Commission some 30 years ago. Once again, we are 
part of the problem.
  He knows we need to do more in linguistic training, and he has raised 
these questions as chairman of the committee and in his communications 
with the DCI.
  His confirmation would bring stability and experience to the 
intelligence community. One thing that worries me, as I have talked to 
some of our intelligence personnel, is a certain concern about whether 
they are really appreciated, and are the old experienced hands going to 
stay, or are they going to leave. I have noticed some of the 
intelligence people I see are getting younger, younger, and younger. 
They need a firm and experienced leader. They need a person who has 
been there with them, understands their needs, and appreciates the job 
they do, and Porter Goss would do that.
  He does support what Congress is about to do. We are going to create 
a national intelligence director position, and we are going to pass 
legislation that is going to reorganize the intelligence community at 
some point, maybe sooner than later.
  Again, he has the right attitude and supports the position I believe 
that Congress is going to be taking.
  There are those who have questioned his independence. Is he a 
partisan? Is he a politician? Whatever happened to congressional 
courtesy? Over the years, I have supported Members of the other party 
from this body and the other body, even though they have sometimes been 
very partisan politicians, very aggressive in their speeches on the 
floor of the House and Senate, but I knew them to be good men and 
women, and I knew when they took on a different role. When you are in 
Congress, when you are in politics, you are a politician. That is not a 
damnation. That is somebody involved in the art of government. When you 
are a member of a party, sometimes members of the other party get under 
your skin, and you speak out.
  I noticed over the years, Porter Goss has not been one of those rabid 
partisans. He has been very calm and very stable. Sometimes he gets a 
little upset. Maybe he thought perhaps the Senate was getting carried 
away with some of our hearings recently. On occasion, I have thought we 
did a little grandstanding in the Senate, and I said so even though it 
was sometimes directed at my own party.
  I know he is an independent thinker, and I know he will put his job 
as head of the CIA, uppermost. He will put his political past and his 
partisanship behind him. He also will be a man, I believe, who can go 
in and meet with the President at those early morning meetings and say: 
Mr. President, this is what we know, this is the truth about the 
situation, and if you go this way, you are going to have certain 
problems.
  He has that stature, he has that credibility, and he will have the 
independence to do that.
  I think having served so many years, having been on the Intelligence 
Committee, and having the record he built at the Intelligence 
Committee, is proof that he will be independent to do that job for the 
American people. I believe he will be more candid with the Congress.
  Quite often when we had testimony before the Intelligence Committee, 
I felt as if I did not get a complete story. Frequently, testimony was 
less than fully satisfactory or sufficient. Porter Goss is going to be 
able to speak to us on a level basis, not from the perspective of a 
former staff member. He was one of us, and he will not try to fool us. 
I think he will tell us the truth.
  By the way, I think we will be very comfortable telling him: Mr. 
Director, we don't believe that. We will be able to be very candid with 
him. I believe he will show flexibility as we move from where we are to 
where we need to be.
  He has been questioned about the positions he has taken, but he 
satisfied the members of the Intelligence Committee by a vote of 12 to 
4 with several Democrats voting for his confirmation. They asked him 
the tough questions. They had their reservations, and those 
reservations have been satisfied.
  I cite one point of how he dealt with the former Director. On 
September of 2003, he wrote a letter to DCI Tenet pointing out concerns 
he had with intelligence. He joined with the ranking member of the 
Intelligence Committee in the House, Congresswoman Harman, and 
indicated there were significant deficiencies with respect to the 
intelligence community's collection activities concerning Iraq's WMD 
programs and ties to al-Qaida prior to the commencement of hostilities 
there.
  So he did not wait until after the fact; he raised concerns when they 
needed to be raised. If my colleagues have taken a look at that letter, 
it certainly shows independence and it was the kind of thing that the 
DCI needed to hear at that particular time.
  So I can attest from experience, from observation, and from a written 
record that this Congressman will be an independent, thoughtful, strong 
voice at the CIA.
  I urge my colleagues, let us have our discussion but let us have a 
vote and let us make it overwhelming. Let us do it now because we need 
strong leadership and we have the right man to do this job. Porter Goss 
will provide leadership for the intelligence community. He will be able 
to work with Congress and he will help give the intelligence community 
the ability to do an even better job.
  I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
Senator from Utah and thank him for his service on the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Also, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his excellent 
commentary, more especially highlighting Mr. Goss's independence and 
the fact he will be a nonpartisan DCI.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague and I certainly 
appreciate the leadership Senators on the Intelligence Committee, in 
particular the Senator from Kansas. He has done a great job. I think 
Senator Rockefeller has worked with him very well for the most part.
  I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from 
Mississippi. There are very few people around here who have had to deal 
with

[[Page S9502]]

the personalities of so many people as Senator Lott has. He has done a 
terrific job throughout both his House and Senate career, and I think 
we ought to listen to the wise people like that with regard to whether 
we should vote for Porter Goss.
  There is no doubt in my mind that Porter Goss is worthy of this 
position and, in my mind, he will do it in an effective way. I 
compliment the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for his cogent 
remarks and his very practical remarks to which we ought to all be 
paying attention.
  I remember when George Tenet was nominated, and George Tenet was a 
Democrat. He was a staffer to Senator Boren. Senator Boren, George 
Tenet, and I traveled all over the world together. There was not any 
question that we were going to support George Tenet when he came up for 
CIA Director, and I think he did a much better job than all of his 
critics are saying. A lot of that was because he worked very hard for 
Senator Boren and for the committee and knew an awful lot about 
intelligence to begin with. This is a tough job. It is almost an 
impossible job to do. In fact, I think it is an impossible job to do in 
every way, in every respect, totally right.

  The fact is, we supported Mr. Tenet and he was a member of our 
family. I believe Porter Goss is a member of our family, too, and a 
person who is worthy of this position. We should not politicize this 
appointment.
  The next person to head the Central Intelligence Agency will lead the 
organization at its most demanding time in history. The next Director 
of Central Intelligence will have to provide leadership in shepherding 
that organization through a much needed reform while continuing to play 
a major role on the ongoing global war on terror. The next person to 
hold this post will require much more than a passing experience with 
the workings of the intelligence community. He will need to understand 
the role of the executive in conducting our foreign policy at war, and 
the essential role of congressional oversight and support in ensuring 
that our intelligence community is flexible enough to address threats 
that have never before been the primary focus of our foreign policy.
  President Bush made the right call when he chose Porter Goss to fill 
this role. I am happy to note that an overwhelming majority of my 
colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have also 
recognized this, having approved his nomination yesterday. I commend 
Chairman Roberts for his leadership and I thank our majority and 
minority leaders for bringing this nomination to the floor today. It is 
important.
  I have had the opportunity to work closely with the chairman of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In the months of 
collaboration between our two committees which produced the joint 
inquiry, I had the opportunity to take the measure of Porter Goss's 
mind, as well as his experience and his commitment to the intelligence 
community. I totally support this nomination.
  As we all recognize, the intelligence community will be undergoing a 
major reform, a process that can only succeed if there is close 
cooperation between the White House and all the relevant executive 
agencies, the Congress--and that includes Democrats and Republicans--
and especially this committee, and the intelligence community.
  The reform that will be promoted should not be a mere bureaucratic 
reshuffling; it should be a reform of our intelligence community that 
enhances and strengthens our ability to understand, penetrate, co-opt, 
and neutralize the threat of armed groups to our national security. The 
success of the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency must 
understand this to be successful.
  The next Director of Central Intelligence must understand that the 
new initiatives we are debating in draft legislation this month, 
legislation we are referring to as an intelligence community reform, 
will be the beginning, not the end, of reform. In fact, I fear that 
once we pass a reform package some of us will believe we will have 
accomplished reform. In fact, we will have only begun.
  Everyone agrees that we need better results from our intelligence 
community. I suppose that is always going to be the case. Most of us, I 
hope, also agree that the efforts of the intelligence community, from 
the Director on down, have been admirable, brave, selfless, and 
intense. I believe former Director Tenet worked hard to revitalize 
capabilities that devolved after the end of the Cold War. I know he 
worked hard. He inherited an agency that needed a lot of improvement, 
and to the extent that he could, he did his best to do so.

  The next Director of Central Intelligence must recognize that our 
goal should not be to rebuild a capability but to build a new 
capability. We need better results and we need a strategy for achieving 
them.
  Director Tenet was candid in speaking before the 9/11 Commission in 
saying that our human intelligence capabilities would take at least 5 
years to rebuild. Porter Goss, when confirmed, must recognize that this 
will be the issue I will address in our first closed hearing. I will 
ask: How do you intend to rebuild the capability? What is your 
strategy? To what standards of measurement will you hold yourself?
  The American intelligence community of the 21st century will face 
traditional geopolitical threats, as we did in the past. We will need 
intelligence to address the question of rising powers, such as China, 
and remilitarizing states, such as Russia. We will need intelligence to 
deal with the failing States of North Korea and Cuba.
  As we all know, we will also need to develop intelligence 
capabilities to gain a strategic advantage against the threat we face 
now and will face for some time to come: the threat of armed groups--
terrorists, if you will.
  I strongly believe al-Qaida will be defeated in the coming years. It 
is not going to be easy, but we will defeat them. On the other hand, I 
think a somber analysis of the world we live in today should remind us 
that, even when al-Qaida is defeated, we will face the threat of other 
armed groups. Nations that have developed a strategic advantage to 
understand, penetrate, co-opt and, when necessary, destroy armed groups 
will enhance their national security.
  We rely on our intelligence community for that strategic advantage. 
Porter Goss understands these requirements. He has worked within the 
intelligence community, and he has performed years of congressional 
oversight over that community. He respects the community and he knows 
what is expected of it. If we do our jobs, I can assure Porter Goss, 
when he is confirmed, he will be the Director made most accountable to 
Congress in the history of intelligence community oversight.
  As I said, when the next director comes before our committee, we 
should not settle for reports. We must demand strategy for achieving 
reform and measurement standards. Our legislative initiatives can only 
do so much. Our oversight, and the stewardship of a responsible and 
experienced director, will be what advances reform.
  There is no doubt in my mind that this man can do the job and can do 
it well. There is no doubt in my mind that as a Member of Congress he 
has occasionally made statements that have irritated the other side of 
this aisle. That is probably true of everyone on both sides of the 
floor. I have to admit I have been irritated from time to time by 
statements made by my colleagues on the other side--and even by some of 
my colleagues on our side--and I am sure I have made statements from 
time to time that have irritated colleagues on the other side as well. 
I have not wanted to, but I am sure I have. It is just the nature of 
being in this political arena. But to then presume a person is an 
indecent partisan because occasionally they find fault with the other 
side, I think shows a degree of immaturity, of political and 
professional immaturity that is unworthy of the nomination process.
  Nobody is going to come before us who is perfect in every way. But I 
have to say, there are very few people who have served as much as 
Porter Goss has and who have as much knowledge of the intelligence 
community as he has, who have ever been members of the top echelon of 
the CIA.
  I have every confidence in him. I am going to support him. I hope all 
my colleagues also will support him. He is worthy of it. He is a Member 
of Congress. He is a person who deserves our support. I hope we all get 
together and

[[Page S9503]]

support him and continue to support him as he serves in this job which 
almost nobody can completely fulfill. This is a job that takes immense 
capabilities and, I might add, commitment. He has both and we should 
support him.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I yield such time as the Senator from New Jersey 
wishes to express his views. I yield him that amount of time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, we are discussing the nomination of 
Representative Porter Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. This 
nomination comes to the floor at a critical time for our Nation's 
intelligence community. With Chairman Collins's leadership and Senator 
Lieberman's ranking membership, the Governmental Affairs Committee is 
in the process this very day of marking up legislation to reform the 
intelligence community. It is a task that all of us on the committee 
are taking very seriously. After all, it was the failures of 
intelligence that led to the horrors of 9/11 and the loss of almost 
3,000 lives. Seven hundred of them came from my home State of New 
Jersey. It was a painful moment in American history.
  It was failures of intelligence that led to our false premises for 
invading Iraq. I thought everyone from the President on down had agreed 
that we needed to take intelligence data more seriously. That is why it 
was so shocking to hear President Bush's odd statement yesterday about 
our Nation's intelligence data on Iraq. A few hours after the President 
spoke at the United Nations about why we went it alone in Iraq, 
President Bush was asked by a reporter about the CIA report that he had 
received in July, regarding the deteriorating situation in Iraq, which 
could even lead to a full-blown civil war.
  The President at that moment dismissed the CIA report by saying that 
the CIA might have been ``just guessing.'' Just guessing? The Central 
Intelligence Agency just guessing? That is quite a way to describe 
their activities.
  On this placard we see what President Bush actually said.

       The CIA laid out a--several scenarios that said, life could 
     be lousy, life could be OK, life could be better. And they 
     were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like.

  That is quite a description, on September 21, yesterday, at the 
Waldorf-Astoria in New York. If the President thinks our Nation's 
intelligence system is just guessing, then we are really in trouble. 
Casual statements.
  I remind President Bush that when you pronounced ``mission 
accomplished'' on the deck of that aircraft carrier, we had lost 138 
American citizens. But since then, since the mission was accomplished--
``mission accomplished'' means job done--almost 900 people, 900 
Americans have perished.
  How do we treat subjects so casually, statements like this? Does 
President Bush believe Congressman Goss will simply direct the guessing 
game at the CIA? Is that all he expects from our main intelligence 
agency?
  As we now know, in July the CIA sent the President a report that laid 
out three scenarios for Iraq, with the rosiest scenario being the 
continuation of the disastrous status quo. Under this scenario, we see 
an average of 87 attacks a day against our troops, and 1,037 dead to 
date. That is a horrible situation.
  The CIA report to the President identified the worst scenario as an 
all-out civil war, with our troops in the crossfire. This is not what 
the President wanted to hear. So what did he do? He ignored it. And now 
when asked how the information came to him, he said: The CIA--just 
guessing.
  President Bush's comments are a frightening sign he is not dealing 
with reality, in that he continues to ignore the truth about what is 
happening on the ground in Iraq. That is why I am so concerned about 
the nomination of Porter Goss to head the CIA.
  I know Mr. Goss only casually. Certainly he seems like a nice enough, 
intelligent fellow. But what the President needs more than ever is an 
intelligence chief who will tell it like it is, and not revamp 
intelligence to meet the President's expectations.
  Congressman Goss has not shown himself to be a person who will 
deliver nonpartisan, objective information to the President.
  At a time when the independence and the objectivity of the CIA is 
more crucial than ever before, President Bush has nominated a 
politician who has been particularly partisan. In a PBS ``Frontline'' 
interview after 9/11, Representative Goss refused to characterize what 
happened as an intelligence failure. How could one argue that 9/11 was 
not an intelligence failure? He also opposed the creation of the 9/11 
Commission.
  Congressman Goss attacked Senator Kerry claiming that Senator Kerry 
tried to cut the Nation's intelligence budget during the Clinton 
administration. But Congressman Goss made the attack against Senator 
Kerry while not revealing that he cosponsored a bill during the same 
period that would have made even deeper budget cuts.
  Here is what Mr. Goss called the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
recent hearings on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. I quote him. He said:

       We've got a circus in the Senate which is always a likely 
     place to look for the circus.

  Quite a commentary about what Mr. Goss thinks of our Government. 
First of all, the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib--he thinks the 
Senate is a circus in hearings, and then he describes this place as a 
big circus tent. Is that what he thinks of us? I hardly think that is 
the kind of person who ought to be taking this serious job.
  When asked whether he would investigate the disclosure of covert CIA 
agent Valerie Plame's identity, he dismissed the scandal, saying, 
``There's a much larger dose of partisan politics going on right now 
than there is worry about national security.''
  Then he added flippantly, ``Somebody sends me a blue dress and some 
DNA and I will have an investigation.''
  What kind of an insulting comment is that intended to be? Do you want 
to trust this individual with a bipartisan responsibility to the entire 
Nation who can be so casual, so insulting, so sarcastic in his view of 
what takes place here? Do we honestly expect someone who has been a 
partisan attack dog for President Bush's reelection efforts to be 
independent and nonpartisan? It is just not realistic.
  It is time for the President and this administration to return to 
reality--the reality of Iraq, the sadness of the loss of life, the 
ruination of families, the emotional disturbances that occur. We have 
some reservists from the State of New Jersey on active duty in Iraq. We 
just had our 33rd death of service people from New Jersey in Iraq. The 
disturbances that go to normal life, the daddies missing, mommies 
missing in the household--it is terrible. We have to get back to 
reality, the reality of Iraq, the reality that our Nation's 
intelligence is not just guessing, and the reality is that we need an 
objective, nonpartisan intelligence chief in this Nation.
  I say with regret that we cannot accept turning responsibility over 
for managing this Nation's intelligence gathering to someone who first 
looks at which side of the political aisle someone is on before he 
makes decisions about the responsibility for the CIA.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I now yield as much time as the distinguished Senator from Maryland 
may use. I thank the distinguished Senator for her service on this 
committee as she always provides the committee with very candid, 
independent, and right-on views. I am delighted to yield time to her at 
this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for 
his words. I also thank him for the process he provided for us to 
evaluate the suitability of Porter Goss to be the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency. He gave us a lot of time to be able to 
interview Mr. Goss directly. His staff has been quite collegial and 
quite cooperative, and we want to thank him for providing us with that 
type of environment in which to make a wise and prudent decision.
  Indeed, deciding on this nomination is vitally important. The 
Director of the CIA needs to be up to the job.

[[Page S9504]]

These are very dangerous times, and it is vitally important that we 
make the right choice. Now more than ever, the security of our Nation 
depends on timely, reliable intelligence to detect, disrupt, and deter 
terrorist attacks on the United States of America and to also make sure 
attacks don't happen to treasured allies, and to help policymakers, 
from the President and his Cabinet to Members of Congress, to make the 
right decisions about what we need to do related to diplomacy and the 
deployment of our troops.
  The next Director of the CIA will have to do all of this and even 
more. The next Director will also have to push through the much needed 
reform at the CIA and to cooperate in the reforming of other 
intelligence agencies. We want to make sure there are no more 9/11's 
and no more wars based on dated and dubious evidence.
  The constitutional duty of the Senate is to review the nominations of 
the President. I take that very seriously. When a nominee comes, 
regardless for what position or from whatever party is in power, for an 
important position like this, I ask four questions: Is that person 
competent? Do they bring integrity to the job? Are they committed to 
the core mission of the agency? And will they function in an 
independent way?
  As I said at our hearings, I know Porter Goss, and I have worked with 
him over the years. I have no doubt that Congressman Goss is competent 
based on his years of service, both as an agent at the CIA as well as 
in the House of Representatives chairing the House Intelligence 
Committee. From my knowledge, he has been a man of integrity. And yes, 
he is committed to the mission of the CIA and the importance of 
intelligence to help protect the United States of America. The great 
big caution yellow light I have is the one about independence--the 
willingness to speak truth to power, committed to reform, to be 
nonpartisan, and also never to sugarcoat, dilute, or twist the 
information going to the President of the United States and top 
policymakers.
  During the last year, I have become very concerned about Mr. Goss's 
partisan activities. He has unfairly attacked Democrats. He has been 
strident in other statements in terms of the political campaign for the 
Presidency.
  My questions are, Who is this Porter Goss? Is he the one I served 
with in the House who was a moderate conservative, straightforward, and 
also someone who said we have to think out of the box so we don't end 
up in a box? Or is he a rather an aggressively partisan person? My 
question about Porter Goss is, Would he be an independent voice in the 
administration as well as a strong advocate for real and deep reform? 
Would he present the President with the best information based on facts 
and sound analysis without regard to ideology or conventional wisdom? 
Would he tell the President what he should hear, not what the President 
would like to hear? That is what speaking truth to power means.
  Speaking truth to power is not easy. It is very difficult. Yet for 
the Director of the CIA it is important that he speak the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, without sugarcoating, no matter how 
difficult. The President must receive the best judgment and 
information. That is what I am looking at.
  Now, having had those questions when Mr. Goss was before the 
committee, in my usual way I asked very direct questions. I raised 
those issues. I even raised the issue the previous Senator, the Senator 
from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg raised. What about this investigation, 
the blue dress, and the DNA? Well, I put it to him. And his answer back 
was, yes, he would be nonpartisan. That he understood the role of the 
Director of the CIA is different from being a Congressman. That it is 
not a political job, it is a job that is both policy and operational.
  He said he would speak truth to power to both the President and to 
the Congress. And if anyone knows the importance of congressional 
oversight, it is Porter Goss. He agreed to work with the Congress to 
reform our intelligence agencies.
  As you can see, at the hearing, in response to both my questioning 
and questioning by the chairman and other members, particularly on this 
independence issue, he said he would raise these issues.
  So when I have to think about, is this the Porter Goss who is 
moderate, straightforward, willing to work across the aisle, or is this 
the aggressively partisan and even intemperate person, I take him at 
his word. However, in the words of Ronald Reagan, who said ``trust but 
verify,'' that is the way I feel about the Porter Goss nomination. I 
accept him at his word, which he not only gave to me but he gave to the 
entire committee in a public format, that he would be nonpartisan, 
committed to the truth, a leader for independence and reform, and would 
always speak truth to power. So I accept him at his word, but I also 
believe we must engage in vigorous congressional oversight to make sure 
Porter Goss does the job he is to do, and to make sure he does what he 
has committed to do.
  So when my name is called, I will vote for Porter Goss. But I want to 
make it very clear that in voting for Porter Goss to be the Director of 
the CIA, I am not voting for him to be the future NID. As you know, we 
are not clear on what is the framework for reform we will adopt. There 
are ideas coming forth that I know we will be debating and voting on 
next week and in the weeks ahead. So we want to be sure whatever 
framework we create, and if we do create the National Intelligence 
Director, a position I have supported for many months, that person's 
nomination come to us separately. In voting for Porter Goss, I am 
voting for him to be the head of CIA, but I am not using this vote for 
him to be the NID by proxy.
  Again, let me conclude by thanking the chairman and the vice chairman 
for their hard work on this committee. It is a committee with great 
responsibility. We take it seriously. But at the end of the day, my 
analysis concludes that I will vote for Porter Goss. I will trust, but 
I will use congressional oversight to verify.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Mikulski for her very 
forthright statement. Like the Senator, I understand the point raised 
by Senator Lautenberg and would only make two points about the notion 
of Porter Goss's alleged lack of independence from the administration.
  First, Mr. Goss sent a very candid letter to DCI Tenet, along with 
Congresswoman Jane Harman, who is the ranking member of the House 
Intelligence Committee, expressing deep concern about our intelligence 
on Iraq. That letter is not the work of a shrinking violet, I can 
assure you.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letter be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was orderd to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         U.S, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee 
           on Intelligence,
                               Washington, DC, September 25, 2003.
     Hon. George J. Tenet,
     Director of Central Intelligence,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Tenet: At the outset, we reaffirm our support for 
     the dedicated men and women working in the Intelligence 
     Community (IC). Their deep commitment to our country and to 
     their profession is evident. The nation owes these 
     professional men and women its gratitude for their tireless 
     efforts to provide policymakers with the intelligence they 
     need to make informed decisions about the security of 
     Americans at home and in places like Iraq.
       Thank you, again, for promptly responding to the 
     Committee's request for all intelligence information related 
     to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, as 
     well as any ties to terrorist organizations, including al 
     Qa'ida. The Committee has reviewed all 9 volumes of material 
     that you provided, Additionally, it has held several closed 
     hearings and an open hearing, conducted a number of 
     interviews, made several oversight trips to Iraq, and 
     reviewed additional materials over the last four months. 
     Although the Committee's work continues, we have some 
     preliminary views that we offer so that the IC can begin to 
     consider necessary improvements. In addition, we offer these 
     views to provide you a chance to answer questions or clarify 
     any issues that will assist us in concluding our review.
       At this point, several months into our review, we believe 
     there were significant deficiencies with respect to the IC's 
     intelligence collection activides concerning Iraq's WMD 
     programs and ties to al-Qa'ida prior to the commencement of 
     hostilities there.
       We have a fundamental disagreement generally on whether the 
     National Intelligence

[[Page S9505]]

     Estimate on Iraq's WMD programs and the intelligence on 
     Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida were deficient with regard to the 
     analysis and presentation, especially in the certainty of the 
     IC's judgments. The Ranking Member believes it was. The 
     Chairman believes it was not.
       Additionally, the Committee is also reviewing the 
     intelligence assessments that existed pre-March 2003 
     regarding the nature and level of resistance that U.S. troops 
     could expect in Iraq and the health of Iraq's civilian 
     infrastructure.


                               iraq's wmd

       In October 2002, the Intelligence Community produced a 
     National Intelligence Estimate that included statements that 
     ``We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and 
     restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons . . 
     .'' and ``in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is 
     reconstituting its nuclear weapons programs.'' (Iraq's 
     Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction at p. 5 
     (hereafter ``NIE'')). The Committee thoroughly reviewed the 
     underlying intelligence supporting these conclusions, that 
     you have provided, as well as the reporting from the early 
     efforts to locate WMD after the cessation of major military 
     action in Iraq. Thus far, it appears that these judgments 
     were based on too many uncertainties.


          iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons

       The U.S. and the U.K. took limited air strikes in 1998 
     (Operation Desert Fox), based on Iraq's lack of cooperation 
     and violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 
     regarding weapons of mass destruction. In early 1998, while 
     the UN inspectors were still in Iraq and providing some 
     amount of solid information about the WMD programs, the IC's 
     judgments were based, in substantial part, on circumstantial 
     information. Such information--among other things--
     identified: gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD 
     declarations to the UN; Iraq's obstruction of United Nations 
     Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections and monitoring 
     activities; Saddam's efforts to declare certain sites exempt 
     from inspections; and Saddam's efforts to end inspections 
     entirely.
       After the departure of UN weapons inspectors and Operation 
     Desert Fox, in 1998, some new information continued to be 
     developed on Iraq's capabilities, but access to ``ground 
     truth'' corroboration was lost. The IC was also faced with 
     the daunting challenge of trying to interpret snippets of 
     information in an environment where the regime was engaged in 
     massive denial and deception efforts. Based on past 
     assessments and some new ``piecemeal'' intelligence, which 
     was otherwise seemingly valid, the Community's analysis of 
     Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities reflected an assumption 
     that these long-standing judgments on the issue were still 
     valid. The absence of proof that chemical and biological 
     weapons and their related development programs had been 
     destroyed was considered as proof that they continued to 
     exist.
       The dearth of post-1998 underlying intelligence reflects a 
     weakness in intelligence collection, The Committee on a 
     number of occasions in the past expressed its concern that 
     the IC was facing serious shortfalls in specific areas of 
     intelligence collection--to include intelligence from human 
     sources (HUMINT) and from technologies designed to tell us 
     about weapons development (Measurement and Signatures 
     Intelligence, or MASINT). The issues presented with respect 
     to Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities appear to be a case 
     in point. Lack of specific intelligence on regime plans and 
     intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist groups 
     appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a better 
     assessment to the policymakers from 1998 through 2003.
       Iraq has held a place of priority in U.S. foreign policy 
     and national security during successive Administrations. For 
     instance, in 1998 U.S. policy toward Iraq was clarified by 
     Congress and the President to reflect an unequivocal policy 
     to seek regime change, See Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (P.L. 
     105-338 Oct. 31, 1998). Given the high priority placed on 
     Iraq policy, we believe greater efforts should have been made 
     to acquire more and better sources of information--
     particularly well-targeted, close-in HUMINT.


            reconstitution of iraq's nuclear weapons program

       In October 2002, the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs made a 
     statement about Iraq's nuclear program, ``. . . in the view 
     of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear 
     weapons program.'' (NIE at page 5.) The NIE cited six factors 
     in making this judgment:
       Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes;
       Iraq's attempts to obtain permanent magnet production 
     capability;
       Iraq's attempts to obtain high-speed balancing machines;
       Iraq's attempts to obtain computer-controlled machine 
     tools;
       Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of 
     weapons personnel, which included appearances by Saddam on 
     Iraqi TV exhorting his nuclear scientists; and
       Activities at suspected nuclear sites.
       Our examination has identified the relatively fragile 
     nature of this information. With respect to the aluminum 
     tubes, as was stated in the NIE, the Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Research (INR), citing the Department of Energy (DoE) 
     analysis, disagreed with the view that these tubes were 
     intended for Iraq's nuclear program. The other items that 
     Iraq was seeking (permanent magnet production capability, 
     high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled 
     machine tools), in addition to having utility in a nuclear 
     weapons program, also have civilian uses. Other elements of 
     information available to the IC on the topic of nuclear 
     reconstitution may have been susceptible to Iraqi denial and 
     deception efforts. These included trying to determine the 
     nature of Iraqi activities at suspected nuclear sites or the 
     purpose of Saddam's TV appearances exhorting his nuclear 
     scientists. We have not found any information in the 
     assessments that are still classified that was any more 
     definitive.


             iraq's ties to terrorists including al-qa'ida

       The Committee has reviewed the three volumes of information 
     provided by you on Iraq's ties to terrorism, most of which 
     remains classified. We have found no reason to question the 
     State Department's decision to designate Iraq as a state 
     sponsor of terrorism for at least a decade.
       On the issue of Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, however, we 
     believe substantial gaps in collection--particularly HUMINT--
     contributed to the Intelligence Community's inability to give 
     policymakers a clear understanding of the nature of the 
     relationship.
       In place of an assessment characterizing the relationship 
     between Saddam and al-Qa'ida, the Intelligence Community 
     reported on possible contacts between al-Qa'ida associates 
     and Iraq. As in other cases of IC reporting on terrorism 
     generally, we believe that there was either a ``low 
     threshold'' or ``no threshold'' for disseminating information 
     on ties between Iraq and al-Qa'ida. As a result, intelligence 
     reports that might have been screened out by a more rigorous 
     vetting process made their way to the analysts' desks, 
     providing ample room for vagary to intrude. Although the 
     Intelligence Community often noted that the reports were 
     ``from sources of varying reliability,'' these reports did 
     not make clear which of them were from sources that were 
     credible and which were from sources that would otherwise be 
     dismissed in the absence of any other corroborating 
     intelligence.


   nature of iraqi resistance and the state of iraq's infrastructure

       In addition to these two issues, we are concerned whether 
     the policymakers were warned adequately about the nature and 
     level of resistance our troops would face in Iraq, or about 
     the dilapidated state of Iraq's civilian infrastructure. The 
     Committee will be reviewing the intelligence available to 
     policymakers prior to the commencement of hostilities to 
     determine if there were shortcomings in the support provided 
     on these issues. The Committee will seek to understand what 
     requirements were levied on the IC prior to the invasion, 
     what assessments were made, whether the assessments were 
     completed in a timely manner, and, with the benefit of 
     hindsight, how well the assessments match what has been found 
     in Iraq since the cessation of major hostilities.


                    policymakers statements on iraq

       The Committee has reviewed extensively allegations that 
     there was a disconnect between public statements by 
     Administration officials and the underlying intelligence, The 
     Committee's purview does not extend to the formulation or 
     articulation of foreign policy. We do believe, however, that 
     if public officials cite intelligence incorrectly, the IC has 
     a responsibility to go back to that policymaker and make 
     clear that the public statement mischaracterized the 
     available intelligence. The IC exists to inform policymakers 
     on matters of foreign intelligence. It does not make policy. 
     The IC is one of many sources of information available to 
     policymakers. Policymakers are under no obligation to believe 
     or adhere to the IC's judgments. Nor should the IC dictate 
     U.S. foreign policy.


                                summary

       The assessment that Iraq continued to pursue chemical and 
     biological, weapons remained constant and static over the 
     past ten years. The U.S. understanding of Iraq's ties to 
     terror groups was also longstanding. We note, however, that 
     there was insufficient specific information regarding the 
     following:
       Saddam's plans and intentions,
       the status of Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities, and
       Iraq's links to al-Qa'ida, specifically.
       The intelligence available to the U.S. on Iraq's possession 
     of WMD and its programs and capabilities relating to such 
     weapons after 1998, and its links to al-Qa'ida, was 
     fragmentary and sporadic. These assessments and longstanding 
     judgments were not challenged as a routine matter within the 
     IC. Saddam Hussein, for his part, apparently made no effort 
     to dispel the conclusions that he possessed weapons of mass 
     destruction, had programs in place to produce them and had 
     the capabilities to deliver them, or that he had links to 
     terrorist groups.
       Underlying these problem areas were serious deficiencies in 
     our HUMINT collection capabilities against this target. HPSCI 
     has consistently recommended greater management attention and 
     allocation of resources to core intelligence mission areas--
     such as HUMINT and analysis. We believe Iraq is, in many 
     ways, a case study for improvements in these areas.
       We would appreciate your response to the issues raised in 
     this letter. In addition, we

[[Page S9506]]

     seek your assurance that the shortcomings identified will be 
     promptly addressed. Finally, we intend to have additional 
     hearings, open and closed, as appropriate.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
                                                         Chairman.
                                                      Jane Harman,
                                                 Ranking Democrat.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Second, the independence issue was thoroughly explored 
at Mr. Goss's confirmation hearing as of this week. Mr. Goss has 
assured the committee--and I do believe him, knowing him for 16 years 
in the Congress--that he has the integrity, as Senator Mikulski put it, 
to look the President in the eye and say no.
  Mr. President, at present, it does not appear either side has a 
Member requesting time, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield such time to the distinguished 
Senator from Florida as he might consume and thank him for his 
contributions, not only with his strong interest in the Intelligence 
Committee and the leading intelligence issues and challenges we face 
today, but for his service on the Armed Services Committee as well, for 
working with me with regard to Captain Spiker and other issues. I look 
forward to his comments.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, we are at ``no fooling time'' 
with regard to our intelligence activities. Because the only thing that 
is going to prevent another terrorist attack, of which there are many 
attempts, is the accuracy and quality and the timeliness of the 
intelligence information we get. In dealing with a secretive nation 
such as North Korea, which in this Senator's opinion is one of the 
gravest threats to the interests of the United States because of their 
outspoken attempt to acquire nuclear capability, we simply have to 
penetrate a secret society such as that with our intelligence apparatus 
more than we have been doing.
  Therefore, who is going to lead this administrative apparatus on 
intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis and intelligence 
coordination, with the multitude of agencies all dealing with 
intelligence, is extremely important. That is why I am standing here 
speaking on behalf of my fellow Floridian and my friend Porter Goss.
  This Congress will have a monumental task before it very shortly on 
the reorganization of the intelligence apparatus as well as the 
reorganization of putting our own house in order as we exercise that 
oversight or give direction to the executive branch of government. And 
that needs to be done better than we have in the past.
  But the task before us right now is to exercise our constitutional 
duty in confirming or rejecting an appointment by the President to lead 
the intelligence apparatus, right now as symbolized by the Director of 
the Central Intelligence. That is why I am here to speak on behalf of 
Porter Goss.
  It has already been said before many times that he started in 1960 as 
an Army intelligence officer, right out of school. Having gone into the 
CIA from that, with a distinguished career, he ended up back being a 
city councilman and a mayor in a little town on the southwest coast of 
Florida. Then-Governor Graham, now my senior colleague in the Senate, 
when three vacancies occurred on the Lee County Commission--they had 
occurred for whatever reason, but they were there--then--Governor 
Graham chose Porter Goss to fill one of those vacancies. Then his 
public service expanded, and he later ran and won a seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. We have known of his public service through 
his capacity as the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
  Now, has Porter said some things he probably wishes he would not have 
said? Yes. But who among us has not made those kinds of mistakes? This 
Senator knows him to be, in this political cauldron of highly charged 
partisan politics, one of the most bipartisan of all Members of 
Congress that I have had the pleasure of knowing. It is my 
understanding that he made a commitment to the Intelligence Committee, 
and specifically to questions propounded by the vice chairman of that 
committee, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. 
Rockefeller, that he would not engage in a partisan manner, which is 
the least that can be expected of the Director of the CIA. The stakes 
are too high for this country for any of that kind of nonsense.
  I believe Porter is a man of his word to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. I believe, given the circumstances of where we are now, with 
so much at stake and having to have the right kind of leader, this is 
the leader the President has nominated. We are now in the process of 
advising and probably consenting, and with the admonitions he has 
received, with the exceptional educational background he has had, with 
the breadth of his experience, not only as an agent but as the chairman 
of the committee, I think it is the constitutional duty of the Senate 
to render a verdict. I think that verdict ought to be for the approval 
of Porter Goss as Director of Central Intelligence.
  Mr. President, that is my effort to lend to this debate. It is short 
and sweet. This Senator, as well as my senior colleague from Florida, 
will be voting in favor of Porter Goss.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, seeing no other Senators requesting time 
now, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, following Senator Dorgan's remarks, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 4 o'clock, and 
that the time during the 4 o'clock period be equally charged against 
both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. ROBERTS. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, 
it is my understanding, or I can ask the distinguished Senator--
  Mr. REID. He said he has a short statement.
  Mr. ROBERTS. He would be able to finish his remarks at 3, in time for 
the meeting?
  Mr. REID. Especially if we didn't talk more.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. ROBERTS. No.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I do not have a long presentation. My 
guess is the 3 o'clock briefing is one most Senators want to attend. I 
do want to, however, visit a bit about this issue of the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency.
  We have been through pretty tough times with respect to intelligence 
in this country, and this is a critically important position. The 
President's choice is an important choice, especially given what we 
have been through. Let me make a couple of comments.
  First of all, I am going to vote for this nomination, but I do so 
without great enthusiasm, and I would like to explain why.
  Porter Goss, I think, is qualified to assume this role. There is 
little in his record that suggests he is a reformer, and there is some 
piece of that record that suggests there is some partisanship, which 
bothers me. But I know Porter Goss. I have known him for a long while. 
When I served in the House of Representatives, I knew him.
  While I would not have made this choice had I been President, the 
President has the opportunity to make the selection and deserves, in 
this case, his own team. My hope is the questions asked of Mr. Goss at 
his hearings will make certain he will run the CIA with a reformist 
attitude, with an understanding that things need to change, with an 
understanding that this cannot, under any circumstance, be a position 
from which partisanship flows, and that we have to get straight 
answers, as does the President, from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[[Page S9507]]

  Over the years, we have had many, many failures in intelligence. For 
those of us who have been through top secret briefings in room 407 of 
the Capitol Building, it is nearly unbelievable what they told us they 
knew from all their different kinds of intelligence-gathering devices 
and their analysis, and what we subsequently learned were the facts or 
the truth of the matter.
  I am telling you because we need a good intelligence system to 
protect our country and protect our homeland. I worry about all of 
this, knowing that the intelligence system was deeply flawed. In candid 
moments, most Members of the Senate would tell you that which was told 
them as top secret intelligence information has often turned out to be 
fundamentally wrong.
  We now read, for example--and I am not now discussing that which 
comes from top secret briefings; I am discussing things that come from 
the periodicals--we read, for example, that the intelligence we were 
given in briefings about the issue of mobile chemical weapons 
laboratories, it turns out came from one source, a source they call 
``Curve Ball.'' I am describing this from Newsweek and Time magazine, 
not from top secret briefings. One source turns out to apparently have 
been a drunk and a fabricator and, as a result of that source, we 
get top secret briefings and the Secretary of State makes a 
presentation at the United Nations about something that apparently we 
now know was untrue. What kind of intelligence system is that?

  We learned that Germans provide the name and information of a 
terrorist to the CIA here in the United States and the telephone number 
and nobody checks on him, nobody follows up at all. Our intelligence 
folks cannot find a couple of alleged terrorists living in San Diego 
when their names and telephone numbers are in the phonebook? What on 
earth is this? I suppose it is Keystone Kops, except this is about the 
security of the United States of America.
  I want the CIA and the Intelligence Community to succeed. Our country 
depends on it being able to succeed in gathering good intelligence and 
protecting this country.
  There is so much that is wrong here. Hans Blix, the U.N. weapons 
inspector, said he was ``not impressed'' by the intelligence presented 
by the administration regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The 
Blix team checked every site where U.S. intelligence indicated weapons 
of mass destruction would be found in Iraq, and there was nothing.
  It goes on and on.
  David Kay, the CIA chief weapons hunter, said the intelligence 
community failed.
  On the 9/11 issue, the intelligence community failed to connect the 
dots. I am not talking here just about the CIA; I am talking about the 
FBI. The list goes on.

  When we are talking about 9/11, we also ought to talk about a report 
that was done by the Joint Intelligence Committee in December of 2002 
that was published with 28 pages missing. Those 28 pages are about the 
Saudis. Fifteen of the 19 who attacked this country were Saudi 
citizens. But when the report was published for the public to read, the 
White House redacted or eliminated the 28 pages that dealt with Saudi 
Arabia.
  On October 29 of last year, I offered an amendment to the Foreign 
Operations appropriations bill, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, 
calling on the administration to declassify those 28 pages. If one is 
talking about 9/11, and talking about intelligence, I believe the 
American people and every Member of this Senate and the Congress need 
to understand what is in those 28 pages dealing with Saudi Arabia.
  It is interesting, even the Saudi Ambassador and the Saudi Foreign 
Minister, publicly insisted that this information be declassified. 
Senator Shelby, the top Republican Senator on the 9/11 inquiry, said 
that 95 percent of the classified pages of these 28 pages could be 
released without jeopardizing our national security.
  I say once again to the administration and to my colleagues that the 
28 pages dealing with Saudi Arabia and 9/11 needs to be released to the 
American people. This Congress and the American people should not be 
evaluating 9/11 and our intelligence without releasing those 28 pages, 
so that the American people see what was deemed required to be 
classified. It should not have been classified.
  Whether we are talking about Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, or 
back even further, Libya or the old Soviet Union, there have been 
intelligence failures. We spend a great deal of money on U.S. 
intelligence. We want it to work. I do not want our intelligence system 
to fail our country, because our country requires a good intelligence 
system to prevent the next terrorist attack and to attack terrorists 
where they live.
  The attack on Iraq was a preemptive strike that the President said 
was necessary to protect our country. Well, it is very important when 
talking about preemption, which is a doctrine that has been foreign to 
this country's interests in the past, to have good intelligence. 
Preemption can never occur based on what one thinks. Preemption could 
only occur based on what one knows. What one knows must come from good 
intelligence.
  We have discovered, since the time preemption was discussed by this 
administration, that the intelligence was just plain horrible on major 
points delivered in top secret briefings to Members of this Congress. 
Our intelligence community was just flat wrong. So we all need to fix 
it.
  There is no Republican or Democratic way to deal with intelligence. 
We need to fix this system in the interests of this country. Our safety 
depends on it.
  I am going to vote for Mr. Goss. I think he is qualified to do this 
job. As I indicated, I am concerned about some things he has done in 
the past. I hope that is over. I am concerned about the intelligence 
agencies themselves. I believe they are in desperate need of reform. I 
hope Mr. Goss will be a reformer. Most importantly, our country, all of 
us, each of us, needs to work together to create an intelligence system 
that works for the safety of this country and works in a way that a 
President, a Congress, a Director of the CIA can rely on good 
intelligence from all around the world.
  My understanding is that we will be in recess for 1 hour until the 
hour of 4 p.m.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________