[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 115 (Wednesday, September 22, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H7430-H7440]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EMOTIONAL TRIP TO RUSSIA
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McCotter). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
is recognized for the remainder of the time until midnight.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise not to refute or
answer the comments that we just heard for the last several hours, but
I will make a couple of comments. First of all, rather than listen to
Members of Congress and this body talk about the conditions in Iraq,
tomorrow the American people will have a chance to listen to the Prime
Minister of Iraq himself whose life has been threatened 4 times,
attempted assassinations on him. I think the American people should
listen to that gentleman, Prime Minister Alawi, to have us get an
understanding of how well his country is responding to our effort.
In terms of the need for the use of our Reservists, as the vice
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I would just remind our
colleagues that it was during the 1990s that our troops were deployed
38 times. None of those deployments were paid for and, as a result, we
had to cut the size of our military. The Army, for instance, in almost
half, cutting our armored divisions down to 20; the Navy was cut from
585 ships to 314. As a result of those significant cutbacks during the
1990s, it was necessary to go to a policy that included the use of our
Guard and Reserve forces. This was clearly understood in the 1990s
because we had no choice. As our military budget was cut back, we had
to rely more and more on the Guard and Reserves, that is why the Guard
and Reserves are being used today in Iraq. I would add, Mr. Speaker,
commitments were made that our troops would be out of Bosnia before
Christmas of 1996. Our troops are still in Bosnia in the fall of 2004.
So again, the rhetoric on this floor is typical rhetoric that we hear
before an
[[Page H7431]]
election, and I would just urge our colleagues and the American people
to tune in tomorrow at 10 a.m., the Prime Minister of Iraq Alawi will
present the case of the Iraqi people to this body in terms of how
grateful they are and what level of success we are achieving.
Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to discuss a recent trip that a
delegation of Members of Congress took in delivering a resolution that
passed on the Floor of this body one week ago. It was my 38th trip to
this country, Mr. Speaker, the country of Russia, which I have worked
hard to try to assist our government, both Democrat and Republican
administrations, in turning from an arch enemy of ours during the Cold
War to a partner. This 38th trip was by far and away the most sad, Mr.
Speaker, and the most emotional.
Three of us traveled to Moscow and, in spite of significant concern
expressed by both our government and the Russian government, we were
able to travel from Moscow after visiting the North Ossetian office in
downtown Moscow to express the condolences of the people of America and
this Congress in particular. We traveled down to Beslan in North
Ossetia. We traveled along with the President of Kalmykia, and the
purpose of the trip was simple, but it was profound.
We carried with us the resolution that was passed unanimously by this
body expressing the solidarity of the American people and the U.S.
Congress, Democrats and Republicans, with the people of Russia in their
darkest hour. It was appropriate that we do this, Mr. Speaker, because
it was, in fact, President Putin that was the first President to call
the President of the United States after 9-11 to express the
condolences of the Russian people in our darkest hour. And I can recall
very vividly the embassy in Moscow, the American embassy after the 9-11
attack, where literally hundreds and thousands of bouquets of flowers
and notes, expressions of sympathy, were laid outside of our embassy by
the people of Russia.
So those of us in the Congress who supported the passage of the
resolution on the Floor of this body one week ago and signed by the
gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) thought it was imperative
that we travel to Beslan and stand in that school and convey to the
people of Russia our conviction that we were with them in the fight
against terrorism.
I want to briefly outline the trip, Mr. Speaker, and then comment on
the implications of both the terrorist attack in Beslan and the
terrorist attacks on 2 Russian airplanes and in downtown Moscow that
have been occurring on a fairly frequent and regular basis.
In arriving in Beslan in North Ossetia in the presidential plane of
the President of Kalmykia, we were greeted by the Speaker of the State
Parliament, or Duma, of North Ossetia. North Ossetia is an autonomous
republic within Russia. They have their own President, their own
parliament called the Duma, but they are, in fact, a part of the
Russian Federation.
{time} 2310
Therefore, the President was someone in that country we hoped and we
did meet with. But the person who greeted us on our arrival at the
airport in Beslan is in fact the Speaker of the Parliament of that
country, equivalent to the Speaker of the House in our country. His job
was to escort us through his country and explain to us in his own terms
what happened at Beslan.
The Speaker of the Parliament when he arrived was certainly someone
who we could relate to because he had a similar job to us in terms of
his function and his job. His name is Taymuraz Mansurov. And it is
interesting because he told us when we arrived that he had four
children himself, two children in college and two children who in fact
were attending the actual school that was attacked by the terrorists on
the first day of classes just several short weeks ago. In fact, both of
his children are today in hospitals in Moscow recovering from
significant wounds. His 12-year-old daughter was shot in the face with
a weapon as she was attempting to leave the school and she is being
treated at a Moscow special medical center for that wound.
He told us that the state of trauma of his country and his city, the
city of Beslan was just something that was impossible for people
outside of North Ossetia to understand and appreciate. As we got off of
the bus at the first stop on our way into Beslan, right next to a
cemetery, we were struck by literally hundreds of graves that had
recently been dug with mounds of dirt on top of each of them where the
children of this school and their parents and their grandparents had
been buried within the previous several days.
On each of those grave sites, and again there were probably 360 of
those graves because that is how many people were killed, were flowers
and items that were left by friends and other well wishers around the
world.
I told our two colleagues who went with me on the trip, the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Souder) and the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks),
that we would walk down the center aisle of these mounds of graves and
that at some point in time we would stop, we would turn and face one
grave and I would ask the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) to say a
prayer, followed by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder), and then I
would close.
The Russian media was filming every step that we took, and I felt it
appropriate to convey at the grave site of these people the prayers of
the American people. The irony was, among these hundreds of graves
sites, these hundreds of mounds covered with flowers and other
materials left behind, we stopped at one about two-thirds of the ways
down the center aisle. We turned to our left and the three of us stood
around this one particular grave.
The large floral bouquet on that grave was red, white, and blue. Now,
the colors of the Russia flag are red, white, and blue as are the
colors of our flag. But as we looked down and bowed our head and as the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) began the prayers on behalf of this
delegation, on behalf of the American people, standing firm with the
people of Beslan and Russia, I could not help but cast my eyes to the
ribbon that was attached to this floral bouquet. And having studied
Russia in both high school and college and understanding the language,
I saw the Cyrillic letters which said USA.
As I looked after the prayer was over at the rest of the ribbon, I
could see who that floral bouquet had come from and where it had been
sent from. That floral bouquet on the grave site out of hundreds that
were there that we just happened to stop at was sent by the students,
the teachers, and the community of Columbine High School in Colorado.
What an amazing start to our visit to Beslan, the three members of
Congress would stop in the midst of this brand-new graveyard where all
of these bodies of children and adults were buried, and the one grave
that we had prayed over would contain the floral recognition of people
from one of our own tragedies.
After we completed our prayers at the grave site, we went back to our
bus with the Speaker of the Duma, and he drove us into the town of
Beslan, a small community in the southern part of Russia in the
Caucasus that has just been rife with terrorism. Dagestan on one side,
Chechnya not far away. And in fact, the fear of the Russians is that
the 32 terrorists who caused this incident were in fact, and they have
stated so publicly, a part of the Chechen uprising and the Chechen
terrorist operation.
As we got to the town, we stood in front of this massive brick
building that in the center had been reduced to rubble. Literally
thousands of floral bouquets, it was there that the Speaker of the Duma
gave us a summary of what actually had occurred.
He told us on the first day of school all of the children in this
school assembled in lines by grades with their parents and their
grandparents. The first day of school in Russia, Mr. Speaker, is a
proud day. It is a family day. It is a community day. Everyone comes
together to begin the new school year. In fact, it is considered a
holiday throughout Russia. And on this day the students at this
particular school all lined up neatly, ranging in age from the very
young, some 2, 3 and 4, some who were too young to go to school, were
there with their parents and they ranged up to the teenage years.
Along with these students were the parents and grandparents who had
come out to see their children off on the first day of classes. As they
stood
[[Page H7432]]
in the courtyard in front of the school, without any indication
whatsoever, the terrorists surrounded the students and the faculty
members and brought out their automatic weapons. And in a very
deliberate and very nasty tone, ordered these 1,000 individuals inside
the school building. As they threatened them with their automatic
weapons and with their rifles and their pistols and threatened to harm
them, the students were in a state of panic but in fact went through
the only entrance into the building which led into a gymnasium area.
The Speaker of the Duma told us that when some of the younger
students were not moving fast enough, they picked up the students and
threw them through the windows without any regard for the well-being of
these youngsters. Once assembled inside this school complex, they had
them stand along the walls, and they began a process of intimidation
that lasted for 3 days. They denied the students water. They denied the
students and the adults food. And in fact, Mr. Speaker, the terrorists
in the early hours of the siege took the youngest parents, the youngest
fathers that were there with their youngsters on the first day of
school and one by one they assassinated them right in front of the
students. They then took their bodies and threw them out the back
windows of the school so that over the course of the first day or so,
all of those fathers who had gone to school with their children were
wiped out by these inhumane terrorists.
As they got control of the hostages and they had reduced the level of
men that were in the crowd that could provide perhaps resistance
against them, the terrorists began to then focus on the mothers, the
grandmothers, some of them very fragile, some of them very elderly, and
the youngest children who were obviously in a state of shock and a
state of fear.
And in fact, Mr. Speaker, the Speaker of the Duma told us that they
on a cellular phone had his children in the school call him on the
cellular phone and the terrorists had his children plead with him to
come and get them and to accede to the demands of the terrorists.
What tremendous personal turmoil that the Speaker went through with
his two youngest children in the school as the terrorists contained
them and yet required them to talk on the cell phone to their father,
using them as pawns in this unbelievable siege.
Obviously, the leaders of the republic and the law enforcement
officials who were around the school would not and could not accede to
the demands of the terrorists.
{time} 2320
The demands were too large in scope, and they were too unreasonable
in nature. So it was basically a waiting game. Day one passed, day two
passed and then day three came.
Now, perhaps there is a lot of second guessing that has been going on
about the effort surrounding the school and acts that should have been
taken, but I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, our delegation was talking to a
father who had his two children in that building when it occurred and
who arrived on the scene within a matter of hours after the siege
occurred.
So this was not some sanitized message being given to us by Russian
authorities. This was an elected official, the Speaker of the North
Ossetia parliament, but it was also the father of two young children in
that school. In fact, the Speaker himself had attended that school as a
child, and his two older children also attended that school.
It was on the third day, Mr. Speaker, when a sense of frustration
came upon everyone, those that were trapped inside the building and
those around the building, the parents outside who were urging the
police officers, the military to do anything possible to end the siege,
to get their children out. Fathers that were outside were screaming
that something had to be done.
Then an explosion occurred. The explosion was inside this school, and
while it has not been fully determined as to the origin of the
explosion, the initial thought by those outside, including the Speaker
of the Duma, was that the explosion occurred because there was a
movement of ammunition inside. When the explosion occurred, it set off
a flurry of activity. Gunshots started to ring out, and family members
on the outside of the school started to rush in. They were rushing in
because they saw it as an opportunity to save their child, as over
1,000 children and adults were still in this complex.
The terrorists then responded by firing automatic weapons and gunning
down the adults that were trying to get in. That explosion led to
additional fires, and in matter of a short period of time, the entire
gymnasium and center area of the school was an inferno.
Children on the inside started running out. Young children, 6-, 7-,
8-, 10-years-old, and the terrorists who were standing at windows, who
had come outside, started firing at will at the backs of these young
children, hitting some in the back of their head, others in their back
and their legs. Children started to fall all over the schoolyard area.
At the end of the siege, Mr. Speaker, 31 of the 32 terrorists were
killed. One terrorist was captured and is currently in the control of
the authorities. I am not sure whether it is in Beslan or in Moscow.
This terrible incident had come to an end. The carnage was unreal.
Immediately attempts were made to take those that were most severely
burned to the local hospital, which we visited and was a typical
hospital servicing a small town, not capable of responding to hundreds
of injuries, hundreds of rifle shots, of wounds, of burns, that were
far beyond the capability of this small-town hospital. In fact, the
chief medical person at the hospital, whom we met when we visited the
hospital after stopping at this school, told us that they treated some
8- or 900 individuals who had serious injuries, and as soon as
possible, within hours, they began flying them out to hospitals in
neighboring cities and the most severely injured to hospitals as far
away as Moscow where they are still located.
Mr. Speaker, as we listened to the story and saw the visual
realization of what this school was and imagined what it was before
this incident to a community that shared the pride of the education of
its young, we just were overcome with emotion. In my case, being a
teacher by profession, I could not imagine the feeling on opening day
of school to have terrorists surround the building and to herd the
students inside. I thought to myself, the Russians have been criticized
for how they handled this, but I wonder if we would have been able to
handle a situation at one of our schools, where on the opening day, a
group of terrorists with automatic weapons or with rifles or pistols
surrounded the schoolyard and forced those youngsters and family
members inside of the building.
I think the Russian people and those in North Ossetia did the best
job they could in an impossible situation. When the Speaker of the Duma
finished explaining to us the details of what had occurred, we walked
solemnly over to the entrance of the school.
We had prepared a special wreath, Mr. Speaker, a wreath that was red,
white and blue, with a ribbon saying, ``In Deepest Sympathy, from the
Congress of the United States.'' We were carrying with us, Mr. Speaker,
an American flag that we had flown over the Capitol the day before we
left to present to the people of Beslan as a symbol of our friendship,
as a symbol of solidarity between the American people and the Russian
people in the fight against terrorism.
The three of us solemnly walked behind this floral bouquet as it was
carried toward the center of the school by two local residents to be
placed in the center of the building. We followed the floral bouquet
in. They carefully placed it right next to a pile of literally hundreds
of flowers. Mr. Speaker, in a sight that I can only describe as
unbelievable, there were hundreds and thousands of bottles of water.
Beslan's a poor community. Many of the family members could not afford
to buy flowers, and yet all of them knew that those children and those
parents and grandparents had been denied water for 3 days and food. So
the people of Beslan brought bottles of water and set those bottles of
water with open tops throughout the school complex and down the center
corridor, interspersed with hundreds of flowers and bouquets. There
were also Teddy bears and stuffed animals and the favorite toys of
students who would never again be able to use them.
[[Page H7433]]
Following the setting down of the flowers, and again, the thoughts
and prayers of the members of Congress, I opened up the American flag
and asked my colleagues to join with me in presenting that flag as a
symbol of the friendship of the U.S. Congress and the people of America
to the people of Beslan, the people of North Ossetia and the people of
Russia.
I have been to a lot of disasters, Mr. Speaker, during my 18 years in
Congress and my career because, as many of my colleagues know, I have
worked the issues involving disasters. In fact, before coming to this
body I used to be a volunteer fire chief.
I have been to earthquakes, Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the
wildfires in California and Oregon in the West, the Midwestern floods,
the Murrah Building bombing with Chief Marrs, the World Trade Center in
1993 and the World Trade Center in 2001. They were all incidents of
significant emotion, loss of life, terrible tragedy, terrible human
suffering. But I can tell you in standing in this school, looking up at
the basketball backboard that had been severely burned, looking at the
scorched walls, seeing the evidence of where young people used to play
and seeing hundreds and thousands of bottles of water placed all around
this complex and still smelling this terrible smell of fire and of
death, it was very difficult for us to provide remarks. In fact, all
three of us had difficulty in getting through our statements.
As we spoke to the people of Beslan who had assembled there with us,
in front of the TV cameras from throughout Russia who were recording
our visit, but very simply, we told the story of the feelings of the
American people, their anger at what had happened at this school, their
frustration in dealing with terrorists, who have no regard for human
life and especially the lives of innocent women, grandmothers and young
children.
We told the Russians one very simple thing, Mr. Speaker, that on this
day we were not Russians nor Americans. We were human beings who were
standing together to tell the terrorists, the cowards that they are,
that we would not stand for these kinds of actions, whether they would
be in downtown Baghdad, whether they would be in the streets of Moscow,
the streets of New York or Oklahoma City or the streets of a small town
like Beslan. We told the Russian people that we were there expressing
the sense of the United States Congress, that we shared their grief and
we stand with them in solidarity.
{time} 2330
I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, that there was a feeling in that school
among the family members that were there of deep appreciation that the
American Congress had taken the time to go to Beslan. We were the first
and, to my knowledge, the only Americans that were allowed into Beslan
to visit the school. Our ambassador would visit the North Ossetia
office the day after we arrived in Beslan to express the condolences of
the American people on behalf of our State Department. In fact, Mr.
Speaker, we wondered why it had taken 2 weeks for our ambassador in
Moscow to make that trip to the North Ossetia embassy.
As we left the school and reflected upon what we had seen, we boarded
the bus and asked to be taken to the local hospital. And there in the
hospital we heard the briefings from both the chief psychiatrist who
was brought in from Moscow and the chief medical leader of this
hospital in Beslan about how they attempted to deal with these
overwhelming casualties.
Then we talked about the kind of treatment that the patients were
currently receiving, both in that hospital, the hospitals around Russia
who had taken other patients and about the offerings of support from
all over the world. But I want to convey this to you, Mr. Speaker, and
to our colleagues, every place we went on that trip we heard from the
people of Beslan that the people of America responded in an
unbelievable way.
In fact, it was the speaker of the parliament and the mayor of the
city who told us that, within hours, there was a planeload of supplies
coming into his community from the people of America. It included
health care needs. It included equipment. It included special beds and
pharmaceuticals, from a Nation that had also suffered a very
significant incident, responding to the needs of the people of Russia.
As we went through the hospitals, we talked with some of the
patients. We talked to the nurses. We thanked the doctors. And then we
stopped in a room with youngsters who were suffering from post-
traumatic stress. I told the young girl who was in the sixth grade that
my first year after college I taught sixth grade, and we talked about
some common issues I knew she would have with sixth graders from
America. I asked her if she had access to e-mail, and she said she
could through the school or the local library. I asked her to e-mail my
office so I could link her up with students of a similar age back in
America.
Again, the medical personnel in that hospital were working under
unbelievable circumstances, and they were doing a fantastic job.
We left the medical center, and my colleagues that wanted to make a
simple contribution to the medical center, not on behalf of the
American people but on behalf of ourselves. Each dug into our pockets
and came out with an amount of money that we each could afford to give
as a donation to that hospital on the spot. And I can tell you, the
doctor was extremely gratified that we had taken the time to do that.
Since coming back to Washington, I have learned that I have a group
in my own State, headquartered in Bucks County, that I will provide the
name of for the Record, Mr. Speaker, who has already raised almost
$800,000 for the people and the families of Beslan. Typical of America
and the American people, responding to a tragedy thousands of miles
away because of people in need.
As we drove from the hospital to the airport and drove through the
streets of this small town, you just could not help but have a heavy
heart in seeing homes where families had been torn apart. We learned of
a mother who had taken her four kids to school that day. The mother was
killed and so were all four children, all buried at one grave site at
that cemetery we had visited.
As we arrived at the airport, we learned the president of North
Ossetia would meet us there, an older gentleman. In fact, his name is
Alexander Dzasokhov, and he warmly greeted us. We had a press event
with the media, and we presented to him, Mr. Speaker, the framed
resolution that our colleagues in this body passed unanimously 5 days
earlier. That document, in a frame, was signed by the Speaker of the
House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), on behalf of all of
us, Democrats and Republicans, who voted unanimously to express our
solidarity in the suffering of the Russian people and those families
impacted at Beslan.
We had discussions with the President about ways in which we could
assist. We told him our burn foundations in America had offered
assistance with burn treatment. We told him many of our people wanted
to help with the monument being built at the grave site and the school.
And I might add, Mr. Speaker, what the speaker of their parliament
told us was that, when that monument is completed on the 40th day of
mourning, which is the official mourning period in Russia, and that
monument is dedicated to the memory of the victims, that American flag
that we handed them that flew over this Capitol building, will be
raised with the Russian flag and the North Ossetia flag, because of
their thanks and their gratitude for the friendship that we showed
them, again, in their darkest hour.
We also discussed with the president other steps that we could take
together as two nations fighting terrorism. We talked about the need to
go after the terrorists, as President Bush and President Putin have
been doing over the past several months and years. And then we followed
up a dialogue we had had in Moscow with Duma Deputy Kokoshin. Chairman
Kokoshin, who is a friend of mine, chairs one of the key committees in
the Duma. The vice chairman of that committee is Deputy Lebedev, and we
discussed with our North Ossetia leaders and the president our desire
to host a conference in Moscow in the first quarter of 2005, a joint
conference of Americans and Russians on the issue of homeland security
and anti-terrorism.
[[Page H7434]]
It was somewhat ironic, Mr. Speaker, that the Monday before I left
for Russia, I was in New York giving the opening speech to a homeland
security conference attended by 3,000 people at the Javitz Center. That
conference on homeland security also had Asa Hutchinson in attendance
and scores of other people from the leadership of our own Homeland
Security, on what we are doing to defend America from the threats of
terrorism and the protection of our homeland.
Mr. Speaker, 260 corporations were exhibiting at that conference,
which was put together by one of the largest conference organizers in
America, EJ Krause. I talked to the EJ Krause folks before I left for
Moscow, and they have agreed to organize the conference that we
together will put on in Russia so that we can show a joint strategy,
joint use of technology and a joint commitment to fight terrorism
together.
Mr. Speaker, we left the president, went back to Moscow, continued
our meetings and discussions, and I can tell you that every one of our
colleagues in this chamber needs to know that the people of Russia were
extremely pleased by the actions this Congress took. It was important
for us to show solidarity with the Russian people because there has
been some turmoil between our countries over the past several years.
And, Mr. Speaker, that leads to the second reason of my special order
tonight and another reason why I felt it was important to make the
statement that this Congress made in our resolution that passed last
week.
There have been some who have been advocating that America should
move away from Putin and Russia, that because President Putin, partly
in response to terrorism, partly for other reasons, has clamped down on
the media, has in fact recently passed new provisions that will limit
the role of the people of Russia to elect their own governors of their
regions, that will reduce the number of political parties from the
current number to approximately two or three, similar to what we have
in America; there are even those colleagues in this body, in both
parties, good friends of mine who I hold in high respect, who have
written to our colleagues that we should deny Russia access to the
World Trade Organization, that we should punish Russia because of these
anti-democracy actions.
Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that those actions would be the worst
steps that we could take right now. Now is not the time for America to
push Russia away from us. Sure, we are all troubled by some of the
actions that President Putin has taken. I am concerned by the clamping
down of the free media. I am concerned by some of the methods of
intimidation. But now is not the time for us to be pushing Putin away,
which would encourage more of the authoritarian efforts that we have
seen rising up in Russia over the past several weeks and months.
Now is not the time for us to move Russia in another direction. Now
is the time for us to bring Russia back, to give Russia perhaps what we
have not given them over the past 12 years since they threw off
communism.
Mr. Speaker, in looking at our relationship with Russia, I was very
critical of the previous administration because I felt we did not have
a consistent policy with Russia. We were talking a good game, saying
all the right things, but there was not a follow-through in terms of
implementation.
We had the radical nationalists in Russia back in the 1990s saying
that America does not want to be our friend; you watch, they will move
NATO up to our borders, and they are going to threaten us; you watch,
they will abrogate the ABM Treaty; they want to dominate us.
{time} 2340
Watch, they do not want us to be involved. They are going to steal
our money and our assets. They want to use us. That was what the
radical nationalists in Moscow said back in the early 1990s. That was
what Uranovsky and that is what Zyuganov said. But many in Russia were
pro-West, and they said, no, we are going to continue to move closer to
America because America is the model that we want to work with.
But I think back, Mr. Speaker, over the past 12 years. We did move
NATO up to Russia's borders, and I supported that. But we handled that
miserably. We did not take the time to have the Russians understand
that the movement of NATO to its borders was not to threaten or
intimidate Russia, but rather to build a new sense of security and that
one day, one day, Russia itself might be able to join NATO. And with
the ABM Treaty, I was the one, Mr. Speaker, who offered the missile
defense bill in 1998 that passed with a veto-proof margin, not because
I wanted to dominate Russia, but when I took Don Rumsfeld and James
Woolsey and Bill Schneider to Moscow the weekend before the vote on my
bill, we told the Russians our concern is with North Korea, our concern
is with Iran, our concern is with China, who were all developing long-
range missiles that we have no defense against.
But, Mr. Speaker, from the Russian perspective in 1995 and 1996, we
had one joint missile defense program with Russia called RAMOS. The
Clinton administration tried to cancel it. Senator Levin and myself and
a group of other Members in both parties and both bodies fought the
administration, and we won. We kept that joint cooperative program
together. But the Russians saw the handwriting on the wall: America
does not want us to be partners in defending our people. They really
want to dominate us. And they were convinced, and perhaps some still
are, that that was our purpose in moving away from the ABM Treaty.
And then we bombed Serbia, perhaps Russia's best friend and ally, the
Serbian people. We all wanted Milosevic out. But instead of using
Russians to help us get Milosevic out of power, we went to NATO instead
of the U.N., and we used NATO as an offensive force, invaded Serbia,
and killed innocent Serbs. It was not until several months after we
realized we could not get Milosevic out by bombing Serbia, by bombing
innocent people, that Russia had to play a role. And it was, in fact,
Russia through the special envoy of President Yeltsin and Victor
Chernomyrdin that we were able to reach an agreement to end the war on
the terms of the West, again with Russia's involvement at the 11th
hour.
The Russians saw through all of this, and they said America does not
want to be our friend. And then we had President Clinton on a number of
occasions say that we should lift Russia out of the restrictions of
Jackson-Vanik. President Bush has made at least ten statements over the
past 4 years that Russia should not be subjected to Jackson-Vanik
consideration any longer. Mr. Speaker, Jackson-Vanik restrictions were
placed on the Soviet Union because back in the 1980s, the Soviet Union
was persecuting Jews. The National Council of Soviet Jewry led that
effort. I supported that effort because back in the Soviet era I used
to meet with the Soviet Jews in Moscow who were being persecuted and
harassed by the KGB and by Russia's leaders.
But in 2004, in 2000, in 1998, the persecution of Soviet Jews was
largely ended. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I went to all the Jewish groups
last August, and I asked will they send me a letter expressing their
interest in elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, and all the major
Jewish groups in America did, Mr. Speaker. They sent me letters, JINSA,
the National Council of Soviet Jewry, AIPAC, all saying, We no longer
think that Russia should be held captive by Jackson-Vanik.
I went to the administration, and some of those people under
President Bush who did not quite get his message said it is a trade
issue, it is about poultry or steel. So I went to our colleagues who
are Chairs of our trade committees, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Pombo), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner), and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), and the three of them sent a letter to me
saying that they too supported elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik.
So, Mr. Speaker, here we had the support of leaders in this body on
issues involving Soviet Jewry, on trade issues saying they support
elevating Russia out. We have the President of our country demanding we
do it. And we still have not done it.
So the Russians look at us and say our words are good, but there is
no action. There is no follow on. And it was those same Russians during
the 1990s who saw oligarchs who were put into place by Yeltsin but with
the help of
[[Page H7435]]
American consultants and American academics who ripped their country
off, who stole billions of dollars from the IMF and World Bank that
were supposed to help build a Russian infrastructure.
I remember very vividly back in the late 1990s, 1997, and 1998,
telling the Clinton administration we have evidence that there are
American companies ripping off the Russians. They did not want to hear
it, did not want to talk about it. It was in the late 1990s, 2000, that
we finally heard the Justice Department indict Bank of New York
officials for allegedly scamming $5 billion out of Russia that should
have gone for infrastructure but instead ended up in Swiss bank
accounts and U.S. real estate investments.
And then we saw the technology proliferation out of Russia,
individual retired generals and admirals selling technology to Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea. We blamed the Russians for that, the
Russian Government, when, in fact, Mr. Speaker, and I remember doing
speech after speech on this, we had documented 20 times we had evidence
of retired Russian generals and admirals selling technology illegally,
violating arms control agreements. Of those 20 times, our Nation
imposed required sanctions four times. Yet we blamed the Russians for
something that we ourselves should have taken action to control.
So if we look to the period from 1992 to 2004, we have to ask the
question, What have we done to assist Russia in becoming our true
partner? I would say, Mr. Speaker, not much. So now we criticize
Russia. We criticize President Putin. We want to push him away further.
President Putin and President Bush have a great personal relationship.
They have met on three or four occasions. They get along very well, and
they want to work together. But, Mr. Speaker, below the two Presidents
there is a vacuum. The President says we want to do Jackson-Vanik
elevation. He said it 10 times. The people under the President say not
now, now is not the right time. They should be fired. The President
sets the foreign policy of our country, but some of those serving him
do not get the message. And Russia bears the consequences of our lack
of action.
The President calls for joint cooperation on missile defense. He has
said it five times and so has President Putin. But this year our
Department of Defense and Missile Defense Agency again canceled the
RAMOS program. We have no cooperation with Russia on missile defense
right now.
We talk about Russian cooperation with weapons of mass destruction.
But we have corruption on the Russian side, corruption on the American
side. We are not being given access to those sensitive sites. And again
we wonder why the Russians do not trust us.
Mr. Speaker, we need Russia. We need Russia to be a partner of ours.
We need Russia to be a partner of ours for several reasons. If we look
at the world's situation right now, we are certainly unhappy with some
of the direction of President Putin, but we have no leverage with him
to get him to understand that he is taking the wrong steps as a
democratic nation. We look at the Middle East. We heard our colleagues
for 2 hours talk about Iraq. Mr. Speaker, the problem in Iraq is not
being caused by the people in Iraq. The people in Iraq did welcome us.
They did give us flowers, and they are happy that we are there. Ask our
troops. Tomorrow we will hear Prime Minister Allawi tell us the real
story of the gratefulness of the Iraqi nation. The problem in Iraq is
not with the Iraqi people.
Mr. Speaker, the problem with Iraq is the problem of the neighbor
Iran. Iran has been involved in undermining our efforts to stabilize
Iraq for the last 18 months. I remember going to CIA Director George
Tenet 18 months ago when a former Member of this body, a former
Democrat Member, came to me and said, I have a source that wants to
work with us, a source that will tell us where bin Laden is and will
give us information about Iran's involvement in Iraq.
I went down to meet with Tenet, and for the past 18 months, Mr.
Speaker, on a regular basis, I have interacted with this informant
based overseas in Europe. We have gotten continuous information that I
have passed along to the CIA, all of which has been verified, that Iran
has been behind the destabilization of Iraq on a continual basis. I
told the CIA over a year ago, Mr. Speaker, that the Ayatollah Khamenei,
the religious fanatic in Iran, not Hatami, the governmental leader, but
the Ayatollah Khamenei was providing $70 million of funding to Sadr.
{time} 2350
The CIA at that time, Mr. Speaker, no one knew who al-Sader was. I
told the CIA that Iran was crashing on a nuclear program. I told the
CIA that my informant had even found evidence of two groups of Iranians
going up through China into North Korea in an attempt to acquire their
nuclear weapons materials. And I told the CIA that Ayatollah Khamenei
had ordered his country to prepare for an attack on one of our nuclear
powers plants, and the letters were beginning with SEA, Seabrook.
Mr. Speaker, that was in June of last year. In August of last year,
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested two al Qaeda-linked
individuals who were flying a plane scoping out a nuclear power plant
up in the Northeast near Seabrook.
Mr. Speaker, Iran has been our problem, and it does not take a rocket
scientist to figure that out. On one side of Iran you have Afghanistan,
a country that now has 10 million people registered to vote in their
first elections, a constitution in place, a country moving toward a
democracy.
On the other side of Iran you have Iraq, stabilizing, moving toward a
constitution, moving toward free elections. So on both sides of Iran
you have democracy breaking out.
And right down the road, Mr. Speaker, you have Libya, where Moammar
Gadhafi has voluntarily given up all of his weapons of mass destruction
without us firing a single shot. I know Gadhafi's purpose, because I
led both delegations to Libya earlier this year in January and March.
Sitting across the tent from him in the desert in Tripoli, looking out
at his house that we had bombed in 1986, he said, ``Congressman Weldon,
I don't want my people to suffer the fate of the Iraqi people and I
don't want to be Saddam Hussein.''
Mr. Speaker, the Iranians understand what is happening. The Ayatollah
Khamenei understands he is not popular in Iran. When they had elections
earlier this year, only 9 percent of the people eligible to vote voted.
They despise radical fundamentalism, but they cannot do anything about
it.
So Iran understands their days are numbered, and that is why they are
crashing on a nuclear program. That is why they are attempting to
undermine Iraq, because Iran does not want Iraq to succeed.
Our colleagues on the other side said we should have anticipated
that. Mr. Speaker, there is no way the President could have anticipated
that. We are dealing with it now.
But how do we deal with Iran, Mr. Speaker? We do not have any
leverage with Iran. We do not even have discussions with Iran. One
country does, Mr. Speaker, and that country is Russia.
Russia has worked with Iran over the past 10, 15 years. They have a
regular entry into Moscow. They interact with the Members of the Duma
and the Federation Council, and President Putin has a relationship with
Iranian leaders that we need. But the problem is, Mr. Speaker, we do
not have the leverage with President Putin.
Yes, President Bush and President Putin have a good personal
relationship, but there is a vacuum under that in both countries. Now
we tried. Back in 2001, Mr. Speaker, we gave this document to Bush and
Putin, 48 pages, 108 recommendations, signed by one-third of the
Congress. Dick Lugar, Carl Levin, Joe Biden, myself, liberal Democrats,
conservative Republicans, one-third of the Congress saying we are ready
for a new relationship.
Unfortunately, the people under President Bush have not been
listening. They were not listening when President Bush said remove
Jackson-Vanik. They were not listening when President Bush said do
joint programs in missile defense. Now we are paying the price for
that.
Mr. Speaker, that is why I proposed to the President and that is why
I am announcing tonight a new initiative, renewed commitments,
strengthened relationships. This four-part strategy
[[Page H7436]]
will give us a series of initiatives that will give President Putin and
the Russian people a clear signal that finally we want to be their
close friend and partners it is a simple strategy. It builds on
successes of the past and deals with issues that we have talked about.
The four strategies are fairly simple, Mr. Speaker. It calls for us
to terminate Jackson-Vanik limitations on Russia, as our President has
called for. We can pass that resolution in this body and the other body
under a suspension.
It calls for a new threat reduction initiative using a new process to
get entry into President Putin that we have been working on for 2 years
that will allow us to reduce the theft and corruption of American tax
dollars and will give us access into sites we have never had access to
before.
Last August I took two members of the other side with me to the
closed city of Krasnoyarsk 26, without any help from our State
Department, no help from our Defense Department, no help from our
Energy Department and no help from the CIA. We went in the mountain
where the Soviet Union built their three largest plutonium producing
reactors.
We met in Moscow, and our Russian counterparts said if you follow
this new process, you get access to any site in Russia you want.
Today, Mr. Speaker, I have proposals signed by the Russians for six
new biological weapons sites that they want to open up for American
joint cooperation. I handed those six initiatives in both Russian and
English to John Bolton the day I left for Moscow last week. The
Russians do want to work with us in a new way, a new way of trust and
confidence in solving problems with weapons of mass destruction.
The third element of this plan, Mr. Speaker, calls for substantive
work on joint missile defense cooperation. President Bush has called
for this repeatedly, publicly. So the question is, why have we not done
it? The answer is, the Defense Department told me they could not get a
meeting with General Baluyevsky, who 6 months ago was the number two
general in the Russian military.
I told General Kadisch at Missile Defense Agency, you cannot get a
meeting with him? Send someone over with me and I will get you the
meeting.
So, Mr. Speaker, two months ago I took a delegation to Moscow. From
the Missile Defense Agency I took General Obering, who is now the three
star general in charge of that agency. He took three other associates
with him.
We arrived in Moscow and they took us to Starya Plochad, which is
equivalent to our East Wing of the White House. We sat at a table
across from Putin's representative to the Duma and the Federation
Council, the chairman of the committee overseeing the Ministry of the
Interior, Alexi Alexandrov, and in walks General Baluyevsky. General
Baluyevsky, in a business suit, talked with General Obering and began a
dialogue that we could not get for a year on missile defense
cooperation.
Two weeks after we left Moscow, President Putin relieved the chairman
of their Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kvashnin, and replaced him with
General Baluyevsky.
The fourth item in this initiative, Mr. Speaker, calls for the
announcement of the U.S.-Russian free energy trade agreement. Not free
trade agreement, but free energy trade agreement. We have significant
energy needs. Russia has significant energy reserves. They are trying
to get their energy to the marketplace, we want to use that energy and
need it.
What I am calling for, Mr. Speaker, is an equivalent relationship
similar to Gore-Chernomyrdrin in the previous administration between
the two presidents of our countries, so that Putin and Bush appoint a
joint effort of having our energy leaders, private sector and
government, work together with Russia's energy leaders, so that we can
help bring their energy out and use it in our marketplace. It is
already happening. We simply want to expedite that process, both in
terms of fossil fuel and in terms of nuclear power.
Along with this four-part position paper, Mr. Speaker, we need to
work together with Russia on anti-terrorism.
I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, if we follow these actions, if the
President takes the bold leadership that is outlined in this document,
then we will have the leverage for President Bush to go to President
Putin and say, ``Vladimir, you are going too far in your actions in
providing autocratic rule over your country. Allow democracy to
survive, to grow and prosper. Vladimir, I need your help in allowing us
to deal with Iran. Help us deal with the problem of the Bushehr nuclear
power plant, because if we do not deal with that power plant, Israel
will eventually try to take it out because they see it as a nuclear
threat to their security.
Mr. Speaker, now is the time for us to join with Russia, to be
Russia's best friend, to be Russia's partner; to hold Russia
accountable, to talk about human rights. But to do it in a way that
Russia understands is in our mutual interest, not a condescending
approach where we look down on Russia, as we have done in the past, and
tell Russia to do what we have outlined for them.
Mr. Speaker, I am convinced nothing is more critical. The timing is
right, and we must act quickly.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record these documents.
U.S.-Russia Partnership--Renewed Commitments, Strengthened
Relationships, August 2004
introduction
Long before Perestroika, Gorbachev and the fall of the
Soviet Union, I developed a deep interest in U.S.-Russian
relations. The Soviet Union, an enemy of the United States,
demonstrated its strength and intent to protect its country
by producing massive stockpiles of nuclear and biological
weapons. The aggression between our two countries led me to
major in Russian Studies, believing that one day, our
relationship would change and the United States and the
Soviet Union would normalize relations. As a county
commissioner, I hosted my first group of young communists in
Pennsylvania in 1985. This relationship, forged 19 years ago,
has maintained its strength and expanded even further to
include a larger circle of Russian citizens. I take great
pride in my efforts to reach out and establish a solid base
of understanding and cooperation to achieve stability for the
people of Russia and the surrounding former Soviet republics.
For the past 10 years, I have co-chaired the Duma-Congress
Study Group, the official inter-parliamentary relationship
between the United States and Russia. This exchange plays a
vital role in strengthening our relationship with Russia. The
overriding purpose of this relationship is to demonstrate to
the Duma and its leaders how an effective inter-parliamentary
relationship can lead to positive changes in both our
countries. Today, Members of Congress work with their
counterparts in the Duma on common interests such as the
environment, health care, social and economic issues. By
building and strengthening a working relationship, we are
then able to confront more difficult issues such as missile
defense, non-proliferation, Iran and other multilateral
relationships.
Three years ago, I unveiled a comprehensive plan to
cooperate with Russia on eleven different issues ranging from
defense and security to agriculture and healthcare. This
proposal, A New Time, A New Beginning, was widely supported
in the U.S. and Russia. However, recently, I have watched
Russia lose confidence in the United States and move further
away from the West. The start of Russian distrust in the
United States began shortly after the fall of Soviet
communism. Russians believed that with the break up of the
Soviet Union, prosperity would soon follow. Instead, in 2001,
$4.08 billion of U.S. foreign direct investment flowed into
Russia while in 2001, Communist China received $10.53 billion
in U.S. foreign direct investment. This was the first of many
negative messages the U.S. sent to Russia.
Additionally, Russians are still bitter of our handling of
the war in Kosovo. Russia believed we could have, and should
have, ended that war much earlier. In fact, instead of
ignoring Russia's relationship with Yugoslavia, we should
have encouraged Russia to play a more aggressive role in
peacefully removing Milosevic from power. It was not until
one year after we began the bombing that we finally requested
Russia's assistance.
Furthermore, when news of the biggest money laundering
scandal broke in late 1999, the Clinton Administration
ignored the theft of billions of U.S. dollars destined for
Russian citizens. The Russians watched as the oligarchs,
including some with close connections to President Boris
Yeltsin, lined their pocketbooks. The United States
downplayed the Bank of New York scandal and continued to
protect the Clinton-Yeltsin relationship.
The September 2000 Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia
concluded that both Russian government agencies and private
entities were directly involved in at least 26 transfers of
proliferation to such states as Iran and Iraq. Instead of
sanctioning Russia, the Clinton Administration continued to
rely on personal assurances from its small cadre of contacts
in the Russian government.
[[Page H7437]]
The Clinton Administration's willful blindness to Russian
proliferation produced immense damage to our relationship
with Russia. Our policy under President Clinton was based on
a personal relationship between Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin, and Vice-President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. As long as these Russians were in power,
nothing else mattered. While Russians lost faith in Yeltsin,
the U.S. continued to support this failed leader.
During the Clinton Administration, tens of thousands of
young Russians were outside the American embassy in Moscow
throwing paint, firing weapons at our embassy and burning the
American flag. In fact, the State Department had issued
travel advisories to Americans traveling to Moscow because
the hatred for America had grown so great in such a short
period of time that the Russian people were adamantly opposed
to any Americans in their country.
To repair our relationship, I have developed a new approach
to improve our relationship with Russia that builds upon the
recommendations in A New Time, A New Beginning. The four
initiatives in this proposal are not new to U.S.-Russian
relations. Rather, they are programs that could easily regain
Russian support and trust in the United States if implemented
in the short term. The U.S. needs Russian support not for our
own security concerns, but for international stability. In
that regard, I firmly believe that the key to stabilizing the
situation in Iraq lies in improving our relations with
Russia. It is no secret that Iran continues to fuel the bulk
of terrorist activity in Iraq. However, given our cold
relationship with Iran resulting from their continued pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction, support of global terrorism
and atrocious human rights record, there is little room for
diplomatic negotiations. In contrast, Russia's deep and
lucrative investments with the Islamic Republic may provide
the necessary leverage to effect change in that country's
activities in Iraq. Specifically, as a major supplier of arms
and nuclear technology to Iran, Russia can exert significant
economic pressure. In addition to its trading activity,
Russia has made strategic policy agreements with Iran to keep
them out of the Caucuses and has coordinated its policy in
Central Asia with specific regard to Caspian oil reserves.
It is also in Russia's best interest to continue to engage
Iran and improve its own bilateral relations with the Islamic
Republic. Iran's military capabilities continue to threaten
Russian as well as its possible support of radical separatism
in Russia's turbulent ``southern rim''.
As such, improving our relationship with Russia would
provide needed leverage to induce Russia to use its influence
with Iran to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. I firmly
believe that we have reached a crucial juncture in our
relationship with Russia and the independent states of the
former Soviet Union. By taking action in four key areas, we
can dramatically improve our relationship with our former
Cold War enemy for years to come. These four key areas are as
follows:
Terminate Jackson-Vanik restrictions against Russia.
Although not a high profile issue in the U.S., Jackson-Vanik
continues to be a political hot-button for the Russian
government and its citizens. Removing the restriction would
send a tremendously positive message that the U.S. is serious
about improving relations between our two nations.
Renew our commitment to Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs. An opportunity exists for the administration to
undertake a new cooperative program with Russian officials to
secure biological weapons facilities that at present are
poorly protected. The interagency Russian International
Exchange Group (IEG) is comprised of senior military,
intelligence and political officials. Operating with the
support of Russian President Putin, the IEG has been
established to remove bureaucratic obstacles to the
implementation of U.S. funded nonproliferation programs. The
IEG concept has been briefed to senior staff of the Office of
the Vice President. The IEG has offered to work with the
appropriate U.S. agencies--most likely DOD/DTRA--on a pilot
project whose goal would be to secure five biological weapons
sites.
As many as 89 additional sites could be worked through the
IEG. DTRA is in the process of being briefed on this
initiative. White House support for the concept would be
instrumental in capitalizing on a new opportunity for the
administration to demonstrate it is working with Russia in
limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Improve Russian energy infrastructure. Russia and the
independent states of the former Soviet Union possess vast
oil and natural gas reserves. Despite their incredible
natural resources, Russia continues to struggle to get these
resources to the world market. Lacking the necessary capital,
much of Russia's natural resources remain untapped. By
assisting Russia in reforming and clarifying their tax code
could result in Russia's ability to extract, transport and
market its energy resources. Russian natural resources could
lower skyrocketing fuel costs and dramatically improve
our economy. Utilizing Russian natural resources would
significantly improve our national security by lessening
our dependence on Middle East oil. In exchange Russia
would receive the much needed upgrade in its energy
producing capabilities and gain the world's largest energy
consuming market as a key customer. Continued cooperation
with Russia on energy policy is also needed to improve the
environment for foreign investment. Assisting Russia
improve its energy infrastructure is the necessary first
step towards attracting the private investment that will
sustain Russia's energy industry for the future.
Improve and enhance our cooperation on missile defense.
Emerging threats of missile attacks from rogue nations may
confront both the U.S. and Russia over the next decade. A
major objective of the Missile Defense Act was to establish
cooperative projects between the two nations. With a new
director at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and changes at
senior levels in the Russian military establishment, the U.S.
should pursue this cooperation immediately.
With the accomplishment of these four proposals, the United
States will win a major victory in Russia, and in return,
Russia will be more willing to cooperate on issues
significantly important to the United States. It is time the
bilateral relationship go beyond the diplomatic posturing and
produce real results.
termination of jackson-vanik
Thirty years ago, the Jackson-Vanik amendment was included
in the Trade Act of 1974 to protect religious freedom in the
former Soviet Union. The United States Congress made a
courageous decision to pass the Jackson-Vanik amendment and
link it to the Soviet Union's trade status and its record on
Jewish emigration. Jackson-Vanik set guidelines for a string
of changes in the Soviet Union and allowed for Jews to escape
oppression and begin new lives. It was the right policy for
the right time.
Since 1994, Russia has been in full compliance of Jackson-
Vanik and Russian Jews are free to emigrate from the former
Soviet Union. Major Jewish organizations--the Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs, the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee and the National Conference on
Soviet Jewry--that long opposed terminating Jackson-Vanik,
are in agreement and on record that the United States should
terminate this obsolete provision.
Although President Putin requested, and President Bush
promised Russia's elevation from Jackson-Vanik two years ago,
there are some in Congress and in the administration that
want to change the original intent of the amendment to meet
unrelated trade disputes. Two years ago, due to Russian
safety concerns, President Putin blocked U.S. poultry
imports causing a major disruption in the U.S. poultry
industry. While I empathize with our farmers, using an
emigration provision to negotiate a trade dispute
undermines U.S. foreign policy. Trade disputes are natural
components of an evolving trade relationship, and under
current trade laws, there are effective remedies to
address them. In resolving the poultry disagreement, I
worked with the key Members of Congress concerned with
agriculture issues. As a result of my efforts,
Representatives Pombo, Boehner and Goodlatte signed a
letter to Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, which has trade
jurisdiction, indicating their disagreement that the
lifting of Jackson-Vanik restriction to poultry trade was
inappropriate.
Additionally, using the amendment to leverage Russia's
accession to the WTO, as some have suggested, would weaken
U.S. credibility. WTO rules already require that every member
of the working party agree before a country is granted
membership. Therefore, Russia cannot accede without consent
from the United States. This guarantees that U.S. negotiators
have adequate authority to monitor and guide Russia's
accession.
An overwhelming majority of U.S. companies active in the
Russian marketplace also agree that terminating Jackson-Vanik
is appropriate, especially since Russia is currently
recognized as a market economy under U.S. trade law.
In addition to fulfilling the Jackson-Vanik requirements,
President Putin was the first foreign leader to contact
President Bush after Sept 11, 2001, to offer condolences,
intelligence assistance and other support, including agreeing
to the positioning of U.S. forces in Central Asia, which was
a key to our military success in Afghanistan. In October
2001, Russia appeased the United States by closing their
Lourdes Listening Facility in Cuba. More recently, instead of
protesting NATO expansion, which brought the organization up
to Russia's borders, Russia negotiated with NATO to establish
a formal method of cooperation. Although Russia has shown the
U.S. its willingness to cooperate and accommodate our many
requests, the United States, has not sent one positive
message to Russia.
Jackson-Vanik is not a high profile issue in the United
States, but it continues to be a sensitive issue for the
Russian government and its citizens. While the changing
nature of our strategic relationship with Russia has been
full of promise, it has been challenged by a growing number
of domestic constituencies within Russia. Russian media
reports consistently remind Russian citizens of this
unfulfilled promise. This opposition can easily be resolved
by granting Russia what it rightfully deserves--elevating
Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This would send a
positive message that the U.S. is serious about improving
relations between our two nations.
[[Page H7438]]
new threat reduction initiative: u.s.-russia cooperation on securing
biological weapons and research sites
Since 1992, the United States and Russia have engaged in a
series of cooperative threat reduction programs, commonly
referred to as Nunn-Lugar programs. Primarily, this
cooperation has focused resources on reducing the threat
posed by the theft or diversion of nuclear weapons and
materials. Some successes have been achieved, but the current
programmatic approach to this daunting challenge has in some
cases been bogged down in a maze of bureaucratic missteps and
a flagging sense of urgency. In other cases, programmatic
implementation has been slowed by bilateral disputes over
taxes and liability.
This new initiative addresses a topic of heretofore--
limited bilateral cooperation--programmatic work to enhance
the security at Russian biological sites that hold dangerous
pathogens of interest to rogue states or terrorist groups--
and also proposes a new cooperative model for implementing
this work. Central to the success of this initiative is the
cooperation of Russian authorities that control access to
these facilities. Reflecting internal concerns about the pace
and scope of existing cooperative threat reduction programs
with the United States, the Russians established an
interagency group, supported by President Putin, senior
military, security and political officials, whose goal is to
find solutions to the bureaucratic obstacles that have
plagued existing programmatic efforts. Known as the
International Exchange Group (IEG) within Russia, as a sign
of its bona fides and influence within the Russian
government, IEG has presented to U.S. officials a list of 89
biological facilities as candidates for security enhancement
work.
Recognizing the challenge and expense of working at such a
large number of sites, the IEG has proposed a pilot project
that would encompass work at six biological sites, including
Biopreparat, the military's leading producer of biological
pathogens. The IEG has contracted official agreements with
all six facilities. These sites would have to be assessed
carefully by U.S. experts to determine the appropriate amount
of funding and most effective set of security enhancements
required for implementing the project, but an overall initial
estimate of $10 million to complete work at the six sites is
required. Funding for this project could be made available
through funds existing within the Department of Defense's
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
In addition to the national security benefit of securing
hazardous biological pathogens, the pilot project would have
two innovative programmatic elements. The first is that the
Russian side would commit its own ``upfront'' funding to
begin the projects. The IEG would expect U.S. funding to be
made available to ultimately fund the six site pilot
projects, but they are prepared to cooperate in the
establishment of a joint U.S.-Russian management team that
would oversee the project. The management team would place
U.S. funds in an escrow account, releasing those funds to
the Russians only when mutually agreed upon project
milestones had been achieved and verified. The second
innovative element of this initiative is that unlike much
of the security enhancement work currently funded that
relies heavily on U.S. contractor involvement--triggering
legal disputes over liability--the pilot project would be
carried out by Russian contractors, working in Russia at
Russian sites. In so doing, the Russians would accept all
the legal liability for performed work and there also
would be no Russian claim that funding should be subject
to Russian taxation.
A number of independent states of the former Soviet Union
have been helpful to the United States in the war on
terrorism. Such states are new and struggling democracies and
would benefit considerably from assistance to create
sustainable jobs for their underemployed or unemployed
scientists, engineers and technicians who were formerly
engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass
destruction for the Russian Federation or other such state.
The United States should establish and promote programs that
prevent the proliferation from scientists, engineers and
technicians of the former Soviet Union to countries with
potential for proliferation, development and production of
weapons of mass destruction.
The Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, as included in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (H.R.
4200), should immediately be enacted to award scientists
employed at the Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation
and scientists employed at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, international exchange fellowships in the nuclear
nonproliferation sciences. This program, between the leading
U.S. and Russian nuclear facilities, would promote peaceful
uses of nuclear technology and provide opportunities for
advancement in the field of nuclear nonproliferation to
scientists who, as demonstrated by their academic or
professional achievements, show particular promise of making
significant contributions in that field.
Removing potential nuclear weapons materials from
vulnerable sites around the world would reduce the chance
that such materials would fall into the hands of groups
hostile to the national security of the United States. A Task
Force on Nuclear Material Removal should be established by
the President appointing the Department of Energy to ensure
that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed
from the most vulnerable sites as soon as practicable.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all part
of the Silk Road region, would benefit from the Silk Road
Initiative to develop sustainable employment opportunities
between the United States and the Silk Road nations for
scientists, engineers and technicians formerly engaged in
activities to develop and produce weapons of mass
destruction. This program will incorporate the best
practices under the former Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention program and facilitate commercial partnerships
between private entities in the United States and
scientists, engineers and technicians in the Silk Road
nations.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union presented the U.S.
with a clear and identifiable threat to our national
security. For decades, the Soviet Union developed massive
stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. With
the fall of the Soviet Union, these stockpiles are largely
unaccounted for and in dangerously insecure locations and
facilities.
In the post-September 11th world, in which our nation faces
new threats from underground terrorist organizations, it is
more important than ever to work with Russia to eliminate and
secure their weapons of mass destruction so that they do not
fall into the wrong hands. By implementing and engaging
Russia in these programs would secure our national security.
U.S.--RUSSIA COOPERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE
Recognizing the emerging threat of missile attack from
rogue nations that may confront both the U.S. and Russia over
the next decade, a major objective of the Missile Defense Act
was the establishment of cooperative projects between the two
former rivals. With a new director at the U.S. Missile
Defense Agency and changes at senior levels in the Russian
military establishment, the time may be right to advance this
cooperation.
Central to the development of bilateral cooperation in
missile defense would be commencement of an ongoing dialogue
between senior U.S. and Russian officials and their experts.
In July 2004, such a meeting occurred in Berlin. Sustaining
this fledgling momentum will be essential and, if supported
by the administration, the Congress and its counterparts in
the Russian Duma, that outcome can be achieved. Such
cooperation is in the national security interest of the
United States. Russian assistance in such areas as sharing
data from target acquisition radars, currently unavailable to
the Missile Defense Agency, would address one of the
information gaps in the system's current configuration.
Comprehensive data exchanges could be the first area of
possible bilateral missile defense cooperation. Under the
auspices of the IEG, a series of senior working group
meetings could be established with U.S. counterparts. The
working group would be empowered to establish agenda topics
reflecting the interests and priorities of each side. In
addition, and as part of that mechanism, the sides might
agree on a process where they would report to their
respective political leadership, as well as representatives
of the U.S. Congress and Duma, on the progress being achieved
by the working group.
Currently, a government-to-government agreement must be in
place to serve as a framework for any industry cooperation on
missile defense. Regular meetings and discussions between
officials of the two governments are ongoing and contributing
to this framework agreement. These discussions should also
review U.S. and Russian export control and liability policies
in order to normalize the trade relationship.
Additional areas of potential missile defense cooperation
that may be beneficial to the two nations include targets,
radars and sensors.
Targets--Both the United States and the Russian Federation
have space-based Early Warning Systems (EWS) and long
histories of development therein. A major new thrust is the
need for the future Ballistic Missile Defense System to
detect missile launches much earlier than provided by current
EWS capabilities. This is important to support the boost
phase intercept element of BMDS where alert and launch of
interceptors within tens of seconds of the threat missile
ignition are extremely valuable to the operational concept.
Currently, an initiative exists that is on-going within the
Missile Defense Agency dealing with targets and
countermeasures. Through this initiative, targets are
provided for missile defense interceptor tests. Competition
exists between U.S. contractors to provide targets and these
awards, if appropriate could be competed to include non-U.S.
entities, including Russian firms to provide realistic
targets to the Missile Defense Agency.
The Russian Federation has been requested by the Missile
Defense Agency to provide ballistic missile targets and
launch services for radar evaluation. In the long term, this
could evolve into an expanded test program to include target
intercepts. Both nations will cooperate to access threat
representative targets and provide more operationally
realistic testing opportunities.
Radars--Early Warning Radars offer a propitious opportunity
for cooperation. A cooperative effort with Russia to co-
develop early
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warning radars, located along the Russian southern border
looking toward Middle East and Southwest Asia threats, is
critical to both nations. UHF technology is globally
widespread and, therefore, in a category of technology
considered exportable. Early warning data alerting our two
governments of a Middle East threat would go to a Russian
site, a U.S. site or it could go to a third site that would
then pass the early warning data to both countries.
Sensors--A great deal of attention is being paid by
Homeland Security and the Defense Agencies to detect the
presence of Special Nuclear Material or nuclear weapons at
points of entry or those assembled clandestinely here at
home. However, once a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb has
been detonated or a successful disastrous attack on a
nuclear reactor has been made, the important problem
remains of defining the contaminated areas for evacuation
and subsequent decontamination. The better and more
quickly the delineation of the dangerous areas can be
accomplished, the sooner the civilian population can be
rescued and their fears alleviated and the more quickly
the decontamination effort can proceed with protection for
the clean up crews.
Present technology depends in large part on the use of
detectors that are sensitive to the gamma rays emitted by the
decay of radionuclides. However, these detectors require that
they be used within the irradiated region that could produce
possible radiation effects on the operator. This mean of free
path of the gamma rays, however, is not sufficiently long
enough to permit the use of a gamma sensor from remote
platforms such as a helicopter or UAV that could provide a
rapid assessment of the situation and mapping of the affected
areas.
Little known measurements, made a number of years ago,
showed that the radioactive decay products (alpha, beta and
gamma rays) cause the atmosphere to fluoresce principally in
the ultraviolet (UV) and to a lesser extent in other regions
of the spectrum. Using this phenomenon it is possible to
measure and localize the UV emission from these radiations
remotely on the ground or from aircraft or a UAV.
The Russians have demonstrated expertise in ultraviolet
sensors under the RAMOS program. In addition, there are
ongoing activities with the Russian nuclear community for
Threat Reduction. The United States and Russia should broaden
and fuse these capabilities to this new program for remote
sensing and mapping of radiological contaminants.
Measurements and modeling of the visible/infrared
signatures (spectral, temporal, and spatial) of Russian
missile plumes is a near term project that could be placed
under the RAMOS program. Of particular interest are data
taken on plumes of the Russian rocket motors and technologies
that have been previously exported or copied by third word
countries of concern. In addition to measuring the boost
phase of Russian and U.S. missile launches, there is also
interest in observing static tests.
The key to forging a U.S.-Russian missile defense alliance
is now, before U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate further.
Even the most modest proposals and programs already underway
should be viewed as reforming a still adversarial
relationship between Washington and Moscow. Current
discussions between the Department of Defense, the Missile
Defense Agency and Russian officials should continue to
provide a strategy to evaluate the feasibility of increasing
technical cooperation with Russian military industry on
missile defense technologies such as the Russian S-400 and S-
500. These cooperative opportunities would benefit Russia
through a long-term relationship and direct involvement in
the U.S. BMDS as well as significant Russian industry
involvement and monetary benefits.
ENERGY
Russia, with its vast oil and gas resources, a growing and
diverse number of private sector companies and a renewed
commitment to investment by international energy companies,
offers a unique opportunity to provide energy stability to an
often volatile and insecure world energy market. Working with
Russia, the U.S. can play a critical role in supporting
energy development among the resource rich countries of the
former Soviet Union. In a time of historically high crude oil
and natural gas prices, the United States and Russia must
establish a more effective energy partnership. Both the
United States and Russia have emphasized the importance of
energy in the bilateral relationship, and have sought ways to
encourage trade and investment, but the results of their
actions have not been sufficient. Russia's vast energy
resources have not flooded the United States market.
Russia's energy sector is at full capacity, unable to
export greater amounts of oil and gas. Increasing Russia's
oil and gas exports will require sequenced long-term
investment in exploration, production and transportation to
increase total system capacity.
Large-scale direct investment by United States companies,
with its major inputs of technology and management, in the
Russian energy sector is vital in order for Russia to
substantially increase its energy output for the benefit of
both the United States and Russia. American energy company
investment in the Russian energy sector will improve Russia's
economic development and political stability, while at the
same time supply the United States with additional oil and
gas, thereby enhancing energy security by decreasing
dependence on the Middle East.
While Russia's foreign direct investment has increased, it
remains far below its potential. Russia's government
policies, regulations and practices still make American
investors wary of its uncertain business environment. United
States companies require greater security and protections of
their interests in order to invest further in their human,
technical and financial capital in Russian energy markets.
Numerous American companies have struggled with Russian
entities over asset ownership and appropriate taxation.
If Russia seeks to encourage foreign investment, it must
create a transparent business environment. The United States
and Russian government must take action, simultaneously, so
that United States companies will overcome this uncertainty
and invest in Russia's energy market.
A. Asset Ownership and Taxation.--Despite financial
incentives, such as the United States Export-Import Bank loan
guarantees to American exporters of oil and gas equipment to
Russia and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
insurance and financing to American investors in the Russian
energy sector, the United States government must provide
further incentives to encourage greater investment in Russia
such as relaxing the foreign tax code. Over the decades,
there have been few major changes in the structure of the
United States international tax system. Reducing the relative
tax burden on foreign investment would increase the extent to
which American companies invest abroad. Policy options
include liberalizing the foreign tax credit's limitation and
Subpart F's restrictions on deferral for Russian energy
investment, exempting all income from Russian energy
production, or at least providing a substantial reduction in
the tax rate on repatriated earnings, and implementing tax
sparring for Russian, and especially the former countries of
the Soviet Union, energy investment.
For Russia to recognize its potential, both Russian and
non-Russian investors must have confidence that, when
disputes arise, a judicial system exists that will fairly and
impartially enforce the rules applicable to their operations
and honor their agreements. In addition, a banking system
capable of providing the funds to finance this growth must
exist. By creating a joint United States-Russian Energy Bank
similar to the World Bank, European Development Bank or
International Monetary Fund but limited to the United States,
Russia and former countries of the Soviet Union, could create
a positive investment environment and produce long term
development of the energy sector in Russia. At least, during
the appropriation process, Congress must encourage that funds
appropriated to these development banks be used in energy
projects in Russian and the former countries of the Soviet
Union.
Russia also needs to clarify and fix either the tax scheme
under which new exploration and production would be covered,
or revisit a Production Sharing Agreement. United States
energy companies need to be able to quantify their potential
outcome prior to investing in explorations, or even seismic
analysis to determine their interest in exploring a given
area.
B. Improve Russia Production Capabilities.--Russia's
ability to transport and export oil and gas is significantly
below its production capabilities. In 2004, Russian oil
exports will expand almost 12% over the 250 mm tons exported
in 2003. However, in the following two years, exports will
increase only 3% annually because the existing pipeline
system is unable to pump greater quantities of oil. The
Russian government must define the rights of investors in
private pipelines so that outside investment can construct
additional major pipelines to increase output. Currently,
energy transportation out of Russia is controlled by the
Russian government which may restrict capacity. Russia should
open transportation capability to non-Russian entities so
that U.S. companies investing in Russia may determine
allocating capacity.
Russia should also remove the government's current
requirement that a fixed percentage of new production must be
sold into the Russian domestic market at a significantly
lower price than the true market price. This would provide an
incentive for new production, since currently an estimated
65% of all production is sold at such a discount. The Russian
government could become economically indifferent when an
appropriate tax scheme is defined at the outset of the
agreement.
Additionally, if Russian companies aspire to become global
leaders in the energy production market, the U.S. can assist
Russian oil companies to develop their resources, shift their
products to the United States market and help advance and
solidify Russia's integration into the international energy
economy. U.S. companies can offer the technical capability,
the access to capital and the international expertise to
Russia. Furthermore, the United States can provide Russian
companies adequate storage at refineries and ports. Old U.S.
military bases, which are no loner used by DoD, could provide
the storage and security for energy imported from Russia.
C. Commercial Energy Dialogue.--The foundation formed by
President Bush and Putin's 2002 United States-Russia
Commercial Energy Dialogue must continue to be
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built upon, but at a faster pace. The U.S. Department of
Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy should
continue to convene annually with U.S. and Russian agency
officials, legislators, industry and academic institutions
and identify areas of further cooperative efforts and
potential areas for new collaborations.
When the President and other high level United States
officials meet with their Russian counterparts, they must
emphasize the great need for Russia to improve its domestic
investment climate as a prerequisite for higher levels of
United States investment in the energy sector.
While this dialogue is committed to pursuing new energy
opportunities by fostering closer relations between
educational and professional institutions and resolving
current trade and administrative disputes, the commission
should also review immigration policies practiced by the
U.S. and Russian agencies granting visas for energy sector
officials and employees. If this dialogue is to be
successful, the participants of both nations should
receive visas in a timely manner.
Additionally, as co-chairman of the Duma-Congress Study
Group, I propose creating a task force between the two
legislative branches in order to expedite legislative reforms
recommended by the commercial energy dialogue. The task force
should hold annual exchanges between members and staff of the
energy committees.
Russia has a renewed commitment to investment by American
energy companies. Recent actions by President Putin signal
the importance placed on energy trade and investment with the
United States. He has called for increased pipeline
infrastructure development to facilitate the export of oil to
Europe and the United States stating ``. . . I would like
relations between Russian and United States businesses to
develop more actively, especially in the strategically
important area of energy. . . .''
It is clear, both the United States and Russia want and
need to increase Russia's exportation of energy. This is a
rare and distinct opportunity where American and Russian
collaboration on enemy research might be beneficial in
fostering a cooperative, market-based approach to energy
security, reducing dependency on the tumultuous Middle East.
This can be the new model of future energy partnerships. The
United States and Russia can play a critical role in
supporting energy development among the energy rich countries
of the former Soviet Union, further improving global energy
diversity and energy security.
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