[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 114 (Tuesday, September 21, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9428-S9429]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, today our Appropriations Committee held a 
hearing and listened to distinguished individuals as to their views on 
the recommendations for intelligence reform. At that time, we were 
provided a statement which is entitled ``Guiding Principles for 
Intelligence Reform'' dated September 21, 2004. It is signed by the 
following persons: former Senator David Boren, former Senator Bill 
Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen, former CIA Director Robert Gates, former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, former Senator and Presidential 
candidate Gary Hart, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former 
Senator Sam Nunn, former Senator Warren Rudman, and former Secretary of 
State George Shultz.
  I do call it to the attention of all Senators in connection with this 
current review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on intelligence 
reform.
  I ask unanimous consent that the ``Guiding Principles for 
Intelligence Reform'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               Guiding Principles for Intelligence Reform

       America's security depends on strengthening our 
     intelligence collection and analysis. Debate is under way on 
     intelligence reform, and harnessing the energy of an election 
     season is a healthy way to assure the issue receives the 
     attention it deserves. Racing to implement reforms on an 
     election timetable is precisely the wrong thing to do. 
     Intelligence reform is too complex and too important to 
     undertake at a campaign's breakneck speed. Based on our 
     experience in both the executive and legislative branches of 
     the U.S. government and on both sides of the political aisle, 
     these are the basic principles we believe should guide any 
     reform effort:


                         Identify the Problems

       Rushing in with solutions before we understand all the 
     problems is a recipe for failure. Only after a full 
     appreciation of the Intelligence Community's problems--and 
     its strengths--can sensible decisions be made about reform, 
     including whether to restructure. Moreover, reform will have 
     to be comprehensive to succeed. Addressing this or that 
     shortcoming--however grave--in isolation will fail to produce 
     the improvement in intelligence capabilities our nation's 
     security demands.


             Strengthen the Intelligence Community's Leader

       The individual responsible for leading the Intelligence 
     Community must be empowered with authority commensurate with 
     his or her responsibility. Specifically and crucially, future 
     leaders must have the ability to align personnel and 
     resources with national intelligence priorities. Whether we 
     maintain the Intelligence Community's current structure or 
     create a new one, we must ensure that the Intelligence 
     Community's leader has the tools to do his or her job.


                   Separate Intelligence from Policy

       A fundamental principle for Intelligence Community reform 
     must be that the intelligence community remains independent 
     from policymakers. Nothing could be more important to a 
     healthy national security structure. When intelligence and 
     policy are too closely tied, the demands of policymakers can 
     distort intelligence and intelligence analysts can hijack the 
     policy development process. It is crucial to ensuring this 
     separation that the Intelligence Community leader have no 
     policy role. Otherwise, an Intelligence Community leader's 
     voice could overwhelm those of Cabinet secretaries and the 
     National Security Advisor and deprive the President of the 
     benefit of robust, informed policy debate. A single 
     individual with the last word on intelligence and a say in 
     policy as well could be a dangerously powerful actor in the 
     national security arena-using intelligence to advocate for 
     particular policy positions, budget requests, or weapons 
     systems that others lacked the knowledge to challenge.
       For this reason, the leader of the Intelligence Community 
     should not work inside the White House; he or she should be 
     at arm's length from the policy process, not at the 
     President's right hand. Nor should the leader become an 
     instrument of diplomacy or policy formulation; his or her 
     role should be to support others in these functions. 
     Similarly, Intelligence Community reform must not rob Cabinet 
     secretaries of their own ability to assess intelligence by 
     centralizing the bulk of assessment resources; the 
     secretaries must be able to turn to their own analysts for 
     independent perspective and be able to task the Intelligence 
     Community leader for input to the policymaking process. 
     Finally, to protect against an unhealthy mixing of functions, 
     we believe the person who is chosen to lead the Intelligence 
     Community should be broadly acceptable to both parties and 
     chosen for his or her substantive or management expertise.

[[Page S9429]]

                    Improve the Quality of Analysis

       Intellectual conformity and failure of analytical 
     imagination have been the major culprits in most intelligence 
     breakdowns, from our failure to predict accurately India and 
     Pakistan's nuclear tests, to our misjudgment of Saddam 
     Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs. Improving the 
     quality of the analysis on which policy makers rely must 
     therefore be a top reform priority. The best analysis emerges 
     from a competitive environment where different perspectives 
     are welcomed and alternative hypotheses are encouraged. 
     Intelligence reform must institutionalize these traits in the 
     analytical process. To preserve their independence, analysts 
     must be insulated from policy and political pressure. 
     Finally, we must not only concern ourselves with the 
     appropriate structure of intelligence analysis, we must also 
     address the critical shortage of human expertise in critical 
     fields. Funding for programs to address this deficiency is 
     dangerously low and the trust funds for the National Security 
     Education Program will be fully depleted within the next two 
     years unless Congress acts.


               Ensure More Effective Information-Sharing

       Intelligence Community players have overwhelming cultural 
     and bureaucratic incentives not to share their information 
     with each other or with those outside the community. These 
     include a natural impulse to hoard information to protect 
     turf, and a deeply ingrained passion for secrecy. Domestic 
     agencies and foreign agencies, in particular, traditionally 
     have resisted sharing information with each other. Yet our 
     nation has learned with painful clarity that failure to 
     share, coordinate, and connect available intelligence can 
     have devastating consequences. The next time an FBI special 
     agent suspects an Arizona flight trainee is an al Qaeda 
     terrorist, the Intelligence Community needs to know. Reform 
     must fundamentally alter agency incentives and culture to 
     require sharing. This must include addressing the excessive 
     emphasis on secrecy and classification that inhibits 
     constructive, timely information flows, while continuing to 
     respect the need to protect genuine sources and methods.


                        Protect Civil Liberties

       Collection of intelligence is inherently intrusive; spying 
     on fellow citizens carries with it great potential for abuse. 
     Even as we merge the domestic and foreign intelligence we 
     collect, we should not merge responsibility for collecting 
     it. Intelligence reform might well create a single strategic 
     coordinator of domestic and overseas collection on cross 
     border threats like terrorism, but exclusive responsibility 
     for authorizing and overseeing the act of domestic 
     intelligence collection should remain with the Attorney 
     General. This is the only way to protect the rights of the 
     American people upon whose support a strong intelligence 
     community depends.


    Preserve Situational Awareness for Tactical Military Operations

       As we have seen from the skies over Bosnia to the sands and 
     cities of Afghanistan and Iraq, tactical intelligence and 
     situational awareness are indispensable to our military's 
     unparalleled operational success. Any successful intelligence 
     reform must respect the military's need to maintain a robust, 
     organic tactical intelligence capability and to have rapid 
     access to national intelligence assets and information.


         Assure Clarity of Authority for Clandestine Operations

       The war on terrorism has blurred agency roles for some 
     critical national security activities. The Department of 
     Defense now performs more clandestine and intelligence 
     operations than in the past; meanwhile, the CIA's Directorate 
     of Operations engages more in traditional military functions, 
     such as the successful campaign in Afghanistan. Authority for 
     these newer roles is murky, and there are sometimes 
     disparities in the type or level of approval needed for an 
     operation, depending on who performs it. The new challenges 
     we face mandate a wide range of tools and creative approaches 
     to intelligence. But establishing absolute clarity of chain 
     of command, oversight, and accountability for clandestine 
     operations is essential.


                   Reform Congressional Oversight Too

       Intelligence reform will not succeed unless Congressional 
     oversight of the Intelligence Community becomes more 
     effective as well. Rather than relying on review of agency 
     submissions and after-the-fact investigation of failures or 
     abuses, Congress should reach out periodically to test and 
     assure the Community's health. Whether meaningful legislative 
     oversight demands a major overhaul of committee structure or 
     merely a change of philosophy, Congressional reform is as 
     vital as changes affecting the Executive Branch.
       Elections are a perfect time for debate, but a terrible 
     time for decision-making. When it comes to intelligence 
     reform, Americans should not settle for adjustments that are 
     driven by the calendar instead of common sense; they deserve 
     a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to these critical 
     issues. If, as seems likely, Congress considers it essential 
     to act now on certain structural reforms, we believe it has 
     an obligation to return to this issue early next year in the 
     109th Congress to address these issues more comprehensively. 
     We hope the principles we've suggested will help shape 
     serious discussion of reform.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

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