[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 110 (Wednesday, September 15, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Page S9288]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. SPECTER:
  S. 2811. A bill to establish the Department of Intelligence, to 
modify and enhance authorities and responsibilities relating to the 
administration of intelligence and the intelligence community, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce 
the Intelligence Reformation Act of 2004, also known as the ``9/11 
Act.'' This bill creates clear, unambiguous lines of authority in the 
intelligence community, which assures both accountability and 
sufficient command authority for a new Department and Director of 
Intelligence to manage and coordinate the intelligence community, break 
down existing stovepipes, demand accountability among the agencies, set 
requirements, and use new directive authority to quickly task 
collection and analysis while moving personnel and resources to respond 
to new and emerging situations.
  The unanimous recommendations which accompany the Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States 
(``9/11 Commission''), and the Executive orders issued on August 27, 
2004, relating to information sharing, intelligence community 
management, and the National Counterterrorism Center, are intended to 
address systematic, long-term problems with the U.S. Intelligence 
Community that have been highlighted by the various investigations into 
the 9/11 tragedy, including the findings of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee on Iraq Pre-War Intelligence, and the congressional Joint 
Inquiry recommendations issued in 2002. Our country has during the last 
decade suffered through an escalating cycle of intelligence failures 
while witnessing the onset of new global threats--most notably 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 
existing intelligence community structure is disorganized and 
dysfunctional, and thus incapable of effectively responding to these 
threats.
  The restructuring recommendations of the President and 9/11 
Commission are consistent with the reorganization efforts I undertook 
as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th 
Congress, my efforts to install a Director of National Intelligence 
beginning in 1986, and my work in 1998-1999 on the Commission to Assess 
the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (``WMD Commission''), as well as that of 
no fewer than 15 independent commissions and legislative or executive 
branch attempts at restructuring the intelligence community, beginning 
in 1955 with the Second Hoover Commission.

  It is imperative that we immediately put into place a national 
security structure that is competent to confront this enemy. While the 
9/11 Commission and recent Executive orders provide helpful guidance, 
much discretion is left to Congress in determining the scope and nature 
of the restructuring of the intelligence community.
  Under the legislation I introduce today, budgetary authority will be 
a principal means for the new Director of Intelligence to maintain 
supervision and control of the intelligence community. For example, the 
Director would have the National Foreign Intelligence Program 
appropriation go directly to him, and that appropriation would remain 
under his jurisdiction through the budget execution process.
  Further, enhanced tasking authority would facilitate coordinated 
intelligence collection and analysis and overcome the ``culture of 
concealment'' that exists among intelligence entities.
  And clear lines of authority, including the ability of the Director 
to hire and fire intelligence community personnel, will in turn avoid 
the uncertainty of ``serving two masters.'' Clear lines of authority 
means that intelligence community personnel will not suffer from the 
disorder and paralysis that epitomized the community prior to 9/11, and 
which continues today. This legislation differs from the 9/11 
Commission recommendations on restructuring the intelligence community 
in two main respects: the institution of a ten-year term for the 
Director of Intelligence in order to remove him from political 
influence, and the direct control and supervision by the Director of 
the major national intelligence community entities, rather than the 
untested ``dual hatting'' approach favored by the 9/11 Commission.
  I also believe that any legislation must address the FBI failures 
that preceded 9/11. By placing the certain FBI functions under the 
direction of the new Director of Intelligence, FBI missteps in 
communication, intelligence gathering and analysis that contributed to 
failures in anticipating the 9/11 attack and in intercepting the 
hijackers can be averted in the future, while adding necessary 
safeguards to protect privacy and civil liberties. And this bill, like 
the bill I have introduced with Senators McCain and Lieberman, codifies 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations on FBI reform.
  Other important reforms undertaken by this legislation are also 
contained in the 9/11 Commission bill. For example, consistent with the 
recent conclusions of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 
legislation would require the National Intelligence Council to 
incorporate alternative views held by elements of the intelligence 
community into National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), and be certified 
as approved for publication by the Director of Intelligence and the 
Chair of the National Intelligence Council.
  The Director and Department of Intelligence that I recommend fully 
integrate the 9/11 Commission and President's important tenets of 
central direction, coordination, and control by a high-ranking 
intelligence official and would bring crucial expertise and immediate 
direction to the many intelligence challenges we face. Creating a 
Department of Intelligence, run by a Director empowered with full 
budget execution and clear line authority over national intelligence, 
but without a large new bureaucratic infrastructure, is a proposal 
which best meets the need of the intelligence community.

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