[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 103 (Thursday, July 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8795-S8798]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 EXPRESSING THE DEEP CONCERN OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE 
     ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO ADHERE TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER A 
    SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Foreign 
Relations Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. Con. 
Res. 81 and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk

[[Page S8796]]

will report the concurrent resolution by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 81) expressing the 
     deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a 
     safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear 
     to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the 
concurrent resolution.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Kyl-
Feinstein amendments at the desk be agreed to; the resolution, as 
amended, be agreed to; the preamble, as amended, be agreed to; the 
title amendment be agreed to; the motion to reconsider be laid upon the 
table; and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in 
the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 3569 and 3570) were agreed to, as follows:


                           Amendment No. 3569

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:
     That Congress--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two 
     decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of 
     its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
       (B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA 
     and the international community about its nuclear programs 
     and activities;
       (2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
     of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
     Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
     that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
       (3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever 
     financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary 
     to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear 
     activities;
       (4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
     (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty''), including the United States, to 
     use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
     weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other 
     cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use 
     items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to 
     its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this 
     resolution referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'') and is 
     clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty;
       (5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during 
     the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 
     has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of 
     a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion 
     and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, 
     equipment, and facilities;
       (6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure 
     of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable 
     research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 
     24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the 
     IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran 
     that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute 
     ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance 
     with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its 
     Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
       (7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the 
     positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and 
     dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, 
     complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear 
     activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand 
     and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of 
     Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct 
     diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. 
     sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs 
     between the United States and Libya;
       (8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country 
     renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and 
     long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its 
     support for international terrorist organizations;
       (9) notes the assistance that the United States has 
     provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on 
     December 26, 2003;
       (10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease 
     all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 
     capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment 
     activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing 
     of related equipment;
       (11) urges Iran to comply with its international 
     commitments and to rescind its decisions--
       (A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
       (B) to produce feed material that could be used in those 
     centrifuges; and
       (C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could 
     be used for plutonium production;
       (12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and 
     legal obligations--
       (A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted 
     access;
       (B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its 
     nuclear activities; and
       (C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its 
     nuclear programs;
       (13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United 
     States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European 
     Union and the United States pledged to implement United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies 
     actions states should take--
       (A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction;
       (B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 
     Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at 
     the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
       (C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       (14) urges close cooperation between the United States and 
     the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in 
     their June 26, 2004, declaration of ``the IAEA Board of 
     Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's 
     insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to 
     cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with 
     IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all 
     enrichment-related and reprocessing activities'';
       (15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to 
     resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements 
     until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has 
     suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not 
     to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably 
     and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development 
     activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium 
     conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (16) further calls upon the members of the European Union 
     to undertake such additional measures, including imposing 
     sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on 
     non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, 
     as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear 
     weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations 
     and commitments to the IAEA;
       (17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance 
     of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and 
     in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns 
     of the IAEA, the United States, and the international 
     community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
       (A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities 
     not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil 
     field;
       (B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and 
     Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their 
     agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid 
     natural gas production field;
       (C) calls on all countries to intercede with their 
     commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain 
     from or suspend all investment and investment-related 
     activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
       (D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent 
     the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop 
     programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear 
     weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, 
     including the provision of dual use items, until Iran 
     complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
     and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty;
       (18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear 
     power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon 
     Russia--
       (A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully 
     its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
       (B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not 
     conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr 
     reactor that would enter into force before Iran has 
     verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons 
     development activity, including a permanent cessation of 
     uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose 
     nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting 
     Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the 
     United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
       (A) to fully investigate such assistance;
       (B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, 
     sites, and information related to the investigations;
       (C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals 
     and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
       (D) to immediately review and rectify their export control 
     laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further 
     assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could 
     support the development of nuclear weapons;
       (20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with 
     Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
       (A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that 
     Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA; and
       (B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran 
     continues to be in noncompliance

[[Page S8797]]

     with its agreements with the IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty, or in which its compliance is 
     uncertain;
       (21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in 
     mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the ``proliferation 
     of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their 
     means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international 
     peace and security,'' to consider measures necessary--
       (A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
       (B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine 
     nuclear activities;
       (22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, 
     immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding 
     the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, 
     to address the threat to international peace and security 
     posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action 
     as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 
     41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
       (23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
     international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon 
     states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit 
     significant violations of their safeguards agreements 
     regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or 
     engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear 
     program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle 
     activities;
       (24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant 
     international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to 
     seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, 
     Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit 
     the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those 
     nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the 
     development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states 
     assured and affordable access to--
       (A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in 
     peaceful nuclear activities; and
       (B) spent fuel management; and
       (25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and 
     currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this 
     resolution.


                           Amendment No. 3570

       Strike the preamble and insert the following:

       Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, 
     and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to 
     oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, 
     including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that 
     transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, 
     biological, or nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that ``all 
     States shall refrain from providing any form of support to 
     non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, 
     manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
     chemical, or biological weapons and their means of 
     delivery'';
       Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous 
     times on persons and entities transferring equipment and 
     technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass 
     destruction programs;
       Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
     5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
       Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to 
     develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
       Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, 
     after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by 
     an opposition group;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium 
     for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly 
     enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per 
     year;
       Whereas, in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director 
     General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its 
     obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to 
     report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, 
     the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium 
     tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and 
     use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use 
     and processing of the material;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report 
     that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a 
     uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that 
     neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water 
     reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 
     to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations 
     under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear 
     material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to 
     cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of 
     Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to 
     disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its 
     Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve 
     questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, 
     including those raised by the detection of two types of 
     highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant;
       Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran 
     admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium 
     conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that 
     included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and 
     that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance 
     with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, 
     called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and 
     any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its 
     nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to 
     sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol 
     between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards 
     (the ``Additional Protocol'') to strengthen investigation of 
     all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third 
     countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in 
     resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
       Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront 
     Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers 
     of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint 
     statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to 
     suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as 
     defined by the IAEA;
       Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United 
     Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access 
     to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once 
     certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully 
     resolved;
       Whereas, in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran 
     further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 
     2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium 
     hexafluoride;
       Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a 
     laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 
     kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, 
     another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment 
     program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly 
     more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of 
     June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran 
     ``had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 
     percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to 
     approximately 15 percent'';
       Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's 
     declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include 
     information that should have been provided, including the 
     fact that ``some samples from'' the laser uranium enrichment 
     project ``had been sent for assessment to the supplier's 
     laboratory'';
       Whereas, in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also 
     admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium 
     dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, 
     another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such 
     activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it 
     would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act 
     in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-
     into-force;
       Whereas, on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the 
     IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all 
     enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to 
     produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to 
     import enrichment related items;
       Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic 
     activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and 
     confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the 
     IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has 
     concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the 
     IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards 
     Agreement;
       Whereas, despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, 
     fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the 
     Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, 
     found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding 
     its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more 
     sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced 
     enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign 
     sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported 
     explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic 
     isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a 
     neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 
     2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples 
     from one room

[[Page S8798]]

     at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and from equipment 
     that had been present in that workshop showed more than trace 
     quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235, despite 
     finding only negligible traces of this on imported centrifuge 
     components, and that the types of uranium contamination at 
     that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, which 
     would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source 
     of contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge 
     components and perhaps also its assertion that it has not 
     enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using 
     centrifuge technology;
       Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, 
     report, that ``the contamination is different on domestic and 
     imported centrifuges,'' that ``it is unlikely'' that the 36 
     percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired 
     from Iran's principal supplier country, and that ``important 
     information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently 
     required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to 
     involve changing or contradictory information'';
       Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations 
     of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous 
     assurances to the IAEA and the international community of 
     full transparency;
       Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to 
     France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend 
     uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized 
     that this suspension is temporary and continued to 
     manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium 
     enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to 
     resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever 
     it chooses;
       Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan 
     Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council 
     of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its 
     research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
     intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
       (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, 
     letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of 
     Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a 
     ``full picture of its nuclear activities'' and ``full 
     transparency'';
       (2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the 
     United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to 
     full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
       (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of 
     September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency 
     and to ``leave no stone unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its 
     peaceful objectives;
       Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, 
     and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black 
     market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether 
     Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has 
     refused to reveal to international inspectors;
       Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will 
     soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched 
     nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if 
     implemented, would undercut the international effort to 
     persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development 
     program;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 
     13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious 
     concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 
     did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's 
     past and present nuclear programme considered essential by 
     the Board's November 2003 resolution,'' and also noted that 
     the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced 
     centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing 
     activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser 
     enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle 
     highly radioactive materials;
       Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern 
     that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the 
     development of its enrichment technology to its current 
     extent, and that a number of other questions remain 
     unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
     Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on 
     the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, 
     extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned 
     heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding 
     the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
       Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that 
     IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest 
     against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 
     2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit 
     inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in 
     mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the 
     Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into 
     serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its 
     intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the 
     IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material 
     for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 
     2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment 
     activities ``does not include suspension of production of 
     UF6,'' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter 
     of November 10, 2003;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 
     2004, which was also adopted unanimously, ``deplores'' the 
     fact that ``Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely 
     and proactive as it should have been'' and ``underlines that, 
     with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important 
     that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a 
     full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by 
     providing all relevant information, as well as by providing 
     prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons'';
       Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that 
     Iran's suspension ``commitments have not been comprehensively 
     implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all 
     remaining shortcomings'';
       Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further 
     confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its 
     decision to begin production testing at the Uranium 
     Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of 
     a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal 
     of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore 
     international confidence undermined by past reports of 
     undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
       Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume 
     production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the 
     IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, 
     which called on Iran ``to suspend all further uranium 
     enrichment-related activities,'' and Iran's voluntary 
     suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to 
     its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers 
     of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
       Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in 
     dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, 
     Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international 
     community, its receipt from other countries of the means to 
     enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear 
     weapon design to another country, its production of 
     centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization 
     workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards 
     Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its 
     legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in 
     acquiring nuclear weapons; and
       Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or 
     reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the 
     maintenance of international peace and security and threaten 
     United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
  The title amendment (No. 3571) was agreed to, as follows:


                           amendment no. 3571

       Amend the title so as to read: ``Expressing the concern of 
     Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce 
     nuclear weapons.''.

  The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 81), as amended, was agreed 
to:
  The preamble, as amended, was agreed to.
  The concurrent resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:
  (The concurrent resolution will be printed in a future edition of the 
Record.)

                          ____________________