[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 103 (Thursday, July 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8776-S8789]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

  SA 3567. Mr. ROBERTS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
by him to the bill S. 2386, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2005 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and 
for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       On page 30, strike lines 10 through 16.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3568. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Gregg) submitted an amendment intended to 
be proposed by him to the bill S. 720, to amend title IX of the Public 
Health Service Act to provide for the improvement of patient safety and 
to reduce the incidence of events that adversely effect patient safety; 
which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Patient Safety and Quality 
     Improvement Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In 1999, the Institute of Medicine released a report 
     entitled To Err is Human that described medical errors as the 
     eighth leading cause of death in the United States, with as 
     many as 98,000 people dying as a result of medical errors 
     each year.
       (2) To address these deaths and injuries due to medical 
     errors, the health care system must identify and learn from 
     such errors so that systems of care can be improved.
       (3) In their report, the Institute of Medicine called on 
     Congress to provide legal protections with respect to 
     information reported for the purposes of quality improvement 
     and patient safety.
       (4) The Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee of 
     the Senate held 4 hearings in the 106th Congress and 1 
     hearing in the 107th Congress on patient safety where experts 
     in the field supported the recommendation of the Institute of 
     Medicine for congressional action.
       (5) Myriad public and private patient safety initiatives 
     have begun. The Quality Interagency Coordination Taskforce 
     has recommended steps to improve patient safety that may be 
     taken by each Federal agency

[[Page S8777]]

     involved in health care and activities relating to these 
     steps are ongoing.
       (6) The research on patient safety unequivocally calls for 
     a learning environment, rather than a punitive environment, 
     in order to improve patient safety.
       (7) Voluntary data gathering systems are more supportive 
     than mandatory systems in creating the learning environment 
     referred to in paragraph (6) as stated in the Institute of 
     Medicine's report.
       (8) Promising patient safety reporting systems have been 
     established throughout the United States and the best ways to 
     structure and use these systems are currently being 
     determined, largely through projects funded by the Agency for 
     Healthcare Research and Quality.
       (9) Many organizations currently collecting patient safety 
     data have expressed a need for legal protections that will 
     allow them to review protected information and collaborate in 
     the development and implementation of patient safety 
     improvement strategies. Currently, the State peer review 
     protections are inadequate to allow the sharing of 
     information to promote patient safety.
       (b) Purposes.--It is the purpose of this Act to--
       (1) encourage a culture of safety and quality in the United 
     States health care system by providing for legal protection 
     of information reported voluntarily for the purposes of 
     quality improvement and patient safety; and
       (2) ensure accountability by raising standards and 
     expectations for continuous quality improvements in patient 
     safety.

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT.

       Title IX of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 299 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 912(c), by inserting ``, in accordance with 
     part C,'' after ``The Director shall'';
       (2) by redesignating part C as part D;
       (3) by redesignating sections 921 through 928, as sections 
     931 through 938, respectively;
       (4) in 934(d) (as so redesignated), by striking the second 
     sentence and inserting the following: ``Penalties provided 
     for under this section shall be imposed and collected by the 
     Secretary using the administrative and procedural processes 
     used to impose and collect civil money penalties under 
     section 1128A of the Social Security Act (other than 
     subsections (a) and (b), the second sentence of subsection 
     (f), and subsections (i), (m), and (n)), unless the Secretary 
     determines that a modification of procedures would be more 
     suitable or reasonable to carry out this subsection and 
     provides for such modification by regulation.'';
       (5) in section 938(1) (as so redesignated), by striking 
     ``921'' and inserting ``931''; and
       (6) by inserting after part B the following:

                  ``PART C--PATIENT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT

     ``SEC. 921. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this part:
       ``(1) Non-identifiable information.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `non-identifiable information' 
     means, with respect to information, that the information is 
     presented in a form and manner that prevents the 
     identification of a provider, a patient, or a reporter of 
     patient safety data.
       ``(B) Identifiability of patient.--For purposes of 
     subparagraph (A), the term `presented in a form and manner 
     that prevents the identification of a patient' means, with 
     respect to information that has been subject to rules 
     promulgated pursuant to section 264(c) of the Health 
     Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 
     U.S.C. 1320d-2 note), that the information has been de-
     identified so that it is no longer individually identifiable 
     health information as defined in such rules.
       ``(2) Patient safety data.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `patient safety data' means--
       ``(i) any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such 
     as root cause analyses), or written or oral statements that 
     are--

       ``(I) collected or developed by a provider for reporting to 
     a patient safety organization, provided that they are 
     reported to the patient safety organization within 60 days;
       ``(II) requested by a patient safety organization 
     (including the contents of such request), if they are 
     reported to the patient safety organization within 60 days;
       ``(III) reported to a provider by a patient safety 
     organization; or
       ``(IV) collected by a patient safety organization from 
     another patient safety organization, or developed by a 
     patient safety organization;

     that could result in improved patient safety, health care 
     quality, or health care outcomes; or
       ``(ii) any deliberative work or process with respect to any 
     patient safety data described in clause (i).
       ``(B) Limitation.--
       ``(i) Collection.--If the original material from which any 
     data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root 
     case analyses), or written or oral statements referred to in 
     subclause (I) or (IV) of subparagraph (A)(i) are collected 
     and is not patient safety data, the act of such collection 
     shall not make such original material patient safety data for 
     purposes of this part.
       ``(ii) Separate data.--The term `patient safety data' shall 
     not include information (including a patient's medical 
     record, billing and discharge information or any other 
     patient or provider record) that is collected or developed 
     separately from and that exists separately from patient 
     safety data. Such separate information or a copy thereof 
     submitted to a patient safety organization shall not itself 
     be considered as patient safety data. Nothing in this part, 
     except for section 922(f)(1), shall be construed to limit--

       ``(I) the discovery of or admissibility of information 
     described in this subparagraph in a criminal, civil, or 
     administrative proceeding;
       ``(II) the reporting of information described in this 
     subparagraph to a Federal, State, or local governmental 
     agency for public health surveillance, investigation, or 
     other public health purposes or health oversight purposes; or
       ``(III) a provider's recordkeeping obligation with respect 
     to information described in this subparagraph under Federal, 
     State, or local law.

       ``(3) Patient safety organization.--The term `patient 
     safety organization' means a private or public entity or 
     component thereof that is currently listed by the Secretary 
     pursuant to section 924(c).
       ``(4) Patient safety organization activities.--The term 
     `patient safety organization activities' means the following 
     activities, which are deemed to be necessary for the proper 
     management and administration of a patient safety 
     organization:
       ``(A) The conduct, as its primary activity, of efforts to 
     improve patient safety and the quality of health care 
     delivery.
       ``(B) The collection and analysis of patient safety data 
     that are submitted by more than one provider.
       ``(C) The development and dissemination of information to 
     providers with respect to improving patient safety, such as 
     recommendations, protocols, or information regarding best 
     practices.
       ``(D) The utilization of patient safety data for the 
     purposes of encouraging a culture of safety and of providing 
     direct feedback and assistance to providers to effectively 
     minimize patient risk.
       ``(E) The maintenance of procedures to preserve 
     confidentiality with respect to patient safety data.
       ``(F) The provision of appropriate security measures with 
     respect to patient safety data.
       ``(G) The utilization of qualified staff.
       ``(5) Person.--The term `person' includes Federal, State, 
     and local government agencies.
       ``(6) Provider.--The term `provider' means--
       ``(A) a person licensed or otherwise authorized under State 
     law to provide health care services, including--
       ``(i) a hospital, nursing facility, comprehensive 
     outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency, 
     hospice program, renal dialysis facility, ambulatory surgical 
     center, pharmacy, physician or health care practitioner's 
     office, long term care facility, behavior health residential 
     treatment facility, clinical laboratory, or health center; or
       ``(ii) a physician, physician assistant, nurse 
     practitioner, clinical nurse specialist, certified registered 
     nurse anesthetist, certified nurse midwife, psychologist, 
     certified social worker, registered dietitian or nutrition 
     professional, physical or occupational therapist, pharmacist, 
     or other individual health care practitioner; or
       ``(B) any other person specified in regulations promulgated 
     by the Secretary.

     ``SEC. 922. PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTIONS.

       ``(a) Privilege.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal, State, or local law, patient safety data shall be 
     privileged and, subject to the provisions of subsection 
     (c)(1), shall not be--
       ``(1) subject to a Federal, State, or local civil, 
     criminal, or administrative subpoena;
       ``(2) subject to discovery in connection with a Federal, 
     State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative 
     proceeding;
       ``(3) disclosed pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United 
     States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of Information 
     Act) or any other similar Federal, State, or local law;
       ``(4) admitted as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any 
     Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative 
     proceeding; or
       ``(5) utilized in a disciplinary proceeding against a 
     provider.
       ``(b) Confidentiality.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of Federal, State, or local law, and subject to the 
     provisions of subsections (c) and (d), patient safety data 
     shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed.
       ``(c) Exceptions to Privilege and Confidentiality.--Nothing 
     in this section shall be construed to prohibit one or more of 
     the following uses or disclosures:
       ``(1) Disclosure by a provider or patient safety 
     organization of relevant patient safety data for use in a 
     criminal proceeding only after a court makes an in camera 
     determination that such patient safety data contains evidence 
     of a wanton and criminal act to directly harm the patient.
       ``(2) Voluntary disclosure of non-identifiable patient 
     safety data by a provider or a patient safety organization.
       ``(d) Protected Disclosure and Use of Information.--Nothing 
     in this section shall be construed to prohibit one or more of 
     the following uses or disclosures:
       ``(1) Disclosure of patient safety data by a person that is 
     a provider, a patient safety organization, or a contractor of 
     a provider or patient safety organization, to another such 
     person, to carry out patient safety organization activities.
       ``(2) Disclosure of patient safety data by a provider or 
     patient safety organization to

[[Page S8778]]

     grantees or contractors carrying out patient safety research, 
     evaluation, or demonstration projects authorized by the 
     Director.
       ``(3) Disclosure of patient safety data by a provider to an 
     accrediting body that accredits that provider.
       ``(4) Voluntary disclosure of patient safety data by a 
     patient safety organization to the Secretary for public 
     health surveillance if the consent of each provider 
     identified in, or providing, such data is obtained prior to 
     such disclosure. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be 
     construed to prevent the release of patient safety data that 
     is provided by, or that relates solely to, a provider from 
     which the consent described in such sentence is obtained 
     because one or more other providers do not provide such 
     consent with respect to the disclosure of patient safety date 
     that relates to such nonconsenting providers. Consent for the 
     future release of patient safety data for such purposes may 
     be requested by the patient safety organization at the time 
     the data is submitted.
       ``(5) Voluntary disclosure of patient safety data by a 
     patient safety organization to State or local government 
     agencies for public health surveillance if the consent of 
     each provider identified in, or providing, such data is 
     obtained prior to such disclosure. Nothing in the preceding 
     sentence shall be construed to prevent the release of patient 
     safety data that is provided by, or that relates solely to, a 
     provider from which the consent described in such sentence is 
     obtained because one or more other providers do not provide 
     such consent with respect to the disclosure of patient safety 
     date that relates to such nonconsenting providers. Consent 
     for the future release of patient safety data for such 
     purposes may be requested by the patient safety organization 
     at the time the data is submitted.
       ``(e) Continued Protection of Information after 
     Disclosure.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     patient safety data that is used or disclosed shall continue 
     to be privileged and confidential as provided for in 
     subsections (a) and (b), and the provisions of such 
     subsections shall apply to such data in the possession or 
     control of--
       ``(A) a provider or patient safety organization that 
     possessed such data before the use or disclosure; or
       ``(B) a person to whom such data was disclosed.
       ``(2) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and 
     subject to paragraph (3)--
       ``(A) if patient safety data is used or disclosed as 
     provided for in subsection (c)(1), and such use or disclosure 
     is in open court, the confidentiality protections provided 
     for in subsection (b) shall no longer apply to such data; and
       ``(B) if patient safety data is used or disclosed as 
     provided for in subsection (c)(2), the privilege and 
     confidentiality protections provided for in subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall no longer apply to such data.
       ``(3) Construction.--Paragraph (2) shall not be construed 
     as terminating or limiting the privilege or confidentiality 
     protections provided for in subsection (a) or (b) with 
     respect to data other than the specific data used or 
     disclosed as provided for in subsection (c).
       ``(f) Limitation on Actions.--
       ``(1) Patient safety organizations.--Except to enforce 
     disclosures pursuant to subsection (c)(1), no action may be 
     brought or process served against a patient safety 
     organization to compel disclosure of information collected or 
     developed under this part whether or not such information is 
     patient safety data unless such information is specifically 
     identified, is not patient safety data, and cannot otherwise 
     be obtained.
       ``(2) Providers.--An accrediting body shall not take an 
     accrediting action against a provider based on the good faith 
     participation of the provider in the collection, development, 
     reporting, or maintenance of patient safety data in 
     accordance with this part. An accrediting body may not 
     require a provider to reveal its communications with any 
     patient safety organization established in accordance with 
     this part.
       ``(g) Reporter Protection.--
       ``(1) In general.--A provider may not take an adverse 
     employment action, as described in paragraph (2), against an 
     individual based upon the fact that the individual in good 
     faith reported information--
       ``(A) to the provider with the intention of having the 
     information reported to a patient safety organization; or
       ``(B) directly to a patient safety organization.
       ``(2) Adverse employment action.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, an `adverse employment action' includes--
       ``(A) loss of employment, the failure to promote an 
     individual, or the failure to provide any other employment-
     related benefit for which the individual would otherwise be 
     eligible; or
       ``(B) an adverse evaluation or decision made in relation to 
     accreditation, certification, credentialing, or licensing of 
     the individual.
       ``(h) Enforcement.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (c) 
     and (d) and as otherwise provided for in this section, it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to negligently or 
     intentionally disclose any patient safety data, and any such 
     person shall, upon adjudication, be assessed in accordance 
     with section 934(d).
       ``(2) Relation to hipaa.--The penalty provided for under 
     paragraph (1) shall not apply if the defendant would 
     otherwise be subject to a penalty under the regulations 
     promulgated under section 264(c) of the Health Insurance 
     Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 
     note) or under section 1176 of the Social Security Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1320d-5) for the same disclosure.
       ``(3) Equitable relief.--
       ``(A) In general.--Without limiting remedies available to 
     other parties, a civil action may be brought by any aggrieved 
     individual to enjoin any act or practice that violates 
     subsection (g) and to obtain other appropriate equitable 
     relief (including reinstatement, back pay, and restoration of 
     benefits) to redress such violation.
       ``(B) Against state employees.--An entity that is a State 
     or an agency of a State government may not assert the 
     privilege described in subsection (a) unless before the time 
     of the assertion, the entity or, in the case of and with 
     respect to an agency, the State has consented to be subject 
     to an action as described by this paragraph, and that consent 
     has remained in effect.
       ``(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to--
       ``(1) limit other privileges that are available under 
     Federal, State, or local laws that provide greater 
     confidentiality protections or privileges than the privilege 
     and confidentiality protections provided for in this section;
       ``(2) limit, alter, or affect the requirements of Federal, 
     State, or local law pertaining to information that is not 
     privileged or confidential under this section;
       ``(3) alter or affect the implementation of any provision 
     of section 264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and 
     Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-191; 110 Stat. 
     2033), section 1176 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1320d-5), or any regulation promulgated under such sections;
       ``(4) limit the authority of any provider, patient safety 
     organization, or other person to enter into a contract 
     requiring greater confidentiality or delegating authority to 
     make a disclosure or use in accordance with subsection (c) or 
     (d); and
       ``(5) prohibit a provider from reporting a crime to law 
     enforcement authorities, regardless of whether knowledge of 
     the existence of, or the description of, the crime is based 
     on patient safety data, so long as the provider does not 
     disclose patient safety data in making such report.

     ``SEC. 923. PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK OF DATABASES.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall maintain a patient 
     safety network of databases that provides an interactive 
     evidence-based management resource for providers, patient 
     safety organizations, and other persons. The network of 
     databases shall have the capacity to accept, aggregate, and 
     analyze nonidentifiable patient safety data voluntarily 
     reported by patient safety organizations, providers, or other 
     persons.
       ``(b) Network of Database Standards.--The Secretary may 
     determine common formats for the reporting to the patient 
     safety network of databases maintained under subsection (a) 
     of nonidentifiable patient safety data, including necessary 
     data elements, common and consistent definitions, and a 
     standardized computer interface for the processing of such 
     data. To the extent practicable, such standards shall be 
     consistent with the administrative simplification provisions 
     of Part C of title XI of the Social Security Act.

     ``SEC. 924. PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATION AND 
                   LISTING.

       ``(a) Certification.--
       ``(1) Initial certification.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), an entity that seeks to be a patient safety 
     organization shall submit an initial certification to the 
     Secretary that the entity intends to perform the patient 
     safety organization activities.
       ``(2) Delayed certification of collection from more than 
     one provider.--An entity that seeks to be a patient safety 
     organization may--
       ``(A) submit an initial certification that it intends to 
     perform patient safety organization activities other than the 
     activities described in subparagraph (B) of section 921(4); 
     and
       ``(B) within 2 years of submitting the initial 
     certification under subparagraph (A), submit a supplemental 
     certification that it performs the patient safety 
     organization activities described in subparagraphs (A) 
     through (F) of section 921(4).
       ``(3) Expiration and renewal.--
       ``(A) Expiration.--An initial certification under paragraph 
     (1) or (2)(A) shall expire on the date that is 3 years after 
     it is submitted.
       ``(B) Renewal.--
       ``(i) In general.--An entity that seeks to remain a patient 
     safety organization after the expiration of an initial 
     certification under paragraph (1) or (2)(A) shall, within the 
     3-year period described in subparagraph (A), submit a renewal 
     certification to the Secretary that the entity performs the 
     patient safety organization activities described in section 
     921(4).
       ``(ii) Term of renewal.--A renewal certification under 
     clause (i) shall expire on the date that is 3 years after the 
     date on which it is submitted, and may be renewed in the same 
     manner as an initial certification.
       ``(b) Acceptance of Certification.--Upon the submission by 
     an organization of an initial certification pursuant to 
     subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2)(A), a supplemental certification 
     pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B), or a renewal certification 
     pursuant to subsection

[[Page S8779]]

     (a)(3)(B), the Secretary shall review such certification 
     and--
       ``(1) if such certification meets the requirements of 
     subsection (a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), or (a)(3)(B), as 
     applicable, the Secretary shall notify the organization that 
     such certification is accepted; or
       ``(2) if such certification does not meet such 
     requirements, as applicable, the Secretary shall notify the 
     organization that such certification is not accepted and the 
     reasons therefor.
       ``(c) Listing.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the Secretary shall compile and maintain a 
     current listing of patient safety organizations with respect 
     to which the Secretary has accepted a certification pursuant 
     to subsection (b).
       ``(2) Removal from listing.--The Secretary shall remove 
     from the listing under paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) an entity with respect to which the Secretary has 
     accepted an initial certification pursuant to subsection 
     (a)(2)(A) and which does not submit a supplemental 
     certification pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B) that is 
     accepted by the Secretary;
       ``(B) an entity whose certification expires and which does 
     not submit a renewal application that is accepted by the 
     Secretary; and
       ``(C) an entity with respect to which the Secretary revokes 
     the Secretary's acceptance of the entity's certification, 
     pursuant to subsection (d).
       ``(d) Revocation of Acceptance.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), if 
     the Secretary determines (through a review of patient safety 
     organization activities) that a patient safety organization 
     does not perform one of the patient safety organization 
     activities described in subparagraph (A) through (F) of 
     section 921(4), the Secretary may, after notice and an 
     opportunity for a hearing, revoke the Secretary's acceptance 
     of the certification of such organization.
       ``(2) Delayed certification of collection from more than 
     one provider.--A revocation under paragraph (1) may not be 
     based on a determination that the organization does not 
     perform the activity described in section 921(4)(B) if--
       ``(A) the listing of the organization is based on its 
     submittal of an initial certification under subsection 
     (a)(2)(A);
       ``(B) the organization has not submitted a supplemental 
     certification under subsection (a)(2)(B); and
       ``(C) the 2-year period described in subsection (a)(2)(B) 
     has not expired.
       ``(e) Notification of Revocation or Removal from Listing.--
       ``(1) Supplying confirmation of notification to 
     providers.--Within 15 days of a revocation under subsection 
     (d)(1), a patient safety organization shall submit to the 
     Secretary a confirmation that the organization has taken all 
     reasonable actions to notify each provider whose patient 
     safety data is collected or analyzed by the organization of 
     such revocation.
       ``(2) Publication.--Upon the revocation of an acceptance of 
     an organization's certification under subsection (d)(1), or 
     upon the removal of an organization from the listing under 
     subsection (c)(2), the Secretary shall publish notice of the 
     revocation or removal in the Federal Register.
       ``(f) Status of Data After Removal from Listing.--
       ``(1) New data.--With respect to the privilege and 
     confidentiality protections described in section 922, data 
     submitted to an organization within 30 days after the 
     organization is removed from the listing under subsection 
     (c)(2) shall have the same status as data submitted while the 
     organization was still listed.
       ``(2) Protection to continue to apply.--If the privilege 
     and confidentiality protections described in section 922 
     applied to data while an organization was listed, or during 
     the 30-day period described in paragraph (1), such 
     protections shall continue to apply to such data after the 
     organization is removed from the listing under subsection 
     (c)(2).
       ``(g) Disposition of Data.--If the Secretary removes an 
     organization from the listing as provided for in subsection 
     (c)(2), with respect to the patient safety data that the 
     organization received from providers, the organization 
     shall--
       ``(1) with the approval of the provider and another patient 
     safety organization, transfer such data to such other 
     organization;
       ``(2) return such data to the person that submitted the 
     data; or
       ``(3) if returning such data to such person is not 
     practicable, destroy such data.

     ``SEC. 925. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

       ``The Secretary, acting through the Director, may provide 
     technical assistance to patient safety organizations, 
     including convening annual meetings for patient safety 
     organizations to discuss methodology, communication, data 
     collection, or privacy concerns.

     ``SEC. 926. PROMOTING THE INTEROPERABILITY OF HEALTH CARE 
                   INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS.

       ``(a) Development.--Not later than 36 months after the date 
     of enactment of the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement 
     Act of 2004, the Secretary shall develop or adopt voluntary 
     standards that promote the electronic exchange of health care 
     information.
       ``(b) Updates.--The Secretary shall provide for the ongoing 
     review and periodic updating of the standards developed under 
     subsection (a).
       ``(c) Dissemination.--The Secretary shall provide for the 
     dissemination of the standards developed and updated under 
     this section.

     ``SEC. 927. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       ``There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may 
     be necessary to carry out this part.''.

     SEC. 4. STUDIES AND REPORTS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
     shall enter into a contract (based upon a competitive 
     contracting process) with an appropriate research 
     organization for the conduct of a study to assess the impact 
     of medical technologies and therapies on patient safety, 
     patient benefit, health care quality, and the costs of care 
     as well as productivity growth. Such study shall examine--
       (1) the extent to which factors, such as the use of labor 
     and technological advances, have contributed to increases in 
     the share of the gross domestic product that is devoted to 
     health care and the impact of medical technologies and 
     therapies on such increases;
       (2) the extent to which early and appropriate introduction 
     and integration of innovative medical technologies and 
     therapies may affect the overall productivity and quality of 
     the health care delivery systems of the United States; and
       (3) the relationship of such medical technologies and 
     therapies to patient safety, patient benefit, health care 
     quality, and cost of care.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services shall prepare and submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report containing the results of the 
     study conducted under subsection (a).
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3569. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. 
Lugar, and Mr. Biden)) proposed an amendment to the concurrent 
resolution S. Con. Res. 81, expressing the concern of Congress over 
Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons; as follows:

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:
     That Congress--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two 
     decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of 
     its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
       (B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA 
     and the international community about its nuclear programs 
     and activities;
       (2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
     of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
     Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
     that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
       (3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever 
     financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary 
     to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear 
     activities;
       (4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
     (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty''), including the United States, to 
     use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
     weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other 
     cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use 
     items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to 
     its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this 
     resolution referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'') and is 
     clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty;
       (5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during 
     the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 
     has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of 
     a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion 
     and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, 
     equipment, and facilities;
       (6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure 
     of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable 
     research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 
     24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the 
     IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran 
     that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute 
     ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance 
     with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its 
     Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
       (7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the 
     positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and 
     dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, 
     complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear 
     activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand 
     and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of 
     Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct 
     diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. 
     sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs 
     between the United States and Libya;
       (8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country 
     renounces and dismantles its

[[Page S8780]]

     weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile 
     programs and renounces its support for international 
     terrorist organizations;
       (9) notes the assistance that the United States has 
     provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on 
     December 26, 2003;
       (10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease 
     all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 
     capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment 
     activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing 
     of related equipment;
       (11) urges Iran to comply with its international 
     commitments and to rescind its decisions--
       (A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
       (B) to produce feed material that could be used in those 
     centrifuges; and
       (C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could 
     be used for plutonium production;
       (12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and 
     legal obligations--
       (A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted 
     access;
       (B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its 
     nuclear activities; and
       (C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its 
     nuclear programs;
       (13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United 
     States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European 
     Union and the United States pledged to implement United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies 
     actions states should take--
       (A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction;
       (B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 
     Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at 
     the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
       (C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       (14) urges close cooperation between the United States and 
     the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in 
     their June 26, 2004, declaration of ``the IAEA Board of 
     Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's 
     insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to 
     cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with 
     IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all 
     enrichment-related and reprocessing activities'';
       (15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to 
     resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements 
     until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has 
     suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not 
     to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably 
     and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development 
     activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium 
     conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (16) further calls upon the members of the European Union 
     to undertake such additional measures, including imposing 
     sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on 
     non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, 
     as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear 
     weapons development activity and to fulfill its obligations 
     and commitments to the IAEA;
       (17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance 
     of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and 
     in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns 
     of the IAEA, the United States, and the international 
     community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
       (A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities 
     not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil 
     field;
       (B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and 
     Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their 
     agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid 
     natural gas production field;
       (C) calls on all countries to intercede with their 
     commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain 
     from or suspend all investment and investment-related 
     activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
       (D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent 
     the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop 
     programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear 
     weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, 
     including the provision of dual use items, until Iran 
     complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
     and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty;
       (18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear 
     power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon 
     Russia--
       (A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully 
     its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
       (B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not 
     conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr 
     reactor that would enter into force before Iran has 
     verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons 
     development activity, including a permanent cessation of 
     uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose 
     nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting 
     Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the 
     United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
       (A) to fully investigate such assistance;
       (B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, 
     sites, and information related to the investigations;
       (C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals 
     and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
       (D) to immediately review and rectify their export control 
     laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further 
     assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could 
     support the development of nuclear weapons;
       (20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with 
     Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
       (A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that 
     Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA; and
       (B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran 
     continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in 
     which its compliance is uncertain;
       (21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in 
     mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the ``proliferation 
     of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their 
     means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international 
     peace and security,'' to consider measures necessary--
       (A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
       (B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine 
     nuclear activities;
       (22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, 
     immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding 
     the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, 
     to address the threat to international peace and security 
     posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action 
     as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 
     41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
       (23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
     international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon 
     states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit 
     significant violations of their safeguards agreements 
     regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or 
     engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear 
     program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle 
     activities;
       (24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant 
     international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to 
     seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, 
     Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit 
     the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those 
     nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the 
     development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states 
     assured and affordable access to--
       (A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in 
     peaceful nuclear activities; and
       (B) spent fuel management; and
       (25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and 
     currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this 
     resolution.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3570. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl) proposed an amendment to the 
concurrent resolution S. Con. Res. 81, expressing the concern of 
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear 
weapons; as follows:

       Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, 
     and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to 
     oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, 
     including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that 
     transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, 
     biological, or nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that ``all 
     States shall refrain from providing any form of support to 
     non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, 
     manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
     chemical, or biological weapons and their means of 
     delivery'';
       Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous 
     times on persons and entities transferring equipment and 
     technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass 
     destruction programs;
       Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
     5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
       Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to 
     develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
       Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, 
     after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by 
     an opposition group;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant could produce

[[Page S8781]]

     enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every 
     year-and-a-half to two years;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly 
     enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per 
     year;
       Whereas, in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director 
     General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its 
     obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to 
     report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, 
     the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium 
     tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and 
     use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use 
     and processing of the material;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report 
     that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a 
     uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that 
     neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water 
     reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 
     to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations 
     under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear 
     material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to 
     cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of 
     Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to 
     disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its 
     Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve 
     questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, 
     including those raised by the detection of two types of 
     highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant;
       Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran 
     admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium 
     conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that 
     included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and 
     that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance 
     with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, 
     called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and 
     any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its 
     nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to 
     sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol 
     between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards 
     (the ``Additional Protocol'') to strengthen investigation of 
     all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third 
     countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in 
     resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
       Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront 
     Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers 
     of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint 
     statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to 
     suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as 
     defined by the IAEA;
       Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United 
     Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access 
     to modern technologies and supplies in a range of areas once 
     certain international concerns regarding Iran are fully 
     resolved;
       Whereas, in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran 
     further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 
     2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium 
     hexafluoride;
       Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a 
     laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 
     kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, 
     another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment 
     program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly 
     more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of 
     June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran 
     ``had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 
     percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to 
     approximately 15 percent'';
       Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's 
     declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include 
     information that should have been provided, including the 
     fact that ``some samples from'' the laser uranium enrichment 
     project ``had been sent for assessment to the supplier's 
     laboratory'';
       Whereas, in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also 
     admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium 
     dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, 
     another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such 
     activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it 
     would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act 
     in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-
     into-force;
       Whereas, on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the 
     IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all 
     enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to 
     produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to 
     import enrichment related items;
       Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic 
     activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and 
     confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the 
     IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has 
     concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the 
     IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards 
     Agreement;
       Whereas, despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, 
     fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the 
     Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, 
     found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding 
     its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more 
     sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced 
     enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign 
     sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported 
     explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic 
     isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a 
     neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 
     2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples 
     from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and 
     from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed 
     more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent 
     U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on 
     imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium 
     contamination at that workshop differed from those found at 
     Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion 
     that the source of contamination at both sites is imported 
     centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it 
     has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using 
     centrifuge technology;
       Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, 
     report, that ``the contamination is different on domestic and 
     imported centrifuges,'' that ``it is unlikely'' that the 36 
     percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired 
     from Iran's principal supplier country, and that ``important 
     information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently 
     required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to 
     involve changing or contradictory information'';
       Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations 
     of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous 
     assurances to the IAEA and the international community of 
     full transparency;
       Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to 
     France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend 
     uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized 
     that this suspension is temporary and continued to 
     manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium 
     enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to 
     resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever 
     it chooses;
       Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan 
     Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council 
     of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its 
     research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
     intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
       (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, 
     letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of 
     Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a 
     ``full picture of its nuclear activities'' and ``full 
     transparency'';
       (2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the 
     United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to 
     full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
       (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of 
     September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency 
     and to ``leave no stone unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its 
     peaceful objectives;
       Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, 
     and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black 
     market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether 
     Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has 
     refused to reveal to international inspectors;
       Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will 
     soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched 
     nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if 
     implemented, would undercut the international effort to 
     persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development 
     program;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 
     13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious 
     concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 
     did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's 
     past and present nuclear programme considered essential by 
     the Board's November 2003 resolution,'' and also noted that 
     the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced 
     centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing 
     activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser 
     enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle 
     highly radioactive materials;
       Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern 
     that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the 
     development of its enrichment technology to its current 
     extent, and that a number of other questions remain 
     unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
     Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on 
     the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, 
     extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned

[[Page S8782]]

     heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding 
     the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
       Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that 
     IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest 
     against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 
     2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit 
     inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in 
     mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the 
     Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into 
     serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its 
     intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the 
     IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material 
     for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 
     2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment 
     activities ``does not include suspension of production of 
     UF6,'' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter 
     of November 10, 2003;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 
     2004, which was also adopted unanimously, ``deplores'' the 
     fact that ``Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely 
     and proactive as it should have been'' and ``underlines that, 
     with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important 
     that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a 
     full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by 
     providing all relevant information, as well as by providing 
     prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons'';
       Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that 
     Iran's suspension ``commitments have not been comprehensively 
     implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all 
     remaining shortcomings'';
       Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further 
     confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its 
     decision to begin production testing at the Uranium 
     Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of 
     a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal 
     of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore 
     international confidence undermined by past reports of 
     undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
       Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume 
     production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the 
     IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, 
     which called on Iran ``to suspend all further uranium 
     enrichment-related activities,'' and Iran's voluntary 
     suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to 
     its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers 
     of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
       Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in 
     dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, 
     Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international 
     community, its receipt from other countries of the means to 
     enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear 
     weapon design to another country, its production of 
     centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization 
     workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards 
     Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its 
     legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in 
     acquiring nuclear weapons; and
       Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or 
     reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the 
     maintenance of international peace and security and threaten 
     United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3571. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl) proposed an amendment to the 
concurrent resolution S. Con. Res. 81, expressing the concern of 
Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear 
weapons; as follows:

       Amend the title so as to read: ``Expressing the concern of 
     Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce 
     nuclear weapons.''.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3572. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. 
Lugar, and Mr. Biden)) proposed an amendment to the concurrent 
resolution H. Con. Res. 398, expressing the concern of Congress over 
Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons; as follows:

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:
     That Congress--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two 
     decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of 
     its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
       (B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the IAEA 
     and the international community about its nuclear programs 
     and activities;
       (2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
     of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
     Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
     that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
       (3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever 
     financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary 
     to enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear 
     activities;
       (4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
     (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty''), including the United States, to 
     use appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
     weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other 
     cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use 
     items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to 
     its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this 
     resolution referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'') and is 
     clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty;
       (5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during 
     the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 
     has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of 
     a full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion 
     and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, 
     equipment, and facilities;
       (6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure 
     of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable 
     research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 
     24, 2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the 
     IAEA, together with the statement by the Government of Iran 
     that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute 
     ample evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance 
     with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its 
     Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
       (7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran's behavior, the 
     positive example of Libya's decision to renounce and 
     dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, 
     complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear 
     activities, which has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand 
     and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of 
     Libya's program and has led to the establishment of direct 
     diplomatic relations with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. 
     sanctions, and the establishment of cooperative programs 
     between the United States and Libya;
       (8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that country 
     renounces and dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and 
     long-range ballistic missile programs and renounces its 
     support for international terrorist organizations;
       (9) notes the assistance that the United States has 
     provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam earthquake on 
     December 26, 2003;
       (10) calls upon Iran to immediately and permanently cease 
     all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 
     capabilities, in particular all uranium enrichment 
     activities, including importing, manufacturing, and testing 
     of related equipment;
       (11) urges Iran to comply with its international 
     commitments and to rescind its decisions--
       (A) to manufacture and construct centrifuges;
       (B) to produce feed material that could be used in those 
     centrifuges; and
       (C) to construct a heavy-water moderated reactor that could 
     be used for plutonium production;
       (12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commitments and 
     legal obligations--
       (A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full and unrestricted 
     access;
       (B) to cooperate fully with the investigation of its 
     nuclear activities; and
       (C) to demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its 
     nuclear programs;
       (13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at the United 
     States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which the European 
     Union and the United States pledged to implement United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which identifies 
     actions states should take--
       (A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction;
       (B) to establish new measures in accordance with the G8 
     Action Plan on Non-Proliferation, announced June 9, 2004, at 
     the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia; and
       (C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       (14) urges close cooperation between the United States and 
     the European Union in accordance with the reaffirmation in 
     their June 26, 2004, declaration of ``the IAEA Board of 
     Governors' Iran resolutions, which deplore Iran's 
     insufficient cooperation and call on Iran, inter alia, to 
     cooperate fully and in a timely and proactive manner, with 
     IAEA investigation of its nuclear programme and suspend all 
     enrichment-related and reprocessing activities'';
       (15) calls upon the members of the European Union not to 
     resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements 
     until the IAEA Director General reports that Iran has 
     suspended all nuclear weapons development activity, and not 
     to implement such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably 
     and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development 
     activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium 
     conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (16) further calls upon the members of the European Union 
     to undertake such additional measures, including imposing 
     sanctions and sponsoring an IAEA Board of Governors report on 
     non-compliance pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, 
     as may be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear 
     weapons development activity and to

[[Page S8783]]

     fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;
       (17) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance 
     of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledges to the IAEA, and 
     in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns 
     of the IAEA, the United States, and the international 
     community regarding Iran's nuclear activities--
       (A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities 
     not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil 
     field;
       (B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and 
     Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their 
     agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid 
     natural gas production field;
       (C) calls on all countries to intercede with their 
     commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain 
     from or suspend all investment and investment-related 
     activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
       (D) calls on Member States of the United Nations to prevent 
     the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop 
     programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear 
     weapons program and to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, 
     including the provision of dual use items, until Iran 
     complies fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
     and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty;
       (18) deplores any effort by any country to provide nuclear 
     power-related assistance to Iran at this time, and calls upon 
     Russia--
       (A) to use all appropriate means to urge Iran to meet fully 
     its obligations and commitments to the IAEA; and
       (B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not 
     conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr 
     reactor that would enter into force before Iran has 
     verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons 
     development activity, including a permanent cessation of 
     uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
     activities;
       (19) calls upon the governments of the countries whose 
     nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting 
     Iranian nuclear activities, including Pakistan, Malaysia, the 
     United Arab Emirates, and Germany--
       (A) to fully investigate such assistance;
       (B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access to individuals, 
     sites, and information related to the investigations;
       (C) to take all appropriate action against such nationals 
     and corporations under the laws of those countries; and
       (D) to immediately review and rectify their export control 
     laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further 
     assistance to countries pursuing nuclear programs that could 
     support the development of nuclear weapons;
       (20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in accordance with 
     Article XII of the IAEA Statute--
       (A) to report to the United Nations Security Council that 
     Iran has been in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA; and
       (B) as appropriate, to specify areas in which Iran 
     continues to be in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA or with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in 
     which its compliance is uncertain;
       (21) urges the United Nations Security Council, bearing in 
     mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that the ``proliferation 
     of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their 
     means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international 
     peace and security,'' to consider measures necessary--
       (A) to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA; and
       (B) to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine 
     nuclear activities;
       (22) further urges the United Nations Security Council, 
     immediately upon receiving any report from the IAEA regarding 
     the continuing non-compliance of Iran with its obligations, 
     to address the threat to international peace and security 
     posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program and take such action 
     as may be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article 
     41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
       (23) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
     international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon 
     states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit 
     significant violations of their safeguards agreements 
     regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or 
     engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear 
     program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle 
     activities;
       (24) further urges the United Nations Security Council, the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant 
     international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, to 
     seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, 
     Switzerland, on the best and most equitable means to limit 
     the right of non-nuclear weapons states to engage in those 
     nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to the 
     development of nuclear weapons, while providing those states 
     assured and affordable access to--
       (A) nuclear reactor fuel and other materials used in 
     peaceful nuclear activities; and
       (B) spent fuel management; and
       (25) urges the President to keep Congress fully and 
     currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this 
     resolution.
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3573. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl (for himself and Mrs. Feinstein)) 
proposed an amendment to the concurrent resolution H. Con. Res. 398, 
expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means 
to produce nuclear weapons; as follows:

       Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, 
     and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to 
     oppose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, 
     including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that 
     transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, 
     biological, or nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that ``all 
     States shall refrain from providing any form of support to 
     non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, 
     manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
     chemical, or biological weapons and their means of 
     delivery'';
       Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous 
     times on persons and entities transferring equipment and 
     technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass 
     destruction programs;
       Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
     5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty");
       Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to 
     develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
       Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, 
     after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by 
     an opposition group;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium 
     for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly 
     enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons per 
     year;
       Whereas, in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director 
     General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its 
     obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to 
     report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, 
     the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium 
     tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and 
     use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use 
     and processing of the material;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report 
     that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building a 
     uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that 
     neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water 
     reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 
     to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations 
     under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear 
     material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to 
     cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of 
     Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had failed to 
     disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its 
     Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve 
     questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, 
     including those raised by the detection of two types of 
     highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant;
       Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran 
     admitted in a letter that it had carried out uranium 
     conversion experiments in the early 1990's, experiments that 
     included bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and 
     that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance 
     with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, 
     called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and 
     any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its 
     nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and to 
     sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol 
     between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards 
     (the ``Additional Protocol'') to strengthen investigation of 
     all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third 
     countries to cooperate closely and fully with the IAEA in 
     resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
       Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront 
     Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers 
     of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint 
     statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to 
     suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as 
     defined by the IAEA;
       Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United 
     Kingdom promised a

[[Page S8784]]

     dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern 
     technologies and supplies in a range of areas once certain 
     international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
       Whereas, in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran 
     further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 
     2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium 
     hexafluoride;
       Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a 
     laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 
     kilograms of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, 
     another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment 
     program had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly 
     more than 3 percent, but the Director General's report of 
     June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran 
     ``had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8 
     percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to 
     approximately 15 percent'';
       Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's 
     declaration of October 21, 2003, failed to include 
     information that should have been provided, including the 
     fact that ``some samples from'' the laser uranium enrichment 
     project ``had been sent for assessment to the supplier's 
     laboratory'';
       Whereas, in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also 
     admitted that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium 
     dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, 
     another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such 
     activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it 
     would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would act 
     in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its entry-
     into-force;
       Whereas, on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the 
     IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all 
     enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to 
     produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to 
     import enrichment related items;
       Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic 
     activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and 
     confronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the 
     IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has 
     concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the 
     IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safeguards 
     Agreement;
       Whereas, despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, 
     fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the 
     Director General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report, 
     found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding 
     its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more 
     sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced 
     enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign 
     sources, and providing incomplete and unsupported 
     explanations about experiments to create a highly toxic 
     isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful as a 
     neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 
     2001, and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples 
     from one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and 
     from equipment that had been present in that workshop showed 
     more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 percent 
     U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on 
     imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium 
     contamination at that workshop differed from those found at 
     Natanz, which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion 
     that the source of contamination at both sites is imported 
     centrifuge components and perhaps also its assertion that it 
     has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent U-235 using 
     centrifuge technology;
       Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, 
     report, that ``the contamination is different on domestic and 
     imported centrifuges,'' that ``it is unlikely'' that the 36 
     percent U-235 contamination was due to components acquired 
     from Iran's principal supplier country, and that ``important 
     information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has frequently 
     required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to 
     involve changing or contradictory information'';
       Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations 
     of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous 
     assurances to the IAEA and the international community of 
     full transparency;
       Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to 
     France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend 
     uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized 
     that this suspension is temporary and continued to 
     manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium 
     enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to 
     resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever 
     it chooses;
       Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan 
     Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council 
     of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its 
     research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
     intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
       (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, 
     letter from the Vice President of Iran and the President of 
     Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a 
     ``full picture of its nuclear activities'' and ``full 
     transparency'';
       (2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the 
     United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to 
     full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
       (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of 
     September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency 
     and to ``leave no stone unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its 
     peaceful objectives;
       Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, 
     and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black 
     market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether 
     Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has 
     refused to reveal to international inspectors;
       Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will 
     soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched 
     nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which, if 
     implemented, would undercut the international effort to 
     persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development 
     program;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 
     13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious 
     concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 
     did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's 
     past and present nuclear programme considered essential by 
     the Board's November 2003 resolution,'' and also noted that 
     the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced 
     centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing 
     activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser 
     enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle 
     highly radioactive materials;
       Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern 
     that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the 
     development of its enrichment technology to its current 
     extent, and that a number of other questions remain 
     unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
     Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on 
     the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, 
     extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned 
     heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding 
     the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
       Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that 
     IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest 
     against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 
     2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit 
     inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to others in 
     mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the 
     Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into 
     serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its 
     intent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the 
     IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed material 
     for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May 18, 
     2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment 
     activities ``does not include suspension of production of 
     UF6,'' which contradicted assurances provided in its letter 
     of November 10, 2003;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 
     2004, which was also adopted unanimously, ``deplores'' the 
     fact that ``Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely 
     and proactive as it should have been'' and ``underlines that, 
     with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important 
     that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a 
     full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by 
     providing all relevant information, as well as by providing 
     prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons'';
       Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that 
     Iran's suspension ``commitments have not been comprehensively 
     implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all 
     remaining shortcomings'';
       Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further 
     confidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its 
     decision to begin production testing at the Uranium 
     Conversion Facility and its decision to start construction of 
     a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal 
     of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore 
     international confidence undermined by past reports of 
     undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
       Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume 
     production of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the 
     IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, 
     which called on Iran ``to suspend all further uranium 
     enrichment-related activities,'' and Iran's voluntary 
     suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to 
     its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers 
     of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
       Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in 
     dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, 
     Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international 
     community, its receipt from other countries of the means to 
     enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear 
     weapon design to another country, its production of 
     centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization 
     workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards 
     Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its

[[Page S8785]]

     legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in 
     acquiring nuclear weapons; and
       Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or 
     reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the 
     maintenance of international peace and security and threaten 
     United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3574. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. Kyl (for himself and Mrs. Feinstein)) 
proposed an amendment to the concurrent resolution H. Con. Res. 398, 
expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means 
to produce nuclear weapons; as follows:

       Amend the title so as to read: ``Expressing the concern of 
     Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce 
     nuclear weapons.''
                                 ______
                                 
  SA 3575. Mr. McCain submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 849, to provide for a land exchange in the State of 
Arizona between the Secretary of Agriculture and Yavapai Ranch Limited 
partnership; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources; as follows:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Northern 
     Arizona Land Exchange and Verde River Basin Partnership Act 
     of 2004''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

                TITLE I--NORTHERN ARIZONA LAND EXCHANGE

Sec. 101. Findings and purpose. 
Sec. 102. Definitions. 
Sec. 103. Land exchange. 
Sec. 104. Exchange valuation, appraisals, and equalization. 
Sec. 105. Miscellaneous provisions. 
Sec. 106. Status and management of land after exchange. 
Sec. 107. Conveyance of additional land. 

                TITLE II--VERDE RIVER BASIN PARTNERSHIP

Sec. 201. Findings and purpose. 
Sec. 202. Definitions. 
Sec. 203. Verde River Basin Partnership. 
Sec. 204. Verde River Basin studies. 
Sec. 205. Verde River Basin Partnership final report. 
Sec. 206. Memorandum of understanding. 
Sec. 207. Effect. 

                TITLE I--NORTHERN ARIZONA LAND EXCHANGE

     SEC. 101. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) the Prescott National Forest in Yavapai County, Arizona 
     includes approximately 170 square miles of parcels of Federal 
     land and private land intermingled in a checkerboard pattern;
       (2) the Federal land is administered by the Secretary of 
     Agriculture as National Forest System land;
       (3) the private land is owned by the Yavapai Ranch Limited 
     Partnership and the Northern Yavapai, L.L.C.;
       (4) portions of the private land within the checkerboard 
     area (including the land located in or near the Pine Creek 
     watershed, Juniper Mesa Wilderness Area, Haystack Peak, and 
     the Luis Maria Baca Float No. 5) possess attributes valuable 
     for public management, use, and enjoyment, including--
       (A) outdoor recreation;
       (B) stands of old growth pine and juniper;
       (C) wildlife habitat;
       (D) cultural and archaeological resources; and
       (E) scenic vistas;
       (5) the checkerboard ownership pattern of private land and 
     Federal land within the Prescott National Forest impedes 
     sound and efficient management and use of the intermingled 
     National Forest System land;
       (6) acquisition by the United States of certain parcels of 
     land through a land exchange with Yavapai Ranch Limited 
     Partnership and the Northern Yavapai, L.L.C., for addition to 
     Prescott National Forest would serve the public objectives 
     of--
       (A) acquiring private land that meets the criteria for 
     inclusion in the National Forest System;
       (B) consolidating a large area of National Forest System 
     land to allow--
       (i) permanent public access, use, and enjoyment of the 
     land; and
       (ii) efficient management of the land;
       (C) minimizing cash outlays by the United States to achieve 
     the objectives described in subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
       (D) reducing administrative costs to the United States 
     through--
       (i) elimination of approximately 350 miles of boundary 
     between private land and the Federal parcels; and
       (ii) reduction of right-of-way, special use, and other 
     permit processing and issuance for roads and other facilities 
     on National Forest System land;
       (7) additional parcels of National Forest System land 
     within Yavapai County, Arizona have been identified for 
     inclusion in the land exchange because the parcels--
       (A) have lost their forest character;
       (B) meet the National Forest Plan criteria for exchange; 
     and
       (C) are managed under special use permits and leases for a 
     variety of purposes (including municipal water treatment 
     facilities, sewage treatment facilities, city parks, camps, 
     and airport-related facilities) that--
       (i) limit the usefulness of the parcels for general 
     National Forest System purposes; but
       (ii)(I) are to be conveyed by the Yavapai Ranch Limited 
     Partnership, to the third-party permit or lease holders in 
     accordance with agreements acceptable to all parties to the 
     agreements; or
       (II) are to be purchased directly from the Secretary in 
     accordance with this Act; and
       (8) the exchange and conveyance of the Federal land should 
     not result in adverse impacts on existing water users, State 
     water right holders, or the Verde River.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to authorize, 
     direct, and facilitate--
       (1) an equal value exchange of Federal land and non-Federal 
     land between the United States, Yavapai Ranch Limited 
     Partnership, and the Northern Yavapai, L.L.C.; and
       (2) the conveyance of portions of certain parcels of the 
     Federal land for community and other uses.

     SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Camp.--The term ``camp'' means Camp Pearlstein, 
     Friendly Pines, Patterdale Pines, Pine Summit, Sky Y, and 
     YoungLife Lost Canyon camps in the State of Arizona.
       (2) Federal land.--The term ``Federal land'' means the land 
     described in section 103(a)(2).
       (3) Management plan.--The term ``Management Plan'' means 
     the land and resource management plan for Prescott National 
     Forest.
       (4) Non-federal land.--The term ``non-Federal land'' means 
     the land described in section 103(b)(2).
       (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Agriculture.
       (6) Yavapai ranch.--The term ``Yavapai Ranch'' means--
       (A) the Yavapai Ranch Limited Partnership, an Arizona 
     Limited Partnership; and
       (B) the Northern Yavapai, L.L.C., an Arizona Limited 
     Liability Company.

     SEC. 103. LAND EXCHANGE.

       (a) Conveyance of Federal Land by the United States.--
       (1) In general.--On receipt of an offer from Yavapai Ranch 
     to convey the non-Federal land that complies with the 
     requirements of this Act and that is acceptable to the 
     Secretary, the Secretary shall convey to Yavapai Ranch by 
     deed acceptable to Yavapai Ranch, subject to easements, 
     rights-of-way, utility lines, and any other valid 
     encumbrances on the Federal land in existence on the date of 
     enactment of this Act and any other reservations that may be 
     agreed to by the Secretary and Yavapai Ranch, all right, 
     title, and interest of the United States in and to the 
     Federal land described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Description of federal land.--The Federal land referred 
     to in paragraph (1) shall consist of the following:
       (A) Certain land comprising approximately 15,300 acres 
     located in Yavapai County, Arizona, as generally depicted on 
     the map entitled ``Yavapai Ranch-Ranch Area Federal Lands'', 
     dated April 2002.
       (B) Certain land in the Coconino National Forest, Coconino 
     County Arizona--
       (i) comprising approximately 1,500 acres located in 
     Coconino National Forest, Coconino County, Arizona, as 
     generally depicted on the map entitled ``Flagstaff Federal 
     Lands-Airport Parcel'', dated April 2002; and
       (ii) comprising approximately 28.26 acres in 2 separate 
     parcels, as generally depicted on the map entitled 
     ``Flagstaff Federal Lands--Wetzel School and Mt. Elden 
     Parcels'', dated September 2002.
       (C) Certain land referred to as Williams Airport, Williams 
     golf course, Williams Sewer, Buckskinner Park, Williams 
     Railroad, and Well parcels numbers 2, 3, and 4, comprising 
     approximately 950 acres, located in Kaibab National Forest, 
     Coconino County, Arizona, as generally depicted on the map 
     entitled ``Williams Federal Lands'', dated April 2002.
       (D) Certain land comprising approximately 2,200 acres 
     located in Prescott National Forest, Yavapai County, Arizona, 
     as generally depicted on the map entitled ``Camp Verde 
     Federal Land--General Crook Parcel'', dated April 2002.
       (E) Certain Forest Service land comprising approximately 
     237.5 acres located in Kaibab National Forest, Coconino 
     County, Arizona, as generally depicted on the map entitled 
     ``Younglife Lost Canyon'', dated April 2002.
       (F) Certain Forest Service land comprising approximately 
     200 acres located in Prescott National Forest, Yavapai 
     County, Arizona, and including Friendly Pines, Patterdale 
     Pines, Camp Pearlstein, Pine Summit, and Sky Y, as generally 
     depicted on the map entitled ``Prescott Federal Lands--Summer 
     Youth Camp Parcels'', dated April 2002.
       (G) Perpetual easements reserved by the United States 
     that--
       (i) run with and benefit land owned by or conveyed to 
     Yavapai Ranch across certain land of the United States;
       (ii) are for the purposes of--

       (I) operating, maintaining, repairing, improving, and 
     replacing electric power lines or water pipelines (including 
     related storage tanks, valves, pumps, and hardware); and

[[Page S8786]]

       (II) providing rights of reasonable ingress and egress 
     necessary for the activities described in subclause (I);

       (iii) are 20 feet in width; and
       (iv) are located 10 feet on either side of each line 
     depicted on the map entitled ``YRLP Acquired Easements for 
     Water Lines'', dated April 2002.
       (3) Permits.--Permits or other legal occupancies of the 
     Federal land by third parties in existence on the date of 
     transfer of the Federal land to Yavapai Ranch shall be 
     addressed in accordance with--
       (A) part 254.15 of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations 
     (or any successor regulation); and
       (B) other applicable laws (including regulations).
       (4) Condition on conveyance of camp verde parcel.--
       (A) In general.--To conserve water in the Verde Valley, 
     Arizona, and to minimize the adverse impacts from future 
     development of the parcels described in paragraph (2)(D) on 
     current and future users of water and holders of water rights 
     in existence on the date of enactment of this Act and the 
     Verde River and National Forest System land retained by the 
     United States, the United States shall limit in perpetuity 
     the use of water on each parcel by reserving conservation 
     easements that--
       (i) run with the land;
       (ii) prohibit golf course development on the parcel;
       (iii) require that public parks and greenbelts on the 
     parcel be watered with treated effluent;
       (iv) limit total post-exchange water use to not more than 
     700 acre-feet of water per year; and
       (v) except for water supplied to the parcel by municipal 
     water service providers or private water companies, require 
     that any water used for the parcel not be withdrawn from 
     wells perforated in the saturated Holocene alluvium of the 
     Verde River.
       (B) Recordation.--The conservation easements described in 
     subparagraph (A) shall be recorded in the title to each 
     parcel described in paragraph (2)(D) that is conveyed by the 
     Secretary to Yavapai Ranch.
       (C) Subsequent conveyance.--
       (i) In general.--On acquisition of title to the parcel 
     described in paragraph (2)(D), Yavapai Ranch may convey all 
     or a portion of the interest of Yavapai Ranch in the parcel 
     to 1 or more successors-in-interest.
       (ii) Water use apportionment.--A conveyance under clause 
     (i) shall, in accordance with the terms described in 
     subparagraph (A), include a recorded and binding agreement on 
     the quantity of water available for use on the parcel or 
     portion of the parcel conveyed, as determined by Yavapai 
     Ranch.
       (D) Enforcement.--The Secretary shall offer to enter into a 
     memorandum of understanding with a political subdivision of 
     the State, as designated by the Director of Arizona 
     Department of Water Resources, that authorizes the political 
     subdivision to enforce the terms described in subparagraph 
     (A) in any manner provided by law.
       (E) Liability.--
       (i) In general.--Any action for a breach of a term of a 
     conservation easement described in subparagraph (A) shall be 
     against the owner of the parcel or portion of the parcel, at 
     the time of the breach, whose action or failure to act has 
     resulted in the breach.
       (ii) Hold harmless.--To the extent that the United States 
     or a successor-in-interest to the United States no longer 
     holds title to a parcel or any portion of a parcel described 
     in paragraph (2)(D), the United States and any successor-in-
     interest shall be held harmless from damages or injuries 
     attributable to any breach of a term of a conservation 
     easement described in subparagraph (A) by a subsequent 
     successor-in-interest if the United States or the successor-
     in-interest did not contribute to the breach.
       (5) Applicable Law.--In accordance with section 120(h) of 
     the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the United States 
     shall reserve an easement in any land transferred to Yavapai 
     Ranch.
       (b) Conveyance of Non-Federal Land by Yavapai Ranch.--
       (1) In general.--On receipt of title to the Federal land, 
     Yavapai Ranch shall simultaneously convey to the United 
     States, by deed acceptable to the Secretary and subject to 
     any encumbrances in existence on April 1, 2002, all right, 
     title, and interest of Yavapai Ranch in and to the non-
     Federal land.
       (2) Description of non-federal land.--The non-Federal land 
     referred to in paragraph (1) consists of approximately 35,000 
     acres of non-Federal land located within the boundaries of 
     Prescott National Forest, as generally depicted on the map 
     entitled ``Yavapai Ranch Non-Federal Lands'', dated April 
     2002.
       (3) Easements.--
       (A) In general.--The conveyance of non-Federal land to the 
     United States under paragraph (1) shall be subject to the 
     reservation of--
       (i) perpetual and unrestricted easements that run with and 
     benefit the land retained by Yavapai Ranch for--

       (I) the operation, maintenance, repair, improvement, 
     development, and replacement of not more than 3 wells in 
     existence on the date of enactment of this Act;
       (II) related storage tanks, valves, pumps, and hardware; 
     and
       (III) pipelines to points of use; and

       (ii) easements for reasonable ingress and egress to 
     accomplish the purposes of the easements described in clause 
     (i).
       (B) Existing wells.--
       (i) In general.--Each easement for an existing well shall 
     be--

       (I) 40 acres in area; and
       (II) to the maximum extent practicable--

       (aa) centered on the existing well; and
       (bb) located in the same square mile section of land.
       (ii) Limitation.--Within each 40-acre easement described in 
     clause (i), the United States and any permitees or licensees 
     of the United States--

       (I) may take any actions that are necessary to use the 
     water from the well; but
       (II) may not undertake, without the written consent of 
     Yavapai Ranch, any activity that materially interferes with 
     the use of the wells by Yavapai Ranch.

       (iii) Reservation of water for the united states.--The 
     United States shall be entitled to \1/2\ the production of 
     each existing well, not to exceed a total of 3,100,000 
     gallons of water annually, for watering wildlife and stock 
     and for other National Forest System purposes from the 3 
     wells.
       (C) Reasonable access.--Each easement for ingress and 
     egress shall be at least 20 feet in width.
       (D) Location.--The locations of the easements and wells 
     shall be the locations generally depicted on a map entitled 
     ``YRLP Reserved Easements for Water Lines and Wells'', dated 
     April 2002.
       (c) Land Transfer Problems.--
       (1) Federal land.--If any parcel of Federal land (or a 
     portion of a Federal parcel) cannot be conveyed to Yavapai 
     Ranch because of the presence of hazardous materials or if 
     the proposed title to a parcel of Federal land (or a portion 
     of a Federal parcel) is unacceptable to Yavapai Ranch because 
     of the presence of threatened or endangered species, cultural 
     or historic resources, unpatented mining claims, or other 
     third party rights under public land laws--
       (A) the parcel of Federal land or portion of the parcel 
     shall be excluded from the exchange; and
       (B) the non-Federal land shall be adjusted in accordance 
     with section 104(c).
       (2) Non-federal land.--If any parcel of non-Federal land 
     (or a portion of a non-Federal parcel) cannot be conveyed to 
     the United States because of the presence of hazardous 
     materials or if the proposed title to a parcel or a portion 
     of the parcel is unacceptable to the Secretary--
       (A) the parcel of non-Federal land or portion of the parcel 
     shall be excluded from the exchange; and
       (B) the Federal land shall be adjusted in accordance with 
     section 104(c).
       (d) Conveyance of Federal Land to Cities and Camps.--
       (1) Subsequent conveyance.--If, after completion of the 
     appraisals of Federal land and non-Federal land under section 
     104(b), but before the completion of the exchange, Yavapai 
     Ranch, the cities of Flagstaff, Williams, and Camp Verde, 
     Arizona, and the owners of the camps enter into an agreement 
     for Yavapai Ranch to convey to the cities and the owners of 
     the camps the parcels of Federal land or portions of parcels 
     located in or near the cities or camps, Yavapai Ranch shall, 
     on acquisition of the Federal land, convey to the cities and 
     the owners of the camps the parcels or portions identified in 
     the agreement in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
       (2) Direct conveyance.--
       (A) In general.--If Yavapai Ranch, the cities referred to 
     in paragraph (1), and the owners of the camps have not 
     entered into an agreement in accordance with paragraph (1), 
     the Secretary--
       (i) shall, on notification by Yavapai Ranch, the cities, or 
     camps, delete the parcel or any portion of the parcel from 
     the exchange to provide the United States with manageable 
     post-exchange land and boundaries; and
       (ii) may, without further administrative or environmental 
     analyses or appraisal and in accordance with any terms and 
     conditions that the Secretary may require, convey to the 
     cities or camps all right, title, and interest of the United 
     States in and to the parcel or portion of the parcel for 
     consideration in an amount determined under subparagraph (B).
       (B) Consideration.--In exchange for a parcel or portion of 
     a parcel acquired under subparagraph (A), the cities or camps 
     shall pay to the Secretary the fair market value of the 
     parcel, as determined by an independent appraisal.
       (C) Disposition of proceeds.--The Secretary shall deposit 
     the proceeds of a sale under subparagraph (A) in a special 
     account in the fund established under Public Law 90-171 
     (commonly known as the ``Sisk Act'') (16 U.S.C. 484a).
       (D) Use.--Amounts deposited under subparagraph (A) shall be 
     available to the Secretary, without further appropriation, 
     until expended, for the acquisition of land in the State of 
     Arizona for National Forest System purposes, including the 
     land authorized for exchange under this title.

     SEC. 104. EXCHANGE VALUATION, APPRAISALS, AND EQUALIZATION.

       (a) Equal Value Exchange.--The value of the non-Federal and 
     Federal land to be exchanged under this title--
       (1) shall be equal, as determined by the Secretary, based 
     on the appraisals conducted under subsection (b); or
       (2) shall be equalized in accordance with subsection (c).
       (b) Appraisals.--

[[Page S8787]]

       (1) In general.--The value of the Federal land and non-
     Federal land shall be determined by appraisals using the 
     appraisal standards in--
       (A) the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land 
     Acquisitions, fifth edition (December 20, 2000); and
       (B) the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
     Practice.
       (2) Approval.--In accordance with part 254.9(a)(1) of title 
     36, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor 
     regulation), the appraiser shall be--
       (A) acceptable to the Secretary and Yavapai Ranch; and
       (B) a contractor, the clients of which shall be the 
     Secretary and Yavapai Ranch.
       (3) Requirements.--During the appraisal process the 
     appraiser shall--
       (A) consider the effect on value of the Federal land or 
     non-Federal land because of the existence of encumbrances on 
     each parcel, including--
       (i) permitted uses on Federal land that cannot be 
     reasonably terminated before the appraisal; and
       (ii) facilities on Federal land that cannot be reasonably 
     removed before the appraisal; and
       (B) determine the value of each parcel of Federal land and 
     non-Federal land (including the value of each individual 
     section of the intermingled Federal and non-Federal land of 
     the Yavapai Ranch) as an assembled transaction consistent 
     with the applicable provisions of parts 254.5 and 
     254.9(b)(1)(v) of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any successor regulation).
       (4) Dispute resolution.--A dispute relating to the 
     appraised values of the Federal land or non-Federal land 
     following completion of the appraisal shall be processed in 
     accordance with--
       (A) section 206(d) of the Federal Land Policy and 
     Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1716(d)); and
       (B) part 254.10 of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations 
     (or any successor regulation).
       (5) Availability.--In accordance with the policy of the 
     Forest Service, and to ensure the timely and full disclosure 
     of the appraisals to the public, the appraisals approved by 
     the Secretary--
       (A) shall be provided by the Secretary to--
       (i) the cities of Flagstaff, Williams, and Camp Verde, 
     Arizona; and
       (ii) the owners of the camps; and
       (B) shall be available for public inspection in--
       (i) the Offices of the Supervisors for Prescott, Coconino, 
     and Kaibab National Forests; and
       (ii) public libraries in the cities referred to in 
     subparagraph (A)(i).
       (c) Equalization of Values.--
       (1) In general.--To achieve an equal value exchange of 
     Federal land and non-Federal land, the Secretary and Yavapai 
     Ranch shall adjust the acreage of the Federal land and non-
     Federal land in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) until, 
     to the maximum extent practicable, the value is equal.
       (2) Surplus of federal land.--
       (A) In general.--If, after any adjustments are made to the 
     non-Federal land or Federal land under subsection (c) or (d) 
     of section 103, the final appraised value of the Federal land 
     exceeds the final appraised value of the non-Federal land, 
     the Federal land and non-Federal land shall be adjusted in 
     accordance with subparagraph (B) until, to the maximum extent 
     practicable, the value is equal.
       (B) Adjustments.--Adjustments under subparagraph (A) shall 
     be made in accordance with the following order:
       (i) By deleting--

       (I) 2 portions of the Camp Verde parcel, comprising a total 
     of approximately 630 acres, consisting of--

       (aa) a portion of the Camp Verde parcel, comprising 
     approximately 316 acres, located in Prescott National Forest, 
     and more particularly described as lots 1, 5, and 6 of 
     section 26, the NENE \1/4\ portion of section 26, and the 
     N\1/2\N\1/2\ portion of section 27, T. 14 N., R. 4 E., Gila 
     and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, Arizona; 
     and
       (bb) a portion of the Camp Verde parcel, comprising 
     approximately 314 acres, located in Prescott National Forest, 
     and more particularly described as lots 2, 7, 8, and 9 of 
     section 26, the SE\1/4\NE\1/4\ portion of section 26, and the 
     S\1/2\N\1/2\ of section 27, T. 14 N., R. 4 E., Gila and Salt 
     River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, Arizona; and

       (II) lots 5 through 7 of section 36, T. 14 N., R. 4 E., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, 
     Arizona.

       (ii) Beginning at the south boundary of section 31, T. 20 
     N., R. 5 W., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai 
     County, Arizona, and sections 33 and 35, T. 20 N., R. 6 W., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, by 
     adding to the non-Federal land to be conveyed to the United 
     States in \1/8\ section increments (E-W 64th line) while 
     deleting from the conveyance to Yavapai Ranch Federal land in 
     the same incremental portions of section 32, T. 20 N., R. 5 
     W., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, 
     Arizona, and sections 32, 34, and 36, in T. 20 N., R. 6 W., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, 
     Arizona, to establish a linear and continuous boundary that 
     runs east to west across the sections.
       (iii) By deleting the Williams Sewer parcel, comprising 
     approximately 20 acres, located in Kaibab National Forest, 
     and more particularly described as the E\1/2\NW\1/4\SE\1/4\ 
     portion of section 21, T. 22 N., R. 2 E., Gila and Salt River 
     Base and Meridian, Coconino County, Arizona.
       (iv) By deleting the Williams railroad parcel, located in 
     the Kaibab National Forest, and more particularly described 
     as--

       (I) the W\1/2\SW\1/4\ portion of section 26, T. 22 N., R. 2 
     E., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino County, 
     Arizona, excluding any portion northeast of the southwestern 
     right-of-way line of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
     Railway (Seligman Subdivision), comprising approximately 30 
     acres;
       (II) the NE\1/4\NW\1/4\, the N\1/2\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\, the 
     SE\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\, the NE\1/4\, the SE\1/4\SW\1/4\, and 
     the SE\1/4\ portions of section 27, T. 22 N., R. 2 E., Gila 
     and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino County, Arizona, 
     excluding any portion north of the southern right-of-way of 
     Interstate 40 and any portion northeast of the southwestern 
     right-of-way line of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
     Railway (Seligman Subdivision), any portion south of the 
     northern right-of-way of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
     Railway (Phoenix Subdivision), and any portion within 
     Exchange Survey No. 677, comprising approximately 220 acres;
       (III) the NE\1/4\NE\1/4\ portion of section 34, T. 22 N., 
     R. 2 E., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino 
     County, Arizona, excluding any portion southwest of the 
     northeastern right-of-way line of the Burlington Northern and 
     Santa Fe Railway (Phoenix Subdivision), comprising 
     approximately 2 acres; and
       (IV) the N\1/2\ portion of section 35, T. 22 N., R. 2 E., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino County, 
     Arizona, excluding any portion north of the southern right-
     of-way line of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
     (Seligman Subdivision) and any portion south of the northern 
     right-of-way of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
     (Phoenix Subdivision), comprising approximately 60 acres.

       (v) By deleting the Buckskinner Park parcel, comprising 
     approximately 50 acres, located in Kaibab National Forest, 
     and more particularly described as the SW\1/4\SW\1/4\, and 
     the S\1/2\S\1/2\NW\1/4\SW\1/4\ portions of section 33, T. 22 
     N., R. 2 E., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino 
     County, Arizona.
       (vi) By deleting the Wetzel school parcel, comprising 
     approximately 10.89 acres, located in Coconino National 
     Forest, and more particularly described as lot 9 of section 
     11, T. 21 N., R. 7 E., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, 
     Coconino County, Arizona.
       (vii) By deleting the Mt. Eldon parcel, comprising 
     approximately 17.21 acres, located in Coconino National 
     Forest, and more particularly described as lot 7 of section 
     7, T. 21 N., R. 8 E., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, 
     Coconino County, Arizona.
       (C) Modifications.--The descriptions of land and acreage 
     provided in clauses (ii), (iii), and (vii) of subparagraph 
     (B) may be modified to conform with a survey approved by the 
     Bureau of Land Management.
       (3) Surplus of non-federal land.--
       (A) In general.--If, after any adjustments are made to the 
     non-Federal land or Federal land under subsection (c) or (d) 
     of section 103, the final appraised value of the non-Federal 
     land exceeds the final appraised value of the Federal land, 
     the Federal land and non-Federal land shall be adjusted in 
     accordance with subparagraph (B) until the value is equal.
       (B) Adjustments.--An adjustment referred to in subparagraph 
     (A) shall be accomplished by beginning at the east boundary 
     of section 30, T. 20 N., R. 6 W., Gila and Salt River Base 
     and Meridian, Yavapai County, Arizona, and adding to the 
     Federal land in \1/8\ section increments (N-S 64th line) and 
     lot lines across the section, while deleting in the same 
     increments portions of sections 19 and 31, T. 20 N., R. 6 W., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Yavapai County, 
     Arizona, to establish a linear and continuous boundary that 
     runs north to south across the sections.
       (d) Cash Equalization.--
       (1) In general.--After the values of the non-Federal and 
     Federal land are equalized to the maximum extent practicable 
     under subsection (c), any balance due the Secretary or 
     Yavapai Ranch shall be paid--
       (A) through cash equalization payments under section 206(b) 
     of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 
     U.S.C. 1716(b)); or
       (B) in accordance with standards established by the 
     Secretary and Yavapai Ranch.
       (2) Limitation.--
       (A) Adjustments.--If the value of the Federal land exceeds 
     the value of the non-Federal land by more than $50,000, the 
     Secretary and Yavapai Ranch shall, by agreement, delete 
     additional Federal land from the exchange until the value of 
     the Federal land and non-Federal land is equal to the maximum 
     extent practicable.
       (B) Deposit.--Any amounts received by the United States 
     under this title--
       (i) shall be deposited in a fund established under Public 
     Law 90-171 (16 U.S.C. 484a) (commonly known as the ``Sisk 
     Act''); and
       (ii) shall be available, without further appropriation, for 
     the acquisition of land or interests in land for National 
     Forest System purposes in the State of Arizona.

     SEC. 105. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

       (a) Revocation of Orders.--Any public orders withdrawing 
     any of the Federal land from appropriation or disposal under 
     the public land laws are revoked to the extent necessary to 
     permit disposal of the Federal land.
       (b) Withdrawal of Federal Land.--The Federal land is 
     withdrawn from all forms of

[[Page S8788]]

     entry and appropriation under the public land laws, including 
     the mining and mineral leasing laws and the Geothermal Steam 
     Act of 1970 (30 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), until the date on which 
     the exchange of Federal land and non-Federal land is 
     completed.
       (c) Surveys, Inventories, and Clearances.--Before 
     completing the exchange of Federal land and non-Federal land 
     under this title, the Secretary shall carry out land surveys 
     and preexchange inventories, clearances, reviews, and 
     approvals relating to hazardous materials, threatened and 
     endangered species, cultural and historic resources, and 
     wetlands and floodplains.
       (d) Costs of Implementing the Exchange.--
       (1) In general.--In accordance with part 254.7(a) of title 
     36, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor 
     regulation), and forest service policy, the costs of 
     implementing the exchange of Federal land and non-Federal 
     land shall be shared equally by the Secretary and Yavapai 
     Ranch.
       (2) Credits.--Any costs incurred by Yavapai Ranch for 
     cultural or historic resource surveys before the date of 
     enactment of this Act or for independent third party 
     contractors under subsection (f) shall be credited against 
     the amount required to be paid by Yavapai Ranch under 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Ineligible reimbursements.--No amount paid by Yavapai 
     Ranch under this subsection shall be eligible for 
     reimbursement under section 206(f) of the Federal Land Policy 
     and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1716(f)).
       (e) Timing.--It is the intent of Congress that the exchange 
     of Federal land and non-Federal land directed by this title 
     be completed not later than 18 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (f) Contractors.--If the Secretary lacks adequate staff or 
     resources to complete the exchange by the date specified in 
     subsection (e), the Secretary or Yavapai Ranch shall contract 
     with independent third party contractors, subject to the 
     mutual agreement of the Secretary and Yavapai Ranch, to carry 
     out any activities necessary to complete the exchange by that 
     date.

     SEC. 106. STATUS AND MANAGEMENT OF LAND AFTER EXCHANGE.

       (a) In General.--Non-Federal land acquired by the United 
     States under this title--
       (1) shall become part of the Prescott National Forest; and
       (2) shall be administered by the Secretary in accordance 
     with--
       (A) this title;
       (B) the laws (including regulations) applicable to the 
     National Forest System; and
       (C) other authorized uses of the National Forest System.
       (b) Management Plan.--
       (1) In general.--Acquisition of the non-Federal land under 
     this title shall not require a revision or amendment to the 
     Management Plan.
       (2) Amendment or revision.--If the Management Plan is 
     amended or revised after the date of acquisition of non-
     Federal land under this title, the Management Plan shall be 
     amended to reflect the acquisition of the non-Federal land.
       (c) Post-Exchange Management of Certain Land.--
       (1) In general.--On acquisition by the United States, the 
     non-Federal land acquired by the United States and any 
     adjoining National Forest System land shall be managed in 
     accordance with--
       (A) paragraphs (2) through (5); and
       (B) the laws (including regulations) generally applicable 
     to National Forest System land.
       (2) Grazing.--Each area located in the Yavapai Ranch 
     grazing allotment as of the date of enactment of this Act, 
     may as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary--
       (A) remain in the Yavapai Ranch grazing allotment; and
       (B) continue to be subject to grazing in accordance with 
     the laws (including regulations) generally applicable to 
     domestic livestock grazing on National Forest System land.
       (3) Easements.--
       (A) In general.--On completion of the land exchange under 
     this title, the Secretary and Yavapai Ranch shall grant each 
     other at no charge reciprocal easements for ingress, egress, 
     and utilities across, over, and through--
       (i)(I) the routes depicted on the map entitled ``Road and 
     Trail Easements--Yavapai Ranch Area'' dated April 2002; and
       (II) any other inholdings retained by the United States or 
     Yavapai Ranch; or
       (ii) any relocated routes that are agreed to by the 
     Secretary and Yavapai Ranch.
       (B) Requirements.--An easement described in subparagraph 
     (A)--
       (i) shall be unlimited, perpetual, and nonexclusive in 
     nature; and
       (ii) shall run with and benefit the land of the grantee.
       (C) Rights of grantee.--The rights of the grantee shall 
     extend to--
       (i) any successors-in-interest, assigns, and transferees of 
     Yavapai Ranch; and
       (ii) in the case of the Secretary, members of the general 
     public, as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary.
       (4) Timber harvesting.--
       (A) In general.--After the completion of the exchange of 
     land under this title, except as provided in subparagraph 
     (B), timber harvesting for commodity production shall be 
     prohibited on the Federal land acquired.
       (B) Exceptions.--Timber harvesting may be conducted on the 
     Federal land acquired under this title if the Secretary 
     determines that timber harvesting is necessary--
       (i) to prevent or control fires, insects, and disease 
     through forest thinning or other forest management 
     techniques;
       (ii) to protect or enhance grassland habitat, watershed 
     values, native plants, trees, and wildlife species; or
       (iii) to improve forest health.
       (5) Water improvements.--Nothing in this title prohibits 
     the Secretary from authorizing or constructing new water 
     improvements in accordance with the laws (including 
     regulations) applicable to water improvements on National 
     Forest System land for--
       (A) the benefit of domestic livestock or wildlife 
     management; or
       (B) the improvement of forest health or forest restoration.
       (d) Maps.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary and Yavapai Ranch may 
     correct any minor errors in the maps of, legal descriptions 
     of, or encumbrances on the Federal land or non-Federal land.
       (2) Discrepancy.--In the event of any discrepancy between a 
     map and legal description, the map shall prevail unless the 
     Secretary and Yavapai Ranch agree otherwise.
       (3) Availability.--All maps referred to in this title shall 
     be on file and available for inspection in the Office of the 
     Supervisor, Prescott National Forest, Prescott, Arizona.
       (e) Effect.--Nothing in this title precludes, prohibits, or 
     otherwise restricts Yavapai Ranch from subsequently granting, 
     conveying, or otherwise transferring title to the Federal 
     land after its acquisition of the Federal land.

     SEC. 107. CONVEYANCE OF ADDITIONAL LAND.

       (a) In General--The Secretary shall convey to an individual 
     or entity that represents the majority of landowners with 
     encroachments on the lot by quitclaim deed the parcel of land 
     described in subsection (b).
       (b) Description of Land.--The parcel of land referred to in 
     subsection (a) is lot 8 in section 11, T. 21 N., R. 7 E., 
     Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian, Coconino County, 
     Arizona.
       (c) Amount of Consideration.--In exchange for the land 
     described in subsection (b), the individual or entity 
     acquiring the land shall pay to the Secretary consideration 
     in the amount of--
       (1) $2500; plus
       (2) any costs of re-monumenting the boundary of land.
       (d) Timing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date on 
     which the Secretary receives a power of attorney executed by 
     the individual or entity acquiring the land, the Secretary 
     shall convey to the individual or entity the land described 
     in subsection (b).
       (2) Limitation.--If, by the date that is 270 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary does not receive 
     the power of attorney described in paragraph (1)--
       (A) the authority provided under this section shall 
     terminate; and
       (B) any conveyance of the land shall be made under Public 
     Law 97-465 (16 U.S.C. 521c et seq.).

                TITLE II--VERDE RIVER BASIN PARTNERSHIP

     SEC. 201. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) the majority of the parcels of Federal land and non-
     Federal land described in title I are located in the upper 
     and middle portions of the Verde River Basin, Arizona;
       (2) the Verde River is a vital resource that--
       (A) provides water for community and other uses within the 
     Verde River Basin and Phoenix, Arizona;
       (B) recharges area groundwater aquifers; and
       (C) sustains highly valued riparian habitat;
       (3) approximately 40.5 miles of the Lower Verde River have 
     been designated as a national wild and scenic river with 
     reserved water rights to maintain flows in the River 
     necessary for recreational and environmental purposes;
       (4) water withdrawals affect available water supplies and 
     baseflow throughout the Verde River Basin because of the 
     hydrologic connection between surface water and groundwater 
     resources within the entire Basin;
       (5) the significant population growth over the past decade 
     in Yavapai County in the Verde River Basin has been 
     accompanied by an increase in water use in the County;
       (6) the proposed development of the parcels of Federal land 
     to be acquired under title I would further increase demands 
     on limited water supplies;
       (7) the Department of the Interior report entitled ``Water 
     2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the West'' identified 
     portions of the Verde River Basin as areas in which existing 
     water supplies are not adequate to meet increasing water 
     demands;
       (8) significant declines in groundwater levels in portions 
     of the Verde Valley have caused water supply problems, 
     including water quality degradation;
       (9) it is essential to the interests of the Federal 
     Government, the State of Arizona, and local communities in 
     the State to determine the long-term availability of water 
     supplies in the Verde Valley before the transfer and private 
     development of Federal land in the area; and
       (10) the Upper San Pedro Partnership in the Sierra Vista 
     subwatershed in the State serves as a model of collaborative, 
     science-

[[Page S8789]]

     based water resource planning and management.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to authorize 
     assistance for a collaborative and science-based water 
     resource planning and management partnership for the Verde 
     River Basin in the State of Arizona, consisting of members 
     that represent--
       (1) Federal, State, and local agencies; and
       (2) economic, environmental, and community water interests 
     in the Verde River Basin.

     SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

        In this title:
       (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     the Arizona Department of Water Resources.
       (2) Partnership.--The term ``Partnership'' means the Verde 
     River Basin Partnership.
       (3) Plan.--The term ``plan'' means the plan for the Verde 
     River Basin required by section 204(a)(1).
       (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Agriculture.
       (5) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of Arizona.
       (6) Verde river basin.--The term ``Verde River Basin'' 
     means the land area designated by the Arizona Department of 
     Water Resources as encompassing surface water and groundwater 
     resources, including drainage and recharge areas with a 
     hydrologic connection to the Verde River.
       (7) Water budget.--The term ``water budget'' means the 
     accounting of--
       (A) the quantities of water leaving the Verde River Basin--
       (i) as discharge to the Verde River and tributaries;
       (ii) as subsurface outflow;
       (iii) as evapotranspiration by riparian vegetation;
       (iv) as surface evaporation; and
       (v) for human consumption; and
       (B) the quantities of water replenishing the Verde River 
     Basin by precipitation, infiltration, and subsurface inflows.

     SEC. 203. VERDE RIVER BASIN PARTNERSHIP.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary may assist the Director and 
     the Yavapai Water Advisory Council by participating in the 
     establishment of a Verde River Basin Partnership to provide 
     science-based and collaborative water resource planning and 
     management activities relating to the Verde River Basin.
       (b) Membership.--It is the intent of Congress that the 
     Partnership be composed of Federal, State, and local members 
     with responsibilities, expertise, and interests pertaining to 
     water resource planning and management.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--On establishment of 
     the Partnership, there are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior such sums as 
     are necessary to carry out the activities of the Partnership 
     for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009.

     SEC. 204. VERDE RIVER BASIN STUDIES.

       (a) Studies.--
       (1) In general.--The Partnership shall prepare a plan for 
     the conduct of water resource studies in the Verde River 
     Basin that identifies--
       (A) the primary study objectives to fulfill water resource 
     planning and management needs for the Verde River Basin; and
       (B) the water resource studies, hydrologic models, surface 
     and groundwater monitoring networks, and other analytical 
     tools helpful in the identification of long-term water supply 
     management options within the Verde River Basin.
       (2) Requirements.--At a minimum, the plan shall--
       (A) include a list of specific studies and analyses that 
     are needed to support Partnership planning and management 
     decisions;
       (B) identify any ongoing or completed water resource or 
     riparian studies that are relevant to water resource planning 
     and management for the Verde River Basin;
       (C) describe the estimated cost and duration of the 
     proposed studies and analyses; and
       (D) designate as a study priority the compilation of a 
     water budget analysis for the Verde Valley, including the 
     Camp Verde parcel described in section 103(a)(2)(D).
       (b) Verde Valley Water Budget Analysis.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 14 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the U.S. Geological 
     Survey, in cooperation with the Director, shall prepare and 
     submit to the Partnership a report that provides a water 
     budget analysis of the portion of the Verde River Basin 
     within the Verde Valley.
       (2) Components.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       (A) a summary of the information available on the 
     hydrologic flow regime for the portion of the Middle Verde 
     River from the Clarkdale streamgauging station to the city of 
     Camp Verde at United States Geological Survey Stream Gauge 
     09506000;
       (B) with respect to the portion of the Middle Verde River 
     described in subparagraph (A), estimates of--
       (i) the inflow and outflow of surface water and 
     groundwater;
       (ii) annual consumptive water use; and
       (iii) changes in groundwater storage; and
       (C) an analysis of the potential long-term consequences of 
     various water use scenarios on groundwater levels and Verde 
     River flows.
       (c) Preliminary Report and Recommendations.--.
       (1) In general.--Not later than 16 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, using the information provided in the 
     report submitted under subsection (b) and any other relevant 
     information, the Partnership shall submit to the Secretary, 
     the Governor of Arizona, and representatives of the Verde 
     Valley communities, a preliminary report that sets forth the 
     findings and recommendations of the Partnership regarding the 
     long-term available water supply within the Verde Valley 
     (including the Camp Verde parcel described in section 
     103(a)(2)(D)), taking into account the long-term consequences 
     analyzed under subsection (b)(2)(C).
       (2) Inclusions.--To the maximum extent practicable, the 
     recommendations submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, 
     with respect to the Camp Verde parcel described in section 
     103(a)(2)(D)--
       (A) proposed development scenarios on the parcel that are 
     compatible with long-term available water supply estimates; 
     and
       (B) designation of any portions of the parcel that should 
     be retained as open space or otherwise managed for aquifer 
     recharge or baseflow maintenance.

     SEC. 205. VERDE RIVER BASIN PARTNERSHIP FINAL REPORT.

        Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Partnership shall submit to the Secretary and the 
     Governor of Arizona a final report that--
       (1) includes a summary of the results of any water resource 
     assessments conducted under this title in the Verde River 
     Basin;
       (2) identifies any areas in the Verde River Basin that are 
     determined to have groundwater deficits or other current or 
     potential water supply problems;
       (3) identifies long-term water supply management options 
     for communities and water resources within the Verde River 
     Basin; and
       (4) identifies water resource analyses and monitoring 
     needed to support the implementation of management options.

     SEC. 206. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

       The Secretary (acting through the Chief of the Forest 
     Service) and the Secretary of the Interior, shall enter into 
     a memorandum of understanding authorizing the United States 
     Geological Survey to access Forest Service land (including 
     stream gauges, weather stations, wells, or other points of 
     data collection on the Forest Service land) to carry out this 
     title.

     SEC. 207. EFFECT.

       Nothing in this title diminishes or expands State or local 
     jurisdiction, responsibilities, or rights with respect to 
     water resource management or control.

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