[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 103 (Thursday, July 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8657-S8660]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           AVIATION SECURITY

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the 9/11 Commission released its report 
today on the events leading up to 9/11, and the security failures that 
precipitated this tragedy. The Senate Commerce Committee has spent a 
great deal of its time and attention on aviation security over the 
years. I have served in the U.S. Senate for more than 38 years. This 
institution can be slow to make decisions, but when needed, this body 
can move quickly and effectively. After 9/11, we acted immediately

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to create the Transportation Security Administration in an effort to 
force real change in our aviation security regime. Fast action to 
bolster our Nation's aviation security was critical to restore the 
trust of travelers in an air transportation system that was on the 
verge of collapse.
  Congress has often acted decisively during the deliberation of 
aviation security issues. For example, following the work of a prior 
presidential commission, a bipartisan group, led on the Senate side by 
Senator Lautenberg and former Senator D'Amato, investigated the 1998 
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and made 
numerous recommendations. We took up and passed many of them as part of 
the Aviation Security and Improvement Act, P.L. 101-604. I also was in 
the Senate as a wave of hijacking to Cuba in the late 1960s and early 
1970s led to the wide use of metal detectors at commercial airports.
  Unfortunatley, the current threat to security is a more sophisticated 
one, and one that has forced our government to change the way we deal 
with security in general. Prior to 9/11, we had a poorly paid screener 
workforce, with a high turnover rate. Post 9/11, we have a better 
trained, better paid workforce with a relatively low turnover rate. 
Some, however, want to turn back the clock. We cannot let that happen.
  Even prior to 9/11, there are indicators that FAA was concerned with 
a number of events around the world regarding hijackings. Following Pan 
Am 103, we pushed to put bomb detection equipment in airports, but 
until TWA 800 blew up over Long Island in July of 1996, there was no 
real effort to fund aviation security.
  Today TSA is spending $5.3 billion annually on all transportation 
security, and it is not enough. We have underfunded capital 
construction at airports, causing a delay in the installation of 
Explosive Detection Systems. We have a cap on the number of security 
screeners that can be hired, causing huge lines at many of our airports 
because we will not provide the money needed to do the job right. But 
aviation, comparatively, is in far better shape than maritime and 
rail--areas that are woefully underfunded. I have made this point to 
the new head of TSA, Admiral Stone, but it is OMB and the 
administration that are stonewalling the security funding. Simple as 
that.
  With all we know about the threats, one would think that we would be 
able to fully fund our security needs, but OMB continues to play the 
types of games it plays with all agencies. Look at our Homeland 
Security Appropriations bill--no direction on how funds need to be 
allocated or which areas need greater attention. We have given the 
administration a blank check to spend the money on programs it believes 
will protect us, but it is not enough. If we keep refusing to take the 
proper actions to improve our transportation security, I am afraid that 
we will find ourselves once again responding to a national tragedy that 
could have been stopped with the proper actions and preparation.
  I ask unanimous consent to print a New York Times editorial on 
aviation security in the Record, as well as a memorandum detailing 
hijackings from 1983 to 1991.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, July 11, 2004]

                    A Dangerous Retreat on Security

       Bashing federal bureaucracies is a favorite sport among 
     Republicans on Capitol Hill, but their fun should not come at 
     the expense of national security. That is what is likely to 
     happen if airport security checkpoints are once again turned 
     over to profit-driven private contractors. Under a little 
     noticed provision of the post-9/11 aviation security law that 
     would undoubtedly shock most travelers, airports may soon 
     have that option.
       Air travelers find it reassuring that federal employees now 
     guard the front lines in the war on terror, which makes it 
     all the more surreal that a Sept. 10 mind-set could still 
     persist on Capitol Hill. The Bush administration and House 
     Republican leaders initially opposed the creation of the 
     federal Transportation Security Administration after the 2001 
     terrorist attacks, arguing that private contractors should 
     continue screening passengers. They gave in to the public 
     demand for a federal takeover, but they made sure to plant 
     the seeds of the effort's rollback. They set an arbitrary cap 
     on the number of federal screeners and set up a pilot program 
     of five airports that would continue being served by private 
     companies, though their screeners have to meet the agency's 
     standards and are paid the same.
       Republican leaders are loath to see the federal government 
     grow on their watch, and security industry lobbyists are 
     eager to get a larger slice of the billions being spent to 
     protect air travelers. So both want to see the pilot program 
     expanded. Under the 2001 law, individual airports will be 
     able to apply to opt out of the federal system later this 
     year, and rely on private contractors overseen by the T.S.A.
       None of this makes any sense. It has taken a herculean 
     effort to deploy the agency's tens of thousands of officers 
     at more than 400 airports in two years. The agency has vastly 
     improved airport security, without perfecting it, and is 
     still making progress.
       It's true that the security provided by private firms at 
     San Francisco and four lesser airports is a far cry from the 
     lax pre-9/11 standard. Studies claim it is no better or worse 
     than the security provided by the T.S.A. But that has been in 
     a period when the federal agency was just getting up to 
     speed, and when companies knew they were essentially on 
     probation.
       To privatize security at a time of growing complacency 
     would be a dangerous step back. Air travelers do not want to 
     see airports compromise security for the sake of convenience, 
     or federal standards for the sake of profit margins.
                                  ____


 Special Analysis--Civil Aviation Incidents in the United States, 1983-
                                  1992

       This report is an ACI-200 analysis of 36 incidents 
     involving the hijacking or commandeering of aircraft, which 
     occurred in the United States and Puerto Rico between January 
     1, 1983 and October 1, 1992. The most recent of these 
     incidents took place in February 1991. Twenty-nine of the 
     incidents were hijackings, six were commandeerings, and one 
     was a potential hijacking that was prevented at a security 
     checkpoint. The purpose of this review is to determine what 
     elements, if any, were common to these events. Incidents 
     involving general aviation aircraft are not included in this 
     report.


                    Hijacker Weapons and Explosives

       Persons who hijacked aircraft used a variety of methods, 
     including the use and/or claim of real or fake weapons, 
     explosive devices, or incendiary devices. In some instances, 
     more that one method was used in a single incident.
       Real weapons were used during five hijackings. Small knives 
     (blade length of four inches or less), the most frequently 
     employed weapon to hijack aircraft, were used in three 
     incidents. One of these involved three persons using two 
     knives. A handgun, a small pistol of unknown caliber, was 
     used in only one hijacking. This incident involved an 
     escorted prisoner who disarmed his three guards after he 
     obtained a weapon apparently cached in the aircraft's 
     lavatory by persons and means unknown. A plastic flare gun 
     was used in another hijacking.
       Flammable liquids (or liquids claimed to be flammable) were 
     used in seven hijacking incidents. Hijackers threatened to 
     ignite liquids in bottles or aerosol hair spray-type cans 
     with cigarette lighters, candles, or matches. Fake explosive 
     devices were displayed in ten incidents and explosive devices 
     were claimed in eight others. Fake weapons, including a 
     starter pistol and a realistic looking toy pistol, were used 
     in three hijackings and weapons were claimed in two others. 
     One hijacker neither used nor claimed a weapon or explosive 
     device. None of the hijacking incidents involved the use of 
     an actual explosive device.
       Except for the escorted prisoner who had been searched, all 
     of the individuals who used real weapons to effect a 
     hijacking went through preboard screening procedures at 
     airport security checkpoints. Weapons were usually hidden in 
     carry-on luggage or on the hijacker. The hijacker who used a 
     starter pistol to effect his act passed it through screening 
     in carryon luggage. He also had a pair of scissors and two 
     knives in his carry-on, but these were well within acceptable 
     standards of the time and were not used in the hijacking. 
     Although it does not appear that there were any especially 
     intricate attempts at concealment, a cassette radio was 
     reportedly used to hide a knife in one incident.
       A potential hijacking was prevented when two individuals 
     were arrested before the aircraft became airborne. Three 
     individuals who had aroused suspicion prior to boarding their 
     flight were searched at the security checkpoint. One person 
     passed through the checkpoint and went on into the aircraft; 
     however, one of his accomplices was found to have a plastic 
     flask of gasoline strapped to his leg. The first individual 
     was again searched and was found to have a toy pistol as well 
     as a flask of gasoline. Their accomplice was not caught.


                             Commandeerings

       Real weapons--two knives, two handguns, and a fire ax--were 
     used in five commandeering incidents, and a fake explosive 
     device was used in a sixth. Although access was gained to 
     aircraft in five incidents, a ticketed passenger was involved 
     in only one. None of the aircraft that were commandeered 
     became airborne, and the situations were resolved through 
     negotiations and/or arrests.
       Two commandeering incidents involved persons who went 
     through preboard screening. In one incident, an individual 
     had a fishing knife in his carry-on luggage. Although

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     he had no ticket, he realized from observing the screening 
     procedure that he did not need one co enter the sterile area. 
     Once through the security checkpoint, he ran past a gate 
     attendant during boarding and on to a jetway where he used 
     his knife to force his way into the aircraft. The second 
     incident involved a ticketed passenger who, upon boarding his 
     flight, displayed a device consisting of wires and an 
     electrical switch.
       Persons who circumvented security checkpoints were involved 
     in three commandeering incidents. Security procedures were 
     observed by the suspects in two of these. One individual, who 
     after watching screening procedures realized she would not be 
     able to pass her handgun through the checkpoint, determined 
     that she could walk quickly past security personnel via the 
     passenger exit ramp; the other individual waited until 
     deplaning passengers caused an automatic door to open. Both 
     of these persons brandished handguns (.22 and .25 caliber) 
     when challenged, and each was able to access an aircraft. In 
     a third incident, an individual grabbed a knife at a food 
     concession area. He ran past a security checkpoint to the 
     door of the aircraft, which was closed, and was thus 
     prevented from gaining access to the plane.
       One commandeering incident also involved a passenger who 
     had been deplaned and was already in the sterile area. He 
     broke through an alarmed door and gained access to the Air 
     Operations Area. He then entered an aircraft being serviced 
     and held several crew members hostage with a fire ax he found 
     on board.


                            Mental Disorders

       Nine of the 36 incidents (25%) were committed by persons 
     who were diagnosed as either being mentally incompetent to 
     stand trial or suffering from various mental disorders. For 
     example, charges were dismissed against the ticketed 
     passenger who displayed a fake explosive device upon boarding 
     the aircraft because he was determined to be suffering from a 
     mental disorder. In another situation, the individual who 
     held hostages aboard an aircraft with a fire ax was suffering 
     from a mental disorder; he committed his act because he 
     believed ``Mafia hit men'' were about to kill him.
       Real weapons were used in three incidents by persons 
     suffering a mental disorder; two had handguns, and one person 
     obtained a fire ax on board in aircraft. Security measures 
     were circumvented on two occasions. One hijacker suffering a 
     mental disorder used a fake weapon, a starter pistol, but 
     also bad a pair of scissors and two knives in his carry-on 
     luggage.
       Five of the nine incidents that involved persons suffering 
     mental disorders were hijackings, and four were 
     commandeerings. Claims of explosives or weapons occurred in 
     three incidents. Fake explosive devices were displayed in two 
     incidents; in one of these, the hijacker displayed a fake 
     device but had a two liter soda bottle filled with gasoline, 
     which he apparently had intended to use, in baggage he was 
     made to check.
       Specific destinations were given in five of the situations 
     involving persons with mental disorders. In one commandeering 
     incident, the individual wanted to take control of the 
     aircraft and immediately crash it in order to commit suicide.


                           Hijackings to Cuba

       Cuba was the destination of choice in 22 of the 29 
     hijackings since January 1983. Fourteen of the first 16 
     flights hijacked to Cuba, between May 1, 1983, and December 
     31, 1984, actually landed in Havana. No flights have 
     successfully been hijacked to Cuba since.
       Of the 14 hijackings that ended in Cuba, real weapons were 
     used in three. A flare gun was used in one incident, a 
     handgun was used by the escorted prisoner in another, and a 
     knife and aerosol spray can was used in the third incident. 
     Fake explosive devices were displayed in six incidents; two 
     of these were used in combination with a claim of a flammable 
     liquid and/or a fake weapon. Two hijackers also claimed to 
     possess an explosive device. Incendiary devices were claimed 
     in six incidents, sometimes in connection with the use of 
     other devices or claims. In one such incident, the hijacker 
     poured a liquid that smelled like gasoline or kerosene on 
     himself and his seat and then sat holding a lit candle.
       Eight of the hijacked flights did not divert to Cuba. A 
     real weapon, a knife, were used in just one of these 
     incidents. Another incident involved the use of a fake weapon 
     (starter pistol) and a claim of explosives. Fake explosive 
     devices were exclusively claimed in one incident and used in 
     three others, once with a claim of a flammable liquid. A 
     weapon was alleged in one incident, and one incident occurred 
     in which neither a device nor a weapon was used or claimed.
       Many of the hijackers who sought to go to Cuba had arrived 
     in the United States during the Mariel Boatlift in the early 
     1980s and wanted to return. Their motivations included 
     homesickness, financial problems, discouragement, and a 
     desire to see family or sick relatives. These individuals 
     usually spoke and understood only Spanish. Several hijackers, 
     however, were non-Cubans who committed their acts for 
     political reasons, that is, to escape the United States and/
     or find support for the ``revolution.'' Some of the hijackers 
     who wanted to go to Cuba, furthermore, suffered from mental 
     disorders.
       Most, if not all, of the hijackers who landed in Cuba were 
     arrested and subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
     prison. This fact was widely publicized in the United States 
     and may have been a factor in a sharp drop in the number of 
     subsequent hijackings to Cuba (17 between May 1983 and 
     January 1985, and one each year from 1987 through 1991).


                            Other Hijackings

       Of the seven hijackings in which Cuba was not given as a 
     destination, two aircraft landed where the hijacker demanded 
     and the others continued on course. The hijackers used fake 
     explosive devices in two incidents, claimed explosives in 
     three, and claimed weapons in two. Real weapons were not used 
     in these incidents.


                           Multiple Hijackers

       Only three of the 36 incidents involved more than one 
     person. Two of these were hijackings, neither of which was 
     especially sophisticated, and the third was a 
     potential hijacking that was prevented at the security 
     checkpoint. None of the commandeering incidents involved 
     more than one person.
       In one incident, a hijacker produced a bottle of liquid 
     that smelled like gasoline and locked himself in the rear 
     lavatory, while an accomplice went to the forward galley 
     holding a device that was later determined to be fake. The 
     two hijackers were seated one row apart. The second incident 
     occurred when a passenger in the aft galley grabbed a flight 
     attendant and held a knife to her throat. At the same time, 
     two accomplices arose from their seats; one held a knife and 
     the other a can of aerosol spray and a cigarette lighter. The 
     potential hijacking involved the two individuals detected 
     with flasks of gasoline tied to their legs. One person had 
     passed through the security checkpoint and was on board the 
     aircraft when his accomplice was stopped at the checkpoint. 
     The first individual was again searched and was found to have 
     a toy pistol in addition to the flask of gasoline. Both 
     individuals stated that a third person who was with them, and 
     who was not caught, paid them to transport the devices.
       One other incident occurred in which a hijacker was 
     supposed to have accomplices. He and three others had planned 
     to commit the hijacking, but, unknown to him, the others did 
     not board the flight after one had been detected with a knife 
     at the security checkpoint. It was only after the hijacker 
     rose from his seat and announced his demand to go to Cuba 
     that he realized he was alone.


                              Other Facts

       Only two of the individuals involved in the 36 incidents 
     were females. One woman successfully hijacked a flight to 
     Cuba using a plastic flare gun, and the other ran past a 
     security checkpoint with a handgun, gained access to an 
     aircraft, and held several hostages before being arrested. 
     This second individual was determined to be suffering from a 
     mental disorder.
       Many of the individuals involved in the hijackings had 
     purchased flight tickets paid for in cash. More often than 
     not, these were same-day purchases of one-way, economy class 
     tickets. A few of the hijackers remained in their assigned 
     seats throughout the incident. More than half of the 
     hijackings were initiated by the hijacker either notifying a 
     flight attendant orally or in writing, or by physically 
     accosting a crew member. Several hijackers simply stood up 
     and announced their act, and a few locked themselves in a 
     lavatory. A few also created disturbances, such as pouring 
     liquid on themselves or their surroundings and threatening to 
     ignite it. There is evidence of preplanning in all but one of 
     the incidents. Finally, there are no indications that any 
     hijackers were familiar with the operation of an aircraft.


                                analysis

       During the past nine years, several elements common, to the 
     36 hijackings and commandeering incidents in the U.S. are 
     evident: Generally only one person was involved in each 
     incident; one-fourth of all suspects were suffering from some 
     form of mental disorder; international terrorists were not 
     involved in any of the incidents; most incidents were 
     preplanned acts rather than spur of the moment decisions; 
     actual explosive devices were not used; hijackers frequently 
     claimed to possess explosive or incendiary devices; actual 
     weapons were used more frequently during commandeering 
     incidents than in hijacking situations; many of the 
     perpetrators simply wanted to go somewhere for a variety of 
     economic, social, or family reasons, and either could not 
     afford a ticket or had no other means of transport; and there 
     were no deaths to passengers or aircraft crew members.
       Many of the incidents occurred either within the sterile 
     area or on board aircraft. Although security procedures at 
     screening checkpoints do not appear to have been at fault in 
     the majority of these cases, some security failures did 
     occur. Actual weapons were taken through screening 
     checkpoints in six incidents. Small knives were used in three 
     hijackings, a plastic flare gun in one incident, and a 
     handgun in another. A small fishing knife was used in a 
     commandeering incident. Fake weapons, a realistic looking toy 
     pistol and a starter pistol, were used in three hijackings.
       Several hijackings were committed with common, innocuous-
     looking items. More than one-third of these incidents were 
     committed by persons carrying hoax explosive devices, for 
     example, a pump toothpaste container attached to a 
     flashlight, a large chalice-like cup, and a cellular 
     telephone. Threats were also made to ignite gasses in aerosol 
     cans or flammable liquids (as claimed) in bottles and flasks 
     in some incidents.
       There were, however, some security successes. One hijacking 
     was prevented at a security checkpoint and another did not 
     take

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     place as planned. The first incident involved the two 
     individuals each of whom had a flask of flammable liquid tied 
     to his leg. In the second incident, the discovery of a knife 
     at a checkpoint resulted in the boarding of only one of four 
     persons who planned to hijack the aircraft to Cuba.
       At the same time that these types of incidents were taking 
     place in the United States, a different kind of aircraft 
     hijacking was occurring in other parts of the world. These 
     incidents, some of which involved U.S. registered carriers, 
     were noteworthy because of their complexity, duration, and 
     deadliness. They include the hijackings of Trans World 
     Airways Flight 847 and Kuwaiti Air Flight 422, which involved 
     multiple and often zealous, well-armed, well-trained, and 
     disciplined hijackers. Unlike their contemporary U.S. 
     counterparts, these individuals often demonstrated a 
     willingness to die rather than fail and to kill others if 
     their demands, which were frequently politically-motivated, 
     were not met. In many instances, passengers were killed as a 
     result of the actions of such hijackers.
       Why such incidents did not occur in the United States 
     during the past nine years is a matter of conjecture. Many 
     theories have been advanced, including logistical and 
     operational problems for international terrorists, non-
     interest by U.S. domestic terrorist groups, and difficulties 
     (or perceived difficulties) in accessing targets. It should 
     not be presupposed from this, however, that such hijackings 
     will never occur in the U.S. Politically motivated hijackings 
     by multiple hijackers have, in fact, taken place in the U.S., 
     but not within the past 9 years.
       During the past nine years, hijackers in the United States 
     have acted in striking contrast to some of their more 
     noteworthy international counterparts. They usually have not 
     been motivated by the same political forces, such as the 
     freeing of political prisoners or providing publicity for a 
     cause, and they have not exhibited the lame propensity to die 
     and kill others rather than fail.
       The fact that handguns were seldom used and actual 
     explosive devices never used in domestic hijackings during 
     the past nine years is interesting, but it should not be 
     assumed that future hijackers will act similarly. It is not 
     known why this occurred; it may be a reflection of either 
     better screening procedures or a perception that it is too 
     difficult to pass a gun on board an aircraft. Since several 
     small knives and other items, such as a pair of scissors and 
     a starter pistol, were successfully passed through screening 
     checkpoints in a carry-on bag, however, the system is not 
     infallible.
       Although most U.S. hijackings during the past nine years 
     were committed by persons acting alone, it should not be 
     assumed that future incidents will follow this format. If 
     there are accomplices, however, they will likely identify 
     themselves in the beginning of the incident rather than 
     remain hidden. Based on past experiences, the hijacker(s) may 
     possess ore or more weapons or a flammable liquid, a fact 
     which they likely will make known, or they may claim to 
     possess an explosive device.
       Hijackings should be taken seriously unless it is obvious 
     that there is no threat or danger. It is often difficult to 
     determine if a claimed weapon, explosive device, or 
     incendiary device is real. The hijacker(s) should be given 
     the benefit of the doubt until circumstances prove otherwise.

                          ____________________