[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 103 (Thursday, July 22, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8622-S8624]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT AND THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED 
                                 STATES

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to discuss 
briefly the 9/11 Commission report and to comment on the status of 
intelligence in the United States.
  In a context where we have been put on notice by the Director of the 
FBI

[[Page S8623]]

and the Secretary of Homeland Security that we may expect an attack by 
al-Qaida on U.S. soil some time between now and the election, it is of 
utmost importance we move ahead to put under a single umbrella all of 
the intelligence agencies in the United States.
  The 9/11 Commission report is one further statement that there is a 
need to put all the intelligence agencies under one umbrella. When we 
debated the Homeland Security bill back in 2002, I made the submission 
on the floor of the Senate repeatedly--on September 3, September 10, 
September 30, November 14, and November 19--that I thought it 
imperative the new Secretary of Homeland Security should have the 
authority to direct--not just to ask but to direct--all of the 
intelligence agencies, to have some effective structure to put all of 
the intelligence agencies under one umbrella.
  I submitted that contention based upon my view that had all of the 
information been at hand, the attack on 9/11 might well have been 
prevented. Had the FBI Phoenix report gotten to the right people in 
headquarters, had the information on Zacarias Moussaoui been properly 
handled with an appropriate standard for probable cause, had the 
terrorists in Kuala Lumpur been kept out of the United States--known by 
the CIA, but let in by Immigration and Naturalization--had those facts 
and others been pulled together, 9/11 might well have been prevented.
  When I chaired the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, it 
was apparent to me at that time all of the intelligence agencies should 
be under one umbrella. I made that suggestion in legislation at that 
time. The Scowcroft report has made the same conclusion. We recently 
had a report by the Senate Intelligence Committee which pointed out 
many deficiencies in the CIA. Today we have had the report by the 9/11 
Commission, all of which leads to one conclusion, which is hard to 
dispute; and that is, all the intelligence agencies ought to be under 
one umbrella.
  At a news conference earlier today, Senator McCain, Senator 
Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I announced our intention to take the 9/11 
Commission report and put it into legislative language, to introduce it 
when we return after the August break. In so doing, we are not 
subscribing to all of the provisions of the 9/11 Commission 
conclusions. But we agree there ought to be a focus of attention, and 
there ought to be debate, and there ought to be action at an early 
date.
  It was suggested during the course of that news conference that when 
we come back in a post-election session, which I think is a virtual 
certainty, we take up the issue of reorganizing the intelligence 
structure in the United States. If we do not come back in a post-
election session as lameducks to finish much of the unfinished 
business, or to finish all of the unfinished business, then the 
suggestion was made there ought to be a special session. I repeat that 
in cosponsoring legislation to encompass the 9/11 Commission report, it 
is not in total agreement with all of the provisions. I have 
reservations as to whether it is appropriate to designate a Director as 
opposed to a Secretary with Cabinet rank to take on the onerous job of 
struggling with the culture of concealment of the FBI and the culture 
of concealment of the CIA and the resistance of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. We will have an opportunity to consider that in a 
legislative package.
  When the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction filed its report 
in 1999--a commission which I cochaired, a commission which came out of 
the recommendations of the Senate Intelligence Committee in the 104th 
Congress when I chaired the Intelligence Committee--the structure was 
to give the Vice President of the United States the responsibility to 
coordinate all of the activities of weapons of mass destruction because 
it was so important and because if you wanted to deal with the 
Secretaries of the various Departments, it would require somebody of 
the stature of the Vice President to do that.

  It may be that we will revisit the concept of having the Vice 
President undertake that kind of a responsibility because we are 
dealing with very strong, powerful forces, which have already started 
resistance--from the Department of Defense not wanting to give up power 
or fiscal control; resistance by the CIA, with the Acting Director 
speaking out very forcefully in opposition to the 9/11 Commission's 
prospective conclusions, even before the report was filed, and in 
defending what the CIA had done. There is much which has to be examined 
as to where the FBI stands.
  When we examined the letter from Special Agent Coleen Rowley--13 
pages, single spaced--at a Judiciary Committee oversight hearing in 
June of 2002, we found out the FBI did not even have the right standard 
for probable cause for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.
  When we have seen what the CIA has done in the very strong criticism 
levied a few weeks ago by the Senate Intelligence Committee, we see 
there is much, much which has to be done. There have to be improvements 
in the FBI. There have to be improvements in the CIA. And all of this 
now comes into sharp focus with the events culminating in today's 
filing of the 9/11 Commission report--again, especially at a time when 
we are under siege and under threat of an al-Qaida attack between now 
and the election.
  Recent disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee have 
documented the failures of the CIA to accurately inform the country, 
including the President and Congress, concerning the facts or judgments 
on whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. As a result, 
some are now questioning whether the United States made the right 
judgment on going to war with Iraq.
  The action on going to war with Iraq, I submit, cannot appropriately 
be judged by 20/20 hindsight. Based on the facts at hand, when the 
Senate voted, the judgment to approve the use of force cannot 
rightfully be faulted. The vote of 77 to 23 encompassed a majority of 
Democrats, including Senator John Kerry and Senator John Edwards.
  The decision to use preemptive force was based on the standard of 
international law which warrants anticipatory self-defense when the 
threat of attack is imminent so that the defense of preemption is 
warranted.
  This standard was enunciated in 1842 by Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster in dealing with the so-called Caroline incident.
  In the floor debate on the force resolution on October 10, 2002, I 
quoted Hugo Crotius, considered the father of international law, who 
said in his 1925 book ``The Law of War and Peace'' that a nation may 
use self-defense in anticipation of attack when there is a ``present 
danger.'' He said, ``it is lawful to kill him who is preparing to 
kill.''
  In that floor statement, I also quoted another eminent authority on 
international law, Elihu Root, who said in 1914 that international law 
did not require a nation to wait to use force in self-defense until it 
is too late to protect itself.
  It is important to revisit the Iraq war vote not to second-guess 
ourselves but to learn from that experience as we view escalating 
problems around the world which may pose an imminent threat to this 
country. It is important that our intelligence agencies present the 
full picture to decisionmakers, in particular the President, Secretary 
of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Congress, so the subtleties may 
be considered in making complicated judgments. Had the decisionmakers 
been presented with more objective comprehensive information concerning 
Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction, it is doubtful that the 
``imminence'' test under international law would have been met.
  It is important, in reviewing the incidents, that we not engage in 
self-flagellation. The comments coming out of Great Britain are 
informative and instructive. The New York Times reported on July 14 
that:

       A major British report released Wednesday found extensive 
     failures both in intelligence gathering on illicit weapons 
     and the government's use of that intelligence to justify the 
     Iraq war. But it cleared Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
     accusations that he or his government distorted the evidence 
     to build a case for war.

  The Times further reported:

       Like an earlier inquiry led by Lord Hutton, the report 
     exonerated the government of the charge that it deliberately 
     exaggerated the threat posed by Mr. Hussein in an effort to 
     deceive the public and Parliament. ``No single individual is 
     to blame,'' Lord Butler said. ``This was a collective 
     operation.''


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  I suggest very close similarities between British intelligence and 
U.S. intelligence and the reliance of the executive branch and the 
reliance of Congress in our vote to use force and in the action of the 
British, that the self-criticism ought not to be levied in the context 
of the findings by the British report that clears Prime Minister Blair 
of accusations that he or his Government distorted the evidence to 
build the war and the finding by Lord Hutton that no single individual 
is to blame but, rather, it was a collective operation.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

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