[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 103 (Thursday, July 22, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H6615-H6650]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     UNITED STATES-MOROCCO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 738, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 4842) to implement the United States-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of H.R. 4842 is as follows:

                               H.R. 4842

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United 
     States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Purposes.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF, AND GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO, THE AGREEMENT

Sec. 101. Approval and entry into force of the Agreement.
Sec. 102. Relationship of the Agreement to United States and State law.
Sec. 103. Implementing actions in anticipation of entry into force and 
              initial regulations.
Sec. 104. Consultation and layover provisions for, and effective date 
              of, proclaimed actions.
Sec. 105. Administration of dispute settlement proceedings.
Sec. 106. Arbitration of claims.
Sec. 107. Effective dates; effect of termination.

                      TITLE II--CUSTOMS PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Tariff modifications.
Sec. 202. Additional duties on certain agricultural goods.
Sec. 203. Rules of origin.
Sec. 204. Enforcement relating to trade in textile and apparel goods.
Sec. 205. Regulations.

                     TITLE III--RELIEF FROM IMPORTS

Sec. 301. Definitions.

     Subtitle A--Relief From Imports Benefiting From the Agreement

Sec. 311. Commencing of action for relief.
Sec. 312. Commission action on petition.
Sec. 313. Provision of relief.
Sec. 314. Termination of relief authority.
Sec. 315. Compensation authority.
Sec. 316. Confidential business information.

           Subtitle B--Textile and Apparel Safeguard Measures

Sec. 321. Commencement of action for relief.
Sec. 322. Determination and provision of relief.
Sec. 323. Period of relief.
Sec. 324. Articles exempt from relief.
Sec. 325. Rate after termination of import relief.
Sec. 326. Termination of relief authority.
Sec. 327. Compensation authority.
Sec. 328. Business confidential information.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are--
       (1) to approve and implement the Free Trade Agreement 
     between the United States and Morocco entered into under the 
     authority of section 2103(b) of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (19 U.S.C. 3803(b));
       (2) to strengthen and develop economic relations between 
     the United States and Morocco for their mutual benefit;
       (3) to establish free trade between the 2 nations through 
     the reduction and elimination of barriers to trade in goods 
     and services and to investment; and
       (4) to lay the foundation for further cooperation to expand 
     and enhance the benefits of such Agreement.

[[Page H6616]]

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreement.--The term ``Agreement'' means the United 
     States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement approved by Congress 
     under section 101(a)(1).
       (2) HTS.--The term ``HTS'' means the Harmonized Tariff 
     Schedule of the United States.
       (3) Textile or apparel good.--The term ``textile or apparel 
     good'' means a good listed in the Annex to the Agreement on 
     Textiles and Clothing referred to in section 101(d)(4) of the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(4)).

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF, AND GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO, THE AGREEMENT

     SEC. 101. APPROVAL AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

       (a) Approval of Agreement and Statement of Administrative 
     Action.--Pursuant to section 2105 of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (19 U.S.C. 3805) and section 
     151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2191), Congress 
     approves--
       (1) the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement entered 
     into on June 15, 2004, with Morocco and submitted to Congress 
     on July 15, 2004; and
       (2) the statement of administrative action proposed to 
     implement the Agreement that was submitted to Congress on 
     July 15, 2004.
       (b) Conditions for Entry Into Force of the Agreement.--At 
     such time as the President determines that Morocco has taken 
     measures necessary to bring it into compliance with those 
     provisions of the Agreement that are to take effect on the 
     date on which the Agreement enters into force, the President 
     is authorized to exchange notes with the Government of 
     Morocco providing for the entry into force, on or after 
     January 1, 2005, of the Agreement with respect to the United 
     States.

     SEC. 102. RELATIONSHIP OF THE AGREEMENT TO UNITED STATES AND 
                   STATE LAW.

       (a) Relationship of Agreement to United States Law.--
       (1) United states law to prevail in conflict.--No provision 
     of the Agreement, nor the application of any such provision 
     to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any 
     law of the United States shall have effect.
       (2) Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed--
       (A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, or
       (B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the 
     United States,
     unless specifically provided for in this Act.
       (b) Relationship of Agreement to State Law.--
       (1) Legal challenge.--No State law, or the application 
     thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or 
     circumstance on the ground that the provision or application 
     is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action 
     brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring 
     such law or application invalid.
       (2) Definition of state law.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, the term ``State law'' includes--
       (A) any law of a political subdivision of a State; and
       (B) any State law regulating or taxing the business of 
     insurance.
       (c) Effect of Agreement With Respect to Private Remedies.--
     No person other than the United States--
       (1) shall have any cause of action or defense under the 
     Agreement or by virtue of congressional approval thereof; or
       (2) may challenge, in any action brought under any 
     provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, 
     agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any 
     State, or any political subdivision of a State, on the ground 
     that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the 
     Agreement.

     SEC. 103. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS IN ANTICIPATION OF ENTRY INTO 
                   FORCE AND INITIAL REGULATIONS.

       (a) Implementing Actions.--
       (1) Proclamation authority.--After the date of the 
     enactment of this Act--
       (A) the President may proclaim such actions, and
       (B) other appropriate officers of the United States 
     Government may issue such regulations,
     as may be necessary to ensure that any provision of this Act, 
     or amendment made by this Act, that takes effect on the date 
     the Agreement enters into force is appropriately implemented 
     on such date, but no such proclamation or regulation may have 
     an effective date earlier than the date the Agreement enters 
     into force.
       (2) Effective date of certain proclaimed actions.--Any 
     action proclaimed by the President under the authority of 
     this Act that is not subject to the consultation and layover 
     provisions under section 104 may not take effect before the 
     15th day after the date on which the text of the proclamation 
     is published in the Federal Register.
       (3) Waiver of 15-day restriction.--The 15-day restriction 
     in paragraph (2) on the taking effect of proclaimed actions 
     is waived to the extent that the application of such 
     restriction would prevent the taking effect on the date the 
     Agreement enters into force of any action proclaimed under 
     this section.
       (b) Initial Regulations.--Initial regulations necessary or 
     appropriate to carry out the actions required by or 
     authorized under this Act or proposed in the statement of 
     administrative action submitted under section 101(a)(2) to 
     implement the Agreement shall, to the maximum extent 
     feasible, be issued within 1 year after the date on which the 
     Agreement enters into force. In the case of any implementing 
     action that takes effect on a date after the date on which 
     the Agreement enters into force, initial regulations to carry 
     out that action shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be 
     issued within 1 year after such effective date.

     SEC. 104. CONSULTATION AND LAYOVER PROVISIONS FOR, AND 
                   EFFECTIVE DATE OF, PROCLAIMED ACTIONS.

       If a provision of this Act provides that the implementation 
     of an action by the President by proclamation is subject to 
     the consultation and layover requirements of this section, 
     such action may be proclaimed only if--
       (1) the President has obtained advice regarding the 
     proposed action from--
       (A) the appropriate advisory committees established under 
     section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155); and
       (B) the United States International Trade Commission;
       (2) the President has submitted to the Committee on Finance 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
     House of Representatives a report that sets forth--
       (A) the action proposed to be proclaimed and the reasons 
     therefor; and
       (B) the advice obtained under paragraph (1);
       (3) a period of 60 calendar days, beginning on the first 
     day on which the requirements set forth in paragraphs (1) and 
     (2) have been met has expired; and
       (4) the President has consulted with such Committees 
     regarding the proposed action during the period referred to 
     in paragraph (3).

     SEC. 105. ADMINISTRATION OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS.

       (a) Establishment or Designation of Office.--The President 
     is authorized to establish or designate within the Department 
     of Commerce an office that shall be responsible for providing 
     administrative assistance to panels established under chapter 
     20 of the Agreement. The office may not be considered to be 
     an agency for purposes of section 552 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for each fiscal year after fiscal year 
     2004 to the Department of Commerce such sums as may be 
     necessary for the establishment and operations of the office 
     under subsection (a) and for the payment of the United States 
     share of the expenses of panels established under chapter 20 
     of the Agreement.

     SEC. 106. ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS.

       The United States is authorized to resolve any claim 
     against the United States covered by article 10.15.1(a)(i)(C) 
     or article 10.15.1(b)(i)(C) of the Agreement, pursuant to the 
     Investor-State Dispute Settlement procedures set forth in 
     section B of chapter 10 of the Agreement.

     SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATES; EFFECT OF TERMINATION.

       (a) Effective Dates.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this 
     Act take effect on the date the Agreement enters into force.
       (b) Exceptions.--Sections 1 through 3 and this title take 
     effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Termination of the Agreement.--On the date on which the 
     Agreement terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than 
     this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall 
     cease to be effective.

                      TITLE II--CUSTOMS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 201. TARIFF MODIFICATIONS.

       (a) Tariff Modifications Provided for in the Agreement.--
       (1) Proclamation authority.--The President may proclaim--
       (A) such modifications or continuation of any duty,
       (B) such continuation of duty-free or excise treatment, or
       (C) such additional duties,
     as the President determines to be necessary or appropriate to 
     carry out or apply articles 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 4.1, 4.3.9, 
     4.3.10, 4.3.11, 4.3.13, 4.3.14, and 4.3.15, and Annex IV of 
     the Agreement.
       (2) Effect on moroccan gsp status.--Notwithstanding section 
     502(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(1)), 
     the President shall terminate the designation of Morocco as a 
     beneficiary developing country for purposes of title V of the 
     Trade Act of 1974 on the date of entry into force of the 
     Agreement.
       (b) Other Tariff Modifications.--Subject to the 
     consultation and layover provisions of section 104, the 
     President may proclaim--
       (1) such modifications or continuation of any duty,
       (2) such modifications as the United States may agree to 
     with Morocco regarding the staging of any duty treatment set 
     forth in Annex IV of the Agreement,
       (3) such continuation of duty-free or excise treatment, or
       (4) such additional duties,
     as the President determines to be necessary or appropriate to 
     maintain the general level of reciprocal and mutually 
     advantageous concessions with respect to Morocco provided for 
     by the Agreement.
       (c) Conversion to Ad Valorem Rates.--For purposes of 
     subsections (a) and (b), with respect to any good for which 
     the base rate in the Tariff Schedule of the United States

[[Page H6617]]

     to Annex IV of the Agreement is a specific or compound rate 
     of duty, the President may substitute for the base rate an ad 
     valorem rate that the President determines to be equivalent 
     to the base rate.

     SEC. 202. ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL GOODS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agricultural safeguard good.--The term ``agricultural 
     safeguard good'' means a good--
       (A) that qualifies as an originating good under section 
     203;
       (B) that is included in the U.S. Agricultural Safeguard 
     List set forth in Annex 3-A of the Agreement; and
       (C) for which a claim for preferential treatment under the 
     Agreement has been made.
       (2) Applicable ntr (mfn) rate of duty.--The term 
     ``applicable NTR (MFN) rate of duty'' means, with respect to 
     an agricultural safeguard good, a rate of duty that is the 
     lesser of--
       (A) the column 1 general rate of duty that would have been 
     imposed under the HTS on the same agricultural safeguard good 
     entered, without a claim for preferential tariff treatment, 
     on the date on which the additional duty is imposed under 
     subsection (b); or
       (B) the column 1 general rate of duty that would have been 
     imposed under the HTS on the same agricultural safeguard good 
     entered, without a claim for preferential tariff treatment, 
     on December 31, 2004.
       (3) F.O.B.--The term ``F.O.B.'' means free on board, 
     regardless of the mode of transportation, at the point of 
     direct shipment by the seller to the buyer.
       (4) Schedule rate of duty.--The term ``schedule rate of 
     duty'' means, with respect to an agricultural safeguard good, 
     the rate of duty for that good set out in the Tariff Schedule 
     of the United States to Annex IV of the Agreement.
       (5) Trigger price.--The ``trigger price'' for a good means 
     the trigger price indicated for that good in the U.S. 
     Agricultural Safeguard List set forth in Annex 3-A of the 
     Agreement or any amendment thereto.
       (6) Unit import price.--The ``unit import price'' of a good 
     means the price of the good determined on the basis of the 
     F.O.B. import price of the good, expressed in either dollars 
     per kilogram or dollars per liter, whichever unit of measure 
     is indicated for the good in the U.S. Agricultural Safeguard 
     List set forth in Annex 3-A of the Agreement.
       (b) Additional Duties on Agricultural Safeguard Goods.--
       (1) Additional duties.--In addition to any duty proclaimed 
     under subsection (a) or (b) of section 201, and subject to 
     paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) of this subsection, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall assess a duty on an 
     agricultural safeguard good, in the amount determined under 
     paragraph (2), if the Secretary determines that the unit 
     import price of the good when it enters the United States is 
     less than the trigger price for that good.
       (2) Calculation of additional duty.--The additional duty 
     assessed under this subsection on an agricultural safeguard 
     good shall be an amount determined in accordance with the 
     following table:

If the excess of the trigger price over     The additional duty is an
 the unit import price is:.                  amount equal to:
 
Not more than 10 percent of the trigger     0.
 price.
More than 10 percent but not more than 40   30 percent of the excess of
 percent of the trigger price.               the applicable NTR (MFN)
                                             rate of duty over the
                                             schedule rate of duty.
More than 40 percent but not more than 60   50 percent of such excess.
 percent of the trigger price.
More than 60 percent but not more than 75   70 percent of such excess.
 percent of the trigger price.
More than 75 percent of the trigger price.  100 percent of such excess.
 

       (3) Exceptions.--No additional duty shall be assessed on a 
     good under this subsection if, at the time of entry, the good 
     is subject to import relief under--
       (A) subtitle A of title III of this Act; or
       (B) chapter 1 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).
       (4) Termination.--The assessment of an additional duty on a 
     good under this subsection shall cease to apply to that good 
     on the date on which duty-free treatment must be provided to 
     that good under the Tariff Schedule of the United States to 
     Annex IV of the Agreement.
       (5) Tariff-rate quotas.--If an agricultural safeguard good 
     is subject to a tariff-rate quota under the Agreement, any 
     additional duty assessed under this subsection shall be 
     applied only to over-quota imports of the good.
       (6) Notice.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which 
     the Secretary of the Treasury assesses an additional duty on 
     a good under this subsection, the Secretary shall notify the 
     Government of Morocco in writing of such action and shall 
     provide to the Government of Morocco data supporting the 
     assessment of additional duties.

     SEC. 203. RULES OF ORIGIN.

       (a) Application and Interpretation.--In this section:
       (1) Tariff classification.--The basis for any tariff 
     classification is the HTS.
       (2) Reference to hts.--Whenever in this section there is a 
     reference to a heading or sub-heading, such reference shall 
     be a reference to a heading or subheading of the HTS.
       (b) Originating Goods.--
       (1) In general.--For purposes of this Act and for purposes 
     of implementing the preferential tariff treatment provided 
     for under the Agreement, a good is an originating good if--
       (A) the good is imported directly--
       (i) from the territory of Morocco into the territory of the 
     United States; or
       (ii) from the territory of the United States into the 
     territory of Morocco; and
       (B)(i) the good is a good wholly the growth, product, or 
     manufacture of Morocco or the United States, or both;
       (ii) the good (other than a good to which clause (iii) 
     applies) is a new or different article of commerce that has 
     been grown, produced, or manufactured in Morocco, the United 
     States, or both, and meets the requirements of paragraph (2); 
     or
       (iii)(I) the good is a good covered by Annex 4-A or 5-A of 
     the Agreement;
       (II)(aa) each of the nonoriginating materials used in the 
     production of the good undergoes an applicable change in 
     tariff classification specified in such Annex as a result of 
     production occurring entirely in the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States, or both; or
       (bb) the good otherwise satisfies the requirements 
     specified in such Annex; and
       (III) the good satisfies all other applicable requirements 
     of this section.
       (2) Requirements.--A good described in paragraph (1)(B)(ii) 
     is an originating good only if the sum of--
       (A) the value of each material produced in the territory of 
     Morocco or the United States, or both, and
       (B) the direct costs of processing operations performed in 
     the territory of Morocco or the United States, or both,
     is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of the 
     good at the time the good is entered into the territory of 
     the United States.
       (c) Cumulation.--
       (1) Originating good or material incorporated into goods of 
     other country.--An originating good or a material produced in 
     the territory of Morocco or the United States, or both, that 
     is incorporated into a good in the territory of the other 
     country shall be considered to originate in the territory of 
     the other country.
       (2) Multiple procedures.--A good that is grown, produced, 
     or manufactured in the territory of Morocco or the United 
     States, or both, by 1 or more producers, is an originating 
     good if the good satisfies the requirements of subsection (b) 
     and all other applicable requirements of this section.
       (d) Value of Materials.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     value of a material produced in the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States, or both, includes the following:
       (A) The price actually paid or payable for the material by 
     the producer of such good.
       (B) The freight, insurance, packing, and all other costs 
     incurred in transporting the material to the producer's 
     plant, if such costs are not included in the price referred 
     to in subparagraph (A).
       (C) The cost of waste or spoilage resulting from the use of 
     the material in the growth, production, or manufacture of the 
     good, less the value of recoverable scrap.
       (D) Taxes or customs duties imposed on the material by 
     Morocco, the United States, or both, if the taxes or customs 
     duties are not remitted upon exportation from the territory 
     of Morocco or the United States, as the case may be.
       (2) Exception.--If the relationship between the producer of 
     a good and the seller of a material influenced the price 
     actually paid or payable for the material, or if there is no 
     price actually paid or payable by the producer for the 
     material, the value of the material produced in the territory 
     of Morocco or the United States, or both, includes the 
     following:
       (A) All expenses incurred in the growth, production, or 
     manufacture of the material, including general expenses.
       (B) A reasonable amount for profit.
       (C) Freight, insurance, packing, and all other costs 
     incurred in transporting the material to the producer's 
     plant.
       (e) Packaging and Packing Materials and Containers for 
     Retail Sale and for Shipment.--Packaging and packing 
     materials and containers for retail sale and shipment shall 
     be disregarded in determining whether a good qualifies as an 
     originating good, except to the extent that the value of such 
     packaging and packing materials and containers have been 
     included in meeting the requirements set forth in subsection 
     (b)(2).
       (f) Indirect Materials.--Indirect materials shall be 
     disregarded in determining whether a good qualifies as an 
     originating good, except that the cost of such indirect 
     materials may be included in meeting the requirements set 
     forth in subsection (b)(2).

[[Page H6618]]

       (g) Transit and Transshipment.--A good shall not be 
     considered to meet the requirement of subsection (b)(1)(A) 
     if, after exportation from the territory of Morocco or the 
     United States, the good undergoes production, manufacturing, 
     or any other operation outside the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States, other than unloading, reloading, or any 
     other operation necessary to preserve the good in good 
     condition or to transport the good to the territory of the 
     United States or Morocco.
       (h) Textile and Apparel Goods.--
       (1) De minimis amounts of nonoriginating materials.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a 
     textile or apparel good that is not an originating good 
     because certain fibers or yarns used in the production of the 
     component of the good that determines the tariff 
     classification of the good do not undergo an applicable 
     change in tariff classification set out in Annex 4-A of the 
     Agreement shall be considered to be an originating good if 
     the total weight of all such fibers or yarns in that 
     component is not more than 7 percent of the total weight of 
     that component.
       (B) Certain textile or apparel goods.--A textile or apparel 
     good containing elastomeric yarns in the component of the 
     good that determines the tariff classification of the good 
     shall be considered to be an originating good only if such 
     yarns are wholly formed in the territory of Morocco or the 
     United States.
       (C) Yarn, fabric, or group of fibers.--For purposes of this 
     paragraph, in the case of a textile or apparel good that is a 
     yarn, fabric, or group of fibers, the term ``component of the 
     good that determines the tariff classification of the good'' 
     means all of the fibers in the yarn, fabric, or group of 
     fibers.
       (2) Goods put up in sets for retail sale.--Notwithstanding 
     the rules set forth in Annex 4-A of the Agreement, textile or 
     apparel goods classifiable as goods put up in sets for retail 
     sale as provided for in General Rule of Interpretation 3 of 
     the HTS shall not be considered to be originating goods 
     unless each of the goods in the set is an originating good or 
     the total value of the nonoriginating goods in the set does 
     not exceed 10 percent of the value of the set determined for 
     purposes of assessing customs duties.
       (i) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Direct costs of processing operations.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``direct costs of processing 
     operations'', with respect to a good, includes, to the extent 
     they are includable in the appraised value of the good when 
     imported into Morocco or the United States, as the case may 
     be, the following:
       (i) All actual labor costs involved in the growth, 
     production, or manufacture of the good, including fringe 
     benefits, on-the-job training, and the costs of engineering, 
     supervisory, quality control, and similar personnel.
       (ii) Tools, dies, molds, and other indirect materials, and 
     depreciation on machinery and equipment that are allocable to 
     the good.
       (iii) Research, development, design, engineering, and 
     blueprint costs, to the extent that they are allocable to the 
     good.
       (iv) Costs of inspecting and testing the good.
       (v) Costs of packaging the good for export to the territory 
     of the other country.
       (B) Exceptions.--The term ``direct costs of processing 
     operations'' does not include costs that are not directly 
     attributable to a good or are not costs of growth, 
     production, or manufacture of the good, such as--
       (i) profit; and
       (ii) general expenses of doing business that are either not 
     allocable to the good or are not related to the growth, 
     production, or manufacture of the good, such as 
     administrative salaries, casualty and liability insurance, 
     advertising, and sales staff salaries, commissions, or 
     expenses.
       (2) Good.--The term ``good'' means any merchandise, 
     product, article, or material.
       (3) Good wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of 
     morocco, the united states, or both.--The term ``good wholly 
     the growth, product, or manufacture of Morocco, the United 
     States, or both'' means--
       (A) a mineral good extracted in the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States, or both;
       (B) a vegetable good, as such a good is provided for in the 
     HTS, harvested in the territory of Morocco or the United 
     States, or both;
       (C) a live animal born and raised in the territory of 
     Morocco or the United States, or both;
       (D) a good obtained from live animals raised in the 
     territory of Morocco or the United States, or both;
       (E) a good obtained from hunting, trapping, or fishing in 
     the territory of Morocco or the United States, or both;
       (F) a good (fish, shellfish, and other marine life) taken 
     from the sea by vessels registered or recorded with Morocco 
     or the United States and flying the flag of that country;
       (G) a good produced from goods referred to in subparagraph 
     (F) on board factory ships registered or recorded with 
     Morocco or the United States and flying the flag of that 
     country;
       (H) a good taken by Morocco or the United States or a 
     person of Morocco or the United States from the seabed or 
     beneath the seabed outside territorial waters, if Morocco or 
     the United States has rights to exploit such seabed;
       (I) a good taken from outer space, if such good is obtained 
     by Morocco or the United States or a person of Morocco or the 
     United States and not processed in the territory of a country 
     other than Morocco or the United States;
       (J) waste and scrap derived from--
       (i) production or manufacture in the territory of Morocco 
     or the United States, or both; or
       (ii) used goods collected in the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States, or both, if such goods are fit only for 
     the recovery of raw materials;
       (K) a recovered good derived in the territory of Morocco or 
     the United States from used goods and utilized in the 
     territory of that country in the production of remanufactured 
     goods; and
       (L) a good produced in the territory of Morocco or the 
     United States, or both, exclusively--
       (i) from goods referred to in subparagraphs (A) through 
     (J), or
       (ii) from the derivatives of goods referred to in clause 
     (i),
     at any stage of production.
       (4) Indirect material.--The term ``indirect material'' 
     means a good used in the growth, production, manufacture, 
     testing, or inspection of a good but not physically 
     incorporated into the good, or a good used in the maintenance 
     of buildings or the operation of equipment associated with 
     the growth, production, or manufacture of a good, including--
       (A) fuel and energy;
       (B) tools, dies, and molds;
       (C) spare parts and materials used in the maintenance of 
     equipment and buildings;
       (D) lubricants, greases, compounding materials, and other 
     materials used in the growth, production, or manufacture of a 
     good or used to operate equipment and buildings;
       (E) gloves, glasses, footwear, clothing, safety equipment, 
     and supplies;
       (F) equipment, devices, and supplies used for testing or 
     inspecting the good;
       (G) catalysts and solvents; and
       (H) any other goods that are not incorporated into the good 
     but the use of which in the growth, production, or 
     manufacture of the good can reasonably be demonstrated to be 
     a part of that growth, production, or manufacture.
       (5) Material.--The term ``material'' means a good, 
     including a part or ingredient, that is used in the growth, 
     production, or manufacture of another good that is a new or 
     different article of commerce that has been grown, produced, 
     or manufactured in Morocco, the United States, or both.
       (6) Material produced in the territory of morocco or the 
     united states, or both.--The term ``material produced in the 
     territory of Morocco or the United States, or both'' means a 
     good that is either wholly the growth, product, or 
     manufacture of Morocco, the United States, or both, or a new 
     or different article of commerce that has been grown, 
     produced, or manufactured in the territory of Morocco or the 
     United States, or both.
       (7) New or different article of commerce.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``new or different article of 
     commerce'' means, except as provided in subparagraph (B), a 
     good that--
       (i) has been substantially transformed from a good or 
     material that is not wholly the growth, product, or 
     manufacture of Morocco, the United States, or both; and
       (ii) has a new name, character, or use distinct from the 
     good or material from which it was transformed.
       (B) Exception.--A good shall not be considered a new or 
     different article of commerce by virtue of having undergone 
     simple combining or packaging operations, or mere dilution 
     with water or another substance that does not materially 
     alter the characteristics of the good.
       (8) Recovered goods.--The term ``recovered goods'' means 
     materials in the form of individual parts that result from--
       (A) the complete disassembly of used goods into individual 
     parts; and
       (B) the cleaning, inspecting, testing, or other processing 
     of those parts that is necessary for improvement to sound 
     working condition.
       (9) Remanufactured good.--The term ``remanufactured good'' 
     means an industrial good that is assembled in the territory 
     of Morocco or the United States and that--
       (A) is entirely or partially comprised of recovered goods;
       (B) has a similar life expectancy to, and meets similar 
     performance standards as, a like good that is new; and
       (C) enjoys a factory warranty similar to that of a like 
     good that is new.
       (10) Simple combining or packaging operations.--The term 
     ``simple combining or packaging operations'' means operations 
     such as adding batteries to electronic devices, fitting 
     together a small number of components by bolting, gluing, or 
     soldering, or packing or repacking components together.
       (11) Substantially transformed.--The term ``substantially 
     transformed'' means, with respect to a good or material, 
     changed as the result of a manufacturing or processing 
     operation so that--
       (A)(i) the good or material is converted from a good that 
     has multiple uses into a good or material that has limited 
     uses;

[[Page H6619]]

       (ii) the physical properties of the good or material are 
     changed to a significant extent; or
       (iii) the operation undergone by the good or material is 
     complex by reason of the number of processes and materials 
     involved and the time and level of skill required to perform 
     those processes; and
       (B) the good or material loses its separate identity in the 
     manufacturing or processing operation.
       (j) Presidential Proclamation Authority.--
       (1) In general.--The President is authorized to proclaim, 
     as part of the HTS--
       (A) the provisions set out in Annex 4-A and Annex 5-A of 
     the Agreement; and
       (B) any additional subordinate category necessary to carry 
     out this title consistent with the Agreement.
       (2) Modifications.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to the consultation and layover 
     provisions of section 104, the President may proclaim 
     modifications to the provisions proclaimed under the 
     authority of paragraph (1)(A), other than provisions of 
     chapters 50 through 63 of the HTS, as included in Annex 4-A 
     of the Agreement.
       (B) Additional proclamations.--Notwithstanding subparagraph 
     (A), and subject to the consultation and layover provisions 
     of section 104, the President may proclaim--
       (i) modifications to the provisions proclaimed under the 
     authority of paragraph (1)(A) as are necessary to implement 
     an agreement with Morocco pursuant to article 4.3.6 of the 
     Agreement; and
       (ii) before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, modifications to correct 
     any typographical, clerical, or other nonsubstantive 
     technical error regarding the provisions of chapters 50 
     through 63 of the HTS, as included in Annex 4-A of the 
     Agreement.

     SEC. 204. ENFORCEMENT RELATING TO TRADE IN TEXTILE AND 
                   APPAREL GOODS.

       (a) Action During Verification.--
       (1) In general.--If the Secretary of the Treasury requests 
     the Government of Morocco to conduct a verification pursuant 
     to article 4.4 of the Agreement for purposes of making a 
     determination under paragraph (2), the President may direct 
     the Secretary to take appropriate action described in 
     subsection (b) while the verification is being conducted.
       (2) Determination.--A determination under this paragraph is 
     a determination--
       (A) that an exporter or producer in Morocco is complying 
     with applicable customs laws, regulations, procedures, 
     requirements, or practices affecting trade in textile or 
     apparel goods; or
       (B) that a claim that a textile or apparel good exported or 
     produced by such exporter or producer--
       (i) qualifies as an originating good under section 203 of 
     this Act, or
       (ii) is a good of Morocco,
     is accurate.
       (b) Appropriate Action Described.--Appropriate action under 
     subsection (a)(1) includes--
       (1) suspension of liquidation of the entry of any textile 
     or apparel good exported or produced by the person that is 
     the subject of a verification referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1) regarding compliance described in subsection 
     (a)(2)(A), in a case in which the request for verification 
     was based on a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity 
     related to such goods; and
       (2) suspension of liquidation of the entry of a textile or 
     apparel good for which a claim has been made that is the 
     subject of a verification referred to in subsection (a)(1) 
     regarding a claim described in subsection (a)(2)(B).
       (c) Action When Information is Insufficient.--If the 
     Secretary of the Treasury determines that the information 
     obtained within 12 months after making a request for a 
     verification under subsection (a)(1) is insufficient to make 
     a determination under subsection (a)(2), the President may 
     direct the Secretary to take appropriate action described in 
     subsection (d) until such time as the Secretary receives 
     information sufficient to make a determination under 
     subsection (a)(2) or until such earlier date as the President 
     may direct.
       (d) Appropriate Action Described.--Appropriate action 
     referred to in subsection (c) includes--
       (1) publication of the name and address of the person that 
     is the subject of the verification;
       (2) denial of preferential tariff treatment under the 
     Agreement to--
       (A) any textile or apparel good exported or produced by the 
     person that is the subject of a verification referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1) regarding compliance described in 
     subsection (a)(2)(A); or
       (B) a textile or apparel good for which a claim has been 
     made that is the subject of a verification referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1) regarding a claim described in subsection 
     (a)(2)(B); and
       (3) denial of entry into the United States of--
       (A) any textile or apparel good exported or produced by the 
     person that is the subject of a verification referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1) regarding compliance described in 
     subsection (a)(2)(A); or
       (B) a textile or apparel good for which a claim has been 
     made that is the subject of a verification referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1) regarding a claim described in subsection 
     (a)(2)(B).

     SEC. 205. REGULATIONS.

       The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe such 
     regulations as may be necessary to carry out--
       (1) subsections (a) through (i) of section 203;
       (2) amendments to existing law made by the subsections 
     referred to in paragraph (1); and
       (3) proclamations issued under section 203(j).

                     TITLE III--RELIEF FROM IMPORTS

     SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Moroccan article.--The term ``Moroccan article'' means 
     an article that qualifies as an originating good under 
     section 203(b) of this Act or receives preferential tariff 
     treatment under paragraphs 9 through 15 of article 4.3 of the 
     Agreement.
       (2) Moroccan textile or apparel article.--The term 
     ``Moroccan textile or apparel article'' means an article 
     that--
       (A) is listed in the Annex to the Agreement on Textiles and 
     Clothing referred to in section 101(d)(4) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(4)); and
       (B) is a Moroccan article.
       (3) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the United 
     States International Trade Commission.

     Subtitle A--Relief From Imports Benefiting From the Agreement

     SEC. 311. COMMENCING OF ACTION FOR RELIEF.

       (a) Filing of Petition.--
       (1) In general.--A petition requesting action under this 
     subtitle for the purpose of adjusting to the obligations of 
     the United States under the Agreement may be filed with the 
     Commission by an entity, including a trade association, firm, 
     certified or recognized union, or group of workers, that is 
     representative of an industry. The Commission shall transmit 
     a copy of any petition filed under this subsection to the 
     United States Trade Representative.
       (2) Provisional relief.--An entity filing a petition under 
     this subsection may request that provisional relief be 
     provided as if the petition had been filed under section 
     202(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2252(a)).
       (3) Critical circumstances.--Any allegation that critical 
     circumstances exist shall be included in the petition.
       (b) Investigation and Determination.--Upon the filing of a 
     petition under subsection (a), the Commission, unless 
     subsection (d) applies, shall promptly initiate an 
     investigation to determine whether, as a result of the 
     reduction or elimination of a duty provided for under the 
     Agreement, a Moroccan article is being imported into the 
     United States in such increased quantities, in absolute terms 
     or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions 
     that imports of the Moroccan article constitute a substantial 
     cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic 
     industry producing an article that is like, or directly 
     competitive with, the imported article.
       (c) Applicable Provisions.--The following provisions of 
     section 202 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2252) apply 
     with respect to any investigation initiated under subsection 
     (b):
       (1) Paragraphs (1)(B) and (3) of subsection (b).
       (2) Subsection (c).
       (3) Subsection (d).
       (4) Subsection (i).
       (d) Articles Exempt From Investigation.--No investigation 
     may be initiated under this section with respect to any 
     Moroccan article if, after the date on which the Agreement 
     enters into force, import relief has been provided with 
     respect to that Moroccan article under this subtitle.

     SEC. 312. COMMISSION ACTION ON PETITION.

       (a) Determination.--Not later than 120 days (180 days if 
     critical circumstances have been alleged) after the date on 
     which an investigation is initiated under section 311(b) with 
     respect to a petition, the Commission shall make the 
     determination required under that section.
       (b) Applicable Provisions.--For purposes of this subtitle, 
     the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 
     330(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1330(d) (1), (2), 
     and (3)) shall be applied with respect to determinations and 
     findings made under this section as if such determinations 
     and findings were made under section 202 of the Trade Act of 
     1974 (19 U.S.C. 2252).
       (c) Additional Finding and Recommendation if Determination 
     Affirmative.--If the determination made by the Commission 
     under subsection (a) with respect to imports of an article is 
     affirmative, or if the President may consider a determination 
     of the Commission to be an affirmative determination as 
     provided for under paragraph (1) of section 330(d) of the 
     Tariff Act of 1930) (19 U.S.C. 1330(d)), the Commission shall 
     find, and recommend to the President in the report required 
     under subsection (d), the amount of import relief that is 
     necessary to remedy or prevent the injury found by the 
     Commission in the determination and to facilitate the efforts 
     of the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to 
     import competition. The import relief recommended by the 
     Commission under this subsection shall be limited to that 
     described in section 313(c). Only those members of the 
     Commission who voted in the affirmative under subsection (a) 
     are eligible to vote on the proposed action to remedy or 
     prevent the injury found by the Commission. Members of the 
     Commission who did not vote in the affirmative may submit, in 
     the report required

[[Page H6620]]

     under subsection (d), separate views regarding what action, 
     if any, should be taken to remedy or prevent the injury.
       (d) Report to President.--Not later than the date that is 
     30 days after the date on which a determination is made under 
     subsection (a) with respect to an investigation, the 
     Commission shall submit to the President a report that 
     includes--
       (1) the determination made under subsection (a) and an 
     explanation of the basis for the determination;
       (2) if the determination under subsection (a) is 
     affirmative, any findings and recommendations for import 
     relief made under subsection (c) and an explanation of the 
     basis for each recommendation; and
       (3) any dissenting or separate views by members of the 
     Commission regarding the determination and recommendation 
     referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2).
       (e) Public Notice.--Upon submitting a report to the 
     President under subsection (d), the Commission shall promptly 
     make public such report (with the exception of information 
     which the Commission determines to be confidential) and shall 
     cause a summary thereof to be published in the Federal 
     Register.

     SEC. 313. PROVISION OF RELIEF.

       (a) In General.--Not later than the date that is 30 days 
     after the date on which the President receives the report of 
     the Commission in which the Commission's determination under 
     section 312(a) is affirmative, or which contains a 
     determination under section 312(a) that the President 
     considers to be affirmative under paragraph (1) of section 
     330(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1330(d)(1)), the 
     President, subject to subsection (b), shall provide relief 
     from imports of the article that is the subject of such 
     determination to the extent that the President determines 
     necessary to remedy or prevent the injury found by the 
     Commission and to facilitate the efforts of the domestic 
     industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition.
       (b) Exception.--The President is not required to provide 
     import relief under this section if the President determines 
     that the provision of the import relief will not provide 
     greater economic and social benefits than costs.
       (c) Nature of Relief.--
       (1) In general.--The import relief (including provisional 
     relief) that the President is authorized to provide under 
     this section with respect to imports of an article is as 
     follows:
       (A) The suspension of any further reduction provided for 
     under Annex IV of the Agreement in the duty imposed on such 
     article.
       (B) An increase in the rate of duty imposed on such article 
     to a level that does not exceed the lesser of--
       (i) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the HTS 
     on like articles at the time the import relief is provided; 
     or
       (ii) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the 
     HTS on like articles on the day before the date on which the 
     Agreement enters into force.
       (C) In the case of a duty applied on a seasonal basis to 
     such article, an increase in the rate of duty imposed on the 
     article to a level that does not exceed the lesser of--
       (i) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the HTS 
     on like articles for the immediately preceding corresponding 
     season; or
       (ii) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the 
     HTS on like articles on the day before the date on which the 
     Agreement enters into force.
       (2) Progressive liberalization.--If the period for which 
     import relief is provided under this section is greater than 
     1 year, the President shall provide for the progressive 
     liberalization of such relief at regular intervals during the 
     period in which the relief is in effect.
       (d) Period of Relief.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), any import 
     relief that the President provides under this section may not 
     be in effect for more than 3 years.
       (2) Extension.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (C), the 
     President, after receiving an affirmative determination from 
     the Commission under subparagraph (B), may extend the 
     effective period of any import relief provided under this 
     section if the President determines that--
       (i) the import relief continues to be necessary to remedy 
     or prevent serious injury and to facilitate adjustment by the 
     domestic industry to import competition; and
       (ii) there is evidence that the industry is making a 
     positive adjustment to import competition.
       (B) Action by commission.--(i) Upon a petition on behalf of 
     the industry concerned that is filed with the Commission not 
     earlier than the date which is 9 months, and not later than 
     the date which is 6 months, before the date any action taken 
     under subsection (a) is to terminate, the Commission shall 
     conduct an investigation to determine whether action under 
     this section continues to be necessary to remedy or prevent 
     serious injury and to facilitate adjustment by the domestic 
     industry to import competition and whether there is evidence 
     that the industry is making a positive adjustment to import 
     competition.
       (ii) The Commission shall publish notice of the 
     commencement of any proceeding under this subparagraph in the 
     Federal Register and shall, within a reasonable time 
     thereafter, hold a public hearing at which the Commission 
     shall afford interested parties and consumers an opportunity 
     to be present, to present evidence, and to respond to the 
     presentations of other parties and consumers, and otherwise 
     to be heard.
       (iii) The Commission shall transmit to the President a 
     report on its investigation and determination under this 
     subparagraph not later than 60 days before the action under 
     subsection (a) is to terminate, unless the President 
     specifies a different date.
       (C) Period of import relief.--Any import relief provided 
     under this section, including any extensions thereof, may 
     not, in the aggregate, be in effect for more than 5 years.
       (e) Rate After Termination of Import Relief.--When import 
     relief under this section is terminated with respect to an 
     article, the rate of duty on that article shall be the rate 
     that would have been in effect, but for the provision of such 
     relief, on the date on which the relief terminates.
       (f) Articles Exempt From Relief.--No import relief may be 
     provided under this section on any article that--
       (1) is subject to an assessment of additional duty under 
     section 202(b); or
       (2) has been subject to import relief under this subtitle 
     after the date on which the Agreement enters into force.

     SEC. 314. TERMINATION OF RELIEF AUTHORITY.

       (a) General Rule.--Subject to subsection (b), no import 
     relief may be provided under this subtitle with respect to a 
     good after the date that is 5 years after the date on which 
     duty-free treatment must be provided by the United States to 
     that good pursuant to Annex IV of the Agreement.
       (b) Presidential Determination.--Import relief may be 
     provided under this subtitle in the case of a Moroccan 
     article after the date on which such relief would, but for 
     this subsection, terminate under subsection (a), if the 
     President determines that Morocco has consented to such 
     relief.

     SEC. 315. COMPENSATION AUTHORITY.

       For purposes of section 123 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2133), any import relief provided by the President 
     under section 313 shall be treated as action taken under 
     chapter 1 of title II of such Act.

     SEC. 316. CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION.

       Section 202(a)(8) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2252(a)(8)) is amended in the first sentence--
       (1) by striking ``and''; and
       (2) by inserting before the period at the end ``, and title 
     III of the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
     Implementation Act''.

           Subtitle B--Textile and Apparel Safeguard Measures

     SEC. 321. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION FOR RELIEF.

       (a) In General.--A request under this subtitle for the 
     purpose of adjusting to the obligations of the United States 
     under the Agreement may be filed with the President by an 
     interested party. Upon the filing of a request, the President 
     shall review the request to determine, from information 
     presented in the request, whether to commence consideration 
     of the request.
       (b) Publication of Request.--If the President determines 
     that the request under subsection (a) provides the 
     information necessary for the request to be considered, the 
     President shall cause to be published in the Federal Register 
     a notice of commencement of consideration of the request, and 
     notice seeking public comments regarding the request. The 
     notice shall include a summary of the request and the dates 
     by which comments and rebuttals must be received.

     SEC. 322. DETERMINATION AND PROVISION OF RELIEF.

       (a) Determination.--
       (1) In general.--If a positive determination is made under 
     section 321(b), the President shall determine whether, as a 
     result of the reduction or elimination of a duty under the 
     Agreement, a Moroccan textile or apparel article is being 
     imported into the United States in such increased quantities, 
     in absolute terms or relative to the domestic market for that 
     article, and under such conditions as to cause serious 
     damage, or actual threat thereof, to a domestic industry 
     producing an article that is like, or directly competitive 
     with, the imported article.
       (2) Serious damage.--In making a determination under 
     paragraph (1), the President--
       (A) shall examine the effect of increased imports on the 
     domestic industry, as reflected in changes in such relevant 
     economic factors as output, productivity, utilization of 
     capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, 
     employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment, none of 
     which is necessarily decisive; and
       (B) shall not consider changes in technology or consumer 
     preference as factors supporting a determination of serious 
     damage or actual threat thereof.
       (b) Provision of Relief.--
       (1) In general.--If a determination under subsection (a) is 
     affirmative, the President may provide relief from imports of 
     the article that is the subject of such determination, as 
     described in paragraph (2), to the extent that the President 
     determines necessary to remedy or prevent the serious damage 
     and to facilitate adjustment by the domestic industry to 
     import competition.
       (2) Nature of relief.--The relief that the President is 
     authorized to provide under this

[[Page H6621]]

     subsection with respect to imports of an article is an 
     increase in the rate of duty imposed on the article to a 
     level that does not exceed the lesser of--
       (A) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the HTS 
     on like articles at the time the import relief is provided; 
     or
       (B) the column 1 general rate of duty imposed under the HTS 
     on like articles on the day before the date on which the 
     Agreement enters into force.

     SEC. 323. PERIOD OF RELIEF.

       (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the import 
     relief that the President provides under subsection (b) of 
     section 322 may not, in the aggregate, be in effect for more 
     than 3 years.
       (b) Extension.--
       (1) In General.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President 
     may extend the effective period of any import relief provided 
     under this subtitle for a period of not more than 2 years, if 
     the President determines that--
       (A) the import relief continues to be necessary to remedy 
     or prevent serious damage and to facilitate adjustment by the 
     domestic industry to import competition; and
       (B) there is evidence that the industry is making a 
     positive adjustment to import competition.
       (2) Limitation.--Any relief provided under this subtitle, 
     including any extensions thereof, may not, in the aggregate, 
     be in effect for more than 5 years.

     SEC. 324. ARTICLES EXEMPT FROM RELIEF.

       The President may not provide import relief under this 
     subtitle with respect to any article if--
       (1) the article has been subject to import relief under 
     this subtitle after the date on which the Agreement enters 
     into force; or
       (2) the article is subject to import relief under chapter 1 
     of title II of the Trade Act of 1974.

     SEC. 325. RATE AFTER TERMINATION OF IMPORT RELIEF.

       When import relief under this subtitle is terminated with 
     respect to an article, the rate of duty on that article shall 
     be the rate that would have been in effect, but for the 
     provision of such relief, on the date on which the relief 
     terminates.

     SEC. 326. TERMINATION OF RELIEF AUTHORITY.

       No import relief may be provided under this subtitle with 
     respect to any article after the date that is 10 years after 
     the date on which duties on the article are eliminated 
     pursuant to the Agreement.

     SEC. 327. COMPENSATION AUTHORITY.

       For purposes of section 123 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2133), any import relief provided by the President 
     under this subtitle shall be treated as action taken under 
     chapter 1 of title II of such Act.

     SEC. 328. BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

       The President may not release information which is 
     submitted in a proceeding under this subtitle and which the 
     President considers to be confidential business information 
     unless the party submitting the confidential business 
     information had notice, at the time of submission, that such 
     information would be released, or such party subsequently 
     consents to the release of the information. To the extent a 
     party submits confidential business information to the 
     President in a proceeding under this subtitle, the party also 
     shall submit a nonconfidential version of the information, in 
     which the confidential business information is summarized or, 
     if necessary, deleted.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 738, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Rangel) each will control 1 hour.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas).
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. THOMAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise today 
in strong support of H.R. 4842, which will implement the United States-
Moroccan Free Trade Agreement. This Free Trade Agreement is 
comprehensive, it is solid, and it will benefit American workers across 
the spectrum, including farmers, consumers, businesses, and therefore 
the United States economy.
  Morocco has been since the inception of this country and is today an 
important strategic partner of the United States. This agreement will 
enhance and in fact solidify our economic relationship. Not only will 
this agreement advance our relationship with Morocco, but it serves as 
a cornerstone to assist the President's broader initiative to create a 
Middle East free trade area by the year 2013.
  The United States has entered into additional agreements, Morocco, 
Bahrain. We have entered into trade and investment framework agreements 
with Kuwait, Yemen, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia. Many of these countries have expressed interest in moving 
forward and negotiating a free trade agreement similar to the Moroccan 
agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a long overdue day, but it has arrived, and I am 
pleased to say that the Senate has already acted on this legislation, 
and when the House concludes its business on this bill it will be sent 
to the President for his signature, and this is a marvelous way to end 
this portion of the 108th Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Brown) and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to yield 
time as he sees fit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, I would like the record to remain clear that in my opinion the 
gentleman from California stole the election in Florida, and I just 
want to get that out of the way.
  But having said that, I think that this agreement that we reach today 
gives us an opportunity to see what we could be doing, especially as it 
relates to international treaty agreements, if we attempt to work 
together.
  The government of Morocco has been friendly to the United States for 
years, and it is a developing country that has strived to have a 
relationship between organized labor and to work to improve the quality 
of life for its workers.

                              {time}  1615

  We Democrats truly believe that we should have a bipartisan approach 
to these types of issues and that there are certain principles we think 
should be in all trade agreements, and that is that you protect 
American jobs and that you provide for basic international labor 
standards in these agreements, and you do no harm.
  There are certain provisions here that deal with intellectual rights 
that we really approve of, but we also believe that we should never 
allow ourselves to deprive people of medicine that they may need for 
their health and, indeed, for their life.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) has worked very, very hard to 
make certain that we on the Democratic side do not unilaterally just 
say out of hand that if we do not find the language we want that we 
will not be supporting the bill. Indeed, we are more concerned with 
having language that all civilized and industrialized countries would 
want to have as a standard that can be reached with the United States 
on international health.
  Mr. Speaker, because of that, I ask unanimous consent to yield the 
balance of my time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), the 
distinguished senior member of the Subcommittee on Trade, and that he 
be allowed to yield time as he sees fit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gilchrest). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he 
may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane), the chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Trade.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am quite pleased that the United States and the 
Kingdom of Morocco have reached agreement on a bilateral free trade 
agreement. Morocco has long been a key ally in the Middle East. As many 
have noted, Morocco was the first country to recognize our sovereignty; 
and in 1786 we signed the U.S.-Morocco treaty of peace and friendship, 
which remains the longest unbroken treaty in our Nation's history.
  Once implemented, this treaty agreement will be the second of its 
kind between the U.S. and a moderate Muslim ally, following our trade 
agreement with the Kingdom of Jordan.
  This is an important strategic agreement. While we have had a long-
standing diplomatic relationship with Morocco, the U.S.-Morocco FTA 
cements the economic relationship between our countries. Two-way trade 
between the U.S. and Morocco is significant, at nearly $1 billion per 
year. The United States exported over $465 million to Morocco last 
year, with a trade surplus of over $79 million.

[[Page H6622]]

  This FTA will eliminate trade barriers, lower tariffs, and provide 
increased market access for U.S. companies. By knocking down trade 
barriers in Morocco and in the rest of the world, we can help support 
even more American jobs. In fact, the International Trade Commission 
estimates that trade between our countries should double once this 
agreement is implemented.
  This is a strong agreement for all sectors of the U.S. economy. Under 
its terms, over 95 percent of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial 
goods to Morocco will become duty free immediately. This follows the 
high standards set by recently passed trade agreements with Singapore, 
Chile, and Australia. This is important for U.S. manufacturers.
  This is also a strong agreement for the services sector of our 
economy, whether it be telecommunications, e-commerce for digital 
commerce, or new opportunities for U.S. financial institutions. The 
agreement also contains state-of-the-art intellectual property 
provisions, including commitments in trademarks, copyrights and 
patents, as well as tough penalties for piracy and counterfeiting. 
Taken together, these provisions continue a trade policy that best 
helps U.S. business compete in a global marketplace.
  Mr. Speaker, the Farm Bureau strongly supports this agreement, which 
covers all agricultural products, because for every $1 in increased 
imports from Morocco, U.S. farmers can expect $10 in increased exports 
to Morocco. In 2003, the United States had a trade surplus in 
agricultural products with Morocco of about $82 million, with exports 
of over $152 million. The Farm Bureau estimates that this agreement 
could increase U.S. agricultural exports to over $450 million by 2015, 
tripling our current exports. Furthermore, because Morocco's agreement 
with the European Union does not include agriculture, this FTA should 
give American farmers a competitive advantage over our EU counterparts.
  Some have questioned whether labor laws in Morocco are adequate. To 
that end, I would like to point out that the U.S.-Morocco FTA, like all 
of our trade agreements, requires Morocco to enforce domestic labor 
laws in accordance with the bipartisan guidance provided by the 
Congress in Trade Promotion Authority.
  Furthermore, in anticipation of a U.S.-Morocco FTA, the Moroccan 
government, business community, and labor force, working together in a 
tripartite manner, found consensus in passing a comprehensive new labor 
law earlier this year that is consistent with ILO standards. 
Accordingly, the agreement language creating an obligation to 
effectively enforce one's laws is, in essence, the same as an 
enforceable ILO standard in this agreement. I, for one, applaud Morocco 
for its efforts in overhauling its labor laws in anticipation of 
completing this important trade agreement.
  Some on the other side, including the Subcommittee on Trade ranking 
member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), and the Committee on 
Ways and Means ranking member, the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Rangel), have raised thoughtful questions with regard to various 
provisions contained in this agreement. I think we have worked well 
together to address these concerns, and I am pleased that we have their 
support. While we may continue to disagree on certain issues, there is 
a lot of common ground from which to work, and I look forward to 
continuing to work with them to pass important trade agreements.
  Unfortunately, I am sure that a small group on the other side who do 
oppose free trade may come to the House floor today and argue that this 
agreement is inadequate in certain respects.
  I would ask my colleagues to not be fooled by this rhetoric, which we 
hear every time when we contemplate trade agreements. We heard it last 
week during debate on our Australian Free Trade Agreement, a country 
with which we have a $9 billion trade surplus; we heard it during 
debate 1 year ago regarding Chile and Singapore; and I am sure we will 
hear it today with regard to Morocco, a country with which we have a 
trade surplus.
  Please do not be fooled. This discomfort has less to do with the 
provisions of this agreement than it does their dislike of free trade 
generally.
  Mr. Speaker, the vast majority of Members on both sides of the aisle 
think differently. The American people know that millions of American 
jobs are dependent upon free trade. U.S. products exported to Morocco 
currently face an average tariff of more than 20 percent. This FTA will 
give American businesses exporting to Morocco a leg up to compete as 
they compete with the European Union. That means better, higher-paying 
jobs here at home. Perhaps that is why the U.S.-Morocco FTA passed the 
Committee on Ways and Means by a 26 to 0 vote on Tuesday and passed the 
Senate by an overwhelming vote of 85 to 13 yesterday. I look forward to 
another strong, bipartisan vote today.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to emphasize my strong support for this 
agreement and my appreciation to the administration and Members on both 
sides of the aisle for their efforts in completing it.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane) and ask unanimous consent that he 
control the time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, while the Jordan Free Trade Agreement passed in the last 
year of the Clinton administration represented a step forward in free 
trade policy, recent free trade agreements provide a template to 
purposely and purposefully circumvent labor and environmental laws.
  To make matters worse, USTR and its pharmaceutical allies are now 
including language in each trade agreement in front of this body to ban 
reimportation in all agreements they negotiate. The Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement is the latest example of this trade, we call it, devolution.
  Last week we voted on the U.S.-Australia FTA. While Australian 
workers, to be sure, enjoy the benefits of good labor laws and the 
enforcement of those laws, the precedent was the same. Labor and 
environmental protections were given short shrift in the core text of 
the agreement, while USTR focused on ensuring the gold standard for the 
pharmaceutical industry.
  It is almost as if the U.S. Government dispatched the USTR again to 
protect the big drug companies in this country. It is no surprise, with 
the rest of the record in this body and in this administration in 
protecting the drug companies on every single issue possible.
  But Morocco is not Australia, and I have significant concerns about 
labor and working conditions there. Like Singapore and Chile, the labor 
provisions in the Morocco FTA are intentionally unenforceable. 
Violations of core labor standards cannot be taken to dispute 
resolution. The commitment to enforce domestic labor laws is subject to 
remedies weaker than those available for commercial disputes. Again, 
the commercial part of the agreement is always better, if you will, 
than the labor part of the agreement, because of this body's and this 
administration's low regard for worker rights.
  This violates the negotiating objective of Fast Track that equivalent 
remedies should exist for all parts of the agreement.
  Further, the ``enforce your own laws'' standard allows countries the 
opportunity to rewrite and weaken their labor laws to attract 
investment and seems to be a magnet for corporate interests all over 
the world to lobby those legislatures and those congresses and 
parliaments to weaken their own labor law, because they are not 
international labor organization standards.
  Today we will vote on the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
containing the same flawed policies on labor and on the environment and 
on reimportation. The same provisions in Morocco are in the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement. This agreement does not look much 
different from CAFTA. So for those of you, and I think it is pretty 
clear a majority of the Bush administration would have brought that 
agreement up this summer, those of you voting ``no'' on CAFTA, you are 
really voting for a pretty similar agreement on Morocco.

[[Page H6623]]

  Every free trade template brought before this House is, as Yogi Berra 
used to say, like deja vu all over again.
  First, the Medicare bill passed this year specifically prohibited the 
U.S. Government from negotiating lower drug prices for America's 
seniors and consumers. That was one this Congress and this Bush 
administration gave to the drug industry. Then the pharmaceutical 
industry punished American consumers by restricting the volume of drug 
inventories in Canada to prevent importation to the U.S. Then the U.S. 
Trade Representative and the administration included language in the 
Australia Free Trade Agreement that enables pharmaceutical companies to 
prevent prescription drug reimportation to the detriment of American 
consumers. Again, another bouquet from this Congress and the Bush 
administration to the drug industry.
  I do not think the connection is anything but obvious when you look 
at the amount of money the drug industry has given to the Republican 
Party, given to Republican leadership, and given to President Bush.
  Now similar provisions contained in last year's Singapore FTA and in 
the upcoming CAFTA are in the Morocco FTA bill that will be voted on. 
Though Morocco is not on the list of countries today covered by pending 
drug legislation, the importation provisions in this FTA prove this is 
a precedent, it was in Australia, now it is in this, that the USTR 
plans to extends this to all future trade agreements.
  There is broad support in this House, there is even broader support 
among seniors and among consumers, because they are not getting 
campaign contributions from the drug industry, for lowering drug prices 
and for allowing Americans to purchase safe, affordable drugs from 
other developed nations.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the administration's back-door effort 
again to close drug reimportation through trade negotiations. It is 
important to overcome attempts by free trade proponents to reduce this 
debate to a choice between free trade and no trade, and frame the 
discussion around priorities affected by irresponsible trade policy, 
labor protections, the environment, and affordable pharmaceutical 
access for all nations.
  This is not a debate on whether one supports trade; this is a debate 
on whether one supports responsible trade. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this irresponsible trade agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, concerns about the consistency of any future drug 
reimportation provisions with this free trade agreement are 
hypothetical. The agreement has no force under U.S. law except to the 
extent that Congress passes an implementing bill to change U.S. law.

                              {time}  1630

  Thus, even if Congress changes U.S. law and the new law were somehow 
inconsistent with the agreement, that new law would trump the 
agreement. The agreement cannot prevent Congress from allowing drug 
reimportation.
  The drug reimportation debate in Congress has focused on changes to 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that would be necessary to 
allow drug reimportation, such as changing its provision that only the 
original manufacturer may reimport a drug. There is nothing in the 
Morocco FTA or the implementing bill that addresses the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act for this requirement.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Shaw).
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me this 
time, and I rise in strong support of the United States-Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement pending before us here in this Chamber today.
  This agreement will provide 95 percent of consumer and industrial 
products in bilateral trade become duty-free immediately upon entering 
into this important, historic agreement.
  The chairman has already indicated that the Senate has passed this 
bill and it will go right from this Chamber to the President's desk for 
signature.
  I strongly concur with Ambassador Bob Zoellick when he stated, ``Our 
agreement with Morocco is not just a single announcement, but a vital 
step in creating a mosaic of United States free trade agreements across 
the Middle East and North Africa.''
  This agreement sends a strong message to this particular region of 
the world. This agreement enables fair and free trade between long-
standing allies. In fact, Morocco and the United States signed a Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship in 1786. The Kingdom has continuously provided 
military and diplomatic support for United States foreign operations, 
and this partnership is solid and it is respected.
  I congratulate President Bush and his Majesty, King Mohammed VI, on 
this historic Free Trade Agreement.
  I would like to point out to the gentleman on the other side of the 
aisle that was speaking about prescription drugs and associate myself 
with the remarks of the chairman concerning this matter, this House has 
passed now on two occasions a bill that said that if the Food and Drug 
Administration can certify that drugs from various countries, namely 
Canada, are what they are and they are pure and they are not 
counterfeit, that they can be imported. Under the Clinton 
administration they said they could not certify that. Under the Bush 
administration they said they cannot certify that. I think clearly we 
are going in that direction, but that has absolutely nothing to do with 
the bill that is before us.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, this trade agreement that we are 
considering today contains provisions that essentially mimic the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a law that is currently being 
litigated and whose scope is as yet unclear. The DMCA, while intended 
to protect the interests of copyright holders, may also endanger the 
rights and expectations of consumers.
  There is substantial reason to believe that the DMCA is having an 
adverse impact on technological innovation. There are a lot of cases on 
appeal, and I think ultimately this body is going to have to sort 
through the DMCA so that we do not kill and stifle technological 
innovation.
  The FCC is now based on the DMCA, asserting the right to preapprove 
every product that moves data in the United States. It sounds a little 
bit like the old Stalinist regime. I think we are going to have to 
revisit that, and I am concerned about the provisions in this act.
  However, I have been reassured by the Trade Representative as well as 
the Secretary of Commerce that the insertion of this provision in these 
types of trade agreements will not prevent the Congress from doing what 
ultimately we are going to have to do, which is to stop the 
technological stranglehold that we have placed on that sector of the 
economy, such as TiVo that we read about today, which the FCC is now 
asserting that they get to decide what TiVo gets to innovate.
  So based on those representations, I am going to certainly vote for 
this agreement today. Certainly, my district in the heart of the 
Silicon Valley needs to export, especially at a time when 35 percent of 
the households say someone in their home has been out of work for more 
than 3 months since January of 2001, when Mr. Bush became President.
  At the same time, I call on Congress to show some leadership to the 
rest of the world by amending the DMCA to make sure that we protect the 
rights of copyright holders, but that we also do not stifle innovation.
  Mr. Speaker, I will insert into the Record the letters from the Trade 
Representative, the Secretary of Commerce, and an article I have 
written on this subject.

         Executive Office of the President, The United States 
           Trade Representative,
                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
     Hon. Zoe Lofgren,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congresswoman Lofgren: Thank you for your recent 
     letter regarding the Singapore and Chile Free Trade 
     Agreements, specifically the provisions that reflect the U.S. 
     Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). I am pleased that my 
     staff had the opportunity to brief you on our FTA 
     negotiations, including on the provisions that address 
     copyright protection in the digital age. I would like to 
     address your remaining concerns.

[[Page H6624]]

       In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress mandated that we seek 
     provisions that reflect a standard of protection similar to 
     that found in U.S. law and that provide strong protection for 
     new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting 
     and distributing products embodying intellectual property. To 
     that end, we have included provisions in our FTAs that 
     reflect the historic and precedent setting standards for 
     intellectual property protection set forth in the DMCA. We 
     firmly believe that this legislation is evidence of 
     Congressional leadership internationally and should be a 
     model for how governments strike the correct balance between 
     copyright holders and the interests of society in the digital 
     age.
       Our FTA provisions that reflect the DMCA were developed in 
     close consultation with the same major domestic stakeholders 
     that worked with Congress to forge the balance in the DMCA. 
     As you may be aware, these groups have recently reiterated 
     their support for our FTAs to Members of Congress and to me. 
     While reflecting the balance in the DMCA, our FTA provisions 
     merely distill the key principles of U.S. legislation; they 
     do not replicate every detail. This is the approach we take 
     throughout the text of the Agreement when reflecting U.S. 
     standards. We take this approach, in part, because we 
     recognize and support, as with all provisions of U.S. law, 
     the Congressional prerogative to adopt further amendments as 
     may be deemed appropriate in the future.
       I fully understand that the DMCA has stimulated a vigorous 
     debate in America as well as in Congress and that there are 
     legislative proposals to amend the DMCA to address what may 
     be unintended consequences arising from its implementation. 
     Although at this time there does not appear to be widespread 
     support in Congress, or the national community at large, for 
     substantially revising the existing, fundamental balance 
     struck by the DMCA, we are quite confident that our FTA 
     provisions are sufficiently broad to encompass amendments 
     that Congress may adopt in the future that remain within the 
     overall balance struck in the DMCA. Moreover, the DMCA 
     itself provides for a periodic administrative rule-making 
     procedure to review the effect of the DMCA on users' 
     ability to make certain non-infringing uses and to create 
     additional exemptions to allow for such uses--a carve-out 
     echoed in the FTA provisions.
       As I believe my staff clarified during their briefing, we 
     have not had the opportunity to examine H.R. 1066 and H.R. 
     107 in detail and have not opined on the extent to which 
     these proposals are consistent with our FTAs. What my staff 
     did indicate, which I want to reiterate here, is that the 
     Administration has sought to reflect faithfully a standard of 
     protection for intellectual property similar to that 
     contained in U.S. law as instructed by Congress, but in no 
     way to require a change in U.S. law. Legislative proposals 
     that do not fundamentally alter the existing overall balance 
     struck in U.S. law, and that comply with all existing 
     international obligations regarding intellectual property, 
     will also comply with our FTAs.
       I hope this information is helpful to you.
           Sincerely,
     Robert B. Zoellick.
                                  ____



                                    The Secretary of Commerce,

                                     Washington, DC, June 5, 2003.
     Hon. Zoe Lofgren,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Lofgren: Thank you for your letter 
     expressing your concerns regarding the Singapore and Chile 
     Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). One of the important 
     negotiating objectives of these agreements was to encourage 
     our trading partners to provide for strong protection and 
     enforcement of intellectual property rights, which is 
     especially important in the modern digital trade environment.
       Although many of our trading partners already belong to the 
     World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
     of Intellectual Property Rights, the World Intellectual 
     Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO 
     Performances and Phonograms Treaty, FTAs build on that 
     foundation. The Singapore and Chile FTAs will ensure that 
     authors and owners of copyrighted works made available in 
     digital form receive commensurate protection, thereby 
     strengthening trade relations with these countries. They also 
     provide a framework of certainty around which companies can 
     begin to build legitimate businesses for the enjoyment of 
     creative works.
       I also would like to take the opportunity to respond to 
     specific issues raised in your letter. You expressed concern 
     that the incorporation of provisions based on the Digital 
     Millennium copyright Act (DMCA) in the Singapore and Chile 
     FTAs may have an adverse impact on technological innovation. 
     I believe, however, that strong protection and enforcement of 
     intellectual property rights in FTAs facilitate the expansion 
     of trade and investment in digital technologies and products, 
     thereby advancing the interests of all parties to the FTAs.
       You also expressed concern about the balance of interests 
     reflected in both the DMCA and the Singapore and Chile FTAs. 
     As you are aware, in enacting the DMCA, Congress worked hard 
     to achieve a balance among the various groups with interests 
     in the legislation, including copyright owners, users, and 
     Internet service providers, that also met the international 
     obligations set forth in the WIPO treaties. That balance is 
     reflected in the Singapore and Chile FTAs. If the Congress 
     amends the DMCA in the future, the FTAs should then be 
     reviewed for consistency with the amended DMCA.
       I believe that the U.S. free trade agreements with 
     Singapore and Chile are milestones in progress toward strong 
     protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
     protection for the digital age. I hope that my comments have 
     helped you to decide in favor of supporting the Singapore and 
     Chile FTAs.
       If you have any further questions, please feel free to 
     contact me or Brenda Becker, Assistant Secretary for 
     Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 482-3662.
           Sincerely,
     Donald L. Evans.
                                  ____


              [From San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 17, 2003.]

                   FCC Rule Could Harm Tech Innovation

                            (By Zoe Lofgren)

        The Federal Communications Commission recently gave itself 
     unprecedented powers to keep new television sets, digital 
     video recorders, handheld devices, third-generation cell 
     phones and even computers out of the hands of American 
     consumers.
        How? The FCC issued new rules on the so-called ``broadcast 
     flag,'' a proposal first put forth by the Motion Picture 
     Association of America purportedly to encourage broadcasters 
     to offer more digital programming.
        The broadcast flag is a single bit of data added to the 
     digital television shows beamed out across the country. By 
     itself, the bit does nothing. Instead, the meat of the new 
     rule requires every future device capable of playing these 
     shows to recognize the flag and include built-in technologies 
     that prevent them from being pirated.
        But here's the kicker. Under the new rules, the FCC gets 
     to decide if a particular technology provides sufficient 
     protection. If you're not on the FCC's pre-approved list, you 
     can't sell your product.
        So what does this mean to you and me? It could mean that 
     future consumer electronics and computing products will never 
     come to market. In our digital world, the FCC is not only 
     targeting television sets. Computers, DVRs and handheld 
     devices can handle flagged content. Indeed, any future device 
     capable of handling digital content could potentially be 
     covered.
        Do we want the FCC wielding veto power over a new Apple 
     computer, Palm handheld or Motorola cell phone? Of course 
     not. This country's technological leadership is rooted in 
     our ability to quickly adapt and innovate, words that are 
     not often used to describe the federal government.
       The FCC's plan sounds a little like the old Soviet Union. 
     And we know how well centralized state control worked for 
     them. That's why Congress never gave the FCC the power to 
     dictate the design of new computers or consumer electronics 
     devices.
       In fact, in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress 
     specifically disavowed such mandates. Apparently, the FCC 
     never got the message. Instead, the FCC believes that its 
     ancillary authority over broadcasting extends to every 
     product that brushes up against digital television. To 
     justify their absurd conclusion, the commissioners even argue 
     that they have the authority to regulate these industries 
     because Congress never said they couldn't.
       The main problem with this or any other government mandate 
     is that they are rooted in the present. It is impossible to 
     predict where American ingenuity will take us. We should do 
     everything we can to foster this ingenuity, not put up 
     roadblocks that will only place our inventors at a 
     competitive disadvantage.
       The FCC's attempt to become the self-anointed gatekeeper to 
     future innovation will undoubtedly benefit the small 
     consortium of companies with approved technologies. But it 
     will also diminish the incentive to bring new technologies to 
     market, hurt consumers who have bought pre-flag devices, and 
     set a dangerous precedent for government mandates on 
     technology.
       That's not to say that the broadcast flag proposal should 
     not be discussed. If Congress, not the FCC, decides that the 
     broadcast flag is necessary, then it should examine ways to 
     implement the flag without stifling innovation and 
     competition. For example, voluntary, non-proprietary 
     standards that preserve interoperability could be set by 
     international non-governmental bodies.
       The real goal should not be to slow down innovation, but to 
     find ways for broadcasters to get paid when they deserve 
     payment.

  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. English), who is cochair of the Morocco Caucus.
  Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, today we are considering landmark legislation to 
implement the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, and delve deeper into 
the bonds of friendship with the Kingdom of Morocco. Just 4 days ago, 
we marked exactly 217 years of official relations with Morocco, the 
longest unbroken diplomatic relationship in the existence of the United 
States. While the furthering of our positive ties with Morocco is 
certainly an important goal, this FTA really stands on its own as a 
benefit to our economy.

[[Page H6625]]

  The U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement was negotiated over a period of 
a year and a half and, once implemented, will be truly a win-win for 
both of our countries. This is, in my view, an FTA which contains the 
best market access package of any FTA that has been negotiated with a 
developing country.
  I believe it has the potential to serve as a model for future free 
trade agreements with developing countries, particularly because of 
tough provisions to enforce intellectual property rights. The Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement contains the most advanced intellectual property 
chapter in any FTA negotiated thus far. It contains language that not 
only commits Morocco to fight piracy, but to fight piracy on products 
that are potentially coming through as transshipment.
  Morocco is a natural market for many American companies, and a Free 
Trade Agreement will bring both countries closer together for mutual 
benefit.
  The International Trade Commission has also determined that U.S. 
exports to Morocco are likely to increase dramatically, by $740 
million, while imports from Morocco are likely to increase by nearly 
$200 million after full implementation of the Free Trade Agreement.
  The major reason for the anticipated increase in U.S. exports is due 
to the fact that on day one of this agreement, 95 percent of tariffs on 
industrial and consumer goods will be eliminated. Morocco has 
demonstrated consistently its commitment to being a fair and 
responsible trading partner. They have taken steps to guarantee the 
security of foreign investment in Morocco, and have enacted sweeping 
labor laws to protect their workers and to improve women's rights. 
These negotiations were a catalyst for Morocco moving forward with a 
modernizing labor code.
  Moreover, workers in Morocco have the right to associate, 
collectively bargain, and to strike. The new labor law also improved 
worker safety, raised the minimum wage, and created additional 
safeguards on child labor, all core obligations of the U.S.-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement, including labor and environmental provisions, 
which are subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the 
agreement, and the agreement includes strong enforcement mechanisms, 
including the ability to suspend trade concessions or establish 
monetary assessments.
  This agreement deepens America's dialogue with the Middle East and 
North Africa, and builds upon the free trade agreements already reached 
with Israel and Jordan.
  The U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in my view, is an essential 
part of the puzzle in moving forward to strengthen our trade 
relationships with our trading partners, establish stronger, more 
enforceable trade agreements, and establish over time a level playing 
field in which American companies and American workers can thrive.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe the passage of this FTA will be a significant 
achievement in moving toward a stronger trade policy for the United 
States, and on the strength of that, I urge all of my colleagues to 
join me in supporting this FTA.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman 
from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Ohio for yielding me 
this time.
  Let me begin by saying I am prepared to yield time to any proponent 
of this bill who can tell me what the minimum wage is in Morocco. I 
heard that it has gone up. What is it, 20 cents an hour, 30 cents an 
hour? What is the minimum wage in Morocco?
  I am prepared to yield time if anyone who is supporting this bill 
will tell me if Morocco is a democratic society. We heard about 
workers' rights. My understanding is that it is an hereditary monarchy 
where the legislature there could be abolished at any time by the King. 
Does anybody want to respond to that? I am waiting. I hear no response.
  A few minutes ago, Mr. Speaker, we were told that gay marriage was 
going to destroy the fabric of American society. Well, I will tell my 
colleagues what is going to destroy the fabric of American society: 
pieces of legislation like this that are wiping out the middle class of 
this country, are lowering our standard of living, are making the gap 
between the rich and the poor grow wider.
  I would yield again to my friends who are pushing this bill if they 
will tell me whether they agree with Thomas Donohue, the President of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who several weeks ago urged, urged 
American companies to outsource, urged American companies to throw our 
workers out on the street and go to China or Morocco.
  Will any proponents of this legislation tell me that they disagree 
with Mr. Donohue? I yield time to anybody who says they disagree with 
Mr. Donohue, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. I do not hear it.
  In other words, the proponents of this bill are telling us that they 
think it is a good idea that Americans workers are thrown out on the 
street, lose decent paying jobs, and are forced to compete in a race to 
the bottom against desperate people all over the world who are working 
for pennies an hour.
  Mr. Speaker, what is happening in our society today is that while 
productivity increases, while technology expands, the reality is that 
the middle class is shrinking and the average American worker is 
working longer hours for lower wages. There are a lot of reasons for 
that, but certainly one of the reasons is that our working class, our 
middle class is being asked to compete against desperate people in 
Morocco, in China, all over this world. And American corporations are 
saying, why should I pay an American worker $10, $15 an hour, have 
unions, protect the environment, when I can go to Morocco, I can go to 
China, and big money interests in this country, with the help of the 
Republican leadership, is going to make it easier for me to go abroad.
  What is happening to this economy is an outrage in terms of the needs 
of our kids. The U.S. Department of Labor has projected that 7 out of 
the 10 fastest-growing jobs in the next 10 years are going to pay low 
wages, require a high school degree, with minimal benefits. We are 
losing our manufacturing base. In the last 3 years, 2.7 million good-
paying manufacturing jobs gone. Now they are taking our information 
technology jobs to India. Gone. And what is going to be left for our 
kids? Well, Wal-Mart is doing very well; Burger King is doing very 
well. Is that what we want for our kids? Why are we selling out the 
middle class of this country? Why are we allowing corporate America to 
go abroad?
  Well, I would suggest that we should look at the campaign 
contributions that come in to this institution from corporate America. 
No, let us have trade that is fair, not this trade agreement.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The new Morocco labor law is a significant improvement over existing 
labor laws and regulations. The law raises the minimum employment age 
from 12 to 15 to combat child labor, reduces the work week from 48 to 
44 hours with overtime rates payable for additional hours, and calls 
for a periodic review of the Moroccan minimum wage.

                              {time}  1645

  Effective July 1, 2004, the minimum wage in Morocco will increase by 
10 percent. Morocco did this to make itself a more attractive FTA 
partner.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Brady).
  Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me 
the time and for his leadership on this issue.
  I hope the American public was listening carefully to our friend and 
colleague from Vermont. What he said was what tears apart the fabric of 
America is to allow our farmers to sell more of their corn to Morocco. 
He made the point that our farmers who are trying to sell more corn to 
Morocco, because they buy a lot of it, our farmers who grow wheat and 
sell more of it will sell more of it to Morocco, that that is bad for 
America, that companies in Texas, from workers, from petro chemical 
plants, our computer manufacturing plants, our chemical plants, hard-
working workers who are trying to build more products to sell overseas 
to Morocco, that this will tear apart the fabric of America.
  I think it is just the opposite. The problem we have is that there 
are too many American-need-not-apply signs around this world. We are 
not able to

[[Page H6626]]

sell our products and our goods and our services across the world. 
American workers are the most productive. Our products are great. We 
need a chance to sell them to customers throughout the world, and what 
this agreement does is make sure that we are given a fair chance to 
sell the great products that we build.
  In Texas we are the fourth largest exporting State to Morocco, $23 
million of goods and services: ag products, petroleum products, 
chemical products, processed foods, computers and electronics. All made 
by Texas workers who want to sell their products overseas, but we are 
blocked. This agreement opens those markets for all workers, because 
that is their future, to sell more products to whoever can afford to do 
that.
  And as Americans, we know that unless we open these markets, if we 
just agree to sell to ourselves, to allow Europe to sell to these 
markets, Asia to sell to these markets, South America to sell to these 
markets, our prosperity is in danger. This is a great agreement for 
American workers, and I strongly support it.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Meeks).
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time.
  Passage of this agreement stands to greatly benefit the United States 
of America, which enjoys a consistent yearly trade surplus with 
Morocco, totaling over $1.5 billion from 1992 to 2003. This agreement 
is a high-standard, comprehensive one that will eliminate tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade.
  In fact, the agreement represents the best industrial and consumer 
goods market access package of any U.S. FTA with a developing nation. 
The agreement also levels the playing field for U.S. businesses, 
farmers, and workers vis-a-vis European competitors, who have for far 
too long enjoyed a competitive advantage over the United States 
suppliers of goods, services, and agricultural products. The agreement 
will also serve as a key building block toward the establishment of a 
broader Middle East free trade area.
  Through this FTA, Morocco also sets an important example throughout 
the developing world of the benefits of trade liberalization and 
strategic importance of high-standard rules that should govern trade. 
In this respect, the FTA includes the best of intellectual property 
rights protections negotiated to date by the United States.
  In addition, the Moroccan government has used the FTA negotiating 
process to strengthen its own laws, particularly with respect to the 
status of women and labor rights, two measures which distinguish 
Morocco from many of its Arab neighbors.
  Finally, this FTA is historic. It is a historic milestone in the 
United States and Morocco bilateral relationship, which began well over 
200 years ago, where Morocco was the first country to recognize the 
newly independent United States of America. Morocco today remains one 
of the United States' closest political allies in the war against 
terror and a steadfast friend in advancing peace in the Middle East.
  And it is for these reasons I urge all of my colleagues to support 
the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement. This is a solid agreement that 
promotes our commercial interests and contains important provisions on 
agriculture, labor, and intellectual property.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, let me first congratulate the former speaker 
for his presentation and what he had to say.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. 
Bereuter).
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this 
legislation. I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  There are a number of economic reasons why this FTA is very much in 
the national interest of the United States, but I want to focus a few 
comments on the diplomatic or foreign policy reasons. The FTA with 
Morocco is in our Nation's interest because it will begin to implement 
the President's vision for a U.S.-Middle East free trade area. I also 
believe it is important to support the economic reform that is going on 
in Morocco, a nation where Islam has deep roots and which occupies a 
leadership position in the Arab world.
  As mentioned frequently here, American friendship in Morocco extends 
back to the beginning of our Republic. We have the longest-standing 
friendship treaty with that country of any in the world. The enactment 
of the FTA legislation with Morocco is a vitally important part of the 
process of boosting economic reform inside the Kingdom of Morocco. In 
addition, this FTA helps further link the Middle East into the global 
economic system and spur economic growth and investment. These closer 
commercial links with our key allies such as Morocco are critically 
important to the region of the world. And hear this: this legislation 
makes it less likely, less likely that jobs and businesses will move to 
Morocco, not more likely.
  It is also vital to point out that Morocco has recently undertaken a 
diplomatic offensive designed to improve its relations with its 
neighbors to settle a 3-decade-old Saharan conflict. It is also 
stepping up its antiterrorism cooperation with the U.S. and with 
Algeria. And recently, it was designated as a major non-NATO ally. That 
should enable it to get the requisite assistance and cooperation to 
strengthen our regional and bilateral relationship.
  Mr. Speaker, for economic or export reasons, there are three primary 
reasons why this is a good step for us. This FTA is in the best 
agriculture interest of the United States. Number two, the FTA will 
give us market access for businesses. And, three, it meets the labor 
and environmental standards set out in the Trade Promotion Act.
  In the area of agriculture, it means, for example, that we are going 
to have an estimated triple increase in our exports to Morocco. In the 
area of industrial products, it is suggested that our greater market 
access will be very important. More than 95 percent of the bilateral 
trade industrial products will become duty-free immediately upon entry 
into force of this agreement. And in the third area, as I mentioned, it 
does meet the labor and environmental standards.
  Moreover, Morocco recently passed a comprehensive new labor law that 
meets international labor organizational core labor standards, 
including right of workers to strike.
  In conclusion, this is a very good step for the United States. It is 
very good for our bilateral relations, and I would say finally that the 
Mediterranean Group of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I happen to be 
the president, recently visited Morocco, and as a result of that visit, 
by unanimous action in the standing committee, we decided to upgrade 
Morocco from observer status to an associate member status because of 
the significant progress they are making in democracy in their 
parliament.
  For all of these reasons, I urge strong support of the legislation.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Strickland).
  Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Speaker, here we go again contemplating the 
passage of another free trade agreement before we have done the basic 
reforms that we need to do to protect the American company, the 
American workers, the American community.
  The truth is we need a moratorium on any further trade agreements 
until we reach a political consensus in this country about what those 
agreements are going to be like.
  For example, there is such inconsistency in the decisions we make in 
this body. Are people aware that we cannot go visit Cuba as free 
American citizens? And the administration has just recently decided 
that those who live in this country with relatives in Cuba can only go 
there every 10 years to visit their loved ones. Why? Well, because Cuba 
is a communist country. Fidel Castro is an authoritarian dictator. And, 
yet, we are encouraging free trade with China. We want our citizens to 
travel to China. We want our companies to invest in China.
  The last time I knew or heard, China was a communist country, it was 
authoritarian, it was a country that routinely violates human rights, 
puts those of religious faith in prison. Why the inconsistency? Why the 
inconsistency?

[[Page H6627]]

  Now, my friends talk about how we are going to sell all of the wheat, 
agricultural products to Morocco. Those who like these free trade 
agreements enjoy talking about all of the products we are going to 
export. They never talk about all the products that are being flooded, 
poured into this country. Every day that passes, this country has a 
$1.5 billion trade deficit, every day, $1.5 billion.
  I have here a copy of the economic report of the President. He 
submitted this and transmitted it to Congress in February of this year. 
His signature is on this economic report. I think that makes him 
responsible for what is inside it.
  On page 25 of that report under a section titled ``International 
Trade and Finance'' are these words: ``When a good or a service is 
produced at lower cost in another country, it makes sense to import it 
rather than to produce it domestically.''
  I read it again for those who may have thought they were unable to 
believe their ears. In the President's economic report to the Nation 
are these words: ``When a good or a service is produced at lower cost 
in another country, it makes sense to import it rather than to produce 
it domestically.''
  I ask Mr. Don Evans, Secretary of Commerce, reported to be one of the 
President's closest personal friends, if he would give me a list of the 
products that cannot be produced at lower cost in another country, a 
country like China where they use slave labor, where they violate human 
rights. We need to wake up in this country. The American people need to 
demand that the President and those of us who serve in this Chamber put 
their needs first.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Pitts) for the purpose of engaging in a colloquy.
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from 
California (Chairman Thomas) as well for his leadership on the U.S.-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement. I am a free trader and believe that free 
trade helps our Nation and the nations of the world. However, I am 
deeply concerned about the issue of Western Sahara, and I have had 
concerns that the U.S. needed to make clear that this free trade 
agreement covers only the internationally- and the U.S.-recognized 
borders of Morocco and does not include the disputed territory of 
Western Sahara. It is my understanding that the language in the 
conference report makes clear that the free trade agreement does not 
cover resources, goods, services, or any other entity related to trade 
that originates in Western Sahara.
  I would ask the gentleman, does the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
cover trade with the disputed territory of Western Sahara?

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PITTS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. CRANE. The Committee on Ways and Means' report states the clear 
coverage of the free trade agreement. ``The committee notes that the 
FTA will cover trade with and investment in the territory of Morocco as 
recognized by the United States, which does not include the Western 
Sahara.''
  Mr. PITTS. I thank the chairman for that clarification.
  The following is a letter from USTR making clear that we do not 
support Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara and the FTA does not 
recognize or include the Western Sahara.
         Executive Office of the President, the United States 
           Trade Representative,
                                    Washington, DC, July 20, 2004.
     Hon. Joseph R. Pitts,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Pitts: Thank you for your letter of July 
     19, 2004, concerning our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
     Morocco and the status of Western Sahara.
       The Administration's position on Western Sahara is clear: 
     sovereignty of Western Sahara is in dispute, and the United 
     States fully supports the United Nations' effort to resolve 
     this issue. The United States and many other countries do not 
     recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have 
     consistently urged the parties to work with the United 
     Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.
       The FTA will cover trade and investment in the territory of 
     Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include 
     Western Sahara. As our Harmonized Tariff Schedule makes 
     clear, for U.S. Customs purposes, the United States treats 
     imports from Western Sahara and Morocco differently. Nothing 
     in the FTA will require us to change this practice. The 
     Administration will draft the proclamation authorized in the 
     legislation implementing the FTA (H.R. 4842) to provide 
     preferential tariff treatment for goods from the territory of 
     Morocco. Preferential tariff treatment will not be provided 
     to goods from Western Sahara.
       I hope this letter addresses your question regarding the 
     FTA and the status of Western Sahara. I encourage you to 
     support the FTA. It will create economic opportunities for 
     U.S. manufacturing and service firms, workers, and farmers, 
     and will support economic reforms and foreign investment in 
     Morocco.
       Thank you again for your letter. Please feel free to 
     contact me should you have further questions.
           Sincerely,
                                               Robert B. Zoellick.

  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, thank you for your leadership.
  While trade is a vital component to strengthening with the greater 
Middle East, promoting the spread of democracy is even more so. The 
Sahrawi are a peaceful pro-Western, pro-democracy people. They want the 
international community, including the U.N. Security Council and the 
United States, to uphold its commitment to a free and transparent 
referendum for self-determination, and it is unacceptable that Morocco 
has been allowed to prevent that vote from taking place.
  During his tenure the former Secretary of State Baker proposed a plan 
that both parties accepted at first, and the Moroccans accepted the 
plan, but as soon as the people of Western Sahara accepted they 
withdrew their support, and I am deeply concerned that the Moroccan 
government, as patterned, will use this agreement with help from 
friends in France and others to attempt to increase its exploitation of 
the resources.
  I just want to clarify the statement about the people of Western 
Sahara. Earlier today someone said that the Sahrawis are terrorists. I 
take exception to this remark, as the people of Western Sahara, and 
like many others in North Africa and the Middle East, have actually 
tried to peacefully solve the conflict. The State Department does not 
consider the people of Western Sahara to be terrorists. It is a 
misstatement. It is wrong. It is unproductive in our fight against 
terrorism to suggest that they are, and our own State Department does 
not believe the people of Western Sahara are terrorists.
  Secondly, I visited there. I visited the refugee camps. I know the 
people. They are not terrorists. Members of this House should go to the 
refugee camps. They should see the terrible malnutrition of the people, 
the lack of health care, the refugee camps. If they would visit the 
refugee camps they would know that the information fed to them by 
supporters is inaccurate.
  Mr. Chairman, I am voting for the FTA because there is protection for 
the people and resources of Western Sahara and because I believe the 
free trade will help the people of Morocco and those of surrounding 
countries.
  The following is a series of items that would make clear that this 
agreement should not be abused by Morocco to profit off of land that it 
has no legitimate claim to.

          Western Sahara--Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975


                     International Court of Justice

       In its Advisory Opinion which the General Assembly of the 
     United Nations had requested on two questions concerning 
     Western Sahara, the Court,
       With regard to Question I, ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro 
     and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a 
     territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?'',
       --decided by 13 votes to 3 to comply with the request for 
     an advisory opinion;
       --was unanimously of opinion that Western Sahara (Rio de 
     Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain 
     was not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius).
       With regard to Question II, ``What were the legal ties 
     between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the 
     Mauritanian entity?'', the Court
       --decided by 14 votes to 2 to comply with the request for 
     an advisory opinion;
       --was of opinion, by 14 votes to 2, that there were legal 
     ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco of the 
     kinds indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the Advisory 
     Opinion;
       --was of opinion, by 15 votes to 1, that there were legal 
     ties between this territory

[[Page H6628]]

     and the Mauritanian entity of the kinds indicated in the 
     penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion.
       The penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion was to 
     the effect that:
       The materials and information presented to the Court show 
     the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal 
     ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of 
     the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They 
     equally show the existence of rights, including some rights 
     relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between 
     the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the 
     territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's 
     conclusion is that the materials and information presented to 
     it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty 
     between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
     Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not 
     found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the 
     application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
     decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the 
     principle of self-determination through the free and genuine 
     expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.
       For these proceedings the Court was composed as follows: 
     President Lachs; Vice-President Ammoun; Judges Forster, Gros, 
     Bengzon, Petren, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro, 
     Morozov, Jimenez de Arechaga, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Nagendra 
     Singh and Ruda; Judge ad hoc Boni.
       Judges Gros, Ignacio-Pinto and Nagendra Singh appended 
     declarations to the Advisory Opinion; Vice-President Ammoun 
     and Judges Forster, Petren, Dillard, de Castro and Boni 
     appended separate opinions, and Judge Ruda a dissenting 
     opinion.
       In these declarations and opinions the judges concerned 
     make clear and explain their positions.
      Course of the Proceedings
     (paras. 1-13 of Advisory Opinion)
       The Court first recalls that the General Assembly of the 
     United Nations decided to submit two questions for the 
     Court's advisory opinion by resolution 3292 (XXIX) adopted on 
     13 December 1974 and received in the Registry on 21 December. 
     It retraces the subsequent steps in the proceedings, 
     including the transmission of a dossier of documents by the 
     Secretary-General of the United Nations (Statute, Art. 65, 
     para. 2) and the presentation of written statements or 
     letters and/or oral statements by 14 States, including 
     Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain and Zaire (Statute, Art. 
     66).
       Mauritania and Morocco each asked to be authorized to 
     choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the proceedings. By an Order 
     of 22 May 1975 (1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 6), the Court found 
     that Morocco was entitled under Articles 31 and 68 of the 
     Statute and Article 89 of the Rules of Court to choose a 
     person to sit as judge ad hoc, but that, in the case of 
     Mauritania, the conditions for the application of those 
     Articles had not been satisfied. At the same time the Court 
     stated that those conclusions in no way prejudged its views 
     with regard to the questions referred to it or any other 
     question which might fall to be decided, including those of 
     its competence to give an advisory opinion and the propriety 
     of exercising that competence.
     Competence of the Court
     (paras. 14-22 of Advisory Opinion)
       Under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Court 
     may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the 
     request of any duly authorized body. The Court notes that the 
     General Assembly of the United Nations is suitably authorized 
     by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and that the two 
     questions submitted are framed in terms of law and raise 
     problems of international law. They are in principle 
     questions of a legal character, even if they also embody 
     questions of fact, and even if they do not call upon the 
     Court to pronounce on existing rights and obligations. The 
     Court is accordingly competent to entertain the request.
     Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion
     (paras. 23-74 of Advisory Opinion)
       Spain put forward objections which in its view would render 
     the giving of an opinion incompatible with the Court's 
     judicial character. It referred in the first place to the 
     fact that it had not given its consent to the Court's 
     adjudicating upon the questions submitted. It maintained (a) 
     that the subject of the questions was substantially identical 
     to that of a dispute concerning Western Sahara which Morocco, 
     in September 1974, had invited it to submit jointly to the 
     Court, a proposal which it had refused: the advisory 
     jurisdiction was therefore being used to circumvent the 
     principle that the Court has no jurisdiction to settle a 
     dispute without the consent of the parties; (b) that the case 
     involved a dispute concerning the attribution of territorial 
     sovereignty over Western Sahara and that the consent of 
     States was always necessary for the adjudication of such 
     disputes; (c) that in the circumstances of the case the Court 
     could not fulfill the requirements of good administration of 
     justice with regard to the determination of the facts. The 
     Court considers (a) that the General Assembly, while noting 
     that a legal controversy over the status of Western Sahara 
     had arisen during its discussions, did not have the object of 
     bringing before the Court a dispute or legal controversy with 
     a view to its subsequent peaceful settlement, but sought an 
     advisory opinion which would be of assistance in the exercise 
     of its functions concerning the decolonization of the 
     territory, hence the legal position of Spain could not be 
     compromised by the Court's answers to the questions 
     submitted; (b) that those questions do not call upon the 
     Court to adjudicate on existing territorial rights; (c) that 
     it has been placed in possession of sufficient information 
     and evidence.
       Spain suggested in the second place that the questions 
     submitted to the Court were academic and devoid of purpose or 
     practical effect, in that the United Nations had already 
     settled the method to be followed for the decolonization of 
     Western Sahara, namely a consultation of the indigenous 
     population by means of a referendum to be conducted by Spain 
     under United Nations auspices. The Court examines the 
     resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject, 
     from resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the 
     Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
     Countries and Peoples, to resolution 3292 (XXIX) on Western 
     Sahara, embodying the request for advisory opinion. It 
     concludes that the decolonization process envisaged by the 
     General Assembly is one which will respect the right of the 
     population of Western Sahara to determine their future 
     political status by their own freely expressed will. This 
     right to self-determination, which is not affected by the 
     request for advisory opinion and constitutes a basic 
     assumption of the questions put to the Court, leaves the 
     General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the 
     forms and procedures by which it is to be realized. The 
     Advisory Opinion will thus furnish the Assembly with elements 
     of a legal character relevant to that further discussion of 
     the problem to which resolution 3292 (XXIX) alludes.
       Consequently the Court finds no compelling reason for 
     refusing to give a reply to the two questions submitted to it 
     in the request for advisory opinion.
     Question I: ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El 
         Hamra) at the Time of Colonization by Spain a Territory 
         Belonging to No One (terra nullius)?''
     (paras. 75-83 of Advisory Opinion)
       For the purposes of the Advisory Opinion, the ``time of 
     colonization by Spain'' may be considered as the period 
     beginning in 1884, when Spain proclaimed its protectorate 
     over the Rio de Oro. It is therefore by reference to the law 
     in force at that period that the legal concept of terra 
     nullius must be interpreted. In law, ``occupation'' was a 
     means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory 
     otherwise than by cession or succession; it was a cardinal 
     condition of a valid ``occupation'' that the territory should 
     be terra nullius. According to the State practice of that 
     period, territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a 
     social and political organization were not regarded as terrae 
     nullius: in their case sovereignty was not generally 
     considered as effected through occupation, but through 
     agreements concluded with local rulers. The information 
     furnished to the Court shows (a) that at the time of 
     colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, 
     if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes 
     and under chiefs competent to represent them; (b) that Spain 
     did not proceed upon the basis that it was establishing its 
     sovereignty over terrae nullius: thus in his Order of 26 
     December 1884 the King of Spain proclaimed that he was 
     taking the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of 
     agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes.
       The Court therefore gives a negative answer to Question I. 
     In accordance with the terms of the request for advisory 
     opinion, ``if the answer to the first question is in the 
     negative'', the Court is to reply to Question II.
     Question II: ``What Were the Legal Ties of This Territory 
         with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian Entity?''
     (paras. 84-161 of Advisory Opinion)
       The meaning of the words ``legal ties'' has to be sought in 
     the object and purpose of resolution 3292 (XXIX) of the 
     United Nations General Assembly. It appears to the Court that 
     they must be understood as referring to such legal ties as 
     may affect the policy to be followed in the decolonization of 
     Western Sahara. The Court cannot accept the view that the 
     ties in question could be limited to ties established 
     directly with the territory and without reference to the 
     people who may be found in it. At the time of its 
     colonization the territory had a sparse population that for 
     the most part consisted of nomadic tribes the members of 
     which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes, 
     sometimes reaching as far as southern Morocco or regions of 
     present-day Mauritania Algeria or other States. These tribes 
     were of the Islamic faith.
       Morocco (paragraphs 90-129 of the Advisory Opinion) 
     presented its claim to legal ties with Western Sahara as a 
     claim to ties of sovereignty on the ground of an alleged 
     immemorial possession of the territory and an uninterrupted 
     exercise of authority. In the view of the Court, however, 
     what must be of decisive importance in determining its answer 
     to Question II must be evidence directly relating to 
     effective display of authority in Western Sahara at the time 
     of its colonization by Spain and in the period immediately 
     preceding. Morocco requests that the Court should take 
     account of the special structure of the Moroccan State. That 
     State was founded on the common religious bond of Islam and 
     on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through 
     their caids or sheiks, rather than on the notion of 
     territory. It consisted partly of what was called the Bled 
     Makhzen, areas actually subject to the Sultan, and partly of 
     what was called the Bled

[[Page H6629]]

     Siba, areas in which the tribes were not submissive to him; 
     at the relevant period, the areas immediately to the north of 
     Western Sahara lay within the Bled Siba.
       As evidence of its display of sovereignty in Western 
     Sahara, Morocco invoked alleged acts of internal display of 
     Moroccan authority, consisting principally of evidence said 
     to show the allegiance of Saharan caids to the Sultan, 
     including dahirs and other documents concerning the 
     appointment of caids, the alleged imposition of Koranic and 
     other taxes, and acts of military resistance to foreign 
     penetration of the territory. Morocco also relied on certain 
     international acts said to constitute recognition by other 
     States of its sovereignty over the whole or part of Western 
     Sahara, including (a) certain treaties concluded with Spain, 
     the United States and Great Britain and Spain between 1767 
     and 1861, provisions of which dealt inter alia with the 
     safety of persons shipwrecked on the coast of Wad Noun or its 
     vicinity, (b) certain bilateral treaties of the late 
     nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whereby Great 
     Britain, Spain, France and Germany were said to have 
     recognized that Moroccan sovereignty extended as far south as 
     Cape Bojador or the boundary of the Rio de Oro.
       Having considered this evidence and the observations of the 
     other States which took part in the proceedings, the Court 
     finds that neither the internal nor the international acts 
     relied upon by Morocco indicate the existence at the relevant 
     period of either the existence or the international 
     recognition of legal ties of territorial sovereignty between 
     Western Sahara and the Moroccan State. Even taking account of 
     the specific structure of that State, they do not show that 
     Morocco displayed any effective and exclusive State activity 
     in Western Sahara. They do, however, provide indications that 
     a legal tie of allegiance existed at the relevant period 
     between the Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic 
     peoples of the territory, through Tekna caids of the Noun 
     region, and they show that the Sultan displayed, and was 
     recognized by other States to possess, some authority or 
     influence with respect to those tribes.
       The term ``Mauritanian entity'' (paragraphs 139-152 of the 
     Advisory Opinion) was first employed during the session of 
     the General Assembly in 1974 at which resolution 3292 (XXIX), 
     requesting an advisory opinion of the Court, was adopted. It 
     denotes the cultural, geographical and social entity within 
     which the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was to be created. 
     According to Mauritania, that entity, at the relevant period, 
     was the Bilad Shinguitti or Shinguitti country, a distinct 
     human unit, characterized by a common language, way of life, 
     religion and system of laws, featuring two types of political 
     authority: emirates and tribal groups.
       Expressly recognizing that these emirates and tribes did 
     not constitute a State, Mauritania suggested that the 
     concepts of ``nation'' and of ``people'' would be the most 
     appropriate to explain the position of the Shinguitti people 
     at the time of colonization. At that period, according to 
     Mauritania, the Mauritanian entity extended from the Senegal 
     river to the Wad Sakiet El Hamra. The territory at present 
     under Spanish administration and the present territory of the 
     Islamic Republic of Mauritania thus together constituted 
     indissociable parts of a single entity and had legal ties 
     with one another.
       The information before the Court discloses that, while 
     there existed among them many ties of a racial, linguistic, 
     religious, cultural and economic nature, the emirates and 
     many of the tribes in the entity were independent in relation 
     to one another; they had no common institutions or organs. 
     The Mauritanian entity therefore did not have the character 
     of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the 
     several emirates or tribes which comprised it. The Court 
     concludes that at the time of colonization by Spain there did 
     not exist between the territory of Western Sahara and the 
     Mauritanian entity any tie of sovereignty, or of allegiance 
     of tribes, or of simple inclusion in the same legal entity. 
     Nevertheless, the General Assembly does not appear to have so 
     framed Question II as to confine the question exclusively to 
     those legal ties which imply territorial sovereignty, which 
     would be to disregard the possible relevance of other legal 
     ties to the decolonization process. The Court considers that, 
     in the relevant period, the nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti 
     country possessed rights, including some rights relating to 
     the lands through which they migrated. These rights 
     constituted legal ties between Western Sahara and the 
     Mauritanian entity. They were ties which knew no frontier 
     between the territories and were vital to the very 
     maintenance of life in the region.
       Morocco and Mauritania both laid stress on the overlapping 
     character of the respective legal ties which they claimed 
     Western Sahara to have had with them at the time of 
     colonization (paragraphs 153-160 of the Advisory Opinion). 
     Although their views appeared to have evolved considerably in 
     that respect, the two States both stated at the end of the 
     proceedings that there was a north appertaining to Morocco 
     and a south appertaining to Mauritania without any 
     geographical void in between, but with some overlapping as a 
     result of the intersection of nomadic routes. The Court 
     confines itself to noting that this geographical overlapping 
     indicates the difficulty of disentangling the various 
     relationships existing in the Western Sahara region at the 
     time of colonization.
       For these reasons, the Court (paragraphs 162 and 163 of the 
     Advisory Opinion) gives the replies indicated on pages 1 and 
     2 above.

               [From Reuters News Service, Jan. 13, 2004]

               Sardines and Sovereignty in Western Sahara

                           (By Eileen Byrne)

       Laayoune, Western Sahara.--On trawlers at the quayside near 
     Laayoune, the main city in Moroccan-controlled Western 
     Sahara, the crew unload sardines in wicker baskets thrown 
     from hand to hand.
       The traditional baskets are misleading, because the yield 
     of sardines, octopus and squid from the Western Saharan ports 
     of Laayoune, Boujdour and Dakhla has come to represent more 
     than 60 percent of Morocco's total annual fisheries yield of 
     almost one million tons. With sovereignty over the Western 
     Sahara still in dispute, this is a politically significant 
     catch.
       The uncertainty about the future of this vast, mainly 
     desert territory in the northwest corner of Africa puts a 
     dampener, for now, on investment in tourism for winter sun-
     seekers, officials in Laayoune admit.
       But against the backdrop of diplomatic stalemate, as the 
     United Nations strives for a solution to the dispute between 
     Morocco and the Polisario separatist movement, Morocco is 
     keen to show that the regional economy is developing apace.
       The fishing sector is one area where the authorities can 
     point to significant growth, always under the firm guiding 
     hand of the central government.


                         southern-most subjects

       Claiming Western Sahara as its historic ``southern 
     provinces,'' Morocco controls most of the territory.
       The Polisario movement, based across the border in Algeria, 
     sees the future of the area as an independent state, governed 
     by its Saharan Arab inhabitants, known as Sahrawis.
       Since a 1991 cease-fire, successive U.N. initiatives aimed 
     at ending a dispute which dates from 1975, and asserting the 
     Sahrawis' right to ``self-determination,'' have failed.
       Advocates of independence for Western Sahara stress the 
     territory's mineral wealth, with the phosphate mine at Boukra 
     near Laayoune, and possible offshore oil reserves.
       But the Boukra mine is loss-making and subsidized by the 
     Office Cherifien des Phosphates' more important phosphate 
     production near Khouribga, according to officials. It is 
     fishing that generates new jobs and export earnings. Western 
     Sahara fish products now account for up to seven percent of 
     Morocco's total export earnings of 85.6 billion dirhams 
     ($9.80 billion).
       Morocco declined to renew a fishing accord with the 
     European Union which until the late 1990s had allowed foreign 
     boats into Moroccan waters. It has instead spent heavily 
     since then on port infrastructure in Western Sahara, as 
     though consolidating its hold on the territory.
       Like all other businesses in Western Sahara, the sardine 
     canning businesses, and plants processing octopus for 
     Japanese dinner tables, pay no taxes except for payroll 
     contributions.
       They also benefit from the subsidies in the prices of fuel, 
     power and water with which Morocco woos its southern-most 
     subjects, who account for less than two percent of the 
     kingdom's 29.6 million population.
       Local investors are often Sahrawi notables who see the 
     territory's future with Rabat rather than the Polisario and 
     who play a prominent role in the local economy. A little over 
     a generation ago, the Sahrawis' lifestyle revolved around 
     camel and goat rearing. Fish did not figure at all in the 
     Sahrawi diet and even today few Sahrawis work directly with 
     fish.
       But among new investors, the favorable conditions for 
     businesses can sometimes encourage over-hasty decisions.


                        octopus for the japanese

       Lining the walls of the conference room in the Laayoune 
     governor's headquarters, photos showed a visit to Western 
     Sahara by Morocco's King Mohammed.
       Some 40 men, and one woman wrapped in the colored veil worn 
     in Western Sahara, listened to Morocco's Fisheries Minister 
     Taieb Rhafes. He had flown down from Rabat to explain why he 
     was extending a ban on octopus fishing.
       With him were representatives of Moroccan banks whose loans 
     to local investors had encouraged a proliferation of octopus-
     freezing plants around Dakhla, from a handful in 1997 to 90 
     in 2003. The octopuses have been almost wiped out by over-
     fishing, the minister explained. It takes only three months 
     to have an octopus-freezing plant up and running, said an 
     official.
       At Laayoune port, the fishermen are not Sahrawis, but come 
     from Moroccan ports further north--Agadir, Essaouira and 
     Safi. A spontaneous movement of sardines southwards, traced 
     by Morocco's fisheries research institute, the INRH, 
     coincided with the development of infrastructure in the 
     Western Sahara. The fishermen followed the fish southwards, 
     bringing their expertise with them.
       Moroccan officials have no separate figures for employment 
     among Sahrawis and non-Sahrawis. ``There are no two 
     communities here,'' only Moroccan citizens, Laayoune Governor 
     Mohamed Rharrabi told Reuters.
       With the sea-faring culture far-removed from the 
     traditional Sahrawi lifestyle, it seems fishing will provide 
     only some of the jobs needed in the Laayoune region, where 
     unemployment at the last census was 40 percent among 20 to 24 
     year-olds.

[[Page H6630]]

   Denmark Does Not Recognise Moroccan Sovereignty on Western Sahara

            [From Sahara Press Service (SPS), June 22, 2004]

       COPENHAGEN--Danish Government, does not ``recognise 
     Moroccan sovereignty on Western Sahara'', declared Danish 
     Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Per Stig Mfller, in 
     response to a question he answered before of his Parliament, 
     according to close sources to the Saharawi representation to 
     Denmark.
       Answering a question asked by Danish Member of the 
     Parliamentary group Enhedslisten (Union list, in English), 
     Mr. Soern Soendergaard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
     asserted that his Government ``does not recognise Moroccan 
     sovereignty on Western Sahara'', considering Moroccan 
     presence on the territory as illegal and unacceptable.
       Regarding the peace plan, elaborated by UN Secretary 
     General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker, Mr. Mfller 
     affirmed that this plan remains applicable, recalling that it 
     ``is accepted by Polisario Front and the neighbouring 
     countries and is unanimously adopted by Security Council in 
     its resolution 1495''.
       Finally, the Head of Danish diplomacy reiterated ``the 
     support of Denmark of the efforts paid by UN's Secretary 
     General and his former Personal Envoy aimed at reaching a 
     just and lasting solution to the conflict'', in Western 
     Sahara conforming to international legality and by 
     implementing UN's resolutions.

            [From Sahara Press Service (SPS), June 24, 2004]

German PDC/CSU Calls to Immediate Settlement of Western Sahara Conflict

       Berlin.--The parliamentary group of German Christian 
     Democrat Party (PDC/CSU) in Bundestag (Parliament), called on 
     Thursday to an immediate settlement of Western Sahara's 
     conflict, exhorting international community to pay more 
     efforts in defending Saharawi people's ``right to self-
     determination''.
       In a communique publicised on Thursday, of which SPS 
     received a copy, PDC/CSU parliamentary Group's spokesperson, 
     Dr. Christian Ruck, asserted that ``Western Sahara conflict's 
     settlement tolerates no more delays'', calling international 
     community to pay more efforts in defending Saharawi people's 
     ``right to self-determination''.
       UN Secretary General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker's 
     resignation ``may push to failure'' the peace plan for self-
     determination of Saharawi people, though this plan 
     constitutes ``a reasonable compromise to realise peace in 
     this region'', deplored the spokesperson.
       Thus, the international community is called to ``prove to 
     the people of this region, who is still suffering this old 
     aging conflict, that its right to self-determination remains 
     a priority for the international community'', which should 
     also defend UN's principles and international law, so as to 
     reach a peaceful settlement to this problem, concluded the 
     communique.

            [From Upstream Online & Hardcopy, July 2, 2004]

                  Svitzer Feels Heat in Western Sahara

                           (By Barry Morgan)

       Fugro affiliate Svitzer has just completed a marine survey 
     on Kerr-McGee's Boujdour acreage off the disputed territory 
     of Western Sahara.
       Based in Norfolk in the UK, Svitzer is the latest company 
     to attract brickbats from activists determined to persuade 
     industry players not to sign deals with Morocco, which 
     occupies the territory and claims its resources.
       Following a one-year extension, KMG's reconnaissance permit 
     will expire on 29 October. However, its tenure is contested 
     by the Sahrawi independence militia, which has long fought 
     for sovereign control, stirring international controversy 
     over the licencing regime imposed by Rabat.
       Fellow UK consultancy Robertson Research International 
     (RRI) is also poised to complete survey work in Western 
     Sahara, despite question marks over the legitimacy of UK 
     corporate involvement in what the UK government calls a 
     ``non-self governing territory'' where it says sovereignty 
     remains to be determined under UN auspices. For its part, RRI 
     said it is not directly contracted to Rabat.
       Confirmation of RRI's involvement comes hard on the heels 
     of a campaign launched by Western Sahara support groups 
     across Europe against exploration and production companies 
     doing business at the behest of Rabat.
       Kerr-McGee, Total and TGS-Nopec were blasted for jumping 
     the gun on a fragile peace process in which the UN has sought 
     diplomatic consensus ahead of a referendum on self-
     determination for the Sahrawi people.
       Activists' primary target of late has been UK-registered 
     Wessex Exploration, which was recently invited to Rabat to 
     finalise a preliminary but open-ended deal to analyse onshore 
     data ahead of an exploration push outlined by Moroccan state 
     oil company managing director Amina Benkhadra.
       Wessex has been warned that ``its reputation would suffer'' 
     if it did not back off or negotiate with the Sahrawi 
     authorities.
       In the meantime, several UK parliamentarians have moved to 
     seek clarification of the UK government's position on British 
     companies doing business in Western Sahara. Concerned MPs led 
     by the Labour Party's David Drew, want to pin down Whitehall 
     on its attitude.
       Drew will shortly table a parliamentary question seeking 
     greater clarity. Drew now speaks for the Western Sahara 
     Support Group and two Conservative MPs are expected to join 
     existing members before they resurface as a parliamentary 
     force.
       The UK Foreign Office insists sovereignty in Western Sahara 
     remains undetermined as long as UN calls to resolve the 
     crisis via the so-called Baker Peace Plan remain unheeded. 
     ``We want to push the UK to promote the Plan so that Morocco 
     withdraws. It should also tell British companies that they 
     should not get involved in Western Sahara at this time while 
     the UN mandate remains unimplemented,'' said Drew.
       The Foreign Office currently has no problem with companies 
     winning reconnaissance or E&P licences from Rabat, so long as 
     the practical effect complies with constraints laid down by 
     the UN Legal Office on ``disregarding the rights'' of the 
     Sahrawi people.
       This means Kerr-McGee and Total can use TGS-Nopec and Fugro 
     to shoot seismic as long as rigs are not deployed to confirm 
     or produce oil finds.
       Meanwhile, the acquisition of strategically important 
     seismic data for Rabat as the licensor remains legal under 
     the ``look but don't touch'' interpretation of both UK and US 
     governments. However, a UK official said that ``we'd have to 
     revisit this opinion if activity got this far. There is no 
     official endorsement''.
       ``Right now, our view is that UK companies going into 
     Western Sahara are on their own and we cannot link them to 
     the Department of Trade & Industry or offer the support of 
     any other government mechanisms,'' the source added.
       Two UK-registered companies presently stand on both sides 
     of the fence. Sterling Resources has inherited an exclusive 
     offshore PSC from AIM-listed Fusion Oil & Gas following a 
     recent take-over, while Wessex is under increasing pressure 
     after retaining its exclusive study licence from Rabat.
       After expending $600 million on peace-keeping efforts, the 
     UN system is tiring of the Western Sahara crisis, with UN 
     Special Envoy James Baker resigning in frustration last 
     month.
       The UN's new representative, Alvaro de Soto, said this week 
     that he would pursue the same policy as Baker, suggesting no 
     new ideas to break the deadlock were on the table.
                                  ____


                    [From afrol News, July 12, 2004]

          Norwegian Industry To Exploit Sahrawi Fish Resources

       Norwegian officials are in the process of promoting 
     Norwegian investments in the booming fisheries industry in 
     Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, despite protests by Sahrawi 
     officials. The fisheries industry is the dominant economic 
     sector in the territory, promoting new Moroccan settlements 
     here. Norwegian capital and knowledge is to help this 
     development.
       According to information made available to afrol News, the 
     Norwegian Ambassador in Morocco, Arne Aasheim last week was 
     on a three-day visit to El Aaiun, the capital of the Western 
     Sahara territory. Here, he had meetings with the Moroccan 
     authorities governing the occupied territory and 
     representatives of the fisheries sector.
       Sources wanting to remain anonymous told afrol News that 
     the primary focus in these meetings was on how Norwegian 
     companies could strengthen their foothold in the booming 
     Moroccan fisheries industry, which mainly is based in the 
     occupied territory. Morocco has been singled out as a golden 
     opportunity for Norway's many companies operating in the 
     fisheries sector.
       Norway is one of Europe's leading fisheries nations, also 
     regarding the larger definition of the industry, including 
     the construction of fisheries vessels, fishing technology and 
     fish processing and distribution technology.
       Morocco, on the other hand, during the last years has 
     singled out the fisheries industry as one of its most 
     promising sectors for economic development. After refusing to 
     renew a fisheries agreement with the European Union in 1999, 
     Moroccan authorities are now promoting the establishment of a 
     large national fleet of fishing vessels, fish processing 
     plants and an export infrastructure. Since 2001, 
     approximately euro 150 million have been invested into the 
     sector annually.
       The controversial bit of Morocco's booming fisheries 
     industry is that it is mostly based on the rich fisheries 
     resources off the cost of occupied Western Sahara. According 
     to international law, an occupying state is obliged to manage 
     the renewable resources of the territory it occupies. 
     However, revenues from these resources are to be channelled 
     into the development of the people of the territory.
       In the case of Western Sahara, the revenues of the 
     exploitation of the territory's resources however do not go 
     to the internationally recognised representatives of the 
     Sahrawis--the exiled Polisario government--but instead to the 
     strengthening of Morocco's occupation of the territory. 
     Almost the entire work force of the fisheries sector in 
     Western Sahara is of Moroccan origin and the sector's growth 
     is promoting more Moroccan settlements in the occupied 
     territory.
       While the Norwegian government generally has defended the 
     case of the Sahrawis in their conflict with Morocco, this has 
     not been the case in the important fisheries sector. Mr 
     Aasheim's predecessor at Norway's

[[Page H6631]]

     Rabat Embassy, Ole Kristian Holthe, since 2000 has been an 
     active and passionate promoter of Norwegian investments in 
     Morocco's booming fisheries sector, non-regarding the 
     location of these investments.
       In February 2002, Ambassador Holthe met with the society 
     for Norwegian Maritime Exporters (NME) in Haugesund, 
     informing about that access to ``the Moroccan market is 
     something that is happening now.'' He especially emphasised 
     on the large number of fishing vessels that Moroccan 
     authorities were ordering in an international tender.
       Explaining that Morocco is ``the most stable Arab country 
     oriented towards the West,'' Mr Holthe added that the 
     problems surrounding Western Sahara should not endanger 
     Norwegian investments. ``Norwegian authorities may consider 
     that [official] Norwegian trade promotion devices should not 
     be involved in investments [in Western Sahara], but my 
     opinion is that, as long as one enters as a partner in the 
     fisheries industry--and looks at this geographically--then it 
     should be safe.''
       According to research done by the Norway-based 
     international fisheries media `IntraFish', Norwegian 
     authorities already in 2002 were financially aiding exporters 
     to get a foothold in Morocco; including the occupied 
     territories. This included aid by the Norwegian government's 
     agency guaranteeing export financing and the Scandinavian 
     Investment Bank. At least kroner 30 million (euro 4 million) 
     were available to finance Norwegian exports to Morocco's 
     fisheries sector.
       These government efforts have already produced several 
     Norwegian investments in Western Sahara. In October 2002, the 
     Norwegian company Finsam announced it was constructing an ice 
     producing plant in ``Laayoune, Morocco''--which translates 
     into El Aaiun in Western Sahara. This ice plant is mainly 
     producing ice for fish landed in El Aaiun.
       Other Norwegian investments in the occupied territory's 
     fishery sector include the company Selfa Arctic, which is 
     ``constructing modern coastal fisheries in Morocco;'' Simrad, 
     which delivers marine electronics to Morocco, including to 
     its ``Moroccan retailer in Laayoune;'' Astia Holdings, which 
     exports fishing vessels and equipment to Morocco; and Furuno, 
     which sells electronic navigation equipment in Morocco.
       Ambassador Holthe's indiscrete promotion of Norwegian 
     export opportunities in Western Sahara however became too 
     much for Norwegian authorities. Already in November 2002, 
     Foreign Minister Jan Petersen instructed his Rabat Ambassador 
     to write an official letter to companies investing in Western 
     Sahara and inform them about the political risk and ethical 
     problems.
       According to information given to afrol News, however, 
     Ambassador Holthe smoothened the wording in the letter he 
     sent out to Norwegian companies, saying that the Embassy 
     could see no limits in international law regarding 
     investments in Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr Holthe was 
     replaced and sent to the Norwegian Embassy in Iran for 
     reasons unknown to afrol News.
       Since that, Ambassador Aasheim has inherited the complex 
     question of Norwegian investments in Western Sahara. As far 
     as afrol News has been able to establish, the Norwegian 
     Embassy in Rabat has not lowered its profile regarding this 
     promotion since Mr Aasheim's appointment. Last week's 
     official promotion trip by the Ambassador to El Aaiun is 
     probably the first ever investment promotion trip to the 
     occupied territories by any Norwegian government official.
       It therefore came as a shock to the Polisario exile 
     government. Mouloud Said, the Polisario Representative in 
     Washington told afrol News today that his government 
     considers ``any transaction between the occupying power with 
     any other entity or government as completely illegal at the 
     eyes of international law, and we do condemn any attempt to 
     strengthen the Moroccan occupation.''
       We are disappointed because traditionally, the Norwegians 
     government has been in support of the peoples' right to self-
     determination all over Africa and in particular in Western 
     Sahara, added Mr Said. ``This is uncharacteristic coming from 
     the representative from a government known for its defence of 
     human rights and the right of self-determination.''
       Mr Said further said that the Polisario considered a UN 
     legal opinion issued in 2001, regarding oil exploration in 
     Western Sahara to be of relevance in this case. The legal 
     opinion concluded that Morocco had no right to act on behalf 
     of Western Sahara and market its resources, according to Mr 
     Said.
       Unfortunately, afrol News was not able to gather reactions 
     from Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian Embassy in Rabat 
     did not answer phone calls from afrol News neither on Friday 
     nor today, while spokesperson Cathrine Andersen at the 
     Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to supply afrol 
     News with a direct phone number to Ambassador Aasheim, 
     claiming the Ministry had ``no other information'' on how to 
     get in contact with its Rabat Embassy.

   Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara (Baker Plan I)


              Annex I of SG Report S/2001/613 of 20 Jun 01

       The authority in Western Sahara shall be as follows:
       1. The population of Western Sahara, through their 
     executive, legislative and judicial bodies shall have 
     exclusive competence over local governmental administration, 
     territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal 
     security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, 
     transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, 
     environmental policy, housing and urban development, water 
     and electricity, roads and other basic infrastructure.
       2. The Kingdom of Morocco will have exclusive competence 
     over foreign relations (including international agreements 
     and conventions) national security and external defence 
     (including determination of borders, maritime, aerial or 
     terrestrial and their protection by all appropriate means) 
     all matters relating to the production, sale, ownership or 
     use of weapons or explosives and the preservation of the 
     territorial integrity against secessionist attempts whether 
     from within or without the territory. In addition, the flag, 
     currency, customs, postal and telecommunication systems of 
     the Kingdom shall be the same for Western Sahara. With 
     respect to all functions described in this paragraph (2) the 
     Kingdom may appoint representatives to serve it in Western 
     Sahara.
       3. In Western Sahara the executive authority shall be 
     vested in an Executive, who shall be elected by a vote of 
     those individuals who have been identified as qualified to 
     vote by the Identification Commission of the United Nations 
     Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, and whose names 
     are on the United Nations provisional voter lists (completed 
     as of 30 December 1999) without giving effect to any appeals 
     or other objections. To qualify as a candidate for Executive, 
     one must be an individual who has been identified as 
     qualified to vote as aforesaid and whose name is on said 
     provisional voter lists. The Executive shall be elected for a 
     term of four years. Thereafter, the Executive shall be 
     elected by majority vote of the Assembly. The Executive shall 
     appoint administrators in charge of executive departments for 
     terms of four years. The legislative authority shall be 
     vested in an Assembly, the members of which shall be directly 
     elected by voters for terms of four years. The judicial 
     authority shall be vested in such courts as may be necessary, 
     the judges of which shall be selected from the National 
     Institute for Judicial Studies but shall be from Western 
     Sahara. Such courts shall be the authority on territorial 
     law. To be qualified to vote for members of the Assembly, a 
     person must be 18 years or older and either (i) a continuous 
     resident of the territory since 31 October 1998, or (ii) a 
     person listed on the repatriation list as of 31 October 2000.
       4. All laws passed by the Assembly and all decisions of the 
     courts referred to in paragraph 3 above must respect and 
     comply with the constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 
     particularly with respect to the protection of public 
     liberties. All elections or referenda referred to in this 
     agreement shall be conducted with all appropriate guarantees 
     and in keeping with the Code of Conduct agreed to by the 
     parties in 1997, except where to do so would be inconsistent 
     with the terms hereof.
       5. Neither the Kingdom nor the executive, legislative, or 
     judicial bodies of the Authority of Western Sahara referred 
     to above may unilaterally change or abolish the status of 
     Western Sahara. Any changes or modifications of this 
     agreement has to be approved by the Executive and the 
     Assembly of Western Sahara. The status of Western Sahara will 
     be submitted to a referendum of qualified voters on such date 
     as the parties hereto shall agree, within the five year 
     period following the initial actions to implement this 
     agreement. To be qualified to vote in such a referendum a 
     voter must have been a full time resident of Western Sahara 
     for the preceding one year.
       6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will offer 
     his mediation and good offices to assist the two parties 
     hereto in the implementation or interpretation of this 
     agreement.
       7. The parties agree to implement this agreement promptly 
     and request the assistance of the United Nations to this end.
                                  ____


          [From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 26, 2004]

               Sahara Refugees Form a Progressive Society


        Literacy and democracy are thriving in an unlikely place

                            (By John Thorne)

       Tindouf, Algeria.--A dozen women recline on the steps of 
     the main girls' school in the Saharawi refugee camps, their 
     pastel robes like blots of water-color on the whitewashed 
     cement. When the door opens and the headmistress emerges, the 
     women suddenly leap up and crowd around her, clamoring. They 
     are mothers seeking places for their daughters in the 
     already-crowded school.
       The Saharawi women are among the most liberated of the 
     Muslim world, and their status is characteristic of the well-
     organized, egalitarian society that has developed in the 
     refugee camps over the past three decades. For all their 
     bleakness, the Saharawi camps boast a representative 
     government, a 95 percent literacy rate, and a constitution 
     that enshrines religious tolerance and gender equality.
       The Saharawis are the Arab nomads of Western Sahara, bound 
     together by their Yemeni ancestry and their dialect, 
     Hassaniya, which remains close to classical Arabic. For 
     centuries, they roamed the territory with their camels and 
     goats, sometimes trading with Spanish colonizers, and became 
     known as ``blue men'' for the indigo robes they wear.

[[Page H6632]]

       When Spain abandoned Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco 
     invaded and drove the Saharawis into neighboring Algeria. 
     Trading their camels for Land Rovers, they fought a guerrilla 
     war under the leadership of the Polisario Front, an 
     independence movement, until the UN brokered a ceasefire in 
     1991. Since then, the promised vote on independence has been 
     stalled by disagreement over who should be allowed to 
     participate.


                                Equality

       Meanwhile the Saharawi refugees, numbering some 160,000, 
     have clung on in camps amid the flat, stony wastes near the 
     town of Tindouf, in southwest Algeria. Subsisting on foreign 
     aid--chiefly rice, bread, and a few root vegetables--most 
     suffer from chronic malnutrition. Their settlements consist 
     almost wholly of adobe huts and dusty canvas tents, appearing 
     from afar as brown smudges on the slightly lighter brown 
     desert.
       ``Women built these camps,'' says Menana Mohammed, deputy 
     secretary-general of the Union of Saharawi Women. When the 
     Saharawis arrived at Tindouf, most of the men had stayed 
     behind as soldiers. ``You'll still find women doing all kinds 
     of work, including leading,'' Ms. Mohammed adds.
       While most of the top brass are men, the minister of 
     culture is a woman. Women hold one fourth of the seats in the 
     Saharawi parliament, and they make up most of the civil 
     service, including teachers, nurses, and doctors.
       ``These days our chief concern is education,'' says 
     Mohammed. All young Saharawis learn Spanish as well as 
     Arabic, and some attend universities in Spain, Cuba, and 
     Algeria through the sponsorship of those countries' 
     governments.
       ``In the camps, we had to be both sexes, because the men 
     were all away fighting,'' says Mohammed. There is an old 
     Saharawi saying, she says, that rings especially true today: 
     ``A tent is raised on two poles: a man and a woman.'' The 
     Saharawis' traditionally tough, wandering lifestyle has 
     always made them regard husband and wife as equal leaders of 
     the household.


                             Individualism

       It has also begotten an individualistic approach to Islam. 
     While most Muslims tend to stress the importance of the 
     Islamic community, ``the Saharawis believe that religion is a 
     very personal issue,'' says Mouloud Said, the Polisario's 
     representative in the United States. ``It's a personal 
     relationship between the human being and his Creator. This is 
     the mentality of the nomadic society.''
       Mosques are conspicuously absent from the camps, in large 
     part because the Saharawis ``don't believe that to speak to 
     God, you need a fancy place,'' explains Mr. Said.
       Saharawis seldom pray in groups save on important Muslim 
     holidays, and view even these ceremonies as purely optional. 
     For some, this is a welcome escape-hatch from the religion's 
     bloodier rituals.
       ``Each person has his own Islam,'' says Zorgan Laroussi, a 
     translator in the camps who chose not to attend the mass 
     slaughter of camels for the feast of al-Eid al-Fitr, which 
     marks the end of Ramadan. His brother-in-law Salek did go, 
     and relishes explaining the ritual's finer points while the 
     two men and their families share a dish of grilled 
     hindquarters.
       Saharawis are equally welcoming of other religions. ``There 
     is an almost continuous presence of church groups from all 
     over the world--in particular the U.S.--in the camps,'' says 
     Said. ``Every year for the last four years, there has been a 
     joint prayer at Easter.''
       ``Tolerance is not something new, but it's something 
     [Saharawi leaders] encourage,'' he says. ``In a tolerant 
     society, the center prevails, not the extremes. That means 
     respect for others, whether for the faith or their ideas.''
       This credo finds ample use in the Saharawis' recent 
     conversion to a united democratic government. Following their 
     flight from Western Sahara, they quickly saw that overcoming 
     the desert and the Moroccan Army meant forsaking old tribal 
     loyalties. ``What's most important is that we Saharawis hang 
     together, so we highlight stories that promote unity among 
     us,'' says Minister of Culture Miriam Salek, who works with 
     the Ministry of Education and the Saharawi Youth Organization 
     to keep alive Saharawi folklore and history.


                               Democracy

       In 1976, the Polisario proclaimed, and more or less became, 
     the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Although a government-
     in-exile, it is recognized by 75 countries, and the UN 
     formally considers Western Sahara an occupied territory.
       Tier upon tier of elected officials make up the camp 
     government, from the national parliament down to neighborhood 
     councils. Saharawis are avid voters, and many participate in 
     local civil service--even if it's merely taking a twice-
     weekly shift on the trash detail, or helping dole out 
     rations.
       This could be the blueprint for an independent Western 
     Sahara, and there is a general sense of pride and excitement 
     among the Saharawis for their new society. ``This has worked 
     so far, what we have here,'' says one young daira (district) 
     councilman, ``and it should still work in Western Sahara. We 
     built this on the hope of the people, and I don't think 
     they'll want to change.''
       But as the years drag on, many fear they will never have 
     the chance to find out. Their smoothly running camps and 
     refusal to resort to terrorism keep them out of the public 
     consciousness, relieving pressure on the UN to push for a 
     quick settlement to the 29-year-old conflict. ``We have been 
     landless for so long,'' laments Tellib Helli Embarik, an old 
     tribal leader. ``I don't know if the UN is just waiting for 
     us to disappear or what!''
                                  ____


                     [From the Hill, July 13, 2004]

                        Deserting the Baker Plan

                            (By David Keene)

        President Bush likes to talk about nurturing democracy 
     within the Muslim world, but he's doing little for the pro-
     Western Muslims of the Western Sahara whose future rests in 
     his hands.
        If you don't know much about the plight of these people, 
     you aren't alone. They have been languishing in refugee camps 
     in western Algeria for nearly 30 years and will remain there 
     until the United States stops playing chief enabler to 
     Moroccan government that invaded and seized their country 
     when it was freed from colonial rule by Spain in the '70s. 
     I've visited the camps, and to suggest that the people who 
     inhabit them live under harsh conditions is to speak 
     euphemistically.
        The Western Saharan or Saharawi peoples tried to resist 
     the Moroccans, but hundreds of thousands of them were forced 
     to flee to Algeria before a U.S.-equipped Moroccan army 
     determined to seize their land. Today more than 300,000 of 
     them survive as best they can, unable to see their relatives 
     or visit their homeland.
        Realizing they didn't have the capability to defeat 
     Morocco on the battlefield, the Saharawi faced a choice. They 
     could fall on the asymmetric warfare of the terrorist, 
     surrender or turn to the international community. They 
     perhaps rather naively chose the latter course and went to 
     the United Nations and the World Court seeking justice.
        Meanwhile, they've built a functioning democracy that 
     guarantees equal rights to men and women alike, educated 
     their children and let it be known that all they want to do 
     is live in peace with those around them. Their congressional 
     friends in the United States include people such as Sens. Jim 
     Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Reps Joe 
     Pitts (R-Pa.), Mark Green (R-Wis.) and Donald Payne (D-N.J.), 
     but so far few of their colleagues and virtually no one in 
     the Bush administration or the media seem to share their 
     concerns.
        This is in spite of the fact that virtually everyone 
     agrees the Saharawi are right. The International Court of 
     Justice in 1975 ruled Morocco had no right to the land 
     seized, but the king of Morocco ignored the ruling and the 
     United Nations sought a referendum in which the people of the 
     region could vote on whether they wanted to be ruled by their 
     colonial masters or by leaders of their own choosing.
        Meanwhile, the United States stood by silent as our 
     Moroccan ally consolidated control over the region to become 
     the last colonial power on the African continent.
        Publicly, of course, the Moroccans declared that they too 
     believed in self-determination, but marched hundreds of 
     thousands of Moroccans into the region and declared that if 
     there was to be a vote, these folks should be allowed to vote 
     too. The Saharawi and the United Nations balked at this 
     baldfaced attempt to stuff the ballot boxes, but finally 
     appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as a 
     special envoy to work something out. Baker eventually came up 
     with a ``compromise'' plan that would grant the vote to 
     enough Moroccans to give them a majority if they stuck 
     together and suggested a period of autonomy within Morocco 
     followed by a vote to decide whether the region would go its 
     own way.
        To everyone's surprise, the Sahrawi accepted the ``Baker 
     Plan.'' They know they can't survive in the camps forever and 
     suspect that more than a few of the Moroccans who will vote 
     might welcome the chance to escape the tender mercies of 
     their king. The Moroccans immediately rejected the plan 
     announcing that they will never accept any scheme that 
     includes the possible loss of the territory they have 
     grabbed.
        The United Nations doesn't know what to do, and Baker has 
     thrown up his arms and resigned. The king's only real ally in 
     the United Nations is France, but it's our silent acceptance 
     of whatever he wants do to that has allowed him to thumb his 
     nose at the world. Everyone knows that as long as King 
     Mohammed VI can keep the United States in line, he will 
     remain intransigent.
        During the king's visit to Washington last week, President 
     Bush supposedly brought up the Baker Plan, but one wonders if 
     he pressed very hard. He has, after all, said nothing about 
     the Saharawi in public and done everything from declaring 
     Morocco a ``major non-NATO ally'' to leading the charge for a 
     U.S.-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement to give the King the 
     impression that we aren't about to do anything at all about 
     the way he acts in his own neighborhood.
        Meanwhile, the Saharawi hang on, praying for the day when 
     an American president who talks about democracy and justice 
     will come to their aid.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, July 9, 2004]

                       Beyond Diplomatic Niceties

                   (By Joseph Pitts and Donald Payne)

       This week, His Majesty, King Mohammed of Morocco is in 
     Washington to tout the newly signed US.-Morocco Free Trade 
     Agreement and to bask in his nation's newly christened status 
     as a ``major non-NATO ally''.
       While we do not oppose free trade or establishing stronger 
     allies, we would do well to

[[Page H6633]]

     look past the diplomatic niceties that surround such trips. 
     His Majesty's country illegally occupies a swath of land in 
     West Africa known as Western Sahara. His government has 
     promised the people of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi, a vote to 
     determine their own future. More than a decade later, that 
     vote has yet to occur.
       Powerful friends in Europe and here in Washington have 
     helped His Majesty's government postpone this vote and 
     consolidate control over the country The Moroccan government 
     says its colonial rule over Western Sahara ensures its 
     ``territorial integrity'' and preserves stability in the 
     region. But this idea is simply divorced from reality on the 
     ground.
       During trips to the country, we have learned the Sahrawis 
     are peaceful, pro-Western and pro-democracy. In short, 
     despite living under an illegitimate colonial power, they 
     have established a deep-rooted culture of democracy, capable 
     of supporting a viable state. They have their own elected 
     leaders, many of them women. They have provided education and 
     equal rights to all their citizens--men and women.
       The only stability a sovereign, democratic Western Sahara 
     disrupts is a status quo defined by tyranny. The King will 
     deny this. Official Washington will ignore it. But it is the 
     truth.
       From 1884 until 1975, Western Sahara was a Spanish colony. 
     Upon Spain's withdrawal, Morocco invaded. The Sahrawis have 
     fought a lonely battle for liberation ever since, many 
     suffering in the refugee camps that dot Algerian sand dunes. 
     The U.N. International Court of Justice ruled Morocco's claim 
     to Western Sahara was illegitimate. Morocco ignored the 
     ruling.
       In 1991, Morocco accepted the U.N.-brokered cease-fire 
     promising the Sahrawis a referendum for national self-
     determination. Moroccan officials moved tens of thousands of 
     their own citizens to Western Sahara, attempting to stack the 
     vote in its favor. In 1997, the United Nations asked former 
     U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to help implement the 
     referendum. Morocco continued to balk.
       The U.N.'s voter identification commission, using agreed-
     upon criteria, set out to identify the eligible voters. After 
     years of interviews with each, the U.N. in January 2000 
     published the provisional list of voters, rejecting the 
     majority of Moroccan applicants. Morocco--fearing it would 
     lose the upper hand--reneged on its commitment to the 
     referendum.
       To break the impasse, Mr. Baker submitted a compromise plan 
     to the Security Council in July 2003. The plan included a 
     referendum for the Sahrawis and gave Moroccans who settled in 
     Western Sahara through 1999 the right to vote, making them 
     the majority of the electorate. Convinced a peaceful solution 
     was possible, the leading Sahrawi political group--the 
     POLISARIO Front--reluctantly accepted the terms of Mr. 
     Baker's plan. Its gesture was never reciprocated. Morocco, 
     supported by France, rejected the Baker Plan from the outset.
       As this battle rages, Sahrawis suffer. The Moroccan 
     government continues to imprison Sahrawi activists, exploit 
     the natural resources of Western Sahara, and prohibit foreign 
     journalists from transmitting the truth to the outside world, 
     as evidenced by the recent expulsion of several Danish 
     reporters.
       The U.N. has spent more than $600 million to maintain this 
     dreadful status quo. Successive U.S. administrations, 
     Republican and Democrat, have walked a fine line on this 
     issue. Morocco is a longstanding ally. However, alliance with 
     powerful nations should not provide the cover to ignore 
     international commitments and deny the basic human right of 
     self-determination to a peaceful, democratic people.
       When the president meets with King Mohammed this week, he 
     should not ignore His Majesty's opposition to democracy in 
     the Western Sahara. The spread of freedom is central to our 
     mission as a nation. This is ever more important as the 
     administration works to spread democracy in Islamic nations.
       Unlike many others in the Middle East and North Africa, the 
     Sahrawis have chosen a peaceful path to democracy. We owe the 
     democratic people of Western Sahara no less than the support 
     we have given others in their fight for independence--the 
     right to have a say in their own future.
       When Congress considers the US.-Morocco free trade 
     agreement, it should seriously consider how it will aid His 
     Majesty's attempt to exploit an area to which he has no 
     legitimate claim. Ignoring Western Sahara will put a vote for 
     Sahrawis further out of reach.
       The time has come to abandon empty promises and hollow 
     rhetoric in favor of a free, fair, and transparent referendum 
     for the Sahrawis. This is the only way to build a peaceful, 
     democratic future for Western Sahara and the entire region.

   Letter dated 29 January 2002 From the Under-Secretary-General for 
  Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the 
                            Security Council

        1. In a letter addressed to me on 13 November 2001, the 
     President of the Security Council requested, on behalf of the 
     members of the Security Council, my opinion on ``the legality 
     in the context of international law, including relevant 
     resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
     of the United Nations, and agreements concerning Western 
     Sahara of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities 
     consisting in the offering and signing of contracts with 
     foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in 
     Western Sahara''.
       2. At my request, the Government of Morocco provided 
     information with respect to two contracts, concluded in 
     October 2001, for oil-reconnaissance and evaluation 
     activities in areas off-shore Western Sahara, one between the 
     Moroccan ``Office National de Recherches et d'Exploitations 
     Petrolieres'' (ONAREP) and the United States oil-company Kerr 
     Mc-Gee du Maroc Ltd., and the other between ONAREP and the 
     French oil company TotalFinaElf E&P Maroc. Concluded for an 
     initial period of 12 months, both contracts contain standard 
     options for the relinquishment of the rights under the 
     contract or its continuation, including an option for future 
     oil contracts in the respective areas or parts thereof.
       3. The question of the legality of the contracts concluded 
     by Morocco off-shore Western Sahara requires an analysis of 
     the status of the territory of Western Sahara, and the status 
     of Morocco in relation to the Territory. As will be seen, it 
     also requires an analysis of the principles of international 
     law governing mineral resource activities in Non-Self-
     Governing Territories.
       4. The law applicable to the determination of these 
     questions is contained in the United Nations Charter, in 
     General Assembly resolutions, pertaining to decolonization, 
     in general, and economic activities in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories, in particular, and in agreements concerning the 
     status of Western Sahara. The analysis of the applicable law 
     must also reflect the changes and developments which have 
     occurred as international law has been progressively codified 
     and developed, as well as the jurisprudence of the 
     International Court of Justice and the practice of States in 
     matters of natural resource activities in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories.


      A. The status of Western Sahara under Moroccan administration

       5. A Spanish protectorate since 1884, Spanish Sahara was 
     included in 1963 in the list of NonSelf-Governing Territories 
     under Chapter XI of the Charter (A/5514, Annex III). 
     Beginning in 1962, Spain as administering Power transmitted 
     technical and statistical information on the territory under 
     Article 73 (e) of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
     information was examined by the Special Committee with Regard 
     to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
     of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
     (``Special Committee''). In a series of General Assembly 
     resolutions on the Question of Spanish/Western Sahara, the 
     applicability to the territory of the Declaration on the 
     Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
     (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), was reaffirmed.
       6. On 14 November 1975, a Declaration of Principles on 
     Western Sahara was concluded in Madrid between Spain, Morocco 
     and Mauritania (the Madrid Agreement), whereby the powers and 
     responsibilities of Spain, as the administering Power of the 
     territory, were transferred to a temporary tripartite 
     administration. The Madrid Agreement did not transfer 
     sovereignty over the territory, nor did it confer upon any of 
     the signatories the status of an administering Power--a 
     status which Spain alone could not have unilaterally 
     transferred. The transfer of administrative authority over 
     the territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, did not 
     affect the international status of Western Sahara as Non-
     Self-Governing Territory.
       7. On 26 February 1976, Spain informed the Secretary-
     General that as of that it had terminated its presence in 
     Western Sahara and relinquished its responsibilities over the 
     Territory, thus leaving it in fact under the administration 
     of both Morocco and Mauritania in their respective controlled 
     areas. following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the 
     Territory in 1979, upon the conclusion of the Mauritano-
     Sahraoui agreement of 19 August 1979 (S/13504, Annex I), 
     Morocco has administrated the territory of Western Sahara 
     alone. Morocco however, is not listed as the administering 
     Power of the territory in the United Nations list of Non-
     Self-Governing Territories, and has, therefore, not 
     transmitted information on the territory in accordance with 
     Articles 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter.
       8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and given the status of 
     Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, it would be 
     appropriate for purposes of the present analysis to have 
     regard to the principles applicable to the powers and 
     responsibilities of an administering Power in matters of 
     mineral resource activities in such a Territory.


   B. The law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-
                         Governing Territories

       9. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter lays down the 
     fundamental principles applicable to Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories. Members of the United Nations who assumed 
     responsibilities for the administration of these territories 
     have whereby recognized the principle that the interest of 
     the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and have 
     accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the 
     utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
     territories. Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter, they are 
     required to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for 
     information purposes statistical and other information of a 
     technical nature relating to economic, social, and 
     educational conditions in the territories under their 
     administration.
       10. The legal regime applicable to Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories was further developed in the practice of the 
     United Nations

[[Page H6634]]

     and, more specifically, in the Special Committee and the 
     General Assembly. Resolutions of the General Assembly adopted 
     under the agenda item ``implementation of the Declaration on 
     the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
     Peoples'', called upon the administering Powers to ensure 
     that all economic activities in the Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories under their administration do not adversely 
     affect the interests of the peoples of such territories, but 
     are instead directed to assist them in the exercise of their 
     right to self-determination. The Assembly also consistently 
     urged the administering Powers to safeguard and guarantee the 
     inalienable rights of the peoples of these territories to 
     their natural resources, and to establish and maintain 
     control over the future development of those resources (GA 
     res 35/118 of 11 December 1980; 52/78 of 10 December 1997; 
     54/91 of 6 December 1999; 55/147 of 8 December 2000; and 
     56/74 of 10 December 2001).
       11. In the resolutions adopted under the item ``Activities 
     of foreign economic and other interests which impede the 
     Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
     Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in territories 
     under Colonial Domination'', the General Assembly reiterated 
     that ``the exploitation and plundering of the marine and 
     other natural resources of colonial and Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of 
     the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat 
     to the integrity and prosperity of these Territories'' and 
     that ``any administering Power that deprives the colonial 
     people of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of 
     their legitimate rights over their natural resources . . . 
     violates the solemn obligations it has assumed under the 
     Charter of the United Nations'' (GA res. 48/46 of 10 December 
     1992 and 49/40 of 9 December 1994).
       12. In an important evolution of this doctrine, the General 
     Assembly in resolution 50/33 of 6 December 1995, drew a 
     distinction between economic activities that are detrimental 
     to the peoples of these territories and those directed to 
     benefit them. In paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General 
     Assembly affirmed ``the value of foreign economic investment 
     undertaken in collaboration with the peoples of Non-Self-
     Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in 
     order to make a valid contribution to the socio-economic 
     development of the Territories''. This position has been 
     affirmed by the General Assembly in later resolutions (GA 
     res. 52/72 of 10 December 1997; 53/61 of 3 December 1998; 54/
     84 of 5 December 1999; 55/38 of 8 December 2000; and 56/66 of 
     10 December 2001).
       13. The question of Western Sahara has been dealt with by 
     both the General Assembly, as a question of decolonization, 
     and by the Security Council as a question of peace and 
     security. The Council was first seized of the matter in 1975, 
     and in resolutions 377 (1975) of 22 October 1975 and 379 
     (1975) of 2 November 1975 it requested the Secretary-General 
     to enter into consultations with the parties. Since 1988, in 
     particular, when Morocco and the Frente Polisaro agreed, in 
     principle, to the settlement proposals of the Secretary-
     General and the Chairman of the OAU, the political process 
     aiming at a peaceful settlement of the question of Western 
     Sahara has been under the purview of the Council. For the 
     purposes of the present analysis, however, the body of 
     Security Council resolutions pertaining to the political 
     process is not relevant to the legal regime applicable to 
     mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories 
     and for this reason is not dealt with in detail in the 
     present letter.
       14. The principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural 
     resources'' as the right of peoples and nations to use and 
     dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the 
     interest of their national development and well-being, was 
     established in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 
     December 1962. It has since been reaffirmed in the 1966 
     International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
     Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in 
     subsequent General Assembly resolutions, most notably, 
     resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, ``Declaration on the 
     Establishment of a New International Economic Order'', and 
     Resolution 3281 (XXIX) containing the Charter of Economic 
     Rights and Duties of States. While the legal nature of the 
     core principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural 
     resources'', as a corollary to the principle of territorial 
     sovereignty or the right of self-determination, is 
     indisputably part of customary international law, its exact 
     legal scope and implications are still debatable. In the 
     present context, the question is whether the principle of 
     ``permanent sovereignty'' prohibits any activities related to 
     natural resources undertaken by an administering Power (cf. 
     para. 8 above) in a Non-Self-Governing Territory, or only 
     those which are undertaken in disregard of the needs, 
     interests and benefits of the people of that territory.


         c. the case law of the international court of justice

       15. The question of natural resource exploitation by 
     administering Powers in Non-Self-Governing Territories was 
     brought before the International Court of Justice in the Case 
     of East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) and the Case Concerning 
     Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia). In 
     neither case, however, was the question of the legality of 
     resource exploitation activities in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories conclusively determined.
       16. In the Case of East Timor, Portugal argued that in 
     negotiating with Indonesia an agreement on the exploration 
     and exploitation of the continental shelf area of the Timor 
     Gap, Australia had failed to respect the right of the people 
     of East Timor to permanent sovereignty over its natural 
     wealth and resources, and the powers and rights of Portugal 
     as administering Power of East Timor. In the absence of 
     Indonesia's participation in the proceedings, the 
     International Court of Justice concluded that it lacked 
     jurisdiction.
       17. In the Nauru Phosphate Case, Nauru claimed the 
     rehabilitation of certain phosphate lands worked out before 
     independence in the period of the Trusteeship administration 
     by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Nauru 
     argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
     natural resources was breached in circumstances in which a 
     major resource was depleted on grossly inequitable terms and 
     its extraction involved the physical reduction of the land. 
     Following the Judgment on the Preliminary Objections, the 
     parties reached a settlement and a Judgment on the merits was 
     no longer required.


                       d. the practice of states

       18. In the recent practice of States, cases of resource 
     exploitation in Non-Self-Governing Territories have, for 
     obvious reasons, been few and far apart. In 1975, the United 
     Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara reported that at 
     the time of the visit, four companies held prospecting 
     concessions in off-shore Spanish Sahara. In discussing the 
     exploitation of phosphate deposits in the region of Bu Craa 
     with Spanish officials, the Mission was told that the 
     revenues expected to accrue would be used for the benefit of 
     the Territory, that Spain recognized the sovereignty of the 
     Saharan population over the Territory's natural resources and 
     that, apart from the return of its investment, Spain laid no 
     claim to benefit from the proceeds (A/10023/Rev.1, p. 52)
       19. The exploitation of uranium and other natural resources 
     in Namibia by South Africa and a number of Western 
     multinational corporations was considered illegal under 
     Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of 
     Namibia, enacted in 1974 by the United Nations Council for 
     Namibia, and was condemned by the General Assembly (GA res. 
     36/51 of 24 November 1981, and 39/42 of 5 December 1984). The 
     case of Namibia, however, must be seen in the light of 
     Security Council resolution 276 (1979) of 30 January 1970, 
     which declared that the continued presence of South Africa in 
     Namibia was illegal and that consequently all acts taken by 
     the Government of South Africa were illegal and invalid.
       20. The case of East Timor under the United Nations 
     Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is unique 
     in that, while UNTAET is not an administering Power within 
     the meaning of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, East 
     Timor is still technically listed as a Non-Self-Governing 
     Territory. By the time UNTAET was established in October 
     1999, the Timor Gap Treaty was fully operational and 
     concessions had been granted in the Zone of Cooperation by 
     Indonesia and Australia, respectively. In order to ensure the 
     continuity of the practical arrangements under the Timor Gap 
     Treaty, UNTAET, acting on behalf of East Timor, concluded on 
     10 February 2000, an Exchange of Letters with Australia 
     for the continued operation of the terms of the Treaty. 
     Two years later, in anticipation of independence, UNTAET, 
     acting on behalf of East Timor, negotiated with Australia 
     a draft ``Timor Sea Arrangement'' which will replace the 
     Timor Gap Treaty upon the independence of East Timor. In 
     concluding the agreement for the exploration and 
     exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits in the 
     continental shelf of East Timor, UNTAET, on both 
     occasions, consulted fully with representatives of the 
     East Timorese people, who participated actively in the 
     negotiations.


                             e. conclusions

       21. The question addressed to me by the Security Council 
     namely, ``the legality . . . of actions allegedly taken by 
     the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and 
     signing of contracts with foreign companies for the 
     exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara,'' has 
     been analysed by analogy as part of the more general question 
     of whether mineral resource activities in a Non-Self-
     Governing Territory by an administering Power is illegal, as 
     such, or only if conducted in disregard of the needs and 
     interests of the people of that territory. An analysis of the 
     relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, General 
     Assembly resolutions, the case law of the International Court 
     of Justice and the practice of States, supports the latter 
     conclusion.
       22. The principle that the interests of the peoples of Non-
     Self-Governing Territories are paramount, and their well-
     being and development is the ``sacred trust'' of their 
     respective administering Powers, was established in the 
     Charter of the United Nations and further developed in 
     General Assembly by resolutions on the question of 
     decolonization and economic activities in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories. In recognizing the inalienable rights of the 
     peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories to the natural 
     resources in their territories, the General Assembly has 
     consistently condemned the exploitation and plundering of 
     natural resources and any economic activities which are 
     detrimental to the interests of the peoples of these 
     territories and deprive them of

[[Page H6635]]

     their legitimate rights over their natural resource. It 
     recognized, however, the value of economic activities which 
     are undertaken in accordance with the wishes of the peoples 
     of those territories, and their contribution to the 
     development of such territories.
       23. In the Cases of East Timor and Nauru, the International 
     Court of Justice did not pronounce itself on the question of 
     the legality of economic activities in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories. It should be noted, however, that in neither 
     case was it alleged that mineral resource exploitation in 
     such territories was illegal per se. In the Case of East 
     Timor, the conclusion of an oil exploitation agreement was 
     allegedly illegal because it was not concluded with the 
     administering Power (Portugal); in the Nauru Case, the 
     illegality allegedly arose because the mineral resource 
     exploitation depleted unnecessarily or inequitably the 
     overlaying lands.
       24. The recent State practice, though limited, is 
     illustrative of an opinio juris on the part of both 
     administering Powers and third States: where resource 
     exploitation activities are concluded in Non-Self-Governing 
     Territories for the benefit of the peoples of these 
     territories, on their behalf, or in consultation with their 
     representatives, they are considered compatible with the 
     Charter obligations of the administering Power, and in 
     conformity with the General Assembly resolutions and the 
     principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural resources'' 
     enshrined therein.
       25. The foregoing legal principles established in the 
     practice of States and the United Nations pertain to economic 
     activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories, in general, and 
     mineral resource exploitation, in particular. It must be 
     recognized, however, that in the present case, the contracts 
     for oil reconnaissance and evaluation do not entail 
     exploitation or the physical removal of the mineral 
     resources, and no benefits have as of yet accrued. The 
     conclusion is, therefore, that, while the specific contracts 
     which are the subject of the Security Council's request are 
     not in themselves illegal, if further exploration and 
     exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the 
     interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they 
     would be in violation of the international law principles 
     applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-
     Governing Territories.

                                                  Hans Corell,

                                Under-Secretary for legal Affairs,
     The Legal Counsel.
                                  ____

                                               Kingdom of Morocco,


                           Ministry of Interior, Secretariate,

                                          Rabat, January 22, 1998.
     From: The Minister of State for the Interior.
     To: All Walis and Governors of the Kingdom's Prefectures and 
         Provinces.
     Object: Training workshops for applicants for identification 
         for the referendum to confirm the Moroccanness of the 
         Sahara.

       This circular results from examination of the daily 
     activity reports on the ethnic workshops, forwarded by 
     yourselves, and from remarks, suggestions and proposals made 
     by the Moroccan party's Observers in the light of seven weeks 
     of identification, some twenty weeks from the end of this 
     operation.
       The results of identification having so far fallen short of 
     the necessary level, owing in part, certainly, to evidence 
     from the Chyoukh representing the other party which is often 
     negative, but also owing to the manifestly insufficient 
     preparation of our applicants, you are invited to pay the 
     closest attention to this briefing and supervise personally, 
     in accordance with my earlier instructions, the strict 
     application of the following measures:
       1. Exhaustive pre-identification of the applicants and 
     their sub-fractions:
       It emerges from the daily activity reports from the ethnic 
     workshops forwarded by yourself that, unfortunately, only a 
     small number of Walis and Governors (see list attached to 
     this circular) have an exact knowledge of the tribes and sub-
     fractions relevant to their respective commands, and have 
     consequently been able to provide the Ministry of the 
     Interior with statistical data on the applicants that 
     conforms to the information in the central index.
       The others are invited immediately to produce their data on 
     the tribes and sub-fractions and on the number of applicants 
     present in their respective commands and held ready to be 
     summoned at any time to MINURSO's Identification Centres.
       It goes without saying that an incomplete knowledge of the 
     sub-fractions and their numbers in a prefecture or province 
     results in underestimation of the real population of 
     applicants, so that an insufficient number of these is being 
     trained and taken to the Identification Centres, contrary to 
     the objective of my earlier instructions.
       The Walis and Governors concerned will therefore, on 
     receipt of this circular, require their information 
     technology units to contact the central information 
     technology service to arrange immediate presentation of the 
     province's or prefecture's data on the sub-fractions and 
     their numbers.
       2. Preparation of applicants for identification:
       As specified in my previous circulars, the basis for the 
     summoning and identification of applicants by MINURSO is the 
     form filled out by them in 1994, on which the computerised 
     data-banks used by this mission and by the Ministry of the 
     Interior itself are both based.
       Each applicant is registered and can be sought through his 
     form number. The form contains the applicant's main details 
     and those of his father and mother, in addition to all the 
     elements that specify which identification criterion, out of 
     the five criteria defined by the United Nations Peace Plan, 
     is likely to be fulfilled by the applicant.
       The applicant must also have perfect knowledge at least of 
     the contents of the said form. However, when this document 
     does not reflect the applicant's real situation, he should 
     not be imprisoned by it but should seek to make it easy for 
     the Identification Commission to recognise key elements, such 
     as:
       the birthplaces of the applicant and his immediate family 
     (father, mother, children).
       the seasonal pasture zones frequented in the Sahara by the 
     applicant or his family.
       landmark dates in relation to the birth of the applicant 
     and his immediate family (father, mother, children) in the 
     Sahara.
       the lineage of the applicant and his immediate family and 
     kinship with a known Sahrawi family.
       the history of the applicant's tribe and family.
       geography of the region in which they lived and travelled.
       Lastly, there is a need to inculcate the applicant with a 
     psychological stance enabling him to:
       demystify the identification operation and the MINURSO 
     commission.
       be motivated and aware of the stakes in the referendum.
       have confidence in himself and be self-assured.
       overcome shyness and diffidence and speak loudly and 
     clearly.
       learn in advance, from applicants already identified as 
     belonging to the same subfraction, what questions the 
     Identification Commission is asking.
       be able to cite one or more family members already counted 
     or identified, and give their numbers.
       convince the Moroccan Cheikh who will then convince the 
     Identification Commission.
       Full mastery of these elements implies preliminary training 
     of the applicant in his prefecture or province of origin and 
     2 or 3 days of fine tuning with the Moroccan Cheikh before 
     the identification session.
       3. Responsibilities of the Cheikh and the Observer:
       As specified in the document attached to this circular, 
     concerning ``verification of eligibility'' of applicants, the 
     Cheikh's main mission with MINURSO is to testify that the 
     applicant fulfils one of the five identification criteria 
     defined by the United Nations Peace Plan.
       To this end, it is necessary for the Cheikh to meet at 
     least once with the Observer and the applicants from each 
     sub-fraction to become amply acquainted with the latter in 
     preparation for the identification session. A list, in 
     Arabic, of the applicants from his sub-fraction should be 
     supplied to the Cheikh.
       To facilitate contact between the applicants and the Cheikh 
     of their fraction, the Observer teams will be tripled to 
     enable them to follow the identification operation at the 
     same time as preparing the applicants.
       In the identification session the Cheikh should appear 
     credible and convincing and should not restrict himself to 
     recognizing the applicant, but seek to support and defend him 
     as well. He should listen closely to the applicant's 
     declaration and give active, reasoned and coherent testimony 
     in support of the applicant's answers.
       He should have perfect knowledge of the applicant, his 
     lineage and his links with the sub-fraction and region.
       He should relate this in a clear and convincing manner to 
     the Identification Commission to elicit a positive verdict 
     from it.
        4. Role of the Instructors
       Close contact between the Instructor, the Cheikh and the 
     Observer is essential to train the Cheikh, teach him the 
     identification process and the five eligibility criteria, 
     raise his awareness, motivate him and remove any complexes he 
     may have about the MINURSO Commission.
       At least one full-day session involving the Observer, the 
     Instructor, the Cheikh and the applicants from the sub-
     fraction is necessary to coordinate, evaluate and plan their 
     common action.
       For each ethnic sub-fraction, it is proposed that a group 
     of applicants from the Southern Provinces who have already 
     been identified, along with qualified cadres from these 
     provinces, should be formed to help with the training 
     programme of applicants from the Northern Provinces.
       These applicants should identify the best-known and most 
     widely distributed parts of their lineage and make them known 
     to the Identification Commission.
       In the same context, applicants from the Northern Provinces 
     who are of Sahrawi origin should be integrated with their 
     respective tribes to familiarize themselves with certain 
     details that may help facilitate their identification.
       Nevertheless, in cases where applicants in this category 
     are certain of their Sahrawi origin but have acquired the 
     culture of Northern Morocco, those concerned should defend 
     their Moroccan personality while providing convincing proofs 
     of their Sahrawi origin.
       Lastly, agents of the authorities, notables, young people 
     and women should be mobilized in support of this operation.
       A special unit is to be established for preparing the 
     Chyoukh, and a system set up to

[[Page H6636]]

     train the Instructors and the Chyoukh in, for example:
       the identification process.
       the five criteria.
       the role of the Chyoukh.
       the technical arrangements.
       Finally, deserving Chyoukh are to be encouraged and treated 
     with respect.
       In conclusion, the next twenty weeks are of determining 
     importance for the outcome of the referendum to confirm the 
     Moroccanness of the Sahara, whose result depends on your 
     immediate action to apply integrally all the instructions you 
     have been given on this subject, which I invite you once 
     again to execute rigorously in liaison with the central 
     Governors concerned, who are required to keep me regularly 
     informed.
                                                      Driss Basri,
                           The Minister of State for the Interior.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. McDermott), a colleague and friend from the Committee 
on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the President and his Trade 
Representative say that the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement is a good 
idea because it will strengthen our economic ties with moderate, I 
emphasize moderate, Muslim countries.
  Well, first of all, two-way trade flow between the United States and 
Morocco is around a billion dollars a year. Morocco is a tiny economy 
with little economic significance. The U.S. Commerce Department 
indicated the trade agreement will have a negligible impact on trade 
and negligible impact on our economies.
  Furthermore, while I recognize that King Mohammed VI has made great 
strides recently, particularly with regard to the rights of women, we 
should not forget two very important issues. One, Morocco is a monarchy 
and the king is deemed the country's religious leader. This FTA is 
really about strengthening ties with moderate monarchies; Jordan, 
Bahrain and others have preceded it.
  There are dozens of Muslim countries that are vibrant democracies, 
Egypt, that we should have chosen to pursue trade agreements before we 
chose Morocco.
  But, two, the way in which Morocco has handled the Western Sahara is 
really a stain on their nation. In 1975, when the Western Sahara went 
free from Spain, the Moroccans moved in immediately and said this is 
our country. It is a very, very wealthy country in natural resources. 
Both oil is being drilled for by Kerr McGee and other American and 
British companies, and the fishing industry off the coast is very 
proficient.
  So before signing an agreement with them, with a nation that has been 
occupying a territory to which it has no legal claim for 25 years, a 
nation that has erected a 2,000-kilometer wall to keep the inhabitants 
of Western Sahara from fleeing, with a country that has no respect for 
the right of self-determination, we should have ensured that the area 
of Western Sahara was justly and peacefully resolved. It would have 
been a lever we could have used to get them to resolve this.
  The U.N. has said you should have an election and they just never 
quite get around to having it for 25 years.
  I am really pleased, however, that the chairman of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means and the ranking member, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Rangel), have worked with me to insert language into the 
official committee documents to indicate that in no way does the free 
trade agreement cover trade investment in the Western Sahara.
  The issue is this: If you drill oil in the Western Sahara and the 
Moroccans take it into Morocco, is it then eligible for tariff-free 
dealings with the United States? And the answer should be no, and there 
should really never have been a trade agreement until that legal claim 
was relinquished or we had some sort of agreement on all of this.
  What we do have is a letter which the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Pitts) inserted in the Record. I suspect I have one very similar 
to his but he will insert it also in the Record. I will include a 
letter from the Trade Representatives saying that in dealing with 
Morocco we are dealing with Morocco as understood by the United Nations 
and the United States, and we are not using this as a kind of end-
around to go out and get more oil.
  One wonders why did we go to Morocco? What is it about Morocco? It is 
a little tiny country, very little trade with us. What is being done 
here that really needs to be done?
  I think we need to protect the indigenous people of the Sahrawi who 
live in Western Sahara. They need to have the protection from this 
United States reaching in and taking their resources by the back door. 
I thank the chairman for bringing this issue to the floor.

         Executive Office of the President, The United States 
           Trade Representative
                                    Washington, DC, July 20, 2004.
     Hon. Jim McDermott,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman McDermott: Thank you for your letter of 
     July 19, 2004, concerning our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
     Morocco and the status of Western Sahara.
       The Administration's position on Western Sahara is clear: 
     sovereignty of Western Sahara is in dispute, and the United 
     States fully supports the United Nations' efforts to resolve 
     this issue. The United States and many other countries do not 
     recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have 
     consistently urged the parties to work with the United 
     Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.
       The FTA will cover trade and investment in the territory of 
     Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include 
     Western Sahara. As our Harmonized Tariff Schedule makes 
     clear, for U.S. Customs purposes, the United States treats 
     imports from Western Sahara and Morocco differently. Nothing 
     in the FTA will require us to change this practice. The 
     Administration will draft the proclamation authorized in the 
     legislation implementing the FTA (H.R. 4842) to provide 
     preferential tariff treatment for goods from the territory of 
     Morocco. Preferential tariff treatment will not be provided 
     to goods from Western Sahara.
       I hope this letter addresses your question regarding the 
     FTA and the status of Western Sahara. I encourage you to 
     support the FTA. It will create economic opportunities for 
     U.S. manufacturing and service firms, workers, and farmers, 
     and will support economic reforms and foreign investment in 
     Morocco.
       Thank you again for your letter. Please feel free to 
     contact me should you have further questions.
           Sincerely,
                                               Robert B. Zoellick.

  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson).
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me time.
  One of the earlier speakers called for a moratorium on trade 
agreements. There is nothing that we could do that would hurt American 
workers more than a moratorium.
  Over the last few years Europe has consummated about 36 bilateral 
trade agreements in this part of the world, and we have consummated 
about three. Now, when they create a trade agreement with a bilateral 
agreement with one of these countries, what they are doing is socking 
in product standards that advantage their products and disadvantage our 
products.
  When we write a free trade agreement with one of these countries it 
is entirely different. That is why countries like to work with us. It 
is comprehensive. It includes all products and it is fair, transparent 
and modern, and I commend Morocco for not only its commitment to 
develop its economy in a way in which everyone benefits and everyone 
prospers, but to have evidenced that commitment by changing their labor 
law in preparation for this free trade agreement. I think that is very 
commendable.
  They changed their labor law to raise the minimum employment age, to 
reduce the number of hours in a workweek, to call for periodic review 
of the Moroccan minimum wage, to improve health and safety regulations, 
and I am skipping over a lot of details, to guarantee the right of 
association and collective bargaining. They looked at the world 
standards of how you should treat your workforce and they changed their 
laws to make those standards their standards.
  They are moving. They are developing. Europe is trading with them 
twice as many dollars worth of product as we are in America. This free 
trade agreement will change that and ensure American jobs, creating new 
ones as well.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this Moroccan so-
called free trade agreement and ask the question, why has the United 
States as a result of these free trade agreements

[[Page H6637]]

over the last 20 years amassed the largest trade deficit in the United 
States history? They have told us when NAFTA was passed we would have a 
trade balance. We would in fact have hundreds of thousands of new jobs 
in this country.
  What have we got? We have got the largest trade deficit with Mexico 
we have ever had, the largest trade deficit with Canada we have ever 
had, and an outwash of jobs from the United States to Mexico, over 
900,000 jobs and counting, nearly a million jobs. NAFTA did not work.
  Then they said, well, let us sign the China Free Trade Agreement. 
Boy, that will really be great. We will bring democracy to China. What 
have we got? We have got the largest growing trade deficit in the 
history of the United States with China. Every day companies are 
closing in this country, moving more production to China where wages 
are what? Ten cents an hour, 20 cents an hour.
  The gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) asked the opposition here, 
what is the minimum wage in Morocco? Nobody stood up. Do you know what 
it is? Eighty cents, 80 cents an hour in Morocco.
  What makes you think if we pass another NAFTA-like trade agreement, 
this time with Morocco, are we going to make it any better? This is no 
different than what we have had. In fact, it is more of the same and 
even worse.
  Our trade balance with Morocco is going down. Now, I think this 
agreement with Morocco has nothing to do with trade. It has everything 
to do with the Sahara and with oil relationships along the western 
side, and that is a whole other story not for this debate. But why 
would we want to sign a free trade agreement with a kingdom? Why would 
we want to empower a monarchy which this will do? You cannot have free 
trade with a country that is not free. Look at Saudi Arabia, where the 
majority of terrorists came from. That is a kingdom. Why would we want 
to empower those who hold assets in undemocratic countries? That is 
exactly what this agreement will do with Morocco.
  This agreement is worse than NAFTA. NAFTA's labor and environmental 
provisions are a joke anyway. They are just side agreements with no 
teeth. This agreement has nothing, let me repeat, this has nothing to 
do with labor or environment. It does not have anything like the 
Jordanian trade agreement which made a step toward labor and the 
environment. Further, this agreement blocks the reimportation of 
prescription drugs as the Australian agreement did.
  This agreement provides for the privatization of public services, 
more outsourcing of our service jobs in this country. There are no 
adjustment provisions in this agreement for workers who lose their 
jobs. In fact, in the old NAFTA agreement, they now do not even want to 
count how many American workers are losing jobs in this country so we 
can provide them with transitional assistance here at home. This 
agreement has no adjustment provisions.
  One of the interesting provisions in this bill deals with Chapter 11. 
It guarantees that if investors get in trouble in Morocco--such as, 
what if terrorists do some things over there we do not like--this 
agreement protects their private risk through government. Even our own 
constitution does not do that on investment. Investors get a good deal 
in this agreement, workers do not.
  Let me address one of the other unusual aspects of this agreement. It 
changes the wording of the provisions that deal with agriculture and 
food safety from being ``equal to'' to what is called ``equivalency''. 
Who is going to define equivalency on food safety and how it is 
different from ``equal to''? Or who is going to define equivalency on 
prescription drugs? What it does is it puts us on a downward path 
compared to the high standards we have set in this country for our own 
food and drug safety.
  This is a bad deal. It is a bad deal economically. It is a bad deal 
politically. In view of our standing in the Muslim and Arab world, this 
is a bad deal. It does not promote democracy.
  I encourage my colleagues in this body to vote no on this NAFTA-like 
expansion that now aims to include Morocco.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments, but we are 
discussing the U.S.-Morocco FTA, which passed the Committee on Ways and 
Means by a vote of 26 to nothing. In addition, we have a trade surplus 
with Morocco. Trade with Morocco creates jobs. The projections are 
right now that over the next decade our exports will triple in the 
agricultural sector alone, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program 
already provides benefits to anyone adversely effected by trade, and 
there is no need for a new program.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. 
Kolbe).
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, just to correct the record, and I am sure the 
gentlewoman misspoke, the United States does not have a free trade 
agreement with China. We have normal trade relations but no free trade 
agreement with China.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. Speaker, I do rise in support of this U.S.-Morocco free trade 
agreement and thank the gentleman from Illinois for his leadership on 
this.
  Today, I am not going to talk about the merits of the agreement. I 
think there are plenty of them; but instead, I want to point out what I 
think this agreement means in the context of U.S. policy for the 
broader Middle East.
  This agreement would be the second free trade agreement that we would 
have with a country in the Middle East, and it would be another 
cornerstone of U.S. free trade efforts in this region. Achieving free 
trade and integrating this region into the global economy is of 
critical concern to the United States.
  Economically, socially, this region faces enormous problems, enormous 
dilemmas. Inequality in many Middle Eastern countries has grown. It has 
not diminished in recent decades.
  Political, economic, and social systems are intertwined and appear 
closed to those in the outside world. For those who are not already a 
part of the system, improvement in their lives is only a distant dream.
  In July 2002, the United Nations Development Program released a 
report with some discouraging statistics. Middle Eastern regional 
growth over the last 2 decades has been the lowest in the world except 
for sub-Saharan Africa. Labor productivity has been on the decline 
since 1960. 65 million people are illiterate. One of every two women 
can neither read nor write. Ten million children are not in school. 
Unemployment has reached 15 percent with many areas experiencing much 
higher rates.
  The Middle East cannot be healthy socially or politically so long as 
its economies are in crisis. The United States has a strong interest in 
helping to stimulate the economies and promote stability in the region.
  Now, the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement cannot by itself solve the 
deep and widespread economic and social inequalities which permeate 
this region, but the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement is a step in 
helping one country in this region deepen its integration into the 
world trading system and reach its aspirations for development.
  Passing this agreement will help this North African country develop 
and practice a system of the rule of law that will have implications 
far beyond trade and the commercial sector.
  I urge my colleagues to support this agreement. It is more than just 
an agreement. It symbolizes our efforts, the efforts of the United 
States, to integrate this country and this region in partnership with 
shared aspirations and expectations.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), another distinguished member of the Committee 
on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin). He does a terrific job with the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane) on a bipartisan basis to ensure 
that every opinion is heard on the Subcommittee on Trade over at the 
Committee on Ways and Means. I think oftentimes that is

[[Page H6638]]

why we have the final product that we do.
  Let me use this opportunity, Mr. Speaker, to explain why I will be 
voting in favor of this bilateral free trade agreement between the 
United States and Morocco, even though there are several aspects of the 
agreement that trouble me.
  My chief disappointment with the agreement is that, once again, the 
administration refused to specifically require our trading partner to 
abide by the five most basic internationally recognized labor 
standards.
  The International Labor Organization has identified those principles 
as the right to associate and bargain collectively, and prohibitions on 
forced labor, discrimination and child labor.
  Instead of assuring these minimal protections for foreign workers, 
our recent trade agreements have imposed a different standard. They 
require our partners to enforce whatever labor laws exist in that 
particular country, regardless of how lax those laws might be.
  While I strongly believe that this is the wrong negotiating tack as a 
general matter, in the specific case of Morocco, the country's labor 
laws more than surpass international minimum standards; and by all 
accounts, it appears that the government is making a genuine and 
conscientious effort to work with unions, workers, and employers to 
bolster its worker protections even further, including the right to 
strike. The labor provisions of this agreement are not perfect, but 
they represent a workable starting point.
  Although this agreement is not what I would ideally like to see, it 
represents an important first step. Fundamentally, I believe that the 
U.S. can improve its international standing and its national security 
by expanding trade and strengthening its relationships with moderate 
Muslim countries. Unfortunately, more and more Muslim voices are 
calling for boycotts of the United States and its products. That makes 
it all the more critical for us to reach out to those who are eager to 
form a partnership with us.
  Over the long term, I believe that agreements with nations such as 
Morocco are mutually beneficial from an economic standpoint. They also 
represent an opportunity to help mend international relations that have 
endured a great deal of strain over the last several years.
  Mr. Speaker, this agreement could be better. Certainly I would have 
negotiated it differently, but it will pave the way for progress in a 
region that is critically important to the United States, and so it 
does have my support.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, can the Chair tell me how much time we have 
remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Crane) has 29 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Levin) has 16 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) 
has 14\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Dunn), a member of the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
  Ms. DUNN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Illinois 
(Chairman Crane) and the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) 
and our ranking members of the Committee on Ways and Means for moving 
this free trade agreement so effectively through the committee process 
and onto the floor so that before we break for August recess we can 
express our support for this agreement.
  I do rise in support of the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement, Mr. 
Speaker. This is our second trade agreement with an Arab country. With 
our trade agreement with Morocco, along with those of Israel, Jordan, 
and Bahrain, we are working to improve economic opportunities in North 
Africa and in the Middle East.
  While the Moroccan economy is much smaller than ours, it remains a 
key export market for the United States and for my home State. In a 
State where approximately one in three jobs is now related to trade, it 
is not surprising that Washington State was the top exporter to Morocco 
with over $112 million in 2003.
  By eliminating 95 percent of the tariffs immediately on United States 
manufactured goods, we are improving the competitiveness of our 
businesses in Morocco. Of the $465 million total United States exported 
from Morocco last year, nearly 29 percent, or $134 million, was due to 
aerospace products. It is very important to the Northwest, where so 
many jobs are directly or indirectly affected by our aerospace 
industry. In fact, Boeing aircraft dominate Royal Air Morac's fleet 
with a potential of 17 more planes on order.
  This agreement will also strengthen intellectual property rights 
standards for patents, for trademarks and for copyrights so that our 
high-tech industries are protected in our digital economy. Higher 
standards, however, are not enough unless there is a commitment for 
better enforcement of these standards.
  For this reason, I am very pleased with Morocco's commitment to 
better enforcement of intellectual property rights, such as increasing 
criminal penalties for piracy and for counterfeiting.
  This is a very good agreement for our agricultural community. It 
eliminates duties on our products, and it liberalizes quotas on 
critical commodities. It also ensures that United States commodities 
will have equivalent access to any other trade agreements that Morocco 
negotiates with any other country. If Morocco gives another country 
better market access on agricultural products, our farmers get the same 
benefits.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this trade agreement so 
that we can build an economic bridge with Morocco and the Middle East.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I am a little puzzled by this debate. I heard my friend from Texas 
talk about all the great promises of free trade and how these trade 
agreements are going to mean so much to our farmers and to our workers 
and to our businesses. I have heard the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Crane) say some of the same kinds of things, but I guess I am puzzled 
because I have heard that throughout my entire 12 years in Congress.
  I have heard every trade agreement that comes to the floor, so many 
speakers say over and over and over again that if we pass these trade 
agreements, we are going to have more jobs, we are going to do more 
exports, we are going to have our balance in trade; and look what has 
happened in the last 12 years.
  Our trade deficit when I came to this Congress was about one-fourth 
of what it is today. We import $1.5 billion more every day than we 
export. George Bush, Senior, said for every $1 billion of trade, either 
export or import, it was equivalent to somewhere in the vicinity of 14 
or 15 or 16,000 jobs. Well, we have almost a $500 billion trade 
deficit. Do the math. That is an awful lot of lost jobs.
  When we pass these trade agreements, we continue to hemorrhage jobs. 
We continue to have job loss. We continue to lose manufacturing jobs. 
One out of six manufacturing jobs in my State has been lost since 
George Bush took office. We have lost 165 jobs every day of the Bush 
administration.
  So the answer to that is let us do more of what we have already been 
doing, let us do more tax cuts for the wealthiest people in society, 
hoping that maybe some of it will trickle down to more jobs, and let us 
do more trade agreements which ship jobs overseas? People in our 
communities say these trade agreements are not working.
  China, entry of China in WTO; NAFTA; Singapore, Chile, Australia, 
Morocco, these trade agreements are not translating into more jobs, and 
people at home know that. In spite of what people in this institution 
say, in spite of how people in this institution vote, the fact is we 
continue to lose manufacturing jobs in this country. We have lost 
millions of jobs in this Bush administration, and then we turn around 
and do the same thing over and over and over. We make the same promises 
over and over and over and the results are the same. When we will ever 
learn?
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I think it is important for everyone to understand that we have a 
trade surplus at the current time with Morocco. The projections are, 
though, that with

[[Page H6639]]

this free trade agreement we will have a very dramatic increase in our 
exports, especially our exports in the agricultural community with that 
dramatic drop in tariff barriers that have struck our access there, but 
we are making progress, dramatic progress.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Ryan), our distinguished colleague on the committee.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me time. I will just briefly pause and say, having a surplus 
with Morocco actually helps us with our trade deficit surplus figure 
because it adds to the surplus side of it.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to pause for a moment and thank those who 
made this possible. I would like to thank those negotiators at the U.S. 
Trade Representative who worked long and hard hours with the Moroccans 
to make this agreement possible. I would like to thank our committee 
chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas); our subcommittee 
chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane); and also I would 
like to thank the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Dunn), who 
spearheaded this through committee and here in Congress. This is a 
great product. This is a great thing.
  Now, specifically, why is this beneficial to our constituents? Why is 
this good for America?
  Well, number one, manufacturing, a very important sector to our 
economy especially in my home State of Wisconsin. This is a great deal 
for manufacturing. This gets rid of the tariffs on our manufacturing 
goods going to Morocco.
  Number two, and even more important, agriculture. For every $1 of 
imports we take from Morocco in imports, we export $10. This is a great 
agreement for agriculture, especially since the Europeans, who enjoy a 
50 percent higher trade flow advantage with Morocco than we have at the 
present time, do not have an agreement with Morocco on agriculture. Let 
me say it another way. Morocco and Europe trade a lot with each other, 
50 percent more than we do with Morocco. That is going to change with 
this agreement, thankfully; but the Europeans do not have an 
agriculture agreement with Morocco. We will, and that means we will 
sell even more agricultural products to Morocco. That is a great thing.
  We have a trade surplus with Morocco. They are a great trading 
partner. This is good for jobs. It is good for manufacturing. It is 
good for agriculture; but Mr. Speaker, there is a broader vision here. 
There is a broader purpose for all of this.
  This is part of the President's MEFTI plan. This is part of the 
Middle Eastern Free Trade Initiative. What is that initiative? That 
initiative is to recognize we need to play a constructive role in the 
Middle East; that in the war on terror, the most important aspect, 
long-term vision of that war on terror is improving our understanding 
and our relations with moderate Muslim countries, with the Arab world. 
This accomplishes this.
  We have 10 TIFAs in place, 10 trade and investment framework 
agreements in place, throughout the Gulf, throughout Northern Africa, 
to engage in discussion and dialogue with those countries to help bring 
them up to the rules of democracy, rules of free enterprise, 
enforceable contracts, the rule of law, women's right to vote, open 
societies.

                              {time}  1730

  This is what these trade agreements produce. So not only do we 
produce trade agreements like this Moroccan agreement, which is good 
for jobs in America, we produce political reforms by engaging in a 
partnership with those in the Middle East who want democracy and want 
openness. Because of these agreements and because of the role we play 
in the world, we serve as a catalyst to getting these countries to open 
their societies.
  Here is one example with the Moroccan agreement. Because of this 
trade agreement, Morocco passed a great piece of legislation in their 
constitution and their law for labor standards. They have been trying 
to do this for 20 years. For 20 years labor groups in Morocco have been 
trying to get the right to collectively bargain, a shorter workweek, 
better laws to protect against child labor. Those things are the law of 
the land in Morocco because of this agreement.
  So what we are doing with this broad initiative, through trade 
investment framework agreements, which lead to these free trade 
agreements like we have with Jordan and Bahrain and now Morocco, what 
this accomplishes is bringing these nations into a partnership of 
democracy, of freedom, of openness and prosperity. That is how we end 
up improving the lives of people in the Middle East, and that at the 
end of the day, and I am going to make this connection, is how we make 
sure that young men and women who are susceptible to the likes of al-
Qaeda, who grow up in tyrannical countries with lives where they have 
no hope and no place to put their creative energies and turn to the 
likes of al-Qaeda, now have hope in the countries where they did not 
have them before.
  Now young people in these countries who are opening up their systems, 
bringing democracy, bringing open societies, they have hope. They have 
a place to channel their energies. This will be one if we improve our 
relationship, our cultural understanding, our dialogue, and, yes, our 
trade with these countries.
  The Moroccan trade agreement is a perfect example of this vision. I 
urge Members to pass this trade agreement. It is good for jobs, it is 
good for Americans, it is good for Moroccans, and it is good for our 
foreign policy in the Middle East. That is a very, very important goal.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Crowley).
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise in support of this free trade agreement between the United 
States and Morocco. It has been a pleasure for me to work not only with 
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Rangel), the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks), the gentleman 
from Washington (Mr. Smith), the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley) 
and others from our side, but also with Members from the other side of 
the aisle, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. English), the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cantor), 
and the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) in making this bill 
a reality today on the floor.
  As a Member who supports free trade and fair trade, and as a member 
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia on the 
Committee on International Relations, I was happy to work with Members 
to develop this legislation, which goes beyond being just a trade bill 
and morphing into a foreign policy tool.
  Morocco has been a strong ally and friend of the United States since 
we declared our independence, and this agreement will continue to 
strengthen our long-standing relationship. This free trade agreement 
with Morocco will immediately eliminate duties on 95 percent of 
nontextile industrial imports, which will be the best market access the 
U.S. enjoys with a developing nation.
  Besides the economic benefits from the implementation of this free 
trade agreement, it also has spurred our friends in Morocco to create a 
comprehensive new labor law which just went into effect this past June. 
The Moroccan new labor law raises the minimum employment age, reduces 
the workweek with overtime rates, improves worker health and safety 
regulations, addresses gender equity, and promotes employment of the 
disabled. This labor law also guarantees rights of association and 
collective bargaining. I believe we can credit this movement in terms 
of improvement of labor standards in Morocco to hopes by Morocco of 
agreement on this trade agreement.
  Morocco has been a stabilizing force in the Middle East, and this 
agreement will help Morocco to continue on the path of moderation. In 
fact, Morocco has been a good friend to one of our strongest allies, 
Israel. Morocco has the largest population of Jews outside of Israel in 
the Middle East and has played an important role in trying to stabilize 
the current situation by continuing to play a role as a critical back 
channel for communications among

[[Page H6640]]

Israel, the Arab world, and the United States.
  At the core of this trade initiative is the belief that through 
economic opportunity and partnership with the United States and Israel 
the goal of peace in this region can be furthered. I support this free 
trade agreement between the United States and Morocco, and I urge 
Members to vote for final passage.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) for 
his outstanding commitment in this effort to advance our free trade 
relations and to advance the civilized values that free trade causes. 
He has done outstanding work in that effort, and I commend him. I thank 
his colleagues on his side of the aisle for their strong bipartisan 
support on this important bill.
  Mr. Speaker, the administration strongly supports H.R. 4842, which 
will approve and implement the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, as 
signed by the United States and Morocco on June 15, 2004.
  The U.S.-Morocco FTA advances U.S. economic interests and meets the 
negotiating principles and objectives set out by the Congress in the 
Trade Act of 2002. The FTA will benefit the people of the United States 
and Morocco and illustrate to other developing countries the advantages 
of more open markets for trade and investment.
  The FTA provides for increased access for American farmers, workers 
and businesses to Morocco's markets. Pursuant to the agreement, Morocco 
will provide strong protection for intellectual property, ensure that 
rules on electronic commerce are nondiscriminatory, and provide U.S. 
firms access to covered government procurement opportunities on the 
same basis that Moroccan firms enjoy.
  The U.S.-Morocco FTA provides a significant opportunity to encourage 
economic reform and development in a moderate Muslim nation and is an 
important step in implementing the President's plan for a broader U.S.-
Middle East Free Trade Area. It also sets a strong example of the 
benefits of open trade and democracy. Opening markets is part of the 
President's six-point plan for continuing to strengthen America's 
economy and to create more opportunities for American farmers, workers 
and businesses.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Ryan).
  Mr. RYAN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  A couple of points I would like to make as we are having this debate. 
One, we hear that there currently is a trade surplus with Morocco, but 
we have to look back just a few years and remember that we had a trade 
surplus with Mexico before we signed NAFTA. I think when we get 
ourselves into these trade agreements the argument is we have a trade 
surplus but things are going to change, and we need to look at that 
here.
  What I cannot understand today, not only with this agreement but the 
legislation that passed out of this House earlier, is what are the 
priorities? We are trying to strip the Supreme Court of their power 
that was given to them by the Constitution. We are going off on another 
trade agreement here. In Ohio, we just lost 14,000 more jobs just in 
the month of June. The unemployment rate in Ohio went from 5.6 percent 
to 5.8 percent. What are the priorities of this Congress?
  In every single trade agreement that has been passed by this 
Congress, there has been a promise that has been made along with it. We 
say we are going to open up markets, we are going to export, and we are 
going to trade. And as we get rid of those low-paying jobs, we are 
going to invest in education, we are going to make sure our country is 
competitive, and we are not living up to that part of the bargain.
  We have 59,000 engineers which graduated from this country in 2001, 
and over 200,000 that graduated from China. If we do not fix the 
problem we have with our Pell Grants, our student loans, No Child Left 
Behind in the State of Ohio alone is underfunded for $1.5 billion for 
one school year, we cannot keep trading and not educating. That is the 
problem with these trade agreements. If we are going to compete in a 
global economy, we have to invest in our students or we are going to 
lose the middle class in the United States of America.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Michigan for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I listened to the debate and I fully agree with Members 
from States like Ohio that have been devastatingly impacted by trade 
bills that have not worked.
  It is unusual for me to extend myself on trade bills and provide my 
support, but as I have looked at this particular trade bill let me 
congratulate the negotiators. They have gone more than the extra mile. 
I have always said that where we can help developing nations, and 
particularly those in Africa that I have worked with over the time of 
my years in Congress, this is an important step we are making.
  I cite in this trade bill some very interesting factors. First of 
all, I am gratified there are no immigration aspects to this bill 
because I oppose definitively any immigration issues on this bill 
because the immigration system in this Nation is broken and we must fix 
it in a way that is fair and balanced to all those who come to this 
country to seek opportunity.
  This bill, however, speaks to the issue of labor concerns. I am 
delighted in 2003 Morocco undertook a major social dialogue involving 
the government of Morocco and talked about adopting and did adopt in 
fact major labor law reforms in July 2003 which reflected a common 
agreement and was endorsed by all groups. Standards of labor treatment 
and the elimination of child labor laws has been the result of these 
negotiations, as well as the recognition of the right to associate and 
participate in labor unions. Morocco made anti-union and other forms of 
discrimination illegal, providing strong penalties against such 
conduct, creating a legal obligation to engage in collective 
bargaining.
  And yes, Mr. Speaker, let me also say that this particular treaty 
also recognizes in the fight against HIV/AIDS that we have the ability 
for the government of Morocco to buy generic drugs. I would hope as we 
look at treaties, as we look at labor agreements that deal in trade, as 
we look at formulating trade agreements in the future, Morocco as a 
developing nation is a very good standard by which to answer the 
Members' questions about the sizable loss of manufacturing jobs and 
other jobs around America. I too believe that we need job creation, the 
creation of manufacturing jobs, and we need to invest in the workforce 
of America.
  I believe that this strong trade agreement will allow us to show the 
people of Morocco how to develop their economic infrastructure, to be 
the consumers of our products here in the United States as we improve 
our trade to balance with them. We want to decrease the trade imbalance 
and increase the amount of exports to Morocco and help it to become an 
economic engine that will receive our products from the United States. 
When that occurs, I am prepared to support a trade agreement such as 
this, and I rise to support the Morocco trade agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support H.R. 4842, the ``United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act.'' Mr. Speaker, having 
traveled to Africa, I have seen the value when U.S. trade markets are 
opened to this part of the world. Morocco is an important ally in a 
region that needs our support. I support the long-term goal of 
increasing free trade with Africa and its surrounding neighbors. This 
legislation will build stronger and more effective commercial 
relationships in a region of the world where economic hope is 
unfortunately non-existent, developing nations like Morocco need our 
partnership.
  Mr. Speaker, one of my strong issues is the worldwide fight against 
the deadly pandemic: the HIV/AIDS virus. In August of 2003, the U.S. 
led the work towards a WTO consensus that allows poor countries without 
domestic drug production capacity to issue compulsory licenses to 
import drugs needed to combat diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis and other infectious epidemics. The Morocco FTA will not 
affect that country's ability to take measures necessary to protect 
public health or to use the WTO solution to import

[[Page H6641]]

drugs. This agreement ensures that government marketing-approval 
agencies will not grant approval to patent-infringing pharmaceuticals.
   As far as the agreement is concerned, Morocco has agreed to 
establish tariff-rate quotas for beef that grow over time, providing 
significantly increased access to the important market in high-quality 
beef. In this respect, the U.S. will have superior access over the 
European Union, and virtually every one else, as well. This legislation 
levels the playing field between U.S. wheat producers and the EU, 
though the transition to parity is longer than I prefer.
   We should welcome Morocco into the larger network of U.S. free trade 
partners. The Agreement provides benefits for businesses wishing to 
supply services cross-border (for instance, by electronic means) as 
well as businesses wishing to establish a presence locally in the other 
country. Strong and detailed disciplines on regulatory transparency 
supplement the Agreement's cross-cutting transparency provisions.
   In this agreement, Morocco will allow U.S.-based firms to supply 
insurance on a cross-border basis (through electronic means) for key 
markets including reinsurance, reinsurance brokerage, and, subject to a 
two-year phase-in, marine, aviation and transport (MAT) insurance and 
brokerage. Morocco also will allow U.S.-based firms to offer services 
cross-border to Moroccans in areas such as financial information and 
data processing, and financial advisory services.
   Of further benefit to U.S. insurance suppliers, Morocco will phase-
out certain mandatory reinsurance cessions and expedite the 
introduction of insurance products. Each government commits that users 
of the telecom network will have reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
access to the network, thereby preventing local firms from having 
preferential or ``first right'' of access to telecom networks.
   U.S. phone companies will have the right to interconnect will former 
monopoly networks in Morocco at non-discriminatory, cost-based rates. 
U.S. firms seeking to build a physical network in Morocco will have 
non-discriminatory access to key facilities, such as telephone switches 
and submarine cable landing stations.
   This agreement is important because Morocco is an emerging market at 
the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. It imports $11 
billion in products each year. Currently, U.S. products entering 
Morocco face an average tariff of more than 20 percent, while Moroccan 
products are only subject to an average 4 percent duty in the United 
States.
   Each government will prohibit bribery, including bribery of foreign 
United States officials, and establish appropriate criminal penalties 
to punish violators. This Agreement establishes a secure, predictable 
legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Morocco.
   All forms of investment will be protected under the Agreement, such 
as enterprises, debt, concessions, contracts and intellectual property. 
U.S. investors will enjoy in almost all circumstances the right to 
establish, acquire and operate investments in Morocco on an equal 
footing with Moroccan investors, and with investors of other countries.

  Pursuant to the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA), the 
Agreement draws from U.S. Legal principles and practices to provide 
U.S. investors in Morocco a basic set of substantive protections that 
Moroccan investors in the United States currently enjoy under the U.S. 
legal system.
  This agreement fully meets the labor objectives set out by the 
Congress in TPA. Labor obligations are part of the core text of the 
Agreement. Each government reaffirms its obligations as members of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), and commits to strive to ensure 
that its domestic laws provide for labor standards consistent with 
internationally recognized labor principles. The Agreement makes clear 
that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce domestic labor protections 
to encourage trade or investment.
  Each government will be required to effectively enforce its own 
domestic labor laws, and this obligation is enforceable through the 
Agreement's dispute settlement procedures.
  Procedural guarantees in the Agreement require each government to 
provide access for workers and employers to fair, equitable and 
transparent labor tribunals or courts.
  The Agreement includes a cooperative mechanism to promote respect for 
the principles embodied in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, and compliance with ILO Convention 182 
on the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
  In closing, I support the Moroccan Free Trade Agreement.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, one of the things I have noticed in these debates on 
these trade issues is there is one common thread. There are many, but 
there is one really thick common thread that is woven through all these 
trade agreements, in not just these trade agreements but that is 
perhaps woven through much of what this Congress has done in the last 3 
years, during the Bush years, and that is whatever the drug industry 
wants, whatever the pharmaceutical companies want.
  We know the drug industry is the most profitable industry in America 
by a factor of three or four times in profitability over other Fortune 
500 industries. We also know the drug industry has 600-plus lobbyists, 
more than one per Member. We also know the drug industry has given more 
money to President Bush, tens of millions of dollars, and to Republican 
leadership than any other industry. And we know they have gotten their 
way.
  They wrote the Medicare bill, we know that, with the insurance 
industry. We know they have begun to try to dry up drug supplies in 
Canada, prescription drugs, so that Americans have more difficulty 
going to Canada to get drugs. We know that the FDA, once one of the 
best agencies in the Federal Government, has been co-opted by the drug 
industry so that on issue after issue they take the drug industry's 
side rather than the public safety or the consumers' side. And most 
importantly, I do not know that Members on the other side of the aisle 
are quite aware of this, but certainly the public is aware at how high 
drug prices, how much they have skyrocketed in the 3 years since 
President Bush has, I was going to say turned a blind eye to drug 
industry abuses but really actually fronted for and assisted in drug 
industry abuses.
  One more example of that is all of these trade agreements, what 
happened with the Australia Free Trade Agreement, how it would for all 
intents and purposes block reimportation, that is, our ability, 
American consumers' ability to buy prescription drugs from another 
country, to get drugs at half or a third or a fourth of their price. We 
are now seeing the same in the Morocco bill.
  But let us kind of scratch the surface a little and what you will 
find, Mr. Speaker, is in April, United States Trade Rep, Ambassador 
Zoellick, gave Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast Asian 
public affairs, Ralph Ives, additional responsibilities as the 
Assistant U.S. Trade Rep for pharmaceutical policy. He was the chief 
negotiator in the Australia FTA, which included these provisions we 
talked about which, of course, benefit the pharmaceutical industry.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, we hear that this same Mr. Ives, who I said was the 
chief Australia FTA negotiator on pharmaceutical interests on behalf of 
the Bush administration, we find out next month he will leave USTR to 
become vice president of AdvaMed, a medical supply company. We have 
also learned that Claude Burke, another negotiator for U.S. taxpayers, 
paid by our government, a Bush appointee for intellectual property 
rights, has already left and now is working for another drug company, 
working for Abbott Labs.
  So this revolving door of the drug industry where the drug industry 
gives money to President Bush, President Bush then helps the drug 
industry, then these people who are working for taxpayers negotiate a 
good deal for the drug company, then leave and come back and work for 
the drug industry. Is there no shame with this crowd, with my 
Republican friends who have fronted for this drug industry that is 
fleecing the American public and with the administration? That is one 
issue.
  The other, Mr. Speaker, is why do we pass a trade agreement when we 
see the same story repeated over and over and over? We just turn the 
calendar back, rewind the clock, and we see it over and over again. We 
see speaker after speaker come to this floor and make all kinds of 
promises. We have a trade surplus in Morocco, so we ought to pass a 
trade agreement. Just like we had a trade surplus with Mexico, we 
passed NAFTA; and now we have a $25 billion a year, plus-plus-plus, 
trade deficit.
  They promise more agricultural exports. They promise more American 
jobs. They promise more business for American companies. They promise 
more exports of American products. But look what happens. In my State 
in the last 3 years, we have lost one out of

[[Page H6642]]

six manufacturing jobs. Does that mean these trade agreements with 
Mexico, with WTO in China, with Morocco, with Australia, with Chile, 
with Singapore, does that mean these trade agreements are working? 
There is no evidence that they are working. We continue to hemorrhage 
jobs. We now have a $450 billion trade deficit, $1.5 billion trade 
deficit every day. So our answer is, boy, let's do more of the same 
because that must be working.
  It is clearly not working. We have lost jobs during the Bush 
administration, the first President since Herbert Hoover to have a net 
loss of jobs. So what are we going to do? We are going to keep pursuing 
the same economic policy we have had the last 3 years, more tax cuts 
for the most privileged people in society, maybe some of it will 
trickle down into economic growth. Clearly that has not worked. More 
trade agreements, like Morocco, like Australia, like NAFTA, like China, 
more trade agreements. That has not worked because we continue to 
hemorrhage jobs. We continue to ship jobs overseas.
  Maybe, just maybe, Mr. Speaker, since none of that seems to have 
worked, maybe we ought to try something different. Maybe we ought to 
have a trade agreement that does not sell out to the drug industry. 
Maybe we ought to have a trade agreement with enforceable labor and 
environmental standards, international labor organization standards. 
Maybe we ought to have a trade agreement that puts American workers 
first, that puts the environment first, that puts food safety first, 
that puts American consumers of prescription drugs first. Maybe, just 
maybe, we ought to put a hold on these trade agreements that continue 
to ship jobs overseas and, instead, pass something that works for 
American consumers, that works for American workers, that works for our 
communities, and that works for the United States of America.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  When we discussed the rule, I went over some of the benefits of this 
agreement, those relating to manufacturing goods, and we have been 
deeply hurt in the manufacturing area in the United States these last 3 
years. This agreement should open up Morocco to more goods made in 
America. I referred to the agricultural area. This agreement does open 
up the Moroccan market to agricultural goods produced in the United 
States of America. It will also liberalize the service areas that are 
important for our development. And there is reference to intellectual 
property safeguards.
  I want to spend a few minutes now talking about the broader 
perspective here, the perspective, I think, with which we must look at 
trade agreements and expanded trade.
  First, there has been some reference here to bipartisanship, and it 
is true that this will pass with bipartisan support. Not complete. But 
I want it clear that there has been these last 3 years no basic 
bipartisan consensus on trade. That has been true of the big issues. We 
fought out TPA here, and it passed narrowly. CAFTA was negotiated on a 
narrow basis without adequate bipartisan participation. The same has 
been true today of the FTAA.
  The failure of this administration to build a bipartisan consensus, a 
strong bipartisan foundation, to renew that foundation that once 
existed here, I think, has handicapped discussions within the WTO. We 
cannot make the tough decisions relating to negotiations in the WTO 
that affect American workers, businesses, farmers and others except on 
the basis of a strong bipartisan foundation. We do not have it.
  Secondly, we on the Democratic side together, all of us, reject the 
use of one agreement as a model for others. For example, we have 
discussed core labor standards. Where labor laws in a country are 
essentially adequate, as was true of Jordan, the standard enforce-your-
own-laws, which was the basic standard in Jordan, can work; but it will 
not work in cases where laws are very inadequate. So that is why we 
Dems essentially in unison reject the CAFTA that was negotiated. We 
support a Central American Free Trade Agreement, but one that is 
different than was negotiated.
  So the basic issue, therefore, is not, as some in the majority have 
stated, whether one is for or against free trade, for or against 
expanded trade. It is whether the terms of expanded trade will be 
shaped to benefit all and not just a few. We do not assume that 
expanded trade is automatically positive all around.
  That is why when this agreement came up, we raised two issues. One of 
them related to core labor standards. There was reform. We wanted to 
know the facts about those reforms. We wanted to know the realities 
within Morocco. We wanted to know whether it was more or less like 
Jordan and not more or less like Central America.
  And so we dug into the facts. We made it clear to the Moroccan 
government that we cared, and I must say I think it is because 
Democrats have been raising these issues perhaps more than any other 
factor that the Moroccan government undertook some reforms, and we 
received back a communication from the government of Morocco. I submit 
for printing in the Record the letter that was sent to us and the three 
other letters referred to during the debate on the rule.
  The material referred to is as follows:
                                                    Embassy of the


                                           Kingdom of Morocco,

                                    Washington, DC, July 19, 2004.
     Hon. Sandy Levin,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     House of Representatives.
       Dear Representative Levin: I deeply appreciate the 
     opportunity to work with you on the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade 
     Agreement. In particular, I appreciate the opportunity to 
     talk to you about the pharmaceutical provisions in the Free 
     Trade Agreement, and about how the Government of Morocco is 
     meeting the health needs of its citizens.
       The Government of Morocco has a well-developed health 
     system, including a comprehensive public health program. For 
     example, free medical care, including medicines, is available 
     through our hospitals. Morocco's health care policy includes 
     a strong emphasis on generic drugs.
       Morocco has not needed to engage in emergency measures such 
     as compulsory licensing or parallel imports. In fact, there 
     is a well-developed domestic pharmaceutical industry in 
     Morocco, producing also generics, and in 2000, well in 
     advance of the Free Trade Agreement and completely 
     independent of it, Morocco decided to bar parallel imports.
       In addition, as a separate, but quite important matter, the 
     Government of Morocco is strongly committed to and has agreed 
     to the highest-standard intellectual property rights 
     provisions in the Free Trade Agreement. The Government of 
     Morocco believes that effective intellectual property right 
     protection will play a vital role in the continued economic 
     development of our country.
       The pharmaceutical provisions in the Free Trade Agreement 
     were carefully considered in Morocco. They were discussed in 
     detail with all parties. All sectors of our health system 
     were involved, including the pharmaceutical industry. The 
     discussions also included the members of the civil society in 
     Morocco.
       The Government of Morocco achieved in this agreement full 
     flexibility to meet our nation's health concerns. In 
     particular, the Government of Morocco believes the agreement 
     fully preserves its right to issue a compulsory license in 
     the event that this should prove necessary.
       The Agreement does bar ``parallel imports'' in 1.5.9.4. 
     However, as described above, the Government of Morocco 
     already bans ``parallel imports.'' In addition, the 
     Government of Morocco believes that in the event that it 
     faced a situation where extraordinary action was required, it 
     could meet the needs of its people through a compulsory 
     license.
       The Government of Morocco considered carefully the data 
     exclusivity provisions in the agreement. We do not believe 
     that they present any risk to our ability to meet the health 
     needs of our citizens.
       Under the Agreement, a compulsory license does not override 
     obligations to provide data exclusivity under 15.10.1 and 2. 
     The Government of Morocco believes it is unlikely that a 
     situation would ever arise where data exclusivity would be a 
     barrier to the issuance of a compulsory license. If such an 
     event did occur, the Government of Morocco believes that an 
     accommodation could be reached with the owner of the data.
       The Government of Morocco supports the Paragraph 6 solution 
     of the Doha Declaration. The Free Trade Agreement does not 
     restrict our ability to export under the Paragraph 6 solution 
     of the Doha Declaration. To the specific, 15.9.6 does not 
     create a barrier to exports under the Paragraph 6 solution of 
     the Doha Declaration.
       The June 15, 2004 side letter between our two countries 
     addresses the ability to amend the Free Trade Agreement, 
     responsive to amendments to the WTO Agreement on Trade-
     Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Under the 
     Agreement, the Government of Morocco believes it can consult 
     immediately to amend the Agreement responsive to any WTO 
     amendments. Under the Agreement, it is not required to wait 
     for there to be an application in dispute of the Agreement.

[[Page H6643]]

       I look forward to keep working with you.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Aziz Mekouar,
     Ambassador.
                                  ____

                                                    Embassy of the


                                           Kingdom of Morocco,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 2004.
     Hon. Sandy Levin,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Levin: I have deeply appreciated the 
     continuing opportunity to work with you on the U.S. Morocco 
     Free Trade Agreement. In particular, I welcome your interest 
     in our nation's labor law, specifically the comprehensive 
     reforms, passed last year.
       I want to address through this letter some of the issues 
     that have been highlighted in conversations with you and your 
     staff. Under Moroccan law, it is illegal to fire an 
     individual because they are a member of a labor organization 
     or have engaged in labor organizing. To fire someone on these 
     grounds would be arbitrary under the 2003 law and would make 
     available the full remedies provided under that law.
       Under Moroccan law, it is illegal to refuse to hire an 
     individual because they are a member of a labor organization 
     or have engaged in labor organizing. It is also illegal to 
     refuse to rehire or extend the contract of an individual for 
     these reasons.
       Section 473 is a provision in the 2003 Labor Law and the 
     provision's intent is to ensure that labor representatives do 
     not undermine the traditional labor organizations. The 
     government intends to implement this provision to achieve 
     that goal, consistent with the core provisions of the ILO.
       The right to strike is protected in the Moroccan 
     constitution. Further clarification of these rights is 
     underway. The government of Morocco is committed to 
     protecting the right to strike in conformance with the 
     International Labor Organization's core principles. In 
     particular, the government of Morocco will not use Article 
     288 of our penal code against lawful strikers.
       Concerning the questions regarding Labor Representatives, 
     employers have the obligation to organize the elections for 
     the labor representatives. Employers cannot vote in these 
     elections and are not able to choose labor representatives. 
     Only employees can vote and elect freely the labor 
     representatives.
       Employees can join freely the Union of their own choice. 
     Unions designate their representatives within the companies.
       On the ILO involvement, Morocco has always worked with ILO. 
     For instance, ILO assisted Morocco to write the Labor Code of 
     2003 and the new law on child labor. Morocco, as in the past, 
     will continue to ask the support of ILO and work with this 
     organization in all labor issues such as new laws and will 
     ask its help in providing assistance for the implementation 
     of the current rules.
       I look forward to continuing to work with you on these 
     issues and any others of potential concern. Nevertheless, I 
     wanted to get back to you in a timely manner on the key 
     issues addressed in this letter.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Aziz Mekouar,
     Ambassador.
                                  ____

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, July 15, 2004.
     Hon. Robert B. Zoellick,
     U.S. Trade Representative,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Ambassador Zoellick: We are writing to express our 
     ongoing concern about sections of recently negotiated U.S. 
     free trade agreements (FTAs) that could affect the 
     availability of affordable drugs in developing countries. In 
     particular, we are concerned about the impact of restrictions 
     on parallel imports and about marketing exclusivity 
     requirements for pharmaceuticals included in the Morocco FTA. 
     Our concern relates to two points.
       First, it appears that some of the provisions contradict, 
     both explicitly and in spirit, commitments made by the United 
     States in the World Trade Organization in both the November 
     2001 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
     (the Doha Declaration) and the September 2003 Implementation 
     of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
     and Public Health (the Paragraph 6 Decision). Section 
     2101(b)(4)(C) of the Trade Act of 2002 (Trade Promotion 
     Authority or TPA) directs the Administration to respect the 
     Doha Declaration, necessarily including subsequent agreements 
     related to that Declaration.
       Second, we are concerned that the FTA's restrictions on 
     obtaining regulatory approval for drugs, including drugs that 
     are already off-patent, are likely to increase prices in the 
     Moroccan market. These restrictions, described below, could 
     undermine the availability of generic versions of drugs to 
     treat serious health problems, including HIV/ADS, that are 
     widespread in many, if not most, developing countries. 
     Moreover, any increase in the price of drugs in a developing 
     country like Morocco will be borne by consumers because most 
     developing countries have large rural, uninsured, and poor 
     populations who pay out-of-pocket for drugs.
       In discussions with your staff and in recent testimony 
     before the Committee on Ways and Means, we understand that 
     your office is of the view that the FTA does not interfere 
     with a country's efforts to ensure broader access to 
     medicines. We request that you explain that view to us in 
     writing, and in particular, by responding to the questions 
     outlined below. We have focused on Chapter 15 of the U.S.-
     Morocco FTA, because it may be considered by Congress in the 
     coming weeks.


                  restrictions on parallel importation

       Article 15.9.4 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA requires both 
     countries to recognize the exclusive right of a patent holder 
     to import a patented product, at least where the patent 
     holder has restricted the right to import by contractual 
     means. In practical terms, this provision means that neither 
     Morocco, nor for that matter, the United States, may allow 
     parallel imports of patented pharmaceutical products from the 
     other country, or where a national of the other country owns 
     the patent.
       With respect to Morocco, which is a developing country, 
     this provision appears to limit one of the flexibilities 
     identified in the Doha Declaration for increasing access to 
     medicines, and accordingly, it appears to contradict the 
     direction in section 2102(b)(4)(c) of TPA. Specifically, the 
     Doha Declaration reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement provides 
     flexibility for WTO Members to take measures to protect 
     public health, including ``promot[ing] access to medicines 
     for all.'' One of the key flexibilities identified in the 
     Doha Declaration is the right of each country to determine 
     for itself whether to allow parallel imports.
       Does Article 15.9.4 of the Morocco FTA prevent Morocco from 
     allowing parallel imports of a patented pharmaceutical 
     product?
       Given that the Doha Declaration explicitly confirms the 
     right of each country to retain flexibility in allowing 
     parallel imports of drugs as one way of meeting the public 
     health needs of its citizens, please explain why the 
     provision was included given that TPA directs the 
     Administration to respect the Doha Declaration?
       Which country sought inclusion of this provision?
       If Morocco or the United States eliminated the exclusive 
     right of a patent holder to import a patented product, would 
     either be in violation of Article 15.9.4?


               market exclusivity and related provisions

       Article 15.10.1 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA requires that both 
     countries prevent the use of data submitted to support an 
     application for marketing approval (e.g., approval from the 
     Food and Drug Administration (FDA)) for a new pharmaceutical 
     chemical product without the consent of the person submitting 
     such data, for a period of five years from the date of 
     approval. In layman's terms, this means that if a company 
     submits data to meet FDA-type safety and efficacy standards, 
     and obtains marketing approval based on that data, other 
     companies cannot obtain regulatory approval based on those 
     data for five years. Given the cost of generating such data, 
     this provision operates effectively as a grant of market 
     exclusivity in virtually all cases, including in cases where 
     the drug is off patent. Article 15.10.2 appears to allow an 
     additional three years of marketing exclusivity for new uses 
     of an already-approved pharmaceutical product. Article 
     15.10.3 requires both countries to extend patents where there 
     is a delay in the marketing approval process.
       The provisions described above appear to be based on 1984 
     amendments to U.S. law known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. The 
     objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act were to accelerate and 
     increase the availability of generic drugs in the United 
     States while balancing the need for continued investment in 
     new drugs. As you are aware, the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
     necessary because prior to 1984, U.S. law made it extremely 
     difficult and expensive to bring a generic version of a 
     pharmaceutical product to market, even after a patent 
     expired. This was because prior to the 1984 changes, a 
     company seeking marketing approval for a copy of an already-
     approved drug had to generate its own data to support its FDA 
     application. The cost of generating those data effectively 
     precluded second entrants from entering the market. (First 
     entrants were able to offset the cost for generation of the 
     data because they enjoyed patent protection.) The Hatch-
     Waxman Act allowed second entrants to rely on data submitted 
     by first entrants, thereby reducing costs and speeding 
     introduction of generic versions of drugs to the U.S. market. 
     In exchange for allowing second entrants to ``piggy-back'' 
     off first entrants, first entrants were given a period of 
     market exclusivity, even for drugs that are off-patent.
       The Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions on market exclusivity 
     were part of a compromise necessary to ensure that the U.S. 
     regulatory structure was updated to facilitate the entry of 
     generic drugs into the U.S. market. Most developing countries 
     already have robust generic markets, in large part because 
     they already allow producers of generic versions of drugs to 
     obtain regulatory approval based on data submitted by first 
     applicants or based on prior approval. In light of that fact, 
     and given that innovative drug companies largely develop 
     drugs for developed country markets and conduct the necessary 
     tests to get marketing approval in those markets regardless 
     of whether they are given market exclusivity in low-income 
     developing countries, what is the rationale for including 
     these provisions?
       Please describe the circumstances under which the three 
     additional years of marketing exclusivity described in 
     Article 15.10.2 would apply.
       Neither Article 15.10.1 or 15.10.2 on marketing exclusivity 
     appear to allow for reliance on previously submitted data or 
     prior

[[Page H6644]]

     approval during the period of market exclusivity absent 
     consent of the first applicant. The Doha Declaration 
     reaffirmed the right of countries to use flexibilities under 
     the TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licenses. A 
     compulsory license allows someone other than the patent 
     holder to produce and sell a drug under patent. It is not 
     clear to us why the grant of a compulsory license would 
     override a grant of market exclusivity, as provided in 
     Articles 15.10.1 and 15.10.02. (We note that there is no 
     exception to protect the public.) Please describe how the 
     market exclusivity provisions in Article 15.10.1 and Article 
     15.10.2 relate to Morocco's ability to issue a compulsory 
     license.
       Where a compulsory license has been issued, may a Party 
     automatically deem that the first applicant has consented to 
     reliance on the data or prior approval for the drug produced 
     under the compulsory license?
       If the patent and test-data were owned by different 
     entities, does a compulsory license result in legal 
     ``consent'' by both the patent holder and the data owner for 
     use of the patented material and the test data?
       When the drug is off patent, and a Party wishes to permit 
     marketing for a second entrant, what mechanism exists in the 
     FTA to allow for an exception to the provisions on market 
     exclusivity?
       Is a grant of market exclusivity pursuant to Articles 
     15.10.1 and 15.10.2 considered an ``investment'' with respect 
     to Chapter 10 of the agreement? If so, would an abridgement 
     of the period of market exclusivity constitute a compensable 
     expropriation under Chapter 10?
       Article 10.6.5 of the FTA appears to clarify that any act 
     of patent infringement carried out by a Party in the issuance 
     of a compulsory license in accordance with the TRIPS does not 
     constitute a compensable expropriation. Issuance of a 
     compulsory license, however, is only one aspect of the 
     process of getting a drug to market. Does the clarification 
     in Article 10.6.5 also ensure that other measures taken by a 
     government to ensure that a drug on which a compulsory 
     license has been issued can be lawfully marketed (e.g., a 
     grant of marketing approval to a generic or second producer 
     before the period of marketing exclusivity has expired) will 
     not constitute compensable expropriations? If not, is there 
     another provision in the agreement that would ensure that 
     such measures do not constitute expropriations?
       Article 15.10.3 requires that a patent term be extended 
     where there is a delay in the regulatory approval process. 
     The provision does not state whether delays attributable to 
     the applicant (e.g., failure to provide adequate data) 
     mitigate against extension. Article 15.9.8, the comparable 
     provision for extension of a patent term because of a delay 
     in the patent approval process, makes clear that delays 
     attributable to the patent applicant should not be considered 
     in determining whether there is a delay that gives rise to 
     the need for an extension. Why was similar language not 
     included in Article 15.10.3?
       Is Morocco, or for that matter the United States, required 
     by the FTA to extend a patent term where there is a delay in 
     the regulatory approval that is attributable to the 
     applicant?


                Bolar-Type Provisions That Limit Export

       Article 15.9.6 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA appears to allow a 
     person other than a patent holder to make use of a patent in 
     order to generate data in support of an application for 
     marketing approval of a pharmaceutical product (e.g., 
     approval from the FDA). However, Article 15.9.6 also states 
     that if exportation of the product using the patent is 
     allowed, exportation must be limited to ``purposes of meeting 
     marketing approval requirements.'' This provision appears to 
     preclude Morocco from exporting generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for any reason other than use in 
     obtaining marketing approval because that is the only 
     exception noted.
       If that is the case, the provision would seem to curtail 
     Morocco's ability to act as an exporter of pharmaceutical 
     products to least-developed and other countries under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. Specifically, the Paragraph 6 Decision 
     allows countries to export drugs produced under a compulsory 
     license to least-developed countries or to countries that 
     lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities. Were the 
     provisions to constrain Morocco's ability to export under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision, the United States could be accused of 
     backtracking on commitments that have been made.
       Please explain whether this Article prohibits Morocco from 
     allowing the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for purposes other than ``meeting 
     market approval requirements.'' If it does not, please 
     explain in detail how you came to that conclusion.
       If this provision does in fact limit Morocco's ability to 
     allow the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products, please explain how Morocco could 
     serve as an exporting country to help least-developed and 
     other countries address public health needs under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. (Exporters under the Paragraph 6 
     Decision are exporting to meet the health needs of an 
     importing country, not merely to obtain marketing approval.)
       Does Article 15.9.6 allow export of a generic version of a 
     patented drug to get marketing approval in a third country 
     (i.e., other than the United States or Morocco)? (Article 
     15.9.6 states that ``the Party shall provide that the product 
     shall only be exported outside its territory for purposes of 
     meeting marketing approval requirements of that Party.'')


                      Side Letter to the Agreement

       The Morocco FTA includes an exchange of letters dated June 
     15, 2004, between the Governments of Morocco and the United 
     States. The letters appear intended to clarify the 
     relationship between the intellectual property provisions of 
     the FTA and the ability of Morocco and the United States to 
     take measures to protect the public health.
       The letters address two issues. First, the letters state 
     that the intellectual property provisions in the FTA ``do not 
     prevent the effective utilization'' of the Paragraph 6 
     Decision. Second, the letters state that if the TRIPS 
     Agreement is amended on issues related to promotion of access 
     to medicines, and that either the United States or Morocco 
     takes action in conformity with such amendments, both 
     countries will ``immediately consult in order to adapt [the 
     intellectual property provisions of the FTA] as appropriate 
     in light of the amendment.''
       On the Paragraph 6 Decision, please explain how the 
     statement that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective 
     utilization'' is not merely rhetorical. Please be specific as 
     to why you believe the provisions in the FTA do not preclude 
     Morocco from acting as an importer or exporter of drugs under 
     the Paragraph 6 Decision, including how the FTA's provisions 
     related to market exclusivity can be waived if Morocco acts 
     in either capacity.
       On the issue of consultation, do the letters mean that both 
     Parties agree to amend the FTA as soon as possible to reflect 
     access to medicines amendments to the TRIPS Agreement? Will 
     the United States refrain from enforcing provisions of the 
     FTA that contravene the TRIPS Agreement amendments while the 
     FTA is being amended? Is USTR willing to engage in an 
     exchange of letters with the Government of Morocco 
     memorializing such an understanding?
       We appreciate your prompt response to these questions.
           Sincerely,
     Charles B. Rangel,
       Ranking Democrat, Committee on Ways and Means.
     Jim McDermott,
       Member, Committee on Ways and Means.
     Sander Levin
       Ranking Democrat, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways 
     and Means.
     Henry A. Waxman,
       Ranking Democrat, Committee on Government Reform.
                                  ____

         Executive Office of the President, Office of the United 
           States Trade Representative,
                                    Washington, DC, July 19, 2004.
     Hon. Sander M. Levin,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Levin: Thank you for your letter of July 
     15, 2004, regarding certain provisions of the intellectual 
     property chapter of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
     (FTA).
       I have addressed each of your specific questions below. As 
     a general matter, for the reasons also set forth below, the 
     FTA does not conflict with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
     Agreement and Public Health or otherwise adversely, affect 
     access to medicines in Morocco. The FTA does not require 
     Morocco to change its policies with respect to any of the 
     flexibilities noted in the Doha Declaration. Furthermore, we 
     believe that this FTA can advance Morocco's ability to 
     address public health problems, both by putting in place 
     incentives to develop and bring new medicines to market 
     quickly and by raising standards of living more broadly.
       The experience of Jordan under the U.S.-Jordan FTA is 
     illuminating. The United States and Jordan signed the FTA in 
     2000, during the prior Administration, and we worked with 
     Congress to enact that agreement in 2001. The U.S.-Jordan FTA 
     contains a strong intellectual property chapter that covers, 
     for example, data protection, one of the issues highlighted 
     in your letter. Jordan has witnessed a substantial increase 
     in pharmaceutical investment, creating new jobs and 
     opportunities. In addition, Jordan has approved 32 new 
     innovative medicines since 2000--a substantial increase in 
     the rate of approval of innovative drugs, helping facilitate 
     Jordanian consumers' access to medicines. The Jordanian drug 
     industry has even begun to develop its own innovative 
     medicines. This is an example of how strong intellectual 
     property protection can bring substantial benefits to 
     developing and developed countries together.
       Your specific questions with respect to the U.S.-Morocco 
     FTA are addressed below.


                          Parallel Importation

       1. Does Article 15.9.4 of the Morocco FTA prevent Morocco 
     from allowing parallel imports of a patented pharmaceutical 
     product?
       Article 15.9.4 of the FTA reflects current Moroccan law and 
     therefore does not require Morocco to do anything it does not 
     already do. The FTA also reflects existing U.S. law. Both 
     Morocco and the United States already provide patent owners 
     with an exclusive right to import patented products, 
     including pharmaceuticals but also all other types of 
     patented products. Many innovative industries and their 
     employees in the United

[[Page H6645]]

     States--from the high tech and pharmaceuticals sectors to 
     sectors covering chemicals and agricultural inputs, and on to 
     engineering and manufacturing--benefit from this long-
     standing protection in U.S. patent law.
       2. Given that the Doha Declaration explicitly confirms the 
     right of each country to retain flexibility in allowing 
     parallel imports of drugs as one way of meeting the public 
     health needs of its citizens, please explain why the 
     provision was included given that TPA directs the 
     Administration to respect the Doha Declaration?
       Providing patent owners with an exclusive import right is 
     consistent with Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
     states that patent owners have the exclusive right to make, 
     use, sell, offer for sale, and import products covered by 
     their patents. U.S. law, developed through a long line of 
     Supreme Court and lower court cases, has recognized this 
     right for over a hundred years. The TRIPS Agreement more 
     precisely articulated the exclusive import right, and, when 
     implementing TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
     Congress amended the patent law by providing for such a right 
     expressly in the statute.
       At the same time, however, the TRIPS Agreement also allows 
     countries to choose to permit ``international exhaustion'' 
     without challenge under WTO dispute settlement. International 
     exhaustion would allow parallel imports. The Doha Declaration 
     affirms this approach, and states that ``[t]he effect of the 
     provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
     exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each 
     member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion 
     without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment 
     provisions of Articles 3 and 4.''
       Importantly, neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha 
     Declaration require WTO members to adopt an international 
     exhaustion rule; they merely recognize that countries may do 
     so without challenge. WTO members are free to exercise their 
     sovereign right to choose an alternative policy. As noted, 
     the United States does not permit parallel imports. Morocco 
     also decided in 2000, well before the FTA negotiations, not 
     to permit parallel imports. The fact that the FTA reflects 
     principles already present in both Parties' laws does not in 
     any way lessen our commitment to the Doha Declaration. In 
     fact, in previous FTA negotiations with developing countries 
     that do not have parallel import restrictions in their 
     domestic law (e.g., Central America, Chile, and Bahrain), the 
     final negotiated texts do not contain provisions on parallel 
     importation.
       3. Which country sought inclusion of this provision?
       This provision is a standard component of the U.S. draft 
     text, which USTR staff has presented to Congress for review 
     and comment on numerous occasions. Morocco readily accepted 
     the proposal, without objection, and noted during the 
     negotiations that Moroccan patent law, like U.S. law, already 
     provided patentees with an exclusive importation right.
       4. If Morocco or the United States eliminated the exclusive 
     right of a patent holder to import a patented product, would 
     either be in violation of Article 15.9.4?
       It would depend on the details of the particular 
     legislation. A change in U.S. law would, however, affect many 
     other innovative sectors that rely on patents besides the 
     pharmaceutical sector. Many U.S. technology, manufacturing, 
     and other innovative businesses--as well as Members of 
     Congress--urge us regularly to vigorously safeguard U.S. 
     patents and the jobs they help create.


                           market exclusivity

       5. The Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions on market exclusivity 
     were part of a compromise necessary to ensure that the U.S. 
     regulatory structure was updated to facilitate the entry of 
     generic drugs into the U.S. market. Most developing countries 
     already have robust generic markets, in large part because 
     they already allow producers of generic versions of drugs to 
     obtain regulatory approval based on data submitted by first 
     applicants or based on prior approval. In light of that fact, 
     and given that innovative drug companies largely develop 
     drugs for developed country markets and conduct the necessary 
     tests to get marketing approval in those markets regardless 
     of whether they are given market exclusivity in low-income 
     developing countries, what is the rationale for including 
     these provisions?
       In negotiating the U.S.-Morocco FTA and other recent FTAs, 
     USTR has been mindful of the guidance provided in the Trade 
     Act of 2002, which directs USTR to seek to ``ensur[e] that 
     the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade 
     agreement governing intellectual property rights that is 
     entered into by the United States reflect[s] a standard of 
     protection similar to that found in United States law.'' We 
     understand the rationale of this guidance is to help protect 
     and create high-paying jobs in leading American businesses. 
     As a developed economy, it is understandable that U.S. 
     workers will be increasingly employed in higher value (and 
     better paid) innovative and productive jobs. On the basis of 
     Congress' direction, the United States sought to include 
     provisions that reflect U.S. law, including with respect to 
     the protection of data.
       The protection of clinical test data has long been a 
     component of trade agreements negotiated by U.S. 
     Administrations with both developed and developing countries. 
     Data protection provisions were included, for example, in 
     many past trade agreements, including the U.S.-Jordan FTA and 
     the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement--both negotiated 
     by the prior Administration after the passage of the law to 
     which you refer. Such provisions were included in NAFTA, too. 
     They are in all recent FTAs, including the U.S.-Singapore FTA 
     and the U.S.-Chile FTA. Data protection provisions have also 
     been included in many bilateral intellectual property 
     agreements.
       The TRIPS Agreement itself requires protection of clinical 
     test data against unfair commercial use. While the United 
     States protects data to obtain approval for new chemical 
     entities for five years, other countries provide different 
     terms. The EU, for example, protects such data for 6-10 
     years.
       Implicit in the question, however, appears to be an 
     assumption that data protection is disadvantageous for 
     developing countries like Morocco. Yet, protection of data 
     actually has the potential of facilitating and accelerating 
     access to medicines. As recognized in Chapter 15 of the FTA 
     (footnotes 12 and 13), Morocco does not currently approve 
     generic versions of medicines based on approvals granted in 
     other countries. As a result, today a generic producer 
     wishing to sell pharmaceuticals in Morocco may obtain 
     approval only if an innovative producer first obtains 
     approval in Morocco or if the generic producer invests the 
     significant money and time necessary to recreate the data 
     itself. After an innovative producer obtains approval in 
     Morocco, a generic producer may rely on such data to obtain 
     approval for its generic product.
       Therefore, under existing Moroccan law, generic 
     manufacturers in Morocco cannot obtain marketing approval for 
     a generic drug until an innovator has first obtained approval 
     for the drug in Morocco. Without data protection, innovative 
     producers will be less likely to enter the Moroccan market in 
     the first place because, once they obtain approval, generic 
     producers may capture most of the market. The data 
     exclusivity provisions of the FTA can thus provide an 
     important incentive for innovators to enter the market, which 
     may in turn expand the potential universe of generic drugs in 
     Morocco. As noted above, this is the development we are 
     seeing in Jordan, to the benefit of Jordan consumers.
       6. Please describe the circumstances under which the three 
     additional years of marketing exclusivity described in 
     Article 15.10.2 would apply.
       The question seems to imply that the basic five year term 
     of protection for data submitted to obtain approval of new 
     chemical entities may be extended to eight years. This is not 
     correct. There is no circumstance in which the FTA requires 
     that an innovator receive a data protection period longer 
     than five years for new chemical entities.
       The three year period of protection reflects a provision in 
     U.S. law, which relates to new information that is submitted 
     after a product is already on the market (for example, 
     because the innovator is seeking approval for a new use of an 
     existing product). In that situation, at least in cases where 
     the origination of this new data involves considerable 
     effort, the FTA requires that the person providing the new 
     data gets three years of protection for that new data 
     relating to that new use. This three year period only applies 
     to the new data for the new use; it is not added to the 
     exclusivity period for any data previously submitted.
       For example, if a new chemical entity is given marketing 
     approval, the data supporting that approval is protected for 
     five years. After that time, generic producers may rely on 
     the data to obtain approval for a generic version of the drug 
     for the use supported by the original data. If a new use is 
     subsequently discovered for the chemical entity, and the 
     health authority approves the new use based on new data, then 
     the originator of the new data is entitled to three years of 
     protection for that data. During that time, however, generics 
     can continue to produce and market the drug for the original 
     use.
       7. Neither Article 15.10.1 or 15.10.2 on marketing 
     exclusivity appear to allow for reliance on previously 
     submitted data or prior approval during the period of market 
     exclusivity absent consent of the first applicant. The Doha 
     Declaration reaffirmed the right of countries to use 
     flexibilities under the TRIPS agreement, such as compulsory 
     licenses. A compulsory license allows someone other than the 
     patent holder to produce and sell a drug under patent. It is 
     not clear to us why the grant of a compulsory license would 
     override a grant of market exclusivity, as provided in 
     Articles 15.10.1 and 15.10.2. (We note that there is no 
     exception to protect the public.) Please describe how the 
     market exclusivity provisions in Article 15.10.1 and Article 
     15.10.2 relate to Morocco's ability to issue a compulsory 
     license.
       The Doha Declaration recognizes that the TRIPS Agreement 
     allows countries to issue compulsory licenses to address 
     public health problems. The U.S.-Morocco FTA is fully 
     consistent with this principle. It contains no provisions 
     with respect to compulsory licensing, leaving the 
     flexibilities available under WTO rules unchanged.
       In the negotiation of the U.S.-Morocco FTA, both parties 
     recognized the importance of protecting public health. Your 
     questions pertain to whether provisions of Chapter 15 (which 
     is the Intellectual Property Rights chapter) might affect 
     this common interest.

[[Page H6646]]

     To address this type of concern, the United States and 
     Morocco agreed to a side letter on public health in which 
     both Parties stated their understanding that ``[t]he 
     obligations of Chapter Fifteen of the Agreement do not affect 
     the ability of either Party to take necessary measures to 
     protect public health by promoting access to medicines for 
     all, in particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, 
     tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as 
     circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency.'' The 
     Parties also stated that ``Chapter Fifteen does not prevent 
     the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution'' 
     reached in the WTO last year to ensure that developing 
     countries that lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity may 
     import drugs. Therefore, if circumstances ever arise in which 
     a drug is produced under a compulsory license, and it is 
     necessary to approve that drug to protect public health or 
     effectively utilize the TRIPS/health solution, the data 
     protection provisions in the FTA would not stand in the way.
       8. Where a compulsory license has been issued, may a Party 
     automatically deem that the first applicant has consented to 
     reliance on the data or prior approval for the drug produced 
     under the compulsory license?
       As explained above, if the measure described in the 
     question is necessary to protect public health, then, as 
     explained in the side letter, the FTA would not stand in the 
     way.
       9. If the patent and test-data were owned by different 
     entities, does a compulsory license result in legal 
     ``consent'' by both the patent holder and the data owner for 
     use of the patented material and the test data?
       See previous response.
       10. When the drug is off patent, and a Party wishes to 
     permit marketing for a second entrant, what mechanism exists 
     in the FTA to allow for an exception to the provisions on 
     market exclusivity?
       A patent is designed to protect one type of intellectual 
     property work, i.e., an invention. Protection of data is 
     intended to protect a different type of work, i.e., 
     undisclosed test data that required significant time and 
     effort to compile. The fact that one type of intellectual 
     property protection for a product has expired, should not 
     lead as a matter of course to the conclusion that all other 
     intellectual property rights attached to the same product 
     should also expire. The same is true in other areas of 
     intellectual property. For example, a single CD may encompass 
     several intellectual property rights related to the music, 
     the performer and the record company. These rights may expire 
     at different times. The fact that the copyright attached to 
     the sound recording has expired, should not mean that the 
     composer or performer loses the copyright it has. As you 
     know, this principle is important to a broad range of U.S. 
     creative and innovative industries, including the 
     entertainment sector, America's second largest export 
     business.
       However, as indicated in the side letter, if a circumstance 
     arose, such as an epidemic or national emergency, that could 
     only be addressed by granting a second entrant marketing 
     approval notwithstanding the data protection rights of the 
     originator of the data, the FTA would not stand in the way.
       11. Is a grant of market exclusivity pursuant to Articles 
     15.10.1 and 15.10.2 considered an ``investment'' with respect 
     to Chapter 10 of the Agreement? If so, would an abridgement 
     of the period of market exclusivity constitute a compensable 
     expropriation under Chapter 10?
       The definition of an ``investment'' in the FTA includes, 
     inter alia, ``intellectual property rights.'' Whether an 
     abridgement of the data protection obligation gives rise to a 
     compensable expropriation of an ``investment'' under Chapter 
     Ten is a fact-specific issue that would have to be resolved 
     on the merits of a particular case. It is worth noting, 
     however, that Article 10.6.5 provides that the expropriation 
     provision of Chapter Ten does not apply to the issuance of 
     compulsory licenses or to the limitation of intellectual 
     property rights to the extent that such action is consistent 
     with the intellectual property chapter (Chapter Fifteen). A 
     determination concerning the consistency of an action with 
     Chapter Fifteen would be informed by the side letter.
       12. Article 10.6.5 of the FTA appears to clarify that any 
     act of patent infringement carried out by a Party in the 
     issuance of a compulsory license in accordance with the TRIPS 
     does not constitute a compensable expropriation. Issuance of 
     a compulsory license, however, is only one aspect of the 
     process of getting a drug to market. Does the clarification 
     in Article 10.6.5 also ensure that other measures taken by a 
     government to ensure that a drug on which a compulsory 
     license has been issued can be lawfully marketed (e.g., a 
     grant of marketing approval to a generic or second producer 
     before the period of marketing exclusivity has expired) will 
     not constitute compensable expropriations? If not, is there 
     another provision in the agreement that would ensure that 
     such measures do not constitute expropriations?
       See response to Question 11.
       13. Article 15.10.3 requires that a patent term be extended 
     where there is a delay in the regulatory approval process. 
     The provision does not state whether delays attributable to 
     the applicant (e.g., failure to provide adequate data) 
     mitigate against extension. Article 15.9., the comparable 
     provision for extension of a patent term because of a delay 
     in the patent approval process, makes clear that delays 
     attributable to the patent applicant should not be considered 
     in determining whether there is a delay that gives rise to 
     the need for an extension. Why was similar language not 
     included in Article 15.10.3?
       The Parties did not find it necessary to specifically 
     address the issue of how to handle delays attributable to an 
     applicant for marketing approval in the context of data 
     protection. As with numerous other provisions, the Parties 
     retain the flexibility to address such details in their 
     implementation of the FTA, provided that they comply with the 
     basic obligation.
       14. Is Morocco, or for that matter the United States, 
     required by the FTA to extend a patent term where there is a 
     delay in the regulatory approval that is attributable to the 
     applicant?
       The FTA preserves flexibility for the Parties to address 
     the issue of delays attributable to an applicant for 
     marketing approval through their domestic laws and 
     regulations.


                            bolar provisions

       15. Please explain whether this Article prohibits Morocco 
     from allowing the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for purposes other than ``meeting 
     marketing approval requirements.'' If it does not, please 
     explain in detail how you came to that conclusion.
       No, it does not. The Article dealing with the ``Bolar'' 
     exception to patent rights only deals with one specific 
     exception. It does not occupy the field of possible 
     exceptions, and thus does not prevent Morocco from allowing 
     the export of generic versions of patented pharmaceutical 
     products for purposes other than ``meeting marketing approval 
     requirements'' when permitted by other exceptions. For 
     example, Morocco has the right to allow exports where 
     consistent with TRIPS Article 30 and WTO rules on compulsory 
     licensing. Morocco may, for example, allow export of generic 
     versions of patented drugs by issuing a compulsory license in 
     accordance with the TRIPS/health solution agreed last August 
     in the WTO.
       16. If this provision does in fact limit Morocco's ability 
     to allow the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products, please explain how Morocco could 
     serve as an exporting country to help least-developed and 
     other countries address public health needs under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. (Exporters under the Paragraph 6 
     Decision are exporting to meet the health needs of an 
     importing country, not merely to obtain marketing approval).
       As noted in the response to Question 15, the FTA does not 
     limit Morocco's ability to make use of the TRIPS/health 
     solution agreed last August to export drugs under a 
     compulsory license to developing countries that cannot 
     produce drugs for themselves.
       17. Does Article 15.9.6 allow export of a generic version 
     of a patented drug to get marketing approval in a third 
     country (i.e., other than the United States or Morocco)? 
     (Article 15.9.6 states that ``the Party shall provide that 
     the product shall only be exported outside its territory for 
     purposes of meeting marketing approval requirements of that 
     Party.'')
       Morocco can get marketing approval in a third country to 
     allow export of a generic version through the issuance of a 
     compulsory license for export, consistent with WTO rules. 
     Article 15.9.6 does not interfere with that result.


                              side letter

       18. On the Paragraph 6 Decision, please explain how the 
     statement that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective 
     utilization'' is not merely rhetorical. Please be specific as 
     to why you believe the provisions in the FTA do not preclude 
     Morocco from acting as an importer or exporter of drugs under 
     the Paragraph 6 Decision, including how the FTA's provisions 
     related to market exclusivity can be waived if Morocco acts 
     in either capacity.
       There are no provisions in the FTA related to compulsory 
     licensing, which means that it does not limit in any way 
     Morocco's ability to issue compulsory licenses in accordance 
     with WTO rules, including TRIPS Article 31 and the TRIPS/
     health solution. With respect to other rules included in 
     Chapter 15, including data protection, the side letter states 
     that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective utilization of 
     the TRIPS/health solution.'' As stated in the side letter, 
     the letter constitutes a formal agreement between the 
     Parties. It is, thus, a significant part of the interpretive 
     context for this agreement and not merely rhetorical. 
     According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
     of Treaties, which reflects customary rules of treaty 
     interpretation in international law, the terms of a treaty 
     must be interpreted ``in their context,'' and that 
     ``context'' includes ``any agreement relating to the treaty 
     which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
     conclusion of the treaty.''
       19. On the issue of consultation, do the letters mean that 
     both Parties agree to amend the FTA as soon as possible to 
     reflect access to medicines amendments to the TRIPS 
     Agreement? Will the United States refrain from enforcing 
     provisions of the FTA that contravene the TRIPS Agreement 
     amendments while the FTA is being amended? Is USTR willing to 
     engage in an exchange of letter with the Government of 
     Morocco memorializing such an understanding?
       The United States would, of course, work with Morocco to 
     ensure that the FTA is adapted as appropriate if an amendment 
     to

[[Page H6647]]

     the TRIPS Agreement were adopted to ensure access to 
     medicines. The only amendment currently being contemplated 
     with respect to TRIPS involves translating the TRIPS/health 
     solution from last August into a formal amendment. The United 
     States has no intention of using dispute settlement to 
     challenge any country's actions that are in accordance with 
     that solution. In fact, Canada passed legislation recently 
     that would allow it to export drugs in accordance with the 
     TRIPS/health solution. The United States reached an agreement 
     with Canada just last Friday, July 16, to suspend parts of 
     NAFTA to ensure that Canada could implement the solution 
     without running afoul of NAFTA rules.
       In closing, let me emphasize that we appreciate the 
     importance of the U.S. commitment to the Doha Declaration on 
     the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the global effort 
     to ensure access to medicines in developing countries to 
     address acute public health problems, such as AIDS, malaria 
     and tuberculosis. The United States played a leading role in 
     developing these provisions, including enabling poor 
     countries without domestic production capacity to import 
     drugs under compulsory licenses. We also successfully called 
     for giving Least Developed Countries an additional ten years, 
     from 2006 until 2016, to implement TRIPS rules related to 
     pharmaceuticals. These accomplishments offer a significant 
     solution to the conflicts we encountered on taking office in 
     2001.
       At the same time, as Congress has directed us, the 
     Administration has worked on multiple fronts to strengthen 
     the value internationally of America's innovation economy. 
     These efforts have included stronger intellectual property 
     protection rules and enforcement so as to assist U.S. 
     businesses and workers, and encourage ongoing innovation that 
     benefits U.S. consumers.
       Our FTAs are but one component of the Administration's 
     broader efforts to achieve these objectives, and complement 
     efforts undertaken in other fora. Our FTAs not only do not 
     conflict with the objectives expressed in the Doha 
     Declaration but reinforce those objectives and facilitate 
     efforts to address public health problems.
           Sincerely,
                                                 John K. Veroneau,
                                                  General Counsel.
  This is what was said in this letter: ``The government of Morocco is 
committed to protecting the right to strike in conformance with the 
International Labor Organization's core principles. In particular, the 
government will not use 288 of our penal code against lawful 
strikers.''
  I do think that our inquiry, I do think the responsible discussions 
that were held with the Moroccan government and their officials 
indicated that, in practice, the labor standards within Morocco 
essentially meet the ILO standards.
  We next raised the issue of prescription medicines. We did not assume 
more trade would automatically benefit everybody, including our 
citizens and also the citizens of Morocco. On reimportation, we do not 
like the language the way it was inserted there, the general language 
on patent protection. However, reimportation from Morocco has never 
been suggested in any of the legislation introduced; and so I think for 
this purpose, for this bill, it is not an issue.
  But there were two provisions that could restrict the access of 
citizens of Morocco to prescription medicines. We are talking about 
people whose health is at stake. We are talking about the spread of 
AIDS. We are talking about the spread of other ailments and other 
diseases. And the question became whether anything in this FTA would 
restrict the government of Morocco from having access for their 
citizens to these prescription medicines. That access was assured in 
the Doha Declaration. And so there followed a letter from us on the 
Democratic side to USTR; and here is what was said, their understanding 
of the provisions including the side letters:
  ``If circumstances ever arise in which a drug is produced under a 
compulsory license and it is necessary to approve the drug to protect 
public health or effectively utilize the TRIPS/health solution, the 
date of protection provisions in the FTA would not stand in the way.''
  They also said, USTR, in interpreting what was in this FTA: ``If the 
measure described in the question is necessary to protect public 
health, then, as explained in the side letter, the FTA would not stand 
in the way.''
  They also said: ``This side letter constitutes a formal agreement 
between the parties. It is thus a significant part of the interpretive 
context for this agreement and not merely rhetorical.''
  In a word, the government of Morocco has the flexibility to assure 
the health of its citizens under the Doha Declaration.

                              {time}  1800

  Because of our efforts to clarify what was going on in terms of core 
labor standards and conditions in Morocco and because of our efforts in 
the response of USTR on prescription medicines, we feel that this 
agreement should be approved.
  However, our questions serve notice that we should be very sensitive 
in the future in how we shape trade agreements. We should not assume 
there is no need to shape expanded trade. We have made it clear it is 
essential that we do so, and it is under that kind of structure, it is 
within that perspective, that I suggest that we approve this agreement 
between our two nations, with whom there are very significant 
relationships.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to first commend our colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
on the Committee on Ways and Means for guaranteeing unanimous 
commitment to passage of our Free Trade Agreement with Morocco and look 
forward to working with them in the future.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas).
  (Mr. THOMAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, my assumption is that the closing remarks on 
the part of the ranking member of the Trade Subcommittee was an 
endorsement. It sounded as though we began with an extremely flawed 
product and, through their efforts, they were successful in righting 
the ship so that we could actually have a minimally decent document. I 
wonder where they were when President Clinton wanted fast track, their 
President, and three quarters of them voted against providing the 
President.
  So when we listen to the remarks, we really have to put it, one, in 
context and then appreciate that intensity or outlandishness does not 
equal votes. And when I close shortly, take a look at the votes in 
terms of who is for and who is against.
  But I do want to spend just 1 minute analyzing the level of the 
content and the direction of the debate. The ranking member from New 
York began this discussion by indicating that I stole the election in 
Florida. That certainly was an appropriate beginning on a debate on a 
Free Trade Agreement with Morocco. I would probably classify it as 
silly, but that is the level of debate that we often engage in. And it 
is just a pleasure to allow the rest of the country to understand the 
level at which exchanges are made not only in committee but on the 
floor when we try to engage in a serious discussion.
  I heard an indication that people were interested in jobs, and, of 
course, I will talk about the gentleman from Ohio and his diatribe in a 
minute.
  You missed the boat on the jobs issue. That was the jobs growth tax 
bill. It has had a major positive effect on jobs. You were ``no'' on 
that one as well. We have got 46 of the 50 States expanding. 
Unemployment is down in all regions of the country. This is the fastest 
growth in the last 20 years. And based upon your debating style, at 
that point I would pause and parenthetically say even including the 
Clinton years so that we can understand that the mention of Bush in 
every other sentence and in a negative way was clearly focused on the 
Free Trade Agreement and had nothing to do with attempting to influence 
an election. We have got 1.5 million jobs, continuing to grow, and they 
will continue to grow right through the election.
  But I want to especially focus on the other gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Ryan) because at some point we cannot allow statements made on the 
floor of the House to stand when they are so outrageously false. The 
statement referred to legislation that we were considering earlier, and 
the statement was that what we did denied what the Constitution 
provides. I would urge everyone at some time, and especially certain 
Members, to look at the Constitution and turn to Article III, the 
judicial article, and look at Section 2. And I will just read it 
briefly, referring to the judicial branch: ``In all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public ministers

[[Page H6648]]

and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme 
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before 
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as 
to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as 
the Congress shall make.''
  The Congress was exercising its constitutional function in indicating 
that areas of appellate jurisdiction were not to be examined by the 
court, and it absolutely floors me, well, I guess it does not based 
upon the other statements made by those on the other side of the aisle, 
that not only apparently they do not know the Constitution, but they 
actually invoke it in a totally false way on the floor of the House of 
Representatives.
  So what I would really urge Members to do is not pay any attention to 
what was said necessarily on the other side of the aisle but take a 
look at the vote for this particular measure. H.R. 4842 certainly 
deserves the overwhelming majority support of this House. I believe it 
will be bipartisan. And, please, we will take away from this particular 
bill on the floor the fact that the vote was bipartisan even if the 
rhetoric is not and at times not just silly but downright, flat-out 
wrong.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, the U.S.-Morocco free trade agreement is 
bad for America.
  The agreement prohibits the importation of lower cost 
pharmaceuticals, and delays the availability of lower cost generic 
drugs by creating new patent-like protections for drug regulatory data. 
Together, these measures will maintain high prescription drug prices in 
the U.S.
  The agreement contains a side letter permitting Morocco to ignore 
enforcement of its labor laws with no penalty whatsoever. Under this 
loophole, American employers and workers under U.S. labor law could be 
at a disadvantage if actual conditions in Morocco are so lax as to 
create a much cheaper business environment.
  The agreement prohibits the preferences for government contracts to 
be given for: employing U.S. workers, using recycled materials, paying 
prevailing or living wages. Furthermore, no criminal record of tax 
evasion, endangering the lives of workers, or pollution can disqualify 
a company for a government contract.
  These flaws are not necessary for trade between nations. They are, 
however, elements in an anti-consumer, anti-worker, anti-environment 
and anti-democratic agenda. For these reasons, I oppose the U.S.-
Morocco free trade agreement.
  Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, while I intend to vote for the Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement, I want to stress to the administration how important 
it is to respect the report language on ``Western Sahara'' which was 
included in this bill by my colleague, the gentleman from Washington, 
Mr. McDermott. This language reflects the sentiment voiced in a recent 
bipartisan letter to the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick.
  Under no circumstances should the U.S. proceed with the 
implementation of a free trade agreement that does not categorically 
exclude the terrority known as the Western Sahara. The U.S., as well as 
the international community, does not recognize Morocco's sovereignty 
over Spain's former colony. Morocco has steadfastly refused any efforts 
by the United Nations to permit a free and fair referendum on self-
determination for the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. We should not 
permit Morocco to use the agreement to further its illegal occupation 
of Western Sahara.
  I urge the administration to take these concerns seriously and to 
implement a free trade agreement that does not violate the sovereignty 
and rights of the people of Western Sahara.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice a significant concern 
with regard to the proposed Free Trade Agreement between the United 
States and Morocco. While this is a concern specific to Morocco, it 
highlights a broader issue that I and many of my colleagues share in 
regard to the pace and ``individuality'' of the many bilateral FTAs 
being negotiated by the USTR.
  Reviewing the February 25, 2004 State Department Country Report on 
Human Rights for Morocco, I came across several issues. The report 
highlights a series of human rights abuses in Morocco and I believe 
these unacceptable practices need to be a priority of the United States 
as it builds and strengthens its long-standing ties with Morocco.
  I was greatly concerned with an issue that comes up several times in 
the report. To quote one sentence: ``The judiciary lacked independence 
and was subject to government influence and corruption.'' As I assume 
we can all agree, the lack of an independent judiciary and corruption 
are significant, fundamental barriers to the development of a sound, 
growing trade relationship.
  As the Ways and Means Committee considered this agreement I asked 
representatives of the USTR about this fundamental issue. They had no 
comment and promised to follow-up with me. I want to thank Chairman 
Thomas for for seconding my concerns at the markup and also seeking a 
response. The USTR has made available to me the American Bar 
Association report on the state of Morocco's judicial system, citing 
some hope for reform.
  My impression is that the state of the judiciary in the Kingdom of 
Morocco and corruption in commerce are issues that received little 
attention as the USTR negotiated this agreement. That should not be the 
case. Bilateral FTAs are a means to address issues such as these with 
key trade partners and strengthen the basis for trade relations. An 
independent judiciary is essential to sound, long-term trade relations. 
As well, corruption in many foreign nations has long been a concern of 
the United States; one where we have long set a high standard and 
required our businesspeople to operate on an ethical basis.
  I understand the USTR's current interest in pursuing a large number 
of bilateral agreements to advance trade around the world--particularly 
as our more broad based talks and negotiations on global agreements 
have stalled. That being said, quantity should not supplant quality in 
agreements. Our goals in each of our trade agreements should remain 
high and be targeted to the situation in each nation. I am concerned in 
this agreement we have not met our highest goals and lost an 
opportunity.
  Reluctantly, I intend to support this FTA because I believe the 
government of Morocco has demonstrated its commitment to working with 
us and raising its own standards; the new labor rights laws enacted 
last year are a good example. But I want to strongly urge the USTR to 
show more care and attention to the individuality of nations as we move 
forward, particularly as it relates to institutional reforms and the 
protection of human rights.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, time sure flies when you're having fun. Just 
last week I expressed serious misgivings about the U.S.-Australian Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA), noting, among other problems, that it set a bad 
precedent for future trade bills. Those concerns are confirmed today by 
this bill. The U.S.-Morocco FTA is a bad agreement that protects U.S. 
pharmaceutical manufacturers while ignoring labor standards and the 
healthcare needs of Moroccan citizens.
  I warned you last week that a vote for the Australian FTA was a vote 
against prescription drug reimportation, and it's true again today. We 
cannot continue to allow USTR to include intellectual property 
provisions in FTAs that undermine Congress's ability to provide 
affordable prescription drugs through reimportation. True, we aren't 
going to be importing drugs from Morocco any time soon, but what 
happens in the next FTA, and the one after that? It should be clear by 
now that the USTR is merely a shill for the pharmaceutical industry, 
engaged in nothing more than closing the door to drug reimportation at 
the request of the Administration.
  Unfortunately, the Morocco agreement doesn't stop at undermining the 
debate over reimportation. In fact, it goes much further by limiting 
access to potentially life saving drugs in Morocco. Because the 
agreement limits parallel importation, if a pubic health emergency 
breaks out, Morocco cannot import affordable drugs from neighboring 
countries if a U.S. country manufacturers the drug.
  Once again, the pharmaceutical industry has used the administration 
and a free trade agreement to protect its profits, without any concern 
for global health. If Morocco has a public health crisis, it would be 
forced to purchase drugs from U.S. manufacturers instead of getting 
immediate access to the same drugs from nearby countries. The U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry has been gouging prices here in America for 
years; just think what they can do to prices when a developing country 
is in crisis.
  You would think one provision limiting access to drugs in Morocco 
would be victory enough for the pharmaceutical manufacturers, but this 
industry just does not stop. Also included in the FTA are limits on the 
use of test data and market exclusivity provisions that could raise the 
price of drugs in Morocco and further limit access.
  Because the FTA limits test data usage and creates 5 years of market 
exclusivity, the introduction of generic drugs in the Moroccan market 
will be substantially delayed. When generics are not available, prices 
increase--along with manufacturers' profits--and poorer citizens have 
less purchasing power to obtain life saving drugs.
  There is also the strong possibility that these data and exclusivity 
provisions will further tie the hands of the Moroccan government during 
a public health emergency. The FTA and side letter are amazingly vague 
on whether Morocco can engage in compulsory licensing of otherwise 
patented drugs during a

[[Page H6649]]

health crisis. Here again, the pharmaceutical manufacturers will do 
anything to make sure they are the monopoly power, even when lives are 
at stake.
  Today we vote on nothing less than the future course of domestic and 
international pharmaceutical policies. USTR will continue to use trade 
agreements to limit our ability to import affordable pharmaceuticals 
from other countries. It is also clear that future negotiations are 
going to limit drug access in other countries so that U.S. 
pharmaceutical manufacturers can make even more money abroad. These are 
bad policies, and we should not let the Administration continue to 
implement them by slipping them into free trade agreements.
  I am also concerned that USTR has once again failed to include core 
labor standard requirements in a free trade agreement. USTR should not 
continue to use the ``enforce your own laws'' standard in FTAs without 
developing countries. I understand Morocco is moving in the right 
direction in terms of labor rights, but there is no reason this FTA 
should not have held them to the core labor standards developed by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO standards ensure 
workers' human rights and their right to organize and strike. We cannot 
have acceptable free trade without a level playing field, and these 
standards are the key to ensuring trade between the U.S. and other 
countries is both free and fair.
  This is a bad free trade agreement that sets a bad precedent for all 
future trade negotiations. We cannot continue to let the administration 
make health policy without Congressional input, and we surely would not 
let the pharmaceutical industry have their way just because of their 
large campaign donor status. We also cannot ignore workers' rights by 
allowing trade partners to enforce their own laws when those laws do 
not meet international labor standards.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement.
   Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement and believe it will promote domestic growth in 
manufacturing and exports. I look forward to seeing this agreement 
enacted into law. I also support, thank and congratulate the United 
States Trade Representative and staff in negotiating the inclusion of 
full duty drawback and duty deferral rights for U.S. manufacturers, 
exporters and workers in this FTA. Free trade agreements should include 
no language that eliminates or otherwise restricts the application of 
duty drawback and duty deferral programs to U.S. manufacturers and 
exporters. The language in the Singapore, Australia, Israel and Jordan 
FTAs and in the CAFTA, for example, have no such restrictive language 
and we should continue to model future agreements after these FTAs. 
This issue is of significant importance to many U.S. manufacturers and 
exporters, including those in my home State of Louisiana.
   Duty drawback and duty deferral programs reduce production and 
operating costs by allowing our manufacturers and exporters to recover 
duties that were paid on imported materials when the same or similar 
materials are exported either whole or as a component part of a 
finished product. Duty drawback positively affects nearly $16 billion 
of U.S. exports each year. Additionally, nearly 300,000 U.S. jobs are 
directly related to exported goods that benefit from drawback, and 
these high quality jobs could be adversely affected by eliminating or 
restricting drawback. In my own home State of Louisiana, drawback and 
duty deferral programs provide substantial benefits to local 
industries, allowing them to compete on a level playing field in the 
global market. Drawback and deferral prevents outsourcing and saves 
U.S. manufacturing and jobs. As long as the programs provide a 
competitive advantage in production and sales for U.S. manufacturers 
and exporters, they will assist in preventing U.S. jobs from moving 
offshore.
   Drawback makes a significant difference to U.S. companies at the 
margin when exporting to our FTA partners where they compete against 
foreign producers that either have substantially lower costs of 
production or enjoy low or zero import duty rates. This export 
promotion program is one of the last WTO-sanctioned programs that 
provide a substantial advantage to U.S. companies participating in the 
export market. The application of these programs to U.S. manufacturers 
and exporters should not be restricted in future free trade agreements 
that we negotiate with our trading partners.
   We need to work hard to complete free trade agreements that provide 
as many competitive advantages as we can to U.S. manufacturers 
competing in the global market, encourage growth in U.S. exports, and 
create U.S. jobs.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to announce my support for 
H.R. 4842, legislation implementing a free trade agreement with the 
nation of Morocco.
  For more than two centuries, Morocco has been a steadfast friend to 
the United States. Few Americans would guess that Morocco was the first 
nation to extend recognition to the new American nation on December 20, 
1777. Morocco is also one of only six Muslim nations to be designated 
as a ``major non-NATO ally.'' So it is only fitting that we establish a 
free trade agreement with such a long-time friend and supporter.
  Under this FTA, more than 95 percent of bilateral trade between our 
countries will be duty-free from the first day of implementation. North 
Carolina exports to Morocco are generally small, valued at just more 
than 8 million dollars. Morocco is my state's 80th biggest export 
market with tobacco products, chemical manufacturing, and 
transportation equipment being our top three exports.
  However, North Carolina stands to gain much from increased access to 
this new market, especially in the field of agriculture. Tariffs on key 
North Carolina products like soybeans and processed poultry products 
will be cut significantly. One significant provision in this agreement 
is that Morocco has agreed to accept U.S. inspection standards for 
poultry. Phony sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on U.S. exports 
have long been a hallmark of international trade. Having Morocco accept 
our inspection regime will go along way to improving access to that 
market.
  According to an analysis by the American Farm Bureau Federation, this 
agreement is expected to result in a 10 to 1 gain for the U.S. 
agricultural sector. Within the next 10-11 years, the U.S. should 
expect to increase agricultural exports to Morocco by $225 million. 
What's more, the FTA includes a provision giving U.S. agriculture an 
``automatic upgrade.'' Should Morocco negotiate another trade agreement 
providing another nation with more favorable market access for 
agriculture, our FTA automatically obtains the same level of access as 
the other nation. This will ensure America's competitiveness against 
other nations seeking to enter the Moroccan market.
  I believe the geopolitical reasons for establishing this free trade 
agreement with another Muslim nation in a volatile region overcomes the 
few deficiencies inherent in the agreement, particularly with regard to 
textiles. Because of the small amount of trade between our two 
countries, any potential adverse impact should be minimized. However, 
this administration cannot continue to count on this Member's support 
for other trade agreements if it is not willing to stand up for even 
stronger labor and environmental standards and better protections for 
America's fragile textile industry.
  I ask my colleagues to support this agreement.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 738, the bill is considered read for 
amendment, and the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to clauses 8 and 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on the 
passage of H.R. 4842 will be followed by 5-minute votes, as ordered, on 
suspending the rules and adopting House Concurrent Resolution 436; and 
House Concurrent Resolution 418.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 323, 
nays 99, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 413]

                               YEAS--323

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Akin
     Allen
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Cole
     Cooper
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeGette
     DeLay

[[Page H6650]]


     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (OH)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Majette
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Watson
     Watt
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NAYS--99

     Aderholt
     Alexander
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Barrett (SC)
     Berry
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Coble
     Conyers
     Costello
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Emerson
     Evans
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Goode
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Holt
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Jackson (IL)
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kildee
     Lantos
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lipinski
     Markey
     Marshall
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Pombo
     Rogers (AL)
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wamp
     Waters
     Waxman
     Wilson (SC)
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Cannon
     Carson (IN)
     Collins
     Gephardt
     Greenwood
     Kirk
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lowey
     Meehan
     Paul
     Quinn


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass) (during the vote). Members are 
advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1832

  Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida, and Messrs. BARRETT of South Carolina, 
RUSH, BURTON of Indiana and BUTTERFIELD changed their vote from ``yea'' 
to ``nay.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                          ____________________