[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 102 (Wednesday, July 21, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8501-S8503]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              INTELLIGENCE

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I want to say something about 
Ambassador Wilson and his activities, but I see Senator Bond is here. 
He is going to follow me, and I know he is going to talk about that. 
Suffice it to say, only one comment needs to be directed about the 
issue of Mr. Wilson; that is, he didn't tell the truth. He didn't tell 
the truth, and that is explicitly set forth in the Senate intelligence 
report. It was also set forth in the report issued by Mr. Butler in 
Britain last week.
  On the 7th of July, Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report on the U.S. 
intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq 
prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This 511-page 
report is highly critical of our intelligence analysis and collection 
capabilities, especially in the field of human intelligence or what we 
refer to as HUMINT.
  Yesterday, the Senate Intelligence Committee began the first of a 
series of

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hearings on intelligence reform. We heard from our colleague Senator 
Feinstein about her proposal to create a new position of director of 
national intelligence to oversee the entire intelligence community. We 
also heard from three prominent experts--former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense John Hamre; former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim 
Woolsey; and Lieutenant General Odom, former Director of the National 
Security Agency--on how best to structure the intelligence community to 
meet the needs of the threats we face today and will face tomorrow.
  This was a very interesting hearing. Senator Feinstein does her 
homework. She studied this issue. She presented a very insightful 
presentation regarding her bill. I look forward to continuing this 
debate and continuing to review the process, looking both at what we 
have in place today as well as what reforms we should make relative to 
the intelligence community.
  Tomorrow, we expect the 9/11 Commission to release its report on 
events leading up to the attack of September 11. There is no doubt that 
the intelligence community will also come under heavy criticism in that 
report.
  These various reports and hearings are getting wide coverage in the 
media. I am glad they are. It is important for our debate on reforming 
the intelligence community to be as inclusive as possible. Intelligence 
reform is a bipartisan issue. The problems we have uncovered span more 
than a decade, under both Republican and Democratic administrations and 
Republican- and Democratic-controlled Congresses. The fact is, the 
systemic changes and reforms in the intelligence community, which would 
have made it more difficult for terrorists to strike us on 9/11 or to 
have more accurate information on Iraq's WMD capabilities, simply did 
not take place.
  As more and more information gets into the public domain, especially 
in this highly charged political year, there will surely be attempts to 
politicize the complex issues of intelligence failures and intelligence 
reform. What I would like to do is to put some clarity on this for the 
American people.
  First, there is only one principle to follow on intelligence reform. 
Intelligence is our first line of defense against terrorism, and we 
must improve the collection capabilities and analysis of intelligence 
to protect the security of the United States and its allies.
  We should beware of anyone who tries to twist this principle in a 
political fashion. The truth is our country, our people, our liberties, 
and our way of life are under attack by radical Islamic terrorists who 
kill and destroy in the name of religion.
  The security of the United States, which is so dependent on having 
accurate and timely intelligence, is not a Republican or a Democratic 
issue. It is a responsibility of all of us in the Congress to make sure 
we legislate and appropriate moneys so we have the best possible 
intelligence community.
  Second, let's be clear about our tasks ahead. We are talking about 
amending the National Security Act of 1947, which has been the 
cornerstone of our security and intelligence structure for over half a 
century. While change is needed, it should be deliberate. It should 
also be substantive, even radical, if necessary.
  The first comprehensive report detailing critical shortfalls within 
the United States intelligence community's performance was conducted by 
the House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. As the 
chairman of that subcommittee, I released its report on July 17, 2002. 
Following this, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a joint 
inquiry into the intelligence community's activities before and after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and issued its report in 
December 2002.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee report released on July 7 reflects 
my deep concern that a number of issues identified both by the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the joint inquiry 
have not yet been acted upon. For example, the subcommittee identified 
that information sharing among intelligence agencies was abysmal, and 
the joint inquiry report pointed out the CIA was too heavily reliant on 
foreign liaison reporting and that it had not taken the steps necessary 
to penetrate hard targets, such as the inner circle of al-Qaida. These 
issues have not yet been corrected to my satisfaction.
  Third, as we address the question of how to reform the intelligence 
community, including the possible creation of a director for national 
intelligence, there are five important objectives for us to focus on.
  First, coordination and information sharing throughout the 
intelligence community must be improved.
  Second, HUMINT capabilities must be increased, and we must be willing 
to accept the risks associated with aggressive HUMINT operations. And 
that is a critical part of this. We must be willing to accept some of 
the risks that are going to be necessary to secure the type and quality 
of information on the intelligence side that we need.
  Third, analytical competition needs to be preserved.
  Fourth, our counterintelligence capabilities need improvement.
  And fifth, the role and scope of the military's position in the 
intelligence community should be reviewed.
  I included this last point because I want to ensure that the 
military's capability to support the intelligence requirements of our 
unified combatant commanders is maintained in any reformation of the 
intelligence community. That is absolutely critical. All one had to do 
was listen to our panel yesterday to understand the real importance of 
that point.
  The scope of the military's direct involvement in intelligence is 
enormous and it needs to have a proper role in the intelligence 
community. Eight of the fifteen members of the intelligence community 
belong to the Department of Defense. In the current structure, each one 
of these DOD elements acts more or less independently, representing one 
small segment of the overall intelligence interests of our military. 
The creation of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has 
helped somewhat to bring a common intelligence policy to DOD, but we 
should also consider the creation of a single DOD intelligence command 
as part of any extensive and meaningful intelligence reform.
  The Congress directed the establishment of the Unified Combatant 
Command for Special Operations, or what is known as SOCOM, over the 
objections of the Department of Defense because our colleagues had the 
vision to foresee the requirement. At the time, the DOD and Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, but in hindsight, the creation of 
SOCOM was the correct path. The rationale for establishing a Unified 
Combatant Command for Intelligence, or INTCOM, is very much the same, 
and I believe now is the proper time to explore this idea.
  As we found in our review on the intelligence on Iraq, the 
intelligence community is made up of hard-working, dedicated men and 
women, and Chairman Roberts, in his statement, referred to giving them 
an intelligence community worthy of their efforts. So I welcome the 
proposal of Senator Feinstein for establishing a Director of National 
Intelligence as one of the several ideas and issues for us to address 
and debate.

  One final point. As President Bush has said many times, he is 
determined to make sure American intelligence is as accurate as 
possible for every challenge we face. America's enemies are secretive, 
they are ruthless, and they are resourceful. That is why the President 
supports intelligence reform as much as we do in the Congress.
  In the coming months, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
will solicit a broad range of views on reforming the intelligence 
community, and we will vigorously debate each intelligence reform 
measure that comes before us. I look forward to this challenge, and I 
will do everything in my power to ensure that the United States has the 
intelligence collection and analytical capabilities necessary to 
protect our lives, our property, our way of life, and our liberties.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I commend my colleague from Georgia for his 
very thoughtful and incisive comments. I believe he is a great addition 
to the Senate with his experience working on

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intelligence issues in the House. On the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
he makes great contributions. I appreciate and second what he has said.

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