[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 98 (Thursday, July 15, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8145-S8148]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ENERGY RELIABILITY
Ms. CANTWELL. Madam President, I rise this morning to talk about our
legislative priorities, and something I think this body needs to
address before we adjourn next week. It is the issue of the reliability
standards for our electricity grid and the fact that I think we are
still putting the grid in jeopardy by not adopting reliability
standards.
Even Enron activities in California, by its own admissions,
jeopardized the reliability of the western electricity grid. That is
certainly unacceptable. We need to have in place rules that explicitly
ban market manipulation and rules that make reliability standards
mandatory and enforceable.
In the documentation that has now been acquired through the Enron
task force, federal agencies and organizations such as the Snohomish
County Public Utility District, which is trying to get out of lawsuits
and manipulated contracts that Enron is pursuing against it, it became
clear that Enron continued to manipulate the market until its
bankruptcy. Even in one scheme, called Get Shorty, Enron discussed in
detail, and I quote from their comments and documents:
This [Get Shorty] is obviously a sensitive issue because of
reliability concerns. It would be difficult to justify our
position if the lights go out because ancillary services were
not available. The reason these services were not available
is because we were selling them without actually having them
in the first place.
In the Enron documentation and memos shared among various employees
in the company about ways to scheme and make more money, they very well
knew they were manipulating the market. They did not have these
services, but sold them anyway at a higher cost, and thereby
jeopardizing reliability.
Another summer is upon us and we have yet to take action on
legislation that would move us forward in ensuring the integrity of the
electricity grid by protecting consumers from these market manipulation
schemes and putting regulatory standards in place for reliability.
Next month, in fact, will mark the first anniversary of the blackout
in the Northeast and the Midwest that caused basically 50 million
consumers and businesses in the Northeast and Midwest to lose power. In
some cases that power was lost up to 4 days.
That blackout could have been avoided. When you think about not just
the inconvenience to consumers but the fact it cost our economy $4 to
$10 billion as a loss of economic activity, it is outrageous we are not
stepping up and passing electricity reliability standards legislation
as a stand-alone bill before we recess for the summer.
We know why the blackout occurred. A few months ago, in April, the
U.S.-Canadian power system outage task force issued a report and the
Department of Energy, together with the Canadian counterpart, convened
a panel of experts that concluded this was something we could avoid if
we put reliability standards in place. In fact, the No. 1
recommendation of that task force, which was reported to various
Members of Congress and various committees, is to ``make reliability
standards mandatory and enforceable, with penalties for non-
compliance.''
That was the No. 1 recommendation out of that task force that
investigated what happened in the Northeast and what happened in the
Midwest.
So the question is, Why are we not passing reliability legislation
before we adjourn, to make sure there are mandatory enforceable rules
in place? After the task force's 7-month investigation was complete,
Congress has been given an opportunity, many times on the floor, to
pass reliability standards. Yet we have not done that. I think some of
my colleagues are trying to get a larger energy bill passed first.
There are many aspects of the comprehensive Energy bill this Senator
would support and many I would not. But I guarantee you this, when this
electricity reliability standards bill comes to the floor and is voted
on, it will have unanimous support.
So the question is, why we are not peeling off something as important
as reliability standards as we approach the summer's hottest months, to
make sure businesses and utilities know they will have electricity
supply and blackouts will not occur. What if the lights go out again
this summer? What if they go out in August? God forbid they go out in
September as many of my colleagues will be in New York doing their
business and having meetings.
We know various Western States now, such as in Arizona, are putting
in place programs to reduce demand because they have concerns. In a
BusinessWeek article, FERC Chairman
[[Page S8146]]
Pat Wood basically described the summer as ``a rosary bead summer'' in
California because he has concerns that region is going to have some
close calls.
We also know, according to the North American Electric Reliability
Council's own Reliability Assessment for 2004, New York City ``might be
susceptible to reliability problems'' again this summer.
So folks across the country could be affected by the cascading
outages that happen to them or in nearby areas. In the words of Michael
Gent, who is the president of the North American Electric Reliability
Council:
Whether legislation is adopted on a stand-alone basis or as
part of a comprehensive energy bill, passage is essential. If
reliability legislation had been enacted when first proposed,
I believe that the blackout would not have occurred.
Why is that? Because right now, while consumers may think there are
standards by which supply needs to be on the grid and reliability
maintained, there are actually no mandatory rules. What happened in the
Midwest and in New York was the fact that people did not have the
supply available at a time that the demand was really there, or the
transmission available to move the power. So consumers were caught in
the dark--many senior citizens, individuals in hospitals. A whole
variety of things occurred that were very unfortunate circumstances.
Now, we in the Northwest know this situation all too well. It was
actually my predecessor, Senator Gorton, who first proposed this
legislation and actually passed it out of this body, and then it
languished in the House of Representatives. We waited again in 2002 and
2003 to get this legislation moved forward through the process. So I
think it is critically important before this body adjourns next week
that we pass the reliability standards legislation and implement it.
Unanimous Consent Request--S. 2236
So, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn
to Calendar No. 465, S. 2236, a bill to enhance the reliability of the
electric system; that the bill be read a third time and passed, and the
motion to reconsider be laid on the table, without any intervening
action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BOND. Madam President, reserving the right to object, we have had
an energy bill pending that has been filibustered by our colleagues on
the other side. We are not in a position where one Senator,
unfortunately, can pass a bill. There may be many bills I would like to
pass. We do not pass bills in this manner. We should get on with
passing an energy bill. And, therefore, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Ms. CANTWELL. Madam President, I hope my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle will reconsider their position because we are not, in the
next 5 to 6 days of legislative action, going to get a comprehensive
energy bill. But we can get an energy reliability standards bill passed
and put in place, and send a message sent to electricity providers
across the country that there are going to be reliability rules and
standards in place.
We cannot continue to hold hostage good energy reliability
legislation for a comprehensive bill when consumers are at risk. We
cannot continue to deny the reports across the country that more
blackouts are coming. We need to act.
Now, Madam President, I would like to take a few minutes to expand on
some of the other news and events that relate to this energy policy.
As my colleague mentioned an energy bill, I certainly would like to
get an energy bill that did something to prevent market manipulation,
or even just a stand-alone bill that would prevent market manipulation.
We in the West have been astounded by the lack of response by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to the news and information about
markets being manipulated.
I do not mean there is speculation about manipulation; I mean there
are documents that have now been uncovered through organizations such
as Snohomish County PUD; they are actually signed documents by various
day traders at the Enron Trading Portland office that showed exactly
how the trading schemes worked. While those utilities harmed will
continue to pursue their case legally, it is absurd that the Federal
energy regulators who are supposed to do their job in protecting
consumers are failing to do anything. Basically they are the policemen
on the watch and they are letting the crime continue to be committed.
When I say ``continue to be committed,'' I would like to submit for
the record an article that was recently published that shows the
chances that these schemes might still be continuing in the State of
Texas. The Texas Public Utilities Commission has an ongoing
investigation, and there are a couple of companies down there that are
actually pursuing this case. Some of the same Enron traders who were
involved in the Portland office in these schemes have now moved on to
other companies. CBS and others now have audiotapes showing that some
of these Texas power giants might still be manipulating the market in
the same ways that Enron did. So the question is, When are we going to
stand up and do something about this?
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article
entitled ``Accusation: Trader Recordings Show TXU Schemed to Spike
Power Prices.''
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From CBS-11, July 8, 2004]
Accusation: Trader Recordings Show TXU Schemed To Spike Power Prices
(By Robert Riggs and Todd Bensman)
Audiotapes allegedly show traders for Texas power giant TXU
carrying out illegal market manipulation schemes to spike
electricity prices, much as Enron traders now stand accused
of doing in California, according to several state
competitors who claim the schemes damaged them.
CBS-11 obtained 250 hours of previously sealed telephone
recordings of TXU trader transactions from Allen-based
competitor Texas Commercial Energy. Company executives say
the recordings prove TXU cornered Texas's newly deregulated
electricity market last year and refused to sell until prices
spiked many hundreds of dollars per megawatt hour above
normal rates.
Officials for TXU, by far the state's largest energy
company, deny that its traders ever illegally cornered Texas
energy markets or squeezed competitors and said state
regulatory investigators cleared the company of any
wrongdoing.
The recordings of telephone trader transactions surfaced
from a Texas Commercial Energy anti-trust lawsuit that
claimed illegal market manipulation schemes by TXU drove the
nascent energy company into bankruptcy after several cold
fronts last year. A judge dismissed Texas Commercial Energy's
lawsuit in June on grounds that the court did not have proper
jurisdiction.
The company says it will appeal for a trial on the actual
merits of its allegations.
``Now, the consumers get a chance to hear what their
intentions were and how they were being damaged,'' said Steve
Ousley, President of Texas Commercial Energy.
In one tape reviewed by CBS-11, TXU traders appear to gloat
about excessive prices charged to Garland Power & Light.
TXU Trader 1: ``They got a little power plant out there. I
think they've got 250, 300 (megawatts). And if they're short,
you know, they buy it from me sometimes.''
TXU Trader 2: ``Is that right?''
TXU Trader 1: ``When I, when I bend them over the bench and
give it to them (laughter).
TXU spokesman Chris Schein dismissed the discussion about
the city of Garland as mere ``boasting'' and ``verbosity.''
``It's embarrassing, but there is no factual basis to what
he said in terms of taking advantage of that customer,''
Schein said.
Texas Commercial Energy and other competitors tell CBS-11
that many other audio recordings prove that TXU imported and
then put to use, during several 2003 cold fronts, the kind of
market manipulation schemes that have resulted in federal
action against traders for Enron, and also the Houston-
based Reliant Energy Services, for trading abuses
California.
In April, the Houston energy company Reliant and four of
its officers were indicted in San Francisco on six counts of
creating false energy shortages to spike prices.
In the course of its investigation of the TXU allegations,
CBS-11 News learned that TXU had hired five ex-Enron traders,
including one who came under FBI investigation for his
previous work in Enron's indictment-plagued Portland, Ore.
office and figures prominently in some of the Texas tapes.
``I think Texans should be outraged that they have adopted
these Enron-like market manipulation schemes and even hired
some of the same people that implemented the schemes out in
California,'' Ousley said. ``In Texas, market manipulation is
all about the money. At the end of the day the consumers are
going to end up paying for the market manipulation.''
[[Page S8147]]
Until now, TXU has largely escaped the kind of public
allegations of illegal market manipulation that has recently
bedeviled former Enron traders and Reliant Energy. Last
month, the release of the so-called ``Grandma Millie'' tapes
of foul-mouthed Enron traders in Portland boasting of illegal
trading schemes spurred widespread condemnation and pressure
on Congress to investigate other energy companies.
Many of the taped TXU trader conversations reviewed by CBS-
11 News are infused with jargon and would be difficult for
industry outsiders to interpret. Interpretation of the Texas
tapes has become central to the emerging controversy over
them.
TXU's Chris Schein said his firm's interpretation of the
tapes is that they show no wrongdoing at all.
``The kinds of shenanigans that you saw in California did
not take place in Texas,'' he said. ``And state regulators
have been very concerned about that occurring.''
Little is known about four of the five former Enron traders
who have come to work for TXU, and Schein said affiliation
with the scandal-plagued company should not automatically
preclude employment at TXU.
But a fifth former Enron employee, Holden Salisbury, was
hired by TXU from Enron's scandal-plagued Portland office in
2002, the company confirms.
Those who worked the Enron office remain under an active
FBI investigation for market manipulation schemes known
euphemistically inside the office as ``Deathstar,'' ``Get
Shorty,'' and ``Fatboy,'' California authorities say. Federal
prosecutors have indicted and convicted several of
Salisbury's former Enron supervisors on charges that they
used market manipulation schemes, including Deathstar, to rip
off millions from California ratepayers.
The 31-year-old Salisbury, who shows up repeatedly in the
Texas tape recordings, has not been indicted or accused of
any crime. His trading logs from Portland, obtained by CBS-
11, indicate that he conducted multiple ``Deathstar''
transactions while working there.
In a brief interview with CBS-11 outside his Allen home,
Salisbury would not say how he came to work for TXU but
insisted he has done nothing wrong as a trader for either
Enron or his current employer.
``I don't think I did anything wrong in Portland, and I
don't think I have done anything wrong in Dallas,'' he said,
declining to talk further without TXU permission.
TXU's Schein said the company would not allow Salisbury to
talk further and that executives were angry that CBS-11 had
tried to interview him at home.
Robert McCullough, a former utility executive in the
Pacific Northwest, has worked as an expert witness in
lawsuits against TXU and Enron. He said he was surprised TXU
would hire anyone else from Enron's tainted Portland office.
``We found hundreds, literally hundreds, of documents where
the different traders would sign off on specific schemes,''
McCullough said. ``So it's very surprising to us that you
would actually want one of those people on your team.''
Asked why TXU would hire a trader from Enron's Portland
office, Schein said Salisbury had passed a TXU background
check. He later indicated the FBI had fully investigated and
cleared Salisbury.
FBI officials in San Francisco, Ca., however, say the
investigation of the personnel in Enron's Portland office was
by no means complete and could yet yield additional cases.
``The FBI is in no way vouching for the character of Mr.
Salisbury,'' said Special Agent LaRae Quy.
Salisbury figures prominently in some of the TXU recordings
made during last year's February ice storm in North Texas.
Texas Commercial Energy officers and lawyers say the scheme
Salisbury and others used involved buying up as much
available energy on the open market as bad weather approached
and then, cutting TXU's scheduled sales. According to Texas
Commercial Energy, TXU traders would then refuse to sell,
even lying to customers about ostensible shortages, until
average $50 prices per megawatt hour spiked to a rare $1,000
per hour high.
In the following days, they say, TXU traders working
together maintained tight control over prices, keeping them
artificially high, but not so high as to trigger the
unwelcome attention of state regulators.
Company officials say this 10:12 a.m. conversation on Feb.
25, 2003 between Salisbury and buyer Norm Berthusen of Cirro
Energy occurred after an extended buying spree by TXU. They
say it is but one of many recorded conversations supporting
their contention that TXU traders conspired to withhold
energy from the market.
Holden Salisbury: ``TXU, this is Holden.''
Norm Berthusen: ``Hey Holden, Norm Bertheson at Cirro.''
Holden Salisbury: ``Yes sir.''
Norm Berthusen: ``Anything happening here in some of the
short term power?''
Holden Salisbury: ``Um, it's not looking too good right
now. I don't think I'm going to have anything. . .''
Norm Berthusen: ``Where's all the energy going?''
Holden Salisbury: ``It's cold man.''
Norm Berthusen: ``I mean, it is, but hell, nobody's at
work. Very few people. I mean. . .''
Holden Salisbury: ``I don't know. . .''
Norm Berthusen: ``Strange. . . Strange how we can have
56,000 available in the summertime and we can't get 40
together in the wintertime.''
Holden Salisbury: ``Yeah. I don't know. I mean there's
(power plant) units that are down in the state.''
Norm Berthusen: ``What units are down?''
Holden Salisbury: ``I don't know, but I know there are some
. . . Look I've gotta go man.''
Norm Berthusen: ``Alright.''
In an interview with CBS-11, Berthusen said he was
suspicious that something nefarious was afoot but didn't know
for sure until much later.
``I believe as a result of those actions that took place in
February 2003 there may be a lot more overview from the
(Public Utilities Commission) side of the fence in terms of
monitoring some of this activity,'' he said.
TXU's spokesman, Chris Schein, said the recording shows no
wrongdoing. He said Salisbury's apparent refusal to say which
plants were off was in line with federal regulations
prohibiting the trader from divulging such protected details.
Texas Commercial Energy officials point to recordings a
month earlier as further evidence that TXU traders carried
strategy of using market dominance to set prices at
artifically high levels.
Traders Tim Drennan and Jim Dunkin discuss the
``strategy.''
Tim Drennan: ``It's sitting at, uh, thirty-five percent . .
. uh thirty four point, uh . . . thirty four and a half
percent . . . uh forty six bucks, forty five bucks.''
Jim Dunkin: ``Yeah.''
Tim Drennan: ``So, eh, pretty much right in there where I
think you wanted to be.''
Jim Dunkin ``Excellent, excellent.''
Tim Drennan ``Yeah. No, I agree. I eh, we eh, we're all on
board with the, the, eh--with what we're doing here.
Jim Dunkin: ``Good.''
Later in the same discussion, according to Texas Commercial
Energy officials, traders talk about cutting large amounts of
scheduled energy deliveries to create an artifical scarcity
in the market, thereby driving prices up.
Jim Dunkin: ``What are you doing?''
Jerry `Doc' Gatty ``I'm pulling my thumb wondering what
Tim's gonna do here.''
Jim Dunkin: ``Well, cut it.'' (laughter)
Jerry `Doc' Gatty: ``We, we've got some big cuts in for
nine o'clock, so . . . I'm ready to get to 9 o'clock and get
it cutting so I know where I'm going. No, I know where I'm
going.''
Jim Dunkin: ``To the bottom.''
Jerry `Doc' Gatty: ``To the bottom.''
Several hours later, according to Texas Commercial Energy
officials, prices began to rise sharply to nearly $274, and
the traders demonstrate that they have achieved control of
prices.
Jim Dunkin: ``That's just like yesterday. Everything's
goin' just like we planned yesterday, except eh, except eh .
. . on the prices. But that's fine. I mean, I don't really
want to bump the prices unless we're 40 percent.
Tim Drennan: ``I understand . . . We'll just keep them
where they're at here, uh, for the rest of the day, unless
we're, uh, unless we're super long. You know, if it gets over
40 percent, maybe I'll take em up to over a hundred. But
right now . . .''
Jim Dunkin: ``You can take them back up over to that . .
.''
Tim Drennan: ``Okay.''
Jim Dunkin: ``. . . if you get up over 40 percent.''
Tim Drennan: ``I understand, I understand.''
Four hours later, the traders discuss price manipulation
strategy for the following day by ``cutting the load,'' or
reducing scheduled energy sales, to create the appearance of
shortages, according to Texas Commercial Energy officials.
Jim Dunkin: ``I'd still go the same strategy tomorrow of
having plenty on, but cut the load.''
Tim Drennan: ``Hey, cut-cut the load, go short, but just
hold the price below 100 bucks.
Jim Dunkin: ``Yeah, hold the price below 100 bucks. But I
wouldn't roll a hundred bucks until I got the CT.''
After some additional discussion about price bidding,
Drennan said ``And what we'll do is we'll just . . . we'll
pull those prices back and keep it under 100, and I'll pass
that on to Chad. And we're going to be fine.''
Said Texas Energy Commission Vice President Bill Silliman:
``They've got control over the prices. They only want to
double the price, not create a five-fold increase that
everyone would notice.''
TXU's Schein says the recordings fall far short of proving
that anyone at TXU has ever committed a crime or behaved
unethically in business. He called the price spikes that
occurred last winter ``anomalies'' due to a variety of
natural causes and normal market circumstances.
``Those things don't occur, have not occurred in Texas,''
TXU's Schein said. ``All of the market anomalies have been
thoroughly investigated and found to have been no wrongful
activities.''
Schein was referring to a January 2004 staff inquiry into
the allegations by the Public Utilities Commission's Market
Oversight Division.
``At this point,'' the report concluded, in part, staff
``has found no evidence of widespread, egregious price
gouging in the . . . energy market by TXU.''
But commission spokesman Terry Hadley conceded that
investigators were only able
[[Page S8148]]
to listen to a tiny fraction of the recordings, very late in
their inquiry, before issuing the report in January. And, he
said, court-ordered restrictions at the time prevented Texas
Commercial Energy attorneys from helping investigators
interpret the recordings beforehand. By contrast, TXU did
work with investigators before the report was completed,
Hadley said.
The investigation remains open, he said.
``Obviously, we don't have the resources to listen to
everything,'' Hadley said. ``They were considered to the
extent that some had been reviewed. With our resources, we're
not able to review all the thousands of hours of recordings.
But . . . we can continue to review the situation.
Robert McCullough, the former utility executive who worked
as an expert witness in lawsuits against TXU and Enron,
questions whether the utility commission is capable of
investigating anything. The number of investigators available
to enforce complex deregulation rules, he said, is pitifully
small.
``Unfortunately, in Texas, we don't have many police. We
have one small office,'' McCullough said. ``I don't doubt
that those gentlemen work very hard, but it's like one
policeman to patrol Dallas at the moment.
``The budget for the state PUC is $600,000,'' he said.
``That amount of money could be purloined, taken from the
consumers in an hour. It's like having the entire budget for
the police force for the city of Dallas being the same amount
as what's in the till of a Ma and Pa grocery store.''
Ms. CANTWELL. The issue is really before us in the sense that we need
to continue to push the Federal regulators to do their job, the Federal
regulators being the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. They have
failed to do their job. We had an Enron collapse and scandal in which
markets were manipulated, shareholders were conned, books were cooked,
and various aspects of this investigation and prosecution are taking
place. My hat is tipped to DOJ in their effectiveness in pursuing this
case against various Enron employees, including their recent indictment
of Ken Lay, even though that is a process in which Mr. Lay has his
opportunity and will have his day in court. But I take great offense to
Mr. Lay's PR campaign in which he goes on television saying that all
that happened in California was California's fault, that it was wrong
for them because they deregulated without proper supply.
Well, I think it is very clear there has been market manipulation as
shown by the documents that are being provided, and it is a question of
whether the Federal regulators are going to do their job.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record an editorial from the Washington Post from this week in which
the paper criticized the Federal energy regulators for not doing their
job. I think that is what we need, more attention to show that those
Federal regulators have not had the bright light of day shown on them
and that they are failing to do their job.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, July 12, 2004]
Enron's Legacy
It has long been clear that ill-starred Enron Corp., whose
founder and chief executive, Kenneth L. Lay, was indicted
last week, deliberately manipulated electricity markets to
intensify the California power crisis of 2000-01, forcing
electricity prices up across the West. But recently released
tapes of conversations between Enron traders have reminded
the victims of just how cynical that manipulation really was.
``I want to see what pain and heartache this is going to
cause Nevada Power Company,'' gloats a trader on one of the
tapes, just before completing a deal. ``I'm still in the mood
to screw with people.''
The ratepayers of Nevada--and the rest of the West--are
right to feel angry about what Enron did and right to feel
aggrieved about the billions of dollars they overpaid for
electricity as a result. It's hardly surprising that their
anger has spread to Congress, particularly during an election
year. Rep. Anna G. Eshoo (D-Calif.) recently got the House to
pass an amendment to an energy appropriations bill,
effectively requiring the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to give the public easier access to Enron
documents. Some, including Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) want the Senate to do the
same.
But while calling for access to documents lets off
political steam, it doesn't address the more fundamental
problems with federal energy regulation, as many in Congress
know perfectly well.
The much larger concern is that FERC's failure to resolve
quickly the gaggle of multimillion-dollar lawsuits and
regulatory cases filed by public utility commissions across
the West has hampered investment and left energy markets in
turmoil.
The fault is partly FERC's. Each case involves different
legal issues, but on the whole, the commission's reaction to
them has been slow, overly cautious and narrowly legalistic.
At the same time, Congress has refused to heed the
regulators' continued pleas for more powers, and particularly
for the right to exact the same kinds of civil penalties
other regulatory bodies do. Because FERC was set up in a
different era, it is a quasi judicial body, with little
ability to enforce rules. Its commissioners argue that they
have acted according to their interpretation of the law,
which among other things does not allow them to invalidate
old contracts retroactively. Spokesmen also point out that
some of Enron's behavior was ugly but legal, which limits
what FERC can do now. Indeed, much of what happened can be
attributed to the poor design of California's electricity
markets--a design that FERC opposed.
Nevertheless, it is becoming clear that FERC's overly
cautious approach to the Enron aftermath, the fault of both
FERC and Congress, has damaged the regulatory commission's
standing and even its ability to oversee market regulation in
the future. In California, Nevada, Washington state and
elsewhere, the acronym FERC has become a byword for
impotence. Its job was to protect consumers, the argument
goes; it didn't protect consumers, and it doesn't deserve
more powers. Yet the future success of deregulated energy
markets depends on the existence of a reliable regulator,
with enhanced powers to enforce standard market rules and to
penalize companies that fail to comply with reliability
requirements or that manipulate markets. It's probably too
late to undo all of the damage, but in upcoming cases FERC
should take far more seriously the spirit of the law, which
was designed to protect consumers, and Congress should
quickly act to give FERC the powers it needs to prevent
market manipulation.
Ms. CANTWELL. The article basically says:
. . . FERC's overly cautious approach to the Enron aftermath
. . . has damaged the regulatory commission's standing and
even its ability to oversee market regulation in the future.
In California, Nevada, Washington state and elsewhere, the
acronym FERC has become a byword for impotence. Its job was
to protect consumers, the argument goes; it didn't protect
consumers. . . .
So I think we need to continue to push. In fact, the editorial goes
on to say:
. . . Congress should quickly act to give FERC the powers it
needs. . . .
We must do our job in continuing to protect consumers from this
market manipulation. When we have evidence now that shows it has taken
place, and we cannot get the cop on the beat to investigate, and we now
have documentation and suspicion that it may still be going on in other
parts of the country, Congress needs to do its job.
Just as we did with the SEC in passing new accounting rules, we need
to make sure the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does its job on
regulating wholesale power rates, making sure that they are just and
reasonable and that the manipulation stops.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
(The remarks of Ms. Collins and Mr. Bond pertaining to the
introduction of S. 2659 are located in today's Record under
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
____________________