[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 94 (Friday, July 9, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7882-S7883]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. BOND. Madam President, I am very pleased to announce that today,
about 90 minutes ago, the report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence on the pre-Iraq war has finally been released. We were
bound not to talk about it until it was released at 10:30 today. Our
staff has done an excellent job reviewing 15,000 documents and 200
witnesses, going back time and again to get the facts straight.
We came up with the unanimous conclusions that I think this body and
our friends around the country, including the media, ought to pay
attention to what is actually in that report. Some of my colleagues
spent yesterday talking about the report and putting their spin on it.
I have been very distressed that the spin had nothing to do with the
facts that are actually in the report. It is a lengthy report. For the
benefit of my colleagues who have not been on the Intelligence
Committee, let me tell you a couple of things that were in the report.
First, the intelligence used by the President, the Vice President,
the chairman, and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, the
chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, along with
the rest of us, was the intelligence given to them by the CIA. This was
intelligence given to them through three administrations. On the basis
of that, on the floor the statement was made on September 19, 2002:
We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a
tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region.
He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations and is
building weapons of mass destruction and the means of
delivering them.
Senator Levin stated that.
On October 10, 2002:
There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is
working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will
likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. We also
should remember we have always underestimated the progress
Saddam has made in the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Senator Jay Rockefeller stated that.
These were conclusions that came from the best intelligence we had
available, that other intelligence agencies had available. Actually, if
you look at it, Iraqi Survey Group leader David Kay, when he came back
to the United States, said we know that Iraq was a far more dangerous
place, even than we had learned from our intelligence because of other
things that were going on that were not fully reported.
We identified problems in this report. There was no human
intelligence, which you absolutely need. There was faulty analysis in
sharing of information among the various agencies. Some analysts did
not fully qualify the information that was not confirmed.
But despite the breathless headlines, despite the political charges
that are being made on the other side of the aisle, no one was
pressured to change judgments or reach specific judgments. In fact, the
committee interviewed over 200 people, searching, searching, and
searching for those who might be pressured.
Chairman Roberts asked repeatedly, publicly and in hearings, that
anybody who had information on pressure to change conclusions, come
forward. Nobody did. They chased rabbits all through every brush pile
that could be imagined. Anybody who had an idea of pressure was
challenged. Do you know what they found? There was tremendous pressure
on the analysts because they had not put together the right information
prior to 9/11. They felt pressure, but they all said it was pressure to
get it right. They said it is the job of the intelligence community to
respond to the most searching questions of the people, the policymakers
who use it.
Let me cite three conclusions from the report, which I think are very
important on intelligence. From page 284: conclusion 83:
The committee did not find any evidence that administration
officials attempted to coerce, influence, or pressure
analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
Page 285, conclusion 84:
The committee found no evidence that the Vice President's
visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to
pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure
analysts by those who participated in the briefings of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure
analysts to change their assessments.
On page 359, conclusion 102:
The committee found that none of the analysts or other
people interviewed by the committee said they were pressured
to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to
terrorism. After 9/11, analysts were under tremendous
pressure to make correct assessments to avoid missing a
credible threat and to avoid an intelligence failure.
These are the findings upon which we unanimously agreed. I think the
Vice President and others who have been politically maligned are
entitled to an apology.
Do you know what this all comes back to? This comes back to a plan
that we learned about on November 6, 2003. I have in my mind a FOX News
report on this memo from a Democratic staffer. Nobody has denied it. In
fact, they are playing their plays out of that game book now.
It talks about:
No. 1: Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues
that may lead to major new disclosures. . . .
No. 2: Assiduously prepare Democratic ``additional views''
to attach to any interim or final reports. . . .
No. 3: We will identify the most exaggerated claims and
contrast them with the intelligence estimates that have since
been declassified. Our additional views will also, among
other things, castigate the majority for seeking to limit the
scope of the inquiry.
That is exactly what the game plan is that they are following. When
you look at the conclusion, the summary of that memo, it says:
Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's
concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, we have an
important
[[Page S7883]]
role to play in revealing the misleading--if not flagrantly
dishonest methods and motives--of senior administration
officials who made the case for a unilateral, preemptive war.
The approach outlined above seems to offer the best prospects
for exposing the administration's dubious motives and
methods.
I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record following my
statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hatch). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BOND. To sum it up, we are at war with terrorists. The terrorists
were in Iraq. They had access to the weapons of mass destruction that
Saddam Hussein had produced in the past and were willing to produce in
the future. We have received increased briefings on recent threats in
the United States. The greatest danger we fear is that Saddam Hussein,
had we not taken him out, would be supplying those terrorists with
chemical and biological weapons.
Our troops remain under fire, but some on this floor and some
commentators I have heard seem to be more interested in politicizing
the problems in the Intelligence Committee rather than getting at the
root of the problem. I hope we can put these partisan charges aside
because there is much work to do to improve the gathering, the
analysis, and the dissemination of intelligence. For the good of this
country, we need to put behind us this partisan effort to fingerpoint
and make accusations that have been explicitly disabused and disavowed
by this intelligence report.
I commend the staff of the Intelligence Committee. I thank the many
thousands of dedicated people in the intelligence community who are
doing their best, under difficult circumstances, to get information
under systems that were not adequate for the needs at the time. We need
to build a system where we get human intelligence, where we analyze it
better, and where we share it among agencies that we have not done
adequately in the past.
I thank my colleagues from Texas and Alabama for their courtesy.
Exhibit 1
Raw Data: Dem Memo on Iraq Intel
[From FOX News, Nov. 6, 2003]
We have carefully reviewed our options under the rules and
believe we have identified the best approach. Our plan is as
follows:
(1) Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that
may lead to major new disclosures regarding improper or
questionable conduct by administration officials. We are
having some success in that regard. For example, in addition
to the president's State of the Union speech, the chairman
has agreed to look at the activities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense as well as Secretary Bolton's office at
the State Department. The fact that the chairman supports our
investigations into these offices and co-signs our requests
for information is helpful and potentially crucial. We don't
know what we will find but our prospects for getting the
access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of the
majority. (Note: we can verbally mention some of the
intriguing leads we are pursuing.)
(2) Assiduously prepare Democratic ``additional views'' to
attach to any interim or final reports the committee may
release. Committee rules provide this opportunity and we
intend to take full advantage of it. In that regard, we have
already compiled all the public statements on Iraq made by
senior administration officials. We will identify the most
exaggerated claims and contrast them with the intelligence
estimates that have since been declassified. Our additional
views will also, among other things, castigate the majority
for seeking to limit the scope of the inquiry. The Democrats
will then be in a strong position to reopen the question of
establishing an independent commission (i.e. the Corzine
amendment).
(3) Prepare to launch an independent investigation when it
becomes clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully
collaborate with the majority. We can pull the trigger on an
independent investigation at any time--but we can only do so
once. The best time to do so will probably be next year
either:
(A) After we have already released our additional views on
an interim report--thereby providing as many as three
opportunities to make our case to the public: (1) additional
views on the interim report; (2) announcement of our
independent investigation; and (3) additional views on the
final investigation; or
(B) Once we identify solid leads the majority does not want
to pursue. We could attract more coverage and have greater
credibility in that context than one in which we simply
launch an independent investigation based on principled but
vague notions regarding the ``use'' of intelligence.
In the meantime, even without a specifically authorized
independent investigation, we continue to act independently
when we encounter foot-dragging on the part of the majority.
For example, the FBI Niger investigation was done solely at
the request of the vice chairman; we have independently
submitted written questions to DoD; and we are preparing
further independent requests for information.
summary
Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's
concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, we have an
important role to play in the revealing the misleading--if
not flagrantly dishonest methods and motives--of the senior
administration officials who made the case for a unilateral,
preemptive war. The approach outline above seems to offer the
best prospect for exposing the administration's dubious
motives and methods.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________