[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 89 (Thursday, June 24, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H4898-H4908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4663, SPENDING CONTROL ACT OF 2004
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the
Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 692 and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 692
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4663) to amend part C of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to extend the
discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go through
fiscal year 2009. The first reading of the bill shall be
dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of
the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the
bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on the Budget. After general debate the bill shall
be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The
bill shall be considered as read. All points of order against
the bill are waived. No amendment to the bill shall be in
order except those printed in the report of the Committee on
Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may
be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question in
the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of
order against such amendments are waived except that upon
adoption of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, only
the last amendment printed in the report of the Committee on
Rules shall be in order. At the conclusion of consideration
of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report
the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been
adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered
on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without
intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or
without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Hastings) is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate
only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York
(Ms. Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may
consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is
for the purpose of debate only.
(Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
{time} 1030
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 692 is a
structured rule providing 1 hour of general debate equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee
on the Budget. The rule waives all points of order against the bill and
its consideration and makes in order only those amendments printed in
the Committee on Rules report accompanying the resolution.
The rule further provides that the amendments printed in the report
shall be considered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report,
equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an opponent, shall
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to demand for a
division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.
Finally, the rule waives all points of order against the amendments
printed in the report, except that upon adoption of an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, only the last amendment printed in the report
shall be in order. The rule provides one motion to recommit with or
without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, as the only Member of the House serving on both the
Committee on Rules and the Committee on the Budget, I have become
increasingly convinced of the need for significant changes in the
congressional budget process, particularly with respect to the spending
side of the budget ledger. Enactment of H.R. 4663 would make major
strides toward providing the House with the tools needed to enforce
spending discipline in a time of unacceptable high Federal deficits.
Like many Members, I wish the bill reported went even further, but it
is an important first step. For that reason, I am pleased that the
Committee on Rules has made in order a long list of proposed amendments
to provide the House with multiple opportunities to strengthen the base
bill.
At the heart of the bill are proposals to reinstate spending caps on
discretionary spending, consistent with the
[[Page H4899]]
levels set forth in the budget resolution, and a 2-year extension of
the pay-as-you-go, or PAYGO, requirements for mandatory spending. It
should be noted, Mr. Speaker, that this latter provision requires that
bills increasing entitlement spending must be offset by reductions in
other spending and not by raising taxes.
The bill also provides that any breach of either of these spending
disciplines would result in automatic spending cuts known as
``sequesters.''
Finally, the bill takes the responsible approach to the sometimes
legitimate need for ``emergency'' spending by permitting such measures
only when they result from circumstances that are truly unanticipated,
temporary, and are needed for the preservation of life, property, or
national security. The bill also requires that future spending
projections no longer assume that these one-time ``emergency'' spending
levels will continue in future years.
Mr. Speaker, the congressional budget process was a badly needed
reform back in 1974; and while it served us well in that time period,
it can serve us better. This bill is an important step towards that
goal; and, accordingly, I encourage Members to support both the rule
and the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Washington for
yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
(Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, early this morning the Committee on Rules
passed a lopsided rule packed with Republican amendments. It is
shocking that of the 19 amendments made in order, only one Democrat
amendment and one bipartisan amendment are in order. Senior Democrats
were shut out, while the rule makes the amendments of junior Members in
order on the Republican side. The rule provides for one-sided debate on
H.R. 4663. The House will be allowed to discuss and vote on Republican
amendments, but Democratic ideas and amendments have been virtually
excluded in the important debate on budget process reform.
Mr. Speaker, the question before us is whether or not the current
budget process creates a product that embodies our budget policies and
our priorities. The Federal Government has gone from having historic
surpluses of $5.26 trillion to having historic deficits of $2.3
trillion. If we are unsatisfied with a budget, are policies or the
budget process to blame? Should the budget process enforcement
mechanism be policy neutral or should the process force or enable
Congress to make policy decisions?
Earlier this spring, the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget
Process of the Committee on Rules held a series of hearings on these
questions. The message that came out of the hearings seemed to be, I
thought, that the budget process is not at fault. Its structural flaws
in the budget process did not produce Federal budgets with massive
debt. Instead, the budgets are products of policy choices. The issue is
not the mechanisms we employ. The real issue is that people are now
unhappy with policy choices made over the last 3\1/2\ years. This
concern is bubbling up as criticism over the budget process, turning
process, not policy, into the villain.
Since the adoption of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, many
reforms have been proposed and tried. Biannual budget, joint budget
resolution, sequestration, caps on discretionary spending, caps on
entitlement spending, pay-as-you-go requirements, constitutional
amendments, and other ideas were part of previous discussions, and
part, again, of the current budget reform debate. We all know that caps
on discretionary spending and PAYGO requirements on mandatory spending
and tax cuts, which is an important point, worked well in the 1990s.
The underlying legislation is fatally flawed in that it leaves future
tax cuts unchecked and applies PAYGO only to mandatory spending. The
historic deficits are in large part the product of the tax cuts, which
primarily benefit the wealthiest Americans. The Congressional Budget
Office has said that the $2.3 trillion deficit has been caused by the
tax cuts and the associated debt services.
During the second subcommittee hearing, budget expert Stan Collender
offered this advice: enacting a new budget process without first
developing the consensus necessary to make it work will be perpetuating
a political hoax. You will be promising results the process cannot
possibly deliver, allowing the process to be used to justify policy
changes that will not otherwise seem appropriate and allowing
policymakers to hide behind both procedural votes that, at best, will
be confusing and, at worst, completely indecipherable.
The body is sharply divided, Mr. Speaker; and there is no consensus
on budget reform. This debate is not an academic exercise. Changes to
the process will affect millions of Americans. Caps on mandatory
spending will dramatically choke vital programs, like Medicare,
Medicaid, veterans benefits and student loans. I urge my colleagues to
oppose this rule so that all ideas, not just the majority suggestions,
may be considered and debated.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht), a senior member of the
Committee on the Budget and a leader in the budget reform process in
the House.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
This is an important debate, Mr. Speaker, so I hope that Members are
paying attention. The real power of the purse rests with us here, in
the people's House. I am proud of what we did through most of the
1990s. When we came here, when I was elected in 1994 and came here in
the spring of 1995, I remember we had some meetings with some of the
economists and people from the Congressional Budget Office. And we have
to go back and remember what was happening in America. We were running
deficits every year of $250 billion and more, and we can all point
fingers and blame this and blame that; but at the end of the day, we
were spending more than the taxpayers were sending in, and America
wanted us to do something about this.
At one of the meetings we were at, we had some economists saying, if
Congress does not get serious about balancing the Federal budget, that
by the time my children got to be my age they would be paying an
effective tax rate to the Federal Government of over 80 percent, just
to pay the interest on the national debt.
Now, I come from a rural district, and I think most folks from rural
communities understand this, because it really has been part of the
rural ethic, particularly those who are farm families, to pay off the
mortgage and leave the kids the farm. What we have been doing is we
were literally selling the farm and leaving our kids the mortgage. We
knew that it was not just bad public policy; it was fundamentally
immoral.
So what we did is we began to limit the growth in Federal spending,
and I am proud to report that from 1995 until the year 2000, the
Federal budget was growing at a slower rate than the average family
budget. That, combined with a fairly strong economy, we literally went
from a $250 billion shortfall every year to a $250 billion surplus.
In fact, just 3 years ago, the Congressional Budget Office told us
that we could look forward to surpluses in the Federal Treasury over
the next 10 years of $5.4 trillion. Now, that same Congressional Budget
Office today is telling us that we can look forward to deficits of $1.6
trillion over the next 10 years. The only thing we can really say about
the Congressional Budget Office's forecasts is that they are both
wrong.
What we do know that is right is that over the last several years we
have allowed Federal spending to grow at a rate double what it grew
through most of the 1990s. And part of the reason that happened is we
allowed some of the budgetary rules to expire, the things that control
the growth in Federal spending.
There was a farmer who told me several years ago, we were talking
about the deficit, and he said, you know, the problem with you guys in
Washington
[[Page H4900]]
is you do not quite get it. The problem is not that we are not sending
enough money to Washington. The problem is you spend it faster than we
send it in. He probably expressed it more accurately and more simply
than any of us would like to admit.
What we want to do today, and this is an important event and these
are important votes, we want to bring back some of the rules that
controlled Congress with regard to spending. One of them is PAYGO. That
means if you want to have a new program, you have to figure out a way
to pay for it. And I do not think that is too much to ask. The other is
setting up some spending caps.
Let me give some ideas why I think that is important. Over the last
several years, we have passed some pretty good budgets, some very tough
budgets here in the House of Representatives. Back in fiscal year 2002,
for example, our budget resolution which we passed here in the House
called for spending $661 billion in what we call discretionary
spending. But by the time we were done negotiating with the Senate, we
ended up spending $734.6 billion. Well, in the next year we said in the
House budget resolution that we would agree to spend $759 billion in
discretionary spending. But before the year was over, we actually spent
$849 billion. Last year, our budget resolution called for spending
$784.5 billion. But when all the numbers were in and the spending was
done and the conference committees at last had concluded, the number
actually was $873 billion.
Pogo was right. We have met the enemy, and he is us.
I think there was a certain amount of hubris that, well, we have done
a pretty good job of balancing the budget over the 5- or 6-year period.
We had actually paid down over a half trillion dollars of publicly held
debt, and I think we began to think we did not need these budget rules
any more. I am here to say that I think we were wrong, and we have to
get back to some of those rules.
This is a very important debate. I support this rule. I know there
will be people who will say, well, we did not get to offer our
amendment, or this amendment was not made in order. But I think we are
going to have a very vigorous debate over the next several hours on the
rule and the bill. Mr. Speaker, I hope later I will have a chance to
visit more about the rule and the bill.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Minnesota,
who just noted that between 1995 and 2000 government spending grew more
slowly than did the economy as a whole and that we, in the process,
paid off almost $.5 trillion in debt.
I very much appreciate the endorsement of the economic policies of
the Clinton administration. It is too bad that those policies were
reversed by the incumbent administration.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who is the ranking member on the Committee
on the Budget.
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 1045
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, this is called the Spending Control Act of
2004. The last time I looked, the Republicans control the House,
Republicans control the Senate, and Republicans control the White
House. So it begs the question, why can they not control spending? Why
do we need this piece of legislation to control spending?
As one looks at the bill and asks that question, another question
arises: Why does this bill have nothing to do with revenues? Basically
what this bill would do is affect discretionary spending for 2 years,
not 5, and put in place a PAYGO rule, a pay as you go rule which
applied to mandatory spending, entitlement spending increases but not
to tax reductions.
Do we disagree on the problem before us? Absolutely not. We have got
a problem. The best evidence of the problem was signaled this week when
we had a defense appropriations bill in which was buried a provision
that will increase the debt ceiling over the next several years by a
substantial sum of money.
Let us look first at what has happened over the last several years on
the watch of the Bush administration with respect to the debt that we
have accumulated, the mountainous debt that we are building up now. The
best indicator of that is where does the debt ceiling stand? There is a
statutory ceiling on the amount of debt we can incur. When President
Bush came to office, it was $5.95 trillion. Within a year, he had to
increase that by $450 billion. Last year he had to increase it by, get
this, $984 billion. The other day they increased it by $650 billion, to
$8.74 trillion once it finally passes the Congress.
That is the record of the last 4 years, three increases in the debt
ceiling in 4 years, from $5.9 trillion to $8 trillion and this is the
bad news: It does not stop here. The Congressional Budget Office tells
us looking at the President's budget out over the next 10 years, as
they are required by law to do, that if we follow the policies laid
down by the Bush administration, the debt of this country will grow in
2014 to $13.6 trillion. That is where the debt ceiling will have to be
taken in order to accommodate their fiscal policies.
What does this bill propose with respect to this problem? As it turns
out, very, very little. Before going any further, it is worth reminding
everybody what happened in the 1990s. It can be done. If you put your
shoulder to the wheel and the President supports it and the leadership
of the Congress supports it, we can bring the deficit to heel. We did
it in the 1990s. We went from a deficit of $290 billion at the end of
fiscal year 1992 to a surplus of $236 billion in 1998. Just as a
reminder from 1997 to 2000 on the watch of the Clinton administration,
we reduced the debt of this country by $362 billion. If you added
fiscal year 2001, which was basically the Clinton budget, we reduced
the debt by more than $400 billion. What a fiscal reversal we have seen
in the last 4 years.
What does this bill propose to do? Essentially it proposes to clamp
down on that wedge of the budget called domestic non-homeland
discretionary spending. That is, discretionary spending from which we
have backed out international spending and from which we have backed
out homeland security, because in both of those categories, they
foresee substantial increases, but they are going to bring all the
force of their efforts to bear on this wedge of the budget which
constitutes 16 percent of the budget.
Let us ask the question, is this where the problem arises, in this
segment called domestic non-homeland discretionary spending? This is
what has happened over the last three fiscal years to that particular
account: $383 billion in 2002, $382 billion in 2003, $383 billion in
2004. The problem does not arise here. But this is where they go for a
solution. On the other hand, look what the solution is. The President
proposes to take domestic non-homeland security resources down to $376
in 2005. That is a reduction of $7 billion. Actually it is hard to do
but in truth, we have got a deficit this year of between $400 billion
and $500 billion, you have only dented the problem once you have done
it.
This is where the problem lies. If you want to look at spending,
which this bill does not do, over the last 4 fiscal years, 90 to 95
percent of the increase in discretionary spending has occurred in
defense, homeland security and our response to 9/11. But this bill
ignores that particular aspect of the problem. And where is the rest of
the problem? When the Bush administration held their tax cuts out to us
and when they were passed, they told us this is the path that revenues
will follow, between $1 trillion and $1.1 trillion. This is where
revenues, income taxes, have actually gone over that period of time,
largely responsible to their tax cuts.
And this is what has happened to spending generally. Spending
generally has gone up in the Bush administration. Revenues have gone
down. Spending, however, is still as we can see from this chart below
the historic norm for the last 25 years. Revenues, on the other hand,
are at an all-time low. Personal income taxes as a percentage of GDP
are at their lowest level since the early 1950s. So revenues are low,
spending is high, and this bill unfortunately
[[Page H4901]]
does nothing about the problem at hand.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I want to respond to some of the things
that our colleague the gentleman from South Carolina has just said.
Much of what he said, I do not disagree with. But there is something I
think we need to clarify for all of the Members. Even if we had a
balanced budget last year and this year, we would have to raise the
debt ceiling. That is something I think it is hard for many Members and
frankly I think most Americans. They wonder how in the world can that
be. It is kind of a complicated thing to explain but even in a very
strong economy with surpluses, we would probably have to raise the debt
ceiling. The reason is this. When money comes into the Social Security
trust fund, there are only two things they can do. They can either pay
benefits or they can buy government bonds. When they buy government
bonds they in effect drive up the debt. I know that is hard for people
to understand, so yes, we are going to have to raise the debt ceiling,
but even if we were balancing the budget we would have to do that.
I would also like to at least remind Members that things did change a
lot in this country on September 11, 2001. I think we all know that. We
all have to be cognizant of that and it has changed the priorities of
how we spend money. Is that an excuse to allow other Federal spending
to be going up? No. And have we been a little too profligate with the
Defense Department and homeland security? My opinion would be yes. We
have allowed our emotions to get the better of us and we have just
said, we will spend more money and maybe we will be safer. I am not
sure that is the answer. I am not sure that having 50 guards at every
airport entrance makes us all that much safer and that is an argument
and a debate we should have.
The debate today is how much are we going to allow Federal spending
to go up, and is there really a good reason to allow the Federal budget
to grow at a rate twice the rate of the average family budget?
The numbers we were talking about, from 1995 until 2000, the Federal
budget went up at an average rate of about 3.2 percent. Since that
time, we have allowed the Federal budget to grow at a rate of 6.4
percent. That assumes that we will enforce the numbers that we passed
in this year's House budget resolution and that is really what we are
debating today; that is, it is one thing to pass a budget, it is
another thing to make certain that we enforce the budget.
There will be two great issues we are going to discuss today that I
think are important. First of all, are we going to enforce the budgets
that we pass here in the House of Representatives? We are the keepers
of the public purse. I think we ought to enforce that budget. The
second thing we are going to debate today is changing the process by
which we derive a budget. The process today all leans towards more
spending. In fact, I think the Wall Street Journal did a beautiful
editorial last week which really underscored that point. Everything we
do here, and frankly that is what we do, is we spend the public's
money, but all of the rules today tend to make it easier to spend more
money. What we want to do is level the rules so that at least we have a
counterbalance to all of that pressure to spend more money.
I might just say this. We all have different reasons, and some say it
is the tax cuts, but I would remind people that we cut taxes in almost
every year during the 1990s, and we did it under PAYGO and spending cap
rules. It can be done. We just have to find offsets for those. And we
did. In fact, most of the supplemental spending bills that we passed we
found offsets for those. It can be done. It means making some tough
choices, but I always remind my colleagues, our constituents did not
send us here just to make the easy choices. They sent us here to make
tough choices. We are going to make some tough choices today in terms
of whether we really mean what we say about holding the line on Federal
spending and whether or not we are going to level the playing field in
terms of the rules by which we make our budgets. This is an important
debate.
The debate about raising the debt ceiling is clearly an important
debate, but I think we have to be clear. Even if we had a balanced
budget, because of the surpluses coming in in the Social Security trust
fund, we would still have to raise the debt ceiling.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor very disappointed
because once again the majority has chosen not to allow the Blue Dogs
to have our amendment considered. I would like to ask the gentleman
from Washington, why did his committee allow 19 amendments, most of
which should be offered by the minority party, but are being offered by
the majority party? Why did he not allow the Blue Dogs to have 5
minutes, 10 minutes, a simple up and down vote on our proposal?
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. As the gentleman knows, I would respond to my friend from
Texas, our committee has to make a lot of difficult decisions sometimes
with the number of amendments that are brought in. Sometimes we have to
make choices that are going to disappoint some Members. My friend from
Texas has been here, and I confess that maybe he has been disappointed
more than once.
Mr. STENHOLM. I take back my time from the gentleman. I appreciate
the honesty in which he comes forward and with a straight face attempts
to say why they denied us a chance. They can find time for 19
amendments, most of which are a joke. The rhetoric sounds good. The
gentleman from Minnesota just spoke, there is a lot he and I can work
together on. What we offered in our amendment is a chance to work
together on something, but we are constantly denied and why? Because if
they allowed our amendment on the floor, there is bipartisan support
for it and it might have a chance to pass.
Any resemblance to democracy in this House is purely coincidental
with the running of it by the current leadership in the House. Purely
coincidental. I ask my colleague why they denied our amendment but
allowed 19 others. We heard the answer.
The rule before us presents us with a false choice. Let me remind
everyone, Republicans control the House, Republicans control the
Senate, Republicans control the White House. The only thing Republicans
cannot control is spending. Spending has gone up more in the last 3
years than in the previous 8. And when you talk about spending, I have
been here 25 years. Spending has gone down by one-half of 1 percent as
a percent of gross domestic product since I was elected in 1978.
Revenue has gone down by 5 percent. That creates the deficits. I agree
with the gentleman who just spoke a moment ago. Raising the debt
ceiling would have to be done. But we should never raise it without
putting a change in the manner in which our economic program is working
that will just continue to have the debt ceiling going on as far as the
eye can see. That makes no sense.
Some of us would like to work with you but we are constantly denied
the opportunity to come before this body and have a vote. What we asked
for is pay as you go that applies to both spending and to revenue. If
you are going to spend more, you have got to cut someplace else. We
agree with the President, President George W. Bush's spending limits
for 2 years. We agree. There is no argument on spending. But there is
an argument on deficits. And with all due respect, if you want to cut
taxes, you have got to cut spending. Do not just talk about it. Do not
just come and make the speeches we are going to hear all day today
about how tough we are going to be on spending. You are in the
majority. Anybody offering some of those amendments you are offering,
you ought to be doing it. Nobody is keeping you from doing it. You have
got the votes. You can do anything you want if you have got the votes.
But what do you do?
[[Page H4902]]
You bring 19 amendments to the floor that you used to offer when you
were in the minority party, and I agreed with you. I agreed with you on
many of those. But now you are in the majority and I disagree with the
manner in which you are running this House. But that is a right of the
majority. All we asked for is a chance to have our idea debated and
through the wisdom of, oh, well, you are going to disappoint some from
time to time, there are folks on your side that agree with us and you
deny them the right to vote with us.
{time} 1100
That is shameful. Applying pay-as-you-go rules to tax cuts does not
prevent Congress from cutting taxes, and do not say that over here. You
know it is not true. It makes great sense, pleases a lot of folks, I
suppose. But all it says is if we are going to reduce our revenues, we
need to reduce spending by the same amount. Do it. Do not just come to
this floor and spend 12 hours debating some of the silliest amendments
that we could have if you are serious about doing something. If we
really want to do it, let us do it like we did in 1990, like we did in
1997, when we had bipartisan support for doing something about the
deficit.
The hand is still here on this side. I wish somebody over there would
take it just once before this year is over.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), a member of the Committee on Ways
and Means.
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time.
And I would like to say to the last speaker the hand was reached out
on an amendment and the last speaker took the hand and that is why he
and I have an amendment on the floor today on a very important item. So
while all the minority's amendments were not made in order, there are a
couple of amendments that were bipartisan that he and I have. And I
hope that he does not count among the silly amendments the one that he
and I have.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding, and
I appreciate that fact, and I do not consider all of the amendments
silly. I consider some of them very silly, but the one that I am
agreeing with him on I do not consider silly.
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate
the clarification.
Mr. Speaker, let me frame what this is all about. What are we doing
here today? What we are trying to accomplish here today is to clean up
this silly budget process we have here in Washington. All of us have
different ideas on how to fix this system.
There are some differences in philosophies. We heard the gentleman
talking about the PAYGO, their version of PAYGO, our version of PAYGO,
that the basis of that philosophical difference is we do not believe
fiscal discipline in Washington should come from tax increases. We
believe fiscal discipline in Washington should come from spending cuts.
And when we have the PAYGO system, much like what we have had in the
past, history already shows that it puts a bias in the law for tax
increases, not spending cuts.
So what we want to accomplish, because we believe this, we want the
discipline, we want the inertia, we want the pressure to be on
controlling spending, not raising taxes. There is the big philosophy
difference.
But going down the road of the system we have here in Washington, Mr.
Speaker, I would argue that we have this thing in place since 1974; and
since 1974, Washington has had a horrible record of getting its handle
on our budgets, when Republicans ran things and when Democrats ran
things. For a while in the 1990s, we did a pretty good job, but since
then we have not; and I would argue that.
We are doing well in many years, but when we look at a system, for
example, that allows some appropriations to come to the floor, say,
adding $50 million for a rain forest museum in Coraville, Iowa, and if
we want to come to this floor and pass an amendment so that we can do
so on behalf of our taxpayer constituents to say I do not think we
should pay $50 million for a rain forest museum in Coraville, Iowa, I
have an amendment to strike that proposal. We could pass that
amendment. But by the rules of this institution from the 1974 Budget
Act, that $50 million would have to be re-spent somewhere else in the
Federal Government. It could not be saved. That is ridiculous. That is
just one example of how crazy this budget system is that we have today.
Another crazy example of these rules is when we pass budgets, and we
really work hard on passing these budget resolutions, as soon as we
pass these budget resolutions, they amount to nothing more than mere
guidelines. They are not actual, enforceable budgets. They do not take
the force of law.
What we propose today, through an amendment and through a couple of
substitutes, is that when we actually pass a budget here, it means
something. We stick to it. We enforce it. It is honest. It is going to
work. It is going to happen. That is not what happens today.
So we want to have a budget process that is done at the beginning of
the budget process where the President signs it into law, and because
the budget becomes law, it therefore is enforceable so that we can make
sure we stick to the budget, that we plan the finances of this country
so that we can factor in all the things we need to think about: the
level of taxation, the level of debt, the deficits, getting ready for
the baby boomer retirement, all of those things so that when we
actually pass a budget, it works and it is enforceable. These are not
really crazy ideas. These are commonsense ideas to bring common sense
to a budget system that is broken.
I would challenge anyone to come to the floor and argue on behalf of
this current budget system to say that this is the epitome of common
sense, that this thing works right as it should. We have not changed
this system since 1974. It is high time we changed it. We are going to
have a lot of amendments to try to do that. We are going to have some
big substitute votes on big bills to do that. This is the product of a
collaborative work. It is a product of Democrats and Republicans. It is
a product that needs to come to this floor. It is a product that needs
to pass into law so that we bring common sense back to our budget
process.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).
Mr. EMANUEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Rochester for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the Democratic substitute.
It would have made incredible common sense to deal with the budget
reform before voting on the budget. But that kind of common sense
regularly escapes the majority, and that is why there has been a 4-
month impasse on their budget between the two Chambers, their party.
The truth is this Congress has been on a recess on dealing with the
crisis that is facing the American people for the last year dealing
with health care costs, college costs, and retirement savings problems.
You are scared to be honest with the American people about the fact
that you have been on a recess. But given how they feel about this
Congress and given the fact that they have given you a failing grade so
far, none of these Hail Mary passes is going to confuse them about
where you are and what you have done in addressing their health care
crisis, their college education crisis, and their savings crisis.
This bill ignores the advice of Chairman Greenspan, who said it would
be a grave mistake to let go of the PAYGO budget rules. This bill even
ignores the advice of the gentleman from Iowa, chairman of the
Committee on the Budget, who said just 2 years ago the PAYGO rules
contributed to obtaining the deficits. The chairman voted for those
rules in 1997. That vote ensured that we made choices, lived within our
means, and were accountable for what we do. Maybe with maturity over
the last 2 years, he has decided to change his view on that. It is
possible. Or maybe like the rest of us, he got the disease that is
rampant in Washington
[[Page H4903]]
where one is firm in one's opinions, but very flexible on one's
principles. That is a possibility too.
The 1990s were good economic times. We created 22 million jobs,
raised income for all levels, had more access for the uninsured to
health care. College was more accessible to more Americans, and savings
were up. We balanced the budget and accumulated surpluses reaching
nearly $300 billion. And what we did not do was say that every tax cut
is good or every tax cut is bad. We made choices. We made choices on
spending.
In the 1993 budget, we cut taxes for the middle class, and we also
reduced spending. In 1997 we cut taxes for people earning $100,000 and,
yes, gave them the first-ever $500-per-child tax cut. And we made
choices by investing in children's health care, investing in the
environment, investing in Medicaid, and also investing in people's
retirement and strengthening our Social Security system.
But your economic plan has led to $3 trillion in additional debt, an
annual budget deficit of $500 billion, 44 million Americans without
health insurance, 2 million more middle-class families who have moved
from the middle class to poverty, and the highest rate of foreclosures
in the last 3 years on personal bankruptcy. You have turned your back
on what worked in the 1990s.
And let me add one additional point. The majority party in the 1990
budget did not vote for it. It took Democratic votes that put us on the
path to fiscal discipline. The majority party in 1993 contributed not a
single vote that built on the 1990 agreement that also reduced the
deficit and put us on the path to a balanced budget. You did not become
a player in deficit discipline until 1997 with that agreement, which
was the last yard.
So let us not rewrite history here. Some of us do not have a foggy
memory of what happened in the 1990 agreement, the 1993 agreement. We
made choices and difficult choices, and some sat on the sidelines and
were really good critics.
Mr. Speaker, this so-called budget process bill says hands off when
it comes to making the tough choices, and it says that we do not have
the political courage to make those choices.
We must make choices when it comes to tax cuts and spending and be
honest with the American people, but it takes both to deal with putting
our fiscal house back in order.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling), a member of the Committee on the
Budget and also a leader on budget reform.
(Mr. HENSARLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
I think this is an incredibly important debate that this House needs
to have today. Not only is it a critically important debate to have;
but, frankly, it reduces itself down to a very simple debate to have.
Simple perhaps, not easy.
The simple proposition is this: Do we believe there should be any
limit to government? It is a very simple proposition. Do we believe
that there should be any limit to government whatsoever?
Many in this body do not believe it. Many do, however. Many know the
struggles and challenges that families face. Some of us believe that it
is time to protect the family budget from the Federal budget.
Since I have been alive, the Federal budget has grown seven times
faster than the family budget when measured by median worker income.
Seven times faster. I believe that is an unsustainable and
unconscionable growth rate.
The government is now spending over $20,000 per American household
for only the fourth time in the entire history of our Nation and for
the first time since World War II. That figure is up from $16,000 per
household just 5 short years ago, just 5 short years ago. This
represents the largest expansion of the Federal Government in 50 years.
At what point do we say enough is enough? I know the Founding Fathers
believed in limited government. The question is do we believe in
limited government?
There is going to be a bill. There are going to be a number of
substitutes. There are going to be a number of amendments. But all of
them are going to reduce down to two simple propositions: Should the
family budget be protected from the Federal budget? Do we believe in
limited government? And second of all, once we pass a budget, will we
abide by that budget? Will we live by that budget like American
families do each and every day? Because we cannot have unlimited
government and unlimited opportunity.
Many of us believe strongly that we must have unlimited opportunity.
It would be wonderful if all of this government spending magically
turned into love and happiness and kindness; and, indeed, there is much
great work done by the Federal Government. But, indeed, there is also
much waste and much fraud and much abuse and much duplication. And I
fear until we limit, limit, the growth of government, that this body
will not take the steps necessary to protect the family budget from the
Federal budget and root this out.
Up until recently, Medicare would routinely pay three, four, five
times as much for a wheelchair as the VA did and had for years. Why?
Because one would competitively bid and the other would not. The
Department of the Interior maintains approximately 31,000 Web sites,
almost one for every two employees. Does this meet the reasonableness
test? I do not believe so.
In the last year of the Clinton administration, HUD spent over 10
percent of their budget, $3 billion, paying out payments to people who
did not even qualify for the program. We spent over $800,000 for one
toilet in one national park, and it did not even work.
My point is we are just scratching the surface here. When we begin to
look at the 10,000 Federal programs spread across 500, 600 government
agencies, we discover that they routinely waste 5, 10, 15, perhaps 20,
percent of their taxpayer-funded budgets and have for years.
This money is not free. It is not ours. It belongs to the families of
America. And when we take it away from their kitchen tables to fund our
programs, what are we taking away from them? Maybe the opportunity for
them to buy a computer, a home computer, to further the education of
their children. Maybe it is that first downpayment on a home. Maybe it
is a couple months of child care.
We must limit the size, the scope, the power, and the expense of the
Federal Government. And this is what this legislation is all about. So
no matter how many different ways people try to obfuscate it and try to
make it confusing and cumbersome, it boils down to one simple
proposition: Do we believe in limited government, or do we not believe
in limited government? And that is why we need this rule for this very
critical debate to go forward.
I know, from listening to the debate on the other side, what we will
hear all day. We will hear about Draconian cuts in the budget. As I
read the legislation, government is still going to grow under every
single amendment. Government will still grow. All we are saying is that
maybe, just maybe, the government budget should not grow faster than
the family budget.
And we hear so much about how tax relief is causing these massive
deficits.
{time} 1115
Well, it is interesting, when we actually look at the numbers, and
last year's budget, which was a 10-year budget, we had almost $27
trillion of spending compared to $350 billion of tax relief. Now, if we
buy into the opposition's argument, that tax relief represents a
government expenditure, if we do the math, we figure out that the tax
relief is roughly 1.5 percent of the spending. We could take it all the
way and make no dent in the challenge whatsoever.
I continue to be perplexed why people who talk so much about their
concern for the deficit will focus all of their rhetoric on 1 percent
of the challenge and ignore 99 percent of the challenge, which is on
the spending side. And, by the way, tax relief is proven to be part of
the solution and not part of the problem.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Fattah).
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
[[Page H4904]]
If the American people want to buy more of what we just heard, they
are going to get a chance in November. But if they want to really think
about the fiscal future of this country, then think about how we have
moved from hundreds of billions of surpluses to hundreds of billions of
deficits. Think about what Treasury Secretary O'Neill said in his book
when he raised the concern about this deficit spending by the majority
and by the Republican party.
He said that Vice President Cheney said, oh, do not worry about
deficits. It did not hamper Reagan, when we quadrupled the national
debt. Now we are raising the debt limit 3 times, up to $8 trillion, so
that our children and our grandchildren will have to pay for the cost
of our expenditures.
And he said well, we do not want to have PAYGO affect tax cuts, we
just want it on the spending side because it is philosophical. Well, it
was philosophical about whether the earth was flat or not, or round.
The facts are stubborn things, Reagan said, and I remember that.
Because when we think about the real facts: 44 million Americans
without health insurance, millions without jobs, a 50-year high on
mortgage foreclosures, an historic high the third year in a row on
personal bankruptcies.
This majority has controlled spending and tax cuts for the last 10
years. They come on the floor and want to blame it on what they
affectionately refer to as ``the other side.'' Where is the willingness
to be accountable, to take responsibility for their own actions?
The majority has decided to take this country on a course of fiscal
irresponsibility. What we need to really think about now is whether we
want to continue to go in that direction, whether we want to continue
to have future generations having to pay for the choices we are making
today, or whether we are prepared to pay for our own choices.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
(Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I come over here with a degree of sadness,
because the rule prohibits the consideration of the Blue Dog substitute
on budget enforcement.
The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) made a speech a while ago
that I could not say any better about why the Blue Dog budget
enforcement ought to be passed. My other young friend talked about
spending. If we want to talk about wasteful spending, let me just talk
about it for a second.
In July of 2002, the debt ceiling in this country was raised $450
billion. On Memorial Day weekend last year, it was raised another $980
billion. The other night in the defense bill, we had to raise it again,
$650-plus. In the last 3 years, the debt of this country, the debt
ceiling has been raised over $2 trillion. At 5 percent interest, what
we have done following this economic game plan is raise taxes $100
billion a year every year, and my Republican colleagues want to talk
about wasteful spending. I can think of nothing more wasteful than
interest, because we get no health care, no military, no education, no
nothing.
But it is even worse than that. Years ago, when we heard about the
GDP, percentage of GDP and the deficit, they said, do not worry about
it. Do my colleagues know who was buying our debt then? Americans. Do
my colleagues know who is financing our debt now? Seventy percent of
our debt last year was financed by foreign interests.
I am telling all of my colleagues, sooner or later, the hocking of
this country to anybody in the world that will buy our paper is going
to, if it is not already, become a national security issue. We are
going to not only do a generational mugging on our children and
grandchildren by what we are doing here now, but we are going to put
future policymakers in a position where there will be leverage on them
by foreign powers who do not see the world the same way the United
States does in such a way that it is going to be a national security
problem for them.
I can think of no other better way to control spending than to apply
PAYGO to tax cuts. Do my colleagues know why? Because then, when we cut
taxes, we have to cut spending. Now, we cut taxes, and I voted for some
of them, but we did not cut spending. Spending keeps going up. If we
are really serious about cutting spending, apply pay-go to both. Then
we will have to cut spending when we cut taxes, and that is what the
Blue Dog budget enforcement has in it. Without that, all we are hearing
is rhetoric, rhetoric, rhetoric.
It has not worked. It will not work. And I tell my colleagues, when
the American people find out what is going on here, I think they are
going to be not only disappointed, but appalled.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to some of the
things that were just said.
First of all, I happen to believe that PAYGO rules ought to apply to
tax cuts, too. But this is all about the politics of the possible, and
we cannot get that done this year. So we can take this step this year,
this day to begin to constrain Federal spending.
Let me also respond to something else. Our friends on the left cannot
have it both ways. They cannot say, well, we need to invest in this
program and that program and this program for people, and if we put
more money into education, the argument is we will get it back ten-
fold, but we do not want to pay any interest on that money. We cannot
have it both ways. Fifty-five percent of what we will spend this year
will be for what are called entitlement programs, and many of those
entitlement programs were sold as investments in people. Now we are
being told, but we get no return on that investment. This is just an
expenditure, and it is lost forever.
So as we debate this, I know that people are going to come at this
from different perspectives, but let us try to at least be honest with
ourselves. We have a system right now, and the rules and the way the
system works encourages more and more spending.
The debate today simply is about this: are we going to enforce the
budgets that we pass here in the House and are we going to change the
rules to give the taxpayers an even break? That is what the debate is
about today. We can debate all of those other issues some other day.
But we need support on both sides of the aisle to make certain that the
American people understand that we are going to enforce the budgets we
pass in the House.
We are the keepers of the public purse. We are going to enforce those
budgets, and we are going to begin to amend the rules to make it more
difficult to spend more than we take in.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
this time.
(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, back in 1990, Congress instituted the pay-
as-you-go rules with bipartisan support, including the support of the
first President Bush. However, those rules were based on the principle
that if you are digging yourself deeper into a hole, the first thing
you do is stop digging. And the 1990 rules which required that both
mandatory spending increases and tax cuts be offset helped keep the
deficit hole from getting deeper, and eventually helped produce record
budget surpluses.
Unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle evidently
have completely forgotten this sound concept. The Republican bill we
debate here today is a deeply flawed and ineffective version of the
earlier pay-as-you-go requirements. Specifically, this legislation lets
the Congress keep digging deeper to make the deficit bigger. By
covering only mandatory spending, tax cuts would not have to be paid
for, and entitlement increases would ultimately have to be paid for by
cutting other entitlements. That is Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid. In essence, this is the way in which they mask the
dismantling of entitlement priorities.
[[Page H4905]]
In addition, the measured spending caps would be set at
unrealistically low levels, which would lead either to devastating cuts
in domestic spending, in education, in health care, in research, or, to
the ignoring of the caps. Record deficits are not due to discretionary
spending. If we eliminated all nondefense discretionary spending, we
would not eliminate the anticipated fiscal year budget deficit of $478
billion, all nondefense discretionary spending. Forget about it.
Eliminate it all. We still would not take care of the deficit.
So since most Federal benefits for low and middle class people are
provided through entitlement programs, and most government subsidies
for high-income individuals and corporations are in the Tax Code, this
measure would then turn the policy practice on its head in favor of the
affluent and against the low and middle income families of this
country.
The bill was designed so that the new spending caps would be set at
discretionary spending levels contained in the conference report on the
budget resolution, which calls for cutting domestic discretionary
programs outside of homeland security by $77 billion over the next 5
years.
Unlike the caps imposed in the 1990s, the new caps require much
deeper cuts and would not be part of a balanced deficit reduction
package that puts every part of the budget, every part of the budget on
the table and calls for shared sacrifice.
Finally, on this rule, Republicans clearly are afraid of the views
expressed on this side of the aisle that everything must be on the
table when there are 19 amendments and 17 are Republican, and leading
democratic voices who are known in this Congress are not given the
opportunity to present on these issues. It is shameful. The rule needs
to be voted down, as does the bill.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 4
minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am going to vote for this rule,
but I do not support it. I do not think it is a good rule. I want to
explain in just the couple of minutes that I have why that is the case.
First, I think I should make it known, especially to Members on my
side of the aisle who have heard recently that I have been opposing
budgetary caps, that that is not true. I do not oppose caps on the
budget. To the contrary, my colleagues have heard me here on the floor
many times saying that I need a budget. I cannot help it that the
budget committees cannot get together and give us a real budget, but I
need a budget to have discipline in the committee when there are
amendments on the floor to raise spending by billions of dollars. So I
need a budget with a budget cap.
However, I will not support statutory budget caps. This rule provides
for a bill that provides for statutory budget caps. The reason I will
not support statutory budget caps is very simple. It goes beyond
politics, it goes beyond the House and the Senate. It is the
Constitution of the United States that has established checks and
balances by separation of powers. The budget process is the
responsibility and the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United
States. Statutory budget caps put the executive branch into the mix. We
would be hearing from OMB on a daily basis that they cannot accept this
or they cannot accept that; that you are going to have to do it our
way, or we will not sign the bill. That is what statutory budget caps
are going to do to this process.
The current process is already unworkable. We need real budget
process reform, but we need budget process reform that is going to
work. And the budget process that we are working under today does not
work.
{time} 1130
We do not have a budget, and that is an example that the current
process does not work. But let me say this: when we have had a real
budget resolution, the Committee on Appropriations stays within their
cap. Discretionary spending has not exceeded the budget caps since this
gentleman has been chairman of the committee.
Where Congress ought to be looking is mandatory programs, because
mandatory spending, which is basically two-thirds of all government
spending, is the spending that runs us deeper into debt every year.
So I do not think the bill that this rule provides consideration for
is a good bill. And I do not intend to support the bill. But I am going
to vote for this rule, although I do not really agree with what it
does. But in order to get the bill on the floor so the House can work
its will, I will vote for the rule, but not for this bill.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote ``no'' on the previous question.
If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to the
rule that will allow the House to vote on an important substitute
amendment that was not allowed under the rule.
This substitute by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm), the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Matheson), the gentleman from California (Mr.
Thompson), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hill), the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Moore), and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner) would
reinstate for 2 years the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act.
It also provides for pay-as-you-go rules for legislation that
increases the deficit, sets discretionary spending limits, and calls
for a separate vote to consider legislation that would increase those
discretionary spending limits or waive the PAYGO requirement.
It is certainly worthy of discussion and a vote in this debate on the
House budget process. Unfortunately, the Republican leadership blocked
this amendment, and it was voted down in the Committee on Rules early
this morning on a straight party-line vote.
When asked why so few or no Democrat amendments were allowed, the
Chair of the Committee on Rules said, Because we are the majority.
Mr. Speaker, there are few Members in this House who have worked as
hard and long to improve the budget process and control the deficit, as
has the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm); yet he was denied an
opportunity after his thoughtful and responsible substitute. Three
Republican substitutes were made in order under the rule and 15 other
amendments, but the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Stenholm) was arbitrarily denied.
It seems that every time we get on the floor to do a rule, the other
side talks about how fair and balanced their rule is. Well, there is
nothing fair and balanced about shutting out of the budget reform
debate one of the House's experts on this matter. If one does not
support the Stenholm substitute, one does not have to vote for it, but
at least let it come before the House for a debate in an up-or-down
vote.
I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to vote ``no'' on the
previous question. Let me make it clear that a ``no'' vote will not
stop the House from taking up the Spending Control Act and will not
prevent any of the amendments made in order by the rule from being
offered. However, a ``yes'' vote will preclude the House from
consideration of the Stenholm substitute, a substitute that would add
greatly to this process.
So do the right thing, please vote ``no'' on the previous question.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the
amendment into the Congressional Record immediately prior to the vote
on the previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from New York?
There was no objection.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, again, vote ``no'' on the previous
question.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this is a serious issue, and it is one that needs to be
debated as we can see by the debate that we have had here simply on the
rule. We expect a more vigorous debate as the issues are presented and
as amendments are offered.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question.
[[Page H4906]]
The material previously referred to by Ms. Slaughter is as follows:
Previous Question for H. Res. 692--Rule on H.R. 4663 Spending Control
Act of 2004
At the end of the resolution, add the following:
``Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
resolution the amendment specified in section 3 shall be in
order as though printed after the amendment numbered 17 in
the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by
Representative Stenholm of Texas or a designee. That
amendment shall be debatable for 60 minutes equally divided
and controlled by the proponent and an opponent.
``Sec. 3. The amendment referred to in section 2 is as
follows:
Amendment to H.R. 3973, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Stenholm of Texas, Mr. Matheson of Utah, Mr. Thompson of
California, Mr. Hill of Indiana, Mr. Moore of Kansas, or Mr. Tanner of
Tennessee
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Living Within Our Means Act
of 2004''.
TITLE I--REINSTATING AND STRENGTHENING BUDGET ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 101. EXTENSION OF THE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING CAPS.
(a) Discretionary Spending Limits.--(1) Section 251(c)(2)
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 is amended by inserting a dash after ``2005'', by
redesignating the remaining portion of such paragraph as
subparagraph (D) and by moving it two ems to the right, and
by inserting after the dash the following new subparagraphs:
``(A) for the general purpose discretionary category:
$819,697,000,000 in new budget authority and $862,247,000,000
in outlays;
``(B) for the highway category: $30,585,000,000 in outlays;
and
``(C) for the mass transit category: $1,554,000,000 in new
budget authority and $6,787,000,000 in outlays; and''.
(2) Section 251(c)(3) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting a dash
after ``2006'', by redesignating the remaining portion of
such paragraph as subparagraph (D) and by moving it two ems
to the right, and by inserting after the dash the following
new subparagraphs:
``(A) for the general purpose discretionary category:
$837,271,000,000 in new budget authority and $853,170,000,000
in outlays;
``(B) for the highway category: $33,271,000,000 in outlays;
and
``(C) for the mass transit category: $1,671,000,000 in new
budget authority and $7,585,000,000 in outlays; and''.
(b) Advance Appropriations.--(1) Section 251 of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is
amended by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Advance Appropriations.--In fiscal years 2005 through
2009, the total amount of discretionary advance
appropriations provided in appropriation Acts shall not
exceed $23,158,000. Any amount enacted in excess of such
amount shall be counted against the discretionary spending
limits for the fiscal year for which the appropriation Act
containing the advance appropriation is enacted.''.
(2) Section 250(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(20) The term `advance appropriation' refers to the
following budget accounts or portions thereof that become
available one fiscal year or more beyond the fiscal year for
which the appropriation Act making such funds available is
enacted:
``(A) 89-5428-0-2-0271 (Elk Hills);
``(B) 16-0174-1-504 (Training and Employment Services);
``(C) 91-0900-01-501 (Education for the Disadvantaged);
``(D) 91-1000-01-501 (School Improvement);
``(E) 75-1536-0-1-506 (Children and Family Services (Head
Start));
``(F) 91-0300-0-1-501 (Special Education);
``(G) 91-0400-0-1-501 (Vocational and Adult Education);
``(H) 18-1001-0-1-372 (Payment to the Postal Service Fund);
or
``(I) 86-0319-0-1-604 (Housing Certificate Fund (Section 8
Renewal).''.
(c) Expiration.--Section 275 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 note) is
amended by striking subsection (b).
(b) Definitions.--Section 250(c)(4) of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by--
(A) striking ``the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century and the Surface Transportation Extension Act of
2003'' and inserting ``the Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users''; and
(B) inserting before the period at the end the following
new clauses:
``(v) 69-8158-0-7-401 (Motor Carrier Safety Grants).
``(vi) 69-8159-0-7-401 (Motor Carrier Safety Operations and
Programs).'';
(2) in subparagraph (C), by--
(A) inserting ``(and successor accounts)'' after ``budget
accounts''; and
(B) striking ``the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century and the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2003
or for which appropriations are provided pursuant to
authorizations contained in those Acts (except that
appropriations provided pursuant to section 5338(h) of title
49, United States Code, as amended by the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century, shall not be included in
this category)'' and inserting ``the Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users or for which appropriations are
provided pursuant to authorizations contained in that Act'';
and
(3) in subparagraph (D)(ii), by striking ``section 8103 of
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century'' and
inserting ``section 8103 of the Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users''.
SEC. 102. ADJUSTMENTS TO ALIGN HIGHWAY SPENDING WITH
REVENUES.
Subparagraphs (B) through (E) of section 251(b)(1) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 are
amended to read as follows:
``(B) Adjustment to align highway spending with revenues.--
(i) When the President submits the budget under section 1105
of title 31, United States Code, OMB shall calculate and the
budget shall make adjustments to the highway category for the
budget year and each outyear as provided in clause
(ii)(I)(cc).
``(ii)(I)(aa) OMB shall take the actual level of highway
receipts for the year before the current year and subtract
the sum of the estimated level of highway receipts in
subclause (II) plus any amount previously calculated under
item (bb) for that year.
(bb) OMB shall take the current estimate of highway
receipts for the current year and subtract the estimated
level of receipts for that year.
``(cc) OMB shall add one-half of the sum of the amount
calculated under items (aa) and (bb) to the obligation
limitations set forth in the section 8103 of the
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users and, using
current estimates, calculate the outlay change resulting from
the change in obligations for the budget year and the first
outyear and the outlays flowing therefrom through subsequent
fiscal years. After making the calculations under the
preceding sentence, OMB shall adjust the amount of
obligations set forth in that section for the budget year and
the first outyear by adding one-half of the sum of the amount
calculated under items (aa) and (bb) to each such year.
``(II) The estimated level of highway receipts for the
purposes of this clause are--
``(aa) for fiscal year 2004, $30,572,000,000;
``(bb) for fiscal year 2005, $34,260,000,000;
``(cc) for fiscal year 2006, $35,586,000,000;
``(dd) for fiscal year 2007, $36,570,000,000;
``(ee) for fiscal year 2008, $37,603,000,000; and
``(ff) for fiscal year 2009, $38,651,000,000.
``(III) In this clause, the term `highway receipts' means
the governmental receipts credited to the highway account of
the Highway Trust Fund.
``(C) In addition to the adjustment required by
subparagraph (B), when the President submits the budget under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year
2006, 2007, 2008, or 2009, OMB shall calculate and the budget
shall include for the budget year and each outyear an
adjustment to the limits on outlays for the highway category
and the mass transit category equal to--
``(i) the outlays for the applicable category calculated
assuming obligation levels consistent with the estimates
prepared pursuant to subparagraph (D), as adjusted, using
current technical assumptions; minus
``(ii) the outlays for the applicable category set forth in
the subparagraph (D) estimates, as adjusted.
``(D)(i) When OMB and CBO submit their final sequester
report for fiscal year 2004, that report shall include an
estimate of the outlays for each of the categories that would
result in fiscal years 2005 through 2009 from obligations at
the levels specified in section 8103 of the Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users using current assumptions.
``(ii) When the President submits the budget under section
1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2006,
2007, 2008, or 2009, OMB shall adjust the estimates made in
clause (i) by the adjustments by subparagraphs (B) and (C).
``(E) OMB shall consult with the Committees on the Budget
and include a report on adjustments under subparagraphs (B)
and (C) in the preview report.''.
SEC. 103. LEVEL OF OBLIGATION LIMITATIONS.
(a) Highway Category.--For the purposes of section 251(b)
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, the level of obligation limitations for the highway
category is--
(1) for fiscal year 2004, $34,309,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 2005, $35,671,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2006, $36,719,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2007, $37,800,000,000;
(5) for fiscal year 2008, $38,913,000,000; and
(6) for fiscal year 2009, $40,061,000,000.
(b) Mass Transit Category.--For the purposes of section
251(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985, the level of obligation limitations for the mass
transit category is--
(1) for fiscal year 2004, $7,266,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 2005, $7,750,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2006, $8,266,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2007, $8,816,000,000;
(5) for fiscal year 2008, $9,403,000,000; and
(6) for fiscal year 2009, $10,029,000,000.
For purposes of this subsection, the term ``obligation
limitations'' means the sum of budget authority and
obligation limitations.
[[Page H4907]]
SEC. 104. REVENUE ADJUSTMENT.
If an amendment is designated to be used to offset a
decrease in receipts for a fiscal year pursuant to section
316(c)(1)(D) or section 317(c)(1)(D) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, then the applicable level of revenues for
such fiscal year for purposes of section 311(a) of such Act
shall be reduced by the amount of such amendment.
SEC. 105. EXTENSION OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO REQUIREMENT.
(a) Purpose.--Section 252(a) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by striking
``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.
(b) Sequestration.--Section 252(b)(1) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended
by striking ``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.
SEC. 106. REPORTS.
Subsections (c)(2) and (f)(2)(A) of section 254 of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 are
amended by striking ``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.
SEC. 107 EXPIRATION.
Section 275(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 is amended by striking ``2002'' and
inserting ``2009'' and by striking ``2006'' and inserting
``2013''.
SEC. 108 AUTOMATIC BUDGET ENFORCEMENT FOR MEASURES CONSIDERED
ON THE FLOOR.
(a) In General.--Title III of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Budget evasion points of order
``Sec. 316. (a) Discretionary Spending Caps.--It shall not
be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any
bill or resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference
report on that bill or resolution) that waives or suspends
the enforcement of section 251 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or otherwise would
alter the spending limits set forth in that section.
``(b) Pay-As-You-Go.--It shall not be in order in the House
of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or
resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on
that bill or resolution) that waives or suspends the
enforcement of section 252 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or otherwise would
alter the balances of the pay-as-you-go scorecard pursuant to
that section.
``(c) Directed Scoring.--It shall not be in order in the
House of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill
or resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on
that bill or resolution) that directs the scorekeeping of any
bill or resolution.
``(d) Far-Outyears.--It shall not be in order in the House
of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or
resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on
that bill or resolution) that contains a provision providing
new budget authority or which reduces revenues which first
takes effect after the first five fiscal years covered in the
most recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget and
would have the effect of reducing the surplus or increasing
the deficit in any fiscal year.
``(e) Enforcement in the House of Representatives.--(1) It
shall not be in order in the House of Representatives to
consider a rule or order that waives the application of this
section.
``(2)(A) This subsection shall apply only to the House of
Representatives.
``(B) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of
order under this section must specify the precise language on
which it is premised.
``(C) As disposition of points of order under this section,
the Chair shall put the question of consideration with
respect to the proposition that is the subject of the points
of order.
``(D) A question of consideration under this section shall
be debatable for 10 minutes by each Member initiating a point
of order and for 10 minutes by an opponent on each point of
order, but shall otherwise be decided without intervening
motion except one that the House adjourn or that the
Committee of the Whole rise, as the case may be.
``(E) The disposition of the question of consideration
under this subsection with respect to a bill or joint
resolution shall be considered also to determine the question
of consideration under this subsection with respect to an
amendment made in order as original text.''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting
after the item for section 315 the following:
``Sec. 316. Budget evasion points of order.''.
SEC. 109. REQUIREMENTS FOR BUDGET ACT WAIVERS IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.
(a) Justification for Budget Act Waivers.--Clause 6 of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(h) It shall not be in order to consider any resolution
from the Committee on Rules for the consideration of any
reported bill or joint resolution which waives section 302,
303, 311, or 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
unless the report accompanying such resolution includes a
description of the provision proposed to be waived, an
identification of the section being waived, the reasons why
such waiver should be granted, and an estimated cost of the
provisions to which the waiver applies.''.
(b) Separate Vote to Waive Major Budget Act Point of
Order.--(1) Section 905 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(h)(1) It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives to consider a rule or order that waives the
application of a major budget act point of order as defined
in paragraph (2).
``(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term `major
budget point of order' means any point of order arising under
any section listed in section 904.
``(3)(A) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of
order under the sections referenced in paragraph (2) must
specify the precise language on which it is premised.
``(B) As disposition of points of order under the sections
referenced in paragraph (2), the Chair shall put the question
of consideration with respect to the proposition that is the
subject of the points of order.
``(C) A question of consideration under the sections
referenced in paragraph (2) shall be debatable for 10 minutes
by each Member initiating a point of order and for 10 minutes
by an opponent on each point of order, but shall otherwise be
decided without intervening motion except one that the House
adjourn or that the Committee of the Whole rise, as the case
may be.
``(D) The disposition of the question of consideration
under this subsection with respect to a bill or joint
resolution shall be considered also to determine the question
of consideration under this subsection with respect to an
amendment made in order as original text.''.
SEC. 110. CBO SCORING OF CONFERENCE REPORTS.
(a) The first sentence of section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 is amended as follows:
(1) Insert ``or conference report thereon,'' before ``and
submit''.
(2) In paragraph (1), strike ``bill or resolution'' and
insert ``bill, joint resolution, or conference report''.
(3) At the end of paragraph (2) strike ``and'', at the end
of paragraph (3) strike the period and insert ``; and'', and
after such paragraph (3) add the following new paragraph:
``(4) A determination of whether such bill, joint
resolution, or conference report provides direct spending.''.
(b) The second sentence of section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting before the period
the following: ``, or in the case of a conference report,
shall be included in the joint explanatory statement of
managers accompanying such conference report if timely
submitted before such report is filed''.
TITLE II--INCREASED AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMATION IN CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET PROCESS
SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST COSTS.
Section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
(2 U.S.C. 639(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) containing a projection by the Congressional Budget
Office of the cost of the debt servicing that would be caused
by such measure for such fiscal year (or fiscal years) and
each of the four ensuing fiscal years.''.
SEC. 202. ACCOUNTABILITY IN EMERGENCY SPENDING.
(a) OMB Emergency Criteria.--Section 3 of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(11)(A) The term `emergency' means a situation that--
``(i) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new
budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the
prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or
property, or a threat to national security; and
``(ii) is unanticipated.
``(B) As used in subparagraph (A), the term `unanticipated'
means that the situation is--
``(i) sudden, which means quickly coming into being or not
building up over time;
``(ii) urgent, which means a pressing and compelling need
requiring immediate action;
``(iii) unforeseen, which means not predicted or
anticipated as an emerging need; and
``(iv) temporary, which means not of a permanent
duration.''.
(b) Development of Guidelines for Application of Emergency
Definition.--Not later than five months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the chairmen of the Committees on the
Budget (in consultation with the President) shall, after
consulting with the chairmen of the Committees on
Appropriations and applicable authorizing committees of their
respective Houses and the Directors of the Congressional
Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget,
jointly publish in the Congressional Record guidelines for
application of the definition of emergency set forth in
section 3(11) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974.
(c) Contingency Operations Related to Global War on
Terrorism.--Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by adding at
the end the following new subparagraph:
``(I) Contingency operations related to global war on
terrorism.--If supplemental
[[Page H4908]]
appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted for
contingency operations related to the global war on terrorism
that, pursuant to this subparagraph, the President designates
as a contingency operation related to the global war on
terrorism and the Congress so designates in statute, the
adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations in
discretionary accounts so designated and the outlays flowing
in all fiscal years from such appropriations.''.
(d) Separate House Vote on Emergency Designation.--(1) Rule
XXII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended
by adding at the end the following new clause:
``13. In the consideration of any measure for amendment in
the Committee of the Whole containing any emergency spending
designation, it shall always be in order unless specifically
waived by terms of a rule governing consideration of that
measure, to move to strike such emergency spending
designation from the portion of the bill then open to
amendment.''.
(2) The Committee on Rules shall include in the report
required by clause 1(d) of rule XI (relating to its
activities during the Congress) of the Rules of the House of
Representatives a separate item identifying all waivers of
points of order relating to emergency spending designations,
listed by bill or joint resolution number and the subject
matter of that measure.
(e) Committee Notification of Emergency Legislation.--
Whenever the Committee on Appropriations or any other
committee of either House (including a committee of
conference) reports any bill or joint resolution that
provides budget authority for any emergency, the report
accompanying that bill or joint resolution (or the joint
explanatory statement of managers in the case of a conference
report on any such bill or joint resolution) shall identify
all provisions that provide budget authority and the outlays
flowing therefrom for such emergency and include a statement
of the reasons why such budget authority meets the definition
of an emergency pursuant to the guidelines described in
subsection (b).
SEC. 203. APPLICATION OF BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER TO
UNREPORTED LEGISLATION.
(a) Section 315 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is
amended by striking ``reported'' the first place it appears.
(b) Section 303(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(A)'' and by
redesignating subparagraph (B) as paragraph (2) and by
striking the semicolon at the end of such new paragraph (2)
and inserting a period; and
(2) by striking paragraph (3).
SEC. 204. BUDGET COMPLIANCE STATEMENTS.
Clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following
new subparagraph:
``(4) A budget compliance statement prepared by the
chairman of the Committee on the Budget, if timely submitted
prior to the filing of the report, which shall include
assessment by such chairman as to whether the bill or joint
resolution complies with the requirements of sections 302,
303, 306, 311, and 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 or any other requirements set forth in a concurrent
resolution on the budget and may include the budgetary
implications of that bill or joint resolution under section
251 or 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, as applicable.''.
SEC. 205. PROJECTIONS UNDER SECTION 257.
Section 257(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting after paragraph
(6) the following new paragraph:
``(7) Emergencies.--New budgetary resources designated
under section 251(b)(2)(A) or 251(b)(2)(I) shall not be
assumed beyond the fiscal year for which they have been
enacted.''.
SEC. 206. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE BALANCED BUDGET AND
EMERGENCY DEFICIT CONTROL ACT OF 1985.
Part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 is amended as follows:
(1) In section 250(a), strike ``SEC. 256. GENERAL AND
SPECIAL SEQUESTRATION RULES'' and insert ``Sec. 256. General
and special sequestration rules'' in the item relating to
section 256.
(2) In subparagraphs (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), and (K) of
section 250(c)(4), insert ``subparagraph'' after ``described
in'' each place it appears.
(3) In section 250(c)(18), insert ``of'' after
``expenses''.
(4) In section 251(b)(1)(A), strike ``committees'' the
first place it appears and insert ``Committees''.
(5) In section 251(b)(1)(C)(i), strike ``fiscal years'' and
insert ``fiscal year''.
(6) In section 251(b)(1)(D)(ii), strike ``fiscal years''
and insert ``fiscal year''.
(7) In section 252(b)(2)(B), insert ``the'' before ``budget
year''.
(8) In section 252(c)(1)(C)(i), strike ``paragraph (1)''
and insert ``subsection (b)''.
(9) In section 254(c)(3)(A), strike ``subsection'' and
insert ``section''.
(10) In section 254(f)(4), strike ``subsection'' and insert
``section'' and strike ``sequesterable'' and insert
``sequestrable''.
(11) In section 255(g)(1)(B), move the fourteenth
undesignated clause 2 ems to the right.
(12) In section 255(g)(2), insert ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end of the next-to-last undesignated clause.
(13) In section 255(h)--
(A) strike ``and'' after the semicolon in the ninth
undesignated clause;
(B) insert ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of the
tenth undesignated clause; and
(C) strike the semicolon at the end and insert a period.
(14) In section 256(k)(1), strike ``paragraph (5)'' and
insert ``paragraph (6)''.
(15) In section 257(b)(2)(A)(i), strike ``differenes'' and
insert ``differences''.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of
my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The question is on ordering
the previous question.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this matter will be postponed.
____________________