[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 89 (Thursday, June 24, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H4898-H4908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4663, SPENDING CONTROL ACT OF 2004

  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 692 and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 692

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 4663) to amend part C of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to extend the 
     discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go through 
     fiscal year 2009. The first reading of the bill shall be 
     dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of 
     the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the 
     bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and 
     controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Committee on the Budget. After general debate the bill shall 
     be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The 
     bill shall be considered as read. All points of order against 
     the bill are waived. No amendment to the bill shall be in 
     order except those printed in the report of the Committee on 
     Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may 
     be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be 
     offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
     considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified 
     in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
     and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall 
     not be subject to a demand for division of the question in 
     the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of 
     order against such amendments are waived except that upon 
     adoption of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, only 
     the last amendment printed in the report of the Committee on 
     Rules shall be in order. At the conclusion of consideration 
     of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered 
     on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without 
     intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or 
     without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Hastings) is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate 
only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York 
(Ms. Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is 
for the purpose of debate only.
  (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)

                              {time}  1030

  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 692 is a 
structured rule providing 1 hour of general debate equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee 
on the Budget. The rule waives all points of order against the bill and 
its consideration and makes in order only those amendments printed in 
the Committee on Rules report accompanying the resolution.
  The rule further provides that the amendments printed in the report 
shall be considered only in the order printed in the report, may be 
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered 
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, 
equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an opponent, shall 
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to demand for a 
division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.
  Finally, the rule waives all points of order against the amendments 
printed in the report, except that upon adoption of an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, only the last amendment printed in the report 
shall be in order. The rule provides one motion to recommit with or 
without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, as the only Member of the House serving on both the 
Committee on Rules and the Committee on the Budget, I have become 
increasingly convinced of the need for significant changes in the 
congressional budget process, particularly with respect to the spending 
side of the budget ledger. Enactment of H.R. 4663 would make major 
strides toward providing the House with the tools needed to enforce 
spending discipline in a time of unacceptable high Federal deficits.
  Like many Members, I wish the bill reported went even further, but it 
is an important first step. For that reason, I am pleased that the 
Committee on Rules has made in order a long list of proposed amendments 
to provide the House with multiple opportunities to strengthen the base 
bill.
  At the heart of the bill are proposals to reinstate spending caps on 
discretionary spending, consistent with the

[[Page H4899]]

levels set forth in the budget resolution, and a 2-year extension of 
the pay-as-you-go, or PAYGO, requirements for mandatory spending. It 
should be noted, Mr. Speaker, that this latter provision requires that 
bills increasing entitlement spending must be offset by reductions in 
other spending and not by raising taxes.
  The bill also provides that any breach of either of these spending 
disciplines would result in automatic spending cuts known as 
``sequesters.''
  Finally, the bill takes the responsible approach to the sometimes 
legitimate need for ``emergency'' spending by permitting such measures 
only when they result from circumstances that are truly unanticipated, 
temporary, and are needed for the preservation of life, property, or 
national security. The bill also requires that future spending 
projections no longer assume that these one-time ``emergency'' spending 
levels will continue in future years.
  Mr. Speaker, the congressional budget process was a badly needed 
reform back in 1974; and while it served us well in that time period, 
it can serve us better. This bill is an important step towards that 
goal; and, accordingly, I encourage Members to support both the rule 
and the underlying bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Washington for 
yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  (Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, early this morning the Committee on Rules 
passed a lopsided rule packed with Republican amendments. It is 
shocking that of the 19 amendments made in order, only one Democrat 
amendment and one bipartisan amendment are in order. Senior Democrats 
were shut out, while the rule makes the amendments of junior Members in 
order on the Republican side. The rule provides for one-sided debate on 
H.R. 4663. The House will be allowed to discuss and vote on Republican 
amendments, but Democratic ideas and amendments have been virtually 
excluded in the important debate on budget process reform.
  Mr. Speaker, the question before us is whether or not the current 
budget process creates a product that embodies our budget policies and 
our priorities. The Federal Government has gone from having historic 
surpluses of $5.26 trillion to having historic deficits of $2.3 
trillion. If we are unsatisfied with a budget, are policies or the 
budget process to blame? Should the budget process enforcement 
mechanism be policy neutral or should the process force or enable 
Congress to make policy decisions?
  Earlier this spring, the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget 
Process of the Committee on Rules held a series of hearings on these 
questions. The message that came out of the hearings seemed to be, I 
thought, that the budget process is not at fault. Its structural flaws 
in the budget process did not produce Federal budgets with massive 
debt. Instead, the budgets are products of policy choices. The issue is 
not the mechanisms we employ. The real issue is that people are now 
unhappy with policy choices made over the last 3\1/2\ years. This 
concern is bubbling up as criticism over the budget process, turning 
process, not policy, into the villain.
  Since the adoption of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, many 
reforms have been proposed and tried. Biannual budget, joint budget 
resolution, sequestration, caps on discretionary spending, caps on 
entitlement spending, pay-as-you-go requirements, constitutional 
amendments, and other ideas were part of previous discussions, and 
part, again, of the current budget reform debate. We all know that caps 
on discretionary spending and PAYGO requirements on mandatory spending 
and tax cuts, which is an important point, worked well in the 1990s.
  The underlying legislation is fatally flawed in that it leaves future 
tax cuts unchecked and applies PAYGO only to mandatory spending. The 
historic deficits are in large part the product of the tax cuts, which 
primarily benefit the wealthiest Americans. The Congressional Budget 
Office has said that the $2.3 trillion deficit has been caused by the 
tax cuts and the associated debt services.
  During the second subcommittee hearing, budget expert Stan Collender 
offered this advice: enacting a new budget process without first 
developing the consensus necessary to make it work will be perpetuating 
a political hoax. You will be promising results the process cannot 
possibly deliver, allowing the process to be used to justify policy 
changes that will not otherwise seem appropriate and allowing 
policymakers to hide behind both procedural votes that, at best, will 
be confusing and, at worst, completely indecipherable.
  The body is sharply divided, Mr. Speaker; and there is no consensus 
on budget reform. This debate is not an academic exercise. Changes to 
the process will affect millions of Americans. Caps on mandatory 
spending will dramatically choke vital programs, like Medicare, 
Medicaid, veterans benefits and student loans. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this rule so that all ideas, not just the majority suggestions, 
may be considered and debated.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht), a senior member of the 
Committee on the Budget and a leader in the budget reform process in 
the House.
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  This is an important debate, Mr. Speaker, so I hope that Members are 
paying attention. The real power of the purse rests with us here, in 
the people's House. I am proud of what we did through most of the 
1990s. When we came here, when I was elected in 1994 and came here in 
the spring of 1995, I remember we had some meetings with some of the 
economists and people from the Congressional Budget Office. And we have 
to go back and remember what was happening in America. We were running 
deficits every year of $250 billion and more, and we can all point 
fingers and blame this and blame that; but at the end of the day, we 
were spending more than the taxpayers were sending in, and America 
wanted us to do something about this.
  At one of the meetings we were at, we had some economists saying, if 
Congress does not get serious about balancing the Federal budget, that 
by the time my children got to be my age they would be paying an 
effective tax rate to the Federal Government of over 80 percent, just 
to pay the interest on the national debt.
  Now, I come from a rural district, and I think most folks from rural 
communities understand this, because it really has been part of the 
rural ethic, particularly those who are farm families, to pay off the 
mortgage and leave the kids the farm. What we have been doing is we 
were literally selling the farm and leaving our kids the mortgage. We 
knew that it was not just bad public policy; it was fundamentally 
immoral.
  So what we did is we began to limit the growth in Federal spending, 
and I am proud to report that from 1995 until the year 2000, the 
Federal budget was growing at a slower rate than the average family 
budget. That, combined with a fairly strong economy, we literally went 
from a $250 billion shortfall every year to a $250 billion surplus.
  In fact, just 3 years ago, the Congressional Budget Office told us 
that we could look forward to surpluses in the Federal Treasury over 
the next 10 years of $5.4 trillion. Now, that same Congressional Budget 
Office today is telling us that we can look forward to deficits of $1.6 
trillion over the next 10 years. The only thing we can really say about 
the Congressional Budget Office's forecasts is that they are both 
wrong.
  What we do know that is right is that over the last several years we 
have allowed Federal spending to grow at a rate double what it grew 
through most of the 1990s. And part of the reason that happened is we 
allowed some of the budgetary rules to expire, the things that control 
the growth in Federal spending.
  There was a farmer who told me several years ago, we were talking 
about the deficit, and he said, you know, the problem with you guys in 
Washington

[[Page H4900]]

is you do not quite get it. The problem is not that we are not sending 
enough money to Washington. The problem is you spend it faster than we 
send it in. He probably expressed it more accurately and more simply 
than any of us would like to admit.
  What we want to do today, and this is an important event and these 
are important votes, we want to bring back some of the rules that 
controlled Congress with regard to spending. One of them is PAYGO. That 
means if you want to have a new program, you have to figure out a way 
to pay for it. And I do not think that is too much to ask. The other is 
setting up some spending caps.
  Let me give some ideas why I think that is important. Over the last 
several years, we have passed some pretty good budgets, some very tough 
budgets here in the House of Representatives. Back in fiscal year 2002, 
for example, our budget resolution which we passed here in the House 
called for spending $661 billion in what we call discretionary 
spending. But by the time we were done negotiating with the Senate, we 
ended up spending $734.6 billion. Well, in the next year we said in the 
House budget resolution that we would agree to spend $759 billion in 
discretionary spending. But before the year was over, we actually spent 
$849 billion. Last year, our budget resolution called for spending 
$784.5 billion. But when all the numbers were in and the spending was 
done and the conference committees at last had concluded, the number 
actually was $873 billion.
  Pogo was right. We have met the enemy, and he is us.
  I think there was a certain amount of hubris that, well, we have done 
a pretty good job of balancing the budget over the 5- or 6-year period. 
We had actually paid down over a half trillion dollars of publicly held 
debt, and I think we began to think we did not need these budget rules 
any more. I am here to say that I think we were wrong, and we have to 
get back to some of those rules.
  This is a very important debate. I support this rule. I know there 
will be people who will say, well, we did not get to offer our 
amendment, or this amendment was not made in order. But I think we are 
going to have a very vigorous debate over the next several hours on the 
rule and the bill. Mr. Speaker, I hope later I will have a chance to 
visit more about the rule and the bill.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Minnesota, 
who just noted that between 1995 and 2000 government spending grew more 
slowly than did the economy as a whole and that we, in the process, 
paid off almost $.5 trillion in debt.
  I very much appreciate the endorsement of the economic policies of 
the Clinton administration. It is too bad that those policies were 
reversed by the incumbent administration.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who is the ranking member on the Committee 
on the Budget.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, this is called the Spending Control Act of 
2004. The last time I looked, the Republicans control the House, 
Republicans control the Senate, and Republicans control the White 
House. So it begs the question, why can they not control spending? Why 
do we need this piece of legislation to control spending?
  As one looks at the bill and asks that question, another question 
arises: Why does this bill have nothing to do with revenues? Basically 
what this bill would do is affect discretionary spending for 2 years, 
not 5, and put in place a PAYGO rule, a pay as you go rule which 
applied to mandatory spending, entitlement spending increases but not 
to tax reductions.
  Do we disagree on the problem before us? Absolutely not. We have got 
a problem. The best evidence of the problem was signaled this week when 
we had a defense appropriations bill in which was buried a provision 
that will increase the debt ceiling over the next several years by a 
substantial sum of money.
  Let us look first at what has happened over the last several years on 
the watch of the Bush administration with respect to the debt that we 
have accumulated, the mountainous debt that we are building up now. The 
best indicator of that is where does the debt ceiling stand? There is a 
statutory ceiling on the amount of debt we can incur. When President 
Bush came to office, it was $5.95 trillion. Within a year, he had to 
increase that by $450 billion. Last year he had to increase it by, get 
this, $984 billion. The other day they increased it by $650 billion, to 
$8.74 trillion once it finally passes the Congress.
  That is the record of the last 4 years, three increases in the debt 
ceiling in 4 years, from $5.9 trillion to $8 trillion and this is the 
bad news: It does not stop here. The Congressional Budget Office tells 
us looking at the President's budget out over the next 10 years, as 
they are required by law to do, that if we follow the policies laid 
down by the Bush administration, the debt of this country will grow in 
2014 to $13.6 trillion. That is where the debt ceiling will have to be 
taken in order to accommodate their fiscal policies.
  What does this bill propose with respect to this problem? As it turns 
out, very, very little. Before going any further, it is worth reminding 
everybody what happened in the 1990s. It can be done. If you put your 
shoulder to the wheel and the President supports it and the leadership 
of the Congress supports it, we can bring the deficit to heel. We did 
it in the 1990s. We went from a deficit of $290 billion at the end of 
fiscal year 1992 to a surplus of $236 billion in 1998. Just as a 
reminder from 1997 to 2000 on the watch of the Clinton administration, 
we reduced the debt of this country by $362 billion. If you added 
fiscal year 2001, which was basically the Clinton budget, we reduced 
the debt by more than $400 billion. What a fiscal reversal we have seen 
in the last 4 years.
  What does this bill propose to do? Essentially it proposes to clamp 
down on that wedge of the budget called domestic non-homeland 
discretionary spending. That is, discretionary spending from which we 
have backed out international spending and from which we have backed 
out homeland security, because in both of those categories, they 
foresee substantial increases, but they are going to bring all the 
force of their efforts to bear on this wedge of the budget which 
constitutes 16 percent of the budget.
  Let us ask the question, is this where the problem arises, in this 
segment called domestic non-homeland discretionary spending? This is 
what has happened over the last three fiscal years to that particular 
account: $383 billion in 2002, $382 billion in 2003, $383 billion in 
2004. The problem does not arise here. But this is where they go for a 
solution. On the other hand, look what the solution is. The President 
proposes to take domestic non-homeland security resources down to $376 
in 2005. That is a reduction of $7 billion. Actually it is hard to do 
but in truth, we have got a deficit this year of between $400 billion 
and $500 billion, you have only dented the problem once you have done 
it.
  This is where the problem lies. If you want to look at spending, 
which this bill does not do, over the last 4 fiscal years, 90 to 95 
percent of the increase in discretionary spending has occurred in 
defense, homeland security and our response to 9/11. But this bill 
ignores that particular aspect of the problem. And where is the rest of 
the problem? When the Bush administration held their tax cuts out to us 
and when they were passed, they told us this is the path that revenues 
will follow, between $1 trillion and $1.1 trillion. This is where 
revenues, income taxes, have actually gone over that period of time, 
largely responsible to their tax cuts.
  And this is what has happened to spending generally. Spending 
generally has gone up in the Bush administration. Revenues have gone 
down. Spending, however, is still as we can see from this chart below 
the historic norm for the last 25 years. Revenues, on the other hand, 
are at an all-time low. Personal income taxes as a percentage of GDP 
are at their lowest level since the early 1950s. So revenues are low, 
spending is high, and this bill unfortunately

[[Page H4901]]

does nothing about the problem at hand.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I want to respond to some of the things 
that our colleague the gentleman from South Carolina has just said. 
Much of what he said, I do not disagree with. But there is something I 
think we need to clarify for all of the Members. Even if we had a 
balanced budget last year and this year, we would have to raise the 
debt ceiling. That is something I think it is hard for many Members and 
frankly I think most Americans. They wonder how in the world can that 
be. It is kind of a complicated thing to explain but even in a very 
strong economy with surpluses, we would probably have to raise the debt 
ceiling. The reason is this. When money comes into the Social Security 
trust fund, there are only two things they can do. They can either pay 
benefits or they can buy government bonds. When they buy government 
bonds they in effect drive up the debt. I know that is hard for people 
to understand, so yes, we are going to have to raise the debt ceiling, 
but even if we were balancing the budget we would have to do that.
  I would also like to at least remind Members that things did change a 
lot in this country on September 11, 2001. I think we all know that. We 
all have to be cognizant of that and it has changed the priorities of 
how we spend money. Is that an excuse to allow other Federal spending 
to be going up? No. And have we been a little too profligate with the 
Defense Department and homeland security? My opinion would be yes. We 
have allowed our emotions to get the better of us and we have just 
said, we will spend more money and maybe we will be safer. I am not 
sure that is the answer. I am not sure that having 50 guards at every 
airport entrance makes us all that much safer and that is an argument 
and a debate we should have.
  The debate today is how much are we going to allow Federal spending 
to go up, and is there really a good reason to allow the Federal budget 
to grow at a rate twice the rate of the average family budget?
  The numbers we were talking about, from 1995 until 2000, the Federal 
budget went up at an average rate of about 3.2 percent. Since that 
time, we have allowed the Federal budget to grow at a rate of 6.4 
percent. That assumes that we will enforce the numbers that we passed 
in this year's House budget resolution and that is really what we are 
debating today; that is, it is one thing to pass a budget, it is 
another thing to make certain that we enforce the budget.
  There will be two great issues we are going to discuss today that I 
think are important. First of all, are we going to enforce the budgets 
that we pass here in the House of Representatives? We are the keepers 
of the public purse. I think we ought to enforce that budget. The 
second thing we are going to debate today is changing the process by 
which we derive a budget. The process today all leans towards more 
spending. In fact, I think the Wall Street Journal did a beautiful 
editorial last week which really underscored that point. Everything we 
do here, and frankly that is what we do, is we spend the public's 
money, but all of the rules today tend to make it easier to spend more 
money. What we want to do is level the rules so that at least we have a 
counterbalance to all of that pressure to spend more money.
  I might just say this. We all have different reasons, and some say it 
is the tax cuts, but I would remind people that we cut taxes in almost 
every year during the 1990s, and we did it under PAYGO and spending cap 
rules. It can be done. We just have to find offsets for those. And we 
did. In fact, most of the supplemental spending bills that we passed we 
found offsets for those. It can be done. It means making some tough 
choices, but I always remind my colleagues, our constituents did not 
send us here just to make the easy choices. They sent us here to make 
tough choices. We are going to make some tough choices today in terms 
of whether we really mean what we say about holding the line on Federal 
spending and whether or not we are going to level the playing field in 
terms of the rules by which we make our budgets. This is an important 
debate.
  The debate about raising the debt ceiling is clearly an important 
debate, but I think we have to be clear. Even if we had a balanced 
budget, because of the surpluses coming in in the Social Security trust 
fund, we would still have to raise the debt ceiling.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor very disappointed 
because once again the majority has chosen not to allow the Blue Dogs 
to have our amendment considered. I would like to ask the gentleman 
from Washington, why did his committee allow 19 amendments, most of 
which should be offered by the minority party, but are being offered by 
the majority party? Why did he not allow the Blue Dogs to have 5 
minutes, 10 minutes, a simple up and down vote on our proposal?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. As the gentleman knows, I would respond to my friend from 
Texas, our committee has to make a lot of difficult decisions sometimes 
with the number of amendments that are brought in. Sometimes we have to 
make choices that are going to disappoint some Members. My friend from 
Texas has been here, and I confess that maybe he has been disappointed 
more than once.
  Mr. STENHOLM. I take back my time from the gentleman. I appreciate 
the honesty in which he comes forward and with a straight face attempts 
to say why they denied us a chance. They can find time for 19 
amendments, most of which are a joke. The rhetoric sounds good. The 
gentleman from Minnesota just spoke, there is a lot he and I can work 
together on. What we offered in our amendment is a chance to work 
together on something, but we are constantly denied and why? Because if 
they allowed our amendment on the floor, there is bipartisan support 
for it and it might have a chance to pass.
  Any resemblance to democracy in this House is purely coincidental 
with the running of it by the current leadership in the House. Purely 
coincidental. I ask my colleague why they denied our amendment but 
allowed 19 others. We heard the answer.
  The rule before us presents us with a false choice. Let me remind 
everyone, Republicans control the House, Republicans control the 
Senate, Republicans control the White House. The only thing Republicans 
cannot control is spending. Spending has gone up more in the last 3 
years than in the previous 8. And when you talk about spending, I have 
been here 25 years. Spending has gone down by one-half of 1 percent as 
a percent of gross domestic product since I was elected in 1978. 
Revenue has gone down by 5 percent. That creates the deficits. I agree 
with the gentleman who just spoke a moment ago. Raising the debt 
ceiling would have to be done. But we should never raise it without 
putting a change in the manner in which our economic program is working 
that will just continue to have the debt ceiling going on as far as the 
eye can see. That makes no sense.
  Some of us would like to work with you but we are constantly denied 
the opportunity to come before this body and have a vote. What we asked 
for is pay as you go that applies to both spending and to revenue. If 
you are going to spend more, you have got to cut someplace else. We 
agree with the President, President George W. Bush's spending limits 
for 2 years. We agree. There is no argument on spending. But there is 
an argument on deficits. And with all due respect, if you want to cut 
taxes, you have got to cut spending. Do not just talk about it. Do not 
just come and make the speeches we are going to hear all day today 
about how tough we are going to be on spending. You are in the 
majority. Anybody offering some of those amendments you are offering, 
you ought to be doing it. Nobody is keeping you from doing it. You have 
got the votes. You can do anything you want if you have got the votes. 
But what do you do?

[[Page H4902]]

  You bring 19 amendments to the floor that you used to offer when you 
were in the minority party, and I agreed with you. I agreed with you on 
many of those. But now you are in the majority and I disagree with the 
manner in which you are running this House. But that is a right of the 
majority. All we asked for is a chance to have our idea debated and 
through the wisdom of, oh, well, you are going to disappoint some from 
time to time, there are folks on your side that agree with us and you 
deny them the right to vote with us.

                              {time}  1100

  That is shameful. Applying pay-as-you-go rules to tax cuts does not 
prevent Congress from cutting taxes, and do not say that over here. You 
know it is not true. It makes great sense, pleases a lot of folks, I 
suppose. But all it says is if we are going to reduce our revenues, we 
need to reduce spending by the same amount. Do it. Do not just come to 
this floor and spend 12 hours debating some of the silliest amendments 
that we could have if you are serious about doing something. If we 
really want to do it, let us do it like we did in 1990, like we did in 
1997, when we had bipartisan support for doing something about the 
deficit.
  The hand is still here on this side. I wish somebody over there would 
take it just once before this year is over.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), a member of the Committee on Ways 
and Means.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time.
  And I would like to say to the last speaker the hand was reached out 
on an amendment and the last speaker took the hand and that is why he 
and I have an amendment on the floor today on a very important item. So 
while all the minority's amendments were not made in order, there are a 
couple of amendments that were bipartisan that he and I have. And I 
hope that he does not count among the silly amendments the one that he 
and I have.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding, and 
I appreciate that fact, and I do not consider all of the amendments 
silly. I consider some of them very silly, but the one that I am 
agreeing with him on I do not consider silly.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate 
the clarification.
  Mr. Speaker, let me frame what this is all about. What are we doing 
here today? What we are trying to accomplish here today is to clean up 
this silly budget process we have here in Washington. All of us have 
different ideas on how to fix this system.
  There are some differences in philosophies. We heard the gentleman 
talking about the PAYGO, their version of PAYGO, our version of PAYGO, 
that the basis of that philosophical difference is we do not believe 
fiscal discipline in Washington should come from tax increases. We 
believe fiscal discipline in Washington should come from spending cuts. 
And when we have the PAYGO system, much like what we have had in the 
past, history already shows that it puts a bias in the law for tax 
increases, not spending cuts.
  So what we want to accomplish, because we believe this, we want the 
discipline, we want the inertia, we want the pressure to be on 
controlling spending, not raising taxes. There is the big philosophy 
difference.
  But going down the road of the system we have here in Washington, Mr. 
Speaker, I would argue that we have this thing in place since 1974; and 
since 1974, Washington has had a horrible record of getting its handle 
on our budgets, when Republicans ran things and when Democrats ran 
things. For a while in the 1990s, we did a pretty good job, but since 
then we have not; and I would argue that.
  We are doing well in many years, but when we look at a system, for 
example, that allows some appropriations to come to the floor, say, 
adding $50 million for a rain forest museum in Coraville, Iowa, and if 
we want to come to this floor and pass an amendment so that we can do 
so on behalf of our taxpayer constituents to say I do not think we 
should pay $50 million for a rain forest museum in Coraville, Iowa, I 
have an amendment to strike that proposal. We could pass that 
amendment. But by the rules of this institution from the 1974 Budget 
Act, that $50 million would have to be re-spent somewhere else in the 
Federal Government. It could not be saved. That is ridiculous. That is 
just one example of how crazy this budget system is that we have today.
  Another crazy example of these rules is when we pass budgets, and we 
really work hard on passing these budget resolutions, as soon as we 
pass these budget resolutions, they amount to nothing more than mere 
guidelines. They are not actual, enforceable budgets. They do not take 
the force of law.
  What we propose today, through an amendment and through a couple of 
substitutes, is that when we actually pass a budget here, it means 
something. We stick to it. We enforce it. It is honest. It is going to 
work. It is going to happen. That is not what happens today.
  So we want to have a budget process that is done at the beginning of 
the budget process where the President signs it into law, and because 
the budget becomes law, it therefore is enforceable so that we can make 
sure we stick to the budget, that we plan the finances of this country 
so that we can factor in all the things we need to think about: the 
level of taxation, the level of debt, the deficits, getting ready for 
the baby boomer retirement, all of those things so that when we 
actually pass a budget, it works and it is enforceable. These are not 
really crazy ideas. These are commonsense ideas to bring common sense 
to a budget system that is broken.
  I would challenge anyone to come to the floor and argue on behalf of 
this current budget system to say that this is the epitome of common 
sense, that this thing works right as it should. We have not changed 
this system since 1974. It is high time we changed it. We are going to 
have a lot of amendments to try to do that. We are going to have some 
big substitute votes on big bills to do that. This is the product of a 
collaborative work. It is a product of Democrats and Republicans. It is 
a product that needs to come to this floor. It is a product that needs 
to pass into law so that we bring common sense back to our budget 
process.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).
  Mr. EMANUEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Rochester for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the Democratic substitute.
  It would have made incredible common sense to deal with the budget 
reform before voting on the budget. But that kind of common sense 
regularly escapes the majority, and that is why there has been a 4-
month impasse on their budget between the two Chambers, their party.
  The truth is this Congress has been on a recess on dealing with the 
crisis that is facing the American people for the last year dealing 
with health care costs, college costs, and retirement savings problems. 
You are scared to be honest with the American people about the fact 
that you have been on a recess. But given how they feel about this 
Congress and given the fact that they have given you a failing grade so 
far, none of these Hail Mary passes is going to confuse them about 
where you are and what you have done in addressing their health care 
crisis, their college education crisis, and their savings crisis.
  This bill ignores the advice of Chairman Greenspan, who said it would 
be a grave mistake to let go of the PAYGO budget rules. This bill even 
ignores the advice of the gentleman from Iowa, chairman of the 
Committee on the Budget, who said just 2 years ago the PAYGO rules 
contributed to obtaining the deficits. The chairman voted for those 
rules in 1997. That vote ensured that we made choices, lived within our 
means, and were accountable for what we do. Maybe with maturity over 
the last 2 years, he has decided to change his view on that. It is 
possible. Or maybe like the rest of us, he got the disease that is 
rampant in Washington

[[Page H4903]]

where one is firm in one's opinions, but very flexible on one's 
principles. That is a possibility too.
  The 1990s were good economic times. We created 22 million jobs, 
raised income for all levels, had more access for the uninsured to 
health care. College was more accessible to more Americans, and savings 
were up. We balanced the budget and accumulated surpluses reaching 
nearly $300 billion. And what we did not do was say that every tax cut 
is good or every tax cut is bad. We made choices. We made choices on 
spending.
  In the 1993 budget, we cut taxes for the middle class, and we also 
reduced spending. In 1997 we cut taxes for people earning $100,000 and, 
yes, gave them the first-ever $500-per-child tax cut. And we made 
choices by investing in children's health care, investing in the 
environment, investing in Medicaid, and also investing in people's 
retirement and strengthening our Social Security system.
  But your economic plan has led to $3 trillion in additional debt, an 
annual budget deficit of $500 billion, 44 million Americans without 
health insurance, 2 million more middle-class families who have moved 
from the middle class to poverty, and the highest rate of foreclosures 
in the last 3 years on personal bankruptcy. You have turned your back 
on what worked in the 1990s.
  And let me add one additional point. The majority party in the 1990 
budget did not vote for it. It took Democratic votes that put us on the 
path to fiscal discipline. The majority party in 1993 contributed not a 
single vote that built on the 1990 agreement that also reduced the 
deficit and put us on the path to a balanced budget. You did not become 
a player in deficit discipline until 1997 with that agreement, which 
was the last yard.
  So let us not rewrite history here. Some of us do not have a foggy 
memory of what happened in the 1990 agreement, the 1993 agreement. We 
made choices and difficult choices, and some sat on the sidelines and 
were really good critics.
  Mr. Speaker, this so-called budget process bill says hands off when 
it comes to making the tough choices, and it says that we do not have 
the political courage to make those choices.
  We must make choices when it comes to tax cuts and spending and be 
honest with the American people, but it takes both to deal with putting 
our fiscal house back in order.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling), a member of the Committee on the 
Budget and also a leader on budget reform.
  (Mr. HENSARLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  I think this is an incredibly important debate that this House needs 
to have today. Not only is it a critically important debate to have; 
but, frankly, it reduces itself down to a very simple debate to have. 
Simple perhaps, not easy.
  The simple proposition is this: Do we believe there should be any 
limit to government? It is a very simple proposition. Do we believe 
that there should be any limit to government whatsoever?
  Many in this body do not believe it. Many do, however. Many know the 
struggles and challenges that families face. Some of us believe that it 
is time to protect the family budget from the Federal budget.
  Since I have been alive, the Federal budget has grown seven times 
faster than the family budget when measured by median worker income. 
Seven times faster. I believe that is an unsustainable and 
unconscionable growth rate.
  The government is now spending over $20,000 per American household 
for only the fourth time in the entire history of our Nation and for 
the first time since World War II. That figure is up from $16,000 per 
household just 5 short years ago, just 5 short years ago. This 
represents the largest expansion of the Federal Government in 50 years. 
At what point do we say enough is enough? I know the Founding Fathers 
believed in limited government. The question is do we believe in 
limited government?
  There is going to be a bill. There are going to be a number of 
substitutes. There are going to be a number of amendments. But all of 
them are going to reduce down to two simple propositions: Should the 
family budget be protected from the Federal budget? Do we believe in 
limited government? And second of all, once we pass a budget, will we 
abide by that budget? Will we live by that budget like American 
families do each and every day? Because we cannot have unlimited 
government and unlimited opportunity.
  Many of us believe strongly that we must have unlimited opportunity. 
It would be wonderful if all of this government spending magically 
turned into love and happiness and kindness; and, indeed, there is much 
great work done by the Federal Government. But, indeed, there is also 
much waste and much fraud and much abuse and much duplication. And I 
fear until we limit, limit, the growth of government, that this body 
will not take the steps necessary to protect the family budget from the 
Federal budget and root this out.
  Up until recently, Medicare would routinely pay three, four, five 
times as much for a wheelchair as the VA did and had for years. Why? 
Because one would competitively bid and the other would not. The 
Department of the Interior maintains approximately 31,000 Web sites, 
almost one for every two employees. Does this meet the reasonableness 
test? I do not believe so.
  In the last year of the Clinton administration, HUD spent over 10 
percent of their budget, $3 billion, paying out payments to people who 
did not even qualify for the program. We spent over $800,000 for one 
toilet in one national park, and it did not even work.
  My point is we are just scratching the surface here. When we begin to 
look at the 10,000 Federal programs spread across 500, 600 government 
agencies, we discover that they routinely waste 5, 10, 15, perhaps 20, 
percent of their taxpayer-funded budgets and have for years.
  This money is not free. It is not ours. It belongs to the families of 
America. And when we take it away from their kitchen tables to fund our 
programs, what are we taking away from them? Maybe the opportunity for 
them to buy a computer, a home computer, to further the education of 
their children. Maybe it is that first downpayment on a home. Maybe it 
is a couple months of child care.
  We must limit the size, the scope, the power, and the expense of the 
Federal Government. And this is what this legislation is all about. So 
no matter how many different ways people try to obfuscate it and try to 
make it confusing and cumbersome, it boils down to one simple 
proposition: Do we believe in limited government, or do we not believe 
in limited government? And that is why we need this rule for this very 
critical debate to go forward.
  I know, from listening to the debate on the other side, what we will 
hear all day. We will hear about Draconian cuts in the budget. As I 
read the legislation, government is still going to grow under every 
single amendment. Government will still grow. All we are saying is that 
maybe, just maybe, the government budget should not grow faster than 
the family budget.
  And we hear so much about how tax relief is causing these massive 
deficits.

                              {time}  1115

  Well, it is interesting, when we actually look at the numbers, and 
last year's budget, which was a 10-year budget, we had almost $27 
trillion of spending compared to $350 billion of tax relief. Now, if we 
buy into the opposition's argument, that tax relief represents a 
government expenditure, if we do the math, we figure out that the tax 
relief is roughly 1.5 percent of the spending. We could take it all the 
way and make no dent in the challenge whatsoever.
  I continue to be perplexed why people who talk so much about their 
concern for the deficit will focus all of their rhetoric on 1 percent 
of the challenge and ignore 99 percent of the challenge, which is on 
the spending side. And, by the way, tax relief is proven to be part of 
the solution and not part of the problem.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Fattah).
  Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this 
time.

[[Page H4904]]

  If the American people want to buy more of what we just heard, they 
are going to get a chance in November. But if they want to really think 
about the fiscal future of this country, then think about how we have 
moved from hundreds of billions of surpluses to hundreds of billions of 
deficits. Think about what Treasury Secretary O'Neill said in his book 
when he raised the concern about this deficit spending by the majority 
and by the Republican party.
  He said that Vice President Cheney said, oh, do not worry about 
deficits. It did not hamper Reagan, when we quadrupled the national 
debt. Now we are raising the debt limit 3 times, up to $8 trillion, so 
that our children and our grandchildren will have to pay for the cost 
of our expenditures.
  And he said well, we do not want to have PAYGO affect tax cuts, we 
just want it on the spending side because it is philosophical. Well, it 
was philosophical about whether the earth was flat or not, or round. 
The facts are stubborn things, Reagan said, and I remember that. 
Because when we think about the real facts: 44 million Americans 
without health insurance, millions without jobs, a 50-year high on 
mortgage foreclosures, an historic high the third year in a row on 
personal bankruptcies.
  This majority has controlled spending and tax cuts for the last 10 
years. They come on the floor and want to blame it on what they 
affectionately refer to as ``the other side.'' Where is the willingness 
to be accountable, to take responsibility for their own actions?
  The majority has decided to take this country on a course of fiscal 
irresponsibility. What we need to really think about now is whether we 
want to continue to go in that direction, whether we want to continue 
to have future generations having to pay for the choices we are making 
today, or whether we are prepared to pay for our own choices.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
  (Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I come over here with a degree of sadness, 
because the rule prohibits the consideration of the Blue Dog substitute 
on budget enforcement.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) made a speech a while ago 
that I could not say any better about why the Blue Dog budget 
enforcement ought to be passed. My other young friend talked about 
spending. If we want to talk about wasteful spending, let me just talk 
about it for a second.
  In July of 2002, the debt ceiling in this country was raised $450 
billion. On Memorial Day weekend last year, it was raised another $980 
billion. The other night in the defense bill, we had to raise it again, 
$650-plus. In the last 3 years, the debt of this country, the debt 
ceiling has been raised over $2 trillion. At 5 percent interest, what 
we have done following this economic game plan is raise taxes $100 
billion a year every year, and my Republican colleagues want to talk 
about wasteful spending. I can think of nothing more wasteful than 
interest, because we get no health care, no military, no education, no 
nothing.
  But it is even worse than that. Years ago, when we heard about the 
GDP, percentage of GDP and the deficit, they said, do not worry about 
it. Do my colleagues know who was buying our debt then? Americans. Do 
my colleagues know who is financing our debt now? Seventy percent of 
our debt last year was financed by foreign interests.
  I am telling all of my colleagues, sooner or later, the hocking of 
this country to anybody in the world that will buy our paper is going 
to, if it is not already, become a national security issue. We are 
going to not only do a generational mugging on our children and 
grandchildren by what we are doing here now, but we are going to put 
future policymakers in a position where there will be leverage on them 
by foreign powers who do not see the world the same way the United 
States does in such a way that it is going to be a national security 
problem for them.
  I can think of no other better way to control spending than to apply 
PAYGO to tax cuts. Do my colleagues know why? Because then, when we cut 
taxes, we have to cut spending. Now, we cut taxes, and I voted for some 
of them, but we did not cut spending. Spending keeps going up. If we 
are really serious about cutting spending, apply pay-go to both. Then 
we will have to cut spending when we cut taxes, and that is what the 
Blue Dog budget enforcement has in it. Without that, all we are hearing 
is rhetoric, rhetoric, rhetoric.
  It has not worked. It will not work. And I tell my colleagues, when 
the American people find out what is going on here, I think they are 
going to be not only disappointed, but appalled.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to some of the 
things that were just said.
  First of all, I happen to believe that PAYGO rules ought to apply to 
tax cuts, too. But this is all about the politics of the possible, and 
we cannot get that done this year. So we can take this step this year, 
this day to begin to constrain Federal spending.
  Let me also respond to something else. Our friends on the left cannot 
have it both ways. They cannot say, well, we need to invest in this 
program and that program and this program for people, and if we put 
more money into education, the argument is we will get it back ten-
fold, but we do not want to pay any interest on that money. We cannot 
have it both ways. Fifty-five percent of what we will spend this year 
will be for what are called entitlement programs, and many of those 
entitlement programs were sold as investments in people. Now we are 
being told, but we get no return on that investment. This is just an 
expenditure, and it is lost forever.
  So as we debate this, I know that people are going to come at this 
from different perspectives, but let us try to at least be honest with 
ourselves. We have a system right now, and the rules and the way the 
system works encourages more and more spending.
  The debate today simply is about this: are we going to enforce the 
budgets that we pass here in the House and are we going to change the 
rules to give the taxpayers an even break? That is what the debate is 
about today. We can debate all of those other issues some other day. 
But we need support on both sides of the aisle to make certain that the 
American people understand that we are going to enforce the budgets we 
pass in the House.
  We are the keepers of the public purse. We are going to enforce those 
budgets, and we are going to begin to amend the rules to make it more 
difficult to spend more than we take in.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
this time.
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, back in 1990, Congress instituted the pay-
as-you-go rules with bipartisan support, including the support of the 
first President Bush. However, those rules were based on the principle 
that if you are digging yourself deeper into a hole, the first thing 
you do is stop digging. And the 1990 rules which required that both 
mandatory spending increases and tax cuts be offset helped keep the 
deficit hole from getting deeper, and eventually helped produce record 
budget surpluses.
  Unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle evidently 
have completely forgotten this sound concept. The Republican bill we 
debate here today is a deeply flawed and ineffective version of the 
earlier pay-as-you-go requirements. Specifically, this legislation lets 
the Congress keep digging deeper to make the deficit bigger. By 
covering only mandatory spending, tax cuts would not have to be paid 
for, and entitlement increases would ultimately have to be paid for by 
cutting other entitlements. That is Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid. In essence, this is the way in which they mask the 
dismantling of entitlement priorities.

[[Page H4905]]

  In addition, the measured spending caps would be set at 
unrealistically low levels, which would lead either to devastating cuts 
in domestic spending, in education, in health care, in research, or, to 
the ignoring of the caps. Record deficits are not due to discretionary 
spending. If we eliminated all nondefense discretionary spending, we 
would not eliminate the anticipated fiscal year budget deficit of $478 
billion, all nondefense discretionary spending. Forget about it. 
Eliminate it all. We still would not take care of the deficit.
  So since most Federal benefits for low and middle class people are 
provided through entitlement programs, and most government subsidies 
for high-income individuals and corporations are in the Tax Code, this 
measure would then turn the policy practice on its head in favor of the 
affluent and against the low and middle income families of this 
country.
  The bill was designed so that the new spending caps would be set at 
discretionary spending levels contained in the conference report on the 
budget resolution, which calls for cutting domestic discretionary 
programs outside of homeland security by $77 billion over the next 5 
years.
  Unlike the caps imposed in the 1990s, the new caps require much 
deeper cuts and would not be part of a balanced deficit reduction 
package that puts every part of the budget, every part of the budget on 
the table and calls for shared sacrifice.
  Finally, on this rule, Republicans clearly are afraid of the views 
expressed on this side of the aisle that everything must be on the 
table when there are 19 amendments and 17 are Republican, and leading 
democratic voices who are known in this Congress are not given the 
opportunity to present on these issues. It is shameful. The rule needs 
to be voted down, as does the bill.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 4 
minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am going to vote for this rule, 
but I do not support it. I do not think it is a good rule. I want to 
explain in just the couple of minutes that I have why that is the case.
  First, I think I should make it known, especially to Members on my 
side of the aisle who have heard recently that I have been opposing 
budgetary caps, that that is not true. I do not oppose caps on the 
budget. To the contrary, my colleagues have heard me here on the floor 
many times saying that I need a budget. I cannot help it that the 
budget committees cannot get together and give us a real budget, but I 
need a budget to have discipline in the committee when there are 
amendments on the floor to raise spending by billions of dollars. So I 
need a budget with a budget cap.
  However, I will not support statutory budget caps. This rule provides 
for a bill that provides for statutory budget caps. The reason I will 
not support statutory budget caps is very simple. It goes beyond 
politics, it goes beyond the House and the Senate. It is the 
Constitution of the United States that has established checks and 
balances by separation of powers. The budget process is the 
responsibility and the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United 
States. Statutory budget caps put the executive branch into the mix. We 
would be hearing from OMB on a daily basis that they cannot accept this 
or they cannot accept that; that you are going to have to do it our 
way, or we will not sign the bill. That is what statutory budget caps 
are going to do to this process.
  The current process is already unworkable. We need real budget 
process reform, but we need budget process reform that is going to 
work. And the budget process that we are working under today does not 
work.

                              {time}  1130

  We do not have a budget, and that is an example that the current 
process does not work. But let me say this: when we have had a real 
budget resolution, the Committee on Appropriations stays within their 
cap. Discretionary spending has not exceeded the budget caps since this 
gentleman has been chairman of the committee.
  Where Congress ought to be looking is mandatory programs, because 
mandatory spending, which is basically two-thirds of all government 
spending, is the spending that runs us deeper into debt every year.
  So I do not think the bill that this rule provides consideration for 
is a good bill. And I do not intend to support the bill. But I am going 
to vote for this rule, although I do not really agree with what it 
does. But in order to get the bill on the floor so the House can work 
its will, I will vote for the rule, but not for this bill.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote ``no'' on the previous question. 
If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to the 
rule that will allow the House to vote on an important substitute 
amendment that was not allowed under the rule.
  This substitute by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm), the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Matheson), the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Thompson), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hill), the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Moore), and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner) would 
reinstate for 2 years the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act.
  It also provides for pay-as-you-go rules for legislation that 
increases the deficit, sets discretionary spending limits, and calls 
for a separate vote to consider legislation that would increase those 
discretionary spending limits or waive the PAYGO requirement.
  It is certainly worthy of discussion and a vote in this debate on the 
House budget process. Unfortunately, the Republican leadership blocked 
this amendment, and it was voted down in the Committee on Rules early 
this morning on a straight party-line vote.
  When asked why so few or no Democrat amendments were allowed, the 
Chair of the Committee on Rules said, Because we are the majority.
  Mr. Speaker, there are few Members in this House who have worked as 
hard and long to improve the budget process and control the deficit, as 
has the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm); yet he was denied an 
opportunity after his thoughtful and responsible substitute. Three 
Republican substitutes were made in order under the rule and 15 other 
amendments, but the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Stenholm) was arbitrarily denied.
  It seems that every time we get on the floor to do a rule, the other 
side talks about how fair and balanced their rule is. Well, there is 
nothing fair and balanced about shutting out of the budget reform 
debate one of the House's experts on this matter. If one does not 
support the Stenholm substitute, one does not have to vote for it, but 
at least let it come before the House for a debate in an up-or-down 
vote.
  I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to vote ``no'' on the 
previous question. Let me make it clear that a ``no'' vote will not 
stop the House from taking up the Spending Control Act and will not 
prevent any of the amendments made in order by the rule from being 
offered. However, a ``yes'' vote will preclude the House from 
consideration of the Stenholm substitute, a substitute that would add 
greatly to this process.
  So do the right thing, please vote ``no'' on the previous question. 
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the 
amendment into the Congressional Record immediately prior to the vote 
on the previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, again, vote ``no'' on the previous 
question.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a serious issue, and it is one that needs to be 
debated as we can see by the debate that we have had here simply on the 
rule. We expect a more vigorous debate as the issues are presented and 
as amendments are offered.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question.

[[Page H4906]]

  The material previously referred to by Ms. Slaughter is as follows:

 Previous Question for H. Res. 692--Rule on H.R. 4663 Spending Control 
                              Act of 2004

       At the end of the resolution, add the following:
       ``Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     resolution the amendment specified in section 3 shall be in 
     order as though printed after the amendment numbered 17 in 
     the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by 
     Representative Stenholm of Texas or a designee. That 
     amendment shall be debatable for 60 minutes equally divided 
     and controlled by the proponent and an opponent.
       ``Sec. 3. The amendment referred to in section 2 is as 
     follows:

                  Amendment to H.R. 3973, as Reported

Offered by Mr. Stenholm of Texas, Mr. Matheson of Utah, Mr. Thompson of 
California, Mr. Hill of Indiana, Mr. Moore of Kansas, or Mr. Tanner of 
                               Tennessee

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Living Within Our Means Act 
     of 2004''.

       TITLE I--REINSTATING AND STRENGTHENING BUDGET ENFORCEMENT

     SEC. 101. EXTENSION OF THE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING CAPS.

       (a) Discretionary Spending Limits.--(1) Section 251(c)(2) 
     of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985 is amended by inserting a dash after ``2005'', by 
     redesignating the remaining portion of such paragraph as 
     subparagraph (D) and by moving it two ems to the right, and 
     by inserting after the dash the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(A) for the general purpose discretionary category: 
     $819,697,000,000 in new budget authority and $862,247,000,000 
     in outlays;
       ``(B) for the highway category: $30,585,000,000 in outlays; 
     and
       ``(C) for the mass transit category: $1,554,000,000 in new 
     budget authority and $6,787,000,000 in outlays; and''.
       (2) Section 251(c)(3) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting a dash 
     after ``2006'', by redesignating the remaining portion of 
     such paragraph as subparagraph (D) and by moving it two ems 
     to the right, and by inserting after the dash the following 
     new subparagraphs:
       ``(A) for the general purpose discretionary category: 
     $837,271,000,000 in new budget authority and $853,170,000,000 
     in outlays;
       ``(B) for the highway category: $33,271,000,000 in outlays; 
     and
       ``(C) for the mass transit category: $1,671,000,000 in new 
     budget authority and $7,585,000,000 in outlays; and''.
       (b) Advance Appropriations.--(1) Section 251 of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is 
     amended by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Advance Appropriations.--In fiscal years 2005 through 
     2009, the total amount of discretionary advance 
     appropriations provided in appropriation Acts shall not 
     exceed $23,158,000. Any amount enacted in excess of such 
     amount shall be counted against the discretionary spending 
     limits for the fiscal year for which the appropriation Act 
     containing the advance appropriation is enacted.''.
       (2) Section 250(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new paragraph:
       ``(20) The term `advance appropriation' refers to the 
     following budget accounts or portions thereof that become 
     available one fiscal year or more beyond the fiscal year for 
     which the appropriation Act making such funds available is 
     enacted:
       ``(A) 89-5428-0-2-0271 (Elk Hills);
       ``(B) 16-0174-1-504 (Training and Employment Services);
       ``(C) 91-0900-01-501 (Education for the Disadvantaged);
       ``(D) 91-1000-01-501 (School Improvement);
       ``(E) 75-1536-0-1-506 (Children and Family Services (Head 
     Start));
       ``(F) 91-0300-0-1-501 (Special Education);
       ``(G) 91-0400-0-1-501 (Vocational and Adult Education);
       ``(H) 18-1001-0-1-372 (Payment to the Postal Service Fund); 
     or
       ``(I) 86-0319-0-1-604 (Housing Certificate Fund (Section 8 
     Renewal).''.
       (c) Expiration.--Section 275 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 note) is 
     amended by striking subsection (b).
       (b) Definitions.--Section 250(c)(4) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by--
       (A) striking ``the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
     Century and the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 
     2003'' and inserting ``the Transportation Equity Act: A 
     Legacy for Users''; and
       (B) inserting before the period at the end the following 
     new clauses:
       ``(v) 69-8158-0-7-401 (Motor Carrier Safety Grants).
       ``(vi) 69-8159-0-7-401 (Motor Carrier Safety Operations and 
     Programs).'';
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by--
       (A) inserting ``(and successor accounts)'' after ``budget 
     accounts''; and
       (B) striking ``the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
     Century and the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2003 
     or for which appropriations are provided pursuant to 
     authorizations contained in those Acts (except that 
     appropriations provided pursuant to section 5338(h) of title 
     49, United States Code, as amended by the Transportation 
     Equity Act for the 21st Century, shall not be included in 
     this category)'' and inserting ``the Transportation Equity 
     Act: A Legacy for Users or for which appropriations are 
     provided pursuant to authorizations contained in that Act''; 
     and
       (3) in subparagraph (D)(ii), by striking ``section 8103 of 
     the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century'' and 
     inserting ``section 8103 of the Transportation Equity Act: A 
     Legacy for Users''.

     SEC. 102. ADJUSTMENTS TO ALIGN HIGHWAY SPENDING WITH 
                   REVENUES.

       Subparagraphs (B) through (E) of section 251(b)(1) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 are 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) Adjustment to align highway spending with revenues.--
     (i) When the President submits the budget under section 1105 
     of title 31, United States Code, OMB shall calculate and the 
     budget shall make adjustments to the highway category for the 
     budget year and each outyear as provided in clause 
     (ii)(I)(cc).
       ``(ii)(I)(aa) OMB shall take the actual level of highway 
     receipts for the year before the current year and subtract 
     the sum of the estimated level of highway receipts in 
     subclause (II) plus any amount previously calculated under 
     item (bb) for that year.
       (bb) OMB shall take the current estimate of highway 
     receipts for the current year and subtract the estimated 
     level of receipts for that year.
       ``(cc) OMB shall add one-half of the sum of the amount 
     calculated under items (aa) and (bb) to the obligation 
     limitations set forth in the section 8103 of the 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users and, using 
     current estimates, calculate the outlay change resulting from 
     the change in obligations for the budget year and the first 
     outyear and the outlays flowing therefrom through subsequent 
     fiscal years. After making the calculations under the 
     preceding sentence, OMB shall adjust the amount of 
     obligations set forth in that section for the budget year and 
     the first outyear by adding one-half of the sum of the amount 
     calculated under items (aa) and (bb) to each such year.
       ``(II) The estimated level of highway receipts for the 
     purposes of this clause are--
       ``(aa) for fiscal year 2004, $30,572,000,000;
       ``(bb) for fiscal year 2005, $34,260,000,000;
       ``(cc) for fiscal year 2006, $35,586,000,000;
       ``(dd) for fiscal year 2007, $36,570,000,000;
       ``(ee) for fiscal year 2008, $37,603,000,000; and
       ``(ff) for fiscal year 2009, $38,651,000,000.
       ``(III) In this clause, the term `highway receipts' means 
     the governmental receipts credited to the highway account of 
     the Highway Trust Fund.
       ``(C) In addition to the adjustment required by 
     subparagraph (B), when the President submits the budget under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 
     2006, 2007, 2008, or 2009, OMB shall calculate and the budget 
     shall include for the budget year and each outyear an 
     adjustment to the limits on outlays for the highway category 
     and the mass transit category equal to--
       ``(i) the outlays for the applicable category calculated 
     assuming obligation levels consistent with the estimates 
     prepared pursuant to subparagraph (D), as adjusted, using 
     current technical assumptions; minus
       ``(ii) the outlays for the applicable category set forth in 
     the subparagraph (D) estimates, as adjusted.
       ``(D)(i) When OMB and CBO submit their final sequester 
     report for fiscal year 2004, that report shall include an 
     estimate of the outlays for each of the categories that would 
     result in fiscal years 2005 through 2009 from obligations at 
     the levels specified in section 8103 of the Transportation 
     Equity Act: A Legacy for Users using current assumptions.
       ``(ii) When the President submits the budget under section 
     1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2006, 
     2007, 2008, or 2009, OMB shall adjust the estimates made in 
     clause (i) by the adjustments by subparagraphs (B) and (C).
       ``(E) OMB shall consult with the Committees on the Budget 
     and include a report on adjustments under subparagraphs (B) 
     and (C) in the preview report.''.

     SEC. 103. LEVEL OF OBLIGATION LIMITATIONS.

       (a) Highway Category.--For the purposes of section 251(b) 
     of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985, the level of obligation limitations for the highway 
     category is--
       (1) for fiscal year 2004, $34,309,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 2005, $35,671,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2006, $36,719,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2007, $37,800,000,000;
       (5) for fiscal year 2008, $38,913,000,000; and
       (6) for fiscal year 2009, $40,061,000,000.
       (b) Mass Transit Category.--For the purposes of section 
     251(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
     Act of 1985, the level of obligation limitations for the mass 
     transit category is--
       (1) for fiscal year 2004, $7,266,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 2005, $7,750,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2006, $8,266,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2007, $8,816,000,000;
       (5) for fiscal year 2008, $9,403,000,000; and
       (6) for fiscal year 2009, $10,029,000,000.

     For purposes of this subsection, the term ``obligation 
     limitations'' means the sum of budget authority and 
     obligation limitations.

[[Page H4907]]

     SEC. 104. REVENUE ADJUSTMENT.

       If an amendment is designated to be used to offset a 
     decrease in receipts for a fiscal year pursuant to section 
     316(c)(1)(D) or section 317(c)(1)(D) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974, then the applicable level of revenues for 
     such fiscal year for purposes of section 311(a) of such Act 
     shall be reduced by the amount of such amendment.

     SEC. 105. EXTENSION OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO REQUIREMENT.

       (a) Purpose.--Section 252(a) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by striking 
     ``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.
       (b) Sequestration.--Section 252(b)(1) of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended 
     by striking ``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.

     SEC. 106. REPORTS.

       Subsections (c)(2) and (f)(2)(A) of section 254 of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 are 
     amended by striking ``2002'' and inserting ``2009''.

     SEC. 107 EXPIRATION.

       Section 275(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 is amended by striking ``2002'' and 
     inserting ``2009'' and by striking ``2006'' and inserting 
     ``2013''.

     SEC. 108 AUTOMATIC BUDGET ENFORCEMENT FOR MEASURES CONSIDERED 
                   ON THE FLOOR.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


                    ``Budget evasion points of order

       ``Sec. 316. (a) Discretionary Spending Caps.--It shall not 
     be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any 
     bill or resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference 
     report on that bill or resolution) that waives or suspends 
     the enforcement of section 251 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or otherwise would 
     alter the spending limits set forth in that section.
       ``(b) Pay-As-You-Go.--It shall not be in order in the House 
     of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or 
     resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on 
     that bill or resolution) that waives or suspends the 
     enforcement of section 252 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or otherwise would 
     alter the balances of the pay-as-you-go scorecard pursuant to 
     that section.
       ``(c) Directed Scoring.--It shall not be in order in the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill 
     or resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on 
     that bill or resolution) that directs the scorekeeping of any 
     bill or resolution.
       ``(d) Far-Outyears.--It shall not be in order in the House 
     of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or 
     resolution (or amendment, motion, or conference report on 
     that bill or resolution) that contains a provision providing 
     new budget authority or which reduces revenues which first 
     takes effect after the first five fiscal years covered in the 
     most recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget and 
     would have the effect of reducing the surplus or increasing 
     the deficit in any fiscal year.
       ``(e)  Enforcement in the House of Representatives.--(1) It 
     shall not be in order in the House of Representatives to 
     consider a rule or order that waives the application of this 
     section.
       ``(2)(A) This subsection shall apply only to the House of 
     Representatives.
       ``(B) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of 
     order under this section must specify the precise language on 
     which it is premised.
       ``(C) As disposition of points of order under this section, 
     the Chair shall put the question of consideration with 
     respect to the proposition that is the subject of the points 
     of order.
       ``(D) A question of consideration under this section shall 
     be debatable for 10 minutes by each Member initiating a point 
     of order and for 10 minutes by an opponent on each point of 
     order, but shall otherwise be decided without intervening 
     motion except one that the House adjourn or that the 
     Committee of the Whole rise, as the case may be.
       ``(E) The disposition of the question of consideration 
     under this subsection with respect to a bill or joint 
     resolution shall be considered also to determine the question 
     of consideration under this subsection with respect to an 
     amendment made in order as original text.''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting 
     after the item for section 315 the following:

``Sec. 316. Budget evasion points of order.''.

     SEC. 109. REQUIREMENTS FOR BUDGET ACT WAIVERS IN THE HOUSE OF 
                   REPRESENTATIVES.

       (a) Justification for Budget Act Waivers.--Clause 6 of rule 
     XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(h) It shall not be in order to consider any resolution 
     from the Committee on Rules for the consideration of any 
     reported bill or joint resolution which waives section 302, 
     303, 311, or 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
     unless the report accompanying such resolution includes a 
     description of the provision proposed to be waived, an 
     identification of the section being waived, the reasons why 
     such waiver should be granted, and an estimated cost of the 
     provisions to which the waiver applies.''.
       (b) Separate Vote to Waive Major Budget Act Point of 
     Order.--(1) Section 905 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h)(1) It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives to consider a rule or order that waives the 
     application of a major budget act point of order as defined 
     in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term `major 
     budget point of order' means any point of order arising under 
     any section listed in section 904.
       ``(3)(A) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of 
     order under the sections referenced in paragraph (2) must 
     specify the precise language on which it is premised.
       ``(B) As disposition of points of order under the sections 
     referenced in paragraph (2), the Chair shall put the question 
     of consideration with respect to the proposition that is the 
     subject of the points of order.
       ``(C) A question of consideration under the sections 
     referenced in paragraph (2) shall be debatable for 10 minutes 
     by each Member initiating a point of order and for 10 minutes 
     by an opponent on each point of order, but shall otherwise be 
     decided without intervening motion except one that the House 
     adjourn or that the Committee of the Whole rise, as the case 
     may be.
       ``(D) The disposition of the question of consideration 
     under this subsection with respect to a bill or joint 
     resolution shall be considered also to determine the question 
     of consideration under this subsection with respect to an 
     amendment made in order as original text.''.

     SEC. 110. CBO SCORING OF CONFERENCE REPORTS.

       (a) The first sentence of section 402 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended as follows:
       (1) Insert ``or conference report thereon,'' before ``and 
     submit''.
       (2) In paragraph (1), strike ``bill or resolution'' and 
     insert ``bill, joint resolution, or conference report''.
       (3) At the end of paragraph (2) strike ``and'', at the end 
     of paragraph (3) strike the period and insert ``; and'', and 
     after such paragraph (3) add the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) A determination of whether such bill, joint 
     resolution, or conference report provides direct spending.''.
       (b) The second sentence of section 402 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting before the period 
     the following: ``, or in the case of a conference report, 
     shall be included in the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying such conference report if timely 
     submitted before such report is filed''.

TITLE II--INCREASED AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMATION IN CONGRESSIONAL 
                             BUDGET PROCESS

     SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST COSTS.

       Section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     (2 U.S.C. 639(a)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) containing a projection by the Congressional Budget 
     Office of the cost of the debt servicing that would be caused 
     by such measure for such fiscal year (or fiscal years) and 
     each of the four ensuing fiscal years.''.

     SEC. 202. ACCOUNTABILITY IN EMERGENCY SPENDING.

       (a) OMB Emergency Criteria.--Section 3 of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(11)(A) The term `emergency' means a situation that--
       ``(i) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new 
     budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the 
     prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or 
     property, or a threat to national security; and
       ``(ii) is unanticipated.
       ``(B) As used in subparagraph (A), the term `unanticipated' 
     means that the situation is--
       ``(i) sudden, which means quickly coming into being or not 
     building up over time;
       ``(ii) urgent, which means a pressing and compelling need 
     requiring immediate action;
       ``(iii) unforeseen, which means not predicted or 
     anticipated as an emerging need; and
       ``(iv) temporary, which means not of a permanent 
     duration.''.
       (b) Development of Guidelines for Application of Emergency 
     Definition.--Not later than five months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the chairmen of the Committees on the 
     Budget (in consultation with the President) shall, after 
     consulting with the chairmen of the Committees on 
     Appropriations and applicable authorizing committees of their 
     respective Houses and the Directors of the Congressional 
     Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget, 
     jointly publish in the Congressional Record guidelines for 
     application of the definition of emergency set forth in 
     section 3(11) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974.
       (c) Contingency Operations Related to Global War on 
     Terrorism.--Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(I) Contingency operations related to global war on 
     terrorism.--If supplemental

[[Page H4908]]

     appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted for 
     contingency operations related to the global war on terrorism 
     that, pursuant to this subparagraph, the President designates 
     as a contingency operation related to the global war on 
     terrorism and the Congress so designates in statute, the 
     adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations in 
     discretionary accounts so designated and the outlays flowing 
     in all fiscal years from such appropriations.''.
       (d) Separate House Vote on Emergency Designation.--(1) Rule 
     XXII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new clause:
       ``13. In the consideration of any measure for amendment in 
     the Committee of the Whole containing any emergency spending 
     designation, it shall always be in order unless specifically 
     waived by terms of a rule governing consideration of that 
     measure, to move to strike such emergency spending 
     designation from the portion of the bill then open to 
     amendment.''.
       (2) The Committee on Rules shall include in the report 
     required by clause 1(d) of rule XI (relating to its 
     activities during the Congress) of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives a separate item identifying all waivers of 
     points of order relating to emergency spending designations, 
     listed by bill or joint resolution number and the subject 
     matter of that measure.
       (e) Committee Notification of Emergency Legislation.--
     Whenever the Committee on Appropriations or any other 
     committee of either House (including a committee of 
     conference) reports any bill or joint resolution that 
     provides budget authority for any emergency, the report 
     accompanying that bill or joint resolution (or the joint 
     explanatory statement of managers in the case of a conference 
     report on any such bill or joint resolution) shall identify 
     all provisions that provide budget authority and the outlays 
     flowing therefrom for such emergency and include a statement 
     of the reasons why such budget authority meets the definition 
     of an emergency pursuant to the guidelines described in 
     subsection (b).

     SEC. 203. APPLICATION OF BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER TO 
                   UNREPORTED LEGISLATION.

       (a) Section 315 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by striking ``reported'' the first place it appears.
       (b) Section 303(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(A)'' and by 
     redesignating subparagraph (B) as paragraph (2) and by 
     striking the semicolon at the end of such new paragraph (2) 
     and inserting a period; and
       (2) by striking paragraph (3).

     SEC. 204. BUDGET COMPLIANCE STATEMENTS.

       Clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subparagraph:
       ``(4) A budget compliance statement prepared by the 
     chairman of the Committee on the Budget, if timely submitted 
     prior to the filing of the report, which shall include 
     assessment by such chairman as to whether the bill or joint 
     resolution complies with the requirements of sections 302, 
     303, 306, 311, and 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 or any other requirements set forth in a concurrent 
     resolution on the budget and may include the budgetary 
     implications of that bill or joint resolution under section 
     251 or 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985, as applicable.''.

     SEC. 205. PROJECTIONS UNDER SECTION 257.

       Section 257(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting after paragraph 
     (6) the following new paragraph:
       ``(7) Emergencies.--New budgetary resources designated 
     under section 251(b)(2)(A) or 251(b)(2)(I) shall not be 
     assumed beyond the fiscal year for which they have been 
     enacted.''.

     SEC. 206. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE BALANCED BUDGET AND 
                   EMERGENCY DEFICIT CONTROL ACT OF 1985.

       Part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
     Act of 1985 is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 250(a), strike ``SEC. 256. GENERAL AND 
     SPECIAL SEQUESTRATION RULES'' and insert ``Sec. 256. General 
     and special sequestration rules'' in the item relating to 
     section 256.
       (2) In subparagraphs (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), and (K) of 
     section 250(c)(4), insert ``subparagraph'' after ``described 
     in'' each place it appears.
       (3) In section 250(c)(18), insert ``of'' after 
     ``expenses''.
       (4) In section 251(b)(1)(A), strike ``committees'' the 
     first place it appears and insert ``Committees''.
       (5) In section 251(b)(1)(C)(i), strike ``fiscal years'' and 
     insert ``fiscal year''.
       (6) In section 251(b)(1)(D)(ii), strike ``fiscal years'' 
     and insert ``fiscal year''.
       (7) In section 252(b)(2)(B), insert ``the'' before ``budget 
     year''.
       (8) In section 252(c)(1)(C)(i), strike ``paragraph (1)'' 
     and insert ``subsection (b)''.
       (9) In section 254(c)(3)(A), strike ``subsection'' and 
     insert ``section''.
       (10) In section 254(f)(4), strike ``subsection'' and insert 
     ``section'' and strike ``sequesterable'' and insert 
     ``sequestrable''.
       (11) In section 255(g)(1)(B), move the fourteenth 
     undesignated clause 2 ems to the right.
       (12) In section 255(g)(2), insert ``and'' after the 
     semicolon at the end of the next-to-last undesignated clause.
       (13) In section 255(h)--
       (A) strike ``and'' after the semicolon in the ninth 
     undesignated clause;
       (B) insert ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of the 
     tenth undesignated clause; and
       (C) strike the semicolon at the end and insert a period.
       (14) In section 256(k)(1), strike ``paragraph (5)'' and 
     insert ``paragraph (6)''.
       (15) In section 257(b)(2)(A)(i), strike ``differenes'' and 
     insert ``differences''.

  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of 
my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The question is on ordering 
the previous question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this matter will be postponed.

                          ____________________