[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 88 (Wednesday, June 23, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H4824-H4855]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 686 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4548.

                              {time}  1641


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4548) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Simpson in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4548, and I ask my colleagues 
on both sides of this great House to support this bill. Casting their 
vote is a vote of confidence, respect, and deep admiration for the 
honorable and heroic patriots who toil quietly, and usually without 
notice, throughout the intelligence community in order to keep

[[Page H4825]]

us safe, prosperous, and free in this wonderful country. It is 
imperative that these men and women understand in these troubled times 
that this House holds them in the highest regard and appreciates that 
the work accomplished by them is critical to the defense of our liberty 
and security. Amid great sacrifice and often intense conditions, the 
men and women of the intelligence community continue to perform their 
missions with great energy and admirable devotion to duty. We commend 
these officers. The security of our Americans at home and abroad truly 
relies on their success.
  Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues like the Defense appropriation bill 
that passed yesterday on a vote of 403 to 17, then this bill should 
equally please my colleagues today. Yesterday's Defense appropriation 
bill was coordinated closely with the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, and our funding levels are very, very close. The 
Intelligence bill currently before the House, however, authorizes 
funding slightly above the level the appropriators set for intelligence 
funding. In fact, this Intelligence bill funds the intelligence 
community at its highest levels in history. It exceeds the total fiscal 
year 2004 appropriated level for the intelligence community, including 
all supplementals, approximately by hundreds of millions. As my 
colleagues know, we cannot be totally precise on the numbers we speak. 
For all intelligence programs in this bill, the committee authorizes a 
total of approximately 16 percent over the President's February 
request.
  This bill increases investment in human intelligence and the 
capabilities that they represent for us, the core mission of our 
intelligence community. It improves intelligence analysis, coverage in 
depth, so that we have more focused, sharper information for our 
decisionmakers. It strengthens intelligence community language 
capabilities across the board, through both improved legislative 
authorities and initial investment, so we have the people who know the 
languages we need to know to do our job.
  It improves the structure and management of the disparate elements of 
the intelligence community's information technology systems by creating 
an intelligence community Chief Information Officer, hopefully to get 
better coordination so that we can overcome some of the problems we 
learned as we reviewed the events of 9/11. It bolsters U.S. 
counterintelligence resource capabilities; and, specifically, it adds 
22 percent above the President's request for human intelligence and 
human-related programs. That is the core business of intelligence. 
Substantial increases in funding for improved analytical capabilities, 
as I have said, are included.
  Significant additional amounts for information technology 
infrastructure, what we call enterprise architecture, is included, and 
information-sharing capabilities, which are critical. Tens of millions 
are included for improved foreign language capabilities.
  This money has been carefully applied; it is carefully managed. This 
bill is very close to the bill passed unanimously out of our sister 
committee in the other body, with one major exception, of course, that 
they did not have the benefit of the contingent emergency relief fund 
during their consideration.

                              {time}  1645

  So, it is fair to say that our bill is more generous to the global 
war on terror than the other body's version, and that bill enjoys 
bipartisan support, unanimous bipartisan support I am informed.
  Some in the minority have suggested that voting down this bill 
somehow better supports our intelligence community and makes our 
country safer. In my view, that is a convolution to the point of 
absurdity. They say if an attack happens before the election, it will 
somehow be our fault for not funding the global war on terror.
  I would point out that the 2004 fiscal year goes on until October, 
and any shortage of resources would be of interest to those who did not 
support the $87 billion supplemental bill for fiscal year 2004.
  All I would say is that the majority in the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence voted to support the men and women of the 
intelligence community in this bill today. We did not vote against the 
community and we did not shortchange the community in the global war on 
terrorism.
  Now, there is an irony here. For years, I have been trying to get 
more support for intelligence. Usually the record will show that 
usually the cutting amendments have come from certain Members of the 
minority, as is their right. Now, it seems my sin is to bring forth a 
bill that spends not enough on intelligence rather than too much. 
Frankly, I think I should declare victory and say thank you all for 
listening.
  But I will be disappointed, on a serious note, if at the end of this 
day, Members on all sides cannot agree that this bill authorizes proper 
sums carefully managed and properly coordinated with the appropriators 
and the other affected committees.
  This is a very good bill with many important aspects that I have 
outlined. Indeed, it is with some hope I note the classified version of 
the minority views in their very first paragraph admit as much. Members 
who took the time to come up to the committee spaces to review the 
classified annex, which is available to all Members as usual, have seen 
the important work this committee has done.
  Our work is not done in the public with klieg lights all the time. 
But it is a little misleading to suggest, as some have, that the 
committee product is less worthy because we do take seriously the 
responsibility, our commitment it is, to safeguard properly classified 
material by using closed sessions. That, incidentally, has been the 
practice for all the recent Congresses that I have been on the 
committee.
  We must also be mindful that our enemies watch and hear what we say. 
Our audience is the American people primarily. Those are the people to 
whom we are accountable and responsible and proud of the work we do, 
and are pleased to share it with them. But, unfortunately, our enemies 
are listening too, and we are a Nation at war. Sometimes the enemy is 
able to gauge their conduct on how this body acts. They are able to use 
psychological warfare to drive wedges. They also could gain an enormous 
advantage if we do not take the appropriate opportunities to keep from 
public discourse our committee discussion on the sensitive intelligence 
matters that we are charged with overseeing. And when we have that 
debate in committee, I like the committee to have the full range of 
conversation, so we start out with the idea in closed session and then 
we winnow out what we can talk about in public, which is why we are 
here today talking about what we can talk about in public.
  For the past 7-plus years, I have been working to refit the 
intelligence community for its future, with the members of the 
committee, for whom I am extremely grateful, to posture it for the days 
ahead. We have always worked hard on the committee to create a 
constituency for intelligence inside and outside of this institution. 
We have insisted that the committee be both supportive advocates and 
constructive overseers. None of like gotcha politics when it comes to 
national security.
  I have tried to engage the past two administrations on the needs to 
retool the Intelligence Community for smarter, better days ahead, and I 
have had the full support of the committee in our efforts so far. This 
bill continues that effort. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit the following for the Record.

      Statement of Administration Policy--H.R. 4548--Intelligence 
                     Authorization Act for FY 2005

       The Administration supports House passage of HR 4548, which 
     authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for the 
     conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government. The committee-
     reported bill authorizes funding that strengthens core 
     intelligence capabilities and supports intelligence 
     activities that would sustain the Global War on Terror.
       Now more than ever before, our Nation's security relies on 
     accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence--and the 
     challenges facing the intelligence community are difficult 
     and complex. This makes it vitally important for the 
     administration and Congress to work together to provide the 
     intelligence community with the tools and resources it needs 
     to enhance our national security posture, win the Global War 
     on Terror, and reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction.

[[Page H4826]]

       We are making advances in our ability to collect, process, 
     and analyze intelligence information. Although not part of 
     this bill, crucial innovations such as the PATRIOT Act and 
     the Terrorist Threat Integration Center are helping us to 
     protect our homeland by sharing information better than ever 
     before. The President has also expressed his interest in 
     working with Congress, when the time is right, to examine 
     structural reforms that may be needed to improve our 
     intelligence capability in the future. The upcoming reports 
     of the Senate intelligence Committee and the 9/11 Commission, 
     along with the work of the Commission on Intelligence 
     Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, will 
     provide important information that will help Congress and the 
     Administration in this effort.
       The Administration looks forward to working with Congress 
     to support the vital work of the intelligence community, 
     especially its counterterrorism activities, to assure 
     continued strong, flexible intelligence capabilities, and to 
     refine certain provisions in this bill, including relating to 
     procurement, to ensure that these provisions maintain the 
     flexibility the President needs to most effectively manage 
     the ongoing war against terrorists of global reach.

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, strong intelligence is our first line of 
defense in the war on terrorism. And make no mistake, we are at war. 
The gruesome beheadings of Danny Pearl, Nick Berg, Paul Johnson, and 
yesterday's murder of 33-year-old Kim Sun Il of South Korea are stark 
reminders of the nature of our enemy.
  Our brave men and women in the intelligence community are on the 
front lines fighting that enemy. They risk their lives for our freedom 
and they deserve our unflinching support. Yet, unfortunately, Mr. 
Chairman, this legislation deprives them of full support. This bill 
provides less than one-third of the key funding that the intelligence 
community has told us they need to fight the war on terrorism. Less 
than one-third.
  I want to use my time to engage the gentleman from Florida (Chairman 
Goss) in a brief dialogue on this important issue. I would like to ask 
my colleague directly, on my time, Mr. Chairman, does this bill provide 
all of the counterterrorism funding that the intelligence agencies have 
told our committee they need for the coming year? Yes or no.
  I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, officially yes, because we do have the 
statement of support from the administration on this bill.
  Ms. HARMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that response, but the 
classified schedule of authorizations in the majority's bill 
specifically states that the additional funds are only for the first 
quarter of the year. Well, that is woefully inadequate.
  The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the gentleman from Minnesota 
(Mr. Peterson) and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell) all proposed 
an amendment to fully fund counterterrorism. Let me demonstrate exactly 
what this full funding amendment does. The majority's bill funds only 
first quarter ops tempo for counterterrorism. The full funding 
amendment, which we hope to offer, funds a full year for 
counterterrorism.
  The majority's bill gives the CIA 11 percent less than fiscal year 
2004 funding, whereas the full funding amendment we had hoped to offer 
gives the CIA 5 percent more than 2004 funding. The majority's bill 
funds only 5 percent of the NRO's CT budget, 19 percent of NSA's CT 
budget, 26 percent of NGA's CT budget, and 35 percent of the CIA's CT 
budget. The full funding amendment funds 100 percent of these budgets.
  Finally, the majority's bill provides no supplemental funding for 
critical CT HUMINT support functions whereas the full funding amendment 
provides full funding for all the HUMINT support functions.
  In short, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4548 is too weak. What is the President 
going to tell the American people when they learn that we are going to 
have a gap in counterterrorism funding next year? There could be a gap 
of 3 to 4 months before we pass a new supplemental. And during that 
gap, our Nation will be at unnecessary risk at a time when, for 
example, we will be having events like the presidential inauguration 
and the Super Bowl.
  The majority has twisted itself into a pretzel trying to justify this 
weak bill, all the while bemoaning the harmful impact of budgeting-by-
supplemental on our intelligence community's ability and our 
committee's ability to do robust oversight.
  Jim Pavitt, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, gave a speech 
this week in which he said that, ``there is no end in sight'' to the 
terrorist threat we face. Terrorism is no longer a one-time emergency. 
It is no longer something we should scramble around to fund. It is our 
way of life. It is our central national security challenge. And if the 
White House or the majority does not understand that, then we are in 
serious danger.
  In our committee we offered several amendments to strengthen 
intelligence and strengthen oversight. They were common sense measures. 
Yet, all of them were rejected on party line votes.
  Mr. Chairman, we know terrorists are actively planning to attack us 
again. We know there is nuclear material out there that is unaccounted 
for for sale to the highest bidder. We know the next attack will be 
followed by the usual Washington hand-wringing about why we did not do 
more.
  The rule under which we debate today has squandered an opportunity to 
do much more. We have lost an opportunity to strengthen intelligence, 
to strengthen congressional oversight, to retire the soon-to-be-vacant 
DCI position and replace it with a 21st century organization capable of 
integrating 15 intelligence agencies into one intelligence community 
and to keep full faith with the brave men and women who are on the 
front lines at this hour risking their lives for our freedom.
  This bill is weaker, far weaker than the American people deserve.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Young), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee 
on Appropriations.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, a world controlled by terrorists 
or threats of terrorists is not acceptable. A world controlled by 
dictators or dictatorial regimes or corrupt regimes is not acceptable. 
The United States of America is vulnerable on many fronts to these 
types of threats, but the more effective our intelligence operations, 
the better we are at what we do in the field of intelligence, whether 
it is technical intelligence or human intelligence. The more effective 
our intelligence is, the more secure America is and will be.
  I believe we did very well in the area of overhead technology, as 
well as other types of technology, many of which we cannot even talk 
about here in this open session today, but we have not done nearly as 
well on human intelligence. And today's world requires a very effective 
human intelligence capability.
  The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and I have discussed this 
many, many times, because, as we appropriate for the intelligence 
activities, we work very closely with my colleague as he authorizes 
intelligence activities.
  This bill, while I am sure you will hear much debate today that it is 
not a perfect piece of legislation, is a very good step toward making 
our intelligence capability far more effective. And I would say again, 
effective intelligence is good security. The more effective the 
intelligence is, the more secure our Nation and our people.
  I commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for the good 
work that he has done in preparing this legislation. I know that there 
will be serious debate. There will be amendments that will be offered. 
But I have to give credit to the chairman for having produced a good 
product.
  I hope that the House will vote on this bill in big numbers. While we 
worked together in developing our appropriations bill that we passed 
yesterday, we actually came up with our own conclusions, but our 
conclusions were very similar in to those in this authorization.
  So I support the bill and I commend the chairman.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on the House Committee on 
Armed

[[Page H4827]]

Services, the committee on which I was honored to serve for 6 years.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, this is an important bill. It provides for 
the programs and activities in our national intelligence agencies. As 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq have taught us, 
timely and accurate intelligence is so vitally important in both 
protecting our country domestically as well as enabling us to act 
militarily.
  I view this bill from the perspective of having served on the 
Committee on Armed Services for over 25 years, and also as a former 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Year in and 
year out, both of the bills from the Committee on Armed Services as 
well as Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence historically passed 
the House with broad bipartisan support.
  That is why I am troubled by the path the intelligence authorization 
bill has taken this year. I cannot remember the last time an 
intelligence bill passed out of committee on a party line vote or when 
amendments offered in committee were all voted down on a party line. I 
am also disappointed that the Committee on Rules only made in order one 
Democratic amendment.

                              {time}  1700

  What is all the more disappointing is that apparently the reason for 
the posture of this bill is that the majority has been unwilling to 
provide as much funding for counterterrorism activities as intelligence 
agencies have told the committee they need. I would remind my 
colleagues that we are now in a war against terrorism. I would think 
that we should make sure that all the funding goes into the 
counterterrorist area.
  So although this bill may provide an overall increase in funding, 
which is a positive note for these intelligence activities, the details 
really are important. It is unfortunate we cannot increase the budget 
in the places that need to have it the most; and though I will favor 
this bill, I must express my disappointment, my deep disappointment at 
the shortage in this area.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a chairman of a subcommittee of 
the committee.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in very strong support of 
H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005.
  As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, 
and Counterintelligence, I can say unequivocally that H.R. 4548 is one 
of the best, most far-reaching, most constructively critical, and 
urgently needed authorization bills that I have been involved in.
  The bill makes urgently needed fixes to the CIA's human intelligence 
collection capability that even the DCI suggested was 5 years away from 
being adequate. I do not believe we can or should wait 5 years, and it 
also authorizes a very sizeable amount beyond the DCI's base request to 
ensure we keep up the maximum possible operational tempo against the 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation targets, both inside and 
outside the theater of war.
  In the area of analysis, significant new funds will be provided to 
address a critical concern: the simple lack of analytical depth. The DI 
analytical cadre is badly in need of bench strength and real expertise. 
We have been burning up our analysts in wartime conditions and shipping 
the majority of them to cover pressing counterterrorism requirements 
since the mid-1990s without being able to adequately backfill 
positions.
  Those analysts need to have the right skills, firsthand exposure to 
countries or issues they cover, cultural appreciation and, if at all 
possible, the necessary foreign language skills in order to be 
effective, and H.R. 4548 addresses all of these issues, particularly 
with regard to language, which has consistently been a high-priority 
item for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a pressing 
need for the whole intelligence community.
  The bill addresses counterintelligence shortfalls, ensures that the 
necessary infrastructure for field operations, training, and a host of 
other important activities are adequately funded, and brings 
astonishingly new technical tools into play.
  The bill continues the committee's long-standing efforts to get the 
CIA's dangerously flawed compensation reform plan back on track; and it 
demonstrates that we strongly support a more aggressive, risk-taking, 
innovative intelligence collection posture. Such a posture would 
finally give us a fighting chance to penetrate terrorist groups. It 
would also allow us to tackle other hard-target countries, countries 
that have plans and intentions to do us harm.
  Overall, H.R. 4548 demonstrates that we are going to back up our 
spies and our analysts when it counts the most.
  To my distinguished colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this war 
we are in is not just about Iraq or about Afghanistan or about where 
Osama bin Laden may be hiding. It is truly a global war on terrorism 
with significant global challenges; and these include money laundering, 
illicit traffic, the preaching of hate, kidnapping, extortion, and even 
at the national level, as we saw, the Madrid train bombing and the 
elections that followed.
  It is a war that is going to take time to win. It is a war that is 
going to take fortitude to win, and it is a war that is going to take a 
substantial and continued investment in our intelligence community.
  I ask my distinguished colleagues to support H.R. 4548 for the sake 
of our Nation's security. Some of my colleagues across the aisle have 
decided that it is not important to provide for the intelligence 
community in the middle of the global war on terrorism, and I say it 
could not be more important.
  This bill moves us closer to acquiring the capabilities and 
directions that are needed not only to win the war on terror but to win 
the peace in Iraq and to make sure we do not forget about the rest of 
the world. We must never forget that the actions of others affects U.S. 
national security interests. We must never retreat in the face of evil.
  Vote ``yes'' on H.R. 4548 because it is urgently needed. The Nation 
simply cannot afford to shortchange its men and women out on the 
frontlines.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, those of us on this side of the aisle feel 
it is important to fund stronger intelligence in the global war on 
terror, and it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a dedicated member of our committee.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me the 
time, and I also want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman, and the ranking member for the hard 
work that they always put into these kinds of efforts and legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, there is much that we expect from our military, from 
our intelligence personnel, and from our civilian employees in what we 
call this war on terrorism. We all take a great deal of pride in their 
work, their professionalism, their dedication, and, yes, sometimes the 
sacrifice that they make by making the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of 
our great Nation.
  So my question this afternoon is, When we expect so much from them, 
why can we not expect the same from ourselves? Why can we not put 
together a piece of legislation that supports them with the same 
dedication, the same professionalism, the same level, 100 percent, of 
the funds that are required for them to succeed?
  In this legislation, Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to see that some 
focus in this bill is on improving the functioning of the new 
intelligence analysis element of the Department of Homeland Security. I 
was also pleased that the bill, in general terms, recognizes the 
importance of sharing information between the Federal, local, and State 
levels and also the Federal levels such as the FBI.
  I was, however, Mr. Chairman, disappointed that the bill did not 
include language supportive of focusing on the necessary resources of 
the El Paso Intelligence Center, such as enhancing the key 
contributions that it makes towards homeland security through 
intelligence analysis and information sharing. Just as the committee 
has increasingly supported the FBI's joint terrorism task forces as a 
potentially useful model for information sharing, EPIC is also a 
successful model for focusing intelligence and law enforcement 
resources on protecting the U.S. Southwestern border.
  I am most disappointed, Mr. Chairman, that this bill does not include 
a

[[Page H4828]]

provision like the Peterson amendment, which would have funded the 
intelligence requirements at the full 100 percent level in this war on 
terrorism. This is not about whether we supported the $87 billion 
supplemental, not about politics. It is not about anything other than 
giving the full amount of resources that are necessary to dedicated 
personnel in the field.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), a valued member of the 
committee and distinguished Member.
  (Mr. BURR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, our enemies are watching us. The terrorists 
know it is an election year, and they want us to become divided. They 
believe that a terrorist act against our country will influence our 
elections. They have a belief that democracy can be divided; yet they 
underestimate the passion of our citizens and their patriotism.
  Despite the decision of minority Members to play politics with this 
bill, I believe we all are united against our enemies. These are 
serious times, and it is important that we send a message to our 
enemies that we cannot be divided. Support this intelligence bill. Send 
the message.
  It sends the message that we are on the offensive to eliminate the 
threats to our homeland. Our intelligence community needs to know the 
United States Congress supports them 100 percent.
  This bill increases the funding for the global war on terrorism. It 
increases by 22 percent our human intelligence. It supports our effort 
on counternarcotics to eliminate the 17,000 Americans that die every 
year from drug-related causes and the $160 billion annually in health 
care, social, and criminal costs. We have provided extra funding for 
the DCI to tackle this problem in this country.
  On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I would like to bid farewell to my 
colleagues on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I 
have enjoyed serving under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss), and I think we are all fortunate that he was in the 
Chair immediately following September 11. The gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) was the right man for our country when we needed an 
intelligence community with expertise, intelligence, moral clarity, and 
compassion. We will miss him.
  I would also like to recognize the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. 
Bereuter), who will also leave, and wish him good luck on his future 
endeavors. I have been proud to serve with both of them.
  Immediately after September 11, the esteemed chairman of the 
Committee on International Relations came to this floor and quoted the 
words of Sir Winston Churchill which he wrote 6 decades ago: 
``Civilization will not last,'' Churchill wrote, ``freedom will not 
survive, peace will not be kept, unless a very large majority of 
mankind unite together to defend them.''
  We were united on September 11. Let us unite today. Let us support 
the Intelligence authorization bill. Let us do it because it is the 
right thing to do.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), ranking member of the Subcommittee 
on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence.
  (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for the time.
  I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his hard work. I 
agree with some things that have been said about the gentleman's good 
work. I actually thought, and I do not say this in anything but a 
gentleman's way, I thought he would accept our idea to fully fund 
counterterrorism. He surprised me, but I still do not take away from 
his good work, and I want him to understand that.
  But the debate over the Intelligence authorization bill this year has 
been a hard fight. There are some serious disagreements about what the 
best bill to protect the American people ought to look like.
  I believe this bill has not gone far enough to strengthen 
intelligence and strengthen oversight.
  We, in this House and on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, have not shied away from standing strong and debating 
these issues head-on. I believe what the American people deserve is our 
best effort to support what we believe is right.
  A lot of good work has gone into the bill. As the ranking Democrat on 
the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and 
Counterintelligence, I am glad to see funding and support for analysis.
  As we have reviewed the intelligence on Iraq's WMD, it has become 
clear to us that analysis did not have the ability to examine the 
reliability of sources. It now appears, for example, that all four 
sources that Secretary Powell relied upon to describe Iraq's mobile 
bioweapons facilities were not solid. I hope that this bill's support 
will improve the quality of analysis so that a future Secretary of 
State has better intelligence at his or her disposal.
  I am also pleased to see investment in long-term HUMINT needs, the 
hiring and training of new case officers. The demands of the 
counterterrorism campaign have been great and the intelligence agencies 
have worked hard to meet those demands, but the war in Iraq has 
stretched our resources. According to The Washington Post, one of the 
largest intelligence efforts since the Vietnam War is under way there.
  I am concerned that the demands Iraq has placed on our intelligence 
resources have left large parts of the world alarmingly undercovered.
  While this bill makes long-term investments, the bill falls short on 
addressing some of the most urgent needs. This bill only provides one-
third of the additional funds the intelligence agencies say that they 
need to fight terrorism.
  The President will not send the rest of the funding request to 
Congress until after the election, at the same time that he is urgently 
warning of a possible terrorist attack before the election. To me, this 
state of affairs is unacceptable.
  I say to my good friends and colleagues here today, What should the 
American people expect us to do? They expect us to do what is right to 
provide them safety through funding counterterrorism. I hope the 
President will send this supplemental funding request to Congress 
before then so we can get on with the business of protecting the 
American people.
  I had hoped that this bill would have been stronger, stronger in its 
support to the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community, 
and I look forward to working with my colleagues to improve it as we go 
through the conference.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the distinguished gentleman in 
the well who just finished that I would have been pleased to have the 
opportunity to try and work out his amendment if we had seen it ahead 
of time before committee.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Collins).

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for the next fiscal year. Yes, we are at war. We are 
at war and a different kind of war than we have seen before. We are at 
war with an enemy who has no identity, who has no uniform and has no 
country. And I agree with the statement that was made earlier. I see no 
end in sight for this war. But, Mr. Chairman, I also see no end to the 
funding in sight for the intelligence community who does such a good 
job of providing us with valuable information.
  The President said it right at the podium there just past February 
when he said we are a Nation of many responsibilities, but the primary 
responsibility of this country and this government is the safety of the 
American people. We are discussing the authorization for funding, 
funding that was passed yesterday in the defense appropriation bill. We 
disagree on the funding levels, yes. We also disagree on whether or not 
we should create a new bureaucracy, a new level of bureaucracy to head 
up what I call a super spy organization for the intelligence community.

[[Page H4829]]

  But as we move forward with the changes that are being made today 
over at the CIA with the retirement of Director George Tenet, we need 
to also keep in sight those who are doing the job and make sure that 
they have the funds and the funds that would be available under this 
authorization to perform their duties.
  We will debate the differences, the differences we have based on the 
different political parties, the different philosophy, and then we will 
vote on those differences later on in this process, but I urge those on 
both sides of the aisle that when it comes to the final passage of this 
authorization, we should all vote yes. We should vote to support those 
who are in harm's way gathering information so that we will have the 
correct information, as best as possible, to fight the war on terrorism 
and protect the American people.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss) that our amendments were shared in advance and 
our views on budgeting by supplemental have been known for years and 
are shared by the majority.
  Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a courageous member of our committee.
  Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, here in general debate, I 
feel it is necessary to repeat what I said earlier for the sake of 
colleagues who may be listening in their offices before they come down 
here to vote.
  This authorization bill has a lot of good things in it, and I want to 
commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and my colleagues 
for the work that they have put together in this bill. And to the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), I want to say that this Member 
will miss you when you are gone next year, and we appreciate your 
leadership.
  But this bill just is not strong enough. It does not fully authorize 
funds for the intelligence community's key counterterrorism operations. 
It authorizes less than a third of the funds that the intelligence 
agency needs for key counterterrorism operations next year, and that is 
just not the right thing to do when the Nation is under threat from 
terrorism.
  The administration has said that they are going to send down another 
supplemental request next year, but there is ample evidence that al 
Qaeda is plotting to strike us again this year, next year and into the 
future.
  This bill leaves 3 to 4 months open funding before a supplemental 
bill can get through this Congress. If there is another terrorist 
attack, do we want the next 9/11 commission to find that the Congress 
failed in our duty to fully authorize funding for counterterrorism? I 
think not.
  In the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we sit up there 
for hours listening to the different agencies tell us how critical it 
is for these funds to be authorized. They roundly criticize the 
practice of funding them on recurring supplementals. Supplementals 
prevent them from planning effectively. They prevent us from doing 
adequate oversight. They have to rob Peter to pay Paul while we wait 
for these additional funds to arrive, and they will probably not 
receive those funds until sometime next year, in April or May, and as I 
said, it is going to leave 3 or 4 months open.
  Supplementals have also been roundly criticized on our committee by a 
bipartisan membership in the committee. The agencies have indicated 
with some precision that additional funds that they will need in the 
coming year, what they are, and we have addressed that.
  So the question before the Congress is quite simple. Do we want to 
fully authorize funds for the intelligence community's counterterrorism 
requirements, or do we not? As it stands now, the majority answer to 
that question is no, and I think we need a stronger bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire the status of the time on 
both sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss) has 12 minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman) has 15\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), a dedicated member of our committee, who is 
ranking member on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), and I want to say to the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss) that I have enjoyed his service on this 
committee. And even though we have had strong differences here at the 
very end, we have enjoyed his dedication to these issues and we will 
miss him.
  To the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), of course, I count 
on your leadership and your dedication to the field as well.
  Mr. Chairman, I am the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and I served with the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) on the other side of the aisle. And we 
have had another good year as well, and despite my differences over the 
counterterrorism funding, I want to talk about positive aspects of this 
bill that I do support.
  In addition to the investments in human intelligence and language 
skills, the bill strengthens our Nation's tactical and technical 
collection and analytical capabilities.
  I am proud to say that H.R. 4548 advances the analytical efforts at 
the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, known as MSIC, which is in 
Huntsville, Alabama, my Congressional district.
  MSIC works to assess the capabilities of surface-to-air missiles that 
continue to be proliferated across the globe by illicit arms 
traffickers and terrorist groups threatening both military and civilian 
aircraft. And those men and women there at MSIC work very hard to make 
sure that we are right on the edge of analyzing that material, and we 
provide them the skills and the tools and the funding to do that with.
  At this time, also I want to thank my colleague from the Alabama 
delegation, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) who is also on 
this select committee. He looks after Alabama's involvement through the 
Missile and Space Intelligence Center through those good people there 
that work on those issues, and we in north Alabama thank our lower 
Alabama native for his dedication and support there as well.
  But we will continue with this effort to make sure that we give the 
field the tools that they need to do the work that they should be able 
to do. A better understanding of the threat capability is needed, and 
this is a bill that provides for that as well.
  So all in all, I think this is a good bill, and in spite of my strong 
feelings that we should have fully funded counterterrorism, there are 
strengths in this bill.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Eshoo).
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member for 
her leadership in the committee, and to the chairman of the full 
committee, who has given much for this country, both in service and in 
representing his congressional district, as well as this committee, I 
salute him, and we all salute him for it.
  To the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), who will be leaving 
the House of Representatives, I salute him as well for his wonderful 
service on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. Chairman, last week was really quite an extraordinary week for 
those of us who serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Breaking with past precedent, all committee Democrats 
voted against the intelligence authorization bill in the committee 
markup. And there was one primary reason for that, and that is that 
counterterrorism is underfunded significantly, by two-thirds, in this 
authorization bill.
  I have said more than once you cannot have a 100 percent commitment 
to counterterrorism and the global war on terrorism if you are only 
going to fund it by 33 percent.
  We have failed, I believe, to do everything we can to strengthen the 
oversight. Truth is the oxygen of democracy, and it is the 
responsibility of members of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence to pursue the truth through strong oversight.
  We offered amendments to fully fund the intelligence community's 
counterintelligence operations, and we offered amendments in the 
committee to

[[Page H4830]]

strengthen oversight. They were rejected by the majority. I offered the 
amendment at getting the straight story on the Defense Department's 
relationship with a man by the name of Ahmad Chalabi.
  I want to know why the Department invested so much political and 
financial capital in a man with such a checkered past. The CIA 
terminated its relationship with him because it found him to be 
unreliable. The State Department could not account for how he was 
spending U.S. Government funds. And despite the obvious warning signs, 
the Defense Department could not wait to give him more money. Now we 
are finding out that Mr. Chalabi's organization may have fed the 
intelligence community misleading or fabricated information on Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction. He may have been instrumental in 
persuading the administration that the Iraqi people would welcome U.S. 
soldiers with open arms, rather than improvised explosive devices.
  That is why we have come to the floor. That is why we have come to 
the floor with our objections. Bipartisanship means that people come 
together. It does not mean that one side stands and says, you have to 
meet us 100 percent in order to make it bipartisan. We should be able 
to agree on the money for counterterrorism and for stronger oversight.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), the distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
  (Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me add to what I said in the rule about 
the chairman. No one in this House, for the last 10 years, has done 
more for the intelligence community, for the people who work in the 
intelligence community than the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). No 
one has.
  As a former CIA agent, he came to the House with the kind of 
experience that I think most of us would relish, and he took it to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and has done an 
extraordinary job. Now, does anybody believe that somebody like Porter 
Goss is going to sell short the intelligence community; is going to 
sell short the men and women who work in dark places in the world? It 
is not even believable.
  He has been working at it for 10 years as a member of the committee, 
8 years as the chairman, and he served as an officer of the CIA. This 
is nonsense for you to be coming to the floor trying to persuade 
people, the American people or Members of the House, that the chairman 
of the committee is going to sell short the CIA. Baloney. Do not 
believe it. If you are watching this on C-SPAN, do not believe it.
  This guy has been committed to this stuff his whole life. You think 
he is going to take the committee down this primrose path? Of course, 
he is not. So do not come here with your charts and do not come here 
with your staged speeches and try and diminish the work this fellow has 
been doing on behalf of people all over this world to collect 
intelligence and do a good job.
  No better person here in this House to talk about intelligence and 
funding it and making sure that we have the money to do it than Porter 
Goss. And we thank him for his service. Thank God he was the Chair of 
the committee when 9/11 happened.
  And for people who come to the floor and have voted against 
opportunities to fund defense and to fund counterintelligence, really, 
to me, you have no standing here when you come down here and say we are 
selling it short. You know it is baloney. You know it is not factual. 
And you know that the American people are not going to buy it. This guy 
is not going to sell the intelligence community short.
  Bipartisanship ended this year, but it started last year with a 
document in the other body, where a whole game plan was laid out where 
the Democrats were going to try to diminish this administration and use 
the intelligence community to do it. That is not right. It is not fair 
to people who work hard in this business, who spend their careers 
trying to find people who want to do harm to America. But that is the 
way it is. That is what happens around here.
  And you have fallen into this trap where your leadership has decided 
they are going to use the intelligence community to try to diminish the 
work of people who work hard, for no good reason except for political 
gain. You know what? People in the House are not going to buy it.
  I say support the bill. It is a good bill. It is a bill that was 
drafted in a way that will help the intelligence community do the hard 
work that needs to be done.

                              {time}  1730

  It will provide the funding that needs to be provided, and it is a 
tribute to the chairman of the committee. This is his last bill. And 
for those of my colleagues to stand on the floor and diminish that, I 
think is wrong.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a reasonably recent and very dedicated member of our 
committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, there are a few good features in this bill. 
For example, the bill supports the State Department's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research funding request and provides additional 
funding for enhanced training of State Department intelligence 
activities. Following my request last year when my amendments with 
regard to foreign language instruction were rejected and the leadership 
assured me that we would take care of it this year, I worked closely 
with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) on a number of 
important provisions. I am pleased to acknowledge the work that he did. 
Nearly $29 million of the $33 million in language programs that we find 
in this bill were what I had specifically recommended or even written. 
They will do a number of things to improve our proficiency in critical 
languages.
  But I am very disappointed in a number of failures. There was a 
commonsense amendment I offered to provide foreign language instruction 
for students of science and engineering at American universities. It 
was a simple idea. We need it. It was voted down on party lines. But 
the fundamental problem, and this is what we keep coming back to today, 
all the world knows that there have been some major intelligence 
failures. We read it in the world's press. In fact, too often we read 
about these things in the world's press a day or two after critical 
people have come before our committee and failed to tell us what we 
need to know in order to exert oversight.
  The reason we are talking about the underfunding here is because the 
approach that the administration is taking, the approach that the 
leadership here is endorsing is funding by supplemental appropriations. 
It removes the oversight process. A large fraction of the funding for 
counterterrorism is now removed from the oversight process, and it 
compromises the work of this committee, it compromises the work of this 
Congress, and it results in a fundamentally flawed authorization bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is the chairman of our 
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence but was also on 
probably the most recent delegation back from Iraq, and I appreciate 
the extra effort that he and his colleagues made.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4548, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. I am disappointed by some of the rhetoric that we 
have heard from the other side of the aisle today. The last speaker on 
the other side of the aisle referenced the unwillingness of the 
committee to accept an amendment. The problem is, there are other 
committees in this House that have jurisdiction. I have similar bills 
in the Committee on Education and the Workforce. The Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence accepted a significant portion of what the 
gentleman from New Jersey presented. We accepted it. The Committee on 
Education and the Workforce passed on jurisdiction, meaning that even 
though we have responsibility to review it, we respect the leadership 
of the chairman of the committee, we respected the work of the members 
of this committee, and we respected and realized how important it was 
to get that done. So we passed on it and we said, let the intelligence 
bill carry this forward.

[[Page H4831]]

  But when it comes to the little amendment, there is no thank you, no 
thank you to the Committee on Education and the Workforce for passing 
the majority of what this individual wanted and letting it go without 
jurisdiction.
  What I have learned out of this process is that perhaps the next time 
the gentleman from New Jersey proposes an amendment, we maybe accept 
the amendment with a realization that says the committee of 
jurisdiction also ought to have the process and also ought to have the 
opportunity to review.
  This chairman has led the committee graciously and effectively for a 
long period of time. Members on the other side of the aisle are talking 
about funding. When they had the opportunity to fund the intelligence 
community earlier this year, the majority of the minority said, No, we 
are not going to give the intelligence community the money that they 
need. Thankfully, the will of the House went in the other direction.
  What has happened in this process is a breakdown in bipartisanship. 
It has characterized this committee for as long as it has been on the 
Hill. I hope that as we move forward, as we move through conference we 
can come back to a bipartisan approach that the men and women in the 
field look to each and every day. They want to know that the people 
here in Washington and the people around the country support the 
effort.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the last speaker for his sincere 
efforts at bipartisanship.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger), our rookie on the committee.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, first I think I do have to respond 
to some of the comments made from the colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle. I do respect each and every member of this committee, and 
this committee should be bipartisan, and our goal is U.S.A. first. I 
think some of the comments that were made have to be addressed.
  First, there is a lot of respect for our chairman, the gentleman from 
Florida. This is not about a personal attack on the gentleman from 
Florida. I respect the gentleman from Florida. I respect what he has 
done as it relates to the intelligence community throughout his career. 
He has done a great job. However, I was elected to come to the Halls 
and the floor of Congress to debate issues. It seems to me that the 
majority thinks that if we disagree on an issue that we are being 
unpatriotic. That is just not so. We disagree on one major issue and 
that is the major issue of the funding of counterterrorism. That is 
what the issue is here today.
  My comments are basically about NSA. I happen to represent Maryland's 
Second Congressional District. NSA is located in my district. I want to 
acknowledge General Hayden and all the members of NSA both in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and throughout the world that do a superb job. 
Unfortunately, the American people should know more about what they do, 
but we cannot really talk about that.
  The bill also makes some reductions in several NSA programs that I 
believe are too deep. All of the affected programs are essential to 
NSA's overall technology modernization program, which is key to the 
future success of the agency. I hope that these reductions will be 
addressed in conference with the Senate.
  Congress last year transferred the authority to review and approve 
NSA's acquisitions programs to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition in the Defense Department. NSA and the Under Secretary are 
faithfully implementing this direction, and NSA is, in my judgment, 
making good progress in restoring confidence in its acquisition 
management capabilities.
  I want to express again my appreciation to the gentleman from 
Florida. He is an honorable man. He has done a great job. We have a 
disagreement on an issue. Again, I ask the majority to understand, 
because we disagree does not mean we are being political. It means that 
we think this is in the best interests of the United States of America 
and its national security.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the 
gentlewoman from California, the ranking member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  I want to thank the gentlewoman for her steady leadership on so many 
issues that are very, very grave related to our national security. Let 
me just say that I appreciate this opportunity to discuss an issue very 
briefly that is of great importance, that is, ensuring that our Federal 
intelligence dollars are not used to support groups or individuals 
engaged in efforts to overthrow democratically elected governments.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. I want to assure 
her that I understand and fully support the general principle reflected 
in her point and appreciate her intention in raising this issue. I also 
want to assure the gentlewoman that, as this bill moves forward, we 
will be mindful of the issue and will try to be helpful.
  Ms. LEE. I thank the gentlewoman for her attention to this issue. I 
look forward to working with her.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of our committee 
who is probably better known as a world-class pilot.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I thank the chairman for yielding time. I am just an 
old man today.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to invoke two names: Jack Murtha and Ike 
Skelton. If you watched the defense bill go through here, both in 
authorization and appropriations, those gentlemen do not care who is 
President or who has the majority. They fight tooth, hook and nail for 
the military, for intelligence, and this Nation. I always felt that 
this committee that I serve on did the same thing, until, as it has 
been mentioned, last year, unfortunately in election year politics, the 
Democrat leadership has forced, I think, or at least led some of the 
more thoughtful members to be partisan. That is the saddest thing.
  In the rule, I talked about the gentlewoman from California. During 
Ronald Reagan's burial, I had tears in my eyes. I could not hold them 
back. She reached over and took my hand to console me, patted my hand 
and said, ``Duke, isn't it good to be friends?'' I would tell the 
gentlewoman from California, we are good friends and the members on the 
committee I hunt and fish with, a lot of them. Some of the ladies I do 
not.
  What is so disappointing, and I tell my friends on the other side, we 
could do this just like Ike Skelton and Jack Murtha and after sitting 
in the committee for several hours and watching the intentional 
partisanship, intent just to hurt the President, even though you know 
there were a couple of those amendments that I wanted to vote for, but 
there was no way I was going to vote for them after that and that is 
sad. I think that we can do better in this committee. We will have 
dinner together. We will hunt, we will fish, and we will cry together; 
but I just think it is sad at this.
  Porter Goss is the finest chairman in defense that I have ever seen 
in 14 years. His experience at CIA and on this committee, sometimes 
during the committee I get upset, but the gentleman from Florida is 
levelheaded, sits there and meets with the ranking member and tries to 
work through these bills in a very bipartisan way. I think we do 
ourselves a disservice today in some cases.
  I ask Members to vote for this bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett).
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 4548. Am I 
the only one that finds it odd that my colleagues from the other side 
are in the position of saying, ``Well, you know, I voted for this thing 
before I voted against it''? Every one of them voted for it yesterday 
in the Defense appropriations bill.
  Nevertheless, I am proud to serve as a member of this Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and it is a distinct privilege to 
serve as a crossover member on the House Committee on Armed Services. 
This bill takes the

[[Page H4832]]

lead in defense intelligence and fully supports the Secretary of 
Defense and his initiatives to transform the Department for the future. 
I think we have a large, but responsible, spending plan here, including 
the contingent emergency reserve fund; and the challenge will be to 
integrate these initiatives into baseline efforts for the purpose of 
fighting terrorism.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed, sincerely disappointed, that my 
friends on the other side did vote against this bill in committee. It 
is a sad departure from what we normally do in that committee. But it 
is a good bill. It properly supports intelligence.
  I will submit my entire statement at this time in the Record.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 4548. I am proud to 
serve as a member of the Intelligence Committee, and it is a distinct 
privilege to serve as a crossover-Member on the House Armed Services 
Committee. I would like to commend the Chairman, Mr. Goss, for bringing 
this bill to the floor at a time when it is needed most in our 
country's history.
  H.R. 4548 addresses a critical need for the Intelligence Community 
and the Department of Defense's architectural strategy, integration, 
and information sharing among classic intelligence activities (like 
SIGINT and IMINT) and innovative or dynamic disciplines such as 
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) that is being increasingly relied on, in our 
current global conflicts.
  This bill takes the lead in Defense Intelligence and fully supports 
the Secretary of Defense and his initiatives to transform the 
Department for the future. I think we have a large, but responsible 
spending plan here, including the Contingent Emergency Reserve Fund, 
and the challenge will be to integrate these initiatives into baseline 
efforts for the fight against terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I would however, also like to express my sincere 
disappointment on the decision of the minority Membership of the 
Committee not to vote for this bill. This is a bad departure from the 
strong tradition of bipartisan support for this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this bill properly supports the 
Intelligence Community, and provides our best and first line of defense 
for America. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4548.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), who is actually known as the 
chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, and otherwise known 
as our colleague and friend.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  And let me just say that when we put the defense bill together, put 
together with bipartisan support, passed the committee unanimously, we 
bolted on $25 billion in supplemental for this next year. 2.2 billion 
of that, after consultation with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman 
Goss), we put into the intel side which went into his intel budget. 
That is only for a couple of months. It was understood that was just 
for a couple of months.
  And I would say to the gentlewoman who said we have underfunded 
counterterrorism to hold on to her horses because we have got a 
supplemental coming up for 2005, which will have a large intel piece to 
it and she will be tired of voting for intel increases.
  So there is no cut to the intel budget. This was always intended to 
be a bridge. And everybody, everybody, on both sides of the aisle, we 
passed this thing 60 to zero in the committee, an overwhelmingly vote 
in the full House. It was only be supposed to be for a couple of months 
at the end of this year so our intel people and the people that wear 
the uniform would have that bridge in the winter months of this year.
  So I want to applaud the gentleman for everything he has done. We did 
this with total synchronization, total coordination, and we have got a 
great budget for the folks who carry out the intel duties for this 
Nation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Ms. Harman asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to our last speaker that 
the DOD appropriations bill is a $400 billion bill, a small fraction of 
which is for intelligence. In my view, that is not the place for this 
debate about fully funding counterterrorism intelligence. The 
intelligence bill is where we should make our stand. And I do 
appreciate the gentleman from California's (Mr. Hunter) clarification, 
as he just said, that the additional counterterrorism funding in his 
bill is only for a couple of months.
  That is the point we are trying to make, Mr. Chairman. We all are 
patriots. We all support the troops. We all support our intelligence 
personnel. We just think that the primary mission of the intelligence 
community ought to be funded in the base bill, the one we are voting on 
today.
  Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization bill represents the 
culmination of many months of work by our community to provide the 
intelligence community with the resources it needs to safeguard our 
national security. It also presents an opportunity to lay down 
important oversight markers so that we can fulfill our constitutionally 
mandated duty to provide oversight of the intelligence community. The 
Intelligence Committees were created for precisely this reason, and if 
we simply become a rubber stamp for the administration, then we might 
as well cease to exist.
  At the outset, let me commend our diligent staff on both sides of the 
aisle for their hard work and late nights, and let me commend all 
members of our committee on both sides of the aisle for their focus and 
dedication to getting it right. Four of them, the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), 
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), and the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Collins), will leave us this year, and I wish them fair 
winds. I also want to explain the gentleman from Florida's (Mr. 
Hastings) absence. Our thoughts are with him as he cares for his ailing 
mother.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate has been very difficult, certainly for me. 
As everyone here knows, over five terms in Congress, I have voted for 
every intelligence authorization bill and every defense authorization 
bill, and I have often worked to try to plus-up amounts in those bills. 
The brave men and women of the intelligence community rely on us. 
Without us, they cannot do their job. I have traveled around the world 
and visited with them, and their bravery and courage speaks volumes 
about how much they love this country.
  For all of these reasons, I stand here today with a heavy heart 
because I feel that unfortunately and needlessly, this bill could have 
and should have provided for stronger intelligence and stronger 
oversight.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say to the gentlewoman the 
reason we bolted on $25 billion, not $50 billion, not $75 billion, with 
a piece of that being carried for her committee was because we have a 
war in two theatres which is ebbing and flowing. We cannot see into the 
future. We may need more money in January and February than projected 
$50 billion or even $75 billion. So I would just say to the 
gentlewoman, there is plenty of money for current operations. Nobody is 
being short-changed in this year.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if I could just respond 
to the gentleman, and I would be happy to yield again if I have any 
more time if he wants to respond to what I have to say, I appreciate 
that comment, but mine is a bit different. I understand that we may not 
fully know what we need. That is why we have supplementals. But in this 
case we do fully know what we need. We know what the agencies in the 
intelligence community need for counterterrorism because they have told 
us, and the amendments we wish had been in order had an unclassified 
piece, which basically says we should fully fund counterterrorism, and 
a classified piece, where we carefully allocated across the 
intelligence community all the money these agencies have told us they 
need. They told us it is hard to plan for their year without knowing 
for sure that they will get money.

[[Page H4833]]

  And the last point I want to make to the gentleman, and I do 
appreciate what he is saying, is that I do not think we will pass 
another supplemental until sometime after the first quarter of next 
year. We will be gearing up in a new Congress, and if we pass the 
supplemental in next March or April, as I pointed out in my earlier 
remarks, we may have a gap in funding counterterrorism just at the time 
when we have the presidential inauguration and the Super Bowl, and 
those are huge events were maximum counterterrorism efforts are needed.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me just say to the gentlewoman that I 
too have looked at requirements. And intel requirements in those two 
war-fighting theatres, Afghanistan and Iraq, are as difficult for the 
intel experts to project as it is for our defense experts, our people 
who are leading uniformed troops, and there is plenty of money to carry 
this bridge. This is a bridge fund, and I might say 60 out of 60 
people, Republicans and Democrats, agreed this was a good number, and 
this had the $2.2 billion intel piece embedded in it when we passed it. 
So I can just tell the gentlewoman there is not going to be a gap.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First of all, I want to assure the gentlewoman that I associate 
myself with stronger intelligence. Her poster, I think, is excellent, 
and I am delighted that we all agree on that.
  Second of all, I want to tell the gentlewoman that I totally agree 
that the form is not pretty. I do not like supplementals either. We 
work with what we have to work with. But the substance, I think, came 
out as well as it could. And I want to thank the distinguished chairman 
of the Committee on Armed Services for reaching out to help us with the 
bridge.
  In a more direct answer to the gentlewoman's question a while ago 
about what requests were, and I am going to be very candid, these were 
the requests we were working with. And they are not for the whole year, 
but they are the requests to deal with the war on terror. And we 
actually come up with 32 percent more than what the CIA requested, 100 
percent of what DIA requested, 39 percent more than what NSA requested, 
88 percent more than NRO, and 19 percent more than NGA.
  So we are way ahead in bridging. But obviously, her point is we have 
not gone for a whole year, and we all understand that. The question is 
will there be a short-change? And my answer is no. And the problem I 
have with her solution that she had proposed, somewhat belatedly, if I 
may say that, and I will come to that point if I have time, is that 
authorized money without appropriated money behind it is monopoly 
money, as we all know, and that was part of the problem.
  Now let me go to the gentleman from Missouri's (Mr. Skelton) point, 
which I think was a very poignant point and I have huge regard for the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), as we all do: What happened this 
year? And the answer is that normally we do work out all of our 
differences before we bring our bill out. We get them done in 
committee. This year we are on a schedule. I thought we had all our 
differences worked out. I honestly did not know we were going to have 
some of these amendments that she came up with until a couple of hours 
before the meeting. I asked that they try to be worked out. Apparently 
they were.
  Normally we need more than 2 or 3 hours to work out something as 
important as a budget. So I do not think there is any bad intention. 
What I think is that there is more work to be done, and there will be 
an opportunity between now and the conference.
  I urge support for this bill because I think it is a great place to 
go forward.
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this important 
Intelligence Authorization, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  First of all, I want to congratulate Porter Goss not only for his 
work on this legislation, but also for his distinguished career as a 
servant for the people.
  Everyday, Porter Goss has come to work with one thought in mind: How 
do I make this country a better and safer place?
  Porter, we are going to miss you when you leave this House.
  I had hoped that the Minority would give you the respect you deserve 
and work with you on this bill.
  Instead, they want to play politics.
  I have to hand it to the Minority. They have taken the strategy that 
the best defense is a good offense to its extreme.
  They have no defense when it comes to their pathetic record on 
intelligence funding. So they try to cloud the issue by saying that we 
are not spending enough on intelligence.
  What makes this strategy laughable is the fact that just yesterday, 
House Democrats voted overwhelmingly for intelligence funding in the 
Defense Appropriations bill.
  Yesterday, the funding was just right. Today, they are simply 
shocked, shocked, that we don't spend enough.
  Why the sudden change of heart? Politics, of course. Pure politics.
  Throughout the 1990's, leading Democrats offered amendment after 
amendment to slash Intelligence funding. They offered amendment after 
amendment in an effort to hamstring the C.I.A. And the Clinton White 
House not only ignored the Intelligence Community, they disdained it. 
Bill Clinton himself rarely allowed the CIA Director into the Oval 
Office.

  Let's not kid ourselves. The left wing of the Democratic Party has a 
long tradition of hostility to the C.I.A. They have never been 
comfortable with the world of intelligence gathering.
  Even after 9-11, many in the Minority have sought to decimate 
intelligence funding. These same Members who today claim the pending 
bill is inadequate, voted against emergency supplemental intelligence 
funding last year.
  For members of the Democratic Party to come to the House floor and 
say that they could do it better than Porter Goss is simply not 
believable.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community deserves better than 
partisan political stunts.
  Without intelligence, we cannot win the war on terror.
  Intelligence funding helped bring to justice Saddam Hussein and his 
evil sons, Qusay and Uday. And it has assisted in the death of or 
capture of 42 of the 55 most wanted criminals of the Saddam regime and 
of more than 2,700 Al-Qa'ida leaders and foot soldiers around the 
globe.
  Perhaps most important, in the United States, nearly 200 suspected 
terrorist associates have been charged with crimes with the help of 
quality intelligence information.
  We are doing the right thing with this authorization. Vote to make 
America safer. Vote for this Intelligence Authorization.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to 
several aspects of the legislation that we consider, H.R. 4548, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005. It is ridiculous that of 
eight quality amendments offered at the Rules * * *.
  The most important of the eight amendments offered but not made in 
order, the Peterson-Cramer-Boswell amendment, would have fully funded 
the counterterrorism activities of the intelligence community at the 
amount that the intelligence agencies have suggested be requested. All 
nine Democrats who serve on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence voted unanimously to support this amendment at its markup.
  Mr. Chairman, without this important amendment, our intelligence 
capabilities will be handicapped. The outlays called for in the 
Peterson-Cramer-Boswell amendment would have provided for additional 
oversight over intelligence, which is critical, especially in light of 
the state of confusion that we see in this Administration's 
intelligence program.
  Like President Bush's request in his FY 2005 Budget, H.R. 4548 
proposes to fund only a small fraction of the intelligence agencies' 
counterterrorism requirements. Only 20 percent of the funding 
requirements for the CIA Counterterrorism Center were called for in the 
Bush Budget. The fact that the administration then requested a 
supplemental allocation for the first quarter of FY 2005 evidences the 
dire need for these monies.
  The intelligence community should not have to rely on supplemental 
funding to carry out its core functions! In the wake of 9/11 and new 
episodes of terrorism violence almost daily, it is not comforting to 
know that our intelligence community is operating on supplemental 
``crutches.'' While this nation sits in a vulnerable state, the 
Administration puts us on ``ice'' until November elections. Very scary.
  The CIA Counterterrorism Center has had to wait for supplemental 
funding for 80 percent of its requirements! Reports from the Houston 
FBI's Field Intelligence Group (FIG), there have been several reports 
that one of Houston's major sources of vulnerability, either the 
airports, the Port of Houston, or the nuclear South Texas Project will 
be hit by al-Qaeda ``sleeper cells.'' We need the most effective 
counterterrorism resources available to prevent such an occurrence. 
Waiting for supplemental funding will not keep our families safe,

[[Page H4834]]

especially with upcoming events that would attract a potential 
terrorist such as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, 
the November elections, and Independence Day celebrations.
  Mr. Chairman, it is important that, should this legislation pass, the 
conferees address the fact that less than one-third of what the 
intelligence agencies have suggested is provided in the proposal. 
Therefore, I would fully support a motion to recommit for purpose of 
incorporating the critical addition of outlays to counterterrorism that 
are needed to secure our homeland.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support a motion to recommit.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this legislation. 
Though I certainly recognize the legitimate national security role of 
our intelligence community, I have concerns about this authorization 
and the questionable role played by components of the intelligence 
community.
  Specifically, I am concerned about our history of secret regime 
changes carried out by our intelligence apparatus. More often than not, 
we see many of the problems we face today were created as a result of 
this unwise practice of forcibly changing regimes in secret.
  The stories of such activities are numerous. In 1953 the CIA 
overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran, installing the Shah as dictator. 
This led to increasing anti-Americanism, the overthrow of the Shah in 
1979, the kidnapping of Americans, the establishment of a hardline 
Islamic regime hostile to the United States. In the 1980s the United 
States provided covert support to Saddam Hussein's Iraq in its war with 
Iran. Ten years later the United States went to war against Saddam 
Hussein and then 11 years after that the United States went to war 
again against Saddam's Iraq. In the 1980s the United States provided 
weapons and training to the Taliban and what later became al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan as they sought to overthrow the communist government in 
power. Some 20 years later, that same Taliban and Osama bin Laden 
struck out against the United States. The United States then went to 
war against that Taliban government.
  I am also concerned about the efficacy of our intelligence community. 
The intelligence budget seems to grow every year, but seldom do my 
colleagues ask what exactly we are getting for our constituents' money. 
It may be unfair that we only hear about the intelligence community's 
failures and shortcomings, but we cannot help but be concerned over so 
many such failures in recent years. Despite the tens of billions we 
spend on these myriad intelligence agencies, it is impossible to ignore 
the failure of the intelligence community to detect and prevent the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.
  Additionally, as we now see so clearly, our intelligence community 
failed completely to accurately assess the nature of the Iraqi threat. 
We were told of weapons of mass destruction capable of reaching the 
United States. This proved to be false. We were told of Iraq's 
relationship with al-Qaeda. This proved to be false. The intelligence 
community relied heavily--perhaps almost exclusively--on Iraqi exile 
and convicted criminal Ahmad Chalabi to provide intelligence on Iraq 
and most of it turned out to be incorrect, perhaps intentionally 
misleading. Now we are told that Chalabi and his organization may have 
passed sensitive intelligence to Iran. We have read reports of secret 
pseudo-agencies set up in the Pentagon and elsewhere whose role appears 
to have been to politicize intelligence in order to force pre-
determined conclusions. This does not serve the American people well. 
These are all by any measure grave failures, costing us incalculably in 
human lives and dollars. Yet from what little we can know about this 
bill, the solution is to fund more of the same. I would hope that we 
might begin coming up with new approaches to our intelligence needs.
  I encourage my colleagues to reject this bill and instead begin 
looking for new ways to strengthen the legitimate functions of our 
intelligence community so as to better protect the borders and citizens 
of the United States.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment and shall be considered read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                               H.R. 4548

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information 
              Management.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency voluntary 
              separation incentive program.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.

                          TITLE VI--EDUCATION

            Subtitle A--National Security Education Program

Sec. 601. Provision for annual funding.
Sec. 602. Modification of obligated service requirements under the 
              National Security Education Program.
Sec. 603. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 604. Establishment of scholarship program for English language 
              studies for heritage community citizens of the United 
              States within the National Security Education Program.

  Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language 
                                 Skills

Sec. 611. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and 
              Education.
Sec. 612. Requirement for foreign language proficiency for advancement 
              to certain senior level positions in the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 613. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 614. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 615. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual 
              Translation Center.
Sec. 616. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors 
              of the Defense Language Institute.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2005 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Department of Justice.
       (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (13) The Coast Guard.
       (14) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4548 of the One Hundred 
     Eighth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2005 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account

[[Page H4835]]

     of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 
     the sum of $318,395,000. Within such amount, funds identified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2006.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel 
     as of September 30, 2005. Personnel serving in such elements 
     may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements 
     of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2005 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts for research and development shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2006.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2005, there are also authorized such additional personnel for 
     such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2005 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $29,811,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2006, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2005 the sum of $239,400,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of 
     any intelligence activity which is not otherwise 
     authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United 
     States.

     SEC. 303. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR 
                   INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Establishment of Position Within the Office of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.--Subsection (e)(2) of 
     section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403) is amended--
       (1) by striking subparagraph (G); and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new 
     subparagraph (G):
       ``(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Information Management.''.
       (b) Duties.--Section 102 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (h); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
     subsection (h):
       ``(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Information Management.--(1) To assist the Director of 
     Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's 
     responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management 
     who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director of 
     Central Intelligence for Information Management is the chief 
     information officer of the intelligence community.
       ``(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Information Management shall--
       ``(A) manage activities relating to the information 
     technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture 
     requirements of the intelligence community;
       ``(B) have procurement approval authority over all 
     information technology items related to the enterprise 
     architectures of all intelligence community components;
       ``(C) direct and manage all information technology-related 
     procurement for the intelligence community; and
       ``(D) ensure that all expenditures for information 
     technology and research and development activities are 
     consistent with the intelligence community enterprise 
     architecture and the strategy of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence for such architecture.
       ``(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management 
     may not, while so serving, serve as the chief information 
     officer of any other agency or department, or component 
     thereof, of the United States.''.
       (c) References.--Any reference to the Assistant Director of 
     Central Intelligence for Administration in any law, 
     regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 
     States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Assistant 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.

       (a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 
     403-4 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (f); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
     (f) and (g), respectively.
       (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) 
     Section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further 
     amended by striking subsection (i).
       (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce 
     Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by 
     striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 
     104)''.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
                   PANEL.

       The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:
       ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security 
     Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing 
     panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be 
     appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director.
       ``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies 
     Panel shall study and assess, and periodically advise the 
     Director on, the research, development, and application of 
     existing and emerging science and technology advances, 
     advances on encryption, and other topics.
       ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) 
     shall not apply with respect to the National Security Agency 
     Emerging Technologies Panel.''.

                          TITLE VI--EDUCATION

            Subtitle A--National Security Education Program

     SEC. 601. PROVISION FOR ANNUAL FUNDING.

       (a) In General.--Title VIII of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 
     105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public 
     Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037), is amended by adding at the end 
     of section 810 the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management 
     Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In 
     addition to amounts that may be made available to the 
     Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from 
     amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with 
     fiscal year 2005, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, 
     fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), 
     and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding 
     subparagraph (A) by inserting ``or from a transfer under 
     section 810(c)'' after ``National Security Education Trust 
     Fund''.

     SEC. 602. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS 
                   UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of title 
     VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1273), as amended by 
     section 925(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1578), is 
     amended by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B), and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, as soon 
     as practicable but in no case later than three years after 
     the completion by the recipient of the study for which 
     scholarship assistance was provided under the program, the 
     recipient shall work for a period of one year--
       ``(i) in a national security position that the Secretary 
     certifies is appropriate to use the unique language and 
     region expertise acquired

[[Page H4836]]

     by the recipient pursuant to such study in the Department of 
     Defense, in any element of the intelligence community, in the 
     Department of Homeland Security, or in the Department of 
     State; or
       ``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department 
     or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient 
     demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available 
     in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i); or
       ``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, as soon 
     as practicable but in no case later than two years after the 
     completion by the recipient of the study for which fellowship 
     assistance was provided under the program, the recipient 
     shall work for a period equal to the duration of assistance 
     provided under the program, but in no case less than one 
     year--
       ``(i) in a position described in subparagraph (A)(i) that 
     the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use the unique 
     language and region expertise acquired by the recipient 
     pursuant to such study; or
       ``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department 
     or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient 
     demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available 
     in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i); 
     and''.
       (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
     regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection 
     (a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall 
     establish standards that recipients of scholarship and 
     fellowship assistance under the program under such section 
     802 are required to demonstrate to satisfy the requirement of 
     a good faith effort to gain employment as required under 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(2) of such 
     section.
       (c) Applicability.--(1) The amendment made by subsection 
     (a) shall apply with respect to service agreements entered 
     into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act 
     of 1991 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not affect 
     the force, validity, or terms of any service agreement 
     entered into under the David L. Boren National Security 
     Education Act of 1991 before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act that is in force as of that date.

     SEC. 603. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE 
                   INITIATIVE.

       (a) Increase in Annual Funding.--Title VIII of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public 
     Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 
     (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
     (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended by striking 
     section 811 and inserting the following new section 811:

     ``SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE 
                   INITIATIVE.

       ``(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 
     and 2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available 
     to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each 
     fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to 
     carry out the grant program for the National Flagship 
     Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
       ``(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management 
     Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In 
     addition to amounts that may be made available to the 
     Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from 
     amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with 
     fiscal year 2005, $12,000,000, to carry out the grant program 
     for the National Flagship Language Initiative under 
     section 802(a)(1)(D).
       ``(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made 
     available under this section shall remain available until 
     expended.''.
       (b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 
     802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act 
     of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new paragraph:
       ``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate 
     student that participates in training in programs under 
     paragraph (1), the student shall enter into an agreement 
     described in subsection (b), other than such a student who 
     has entered into such an agreement pursuant to subparagraph 
     (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
       ``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department 
     of the Federal Government that participates in training in 
     programs under paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in 
     writing--
       ``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or 
     department of the Federal Government employing the employee 
     for the period of such training;
       ``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or 
     department employing the employee following completion of 
     such training for a period of two years for each year, or 
     part of the year, of such training;
       ``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost 
     of such training (excluding the employee's pay and 
     allowances) provided to the employee if, before the 
     completion by the employee of the training, the employment of 
     the employee by the agency or department is terminated due to 
     misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily; 
     and
       ``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing 
     such training, the employment of the employee by the agency 
     or department is terminated either by the agency or 
     department due to misconduct by the employee or by the 
     employee voluntarily, before the completion by the employee 
     of the period of service required in clause (ii), in an 
     amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of the 
     training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) 
     provided to the employee as the unserved portion of such 
     period of service bears to the total period of service under 
     clause (ii).
       ``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to 
     reimburse the United States under an agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) is for all purposes a debt owing the United 
     States.
       ``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     may release an employee, in whole or in part, from the 
     obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement 
     under subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of 
     the element, the head of the element determines that equity 
     or the interests of the United States so require.''.
       (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to 
     training that begins on or after the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational 
     Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps 
     as the Secretary determines will increase the number of 
     qualified educational institutions that receive grants under 
     the National Flagship Language Initiative to establish, 
     operate, or improve activities designed to train students in 
     programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels 
     of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary 
     identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the 
     national security of the United States.
       (d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
     Educational institutions that receive grants under the 
     National Flagship Language Initiative may support students 
     who pursue total immersion foreign language studies overseas 
     of foreign languages that are critical to the national 
     security of the United States.

     SEC. 604. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH 
                   LANGUAGE STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY 
                   CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

       (a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for 
     Heritage Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) 
     Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren 
     National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
       ``(i) are United States citizens who--

       ``(I) are native speakers (commonly referred to as heritage 
     community residents) of a foreign language that is identified 
     as critical to the national security interests of the United 
     States who should be actively recruited for employment by 
     Federal security agencies with a need for linguists; and
       ``(II) are not proficient at a professional level in the 
     English language with respect to reading, writing, and 
     interpersonal skills required to carry out the national 
     security interests of the United States, as determined by the 
     Secretary,

     to enable such students to pursue English language studies at 
     an institution of higher education of the United States to 
     attain proficiency in those skills; and
       ``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a national 
     security position or work in the field of education in the 
     area of study for which the scholarship was awarded in a 
     similar manner (as determined by the Secretary) as agreements 
     entered into pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).''.
       (2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section 
     is amended--
       (A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the 
     scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under 
     paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language 
     Initiative described in subsection (i)''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the 
     authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program 
     under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
       (3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1903(d)(4)(E)) is amended by inserting before the period the 
     following: ``and section 802(a)(1)(E) (relating to 
     scholarship programs for advanced English language studies by 
     heritage community residents)''.
       (b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security 
     Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN 
                   HERITAGE COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.

       ``(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management 
     Account.--In addition to amounts that may be made available 
     to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the 
     Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning 
     with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out the 
     scholarship programs for English language studies by certain 
     heritage community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under 
     subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.''.

  Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language 
                                 Skills

     SEC. 611. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR 
                   LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION.

       (a) In General.--Section 102 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Language and Education.--(1) To assist the Director of 
     Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's 
     responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant 
     Director of

[[Page H4837]]

     Central Intelligence for Language and Education who shall be 
     appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Language and Education shall carry out the following duties:
       ``(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign 
     language education and training of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities 
     relating to such requirements.
       ``(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the 
     capability of the intelligence community to carry out 
     national security activities of the United States.
       ``(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign 
     language education and training in order to ensure the 
     requirements of the intelligence community with respect to 
     foreign language proficiency are met.'';
       (2) in subsection (d)(2) by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central 
     Intelligence for Language and Education, ensuring the foreign 
     language education and training requirements of the 
     intelligence community are met.''; and
       (3) in subsection (e)(2)--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (I); 
     and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following new 
     subparagraph (H):
       ``(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Education and Language.''.
       (b) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which 
     the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language 
     and Education is first appointed under section 102(i) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), 
     the Assistant Director shall submit to Congress the following 
     reports:
       (1) A report that identifies--
       (A) skills and processes involved in learning a foreign 
     language; and
       (B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are most 
     effective in teaching foreign languages.
       (2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage 
     communities, particularly such communities that include 
     speakers of languages that are critical to the national 
     security of the United States.
       (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign 
     language heritage community'' means a community of residents 
     or citizens of the United States--
       (i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency in, a 
     foreign language; and
       (ii) who should be actively recruited for employment by 
     Federal security agencies with a need for linguists.
       (3) A report on--
       (A) the estimated cost of establishing a program under 
     which the heads of elements of the intelligence community 
     agree to repay employees of the intelligence community for 
     any student loan taken out by that employee for the study of 
     foreign languages critical for the national security of the 
     United States; and
       (B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting and 
     retaining highly qualified personnel in the intelligence 
     community.

     SEC. 612. REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR 
                   ADVANCEMENT TO CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS 
                   IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 104 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for 
     Certain Senior Level Positions in the Central Intelligence 
     Agency.--(1) An individual may not be appointed to a position 
     in the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of 
     Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that the individual--
       ``(A) has been certified as having a professional speaking 
     and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such 
     proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency 
     Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate 
     proficiency level on such other indicator of proficiency as 
     the Director determines to be appropriate; and
       ``(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities of 
     the United States and exercise influence in that foreign 
     language.
       ``(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through 
     the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language 
     and Education.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of section 102 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403), as added 
     by section 611(a), is amended in paragraph (2) by adding at 
     the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply with respect to appointments made on or after the 
     date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (d) Report on Exceptions.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report that 
     identifies positions within the Senior Intelligence Service 
     in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of 
     Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that should be 
     exempt from the requirements of section 104(i) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), 
     and that includes the rationale for the exemption of each 
     such position identified by the Director.

     SEC. 613. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C.) is amended--
       (1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the 
     following:

                ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology'';

     and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program


     ``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the 
                         intelligence community

       ``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary 
     of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may 
     jointly establish a program to advance foreign languages 
     skills in languages that are critical to the capability of 
     the intelligence community to carry out national security 
     activities of the United States (hereinafter in this subtitle 
     referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
       ``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to 
     carry out the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     jointly determine actions required to improve the education 
     of personnel in the intelligence community in foreign 
     languages that are critical to the capability of the 
     intelligence community to carry out national security 
     activities of the United States to meet the long-term 
     intelligence needs of the United States.


                        ``education partnerships

       ``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign 
     Languages Program, the head of an element of an intelligence 
     community entity may enter into one or more education 
     partnership agreements with educational institutions in the 
     United States in order to encourage and enhance the study of 
     foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the 
     intelligence community to carry out national security 
     activities of the United States in educational institutions.
       ``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership 
     Agreements.--Under an educational partnership agreement 
     entered into with an educational institution pursuant to this 
     section, the head of an element of an intelligence community 
     entity may provide the following assistance to the 
     educational institution:
       ``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of 
     the element of the intelligence community entity to the 
     educational institution for any purpose and duration that the 
     head determines to be appropriate.
       ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating 
     to transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the 
     educational institution of any computer equipment, or other 
     equipment, that is--
       ``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
       ``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
       ``(C) determined by the head of the element to be 
     appropriate for support of such agreement.
       ``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the 
     educational institution--
       ``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are 
     critical to the capability of the intelligence community to 
     carry out national security activities of the United States; 
     or
       ``(B) to assist in the development of such courses and 
     materials for the institution.
       ``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the 
     educational institution in research projects of the element 
     of the intelligence community entity.
       ``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in 
     developing a program under which students receive academic 
     credit at the educational institution for work on research 
     projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
       ``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and 
     assistance to students of the educational institution.
       ``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the 
     head of the element of the intelligence community entity 
     determines to be appropriate.


                          ``voluntary services

       ``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--
     Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, 
     and subject to subsection (b), the Foreign Languages Program 
     under section 1011 shall include authority for the head of 
     an element of an intelligence community entity to accept 
     from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as defined 
     in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the 
     activities authorized by this subtitle.
       ``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting 
     voluntary services from an individual under subsection (a), 
     the head of the element shall--
       ``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the 
     head of the element would supervise a compensated employee of 
     that element providing similar services; and
       ``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, 
     has appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or 
     is otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to 
     provide such services.
       ``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual 
     under subsection (a), the head of an element of the 
     intelligence community entity may not--
       ``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or 
     other position performing inherently government functions; or
       ``(B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate the 
     individual for the provision of such services.
       ``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing 
     Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence 
     community entity may recruit and train individuals to provide 
     voluntary services accepted under subsection (a).
       ``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) 
     Subject to paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services 
     accepted under subsection (a) or receiving training under 
     subsection (c), an individual shall be considered to

[[Page H4838]]

     be an employee of the Federal Government only for purposes of 
     the following provisions of law:
       ``(A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
     Code (relating to compensation for work-related injuries).
       ``(B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating 
     to maintenance of records on individuals).
       ``(C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating 
     to conflicts of interest).
       ``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under 
     paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the 
     scope of the services so accepted, the individual is deemed 
     to be a volunteer of a governmental entity or nonprofit 
     institution for purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act of 
     1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
       ``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual 
     with respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) 
     of such Act (42 U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
       ``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section 
     shall have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a 
     security clearance.
       ``(e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes 
     of determining the compensation for work-related injuries 
     payable under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to 
     an individual providing voluntary services accepted under 
     subsection (a), the monthly pay of the individual for such 
     services is deemed to be equal to the amount determined by 
     multiplying--
       ``(1) the average monthly number of hours that the 
     individual provided the services, by
       ``(2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with 
     section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 
     U.S.C. 206(a)(1)).
       ``(f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head 
     of an element of the intelligence community entity may 
     reimburse an individual for incidental expenses incurred by 
     the individual in providing voluntary services accepted under 
     subsection (a). The head of an element of the intelligence 
     community entity shall determine which expenses are eligible 
     for reimbursement under this subsection.
       ``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
     appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
       ``(g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an 
     element of the intelligence community may install telephone 
     lines and any necessary telecommunication equipment in the 
     private residences of individuals who provide voluntary 
     services accepted under subsection (a).
       ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     may pay the charges incurred for the use of equipment 
     installed under paragraph (1) for authorized purposes.
       ``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United 
     States Code, the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community entity may use appropriated funds or 
     nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying out this 
     subsection.


                             ``regulations

       ``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and 
     the Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate 
     regulations necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages 
     Program authorized under this subtitle.
       ``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of 
     an element of an intelligence community entity shall 
     prescribe regulations to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 
     with respect to that element including the following:
       ``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of 
     voluntary services under section 1013.
       ``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the 
     installation of equipment under section 1013(g).


                             ``Definitions

       ``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
       ``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an 
     agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in 
     subparagraphs (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
       ``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
       ``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is defined 
     in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
     Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
       ``(B) an institution of higher education (as defined in 
     section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     1002) other than institutions referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
       ``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides 
     instruction of foreign languages in languages that are 
     critical to the capability of the intelligence community to 
     carry out national security activities of the United States.
       ``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the 
     intelligence community and private citizens (including former 
     civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been 
     voluntarily separated, and members of the United States 
     Armed Forces who have been honorably discharged or 
     generally discharged under honorable circumstances, and 
     rehired on a voluntary basis specifically to perform the 
     activities authorized under this subtitle).

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions


 ``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students

       ``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence, acting through the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community, may assign employees of such elements 
     in analyst positions requiring foreign language expertise as 
     students at accredited professional, technical, or other 
     institutions of higher education for training at the graduate 
     or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for the 
     conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
       ``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and 
     Training.--(1) The Director may reimburse an employee 
     assigned under subsection (a) for the total cost of the 
     training described in subsection (a), including costs of 
     educational and supplementary reading materials.
       ``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to 
     employees who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
       ``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
     appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
       ``(c) Relationship to Compensation as an Analyst.--
     Reimbursement under this section to an employee who is an 
     analyst is in addition to any benefits, allowances, travels, 
     or other compensation the employee is entitled to by reason 
     of serving in such an analyst position.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 1001 and inserting the following new 
     items:

                  ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology

``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate 
              degrees in science and technology.

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to 
              the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language 
              students.''.

     SEC. 614. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.

       (a) Pilot Project.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian 
     Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of United States citizens 
     with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages who 
     would be available upon a call of the President to perform 
     such service or duties with respect to such foreign languages 
     in the Federal Government as the President may specify.
       (b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings 
     and recommendations contained in the report required under 
     section 325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting 
     the pilot project under subsection (a) the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall--
       (1) identify several foreign languages that are critical 
     for the national security of the United States;
       (2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of 
     proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available 
     to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection 
     (a); and
       (3) implement a call for the performance of such services 
     and duties.
       (c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under 
     subsection (a) shall be conducted for a three-year period.
       (d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence may enter into contracts with 
     appropriate agencies or entities to carry out the pilot 
     project under subsection (a).
       (e) Reports.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress an initial and a final report on the 
     pilot project conducted under subsection (a).
       (2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain 
     information on the operation of the pilot project, the 
     success of the pilot project in carrying out the objectives 
     of the establishment of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, 
     and recommendations for the continuation or expansion of the 
     pilot project.
       (3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 
     months after the completion of the project.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Director of Central Intelligence 
     for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to 
     carry out the pilot project under subsection (a) such sums as 
     are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to section 102.

     SEC. 615. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
                   VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


                 ``national virtual translation center

       ``Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the 
     intelligence community known as the National Virtual 
     Translation Center under the direction of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence.
       ``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center 
     shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign 
     intelligence for all other elements of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to 
     minimize the need for a central facility for the National 
     Virtual Translation Center, the Center shall--
       ``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
       ``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the 
     intelligence community; and
       ``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
       ``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National 
     Virtual Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center 
     at any location that--
       ``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency 
     or department of the United States; and
       ``(2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines to be 
     appropriate for such purpose.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act 
     is amended by inserting after

[[Page H4839]]

     the item relating to section 118 the following new item:

``Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.''.

     SEC. 616. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED 
                   INSTRUCTORS OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study 
     on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of 
     qualified foreign language instructors at the Foreign 
     Language Center of the Defense Language Institute. In 
     conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in the 
     case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to 
     expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary 
     status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
     residence.
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     on the study conducted under subsection (a), and shall 
     include in that report recommendations for such changes in 
     legislation and regulation as the Secretary determines to be 
     appropriate.
       (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the substitute is in order except the 
amendments printed in House Report 108-561. Each amendment may be 
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated 
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the 
time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the 
proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to 
amendment and shall not be subject to be a demand for division of the 
question.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 108-561.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Goss

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Goss:
       In section 104(e)(1), strike ``$29,811,000'' and insert 
     ``$37,811,000''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The purpose of this amendment is very simple. It restores the funding 
for the National Drug Intelligence Center to the levels contained in 
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request. In fact, a number of 
actions were taken in committee regarding NDIC this year in response to 
an ongoing investigation into activities there. This amendment does 
nothing to affect these investigations that are ongoing in any way. It 
does not change in any reporting requirements nor does it lift any 
fences that were put in place. But what it does do is it restores the 
authorization level to include $8 million that had been cut from the 
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request.
  I am doing this to address the concern that the cut might 
significantly impact the important mission of the National Drug 
Intelligence Center, and the reason I have brought the amendment 
forward is because I wanted to have the distinguished gentleman from 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), who I felt has actually 
been the person who is most instrumental in this particular program, 
have as much time as he wanted to address this issue. I wanted to make 
sure he had the opportunity.
  In any event, I am assuming he would support the amendment. In the 
absence of knowing nothing beyond that, I am going to suggest that this 
amendment be adopted.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I ask to 
control the time on this side.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) may control the time.
  There was no objection.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment to restore the level of 
funding requested for NDIC, the National Drug Intelligence Center. I 
was concerned to learn that these funds had been cut, as have others 
for key satellite programs, and I am pleased that the chairman has now 
decided to restore the level of funding the Center needs to carry out 
its important counternarcotics mission. Hopefully we will address other 
shortfalls that some on our side have identified in the conference.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make an additional comment about a 
subject the chairman raised at the end of general debate, and that was 
when he called additional budget authority monopoly money. I certainly 
share his view that we should appropriate the funds that we authorize. 
That is why this side wants to authorize additional funds and then 
hopefully to get them appropriated. I have spoken to the highest levels 
of this administration about my keen view that the amount of money to 
fully fund counterterrorism for fiscal year 2005 is not so great.

                              {time}  1800

  It is not a big budget buster, certainly not as big as many other 
requests made by this administration.
  I see the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) in the room, for whom 
I have high regard. It would be my hope that sometime soon, even 
perhaps in the defense appropriations bill that comes out of 
conference, we will increase the funding for counterterrorism for 
fiscal year 2005.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, pending the arrival of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), if he is able to be here, I would be very 
happy to yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the man with whom our committee 
works very closely. He is the appropriator for our business, and we are 
indeed indebted and grateful for the kind attention and the generosity 
that he bestows on the intelligence community.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very 
much for yielding, and I appreciate the comments of the ranking member 
as well.
  It was my privilege to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence for some years, and I have great respect for the work you 
are about.
  I must say that while the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) 
and I have discussed this amendment and I know of his concerns and I am 
very supportive of his concerns, in the meantime, I really asked for 
the time because I am a bit disconcerted about what I sensed from the 
general debate as I was watching it over C-SPAN from my office.
  There appears to be developing here a level of kind of partisanship 
that I am not used to seeing when we discuss intelligence. There is 
absolutely no question that intelligence work does not know a partisan 
divide, if things are happening as they should, and to see that 
developing in the committee is most disconcerting to this Member.
  Over the years, we all know that intelligence funding was way, way 
below where it should be. The development of that lack of funding took 
place as the Congress some years ago was radically reducing defense 
spending. In those days, I used to say as defense spending is coming 
down, intelligence spending should go up, because the Commander-in-
Chief needs better and more information at such a time, rather than 
less.
  In the meantime, there is little doubt that during the 1990s, there 
were significant impacts that were negatively affecting our 
intelligence programming. In recent years, we have seen a movement in 
the other direction.
  In the bill that came off the floor yesterday, there was a reflection 
of all of our concern. Indeed, within the base bill, the appropriations 
for defense, we spent more than was in the President's budget. And in 
the Committee's action on the amendment that came from the 
administration for some $25 billion, we provided substantial amounts of 
additional funding for intelligence work.
  There is little doubt of the priority of this president, this 
administration, in making sure we have adequate funding, and I feel 
very strongly that we should know that especially the Commander-

[[Page H4840]]

in-Chief does not see partisan value in this work.
  The committee is a great committee, but there is a divide here that, 
I must say, reflects more than normally membership divide. If, at the 
staff level, we have people who are reacting for purely partisan 
purposes or their own biases, that is disconcerting to me. It is not 
healthy for the community, it is not healthy for our national defense, 
it clearly is not healthy for our intelligence community.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge support for the amendment. Not knowing 
that there would be a contrary wish from the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), whose guidance I would follow very closely 
on this, I am going to make that assumption. I hope that is a correct 
assumption and has the support of the other side, as we have heard 
expressed.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, it has our support.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 108-561.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Gallegly

  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Gallegly:
       Add at the end the following new title:

  TITLE VII--REFORM OF DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

     SEC. 701. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

       (a) Period of Designation.--Section 219(a)(4) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a'' 
     and inserting ``A''; and
       (B) by striking ``for a period of 2 years beginning on the 
     effective date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B)'' 
     and inserting ``until revoked under paragraph (5) or (6) or 
     set aside pursuant to subsection (c)'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(B) Review of designation upon petition.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall review the 
     designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the 
     procedures set forth in clauses (iii) and (iv) if the 
     designated organization files a petition for revocation 
     within the petition period described in clause (ii).
       ``(ii) Petition period.--For purposes of clause (i)--

       ``(I) if the designated organization has not previously 
     filed a petition for revocation under this subparagraph, the 
     petition period begins 2 years after the date on which the 
     designation was made; or
       ``(II) if the designated organization has previously filed 
     a petition for revocation under this subparagraph, the 
     petition period begins 2 years after the date of the 
     determination made under clause (iv) on that petition.

       ``(iii) Procedures.--Any foreign terrorist organization 
     that submits a petition for revocation under this 
     subparagraph must provide evidence in that petition that the 
     relevant circumstances described in paragraph (1) have 
     changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation with 
     respect to the organization.
       ``(iv) Determination.--

       ``(I) In general.--Not later than 180 days after receiving 
     a petition for revocation submitted under this subparagraph, 
     the Secretary shall make a determination as to such 
     revocation.
       ``(II) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider 
     classified information in making a determination in response 
     to a petition for revocation. Classified information shall 
     not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains 
     classified, except that such information may be disclosed to 
     a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial 
     review under subsection (c).
       ``(III) Publication of determination.--A determination made 
     by the Secretary under this clause shall be published in the 
     Federal Register.
       ``(IV) Procedures.--Any revocation by the Secretary shall 
     be made in accordance with paragraph (6).''; and

       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) Other review of designation.--
       ``(i) In general.--If in a 6-year period no review has 
     taken place under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall 
     review the designation of the foreign terrorist organization 
     in order to determine whether such designation should be 
     revoked pursuant to paragraph (6).
       ``(ii) Procedures.--If a review does not take place 
     pursuant to subparagraph (B) in response to a petition for 
     revocation that is filed in accordance with that 
     subparagraph, then the review shall be conducted pursuant to 
     procedures established by the Secretary. The results of such 
     review and the applicable procedures shall not be reviewable 
     in any court.
       ``(iii) Publication of results of review.--The Secretary 
     shall publish any determination made pursuant to this 
     subparagraph in the Federal Register.''.
       (b) Aliases.--Section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Amendments to a Designation.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may amend a designation 
     under this subsection if the Secretary finds that the 
     organization has changed its name, adopted a new alias, 
     dissolved and then reconstituted itself under a different 
     name or names, or merged with another organization.
       ``(2) Procedure.--Amendments made to a designation in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) shall be effective upon 
     publication in the Federal Register. Subparagraphs (B) and 
     (C) of subsection (a)(2) shall apply to an amended 
     designation upon such publication. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (4), 
     (5), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (a) shall also apply to 
     an amended designation.
       ``(3) Administrative record.--The administrative record 
     shall be corrected to include the amendments as well as any 
     additional relevant information that supports those 
     amendments.
       ``(4) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider 
     classified information in amending a designation in 
     accordance with this subsection. Classified information shall 
     not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains 
     classified, except that such information may be disclosed to 
     a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial 
     review under subsection (c).''.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 219 of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (b)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (c)'';
       (B) in paragraph (6)(A)--
       (i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``or a 
     redesignation made under paragraph (4)(B)'' and inserting 
     ``at any time, and shall revoke a designation upon completion 
     of a review conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) 
     of paragraph (4)''; and
       (ii) in clause (i), by striking ``or redesignation'';
       (C) in paragraph (7), by striking ``, or the revocation of 
     a redesignation under paragraph (6),''; and
       (D) in paragraph (8)--
       (i) by striking ``, or if a redesignation under this 
     subsection has become effective under paragraph (4)(B),''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``or redesignation''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``of the designation in 
     the Federal Register,'' and all that follows through ``review 
     of the designation'' and inserting ``in the Federal Register 
     of a designation, an amended designation, or a determination 
     in response to a petition for revocation, the designated 
     organization may seek judicial review'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, amended designation, 
     or determination in response to a petition for revocation'' 
     after ``designation'';
       (C) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, amended designation, 
     or determination in response to a petition for revocation'' 
     after ``designation''; and
       (D) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``, amended designation, 
     or determination in response to a petition for revocation'' 
     after ``designation'' each place that term appears.
       (d) Savings Provision.--For purposes of applying section 
     219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on or after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the term ``designation'', as 
     used in that section, includes all redesignations made 
     pursuant to section 219(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B)) prior to the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and such redesignations shall continue 
     to be effective until revoked as provided in paragraph (5) or 
     (6) of section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).

     SEC. 702. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY 
                   REPORTS ON TERRORISM OF INFORMATION ON 
                   TERRORIST GROUPS THAT SEEK WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION AND GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN 
                   DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

       (a) Inclusion in Reports.--Section 140 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 
     U.S.C. 2656f) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``any terrorist group known to have 
     obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or 
     develop, weapons of mass destruction,'' after ``during the 
     preceding five years,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``any group designated by the Secretary as 
     a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
     Immigration

[[Page H4841]]

     and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189),'' after ``Export 
     Administration Act of 1979,'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(iii), by striking ``and'' at 
     the end;
       (3) in subsection (b)(1)(C)--
       (A) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
       (B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new 
     clause:
       ``(iv) providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance 
     in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or 
     terrorist groups; and''; and
       (4) in subsection (b)(2)--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) as 
     (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop weapons 
     of mass destruction;''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply beginning with the first report under section 140 
     of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
     and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f), submitted more than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Gallegly) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly).
  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very important to the question of how 
our government spends its resources fighting international terrorism. 
The amendment streamlines the very burdensome and time-consuming 
procedure for redesignating a group as a foreign terrorist 
organization, thereby allowing the Federal Government to focus on 
actually fighting terrorism and preventing new attacks.
  Under existing law, the U.S. Government must devote significant 
amounts of its counterterrorist resources to the terrorist organization 
redesignation effort. This bureaucratic process must take place every 2 
years, even though the vast majority of these groups do not even 
dispute their designation. And, as we all know, some groups, such as al 
Qaeda, openly boast of their terrorist activity.
  This amendment would make two principle changes to the law. First, it 
would replace the requirement to formally redesignate terrorist 
organizations every 2 years with a procedure that allows the groups to 
petition the Secretary of State at 2-year intervals to have their 
designation revoked. It would also require the Secretary to review each 
group's designation every 6 years.
  Let me be clear. This amendment does not change the procedure for 
placing a group on the foreign terrorist organization list. The 
government must still undergo the same lengthy process that exists 
today.
  What changes under the amendment is the every 2 year redesignation 
process. Currently, the burden is on the State Department and other 
agencies to demonstrate that a group should stay on the list. This 
amendment shifts the burden to the terrorist organization to petition 
the government to be removed from the list. A terrorist group can 
petition the government every 2 years. Even if a terrorist group does 
not petition for formal removal from the terrorist list, the government 
must still review the designation every 6 years.
  By streamlining the process, the State Department and other agencies, 
including our intelligence services, can focus on designating new 
groups as terrorist organizations and focus on preventing new attacks.
  For example, last year, 29 of the 37 organizations on the foreign 
terrorist list were due for redesignation. As a result, the State, 
Justice, Treasury and the intelligence community spent thousands of 
hours in preparing a detailed administrative record for each of these 
groups.
  Meanwhile, back in March, the State Department designated for the 
first time the group, Ansar al-Islam, as a foreign terrorist 
organization based in north Iraq. The group has been linked to al Qaeda 
and is known to have participated in attacks on both U.S. troops and 
Iraqi civilians. The designation of Ansar al-Islam took longer than it 
should have, because over the preceding 6 months, Federal 
counterterrorism groups were bogged down in the redesignation of large 
numbers of terrorist groups.
  The modified redesignation requirement proposed by the amendment will 
still provide designated terrorist groups with plenty of procedural 
safeguards. For example, a group can still request a court review of 
designation within 30 days after its first designation. In addition, 
the amendment allows organizations to petition the Secretary every 2 
years to revoke its designation. If that review is not to the group's 
satisfaction, the designation can still be challenged in court.
  The amendment also establishes a new, expedited procedure for 
handling the situation in which a terrorist group changes its name or 
uses new aliases.
  The language on foreign terrorist organizations is identical to the 
provisions contained in an en bloc amendment to the Department of State 
authorization bill that was passed by a voice vote here on the floor.
  Given the importance of this measure, I introduced it as a separate 
bill. It was approved by the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation and Human Rights on March 17. In addition, this 
provision has the support of both the State Department and the 
Department of Justice.
  Lastly, section 702 of my amendment requires that the State 
Department's annual report on terrorism include information on 
countries and terrorist groups that are seeking to obtain weapons of 
mass destruction. Experts on terrorism, both within and outside the 
government, agree that the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction is the most dangerous security threat faced by the United 
States and our allies. Therefore, it makes absolute sense to have the 
State Department's main report on terrorism discuss this linkage.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this important amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose this amendment, but I will 
control the time on this side.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to support the author of this amendment for his 
carefully crafted amendment and excellent remarks. I believe it is 
imperative that we maintain an effective and efficient process for 
designating foreign terrorist organizations and understand better the 
threat posed by those terrorist organizations and their links to 
weapons of mass destruction.
  I understand, as the gentleman said, that the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Committee on International Relations have been 
working on a stand-alone bill to require the Secretary of State to 
review designations every 4 years, not every 6, as this amendment 
provides.
  I think this additional flexibility would be a good thing and would 
suggest, for example, that a bill, which I assume will be taken up at 
another time, should include a provision allowing the Secretary of 
State to remove groups from the list of foreign terrorist organizations 
if they renounce terrorism. This is one way of using our soft power 
instead of relying solely on military power to influence groups on the 
list. I would hope that these details and others could be worked out 
separately, or in the conference on this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that from 1999 to 2000, I 
served as a member of the so-called Bremer Commission on Terrorism, 
headed by former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who now serves as civil 
administrator in Iraq. The issue of listing groups and states as 
terrorist actors was something we considered carefully. In fact, we 
spoke out about one such state.
  I think this is an excellent tool to help defeat the threats we face. 
I really want to commend the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) 
for offering this improvement to our intelligence authorization bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my good friend, 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my friend, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) for offering this amendment.

[[Page H4842]]

  In 1996, following a series of terrorist attacks throughout the 
world, Congress acted to make clear that this country is not to be used 
as a staging ground for those who seek to commit acts of terrorism 
against persons in other countries.
  One of the components in the Committee on the Judiciary's 1996 anti-
terrorism legislation was to authorize the Secretary of State to 
designate foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs, that threaten U.S. 
residents or the national security of the United States.
  Seven years of experience with the designation process has shown that 
it is needlessly burdensome, draining resources that are needed in the 
war on terrorism. There are now some 37 designated FTOs, and the 
redesignation of each requires intensive interagency review and the 
preparation of a voluminous administrative record. Which can take 
months, of course.
  Few of the designated FTOs ever challenge their designation. For 
example, it is unlikely that al Qaeda will seek judicial review of the 
Secretary's designation of them as FTOs in the D.C. Circuit Court. 
Nevertheless, every 2 years the Federal Government must compile the 
record against them.
  State and Justice Department officials have informed the Committee on 
the Judiciary that the cost of repeatedly proving that FTOs have 
retained their terrorist characteristics diverts resources from other 
pressing counterterrorism work, including pursuit of additional 
designations.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Gallegly) addresses each of these concerns in a way that still 
assures appropriate review. The text of this amendment tracks language 
in a bill that has been reviewed by the Committee on the Judiciary. 
This amendment would free up critical anti-terrorism resources that are 
now expended on the onerous and, for most groups, largely pointless 
task of redesignation, while assuring that affected groups have the 
opportunity to seek appropriate review.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my support for this amendment, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my friend, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), for her positive comments and for the support.
  Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 108-561.


                Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Boehlert

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Boehlert:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL OF 
                   LIBYA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Libya has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism 
     by the Department of State each year since 1979.
       (2) A German court found the Libyan Government guilty of 
     the East Berlin La Belle disco bombing of 1986, in which two 
     US servicemen were killed.
       (3) A Scottish court in January 2001 found a former Libyan 
     official guilty of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
       (4) Libya received and deserved world's condemnations for 
     these horrific acts against innocents.
       (5) In March 2003, while Coalition Forces were preparing to 
     liberate Iraq, Libya quietly approached members of the 
     intelligence services of the United States and United Kingdom 
     and indicted a willingness to discuss Libya's weapons of mass 
     destruction programs.
       (6) On December 19, 2003, after nine months of intense 
     negotiations, Libya publicly announced that it was prepared 
     to eliminate all elements of its clandestine nuclear and 
     chemical weapons programs.
       (7) The United States, the United Kingdom, partners in the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative and key arms control 
     agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
     Weapons (OPCW), have worked in a multilateral and concerted 
     fashion with Libya in an effort to completely dismantle 
     Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to 
     deliver them.
       (8) Because of the hard work by the men and women of the 
     intelligence community, United States policymakers were able 
     to work successfully to convince Libya to relinquish its WMD 
     programs.
       (9) On January 27, 2004, a cargo plane flew from Libya to 
     Knoxville, Tennessee, carrying 55,000 pounds of equipment and 
     documents relating to Libya's nuclear weapons and missile 
     programs.
       (10) Documents relating to those programs indicate that 
     Libya had purchased a virtual ``turnkey facility'' to produce 
     parts for gas centrifuges together with assistance to 
     assemble and test these centrifuges, and was otherwise 
     attempting to develop a large uranium enrichment plant which 
     could have produced enough fuel for several nuclear bombs a 
     year.
       (11) On January 24, 2004, Libya announced that it would 
     accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
       (12) On March 4, 2004, Libya submitted its Chemical Weapons 
     Convention declaration, including a full declaration of its 
     chemical weapons, an inventory of its production capacity, a 
     description of any industrial activity that could be involved 
     in making illegal weapons, and a plan for destroying any 
     banned materials.
       (13) All of Libya's known chemical munitions have since 
     been destroyed and the country's stocks of mustard gas have 
     been consolidated within a single secure facility under the 
     supervision of the OPCW.
       (14) On May 6, 2004, a cargo ship departed Libya for the 
     United States carrying an additional 1,000 tons of weapons of 
     mass destruction equipment, including centrifuge parts and 
     components needed to enrich uranium, the Libyan uranium 
     conversion facility and all associated equipment, five SCUD-C 
     missiles and launchers, and two partial missiles.
       (15) In testimony before the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives on May 10, 2004, 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, 
     Paula DeSutter, indicated that Libya had signed the 
     additional protocol for the IAEA in Vienna and announced 
     ``the complete dismantlement of Libya's longest range and 
     most sophisticated missiles and the elimination of all of 
     Libya's declared chemical munitions''.
       (16) International inspectors and monitors are expected to 
     remain on the ground with full cooperation from Libya to 
     ensure that Libya possesses no biological weapons programs 
     and that its weapons of mass destruction programs have been 
     fully dismantled and or converted to civilian use.
       (17) The United States and Libya currently are engaged in 
     talks to enter a third phase of negotiations focused on 
     follow-up, verification, and long-term monitoring to ensure 
     that Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the 
     means to deliver them have been completely dismantled, as 
     well as plans for the retraining of Libyan scientists and 
     technicians for peaceful work.
       (18) Libya's cooperation with international inspectors and 
     revelations about procurement networks have helped identify 
     numerous black market suppliers in an ``international 
     supermarket'' for nuclear parts and weapons designs that also 
     has aided such countries as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
       (19) Other countries voluntarily have dismantled their 
     weapons of mass destruction programs, but Libya is the first 
     and only country on the Department of State's list of State 
     Sponsors of Terrorism to do so.
       (20) Libya's decision to shed it pariah status and divest 
     itself of its weapons of mass destruction programs can be 
     directly attributed to the demonstrated resolve of the United 
     States in the global war against terrorism, the liberation of 
     Iraq by United States Armed Forces and Coalition Forces, and 
     the adoption of policies in targeting and seizing shipments 
     of such weapons.
       (21) It is appropriate to pursue a policy of cautious and 
     deliberate re-engagement with Libya based upon verifiable 
     results, but the United States should not restore full 
     diplomatic relations with Libya unless and until Libya has--
       (A) agreed and submitted to comprehensive monitoring of the 
     full dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programs;
       (B) severed all links to and support for acts of 
     international terrorism;
       (C) ceased all support for insurgency groups which have 
     destabilized countries in Africa;
       (D) demonstrated respect for human rights and the rule of 
     law;
       (E) implemented its pledge to cooperate in the further 
     investigation of the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103; and
       (F) settled all legal claims relating to past acts of 
     international terrorism, including but not limited to the 
     bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and the La Belle Discotheque.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the world has been made safer with the dismantling and 
     removal of Libya's weapons of mass destruction and the means 
     to deliver them;
       (2) this would not have been possible if not for the 
     demonstrated resolve of the United

[[Page H4843]]

     States in the global war on terror and in the liberation of 
     Iraq by United States and Coalition Forces;
       (3) the President should be commended for having the 
     courage to undertake those policies which persuaded Libya to 
     agree to relinquish such weapons; and
       (4) other countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, 
     should follow Libya's example, and voluntarily dismantle 
     their weapons of mass destruction and submit their programs 
     to international inspections.

                              {time}  1815

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Boehlert) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).


           Modification to Amendment Offered by Mr. Boehlert

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be modified in the form at the desk.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Boehlert:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL OF 
                   LIBYA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Libya has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism 
     by the Department of State each year since 1979.
       (2) A German court found the Libyan Government guilty of 
     the East Berlin La Belle disco bombing of 1986, in which two 
     US servicemen were killed.
       (3) A Scottish court in January 2001 found a former Libyan 
     official guilty of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
       (4) Libya received and deserved world's condemnations for 
     these horrific acts against innocents.
       (5) ``As a result of Libya's support for international 
     terrorism and its destabilizing role in the international 
     community, the United States maintained a comprehensive 
     economic embargo on Libya for more than two decades, which 
     was aided by multilateral sanctions imposed by United Nations 
     Security Council Resolutions 731 and 742 in 1992, and which 
     together hobbled the development of the Libyan economy.''
       (6) In March 2003, while Coalition Forces were preparing to 
     liberate Iraq, Libya once again quietly approached members of 
     the intelligence services of the United States and United 
     Kingdom and indicted a willingness to discuss Libya's weapons 
     of mass destruction programs, as it had previously in the 
     1990's.
       (7) On December 19, 2003, after nine months of intense 
     negotiations, Libya publicly announced that it was prepared 
     to eliminate all elements of its clandestine nuclear and 
     chemical weapons programs.
       (8) The United States, the United Kingdom, partners in the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative and key arms control 
     agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
     Weapons (OPCW), have worked in a multilateral and concerted 
     fashion with Libya in an effort to completely dismantle 
     Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to 
     deliver them.
       (9) Because of the hard work by the men and women of the 
     intelligence community, United States policymakers were able 
     to work successfully to convince Libya to relinquish its WMD 
     programs.
       (10) On January 27, 2004, a cargo plane flew from Libya to 
     Knoxville, Tennessee, carrying 55,000 pounds of equipment and 
     documents relating to Libya's nuclear weapons and missile 
     programs.
       (11) Documents relating to those programs indicate that 
     Libya had purchased a virtual ``turnkey facility'' to produce 
     parts for gas centrifuges together with assistance to 
     assemble and test these centrifuges, and was otherwise 
     attempting to develop a large uranium enrichment plant which 
     could have produced enough fuel for several nuclear bombs a 
     year.
       (12) On January 24, 2004, Libya announced that it would 
     accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
       (13) On March 4, 2004, Libya submitted its Chemical Weapons 
     Convention declaration, including a full declaration of its 
     chemical weapons, an inventory of its production capacity, a 
     description of any industrial activity that could be involved 
     in making illegal weapons, and a plan for destroying any 
     banned materials.
       (14) All of Libya's known chemical munitions have since 
     been destroyed and the country's stocks of mustard gas have 
     been consolidated within a single secure facility under the 
     supervision of the OPCW.
       (15) On May 6, 2004, a cargo ship departed Libya for the 
     United States carrying an additional 1,000 tons of weapons of 
     mass destruction equipment, including centrifuge parts and 
     components needed to enrich uranium, the Libyan uranium 
     conversion facility and all associated equipment, five SCUD-C 
     missiles and launchers, and two partial missiles.
       (16) In testimony before the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives on May 10, 2004, 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, 
     Paula DeSutter, indicated that Libya had signed the 
     additional protocol for the IAEA in Vienna and announced 
     ``the complete dismantlement of Libya's longest range and 
     most sophisticated missiles and the elimination of all of 
     Libya's declared chemical munitions''.
       (17) International inspectors and monitors are expected to 
     remain on the ground with full cooperation from Libya to 
     ensure that Libya possesses no biological weapons programs 
     and that its weapons of mass destruction programs have been 
     fully dismantled and or converted to civilian use.
       (18) The United States and Libya currently are engaged in 
     talks to enter a third phase of negotiations focused on 
     follow-up, verification, and long-term monitoring to ensure 
     that Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the 
     means to deliver them have been completely dismantled, as 
     well as plans for the retraining of Libyan scientists and 
     technicians for peaceful work.
       (19) Libya's cooperation with international inspectors and 
     revelations about procurement networks have helped identify 
     numerous black market suppliers in an ``international 
     supermarket'' for nuclear parts and weapons designs that also 
     has aided such countries as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
       (20) Other countries voluntarily have dismantled their 
     weapons of mass destruction programs, but Libya is the first 
     and only country on the Department of State's list of State 
     Sponsors of Terrorism to do so.
       (21) Libya's decision to shed it pariah status and divest 
     itself of its weapons of mass destruction programs can be 
     directly attributed to decades of United States and 
     multilateral economic sanctions against Libya, the 
     demonstrated resolve of the United States in the global war 
     against terrorism, the liberation of Iraq by United States 
     Armed Forces and Coalition Forces, and the adoption of 
     policies in targeting and seizing shipments of such weapons.
       (22) It is appropriate to pursue a policy of cautious and 
     deliberate re-engagement with Libya based upon verifiable 
     results, but the United States should not restore full 
     diplomatic relations with Libya unless and until Libya has--
       (A) agreed and submitted to comprehensive monitoring of the 
     full dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programs;
       (B) severed all links to and support for acts of 
     international terrorism;
       (C) ceased all support for insurgency groups which have 
     destabilized countries in Africa;
       (D) demonstrated respect for human rights and the rule of 
     law;
       (E) implemented its pledge to cooperate in the further 
     investigation of the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103; and
       (F) settled all legal claims relating to past acts of 
     international terrorism, including but not limited to the 
     bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and the La Belle Discotheque.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the world has been made safer with the dismantling and 
     removal of Libya's weapons of mass destruction and the means 
     to deliver them;
       (2) this would not have been possible if not for decades of 
     United States and multilateral sanctions against Libya, the 
     demonstrated resolve of the United States in the global war 
     on terror and the liberation of Iraq by United States and 
     Coalition Forces;
       (3) the President and previous Administrations should be 
     commended for having the courage to undertake those policies 
     which persuaded Libya to agree to relinquish such weapons; 
     and
       (4) other countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, 
     should follow Libya's example, and voluntarily dismantle 
     their weapons of mass destruction and submit their programs 
     to international inspections.

  Mr. BOEHLERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the modified amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, though I 
will not object, I want to be sure that the language that has not been 
read is consistent with the language I just reviewed.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentlewoman that that is 
the case.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.

[[Page H4844]]

  Let me tell my colleagues a little bit about the genesis of this 
amendment. Early in February, as a senior member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, I was asked to lead a delegation for 
a mission to Iraq and Afghanistan. That delegation included the 
distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking 
member of the committee, and there were four others. There were six of 
us. We planned a most ambitious schedule for 6 days: six countries, 6 
days.
  Our purpose was not to determine the progress on the Constitution, 
important though that was; not to check on the morale of the troops, 
important though that always is; not to check on how we were spending 
our money on the reconstruction, and that too is very important. Our 
purpose as members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
was to meet with members of the intelligence community on-site in that 
war zone to hear from them in their own words their assessment of the 
situation. I want to compliment all of the members of that delegation 
for the outstanding contribution they made to that mission.
  But before we were going and still in the planning stages, I had a 
call from the State Department, Ambassador Burns, who directs the Near 
East desk. He said, Mr. Chairman, I would like you and the delegation 
to consider making an addition to your trip, another stop. I said, have 
you looked at our schedule? Six countries in 6 days. We do not have 
time to wind our watch. He said, let me talk to you about it. Then he 
came up to Capitol Hill; and in the secure sanctuary of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence rooms on the fourth floor of the 
Capitol, he said, We would like you to go to Libya. We would like your 
delegation to meet with Colonel Qadhafi. I said, Are you kidding? Are 
you serious? Libya is engaged in state-sponsored acts of terrorism 
against American citizens. It has endured U.N. sanctions; that has been 
going on for 20 years; disregarded world condemnation, and dismissed 
diplomatic settlements. What has changed? And he said, in the secure 
sanctuary of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence quarters on 
the fourth floor of the Capitol, There is movement; There is progress. 
We think it would be very valuable for your bipartisan delegation to go 
to Libya to meet Colonel Qadhafi, because we want to demonstrate in 
tangible form that if he begins to cooperate with us, we will cooperate 
with him.
  After checking with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), she 
agreed. She thought it would be a good idea, and off we went. We spent 
8 hours in the country, the final 2 hours in a tent in the middle of 
the Libyan desert outside of Surt, Colonel Qadhafi's hometown. We 
talked about weapons of mass destruction. We talked about the war on 
terrorism. We talked about the shooting down of Pan Am Flight 103, 
which has a searing impact on my soul forever more because there were 
35 students from Syracuse University on that flight. We talked about 
all of the gut-wrenching issues that are so important to our security 
and the security of the Free World, and it was a meaningful discussion. 
And the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) can characterize it 
from her standpoint what she thought of it.
  Then we completed the rest of our mission. We went to Jordan, we went 
to Iraq, we went to Afghanistan, we went to Turkey. This was a world-
wind visit of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, very 
serious business, doing very important work. As a matter of fact, 3 of 
the 6 days, we did not even sleep in a hotel; we slept in the airplane. 
We got back home, and we reported everything to the committee and to 
the State Department.
  Since then, there has been a great opening up with Libya. Colonel 
Qadhafi, I do not think he went to bed one night and suddenly woke up 
and said, Hey, those guys are right and I have been wrong. I am going 
to change my ways. I think he looked around at the world and he said, 
the war on terrorism could negatively impact him like it negatively 
impacted his neighbor to the north, who is now behind bars, Saddam 
Hussein. I think he said that he wants to be concerned about his legacy 
and in what shape he was going to leave that country. I think he 
decided that it would be best to cooperate.
  What has happened since then? He has turned over the weapons of mass 
destruction, he has made his country open for inspection, and he is 
cooperating fully.
  Does that mean we can clap our hands and say, boy, is this not a 
great victory? Although it is a great victory as far as it goes, and it 
does prove that leadership really results in something positive if we 
work together. But the fact of the matter is, we have to continue to be 
cautious, but we have to be very deliberate.
  That country is moving in the right direction. Let us hope they 
continue that movement. We want signals to be sent to others. We want 
Iran and North Korea and other nations, others who are on the list of 
countries that sponsor state terrorism, to get the message; and we 
think that this amendment that I am offering, this sense of the 
Congress amendment, will do the right thing in the appropriate way.
  Let me add that there are a number of Members on both sides of the 
aisle that have worked very cooperatively on this. The gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos) had some suggestions for language. That is what 
my modifying amendment includes, the suggestions he made. That is the 
way we work best together, when we reach across the center aisle and 
find common ground.
  So I would urge the adoption of my amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will 
control the time on this side; and I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) not only 
for the amendment but for, as he said, engaging the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos) in a constructive effort to improve the 
amendment, and I think it is a lot better. Frankly, I wish that our 
bill that we are considering and voting on today had engaged the 
minority more constructively at an earlier stage; I think it would have 
been a lot better.
  I do support the Boehlert amendment. I fondly remember our trip, six 
countries, 6 days. I think the gentleman left out Sicily, so we might 
add 7 countries in 6 days.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. The only reason we left out Sicily, because the initial 
was 6 countries in 6 days; but as the gentlewoman will recall, when we 
added Libya, there were requirements on the pilots in that they could 
not fly a certain amount of time beyond their standard time, so we 
could not go any farther than Sicily. We had to exit Libya, but we 
could not go any farther than Sicily, so we stayed overnight and got up 
the next morning and off we went.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thought our Sicily 
stop was outstanding, which is why I brought it up.
  But I think that the improvements made to this amendment by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) are noteworthy. What he did, as 
I understand it, was to insert a bit of the history here, the role of 
sanctions initiated by President Reagan, the role of international 
legal negotiations to get Libya to renounce terrorism and turn over 
terrorism suspects to international courts, and the role of diplomacy 
in previous administrations and by the British and others before the 
beginning of this administration. Though this administration did play a 
role, and I commend it, in President Qadhafi's stunning decision to do 
the right thing, that should be reflected, and is, in this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I will put two very important articles on this subject 
in the Record. One is by Dr. Flynt Leverett entitled ``Why Libya Gave 
Up the Bomb'' from the January 23, 2004, New York Times; and the second 
is a Middle East Institute Policy Brief by two former assistant 
Secretaries of State and former ambassadors, Martin Indyk and Edward S. 
Walker entitled ``What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue 
States?'' dated April 7, 2004.
  Finally, let me make two other points. We have seen in recent days 
troubling allegations that Colonel Qadhafi was himself involved in 
ordering assassinations of Saudi leaders. These

[[Page H4845]]

are, of course, press reports. But these stories remind us that the 
success of our policies toward Libya remain an open question, and I am 
sure the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) agrees with me that we 
need to be clear-eyed and diligent to make certain that these promises 
by Colonel Qadhafi are kept, and that in other respects, he does not 
convert to any of his old habits.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York, the sponsor of 
the amendment.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Let 
me stress we have to be cautious, but deliberate. But as a favorite son 
of the gentlewoman's State, the great President that we just lost, I am 
reminded of his admonition: trust, but verify.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for those comments 
and strongly agree with them.
  In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just mention that on that trip that 
was described, we did spend a day and evening in Baghdad. It was my 
second visit. We met with troops, but we also met with all of our 
intelligence personnel at the scene in addition to the leaders of the 
CPA. What is troubling about that, and I believe the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss) has commented on this in another appearance, 
our appearance yesterday in the Committee on Rules, because the timing 
of our trip was February 2004. While we were in Baghdad, General Taguba 
was doing his investigation of prison abuse and so forth in Baghdad, 
and we were never told by these intelligence leaders that that 
investigation was ongoing. That was wrong. That diminishes our 
oversight, and those folks whom we support as robustly as we can need 
to be fully candid with our committee, especially when we are seeking 
them out to try to help them.
  Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by saying that I support the 
gentleman's amendment as improved by the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos).

               [From the New York Times, 23 January 2004]

                     Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,

                          (By Flynt Leverett)

       Washington.--As President Bush made clear in his State of 
     the Union address, he sees the striking developments in 
     relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war 
     on terrorism. The idea is that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's 
     apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was 
     a largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which 
     thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out 
     the prospect of similar progress with other states that 
     support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and 
     brutalize their own people.
       However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq 
     war, the president misrepresents the real lessons of the 
     Libyan case. This confusion undermines our chances of getting 
     countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead.
       The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to 
     the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's 
     first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should 
     even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of 
     international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans 
     decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with 
     the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton 
     administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton 
     White House made clear that no movement toward better 
     relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities 
     stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
     Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
       These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi 
     ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, 
     produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence 
     officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the 
     Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 
     Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations 
     sanctions against Libya.
       Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the 
     State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush 
     administration picked up on those discussions and induced the 
     Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With 
     our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a 
     ``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to 
     satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the 
     Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the 
     actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the 
     case.
       We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya 
     met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain 
     would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted 
     permanently. This script became the basis for three-party 
     negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue.
       By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the 
     conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was 
     evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, 
     Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya 
     to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation 
     agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted 
     responsibility for its officials' actions.
       But during these two years of talks, American negotiators 
     consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie 
     situation would lead to no more than elimination of United 
     Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United 
     States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, 
     particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       This is the content in which Libyan officials approached 
     the United States and Britain last spring to discuss 
     dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which 
     had not yet started, was not the driving force behind 
     Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of 
     credible diplomatic representations by the United States 
     over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so 
     was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic 
     goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo 
     was offered: American officials indicated that a 
     verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would 
     lead the removal of our own sanctions, perhaps by the end 
     of this year.
       The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime 
     to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons 
     of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also 
     make clear the potential benefits of cooperation. 
     Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take 
     this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and 
     Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as 
     well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing 
     Iranian or Syrian behavior.
       The president's lack of initiative on this point is 
     especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath 
     of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has a singular 
     opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and 
     Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic 
     elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through 
     diplomatic channels and to former officials (including 
     myself) their interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United 
     States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to 
     terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security 
     guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations 
     with Washington.
       Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President 
     Bashar al-Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last 
     week--have told me that they want a better strategic 
     understanding with the United States. To achieve this, 
     however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what 
     Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to 
     terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. 
     As Mr. Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if 
     it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in 
     return.
       One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more 
     constructive course with Libya was that the White House, 
     uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's 
     neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of 
     carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots 
     could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial 
     decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie 
     case was approved by an informal coalition made up of 
     Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and 
     Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to 
     the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass 
     destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the 
     shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of 
     the loop.
       Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's 
     bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security 
     Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course 
     involving Iran and Syria. However, until the administration 
     learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy 
     toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the 
     mind of ideology.
       Flynn Leverett, a visiting fellow with the Saban Center for 
     Middle East Politics at the Brookings Institution, was senior 
     director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security 
     Council from 2002 to 2003.
                                  ____


            [From the Middle East Institute, April 7, 2004]

        What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?

      (By Ambassador Martin S. Indyk; Ambassador Edward S. Walker)

       Summary. Ambassadors Martin Indyk and Edward Walker 
     discussed the bilateral negotiations begun in 1999 between 
     the United States and Libya that led to Libyan leader Colonel 
     Mu'ammar Qadhafi's radical change in foreign policy. These 
     talks began during the Clinton Administration as part of a 
     broader strategy that sought to ``graduate'' rogue states 
     into the international community and establish normal 
     relationships with the United States. Although initially wary 
     of the process, the Bush Administration successfully forged 
     ahead with the secret negotiations bringing about the recent 
     rapprochement between the two countries.
       Brief. When the secret US-Libyan negotiations began in 
     1999, Libya was engaged in an effective campaign in the 
     United Nations to cease the multilateral sanctions imposed on

[[Page H4846]]

     it by the international community. The United States was in a 
     difficult position because it was the only member that 
     refused to lift the sanctions and therefore was in danger of 
     becoming isolated in the Security Council. Had the United 
     States merely vetoed a new UN resolution to lift the 
     sanctions, the international consensus that made the 
     sanctions regime effective would have eroded, and this 
     potentially would have led to the failure of the US 
     objectives regarding Libya: the halting of state sponsorship 
     of terrorism, an admission of responsibility for the bombing 
     of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 
     payment of compensation to families of Pan Am Flight 103's 
     victims.
       A New Strategy. The United States' primary short-term goal 
     in the negotiations was to maintain the sanctions. At the 
     same time, the US was pursuing a new strategy that went 
     considerably beyond a policy of containment. The goal of this 
     broader strategy was to try to change the behavior of rogue 
     states and ``graduate'' them into the international community 
     and normalize relations with the United States. Libya was a 
     good test case for this new strategy because the broad 
     international consensus that Colonel Qadhafi's actions were 
     unacceptable provided the US with more flexibility. As for 
     the Libyan goals, Qadhafi, having abandoned his pan-Arab 
     aspirations, made a deliberate tactical decision to 
     normalize relations with America.
       The Negotiations. The negotiations began in May 1999, with 
     Musa Kusa, Colonel Qadhafi's head of intelligence services, 
     leading the Libyan delegation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi 
     Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt strongly backed 
     the process and at times even provided logistical support. 
     The US put forth two initial conditions which Colonel Qadhafi 
     fulfilled immediately: first, that Libya halt all efforts in 
     the UN to have the sanctions lifted; and second, that the 
     bilateral dialogue be kept secret. Surprisingly, Libya was 
     prepared to accept subsequent US requirements with little 
     negotiation. Among the additional requirements were the 
     closure of all terrorist camps in the country, acknowledging 
     responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist operation, 
     paying compensation to families of the victims, and 
     disclosing weapons of mass destruction (at the time only 
     consisting of chemical weapons, as Libya had yet to begin a 
     nuclear weapons program).
       Ambassador Indyk suggested these negotiations could have 
     proceeded more quickly, possibly concluding prior to the 2000 
     election season, had the United States not periodically 
     instituted new demands to ensure Colonel Qadhafi's 
     consistency and compliance. Another complicating factor was a 
     strong and vocal anti-Libyan constituency among the families 
     of Pan Am Flight 103 victims who slowed down the 
     reconciliation. The negotiations were also put on hold for 
     the 2000 American presidential elections out of concern that 
     the process would be leaked to the press and result in a 
     scandal. Once elected, although initially wary of the 
     process, the Bush Administration resumed talks in a more 
     public forum and ``took them to their natural conclusion,'' 
     which has led to the recent public US-Libyan rapprochement.
       Although this has been a success story for this new 
     strategy, it is not necessarily applicable to all rogue 
     states. There were specific conditions with regard to Libya 
     that made the process work. First, the international 
     community was united in condemning Libya's terrorist actions. 
     Though the United Nations contemplated lifting sanctions, the 
     international consensus against Libya was largely still 
     intact. Second, the United States had shown previously that 
     it was willing to use military force against Libya, after the 
     1986 West Berlin nightclub bombing. Finally, Qadhafi had a 
     change of heart. He decided that he wanted American companies 
     specifically to develop Libya's oil fields and this strongly 
     influenced his decision-making. The United States was able to 
     use the carrot and the stick effectively throughout the 
     process, and Colonel Qadhafi consistently reinforced his 
     willingness to comply with US demands.
       The Ambassadors added that one way to improve this type of 
     strategy in the future would be for the US Administration to 
     articulate from the outset the final goals of the engagement 
     and identify concrete steps for compliance. On a final note, 
     both Indyk and Walker believe that the new approach has been 
     very effective and extend credit to the George W. Bush 
     Administration for seeing this unusual policy to its 
     conclusion.

  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I will complete the balance of my time by 
just once again emphasizing that all is not over, all is not hunky-
dory, as the phrase goes; but there has been significant movement in 
the right direction, thanks to good intelligence, thanks to firm and 
decisive leadership. But we have to go forward with the admonition that 
we trust, but verify.
  So I would urge strong support of this amendment for all the reasons 
that have just been enumerated by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) and this gentleman, and I would urge a ``yes'' vote on my 
amendment.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I voted against the Boehlert Amendment to 
the Intelligence Authorizations bill for 2005, H.R. 4548, due to the 
language which suggested that the war against Iraq and the policies of 
our commander-in-chief were the major factors in Libya's change with 
respect to the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction. It was, in fact, concerted multilateral economic and 
diplomatic pressure which brought Libya's leader, Col. Qaddafi, to his 
senses to cut a deal to end U.S. and multilateral sanctions and relieve 
Libya's diplomatic isolation. I agree with the Ranking Member of the 
International Relations Committee, who insisted that language be added 
noting the effect sanctions had on the Libyan leader's policies. 
However, I cannot support legislation which suggests that the 
President's policy in Iraq played the major role in affecting policy in 
Tripoli.
  I also voted against the Rogers Amendment. Though I agree with many 
of its provisions, I cannot support its partisan tone.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment represents another 
example of the Republican leadership playing politics with important 
matters of national security. The decision of Libya to renounce its 
program to develop weapons of mass destruction represents an important 
victory for U.S. diplomatic and foreign policy efforts. However, the 
attempt to directly tie that success to the war in Iraq is not 
supported by the facts. Consequently, while I agree with much that is 
contained in this amendment, I will not engage in this politically 
motivated farce.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered 
by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Boehlert) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House 
Report 108-561.


          Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas

  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, 
                   AND INTERROGATION OF TERRORISTS ARE FUNDAMENTAL 
                   TO THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE GLOBAL WAR 
                   ON TERROR.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the people of the 
     United States were too often brutalized again and again by 
     deadly terrorist violence, as evidenced by the hundreds of 
     American deaths in the Beirut and Lockerbie bombings, the 
     attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the destruction of 
     the Khobar Towers military barracks, the bombing of the 
     American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the vicious 
     attacks on the USS Cole in 2000.
       (2) The terrorist violence targeted against the United 
     States became more emboldened after each attack, culminating 
     in the deadly attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
     Pentagon on September 11, 2001, which killed thousands of 
     innocent Americans, including innocent women and children.
       (3) Since September 11, 2001, the citizens of the United 
     States have remained the priority target of terrorist 
     violence, with journalists and employees of non-governmental 
     organizations being held hostage, tortured, and decapitated 
     in the name of terror.
       (4) Congress has authorized the President to use all 
     necessary and appropriate means to defeat terrorism ; and on 
     numerous occasions since September 11, 2001, and throughout 
     the Global War on Terror, the interrogation of detainees has 
     yielded valuable intelligence that has saved the lives of 
     American military personnel and American citizens at home and 
     abroad.
       (5) The interrogation of detainees has also provided highly 
     valuable insights into the structure of terrorist 
     organizations, their target selection process, and the 
     identities of key operational and logistical personnel that 
     were previously unknown to the Intelligence Community.
       (6) The lawful interrogation of detainees is consistent 
     with the United States Constitution.
       (7) The abuses against detainees documented at Abu Ghraib 
     prison in Iraq were deplorable aberrations that were not part 
     of United States policy and were not in keeping with the 
     finest traditions of the United States military and the 
     honorable men and women who serve.

[[Page H4847]]

       (8) The loss of interrogation-derived information would 
     have a disastrous effect on the Nation's intelligence 
     collection and counterterrorism efforts and would constitute 
     a damaging reversal in the Global War on Terror during this 
     critical time.
       (9) The apprehension, detention, and interrogation of 
     terrorists are essential elements to successfully waging the 
     Global War on Terror.
       (10) The interrogation of detainees can and should continue 
     by the United States within the bounds of the United States 
     Constitution and the laws of the United States of America.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the apprehension, detention, and interrogation of terrorists 
     are fundamental to the successful prosecution of the Global 
     War on Terror.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  My amendment is pretty simple. It expresses the sense of Congress 
that the apprehension, detention, and legal interrogation of terrorists 
is imperative to winning the war on terrorism and stopping the 
barbarians.
  The terrorist thugs that we are fighting today are well-organized, 
well-financed forces who have publicly declared war on the United 
States of America and the Free World. They have a global network of 
hide-outs and cells, set up solely to wage war on the United States and 
kill innocent American citizens.

                              {time}  1830

  They have carried out attack after attack on Americans. They attacked 
the USS Cole. They attacked our barracks. They attacked our embassies, 
and we will always remember the highly coordinated attacks of September 
11 on our own land.
  This Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and 
appropriate means to defeat terrorism. On numerous occasions since 
September 11 and throughout the global war on terror, the interrogation 
of detainees has yielded valuable intelligence. This intelligence has 
saved the lives of American military personnel and American citizens at 
home and abroad. The interrogation of detainees has also provided 
highly valuable insights into the structure of terrorist organizations 
and their target selection process and the identities of key 
operational and logistical personnel who were previously unknown.
  The reported abuses against detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq has led some to question our interrogation policy. Make no 
mistake. What happened at Abu Ghraib was not part of U.S. policy, not 
keeping with the finest traditions of the United States military.
  The careers of those people are over. They are being punished. 
However, the deplorable actions of some should not jeopardize the use 
of interrogation by our armed services, and we should not let it 
tarnish the sterling representation of our military.
  The loss of interrogation-derived information would have a disastrous 
effect on our Nation's intelligence, collection and counterterrorism 
efforts. It would constitute a damaging reversal in the global war on 
terror at this critical time.
  Support this amendment for the safety of our troops for Americans all 
over the globe, and for the war on terror. It is imperative that lawful 
interrogation of detainees continue, and this Congress ought to support 
it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Who seeks to control the time in opposition to the 
amendment?
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will 
control the time on our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I will support the amendment, though I wish it had 
included a clear statement about the importance of U.S. obligations to 
adhere to international laws, conventions and treatises to prevent 
torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of human beings.
  Mr. Chairman, one of the most troubling aspects of this whole 
detainee issue, besides the absolutely reprehensible abuse of 
prisoners, is the all-out assault on the rule of law that is clearly 
revealed in legal memos that seem to justify abuse and even torture of 
detainees.
  None of us is naive here, and as a member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I strongly believe in the importance of 
interrogations and understand that interrogations can yield information 
that protect thousands or millions of Americans. We have to interrogate 
prisoners, but over the many years of our country's history, we have 
always done those interrogations consistent with the rule of law, and 
only recently have some very troubling memoranda surfaced at the 
highest levels of the Justice Department and the Defense Department 
that raise questions and that actually assert that the President of the 
United States in his role as commander in chief could actually be above 
the law.
  I thought, Mr. Chairman, that we had defeated that idea at Runnymede 
centuries and centuries ago and that our country was built on a 
foundation of the rule of law, and I worry, Mr. Chairman, that if we do 
not observe the rule of law, not only do we undercut our moral 
authority, but we endanger our troops who might be treated just the way 
some of our people are treating other troops.
  Now, let me add quickly that the beheading of Americans and other 
nationals is absolutely outrageous, and nowhere do I think that 
behavior is consistent with even rational or humane behavior. It is 
abhorrent and appalling, and I strongly condemn it.
  But in conclusion, I think it is important that we support this 
amendment, but I think it is also important that as we do support this 
amendment, we think about the fact that the rule of law must always 
apply as we treat detainees and proceed with the important work of 
interrogations.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) for her comments, and I agree that it is 
barbarous what is going on over there.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Johnson) for bringing this amendment forward and for yielding me the 
time.
  As my ranking member has said, the use of interrogation is absolutely 
critical. It is a very important tool in the war on terrorism. Getting 
information timely, not only saves lives for our forces, but in the 
type of unconventional war we are fighting today, it is critical to 
know where the next bad surprise is going to come from, because these 
folks do not fight fair, as you say.
  Equally, in order to protect the tool that we have, the proper use of 
interrogation, we need to prevent the abuse of interrogation. We all 
understand that, and unfortunately, I think that those of us who 
understand it and have looked into it are a little puzzled by the 
fixation that the liberal media has assigned to some of this, what I 
would call, aberration problem that took place at Abu Ghraib, which was 
admittedly terrible, but I believe it is an aberration.
  I would like to point out to the American people that our committee 
does have oversight over interrogation, and we have looked into what 
has happened in the intelligence aspects, the interrogation aspects. We 
have had numerous briefings, and we had a rather full-scale day of 
hearings settled for, I guess it was last Friday. Unfortunately, that 
was preempted by the sad events with President Reagan's, the national 
day of mourning for State ceremony for former President of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan. So the government was closed, and obviously we 
have had to postpone.
  But we are on top of the hearings in keeping up with this, and we 
have reams of material and reports, and we are obviously going to have 
more, because more reports are taking place.

[[Page H4848]]

  I think the purpose of the gentleman's amendment is very, very 
important. We must not lose sight that interrogation is a critical 
tool, and despite the hype and the sensationalism that the liberal 
media is fixing on, and it is a shame they do not talk more about the 
cruelty and the barbarity, as the gentleman has alluded to, of the 
enemy than they do of some people who got out of control on our team.
  I would also like to say that for the record, it is my understanding, 
and we do not know all of the facts yet, that perhaps the reason that 
the gentlewoman did not get an intelligence briefing in February while 
she was in Iraq is because the prisoners that were involved, we are 
finding out, were prisoners of crimes, of murder and rape and so forth, 
and not necessarily subjects of intelligence interest.
  Now, that needs to be pursued further, but you can understand that if 
they are just criminals, that there would not be a huge reason to go 
out and get the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence involved, 
its abuse of prisoner handling, if that is the issue.
  So we have got an area of jurisdiction there where we will sort out. 
I do think that it is extremely important that we support this 
amendment. And I thank the gentleman for bringing it forward. I think 
it is a huge improvement to our bill, and I will be very happy to 
accept it from our perspective.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Texas that I 
appreciate his comments welcoming my comments. That, again, is in the 
spirit of bipartisanship. We all do better when we are bipartisan.
  I would just also make a comment to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss). I certainly agree that a lot of material is in our committee 
spaces, but we will consider an amendment later this afternoon on this 
subject of the committee's ability to oversee the detainee problem. 
Some of us remain skeptical that our committee has gotten all the 
material we need and certainly skeptical that we have gotten adequate 
candid testimony from administration officials.
  I would also point out to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) that 
while we were in Baghdad, we should have been told about some issues 
directly relevant to our jurisdiction, such as this issue of ghosting 
of detainees as described by General Taguba in his report, and that is 
the placing of detainees without revealing their numbers or their 
identity in prisons so that, as I understand it, the International Red 
Cross and other outside observers would not be aware of their 
existence. This is a serious issue directly relevant to our 
jurisdiction. I believe that it was known to those we met with in 
Baghdad and they should have informed us; at least that is my personal 
opinion.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Holt), another member of our committee to comment on the Johnson 
amendment.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, the amendment by our colleague from Texas 
indeed states a correct proposition that the detention and lawful 
interrogation of terrorists is fundamental to our national security. 
The key word, of course, is ``lawful.'' And perhaps the amendment could 
have been improved by spelling out more explicitly the importance of 
adhering to international convention, international law, international 
standards.
  There is no doubt that the gentleman from Texas has the admiration 
and appreciation of every Member here in this body for his service, and 
no one knows better than he, he has very personal and strong reasons 
for caring about the treatment of detainees and prisoners. And, in 
fact, I just wanted to underscore the point that I am sure the 
gentleman knows better than I, that the reason we do adhere to 
international standards, is for the protection of our own servicemen 
and women who may indeed become prisoners themselves.
  We certainly deplore the barbaric treatment of Americans, Koreans and 
others by the terrorists. We understand that non-state terrorists 
sometimes do not feel bound by the international standards, but the 
gentleman's legislation with an emphasis on the word ``lawful'' makes a 
good point.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make a point about the fact 
that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) had invited several of 
us on the committee to go to Guantanamo on two different occasions. We 
spent 2 full days on two separate occasions touring and observing and 
paying attention. And there is absolutely no question the work that 
goes on there is absolutely critical to our ability to win the war on 
terror. And it is absolutely critical to our work and the work of law 
enforcement people in this country to find those people that are still 
here in America, trying to hurt our country and trying to hurt our 
system.
  And that is why the amendment of the gentleman from Texas is so 
important because it does point up the importance of the work that goes 
on. And the work that goes on in the Guantanamo is very professional 
work. It is done by the book. It is done in a way that, I think, has 
elicited the kind of information that has really helped those in this 
country and around the world get the information they need.
  And so I support the amendment and I support those that are doing the 
hard work in Guantanamo because it will make a difference in our 
ability to win the war on terror.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I see no additional speakers on our side. I 
support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I advocate lawful and legal 
interrogation, and it must continue because it does save lives on our 
side. And I would also like to point out that the Bush administration 
has recently declassified and released hundreds of pages of internal 
documents that show that torture against detainees has never been 
authorized and will never be authorized by our Nation.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I voted against the amendment because 
while the Abu Ghraib prison abuses should not be part of the United 
States' policy, the evidence is not clear that it was not part of the 
policy of the Bush administration. Given the disturbing documents that 
are coming to light, this amendment seemed to be partisan wishful 
thinking rather than a clear expression of policy supported by 
objective analysis.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and 
pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson) 
will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
  It is now in order to consider amendment number 5 printed in House 
Report 108-561.

                              {time}  1845


           Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The men and women of the intelligence community are the 
     backbone of the Nation's efforts to gather and collect the 
     intelligence which is vital to the national security of the 
     United States.
       (2) The men and women of the intelligence community are 
     great patriots who perform their jobs without fan fair and 
     all too often without receiving the proper credit.
       (3) The men and women of the intelligence community are 
     combating vastly different threats to the Nation's security 
     compared to their Cold War colleagues.

[[Page H4849]]

       (4) Threats to the United States have evolved through the 
     use of technology and non-state actions, demanding 
     alternatives to traditional diplomatic actions.
       (5) The 1995 ``Deutch Guidelines'' regarding the 
     recruitment of foreign assets impeded human intelligence 
     collection efforts and contributed to the creation of a risk 
     averse environment. Despite repeated efforts by the 
     intelligence oversight committees of Congress to convince the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to drop the guidelines, 
     these guidelines stood until formally repealed in 2001 by an 
     Act of Congress.
       (6) The President's budget request for the intelligence 
     community fell by 11 percent from 1993 to 1995.
       (7) Congress cut the President's budget request for the 
     intelligence community each year from 1992 through 1994.
       (8) The cutbacks in resources and political support during 
     the middle of the previous decade has caused nearly 
     irreversible damage.
       (9) Widespread risk aversion in clandestine HUMINT 
     collection and intelligence analysis resulted from lack of 
     resources and, more importantly, of political support for the 
     mission during the middle of the previous decade.
       (10) Unnecessarily cumbersome legal impediments to the 
     clandestine HUMINT collection mission were raised during the 
     middle of the previous decade, leaving our intelligence 
     officers unable to penetrate legitimate target organizations, 
     such as terrorist groups.
       (11) Congress and the current President have worked 
     cooperatively to restore funding, personnel levels, and 
     political support for intelligence.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the intelligence community should be revitalized by 
     investing in the missions, people, and capabilities of the 
     community; and
       (2) the efforts of the men and women of the intelligence 
     community should be recognized and commended.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
might consume.
  I rise today, and I am not one that normally comes to the floor; but 
given my time as a special agent with the FBI and watching the 
intelligence community get really abused in the 1990s and to see this 
very partisan debate engaged in this Intelligence authorization, I felt 
compelled to come to the floor, at least to try to interject some 
common sense and some plea that we could get back to the serious work 
of protecting the United States of America. One way we do that is we 
stand tall and we stand together and we commend those who are risking 
their lives every day in what is an art, a skill, to some degree a 
science, of collecting intelligence around the world.
  The 1990s was brutal to intelligence collection. Funding was reduced. 
As a matter of fact, the number of intelligence operatives declined by 
27 percent from 1992 to 1999. From 1991 to 1997, the number of stations 
declined by 30 percent. The number of assets declined by 40 percent. 
The intelligence reporting declined by approximately 50 percent. As a 
matter of fact, George Tenet said in front of the commission, When I 
became DCI, I found a community and a CIA whose dollars were declining 
and whose expertise was ebbing.
  There was a feeling in the community of intelligence that they were 
the stepchild; they were the sinister folks who we did not need to 
spend money on anymore, who had passed their prime after the close of 
the Cold War. They became the great awful folks that we wanted to blame 
for a lot of things.
  As a matter of fact, in the Deutch guidelines of 1995, they basically 
said that CIA operatives around the world could not associate with 
unsavory characters. I have to tell my colleagues that as an agent of 
the FBI, if you were not dealing with some unsavory characters, you 
were not catching bad guys. That is exactly what we needed to do. My 
colleagues can imagine the morale and the confusing message that we 
send to somebody who is risking their life in some remote corner of the 
world, dealing with somebody who would just as soon slit your throat as 
to say hi, and say to them, boy, you cannot deal with unsavory 
characters to save and defend the United States of America; it might 
embarrass us somewhere along the way.
  Well, if we are going to defeat terrorism, we need to deal exactly 
with those unsavory characters. The gentlemanly days of Ivy League 
spies are over. The threat today are those who behead their hostages. 
The threat today are those who use illegal operations and criminal 
enterprise to conduct horrible acts against the United States, 
including flying airplanes into buildings.
  So what we do by this amendment is say, yes, we have made some 
mistakes; yes, we did not hold you in high regard in the last decade, 
but we do today and we appreciate your work. You will not be on TV. You 
probably will not write a book. You probably will not be famous, but 
you are risking your life every single day for the defense of the 
United States.
  I talked to a CIA station chief just this weekend who said our 
business is really to steal secrets, and all we want is the 
appreciation of what we do, the art of getting to them before they get 
to us.
  These are great Americans, and when we tell them not to do something, 
they will not do it. When we tell them that we care and believe in 
them, they are going to do it. So this amendment is exactly that. It is 
us standing together, trying to set aside our partisan differences on 
what should never be a partisan issue, the safety and security of the 
United States of America.
  So, to every FBI agent who gets up in the morning and worries that on 
their watch something bad is going to happen, to every CIA agent, to 
every other intelligence operative that we have employed by the United 
States of America who stands tall as a patriot for their Nation, we 
ought to say today, we recognize we did not treat you well, but we 
understand how valuable you are today, and we will stand with you. We 
will stand with you all the way. We are going to give you the resources 
you need, and we are going to give you the respect that you should 
command.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Who seeks to control the time in opposition to the 
amendment?
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, and 
I will control the time on our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me just say to the sponsor of the amendment that all of us in 
this House, on a bipartisan basis, recognize and respect and honor the 
heroism and sacrifice of the men and women in the intelligence 
community. I have spoken to it two or three times already today. That 
is not the issue. The issue is additional language in this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) for the time.
  First, we appreciate the gentleman from Michigan's (Mr. Rogers) 
service, and I agree with a lot of the comments he made about coming 
together and supporting our men and women who really toil in the 
intelligence community. They toil tirelessly in the shadows for sake of 
our Nation's security.
  Today, we have heard complaints about our side being involved in 
partisan politics when, in fact, we are just trying to debate an issue 
that we disagree on; but I believe that certain parts of this amendment 
deal with a lot of politics, and I think it is important when we deal 
with the issue of politics that we then follow the facts because we 
need to be bipartisan as it relates to intelligence.
  The problem with this amendment, basically, is that the facts are as 
follows: first, the cuts in the Intelligence budget began after the 
first Bush administration. The first President Bush ordered a 17.5 
across-the-board cut in intelligence staffing from 1991 to 1997.
  Now, let us talk about the reasons for some of these cuts. It was the 
end of the Cold War. The entire intelligence community was going 
through a transition that we are still going through today. So let us 
follow the facts.
  House Republicans supported a 6 percent cut in President Clinton's 
Intelligence budget by voice vote in 1992. The Republicans have 
controlled the Congress in the last 10 years, which includes the purse 
strings. In 1996, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense; the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr.

[[Page H4850]]

Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and 
Senator Warner were cosigners of the Brown-Rudman report calling for 
further staffing reductions in intelligence, 3 years after the World 
Trade Center bombing in 1993.
  Senate Republicans cut $400 million from President Clinton's 
Intelligence budget in 1998, and these cuts were later restored.
  In 1999, President Clinton's CIA Director, George Tenet, secured the 
largest single increase in intelligence funding in 15 years.
  House Republicans increased President Clinton's fiscal year 2000 
budget by just 1 percent.
  From 1990 to 2003, overwhelming bipartisan majorities have supported 
every intelligence budget by a roll call or voice vote.
  I think we all recognize what this amendment really is. Let us get 
back to national security, and let us get away from the politics.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Simmons), whose service 
in the CIA has been unparalleled, and his service to his country is 
unmatched.
  Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.
  I rise in support of the amendment. As my colleague from Michigan 
mentioned, I spent 10 years in the Central Intelligence Agency. For all 
of those 10 years, I was a case officer. Five of those 10 years I 
served abroad on what I feel are difficult and dangerous missions. We 
have people today overseas serving under similarly difficult and 
dangerous conditions.
  The life of a CIA officer operating undercover overseas is not easy. 
They are required to penetrate a host government, a terrorist 
organization, or some other entity that may do harm to our Nation. Of 
definition, you are going to be dealing with unsavory characters. Of 
definition, you are going to have to do things that you would not 
normally do to accomplish your mission.
  This is stressful and this is dangerous, and so you can imagine what 
it must be like to operate in this environment when the DCI in 1995 
issues the Deutch Guidelines, where cumbersome legal impediments are 
placed upon the clandestine operative in his or her effort to 
accomplish their mission.
  I think this resolution correctly points out some of the difficulties 
that we have encountered over the last 3 years, and I would argue that 
some of those difficulties were encountered on both sides of the aisle, 
no question about it.
  But I think it is also incumbent that we use this opportunity, this 
Intelligence authorization bill to discuss some of these issues so the 
American people better understand how regulations like the Deutch 
regulations, which sound good on the surface, which restrict us from 
dealing with unsavory characters, in fact, work to defeat the 
fundamental mission of our intelligence men and women operating 
undercover overseas.
  I thank the gentleman for his amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to agree with the comments of the last speaker and commend his 
service as part of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings great 
expertise to this House, and I as one Member value it enormously.
  He may not know that the Bremer Commission on which I served 
recommended that the Deutch Guidelines not apply in the case of 
recruitment of terrorist spies. We, too, found that, though well-
intended, and I believe they were well-intended, those guidelines 
inhibited the aggressive recruitment of people who had the 
qualifications to penetrate the worst terrorist organizations, which we 
need them to do. Yes, these are unsavory characters, and yes, we need 
them, provided that they are reasonably vetted so that we know that 
they are reliable, but nonetheless, yes, we need them. I do not want to 
be heard to be ambivalent about this at all.
  A few years ago, our committee found that those guidelines had not 
been rescinded; and on a bipartisan basis, we directed that the DCI 
rescind them and replace them, and that was done at our direction. That 
was one of our impressive bipartisan actions, and so I would just point 
out that, while the language of this amendment commending our people in 
the field who take risk on our behalf is excellent, the problem we are 
having on this side is with the findings that very narrowly focus on a 
very few years of history.
  The history is longer, and let me say in the spirit of bipartisanship 
that we all got it wrong after the Cold War. We all thought the world 
would be more peaceful. We all thought there would be a peace dividend. 
That is why the 41st President, President Bush, began to draw down both 
the Defense and Intelligence budgets, anticipating a more peaceful 
world, which obviously did not come to pass.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, well, I know that we like to have it both 
ways around here, all of us do; but you cannot have it both ways. You 
cannot come to the floor tonight and say that we are not doing enough 
and then vote against this amendment.
  This amendment says that in the 1990s we did not put enough money in. 
You all know that. The cash cow when Clinton came into office was 
Defense and Intelligence, and what he did was he took the cash cow and 
he used the money for a lot of other things as all of you supported 
over there.
  So the idea that we are not doing enough but they did enough sort of 
belies belief here, and what the gentleman's amendment talks about is 
the fact that in the 1990s they took the cash cow, which was 
Intelligence and Defense, emasculated it, drew it down as far as they 
could and used it on a lot of other things. These charts prove that.
  Then the idea that the former head of the CIA, President Herbert 
Walker Bush, did not do that, that is fiction, too. You all know that. 
So you cannot come here and have it both ways. You cannot say you are 
saying that the chairman did not put a good mark up here because he did 
not fund fully the things that you want and yet during the 1990s they 
did. You know what, it does not work that way, but I guess it does work 
that way because you can come here and say anything you want; but the 
facts are the facts.
  The gentleman has a good amendment, and you all ought to be 
supporting that.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much more time do we have?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 5 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) has 2\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California has the right to 
close.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would just point out to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) 
that the findings section of this amendment claims there was a funding 
reduction in the Intelligence budget of 11 percent between 1993 and 
1995. This narrow period matches a period when President Clinton was in 
office and Democrats still controlled the Congress.

                              {time}  1900

  But the decline commenced in the first Bush administration, in 1990, 
as the Soviet empire was collapsing. And the trend continued through 
the 6-year period of Republican control of Congress until 9-11.
  It is good that we have increased the budget. I hope everyone in this 
House supports those increases. Certainly those of us on this side of 
the debate are talking about full funding of counterterrorism, because 
it turns out that the world was not more peaceful after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The world was more dangerous, and all of us underestimated 
the lethality of the threats we faced.
  In hindsight, we all, over three administrations, should have done a 
lot more. In foresight, hopefully together on a bipartisan basis, we 
will.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murphy).
  Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the rhetoric of this debate is not without 
its dangers. While this evening's discussion is ostensibly about the 
intelligence reauthorization, and I welcome

[[Page H4851]]

the more temperate approach tonight has, on other days the vituperative 
words here and also on the campaign trails, I believe, may have harmful 
consequences that demand our attention.
  We may be responsible for giving weapons of intelligence to the 
terrorists themselves. In World War II, the Germans launched V2 rockets 
towards England and waited to learn where they fell. Newspaper and 
radio accounts of the damage could help the Nazis adjust their fire 
accordingly.
  Now, you do not have to be a psychologist to understand the behavior 
of terrorists towards us is based upon the feedback they get from us. 
Are they getting their ideas and marching orders from the evening news?
  Politicians look to incite anger and blame over gas prices. Does this 
lead to bombing of refineries?
  Politicians raise doubt about Iraqi security strength. Is that why 
they attack police barracks?
  Politicians questioned if Iraqi leaders were ready to take over. Did 
that contribute to assassinations of Iraqi leaders?
  Politicians screamed about enemy prisoner abuse. Did that contribute 
to the capture, torture, and decapitation of American citizens?
  And politicians questioned if Americans could tolerate casualties of 
our soldiers. Could that be encouraging attacks on our troops?
  Terrorists watch the evening news for our reactions to their crimes, 
listen to our speeches, listen for calls to run away, watch the polls, 
and are emboldened by any sign we are weakening, and are thwarted by 
signs we remain steadfast. We tell them where, how, and how severe to 
strike next. Our intelligence is important here.
  After U.S. politicians began to apply the words ``Vietnam'' and 
``quagmire'' in Iraq, al Qaeda added the same words to their daily 
lexicon.
  Terrorists are looking for ways to sway public opinion. Look at 
Madrid. And now the ultimate question before them is: How will a direct 
attack on the U.S.A. affect our fall elections?
  I believe these concerns are real. But even if only a remote chance 
of a link, should we not stop, think, and ask where we must draw the 
line.
  And while we deliberate the intelligence bill tonight, let us stop 
aiding the enemies of freedom through politicized debate here or on the 
campaign trails. Unless we do, we risk having the blood of Americans on 
our hands. I say support the amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on our side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 4 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) has \1/
2\ minute remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would subscribe to the comments of the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Simmons), and I would like to point out the problem 
with this amendment. It says it is the sense of Congress that the 
intelligence community should be revitalized by investing in its 
missions, people, and capabilities of the community. And, of course, 
that the efforts of the men and women of the intelligence community 
should be recognized and commended.
  This is commendable. This is what we would like to do. But if you 
read the findings of this, you find out what is really at play here. It 
is a gratuitous swipe at an administration that has long been out of 
office.
  If, in fact, we want to revitalize the community by reinvesting in 
its missions, we should be doing exactly what we have been talking 
about today, funding counterterrorism at something more than 30 percent 
of what the community, these people, say they need to carry out their 
missions and the capabilities that they need. Yes, we should revitalize 
by reinvesting. That is what we are asking to do today.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume just to clarify and point out that in fiscal year 1993, 
President Bush requested a 4 percent increase, and the Democrat 
Congress that year cut the request by 10 percent, effectively reducing 
the funding by 5 percent from the 1992 appropriation.
  I understand the politics of being a convert to intelligence. Thank 
you. Let us stand together and say, okay, that time has gone, we are 
going to move forward, we are going to stand with the intelligence 
community.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I actually urge support of this. When 
something bad is going to happen, we want to make sure that it is the 
bad guys that get us and not the good guys. And we are concerned that 
we have not, in our own country, focused enough on that subject.
  I think this amendment helps the good guys and hurts the bad guys, so 
I urge its support.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
I do not think we have any further speakers on this amendment, but I 
would like to enter into a dialogue with the amendment's sponsor to 
suggest to him that we might agree by unanimous consent that the sense 
of Congress in his resolution be the entire resolution.
  We strike the findings, because our side feels that they are not 
complete and that some of them may be misleading. And that, as I said, 
on a bipartisan basis we all were wrong in 1990 when the wall came down 
and we expected a more peaceful world.
  Would the gentleman be amenable to striking the findings and having 
his resolution be the Sense of Congress, as he has drafted it, which I 
would predict would be adopted unanimously?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, facts are very stubborn things. 
Given the sense of where the intelligence community is today, they are 
beleaguered at every corner. For years, their hands were tied behind 
their back. And now you have commissions coming out and say, gee, we 
tied your hands and now we are faulting you for not being super heroes 
and doing super work without the funding and resources.
  I think it is accurate, and I think we should make that statement 
that we all recognize those shortcomings of 1990s, but we will stand 
with you today. It is an important commitment for the morale of the 
intelligence officers in the field.
  Ms. HARMAN. Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed 
in that answer only because I think there is plenty of blame to go 
around over three or four administrations and findings that made that 
clear, I think, would be more helpful.
  Let me reiterate my strong view, and the view of everyone that I can 
imagine on our side, that we support the men and women of the 
intelligence community. That is something I have said over and over and 
over again in our committee briefings, hearings, and travels. 
Everywhere we go around the globe, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) and I and others have traveled to places like Pyongyang, and 
Baghdad and Kabul and Libya and elsewhere. We have always thanked the 
men and women of the intelligence community with whom we have met.
  I wish that this would have been drafted on a bipartisan basis with 
what we would view as a fairer statement of findings over a longer 
period of time. I think that that would do more honor to the capable 
men and women who are now in harm's way. So I regrettably urge a ``no'' 
vote on this amendment.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I stand in strong support of the Rogers 
Amendment recognizing the vital, groundbreaking work of our 
intelligence community.
  As a former FBI special agent, I well understand the importance of 
human intelligence gathering. The patriots of our intelligence 
community are frequently unsung heroes, not receiving due credit for 
their tireless efforts. Due to the nature of their work, they don't 
make the headlines, but their work will continue to derail terrorist 
activities and thus prevent headlines from being made.
  Mr. Chairman, we're facing significant new threats in the post-Cold 
War era, and certainly since September 11, 2001. New hot spots have 
emerged throughout the world, and new havens for terrorists and their 
supporters. The threats we encounter are no longer solely state-based, 
and require new methods to combat them.
  Unfortunately, changing our Cold War ways has not kept pace with 
these new threats. It

[[Page H4852]]

has taken too long to reverse the Church Commission's outdated and 
overreaching reforms that crippled our intelligence abilities, 
restricting human intelligence and limiting people from getting out in 
the field. The 2002 Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks confirmed 
that the lack of reliable human sources in al Qaeda ``significantly 
limited the [intelligence] community's ability to acquire intelligence 
that could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks.''
  While human intelligence can be the force multiplier in many 
instances, our intelligence community has not received the funding or 
the support it requires to conduct operations. Through the leadership 
of Chairman Goss and others, we're continuing to work toward 
revitalizing the community, giving our operatives what they need to 
continue their work and respond to the new threats we face. Their work 
stands at the center of our global war on terrorism.
  I salute Mike Rogers for introducing this amendment to recognize the 
dedication and importance of our intelligence community, and thank 
Chairman Goss for crafting this authorization to meet our current and 
future threats.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) 
will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House 
Report 108-561.


                Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ackerman

  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Ackerman:
       At the end of title III, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 304. REPORTS ON PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO CURB PROLIFERATION 
                   OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TO FIGHT 
                   TERRORISM.

       (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress classified 
     reports on the following matters:
       (1) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan, or 
     individuals or entities in Pakistan, to acquire or transfer 
     weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, or 
     missile equipment and technology, to any other nation, 
     entity, or individual.
       (2) The steps taken by the Government of Pakistan to combat 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
     technologies.
       (3) The steps taken by the Government of Pakistan to 
     safeguard nuclear weapons and related technologies in the 
     possession of the Government of Pakistan.
       (4) The size of the stockpile of fissile material of the 
     Government of Pakistan and whether any additional fissile 
     material has been produced.
       (5) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan to fight Al 
     Qaeda and the Taliban as well as to dismantle terrorist 
     networks operating inside of Pakistan.
       (6) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan to establish 
     and strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan.
       (b) Deadline for Submittal of Reports.--(1) The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall submit the first report required 
     under subsection (a) not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (2) The Director shall submit subsequent reports required 
     under subsection (a) on April 1 of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
     and 2009.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (B) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
     the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Weapons of mass destruction.--The term ``weapons of 
     mass destruction'' has the meaning given such term in section 
     1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 
     Act of 1996. (Public Law 104-201).
       (3) Missile equipment and technology.--The term ``missile 
     equipment and technology'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 74(a)(5) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2797c(a)(5)).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686 the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Ackerman) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Last year, Mr. Chairman, President Bush announced a 5-year, $3 
billion aid package for Pakistan in return for Pakistan's continued 
cooperation in the global war on terrorism. At that time, the 
President, through his spokesman, said that Congress would be looking 
closely at Pakistan's efforts on nuclear nonproliferation, on combating 
al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups, and the 
reestablishment of democracy.
  Without question, Pakistani cooperation in the war on terrorism will 
be key to our success. Yet since the President's announcement, the 
media has been filled with reports of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan's nuclear 
network, where it turns out two-thirds of the axis got their nuclear 
technology and that Khan's agents tried to sell it to the other third.
  In addition, there have been recent reports of uneven cooperation 
from Pakistan with regard to terrorism generally, and al-Qaeda in 
particular. These reports reach to the very heart of the 
administration's justification for supporting Pakistan.
  Lastly, I do not think anyone can credibly say that the so-called 
referendum on General Musharraf's rule, or the parliamentary elections 
held last year, were either fair or free. Real democratization in 
Pakistan just does not seem to be high on General Musharraf's list, and 
we must do much more than to pretend it is high on ours.
  My amendment would require the Director of Central Intelligence to 
issue a classified, that is classified report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress regarding, one, the efforts of any Pakistani 
entity or individuals to acquire or transfer weapons of mass 
destruction and related technologies or missile equipment and 
technology to any other nation, entity, or individual; two, Pakistan's 
efforts to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means to deliver them; three, Pakistani steps to ensure that their own 
nuclear weapons are secure; four, Pakistani efforts to dismantle 
terrorist networks operating inside Pakistan, including but not limited 
to al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and, finally, five, Pakistani steps to 
restore democracy.
  The point, Mr. Chairman, of my amendment, is to help Members 
establish, on a classified basis, some of the facts about Pakistan's 
efforts and cooperation on all of these subjects. We will all be asked 
to support substantial military and economic assistance to Pakistan 
over the next several years, and I strongly support that proposition, 
but I believe that Members should understand the whole picture as they 
are being asked to approve this substantial assistance.
  While I understand that executive agencies generally do not like 
reporting requirements, we are a coequal part of government, and we 
have to learn the facts and the truth, we have to authorize and 
appropriate the money, and we must be informed. I have personally, as 
well as others have personally, tried to get the information from the 
administration, particularly regarding A.Q. Khan, and those efforts 
have been rebuffed.
  I do not believe my amendment would be unduly burdensome to the CIA, 
since they are supposed to be following the events in Pakistan anyway. 
I am merely asking that they put their information into some useful 
form for Members.
  Mr. Chairman, the administration has said repeatedly and properly 
that weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that they may be 
acquired by terrorists is the single biggest threat facing the United 
States, and in Pakistan, we have the epicenter of both of those 
threats. Our relationship with Pakistan is a complicated one and 
presents the United States with one of its most difficult near-term 
foreign policy challenges. I think the Members must make intelligent 
decisions regarding Pakistan, and we should have as much information on 
a classified basis as possible.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge Members to support the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, and I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.

[[Page H4853]]

  Mr. Chairman, I do not have huge heartburn over this at all, but I am 
a little concerned on a couple of points.
  The first is that Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in a very 
delicate part of the world with this global war of terrorism. I think 
it is important to remember that Pakistan's stability and continued 
cooperation in the war on terror is of paramount importance to the 
United States' national interest at this time, and we all know it. 
Without Pakistan's help, the war on terror would be much more difficult 
to fight and to win.
  Anyone who doubts Pakistan's commitment need only see last week's 
report that Pakistani forces killed one of the country's best known, 
most wanted pro al-Qaeda militants, that would be Nek Mohammed, in a 
missile strike. Pakistani security forces have killed or captured 
dozens of al-Qaeda operatives since 9-11 and have sustained significant 
casualties in so doing, and considered high-level casualties there, 
too, I am sorry to say.
  President Musharraf, moreover, is walking a political tightrope in 
helping us, as all of us who have been in that country know, yet he 
believes that the war on terror must be won, and is willing to take 
significant political, and I would say personal risk on his part to do 
it.
  The stories about A.Q. Khan's proliferation exploits were not a 
surprise to the intelligence community. This was an example of very 
good work, and it is work that is continuing.

                              {time}  1915

  The intelligence community and State Department are working 
diligently, constructively, carefully and quietly on the sensitive 
matters referred to in this amendment. The committees of jurisdiction 
are being kept well informed about the status of things.
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, I know the 
motivation is good, but nevertheless this requires the Director of 
Central Intelligence to report to eight congressional committees on 
Pakistan's efforts to curb WMD proliferation, fight terrorism, 
safeguard nuclear weapons, strengthen Pakistan's democratic 
institutions, and disclose the size of Pakistan's fissile material 
stockpile. Actually that is happening. I think that is all going on. I 
do not have any problem reiterating it, but I am a little concerned the 
amendment might be misconstrued by some, given the sensitive state of 
affairs in the region; and frankly I do not think it is helpful to U.S. 
interests.
  As I say, I think much of the oversight noted in what he is trying to 
accomplish is already being done by the committees of jurisdiction. As 
I say, I do not have huge heartburn over this, but I am worried that it 
could upset a delicate balance.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am glad that the gentleman does not 
have heartburn. I appreciate his sentiments. Nobody is suggesting that 
we oppose aid to Pakistan.
  Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and commend him for this amendment and rise in support.
  I do agree with Chairman Goss that our committee is already studying 
these issues. I also agree with Chairman Goss that these are touchy 
issues because we certainly want to communicate our strong support for 
the Government of Pakistan which has, after all, been an ally of ours 
in this very, very difficult global war on terror and which continues 
to take major risks on our behalf. So, yes, that is true.
  On the other hand, I believe it is important to run to ground key 
questions, including the breadth and scope of the proliferation headed 
by A.Q. Khan, the number of customers, the degree of cooperation with 
other rogue states, and whether at any level there was complicity of 
the Pakistani Government. These are tough questions, and I think that 
what is requested in this amendment, which is a report on these 
questions, will certainly burden the agencies. Yes, it will. On the 
other hand, it will give us some answers that we need.
  On balance, I think it is commendable that we focus additional 
attention on the damage done with respect to proliferation around the 
world by A.Q. Khan and his network and we recognize that there is a 
place, I think the place is now, in our consideration of these issues 
to get the clear answers we deserve.
  I support this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed 
in House Report 108-561.


                  Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Shays

  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be read. It is short.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment will be read in full.
  There was no objection.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Shays:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the Sense of Congress that the head of each element 
     of the intelligence community, including the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
     the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury 
     should make available upon a request from a committee of 
     Congress with jurisdiction over matters relating to the 
     Office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program of the United 
     Nations, any information and documents in the possession or 
     control of such element in connection with any investigation 
     of that Office by such a committee.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Shays) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I obviously move the adoption of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Ose).
  Mr. OSE. I thank the gentleman from Connecticut for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, before you came to Congress doing business, were you 
ever ripped off? Just plainly and simply ripped off? Mr. Chairman, this 
oil-for-food program is a rip-off to trump any scheme or action 
perpetrated on any member of any country anytime anywhere. This oil-
for-food program got hijacked, pure and simple.
  The way it worked was, Iraq complained about not having enough money 
to buy food or medicine for its people, so the United Nations frankly 
in what turned out to be a moment of great generosity set up a program 
whereby a limited amount of Iraqi oil could be brought to market and 
sold to willing buyers for the purpose of generating revenue that Iraq 
could then use through the United Nations to buy food and medicine for 
its people.
  Lo and behold, the grand bazaar of Baghdad turned out to be a rip-off 
of all rip-offs. Saddam Hussein hijacked this program, arguably with 
the knowledge beforehand of certain members of the United Nations staff 
responsible for oversight to make sure this did not happen and lined 
his pockets with up to $10 billion of surcharges and levies on this 
program. Over the course of the oil-for-food program, $67 billion worth 
of oil was sold. Half of that $67 billion in turn was used to purchase 
food and medicine and other supplies for the benefit of the Iraqi 
people. Keep in mind that under the United Nations resolution that set 
this program up, the purpose of these oil sales was to provide food and 
medicine to the starving and unhealthy population in Iraq.
  However, let me tell my colleagues what the dictator of Baghdad 
purchased for the people of Iraq in part. The people of Iraq were asked 
to consume 1,500 ping-pong tables. They were provided with all sorts of 
soft ice cream machines. They purchased overpriced dental chairs from 
China. They even were able to acquire a warehouse full of undelivered 
wheelchairs and cigarettes. They paid $2 billion for presidential 
palaces. They bought 300 Mercedes-Benz sedans. They paid for a $200 
million Olympic stadium. They bought limos. They even bought defective 
ultrasound machines from Algeria to feed their people with.
  The purpose of the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment is to 
harness

[[Page H4854]]

the energies and talents of America's agencies to help us get to the 
bottom of this. There is absolutely no rationale for allowing this kind 
of a rip-off to occur. The gentleman from Connecticut's amendment 
directs American agencies to cooperate with the different committees of 
Congress to get to the bottom of this.
  I would close, Mr. Chairman, by, in effect, pardon my phrase, 
throwing back at the Secretary-General his words. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan said, ``I want to get to the truth and I want to get to the 
bottom of this.'' Mr. Chairman, we want the truth as well. We want some 
answers. We want to know, what was the purpose of Cotecna in this 
dynamic process? How come we had to send stuff through Jordan at 
discounts of upwards of 67 percent to true value? How come we were able 
to ship stuff through Syria for only a 33 percent discount? This thing 
begs for an investigation. Interestingly enough, between Benon Sevan 
and Kojo Annan and the people who were responsible for this, the future 
holds answers that are just going to fascinate us all.
  I urge adoption of this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Who claims time in opposition to the amendment?
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will 
control the time on this side.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as a strong supporter of congressional oversight, I 
believe that information should be readily available to those 
congressional committees of jurisdiction conducting investigations, 
including investigations of the U.N. oil-for-food program. Therefore, I 
am happy to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Connecticut and feel it is very constructive.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), a member of our committee.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, one of the issues we have been 
debating today is the issue of oversight with respect to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. I am a member of that committee, but 
I am also a member of the Subcommittee on National Security of the 
Committee on Government Reform of which the gentleman from Connecticut 
(Mr. Shays) is our chairman. I support this amendment. I find that the 
gentleman from Connecticut is taking his responsibility for oversight 
very seriously. Not only has he ruled and really been in charge of this 
committee and trying to seek and follow the facts but he has gone to 
Iraq. He has done his investigation. It is important that we follow the 
facts and that we move forward because this oil-for-food program is a 
rip-off. People were taken advantage of. Our citizens were taken 
advantage of, as were the Iraqi citizens. We must follow this 
investigation.
  Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. OSE. The gentleman from Maryland is very accurate in terms of 
talking about the oil-for-food program. I just want to highlight one 
thing. Some of the revenues that were used in this program in effect 
were used to buy food that had spoiled. We paid people to deliver food 
under this program that was spoiled. And Saddam collected commissions 
or levies or tariffs or something on it. We need to get to the bottom 
of this. I cannot tell the gentleman how pleased I am to have both 
sides interested in making this happen.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Reclaiming my time, there is also an issue of Mr. 
Chalabi, who made allegations that he had evidence concerning this 
issue. We had under oath certain representatives representing Mr. 
Chalabi that were going to come forward with evidence. That did not 
occur. It is important that we move forward in a bipartisan way and 
follow the facts.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I 
do not think I need to use the whole debate, particularly given the 
gracious support of both sides of the aisle, the chairman of the full 
committee and ranking member, and say that they have always been a 
pleasure to work with. I thank the gentlewoman from California so much 
for all the work that she does and the gentleman from Florida. The 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) has been a tremendous 
supporter for our efforts. The gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) has 
really brought out a lot in the hearing that we had.
  We know that we could not allow the sanctions to deprive Iraqi 
citizens of food and medicine. The problem was they did not get the 
food they paid for and they did not get the medicines they paid for, 
because Saddam Hussein was basically allowed to run the program with 
the oversight of the U.N. that chose not to provide oversight, 
particularly the Chinese and the Russians who did not believe that 
there should even be sanctions and did not go out of their way to make 
this system work.
  So we had countries that knowingly allowed Saddam to rip off his own 
people. He undersold oil and then got huge kickbacks, and he overpaid 
for commodities and got huge kickbacks, $4.4 billion in the 
overcharges, the surcharges for the oil and the kickbacks on 
humanitarian purchases and an estimated $5.7 billion going through 
Syria. The Syrians and the Russians and, frankly, the French were not 
helpful in this process.
  What I rejoice in was that this story was really outed by the free 
press in Iraq. We all knew that this was a corrupt program; but what 
happened was the Iraqi Governing Council, some in it, leaked 
information to their now free press that printed the names of almost 
300 people. Well over 200. They were high-ranking government officials 
including, frankly, Kofi Annan's son allegedly involved, Benon Sevan in 
charge of the program, and so we have now an investigation of the U.N.
  But Mr. Volker will tell you, it is kind of like being in the Senate. 
It is unanimous consent. He has to get the cooperation of everyone. He 
does not have the ability to just say, I want this information. If I 
don't get it we're going to subpoena it. So he is first looking at the 
U.N. and what they are doing to try to, in my judgment, go carefully to 
build credibility so he can go after what he thinks are more serious 
problems. The bottom line is we need to encourage much more aggressive 
activity on the part of the U.N. We can only do that if we get the 
information, information from the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and our criminal justice system. I want to also compliment 
the Committee on International Relations. They are working so well with 
our subcommittee and our subcommittee is working so well with them.

                              {time}  1930

  We are trading information. There is more than any one committee can 
do, and ultimately I think we will get to the truth of it. I just would 
say that the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) was absolutely correct 
when he said that this is one of the largest rip-offs to any country, 
and it was a community rip-off by other nations. They allowed Saddam to 
make billions of dollars at the expense of his own people.
  And it really suggests why in some cases some countries may not have 
been interested in our allowing the Iraqis to overthrow Saddam, getting 
this information that will expose him. I think they all thought it 
would just be quiet and that this program would continue ad infinitum.
  I have spoken longer that I have chosen. I do not really have 
anything else to say other than to thank my colleagues and to them on a 
bipartisan basis we are going to get at the truth.
  From its inception in 1996, the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program 
(OFF) was susceptible to political manipulation and financial 
corruption. Trusting Saddam Hussein to exercise sovereign control over 
billions of dollars of oil sales and commodity purchases invited the 
illicit premiums and kickback schemes now coming to light.
  But much is still not known about the exact details of Oil-for-Food 
transactions. That is one reason my Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations convened a hearing on 
April 21st: to help pierce the veil of secrecy that still shrouds the 
largest humanitarian aid effort in history.
  This much we know: The Hussein regime reaped an estimated $10.1 
billion from this

[[Page H4855]]

program: $5.7 in smuggled oil; $4.4 in oil surcharges and kickbacks on 
humanitarian purchases through the Oil-for-Food Program. There is no 
innocent explanation for this.
  At the hearing, the Subcommittee heard the program, while successful 
in many ways, was riddled with corruption and the independent efforts 
of the Iraqis to investigate the fraud was being stifled by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority.
  We want the State Department, the CPA, the intelligence community, 
and the U.N. to know there has to be a full accounting of all Oil-for-
Food transactions, even if that unaccustomed degree of transparency 
embarrasses some members of the Security Council.
  Two months ago, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan assured me he wants 
to get to the bottom of this scandal and restore faith in the ability 
of the U.N. to do its job. Subsequently, the Secretary General 
appointed Paul Volcker to lead an independent panel to look into the 
Oil-for-Food Program.
  While Mr. Volcker brings expertise and prestige to the task, we are 
concerned about the slow pace of the U.N. investigation. The Volcker 
panel has just announced the hiring of senior staff. Nevertheless, they 
continue to say an interim report, possibly this summer, will address 
the conduct of U.N. employees and allegations about the Secretary 
General's son involvement.
  But we also need to know more than what just happened at the U.N. We 
also need to know what happened at the U.S. Mission. We need to know 
what our intelligence community knew and knows.
  Many of the allegations are true, we just don't know which ones yet. 
We should be long past asking whether something went wrong in OFF. It's 
time to find out exactly what went wrong and who is responsible.
  Our staff has been through the minutes of the U.N. ``661 Committee'' 
of Security Council members responsible for sanctions monitoring and 
oversight of OFF. Those minutes tell a story of diplomatic obfuscation 
and an obvious, purposeful unwillingness to acknowledge the program was 
being corrupted. Questions about oil or commodity contracts were 
dismissed as dubious media rumors beneath the dignity of the U.N. to 
answer, while Saddam was given the undeserved benefit of every doubt.
  We cannot ignore the profoundly serious allegations of malfeasance in 
the Oil-for-Food Program. To do so would be to deny the Iraqi people 
the accounting they deserve and leave the U.N. under an ominous cloud. 
This is the Iraqi's money we're talking about, so the Iraqi Governing 
Council and its successor should get cooperation from the CPA and the 
State Department in conducting its inquiries.
  In Iraq, and elsewhere, the world needs an impeccably clean, 
transparent U.N. The dominant instrument of multilateral diplomacy 
should embody our highest principles and aspirations, not 
systematically sink to the lowest common denominator of political 
profiteering.
  This emerging scandal is a huge black mark against the United Nations 
and only a prompt and thorough accounting, including punishment for any 
found culpable, will restore U.N. credibility and integrity.
  That is why it is critical to get to the bottom of the corruption. In 
order to do that we need for the intelligence community to better 
assist the Congress in its investigations.
  Mr. Chairman, this Sense of Congress will help address the 
difficulties many committees have had obtaining information and 
documents--especially from the intelligence community--pertaining to 
the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program. This amendment should reinforce the 
importance Congress places on the Oil-for-Food investigations.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  As I have stated earlier and others on our side have stated, we 
support this amendment. We think congressional oversight matters. 
Committees can make a big difference, and on a bipartisan basis we 
think this amendment should be supported by the whole House.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) 
will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House 
Report 108-561.


                Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Kucinich

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
       At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON EVIDENCE OF 
                   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND AL-
                   QAEDA.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of the evidence of 
     any relationship, existing before September 11, 2001, between 
     the regime of Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, referenced in all 
     intelligence reporting of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     including products, briefings and memoranda, distributed to 
     the White House and Congress.
       (b) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the audit conducted 
     under subsection (a).


     

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