[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 88 (Wednesday, June 23, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H4824-H4855]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 686 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4548.
{time} 1641
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4548) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Simpson in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4548, and I ask my colleagues
on both sides of this great House to support this bill. Casting their
vote is a vote of confidence, respect, and deep admiration for the
honorable and heroic patriots who toil quietly, and usually without
notice, throughout the intelligence community in order to keep
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us safe, prosperous, and free in this wonderful country. It is
imperative that these men and women understand in these troubled times
that this House holds them in the highest regard and appreciates that
the work accomplished by them is critical to the defense of our liberty
and security. Amid great sacrifice and often intense conditions, the
men and women of the intelligence community continue to perform their
missions with great energy and admirable devotion to duty. We commend
these officers. The security of our Americans at home and abroad truly
relies on their success.
Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues like the Defense appropriation bill
that passed yesterday on a vote of 403 to 17, then this bill should
equally please my colleagues today. Yesterday's Defense appropriation
bill was coordinated closely with the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, and our funding levels are very, very close. The
Intelligence bill currently before the House, however, authorizes
funding slightly above the level the appropriators set for intelligence
funding. In fact, this Intelligence bill funds the intelligence
community at its highest levels in history. It exceeds the total fiscal
year 2004 appropriated level for the intelligence community, including
all supplementals, approximately by hundreds of millions. As my
colleagues know, we cannot be totally precise on the numbers we speak.
For all intelligence programs in this bill, the committee authorizes a
total of approximately 16 percent over the President's February
request.
This bill increases investment in human intelligence and the
capabilities that they represent for us, the core mission of our
intelligence community. It improves intelligence analysis, coverage in
depth, so that we have more focused, sharper information for our
decisionmakers. It strengthens intelligence community language
capabilities across the board, through both improved legislative
authorities and initial investment, so we have the people who know the
languages we need to know to do our job.
It improves the structure and management of the disparate elements of
the intelligence community's information technology systems by creating
an intelligence community Chief Information Officer, hopefully to get
better coordination so that we can overcome some of the problems we
learned as we reviewed the events of 9/11. It bolsters U.S.
counterintelligence resource capabilities; and, specifically, it adds
22 percent above the President's request for human intelligence and
human-related programs. That is the core business of intelligence.
Substantial increases in funding for improved analytical capabilities,
as I have said, are included.
Significant additional amounts for information technology
infrastructure, what we call enterprise architecture, is included, and
information-sharing capabilities, which are critical. Tens of millions
are included for improved foreign language capabilities.
This money has been carefully applied; it is carefully managed. This
bill is very close to the bill passed unanimously out of our sister
committee in the other body, with one major exception, of course, that
they did not have the benefit of the contingent emergency relief fund
during their consideration.
{time} 1645
So, it is fair to say that our bill is more generous to the global
war on terror than the other body's version, and that bill enjoys
bipartisan support, unanimous bipartisan support I am informed.
Some in the minority have suggested that voting down this bill
somehow better supports our intelligence community and makes our
country safer. In my view, that is a convolution to the point of
absurdity. They say if an attack happens before the election, it will
somehow be our fault for not funding the global war on terror.
I would point out that the 2004 fiscal year goes on until October,
and any shortage of resources would be of interest to those who did not
support the $87 billion supplemental bill for fiscal year 2004.
All I would say is that the majority in the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence voted to support the men and women of the
intelligence community in this bill today. We did not vote against the
community and we did not shortchange the community in the global war on
terrorism.
Now, there is an irony here. For years, I have been trying to get
more support for intelligence. Usually the record will show that
usually the cutting amendments have come from certain Members of the
minority, as is their right. Now, it seems my sin is to bring forth a
bill that spends not enough on intelligence rather than too much.
Frankly, I think I should declare victory and say thank you all for
listening.
But I will be disappointed, on a serious note, if at the end of this
day, Members on all sides cannot agree that this bill authorizes proper
sums carefully managed and properly coordinated with the appropriators
and the other affected committees.
This is a very good bill with many important aspects that I have
outlined. Indeed, it is with some hope I note the classified version of
the minority views in their very first paragraph admit as much. Members
who took the time to come up to the committee spaces to review the
classified annex, which is available to all Members as usual, have seen
the important work this committee has done.
Our work is not done in the public with klieg lights all the time.
But it is a little misleading to suggest, as some have, that the
committee product is less worthy because we do take seriously the
responsibility, our commitment it is, to safeguard properly classified
material by using closed sessions. That, incidentally, has been the
practice for all the recent Congresses that I have been on the
committee.
We must also be mindful that our enemies watch and hear what we say.
Our audience is the American people primarily. Those are the people to
whom we are accountable and responsible and proud of the work we do,
and are pleased to share it with them. But, unfortunately, our enemies
are listening too, and we are a Nation at war. Sometimes the enemy is
able to gauge their conduct on how this body acts. They are able to use
psychological warfare to drive wedges. They also could gain an enormous
advantage if we do not take the appropriate opportunities to keep from
public discourse our committee discussion on the sensitive intelligence
matters that we are charged with overseeing. And when we have that
debate in committee, I like the committee to have the full range of
conversation, so we start out with the idea in closed session and then
we winnow out what we can talk about in public, which is why we are
here today talking about what we can talk about in public.
For the past 7-plus years, I have been working to refit the
intelligence community for its future, with the members of the
committee, for whom I am extremely grateful, to posture it for the days
ahead. We have always worked hard on the committee to create a
constituency for intelligence inside and outside of this institution.
We have insisted that the committee be both supportive advocates and
constructive overseers. None of like gotcha politics when it comes to
national security.
I have tried to engage the past two administrations on the needs to
retool the Intelligence Community for smarter, better days ahead, and I
have had the full support of the committee in our efforts so far. This
bill continues that effort. I urge its adoption.
Mr. Chairman, I submit the following for the Record.
Statement of Administration Policy--H.R. 4548--Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 2005
The Administration supports House passage of HR 4548, which
authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for the
conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government. The committee-
reported bill authorizes funding that strengthens core
intelligence capabilities and supports intelligence
activities that would sustain the Global War on Terror.
Now more than ever before, our Nation's security relies on
accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence--and the
challenges facing the intelligence community are difficult
and complex. This makes it vitally important for the
administration and Congress to work together to provide the
intelligence community with the tools and resources it needs
to enhance our national security posture, win the Global War
on Terror, and reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
[[Page H4826]]
We are making advances in our ability to collect, process,
and analyze intelligence information. Although not part of
this bill, crucial innovations such as the PATRIOT Act and
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center are helping us to
protect our homeland by sharing information better than ever
before. The President has also expressed his interest in
working with Congress, when the time is right, to examine
structural reforms that may be needed to improve our
intelligence capability in the future. The upcoming reports
of the Senate intelligence Committee and the 9/11 Commission,
along with the work of the Commission on Intelligence
Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, will
provide important information that will help Congress and the
Administration in this effort.
The Administration looks forward to working with Congress
to support the vital work of the intelligence community,
especially its counterterrorism activities, to assure
continued strong, flexible intelligence capabilities, and to
refine certain provisions in this bill, including relating to
procurement, to ensure that these provisions maintain the
flexibility the President needs to most effectively manage
the ongoing war against terrorists of global reach.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, strong intelligence is our first line of
defense in the war on terrorism. And make no mistake, we are at war.
The gruesome beheadings of Danny Pearl, Nick Berg, Paul Johnson, and
yesterday's murder of 33-year-old Kim Sun Il of South Korea are stark
reminders of the nature of our enemy.
Our brave men and women in the intelligence community are on the
front lines fighting that enemy. They risk their lives for our freedom
and they deserve our unflinching support. Yet, unfortunately, Mr.
Chairman, this legislation deprives them of full support. This bill
provides less than one-third of the key funding that the intelligence
community has told us they need to fight the war on terrorism. Less
than one-third.
I want to use my time to engage the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss) in a brief dialogue on this important issue. I would like to ask
my colleague directly, on my time, Mr. Chairman, does this bill provide
all of the counterterrorism funding that the intelligence agencies have
told our committee they need for the coming year? Yes or no.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, officially yes, because we do have the
statement of support from the administration on this bill.
Ms. HARMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that response, but the
classified schedule of authorizations in the majority's bill
specifically states that the additional funds are only for the first
quarter of the year. Well, that is woefully inadequate.
The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the gentleman from Minnesota
(Mr. Peterson) and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell) all proposed
an amendment to fully fund counterterrorism. Let me demonstrate exactly
what this full funding amendment does. The majority's bill funds only
first quarter ops tempo for counterterrorism. The full funding
amendment, which we hope to offer, funds a full year for
counterterrorism.
The majority's bill gives the CIA 11 percent less than fiscal year
2004 funding, whereas the full funding amendment we had hoped to offer
gives the CIA 5 percent more than 2004 funding. The majority's bill
funds only 5 percent of the NRO's CT budget, 19 percent of NSA's CT
budget, 26 percent of NGA's CT budget, and 35 percent of the CIA's CT
budget. The full funding amendment funds 100 percent of these budgets.
Finally, the majority's bill provides no supplemental funding for
critical CT HUMINT support functions whereas the full funding amendment
provides full funding for all the HUMINT support functions.
In short, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4548 is too weak. What is the President
going to tell the American people when they learn that we are going to
have a gap in counterterrorism funding next year? There could be a gap
of 3 to 4 months before we pass a new supplemental. And during that
gap, our Nation will be at unnecessary risk at a time when, for
example, we will be having events like the presidential inauguration
and the Super Bowl.
The majority has twisted itself into a pretzel trying to justify this
weak bill, all the while bemoaning the harmful impact of budgeting-by-
supplemental on our intelligence community's ability and our
committee's ability to do robust oversight.
Jim Pavitt, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, gave a speech
this week in which he said that, ``there is no end in sight'' to the
terrorist threat we face. Terrorism is no longer a one-time emergency.
It is no longer something we should scramble around to fund. It is our
way of life. It is our central national security challenge. And if the
White House or the majority does not understand that, then we are in
serious danger.
In our committee we offered several amendments to strengthen
intelligence and strengthen oversight. They were common sense measures.
Yet, all of them were rejected on party line votes.
Mr. Chairman, we know terrorists are actively planning to attack us
again. We know there is nuclear material out there that is unaccounted
for for sale to the highest bidder. We know the next attack will be
followed by the usual Washington hand-wringing about why we did not do
more.
The rule under which we debate today has squandered an opportunity to
do much more. We have lost an opportunity to strengthen intelligence,
to strengthen congressional oversight, to retire the soon-to-be-vacant
DCI position and replace it with a 21st century organization capable of
integrating 15 intelligence agencies into one intelligence community
and to keep full faith with the brave men and women who are on the
front lines at this hour risking their lives for our freedom.
This bill is weaker, far weaker than the American people deserve.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Young), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee
on Appropriations.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, a world controlled by terrorists
or threats of terrorists is not acceptable. A world controlled by
dictators or dictatorial regimes or corrupt regimes is not acceptable.
The United States of America is vulnerable on many fronts to these
types of threats, but the more effective our intelligence operations,
the better we are at what we do in the field of intelligence, whether
it is technical intelligence or human intelligence. The more effective
our intelligence is, the more secure America is and will be.
I believe we did very well in the area of overhead technology, as
well as other types of technology, many of which we cannot even talk
about here in this open session today, but we have not done nearly as
well on human intelligence. And today's world requires a very effective
human intelligence capability.
The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and I have discussed this
many, many times, because, as we appropriate for the intelligence
activities, we work very closely with my colleague as he authorizes
intelligence activities.
This bill, while I am sure you will hear much debate today that it is
not a perfect piece of legislation, is a very good step toward making
our intelligence capability far more effective. And I would say again,
effective intelligence is good security. The more effective the
intelligence is, the more secure our Nation and our people.
I commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for the good
work that he has done in preparing this legislation. I know that there
will be serious debate. There will be amendments that will be offered.
But I have to give credit to the chairman for having produced a good
product.
I hope that the House will vote on this bill in big numbers. While we
worked together in developing our appropriations bill that we passed
yesterday, we actually came up with our own conclusions, but our
conclusions were very similar in to those in this authorization.
So I support the bill and I commend the chairman.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on the House Committee on
Armed
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Services, the committee on which I was honored to serve for 6 years.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, this is an important bill. It provides for
the programs and activities in our national intelligence agencies. As
the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq have taught us,
timely and accurate intelligence is so vitally important in both
protecting our country domestically as well as enabling us to act
militarily.
I view this bill from the perspective of having served on the
Committee on Armed Services for over 25 years, and also as a former
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Year in and
year out, both of the bills from the Committee on Armed Services as
well as Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence historically passed
the House with broad bipartisan support.
That is why I am troubled by the path the intelligence authorization
bill has taken this year. I cannot remember the last time an
intelligence bill passed out of committee on a party line vote or when
amendments offered in committee were all voted down on a party line. I
am also disappointed that the Committee on Rules only made in order one
Democratic amendment.
{time} 1700
What is all the more disappointing is that apparently the reason for
the posture of this bill is that the majority has been unwilling to
provide as much funding for counterterrorism activities as intelligence
agencies have told the committee they need. I would remind my
colleagues that we are now in a war against terrorism. I would think
that we should make sure that all the funding goes into the
counterterrorist area.
So although this bill may provide an overall increase in funding,
which is a positive note for these intelligence activities, the details
really are important. It is unfortunate we cannot increase the budget
in the places that need to have it the most; and though I will favor
this bill, I must express my disappointment, my deep disappointment at
the shortage in this area.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a chairman of a subcommittee of
the committee.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in very strong support of
H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005.
As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis,
and Counterintelligence, I can say unequivocally that H.R. 4548 is one
of the best, most far-reaching, most constructively critical, and
urgently needed authorization bills that I have been involved in.
The bill makes urgently needed fixes to the CIA's human intelligence
collection capability that even the DCI suggested was 5 years away from
being adequate. I do not believe we can or should wait 5 years, and it
also authorizes a very sizeable amount beyond the DCI's base request to
ensure we keep up the maximum possible operational tempo against the
counterterrorism and counterproliferation targets, both inside and
outside the theater of war.
In the area of analysis, significant new funds will be provided to
address a critical concern: the simple lack of analytical depth. The DI
analytical cadre is badly in need of bench strength and real expertise.
We have been burning up our analysts in wartime conditions and shipping
the majority of them to cover pressing counterterrorism requirements
since the mid-1990s without being able to adequately backfill
positions.
Those analysts need to have the right skills, firsthand exposure to
countries or issues they cover, cultural appreciation and, if at all
possible, the necessary foreign language skills in order to be
effective, and H.R. 4548 addresses all of these issues, particularly
with regard to language, which has consistently been a high-priority
item for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a pressing
need for the whole intelligence community.
The bill addresses counterintelligence shortfalls, ensures that the
necessary infrastructure for field operations, training, and a host of
other important activities are adequately funded, and brings
astonishingly new technical tools into play.
The bill continues the committee's long-standing efforts to get the
CIA's dangerously flawed compensation reform plan back on track; and it
demonstrates that we strongly support a more aggressive, risk-taking,
innovative intelligence collection posture. Such a posture would
finally give us a fighting chance to penetrate terrorist groups. It
would also allow us to tackle other hard-target countries, countries
that have plans and intentions to do us harm.
Overall, H.R. 4548 demonstrates that we are going to back up our
spies and our analysts when it counts the most.
To my distinguished colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this war
we are in is not just about Iraq or about Afghanistan or about where
Osama bin Laden may be hiding. It is truly a global war on terrorism
with significant global challenges; and these include money laundering,
illicit traffic, the preaching of hate, kidnapping, extortion, and even
at the national level, as we saw, the Madrid train bombing and the
elections that followed.
It is a war that is going to take time to win. It is a war that is
going to take fortitude to win, and it is a war that is going to take a
substantial and continued investment in our intelligence community.
I ask my distinguished colleagues to support H.R. 4548 for the sake
of our Nation's security. Some of my colleagues across the aisle have
decided that it is not important to provide for the intelligence
community in the middle of the global war on terrorism, and I say it
could not be more important.
This bill moves us closer to acquiring the capabilities and
directions that are needed not only to win the war on terror but to win
the peace in Iraq and to make sure we do not forget about the rest of
the world. We must never forget that the actions of others affects U.S.
national security interests. We must never retreat in the face of evil.
Vote ``yes'' on H.R. 4548 because it is urgently needed. The Nation
simply cannot afford to shortchange its men and women out on the
frontlines.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, those of us on this side of the aisle feel
it is important to fund stronger intelligence in the global war on
terror, and it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a dedicated member of our committee.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me the
time, and I also want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman, and the ranking member for the hard
work that they always put into these kinds of efforts and legislation.
Mr. Chairman, there is much that we expect from our military, from
our intelligence personnel, and from our civilian employees in what we
call this war on terrorism. We all take a great deal of pride in their
work, their professionalism, their dedication, and, yes, sometimes the
sacrifice that they make by making the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of
our great Nation.
So my question this afternoon is, When we expect so much from them,
why can we not expect the same from ourselves? Why can we not put
together a piece of legislation that supports them with the same
dedication, the same professionalism, the same level, 100 percent, of
the funds that are required for them to succeed?
In this legislation, Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to see that some
focus in this bill is on improving the functioning of the new
intelligence analysis element of the Department of Homeland Security. I
was also pleased that the bill, in general terms, recognizes the
importance of sharing information between the Federal, local, and State
levels and also the Federal levels such as the FBI.
I was, however, Mr. Chairman, disappointed that the bill did not
include language supportive of focusing on the necessary resources of
the El Paso Intelligence Center, such as enhancing the key
contributions that it makes towards homeland security through
intelligence analysis and information sharing. Just as the committee
has increasingly supported the FBI's joint terrorism task forces as a
potentially useful model for information sharing, EPIC is also a
successful model for focusing intelligence and law enforcement
resources on protecting the U.S. Southwestern border.
I am most disappointed, Mr. Chairman, that this bill does not include
a
[[Page H4828]]
provision like the Peterson amendment, which would have funded the
intelligence requirements at the full 100 percent level in this war on
terrorism. This is not about whether we supported the $87 billion
supplemental, not about politics. It is not about anything other than
giving the full amount of resources that are necessary to dedicated
personnel in the field.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), a valued member of the
committee and distinguished Member.
(Mr. BURR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, our enemies are watching us. The terrorists
know it is an election year, and they want us to become divided. They
believe that a terrorist act against our country will influence our
elections. They have a belief that democracy can be divided; yet they
underestimate the passion of our citizens and their patriotism.
Despite the decision of minority Members to play politics with this
bill, I believe we all are united against our enemies. These are
serious times, and it is important that we send a message to our
enemies that we cannot be divided. Support this intelligence bill. Send
the message.
It sends the message that we are on the offensive to eliminate the
threats to our homeland. Our intelligence community needs to know the
United States Congress supports them 100 percent.
This bill increases the funding for the global war on terrorism. It
increases by 22 percent our human intelligence. It supports our effort
on counternarcotics to eliminate the 17,000 Americans that die every
year from drug-related causes and the $160 billion annually in health
care, social, and criminal costs. We have provided extra funding for
the DCI to tackle this problem in this country.
On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I would like to bid farewell to my
colleagues on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I
have enjoyed serving under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss), and I think we are all fortunate that he was in the
Chair immediately following September 11. The gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) was the right man for our country when we needed an
intelligence community with expertise, intelligence, moral clarity, and
compassion. We will miss him.
I would also like to recognize the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr.
Bereuter), who will also leave, and wish him good luck on his future
endeavors. I have been proud to serve with both of them.
Immediately after September 11, the esteemed chairman of the
Committee on International Relations came to this floor and quoted the
words of Sir Winston Churchill which he wrote 6 decades ago:
``Civilization will not last,'' Churchill wrote, ``freedom will not
survive, peace will not be kept, unless a very large majority of
mankind unite together to defend them.''
We were united on September 11. Let us unite today. Let us support
the Intelligence authorization bill. Let us do it because it is the
right thing to do.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), ranking member of the Subcommittee
on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for the time.
I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his hard work. I
agree with some things that have been said about the gentleman's good
work. I actually thought, and I do not say this in anything but a
gentleman's way, I thought he would accept our idea to fully fund
counterterrorism. He surprised me, but I still do not take away from
his good work, and I want him to understand that.
But the debate over the Intelligence authorization bill this year has
been a hard fight. There are some serious disagreements about what the
best bill to protect the American people ought to look like.
I believe this bill has not gone far enough to strengthen
intelligence and strengthen oversight.
We, in this House and on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, have not shied away from standing strong and debating
these issues head-on. I believe what the American people deserve is our
best effort to support what we believe is right.
A lot of good work has gone into the bill. As the ranking Democrat on
the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and
Counterintelligence, I am glad to see funding and support for analysis.
As we have reviewed the intelligence on Iraq's WMD, it has become
clear to us that analysis did not have the ability to examine the
reliability of sources. It now appears, for example, that all four
sources that Secretary Powell relied upon to describe Iraq's mobile
bioweapons facilities were not solid. I hope that this bill's support
will improve the quality of analysis so that a future Secretary of
State has better intelligence at his or her disposal.
I am also pleased to see investment in long-term HUMINT needs, the
hiring and training of new case officers. The demands of the
counterterrorism campaign have been great and the intelligence agencies
have worked hard to meet those demands, but the war in Iraq has
stretched our resources. According to The Washington Post, one of the
largest intelligence efforts since the Vietnam War is under way there.
I am concerned that the demands Iraq has placed on our intelligence
resources have left large parts of the world alarmingly undercovered.
While this bill makes long-term investments, the bill falls short on
addressing some of the most urgent needs. This bill only provides one-
third of the additional funds the intelligence agencies say that they
need to fight terrorism.
The President will not send the rest of the funding request to
Congress until after the election, at the same time that he is urgently
warning of a possible terrorist attack before the election. To me, this
state of affairs is unacceptable.
I say to my good friends and colleagues here today, What should the
American people expect us to do? They expect us to do what is right to
provide them safety through funding counterterrorism. I hope the
President will send this supplemental funding request to Congress
before then so we can get on with the business of protecting the
American people.
I had hoped that this bill would have been stronger, stronger in its
support to the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community,
and I look forward to working with my colleagues to improve it as we go
through the conference.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the distinguished gentleman in
the well who just finished that I would have been pleased to have the
opportunity to try and work out his amendment if we had seen it ahead
of time before committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Collins).
{time} 1715
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for the next fiscal year. Yes, we are at war. We are
at war and a different kind of war than we have seen before. We are at
war with an enemy who has no identity, who has no uniform and has no
country. And I agree with the statement that was made earlier. I see no
end in sight for this war. But, Mr. Chairman, I also see no end to the
funding in sight for the intelligence community who does such a good
job of providing us with valuable information.
The President said it right at the podium there just past February
when he said we are a Nation of many responsibilities, but the primary
responsibility of this country and this government is the safety of the
American people. We are discussing the authorization for funding,
funding that was passed yesterday in the defense appropriation bill. We
disagree on the funding levels, yes. We also disagree on whether or not
we should create a new bureaucracy, a new level of bureaucracy to head
up what I call a super spy organization for the intelligence community.
[[Page H4829]]
But as we move forward with the changes that are being made today
over at the CIA with the retirement of Director George Tenet, we need
to also keep in sight those who are doing the job and make sure that
they have the funds and the funds that would be available under this
authorization to perform their duties.
We will debate the differences, the differences we have based on the
different political parties, the different philosophy, and then we will
vote on those differences later on in this process, but I urge those on
both sides of the aisle that when it comes to the final passage of this
authorization, we should all vote yes. We should vote to support those
who are in harm's way gathering information so that we will have the
correct information, as best as possible, to fight the war on terrorism
and protect the American people.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to the gentleman from
Florida (Chairman Goss) that our amendments were shared in advance and
our views on budgeting by supplemental have been known for years and
are shared by the majority.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a courageous member of our committee.
Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, here in general debate, I
feel it is necessary to repeat what I said earlier for the sake of
colleagues who may be listening in their offices before they come down
here to vote.
This authorization bill has a lot of good things in it, and I want to
commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and my colleagues
for the work that they have put together in this bill. And to the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), I want to say that this Member
will miss you when you are gone next year, and we appreciate your
leadership.
But this bill just is not strong enough. It does not fully authorize
funds for the intelligence community's key counterterrorism operations.
It authorizes less than a third of the funds that the intelligence
agency needs for key counterterrorism operations next year, and that is
just not the right thing to do when the Nation is under threat from
terrorism.
The administration has said that they are going to send down another
supplemental request next year, but there is ample evidence that al
Qaeda is plotting to strike us again this year, next year and into the
future.
This bill leaves 3 to 4 months open funding before a supplemental
bill can get through this Congress. If there is another terrorist
attack, do we want the next 9/11 commission to find that the Congress
failed in our duty to fully authorize funding for counterterrorism? I
think not.
In the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we sit up there
for hours listening to the different agencies tell us how critical it
is for these funds to be authorized. They roundly criticize the
practice of funding them on recurring supplementals. Supplementals
prevent them from planning effectively. They prevent us from doing
adequate oversight. They have to rob Peter to pay Paul while we wait
for these additional funds to arrive, and they will probably not
receive those funds until sometime next year, in April or May, and as I
said, it is going to leave 3 or 4 months open.
Supplementals have also been roundly criticized on our committee by a
bipartisan membership in the committee. The agencies have indicated
with some precision that additional funds that they will need in the
coming year, what they are, and we have addressed that.
So the question before the Congress is quite simple. Do we want to
fully authorize funds for the intelligence community's counterterrorism
requirements, or do we not? As it stands now, the majority answer to
that question is no, and I think we need a stronger bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire the status of the time on
both sides?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss) has 12 minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Harman) has 15\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), a dedicated member of our committee, who is
ranking member on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman), and I want to say to the gentleman from
Florida (Chairman Goss) that I have enjoyed his service on this
committee. And even though we have had strong differences here at the
very end, we have enjoyed his dedication to these issues and we will
miss him.
To the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), of course, I count
on your leadership and your dedication to the field as well.
Mr. Chairman, I am the ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and I served with the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) on the other side of the aisle. And we
have had another good year as well, and despite my differences over the
counterterrorism funding, I want to talk about positive aspects of this
bill that I do support.
In addition to the investments in human intelligence and language
skills, the bill strengthens our Nation's tactical and technical
collection and analytical capabilities.
I am proud to say that H.R. 4548 advances the analytical efforts at
the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, known as MSIC, which is in
Huntsville, Alabama, my Congressional district.
MSIC works to assess the capabilities of surface-to-air missiles that
continue to be proliferated across the globe by illicit arms
traffickers and terrorist groups threatening both military and civilian
aircraft. And those men and women there at MSIC work very hard to make
sure that we are right on the edge of analyzing that material, and we
provide them the skills and the tools and the funding to do that with.
At this time, also I want to thank my colleague from the Alabama
delegation, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) who is also on
this select committee. He looks after Alabama's involvement through the
Missile and Space Intelligence Center through those good people there
that work on those issues, and we in north Alabama thank our lower
Alabama native for his dedication and support there as well.
But we will continue with this effort to make sure that we give the
field the tools that they need to do the work that they should be able
to do. A better understanding of the threat capability is needed, and
this is a bill that provides for that as well.
So all in all, I think this is a good bill, and in spite of my strong
feelings that we should have fully funded counterterrorism, there are
strengths in this bill.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Eshoo).
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member for
her leadership in the committee, and to the chairman of the full
committee, who has given much for this country, both in service and in
representing his congressional district, as well as this committee, I
salute him, and we all salute him for it.
To the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), who will be leaving
the House of Representatives, I salute him as well for his wonderful
service on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, last week was really quite an extraordinary week for
those of us who serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. Breaking with past precedent, all committee Democrats
voted against the intelligence authorization bill in the committee
markup. And there was one primary reason for that, and that is that
counterterrorism is underfunded significantly, by two-thirds, in this
authorization bill.
I have said more than once you cannot have a 100 percent commitment
to counterterrorism and the global war on terrorism if you are only
going to fund it by 33 percent.
We have failed, I believe, to do everything we can to strengthen the
oversight. Truth is the oxygen of democracy, and it is the
responsibility of members of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to pursue the truth through strong oversight.
We offered amendments to fully fund the intelligence community's
counterintelligence operations, and we offered amendments in the
committee to
[[Page H4830]]
strengthen oversight. They were rejected by the majority. I offered the
amendment at getting the straight story on the Defense Department's
relationship with a man by the name of Ahmad Chalabi.
I want to know why the Department invested so much political and
financial capital in a man with such a checkered past. The CIA
terminated its relationship with him because it found him to be
unreliable. The State Department could not account for how he was
spending U.S. Government funds. And despite the obvious warning signs,
the Defense Department could not wait to give him more money. Now we
are finding out that Mr. Chalabi's organization may have fed the
intelligence community misleading or fabricated information on Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction. He may have been instrumental in
persuading the administration that the Iraqi people would welcome U.S.
soldiers with open arms, rather than improvised explosive devices.
That is why we have come to the floor. That is why we have come to
the floor with our objections. Bipartisanship means that people come
together. It does not mean that one side stands and says, you have to
meet us 100 percent in order to make it bipartisan. We should be able
to agree on the money for counterterrorism and for stronger oversight.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me add to what I said in the rule about
the chairman. No one in this House, for the last 10 years, has done
more for the intelligence community, for the people who work in the
intelligence community than the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). No
one has.
As a former CIA agent, he came to the House with the kind of
experience that I think most of us would relish, and he took it to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and has done an
extraordinary job. Now, does anybody believe that somebody like Porter
Goss is going to sell short the intelligence community; is going to
sell short the men and women who work in dark places in the world? It
is not even believable.
He has been working at it for 10 years as a member of the committee,
8 years as the chairman, and he served as an officer of the CIA. This
is nonsense for you to be coming to the floor trying to persuade
people, the American people or Members of the House, that the chairman
of the committee is going to sell short the CIA. Baloney. Do not
believe it. If you are watching this on C-SPAN, do not believe it.
This guy has been committed to this stuff his whole life. You think
he is going to take the committee down this primrose path? Of course,
he is not. So do not come here with your charts and do not come here
with your staged speeches and try and diminish the work this fellow has
been doing on behalf of people all over this world to collect
intelligence and do a good job.
No better person here in this House to talk about intelligence and
funding it and making sure that we have the money to do it than Porter
Goss. And we thank him for his service. Thank God he was the Chair of
the committee when 9/11 happened.
And for people who come to the floor and have voted against
opportunities to fund defense and to fund counterintelligence, really,
to me, you have no standing here when you come down here and say we are
selling it short. You know it is baloney. You know it is not factual.
And you know that the American people are not going to buy it. This guy
is not going to sell the intelligence community short.
Bipartisanship ended this year, but it started last year with a
document in the other body, where a whole game plan was laid out where
the Democrats were going to try to diminish this administration and use
the intelligence community to do it. That is not right. It is not fair
to people who work hard in this business, who spend their careers
trying to find people who want to do harm to America. But that is the
way it is. That is what happens around here.
And you have fallen into this trap where your leadership has decided
they are going to use the intelligence community to try to diminish the
work of people who work hard, for no good reason except for political
gain. You know what? People in the House are not going to buy it.
I say support the bill. It is a good bill. It is a bill that was
drafted in a way that will help the intelligence community do the hard
work that needs to be done.
{time} 1730
It will provide the funding that needs to be provided, and it is a
tribute to the chairman of the committee. This is his last bill. And
for those of my colleagues to stand on the floor and diminish that, I
think is wrong.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a reasonably recent and very dedicated member of our
committee.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, there are a few good features in this bill.
For example, the bill supports the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research funding request and provides additional
funding for enhanced training of State Department intelligence
activities. Following my request last year when my amendments with
regard to foreign language instruction were rejected and the leadership
assured me that we would take care of it this year, I worked closely
with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) on a number of
important provisions. I am pleased to acknowledge the work that he did.
Nearly $29 million of the $33 million in language programs that we find
in this bill were what I had specifically recommended or even written.
They will do a number of things to improve our proficiency in critical
languages.
But I am very disappointed in a number of failures. There was a
commonsense amendment I offered to provide foreign language instruction
for students of science and engineering at American universities. It
was a simple idea. We need it. It was voted down on party lines. But
the fundamental problem, and this is what we keep coming back to today,
all the world knows that there have been some major intelligence
failures. We read it in the world's press. In fact, too often we read
about these things in the world's press a day or two after critical
people have come before our committee and failed to tell us what we
need to know in order to exert oversight.
The reason we are talking about the underfunding here is because the
approach that the administration is taking, the approach that the
leadership here is endorsing is funding by supplemental appropriations.
It removes the oversight process. A large fraction of the funding for
counterterrorism is now removed from the oversight process, and it
compromises the work of this committee, it compromises the work of this
Congress, and it results in a fundamentally flawed authorization bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is the chairman of our
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence but was also on
probably the most recent delegation back from Iraq, and I appreciate
the extra effort that he and his colleagues made.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4548, the Intelligence
Authorization Act. I am disappointed by some of the rhetoric that we
have heard from the other side of the aisle today. The last speaker on
the other side of the aisle referenced the unwillingness of the
committee to accept an amendment. The problem is, there are other
committees in this House that have jurisdiction. I have similar bills
in the Committee on Education and the Workforce. The Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence accepted a significant portion of what the
gentleman from New Jersey presented. We accepted it. The Committee on
Education and the Workforce passed on jurisdiction, meaning that even
though we have responsibility to review it, we respect the leadership
of the chairman of the committee, we respected the work of the members
of this committee, and we respected and realized how important it was
to get that done. So we passed on it and we said, let the intelligence
bill carry this forward.
[[Page H4831]]
But when it comes to the little amendment, there is no thank you, no
thank you to the Committee on Education and the Workforce for passing
the majority of what this individual wanted and letting it go without
jurisdiction.
What I have learned out of this process is that perhaps the next time
the gentleman from New Jersey proposes an amendment, we maybe accept
the amendment with a realization that says the committee of
jurisdiction also ought to have the process and also ought to have the
opportunity to review.
This chairman has led the committee graciously and effectively for a
long period of time. Members on the other side of the aisle are talking
about funding. When they had the opportunity to fund the intelligence
community earlier this year, the majority of the minority said, No, we
are not going to give the intelligence community the money that they
need. Thankfully, the will of the House went in the other direction.
What has happened in this process is a breakdown in bipartisanship.
It has characterized this committee for as long as it has been on the
Hill. I hope that as we move forward, as we move through conference we
can come back to a bipartisan approach that the men and women in the
field look to each and every day. They want to know that the people
here in Washington and the people around the country support the
effort.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the last speaker for his sincere
efforts at bipartisanship.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger), our rookie on the committee.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, first I think I do have to respond
to some of the comments made from the colleagues on the other side of
the aisle. I do respect each and every member of this committee, and
this committee should be bipartisan, and our goal is U.S.A. first. I
think some of the comments that were made have to be addressed.
First, there is a lot of respect for our chairman, the gentleman from
Florida. This is not about a personal attack on the gentleman from
Florida. I respect the gentleman from Florida. I respect what he has
done as it relates to the intelligence community throughout his career.
He has done a great job. However, I was elected to come to the Halls
and the floor of Congress to debate issues. It seems to me that the
majority thinks that if we disagree on an issue that we are being
unpatriotic. That is just not so. We disagree on one major issue and
that is the major issue of the funding of counterterrorism. That is
what the issue is here today.
My comments are basically about NSA. I happen to represent Maryland's
Second Congressional District. NSA is located in my district. I want to
acknowledge General Hayden and all the members of NSA both in Iraq and
Afghanistan and throughout the world that do a superb job.
Unfortunately, the American people should know more about what they do,
but we cannot really talk about that.
The bill also makes some reductions in several NSA programs that I
believe are too deep. All of the affected programs are essential to
NSA's overall technology modernization program, which is key to the
future success of the agency. I hope that these reductions will be
addressed in conference with the Senate.
Congress last year transferred the authority to review and approve
NSA's acquisitions programs to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition in the Defense Department. NSA and the Under Secretary are
faithfully implementing this direction, and NSA is, in my judgment,
making good progress in restoring confidence in its acquisition
management capabilities.
I want to express again my appreciation to the gentleman from
Florida. He is an honorable man. He has done a great job. We have a
disagreement on an issue. Again, I ask the majority to understand,
because we disagree does not mean we are being political. It means that
we think this is in the best interests of the United States of America
and its national security.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the
gentlewoman from California, the ranking member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
I want to thank the gentlewoman for her steady leadership on so many
issues that are very, very grave related to our national security. Let
me just say that I appreciate this opportunity to discuss an issue very
briefly that is of great importance, that is, ensuring that our Federal
intelligence dollars are not used to support groups or individuals
engaged in efforts to overthrow democratically elected governments.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. I want to assure
her that I understand and fully support the general principle reflected
in her point and appreciate her intention in raising this issue. I also
want to assure the gentlewoman that, as this bill moves forward, we
will be mindful of the issue and will try to be helpful.
Ms. LEE. I thank the gentlewoman for her attention to this issue. I
look forward to working with her.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of our committee
who is probably better known as a world-class pilot.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I thank the chairman for yielding time. I am just an
old man today.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to invoke two names: Jack Murtha and Ike
Skelton. If you watched the defense bill go through here, both in
authorization and appropriations, those gentlemen do not care who is
President or who has the majority. They fight tooth, hook and nail for
the military, for intelligence, and this Nation. I always felt that
this committee that I serve on did the same thing, until, as it has
been mentioned, last year, unfortunately in election year politics, the
Democrat leadership has forced, I think, or at least led some of the
more thoughtful members to be partisan. That is the saddest thing.
In the rule, I talked about the gentlewoman from California. During
Ronald Reagan's burial, I had tears in my eyes. I could not hold them
back. She reached over and took my hand to console me, patted my hand
and said, ``Duke, isn't it good to be friends?'' I would tell the
gentlewoman from California, we are good friends and the members on the
committee I hunt and fish with, a lot of them. Some of the ladies I do
not.
What is so disappointing, and I tell my friends on the other side, we
could do this just like Ike Skelton and Jack Murtha and after sitting
in the committee for several hours and watching the intentional
partisanship, intent just to hurt the President, even though you know
there were a couple of those amendments that I wanted to vote for, but
there was no way I was going to vote for them after that and that is
sad. I think that we can do better in this committee. We will have
dinner together. We will hunt, we will fish, and we will cry together;
but I just think it is sad at this.
Porter Goss is the finest chairman in defense that I have ever seen
in 14 years. His experience at CIA and on this committee, sometimes
during the committee I get upset, but the gentleman from Florida is
levelheaded, sits there and meets with the ranking member and tries to
work through these bills in a very bipartisan way. I think we do
ourselves a disservice today in some cases.
I ask Members to vote for this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett).
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 4548. Am I
the only one that finds it odd that my colleagues from the other side
are in the position of saying, ``Well, you know, I voted for this thing
before I voted against it''? Every one of them voted for it yesterday
in the Defense appropriations bill.
Nevertheless, I am proud to serve as a member of this Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and it is a distinct privilege to
serve as a crossover member on the House Committee on Armed Services.
This bill takes the
[[Page H4832]]
lead in defense intelligence and fully supports the Secretary of
Defense and his initiatives to transform the Department for the future.
I think we have a large, but responsible, spending plan here, including
the contingent emergency reserve fund; and the challenge will be to
integrate these initiatives into baseline efforts for the purpose of
fighting terrorism.
{time} 1745
Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed, sincerely disappointed, that my
friends on the other side did vote against this bill in committee. It
is a sad departure from what we normally do in that committee. But it
is a good bill. It properly supports intelligence.
I will submit my entire statement at this time in the Record.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 4548. I am proud to
serve as a member of the Intelligence Committee, and it is a distinct
privilege to serve as a crossover-Member on the House Armed Services
Committee. I would like to commend the Chairman, Mr. Goss, for bringing
this bill to the floor at a time when it is needed most in our
country's history.
H.R. 4548 addresses a critical need for the Intelligence Community
and the Department of Defense's architectural strategy, integration,
and information sharing among classic intelligence activities (like
SIGINT and IMINT) and innovative or dynamic disciplines such as
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) that is being increasingly relied on, in our
current global conflicts.
This bill takes the lead in Defense Intelligence and fully supports
the Secretary of Defense and his initiatives to transform the
Department for the future. I think we have a large, but responsible
spending plan here, including the Contingent Emergency Reserve Fund,
and the challenge will be to integrate these initiatives into baseline
efforts for the fight against terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I would however, also like to express my sincere
disappointment on the decision of the minority Membership of the
Committee not to vote for this bill. This is a bad departure from the
strong tradition of bipartisan support for this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this bill properly supports the
Intelligence Community, and provides our best and first line of defense
for America. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4548.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), who is actually known as the
chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, and otherwise known
as our colleague and friend.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
And let me just say that when we put the defense bill together, put
together with bipartisan support, passed the committee unanimously, we
bolted on $25 billion in supplemental for this next year. 2.2 billion
of that, after consultation with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss), we put into the intel side which went into his intel budget.
That is only for a couple of months. It was understood that was just
for a couple of months.
And I would say to the gentlewoman who said we have underfunded
counterterrorism to hold on to her horses because we have got a
supplemental coming up for 2005, which will have a large intel piece to
it and she will be tired of voting for intel increases.
So there is no cut to the intel budget. This was always intended to
be a bridge. And everybody, everybody, on both sides of the aisle, we
passed this thing 60 to zero in the committee, an overwhelmingly vote
in the full House. It was only be supposed to be for a couple of months
at the end of this year so our intel people and the people that wear
the uniform would have that bridge in the winter months of this year.
So I want to applaud the gentleman for everything he has done. We did
this with total synchronization, total coordination, and we have got a
great budget for the folks who carry out the intel duties for this
Nation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Ms. Harman asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to our last speaker that
the DOD appropriations bill is a $400 billion bill, a small fraction of
which is for intelligence. In my view, that is not the place for this
debate about fully funding counterterrorism intelligence. The
intelligence bill is where we should make our stand. And I do
appreciate the gentleman from California's (Mr. Hunter) clarification,
as he just said, that the additional counterterrorism funding in his
bill is only for a couple of months.
That is the point we are trying to make, Mr. Chairman. We all are
patriots. We all support the troops. We all support our intelligence
personnel. We just think that the primary mission of the intelligence
community ought to be funded in the base bill, the one we are voting on
today.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization bill represents the
culmination of many months of work by our community to provide the
intelligence community with the resources it needs to safeguard our
national security. It also presents an opportunity to lay down
important oversight markers so that we can fulfill our constitutionally
mandated duty to provide oversight of the intelligence community. The
Intelligence Committees were created for precisely this reason, and if
we simply become a rubber stamp for the administration, then we might
as well cease to exist.
At the outset, let me commend our diligent staff on both sides of the
aisle for their hard work and late nights, and let me commend all
members of our committee on both sides of the aisle for their focus and
dedication to getting it right. Four of them, the gentleman from
Florida (Chairman Goss), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter),
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), and the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Collins), will leave us this year, and I wish them fair
winds. I also want to explain the gentleman from Florida's (Mr.
Hastings) absence. Our thoughts are with him as he cares for his ailing
mother.
Mr. Chairman, this debate has been very difficult, certainly for me.
As everyone here knows, over five terms in Congress, I have voted for
every intelligence authorization bill and every defense authorization
bill, and I have often worked to try to plus-up amounts in those bills.
The brave men and women of the intelligence community rely on us.
Without us, they cannot do their job. I have traveled around the world
and visited with them, and their bravery and courage speaks volumes
about how much they love this country.
For all of these reasons, I stand here today with a heavy heart
because I feel that unfortunately and needlessly, this bill could have
and should have provided for stronger intelligence and stronger
oversight.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say to the gentlewoman the
reason we bolted on $25 billion, not $50 billion, not $75 billion, with
a piece of that being carried for her committee was because we have a
war in two theatres which is ebbing and flowing. We cannot see into the
future. We may need more money in January and February than projected
$50 billion or even $75 billion. So I would just say to the
gentlewoman, there is plenty of money for current operations. Nobody is
being short-changed in this year.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if I could just respond
to the gentleman, and I would be happy to yield again if I have any
more time if he wants to respond to what I have to say, I appreciate
that comment, but mine is a bit different. I understand that we may not
fully know what we need. That is why we have supplementals. But in this
case we do fully know what we need. We know what the agencies in the
intelligence community need for counterterrorism because they have told
us, and the amendments we wish had been in order had an unclassified
piece, which basically says we should fully fund counterterrorism, and
a classified piece, where we carefully allocated across the
intelligence community all the money these agencies have told us they
need. They told us it is hard to plan for their year without knowing
for sure that they will get money.
[[Page H4833]]
And the last point I want to make to the gentleman, and I do
appreciate what he is saying, is that I do not think we will pass
another supplemental until sometime after the first quarter of next
year. We will be gearing up in a new Congress, and if we pass the
supplemental in next March or April, as I pointed out in my earlier
remarks, we may have a gap in funding counterterrorism just at the time
when we have the presidential inauguration and the Super Bowl, and
those are huge events were maximum counterterrorism efforts are needed.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me just say to the gentlewoman that I
too have looked at requirements. And intel requirements in those two
war-fighting theatres, Afghanistan and Iraq, are as difficult for the
intel experts to project as it is for our defense experts, our people
who are leading uniformed troops, and there is plenty of money to carry
this bridge. This is a bridge fund, and I might say 60 out of 60
people, Republicans and Democrats, agreed this was a good number, and
this had the $2.2 billion intel piece embedded in it when we passed it.
So I can just tell the gentlewoman there is not going to be a gap.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First of all, I want to assure the gentlewoman that I associate
myself with stronger intelligence. Her poster, I think, is excellent,
and I am delighted that we all agree on that.
Second of all, I want to tell the gentlewoman that I totally agree
that the form is not pretty. I do not like supplementals either. We
work with what we have to work with. But the substance, I think, came
out as well as it could. And I want to thank the distinguished chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services for reaching out to help us with the
bridge.
In a more direct answer to the gentlewoman's question a while ago
about what requests were, and I am going to be very candid, these were
the requests we were working with. And they are not for the whole year,
but they are the requests to deal with the war on terror. And we
actually come up with 32 percent more than what the CIA requested, 100
percent of what DIA requested, 39 percent more than what NSA requested,
88 percent more than NRO, and 19 percent more than NGA.
So we are way ahead in bridging. But obviously, her point is we have
not gone for a whole year, and we all understand that. The question is
will there be a short-change? And my answer is no. And the problem I
have with her solution that she had proposed, somewhat belatedly, if I
may say that, and I will come to that point if I have time, is that
authorized money without appropriated money behind it is monopoly
money, as we all know, and that was part of the problem.
Now let me go to the gentleman from Missouri's (Mr. Skelton) point,
which I think was a very poignant point and I have huge regard for the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), as we all do: What happened this
year? And the answer is that normally we do work out all of our
differences before we bring our bill out. We get them done in
committee. This year we are on a schedule. I thought we had all our
differences worked out. I honestly did not know we were going to have
some of these amendments that she came up with until a couple of hours
before the meeting. I asked that they try to be worked out. Apparently
they were.
Normally we need more than 2 or 3 hours to work out something as
important as a budget. So I do not think there is any bad intention.
What I think is that there is more work to be done, and there will be
an opportunity between now and the conference.
I urge support for this bill because I think it is a great place to
go forward.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this important
Intelligence Authorization, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
First of all, I want to congratulate Porter Goss not only for his
work on this legislation, but also for his distinguished career as a
servant for the people.
Everyday, Porter Goss has come to work with one thought in mind: How
do I make this country a better and safer place?
Porter, we are going to miss you when you leave this House.
I had hoped that the Minority would give you the respect you deserve
and work with you on this bill.
Instead, they want to play politics.
I have to hand it to the Minority. They have taken the strategy that
the best defense is a good offense to its extreme.
They have no defense when it comes to their pathetic record on
intelligence funding. So they try to cloud the issue by saying that we
are not spending enough on intelligence.
What makes this strategy laughable is the fact that just yesterday,
House Democrats voted overwhelmingly for intelligence funding in the
Defense Appropriations bill.
Yesterday, the funding was just right. Today, they are simply
shocked, shocked, that we don't spend enough.
Why the sudden change of heart? Politics, of course. Pure politics.
Throughout the 1990's, leading Democrats offered amendment after
amendment to slash Intelligence funding. They offered amendment after
amendment in an effort to hamstring the C.I.A. And the Clinton White
House not only ignored the Intelligence Community, they disdained it.
Bill Clinton himself rarely allowed the CIA Director into the Oval
Office.
Let's not kid ourselves. The left wing of the Democratic Party has a
long tradition of hostility to the C.I.A. They have never been
comfortable with the world of intelligence gathering.
Even after 9-11, many in the Minority have sought to decimate
intelligence funding. These same Members who today claim the pending
bill is inadequate, voted against emergency supplemental intelligence
funding last year.
For members of the Democratic Party to come to the House floor and
say that they could do it better than Porter Goss is simply not
believable.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community deserves better than
partisan political stunts.
Without intelligence, we cannot win the war on terror.
Intelligence funding helped bring to justice Saddam Hussein and his
evil sons, Qusay and Uday. And it has assisted in the death of or
capture of 42 of the 55 most wanted criminals of the Saddam regime and
of more than 2,700 Al-Qa'ida leaders and foot soldiers around the
globe.
Perhaps most important, in the United States, nearly 200 suspected
terrorist associates have been charged with crimes with the help of
quality intelligence information.
We are doing the right thing with this authorization. Vote to make
America safer. Vote for this Intelligence Authorization.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to
several aspects of the legislation that we consider, H.R. 4548, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005. It is ridiculous that of
eight quality amendments offered at the Rules * * *.
The most important of the eight amendments offered but not made in
order, the Peterson-Cramer-Boswell amendment, would have fully funded
the counterterrorism activities of the intelligence community at the
amount that the intelligence agencies have suggested be requested. All
nine Democrats who serve on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence voted unanimously to support this amendment at its markup.
Mr. Chairman, without this important amendment, our intelligence
capabilities will be handicapped. The outlays called for in the
Peterson-Cramer-Boswell amendment would have provided for additional
oversight over intelligence, which is critical, especially in light of
the state of confusion that we see in this Administration's
intelligence program.
Like President Bush's request in his FY 2005 Budget, H.R. 4548
proposes to fund only a small fraction of the intelligence agencies'
counterterrorism requirements. Only 20 percent of the funding
requirements for the CIA Counterterrorism Center were called for in the
Bush Budget. The fact that the administration then requested a
supplemental allocation for the first quarter of FY 2005 evidences the
dire need for these monies.
The intelligence community should not have to rely on supplemental
funding to carry out its core functions! In the wake of 9/11 and new
episodes of terrorism violence almost daily, it is not comforting to
know that our intelligence community is operating on supplemental
``crutches.'' While this nation sits in a vulnerable state, the
Administration puts us on ``ice'' until November elections. Very scary.
The CIA Counterterrorism Center has had to wait for supplemental
funding for 80 percent of its requirements! Reports from the Houston
FBI's Field Intelligence Group (FIG), there have been several reports
that one of Houston's major sources of vulnerability, either the
airports, the Port of Houston, or the nuclear South Texas Project will
be hit by al-Qaeda ``sleeper cells.'' We need the most effective
counterterrorism resources available to prevent such an occurrence.
Waiting for supplemental funding will not keep our families safe,
[[Page H4834]]
especially with upcoming events that would attract a potential
terrorist such as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions,
the November elections, and Independence Day celebrations.
Mr. Chairman, it is important that, should this legislation pass, the
conferees address the fact that less than one-third of what the
intelligence agencies have suggested is provided in the proposal.
Therefore, I would fully support a motion to recommit for purpose of
incorporating the critical addition of outlays to counterterrorism that
are needed to secure our homeland.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support a motion to recommit.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this legislation.
Though I certainly recognize the legitimate national security role of
our intelligence community, I have concerns about this authorization
and the questionable role played by components of the intelligence
community.
Specifically, I am concerned about our history of secret regime
changes carried out by our intelligence apparatus. More often than not,
we see many of the problems we face today were created as a result of
this unwise practice of forcibly changing regimes in secret.
The stories of such activities are numerous. In 1953 the CIA
overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran, installing the Shah as dictator.
This led to increasing anti-Americanism, the overthrow of the Shah in
1979, the kidnapping of Americans, the establishment of a hardline
Islamic regime hostile to the United States. In the 1980s the United
States provided covert support to Saddam Hussein's Iraq in its war with
Iran. Ten years later the United States went to war against Saddam
Hussein and then 11 years after that the United States went to war
again against Saddam's Iraq. In the 1980s the United States provided
weapons and training to the Taliban and what later became al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan as they sought to overthrow the communist government in
power. Some 20 years later, that same Taliban and Osama bin Laden
struck out against the United States. The United States then went to
war against that Taliban government.
I am also concerned about the efficacy of our intelligence community.
The intelligence budget seems to grow every year, but seldom do my
colleagues ask what exactly we are getting for our constituents' money.
It may be unfair that we only hear about the intelligence community's
failures and shortcomings, but we cannot help but be concerned over so
many such failures in recent years. Despite the tens of billions we
spend on these myriad intelligence agencies, it is impossible to ignore
the failure of the intelligence community to detect and prevent the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
Additionally, as we now see so clearly, our intelligence community
failed completely to accurately assess the nature of the Iraqi threat.
We were told of weapons of mass destruction capable of reaching the
United States. This proved to be false. We were told of Iraq's
relationship with al-Qaeda. This proved to be false. The intelligence
community relied heavily--perhaps almost exclusively--on Iraqi exile
and convicted criminal Ahmad Chalabi to provide intelligence on Iraq
and most of it turned out to be incorrect, perhaps intentionally
misleading. Now we are told that Chalabi and his organization may have
passed sensitive intelligence to Iran. We have read reports of secret
pseudo-agencies set up in the Pentagon and elsewhere whose role appears
to have been to politicize intelligence in order to force pre-
determined conclusions. This does not serve the American people well.
These are all by any measure grave failures, costing us incalculably in
human lives and dollars. Yet from what little we can know about this
bill, the solution is to fund more of the same. I would hope that we
might begin coming up with new approaches to our intelligence needs.
I encourage my colleagues to reject this bill and instead begin
looking for new ways to strengthen the legitimate functions of our
intelligence community so as to better protect the borders and citizens
of the United States.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment and shall be considered read.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is
as follows:
H.R. 4548
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information
Management.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency voluntary
separation incentive program.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program
Sec. 601. Provision for annual funding.
Sec. 602. Modification of obligated service requirements under the
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 603. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 604. Establishment of scholarship program for English language
studies for heritage community citizens of the United
States within the National Security Education Program.
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
Sec. 611. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education.
Sec. 612. Requirement for foreign language proficiency for advancement
to certain senior level positions in the intelligence
community.
Sec. 613. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence
community.
Sec. 614. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 615. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual
Translation Center.
Sec. 616. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors
of the Defense Language Institute.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2005 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Department of Justice.
(10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(13) The Coast Guard.
(14) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4548 of the One Hundred
Eighth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2005 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account
[[Page H4835]]
of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005
the sum of $318,395,000. Within such amount, funds identified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall
remain available until September 30, 2006.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2005. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2005 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts for research and development shall
remain available until September 30, 2006.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2005, there are also authorized such additional personnel for
such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2005 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $29,811,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development,
testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2006, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2005 the sum of $239,400,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of
any intelligence activity which is not otherwise
authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States.
SEC. 303. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.
(a) Establishment of Position Within the Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence.--Subsection (e)(2) of
section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403) is amended--
(1) by striking subparagraph (G); and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new
subparagraph (G):
``(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management.''.
(b) Duties.--Section 102 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403) is
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (h); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new
subsection (h):
``(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management.--(1) To assist the Director of
Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's
responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Information Management is the chief
information officer of the intelligence community.
``(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Information Management shall--
``(A) manage activities relating to the information
technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture
requirements of the intelligence community;
``(B) have procurement approval authority over all
information technology items related to the enterprise
architectures of all intelligence community components;
``(C) direct and manage all information technology-related
procurement for the intelligence community; and
``(D) ensure that all expenditures for information
technology and research and development activities are
consistent with the intelligence community enterprise
architecture and the strategy of the Director of Central
Intelligence for such architecture.
``(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management
may not, while so serving, serve as the chief information
officer of any other agency or department, or component
thereof, of the United States.''.
(c) References.--Any reference to the Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Administration in any law,
regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United
States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.
(a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C.
403-4 note) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (f); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively.
(b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1)
Section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further
amended by striking subsection (i).
(2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce
Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by
striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat.
104)''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
PANEL.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security
Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing
panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be
appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director.
``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies
Panel shall study and assess, and periodically advise the
Director on, the research, development, and application of
existing and emerging science and technology advances,
advances on encryption, and other topics.
``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)
shall not apply with respect to the National Security Agency
Emerging Technologies Panel.''.
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program
SEC. 601. PROVISION FOR ANNUAL FUNDING.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183;
105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public
Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037), is amended by adding at the end
of section 810 the following new subsection:
``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management
Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In
addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from
amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with
fiscal year 2005, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship,
fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B),
and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) by inserting ``or from a transfer under
section 810(c)'' after ``National Security Education Trust
Fund''.
SEC. 602. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of title
VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1273), as amended by
section 925(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1578), is
amended by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B), and inserting
the following:
``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, as soon
as practicable but in no case later than three years after
the completion by the recipient of the study for which
scholarship assistance was provided under the program, the
recipient shall work for a period of one year--
``(i) in a national security position that the Secretary
certifies is appropriate to use the unique language and
region expertise acquired
[[Page H4836]]
by the recipient pursuant to such study in the Department of
Defense, in any element of the intelligence community, in the
Department of Homeland Security, or in the Department of
State; or
``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department
or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient
demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available
in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i); or
``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, as soon
as practicable but in no case later than two years after the
completion by the recipient of the study for which fellowship
assistance was provided under the program, the recipient
shall work for a period equal to the duration of assistance
provided under the program, but in no case less than one
year--
``(i) in a position described in subparagraph (A)(i) that
the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use the unique
language and region expertise acquired by the recipient
pursuant to such study; or
``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department
or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient
demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available
in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i);
and''.
(b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection
(a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall
establish standards that recipients of scholarship and
fellowship assistance under the program under such section
802 are required to demonstrate to satisfy the requirement of
a good faith effort to gain employment as required under
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(2) of such
section.
(c) Applicability.--(1) The amendment made by subsection
(a) shall apply with respect to service agreements entered
into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act
of 1991 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not affect
the force, validity, or terms of any service agreement
entered into under the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 before the date of the enactment of
this Act that is in force as of that date.
SEC. 603. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE
INITIATIVE.
(a) Increase in Annual Funding.--Title VIII of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public
Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended by striking
section 811 and inserting the following new section 811:
``SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE
INITIATIVE.
``(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003
and 2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available
to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each
fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to
carry out the grant program for the National Flagship
Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
``(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management
Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In
addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from
amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with
fiscal year 2005, $12,000,000, to carry out the grant program
for the National Flagship Language Initiative under
section 802(a)(1)(D).
``(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made
available under this section shall remain available until
expended.''.
(b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section
802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act
of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate
student that participates in training in programs under
paragraph (1), the student shall enter into an agreement
described in subsection (b), other than such a student who
has entered into such an agreement pursuant to subparagraph
(A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department
of the Federal Government that participates in training in
programs under paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in
writing--
``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or
department of the Federal Government employing the employee
for the period of such training;
``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or
department employing the employee following completion of
such training for a period of two years for each year, or
part of the year, of such training;
``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost
of such training (excluding the employee's pay and
allowances) provided to the employee if, before the
completion by the employee of the training, the employment of
the employee by the agency or department is terminated due to
misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily;
and
``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing
such training, the employment of the employee by the agency
or department is terminated either by the agency or
department due to misconduct by the employee or by the
employee voluntarily, before the completion by the employee
of the period of service required in clause (ii), in an
amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of the
training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided to the employee as the unserved portion of such
period of service bears to the total period of service under
clause (ii).
``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to
reimburse the United States under an agreement under
subparagraph (A) is for all purposes a debt owing the United
States.
``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may release an employee, in whole or in part, from the
obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement
under subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of
the element, the head of the element determines that equity
or the interests of the United States so require.''.
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to
training that begins on or after the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational
Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps
as the Secretary determines will increase the number of
qualified educational institutions that receive grants under
the National Flagship Language Initiative to establish,
operate, or improve activities designed to train students in
programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels
of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary
identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the
national security of the United States.
(d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
Educational institutions that receive grants under the
National Flagship Language Initiative may support students
who pursue total immersion foreign language studies overseas
of foreign languages that are critical to the national
security of the United States.
SEC. 604. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH
LANGUAGE STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for
Heritage Community Citizens of the United States.--(1)
Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren
National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is
amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D)
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
``(i) are United States citizens who--
``(I) are native speakers (commonly referred to as heritage
community residents) of a foreign language that is identified
as critical to the national security interests of the United
States who should be actively recruited for employment by
Federal security agencies with a need for linguists; and
``(II) are not proficient at a professional level in the
English language with respect to reading, writing, and
interpersonal skills required to carry out the national
security interests of the United States, as determined by the
Secretary,
to enable such students to pursue English language studies at
an institution of higher education of the United States to
attain proficiency in those skills; and
``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a national
security position or work in the field of education in the
area of study for which the scholarship was awarded in a
similar manner (as determined by the Secretary) as agreements
entered into pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).''.
(2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section
is amended--
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the
scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under
paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language
Initiative described in subsection (i)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the
authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program
under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
(3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
1903(d)(4)(E)) is amended by inserting before the period the
following: ``and section 802(a)(1)(E) (relating to
scholarship programs for advanced English language studies by
heritage community residents)''.
(b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN
HERITAGE COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.
``(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management
Account.--In addition to amounts that may be made available
to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the
Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning
with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out the
scholarship programs for English language studies by certain
heritage community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).
``(b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under
subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.''.
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
SEC. 611. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION.
(a) In General.--Section 102 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
(1) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Language and Education.--(1) To assist the Director of
Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's
responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant
Director of
[[Page H4837]]
Central Intelligence for Language and Education who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Language and Education shall carry out the following duties:
``(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign
language education and training of the intelligence
community.
``(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities
relating to such requirements.
``(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the
capability of the intelligence community to carry out
national security activities of the United States.
``(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign
language education and training in order to ensure the
requirements of the intelligence community with respect to
foreign language proficiency are met.'';
(2) in subsection (d)(2) by adding at the end the
following:
``(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Language and Education, ensuring the foreign
language education and training requirements of the
intelligence community are met.''; and
(3) in subsection (e)(2)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (I);
and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following new
subparagraph (H):
``(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Education and Language.''.
(b) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which
the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language
and Education is first appointed under section 102(i) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a),
the Assistant Director shall submit to Congress the following
reports:
(1) A report that identifies--
(A) skills and processes involved in learning a foreign
language; and
(B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are most
effective in teaching foreign languages.
(2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage
communities, particularly such communities that include
speakers of languages that are critical to the national
security of the United States.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign
language heritage community'' means a community of residents
or citizens of the United States--
(i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency in, a
foreign language; and
(ii) who should be actively recruited for employment by
Federal security agencies with a need for linguists.
(3) A report on--
(A) the estimated cost of establishing a program under
which the heads of elements of the intelligence community
agree to repay employees of the intelligence community for
any student loan taken out by that employee for the study of
foreign languages critical for the national security of the
United States; and
(B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting and
retaining highly qualified personnel in the intelligence
community.
SEC. 612. REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR
ADVANCEMENT TO CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 104 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for
Certain Senior Level Positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency.--(1) An individual may not be appointed to a position
in the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of
Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the
Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that the individual--
``(A) has been certified as having a professional speaking
and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such
proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency
Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate
proficiency level on such other indicator of proficiency as
the Director determines to be appropriate; and
``(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities of
the United States and exercise influence in that foreign
language.
``(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through
the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language
and Education.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of section 102 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403), as added
by section 611(a), is amended in paragraph (2) by adding at
the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to appointments made on or after the
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(d) Report on Exceptions.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report that
identifies positions within the Senior Intelligence Service
in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that should be
exempt from the requirements of section 104(i) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a),
and that includes the rationale for the exemption of each
such position identified by the Director.
SEC. 613. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C.) is amended--
(1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the
following:
``Subtitle A--Science and Technology'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:
``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the
intelligence community
``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may
jointly establish a program to advance foreign languages
skills in languages that are critical to the capability of
the intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States (hereinafter in this subtitle
referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to
carry out the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall
jointly determine actions required to improve the education
of personnel in the intelligence community in foreign
languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States to meet the long-term
intelligence needs of the United States.
``education partnerships
``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign
Languages Program, the head of an element of an intelligence
community entity may enter into one or more education
partnership agreements with educational institutions in the
United States in order to encourage and enhance the study of
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States in educational institutions.
``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership
Agreements.--Under an educational partnership agreement
entered into with an educational institution pursuant to this
section, the head of an element of an intelligence community
entity may provide the following assistance to the
educational institution:
``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of
the element of the intelligence community entity to the
educational institution for any purpose and duration that the
head determines to be appropriate.
``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating
to transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the
educational institution of any computer equipment, or other
equipment, that is--
``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
``(C) determined by the head of the element to be
appropriate for support of such agreement.
``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the
educational institution--
``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence community to
carry out national security activities of the United States;
or
``(B) to assist in the development of such courses and
materials for the institution.
``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the
educational institution in research projects of the element
of the intelligence community entity.
``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in
developing a program under which students receive academic
credit at the educational institution for work on research
projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and
assistance to students of the educational institution.
``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the
head of the element of the intelligence community entity
determines to be appropriate.
``voluntary services
``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--
Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code,
and subject to subsection (b), the Foreign Languages Program
under section 1011 shall include authority for the head of
an element of an intelligence community entity to accept
from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as defined
in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the
activities authorized by this subtitle.
``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting
voluntary services from an individual under subsection (a),
the head of the element shall--
``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the
head of the element would supervise a compensated employee of
that element providing similar services; and
``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged,
has appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or
is otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to
provide such services.
``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual
under subsection (a), the head of an element of the
intelligence community entity may not--
``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or
other position performing inherently government functions; or
``(B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate the
individual for the provision of such services.
``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence
community entity may recruit and train individuals to provide
voluntary services accepted under subsection (a).
``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1)
Subject to paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services
accepted under subsection (a) or receiving training under
subsection (c), an individual shall be considered to
[[Page H4838]]
be an employee of the Federal Government only for purposes of
the following provisions of law:
``(A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code (relating to compensation for work-related injuries).
``(B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating
to maintenance of records on individuals).
``(C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating
to conflicts of interest).
``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under
paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the
scope of the services so accepted, the individual is deemed
to be a volunteer of a governmental entity or nonprofit
institution for purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act of
1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual
with respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d)
of such Act (42 U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section
shall have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a
security clearance.
``(e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes
of determining the compensation for work-related injuries
payable under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to
an individual providing voluntary services accepted under
subsection (a), the monthly pay of the individual for such
services is deemed to be equal to the amount determined by
multiplying--
``(1) the average monthly number of hours that the
individual provided the services, by
``(2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with
section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. 206(a)(1)).
``(f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head
of an element of the intelligence community entity may
reimburse an individual for incidental expenses incurred by
the individual in providing voluntary services accepted under
subsection (a). The head of an element of the intelligence
community entity shall determine which expenses are eligible
for reimbursement under this subsection.
``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
``(g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an
element of the intelligence community may install telephone
lines and any necessary telecommunication equipment in the
private residences of individuals who provide voluntary
services accepted under subsection (a).
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may pay the charges incurred for the use of equipment
installed under paragraph (1) for authorized purposes.
``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United
States Code, the head of an element of the intelligence
community entity may use appropriated funds or
nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying out this
subsection.
``regulations
``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate
regulations necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages
Program authorized under this subtitle.
``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of
an element of an intelligence community entity shall
prescribe regulations to carry out sections 1012 and 1013
with respect to that element including the following:
``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of
voluntary services under section 1013.
``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the
installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
``Definitions
``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an
agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in
subparagraphs (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is defined
in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
``(B) an institution of higher education (as defined in
section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1002) other than institutions referred to in subsection
(a)(1)(C) of such section), or
``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides
instruction of foreign languages in languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence community to
carry out national security activities of the United States.
``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the
intelligence community and private citizens (including former
civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been
voluntarily separated, and members of the United States
Armed Forces who have been honorably discharged or
generally discharged under honorable circumstances, and
rehired on a voluntary basis specifically to perform the
activities authorized under this subtitle).
``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central
Intelligence, acting through the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community, may assign employees of such elements
in analyst positions requiring foreign language expertise as
students at accredited professional, technical, or other
institutions of higher education for training at the graduate
or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for the
conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and
Training.--(1) The Director may reimburse an employee
assigned under subsection (a) for the total cost of the
training described in subsection (a), including costs of
educational and supplementary reading materials.
``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to
employees who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
``(c) Relationship to Compensation as an Analyst.--
Reimbursement under this section to an employee who is an
analyst is in addition to any benefits, allowances, travels,
or other compensation the employee is entitled to by reason
of serving in such an analyst position.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item
relating to section 1001 and inserting the following new
items:
``Subtitle A--Science and Technology
``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate
degrees in science and technology.
``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to
the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.
``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language
students.''.
SEC. 614. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.
(a) Pilot Project.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian
Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of United States citizens
with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages who
would be available upon a call of the President to perform
such service or duties with respect to such foreign languages
in the Federal Government as the President may specify.
(b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings
and recommendations contained in the report required under
section 325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting
the pilot project under subsection (a) the Director of
Central Intelligence shall--
(1) identify several foreign languages that are critical
for the national security of the United States;
(2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of
proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available
to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection
(a); and
(3) implement a call for the performance of such services
and duties.
(c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under
subsection (a) shall be conducted for a three-year period.
(d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Director of
Central Intelligence may enter into contracts with
appropriate agencies or entities to carry out the pilot
project under subsection (a).
(e) Reports.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to Congress an initial and a final report on the
pilot project conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain
information on the operation of the pilot project, the
success of the pilot project in carrying out the objectives
of the establishment of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps,
and recommendations for the continuation or expansion of the
pilot project.
(3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6
months after the completion of the project.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Director of Central Intelligence
for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to
carry out the pilot project under subsection (a) such sums as
are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to section 102.
SEC. 615. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL
VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``national virtual translation center
``Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the
intelligence community known as the National Virtual
Translation Center under the direction of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center
shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign
intelligence for all other elements of the intelligence
community.
``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to
minimize the need for a central facility for the National
Virtual Translation Center, the Center shall--
``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the
intelligence community; and
``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National
Virtual Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center
at any location that--
``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency
or department of the United States; and
``(2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines to be
appropriate for such purpose.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act
is amended by inserting after
[[Page H4839]]
the item relating to section 118 the following new item:
``Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.''.
SEC. 616. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED
INSTRUCTORS OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study
on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of
qualified foreign language instructors at the Foreign
Language Center of the Defense Language Institute. In
conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in the
case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to
expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary
status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
on the study conducted under subsection (a), and shall
include in that report recommendations for such changes in
legislation and regulation as the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the substitute is in order except the
amendments printed in House Report 108-561. Each amendment may be
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the
time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the
proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to
amendment and shall not be subject to be a demand for division of the
question.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House
Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Goss
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Goss:
In section 104(e)(1), strike ``$29,811,000'' and insert
``$37,811,000''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The purpose of this amendment is very simple. It restores the funding
for the National Drug Intelligence Center to the levels contained in
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request. In fact, a number of
actions were taken in committee regarding NDIC this year in response to
an ongoing investigation into activities there. This amendment does
nothing to affect these investigations that are ongoing in any way. It
does not change in any reporting requirements nor does it lift any
fences that were put in place. But what it does do is it restores the
authorization level to include $8 million that had been cut from the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request.
I am doing this to address the concern that the cut might
significantly impact the important mission of the National Drug
Intelligence Center, and the reason I have brought the amendment
forward is because I wanted to have the distinguished gentleman from
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), who I felt has actually
been the person who is most instrumental in this particular program,
have as much time as he wanted to address this issue. I wanted to make
sure he had the opportunity.
In any event, I am assuming he would support the amendment. In the
absence of knowing nothing beyond that, I am going to suggest that this
amendment be adopted.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I ask to
control the time on this side.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman) may control the time.
There was no objection.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment to restore the level of
funding requested for NDIC, the National Drug Intelligence Center. I
was concerned to learn that these funds had been cut, as have others
for key satellite programs, and I am pleased that the chairman has now
decided to restore the level of funding the Center needs to carry out
its important counternarcotics mission. Hopefully we will address other
shortfalls that some on our side have identified in the conference.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make an additional comment about a
subject the chairman raised at the end of general debate, and that was
when he called additional budget authority monopoly money. I certainly
share his view that we should appropriate the funds that we authorize.
That is why this side wants to authorize additional funds and then
hopefully to get them appropriated. I have spoken to the highest levels
of this administration about my keen view that the amount of money to
fully fund counterterrorism for fiscal year 2005 is not so great.
{time} 1800
It is not a big budget buster, certainly not as big as many other
requests made by this administration.
I see the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) in the room, for whom
I have high regard. It would be my hope that sometime soon, even
perhaps in the defense appropriations bill that comes out of
conference, we will increase the funding for counterterrorism for
fiscal year 2005.
Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, pending the arrival of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), if he is able to be here, I would be very
happy to yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the man with whom our committee
works very closely. He is the appropriator for our business, and we are
indeed indebted and grateful for the kind attention and the generosity
that he bestows on the intelligence community.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very
much for yielding, and I appreciate the comments of the ranking member
as well.
It was my privilege to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence for some years, and I have great respect for the work you
are about.
I must say that while the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha)
and I have discussed this amendment and I know of his concerns and I am
very supportive of his concerns, in the meantime, I really asked for
the time because I am a bit disconcerted about what I sensed from the
general debate as I was watching it over C-SPAN from my office.
There appears to be developing here a level of kind of partisanship
that I am not used to seeing when we discuss intelligence. There is
absolutely no question that intelligence work does not know a partisan
divide, if things are happening as they should, and to see that
developing in the committee is most disconcerting to this Member.
Over the years, we all know that intelligence funding was way, way
below where it should be. The development of that lack of funding took
place as the Congress some years ago was radically reducing defense
spending. In those days, I used to say as defense spending is coming
down, intelligence spending should go up, because the Commander-in-
Chief needs better and more information at such a time, rather than
less.
In the meantime, there is little doubt that during the 1990s, there
were significant impacts that were negatively affecting our
intelligence programming. In recent years, we have seen a movement in
the other direction.
In the bill that came off the floor yesterday, there was a reflection
of all of our concern. Indeed, within the base bill, the appropriations
for defense, we spent more than was in the President's budget. And in
the Committee's action on the amendment that came from the
administration for some $25 billion, we provided substantial amounts of
additional funding for intelligence work.
There is little doubt of the priority of this president, this
administration, in making sure we have adequate funding, and I feel
very strongly that we should know that especially the Commander-
[[Page H4840]]
in-Chief does not see partisan value in this work.
The committee is a great committee, but there is a divide here that,
I must say, reflects more than normally membership divide. If, at the
staff level, we have people who are reacting for purely partisan
purposes or their own biases, that is disconcerting to me. It is not
healthy for the community, it is not healthy for our national defense,
it clearly is not healthy for our intelligence community.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge support for the amendment. Not knowing
that there would be a contrary wish from the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), whose guidance I would follow very closely
on this, I am going to make that assumption. I hope that is a correct
assumption and has the support of the other side, as we have heard
expressed.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, it has our support.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 2 printed
in House Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Gallegly
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Gallegly:
Add at the end the following new title:
TITLE VII--REFORM OF DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
SEC. 701. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Period of Designation.--Section 219(a)(4) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking ``Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a''
and inserting ``A''; and
(B) by striking ``for a period of 2 years beginning on the
effective date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B)''
and inserting ``until revoked under paragraph (5) or (6) or
set aside pursuant to subsection (c)'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the
following:
``(B) Review of designation upon petition.--
``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall review the
designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the
procedures set forth in clauses (iii) and (iv) if the
designated organization files a petition for revocation
within the petition period described in clause (ii).
``(ii) Petition period.--For purposes of clause (i)--
``(I) if the designated organization has not previously
filed a petition for revocation under this subparagraph, the
petition period begins 2 years after the date on which the
designation was made; or
``(II) if the designated organization has previously filed
a petition for revocation under this subparagraph, the
petition period begins 2 years after the date of the
determination made under clause (iv) on that petition.
``(iii) Procedures.--Any foreign terrorist organization
that submits a petition for revocation under this
subparagraph must provide evidence in that petition that the
relevant circumstances described in paragraph (1) have
changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation with
respect to the organization.
``(iv) Determination.--
``(I) In general.--Not later than 180 days after receiving
a petition for revocation submitted under this subparagraph,
the Secretary shall make a determination as to such
revocation.
``(II) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider
classified information in making a determination in response
to a petition for revocation. Classified information shall
not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains
classified, except that such information may be disclosed to
a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial
review under subsection (c).
``(III) Publication of determination.--A determination made
by the Secretary under this clause shall be published in the
Federal Register.
``(IV) Procedures.--Any revocation by the Secretary shall
be made in accordance with paragraph (6).''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Other review of designation.--
``(i) In general.--If in a 6-year period no review has
taken place under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall
review the designation of the foreign terrorist organization
in order to determine whether such designation should be
revoked pursuant to paragraph (6).
``(ii) Procedures.--If a review does not take place
pursuant to subparagraph (B) in response to a petition for
revocation that is filed in accordance with that
subparagraph, then the review shall be conducted pursuant to
procedures established by the Secretary. The results of such
review and the applicable procedures shall not be reviewable
in any court.
``(iii) Publication of results of review.--The Secretary
shall publish any determination made pursuant to this
subparagraph in the Federal Register.''.
(b) Aliases.--Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Amendments to a Designation.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary may amend a designation
under this subsection if the Secretary finds that the
organization has changed its name, adopted a new alias,
dissolved and then reconstituted itself under a different
name or names, or merged with another organization.
``(2) Procedure.--Amendments made to a designation in
accordance with paragraph (1) shall be effective upon
publication in the Federal Register. Subparagraphs (B) and
(C) of subsection (a)(2) shall apply to an amended
designation upon such publication. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (4),
(5), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (a) shall also apply to
an amended designation.
``(3) Administrative record.--The administrative record
shall be corrected to include the amendments as well as any
additional relevant information that supports those
amendments.
``(4) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider
classified information in amending a designation in
accordance with this subsection. Classified information shall
not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains
classified, except that such information may be disclosed to
a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial
review under subsection (c).''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 219 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (b)'' and
inserting ``subsection (c)'';
(B) in paragraph (6)(A)--
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``or a
redesignation made under paragraph (4)(B)'' and inserting
``at any time, and shall revoke a designation upon completion
of a review conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C)
of paragraph (4)''; and
(ii) in clause (i), by striking ``or redesignation'';
(C) in paragraph (7), by striking ``, or the revocation of
a redesignation under paragraph (6),''; and
(D) in paragraph (8)--
(i) by striking ``, or if a redesignation under this
subsection has become effective under paragraph (4)(B),'';
and
(ii) by striking ``or redesignation''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``of the designation in
the Federal Register,'' and all that follows through ``review
of the designation'' and inserting ``in the Federal Register
of a designation, an amended designation, or a determination
in response to a petition for revocation, the designated
organization may seek judicial review'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, amended designation,
or determination in response to a petition for revocation''
after ``designation'';
(C) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, amended designation,
or determination in response to a petition for revocation''
after ``designation''; and
(D) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``, amended designation,
or determination in response to a petition for revocation''
after ``designation'' each place that term appears.
(d) Savings Provision.--For purposes of applying section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on or after the
date of enactment of this Act, the term ``designation'', as
used in that section, includes all redesignations made
pursuant to section 219(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B)) prior to the date of
enactment of this Act, and such redesignations shall continue
to be effective until revoked as provided in paragraph (5) or
(6) of section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
SEC. 702. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERRORISM OF INFORMATION ON
TERRORIST GROUPS THAT SEEK WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN
DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Inclusion in Reports.--Section 140 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 2656f) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``any terrorist group known to have
obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or
develop, weapons of mass destruction,'' after ``during the
preceding five years,''; and
(B) by inserting ``any group designated by the Secretary as
a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration
[[Page H4841]]
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189),'' after ``Export
Administration Act of 1979,'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(iii), by striking ``and'' at
the end;
(3) in subsection (b)(1)(C)--
(A) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
(B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new
clause:
``(iv) providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance
in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or
terrorist groups; and''; and
(4) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) as
(D), (E), and (F), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop weapons
of mass destruction;''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall apply beginning with the first report under section 140
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f), submitted more than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Gallegly) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly).
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very important to the question of how
our government spends its resources fighting international terrorism.
The amendment streamlines the very burdensome and time-consuming
procedure for redesignating a group as a foreign terrorist
organization, thereby allowing the Federal Government to focus on
actually fighting terrorism and preventing new attacks.
Under existing law, the U.S. Government must devote significant
amounts of its counterterrorist resources to the terrorist organization
redesignation effort. This bureaucratic process must take place every 2
years, even though the vast majority of these groups do not even
dispute their designation. And, as we all know, some groups, such as al
Qaeda, openly boast of their terrorist activity.
This amendment would make two principle changes to the law. First, it
would replace the requirement to formally redesignate terrorist
organizations every 2 years with a procedure that allows the groups to
petition the Secretary of State at 2-year intervals to have their
designation revoked. It would also require the Secretary to review each
group's designation every 6 years.
Let me be clear. This amendment does not change the procedure for
placing a group on the foreign terrorist organization list. The
government must still undergo the same lengthy process that exists
today.
What changes under the amendment is the every 2 year redesignation
process. Currently, the burden is on the State Department and other
agencies to demonstrate that a group should stay on the list. This
amendment shifts the burden to the terrorist organization to petition
the government to be removed from the list. A terrorist group can
petition the government every 2 years. Even if a terrorist group does
not petition for formal removal from the terrorist list, the government
must still review the designation every 6 years.
By streamlining the process, the State Department and other agencies,
including our intelligence services, can focus on designating new
groups as terrorist organizations and focus on preventing new attacks.
For example, last year, 29 of the 37 organizations on the foreign
terrorist list were due for redesignation. As a result, the State,
Justice, Treasury and the intelligence community spent thousands of
hours in preparing a detailed administrative record for each of these
groups.
Meanwhile, back in March, the State Department designated for the
first time the group, Ansar al-Islam, as a foreign terrorist
organization based in north Iraq. The group has been linked to al Qaeda
and is known to have participated in attacks on both U.S. troops and
Iraqi civilians. The designation of Ansar al-Islam took longer than it
should have, because over the preceding 6 months, Federal
counterterrorism groups were bogged down in the redesignation of large
numbers of terrorist groups.
The modified redesignation requirement proposed by the amendment will
still provide designated terrorist groups with plenty of procedural
safeguards. For example, a group can still request a court review of
designation within 30 days after its first designation. In addition,
the amendment allows organizations to petition the Secretary every 2
years to revoke its designation. If that review is not to the group's
satisfaction, the designation can still be challenged in court.
The amendment also establishes a new, expedited procedure for
handling the situation in which a terrorist group changes its name or
uses new aliases.
The language on foreign terrorist organizations is identical to the
provisions contained in an en bloc amendment to the Department of State
authorization bill that was passed by a voice vote here on the floor.
Given the importance of this measure, I introduced it as a separate
bill. It was approved by the Subcommittee on International Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Human Rights on March 17. In addition, this
provision has the support of both the State Department and the
Department of Justice.
Lastly, section 702 of my amendment requires that the State
Department's annual report on terrorism include information on
countries and terrorist groups that are seeking to obtain weapons of
mass destruction. Experts on terrorism, both within and outside the
government, agree that the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction is the most dangerous security threat faced by the United
States and our allies. Therefore, it makes absolute sense to have the
State Department's main report on terrorism discuss this linkage.
Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this important amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose this amendment, but I will
control the time on this side.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California is
recognized for 10 minutes.
There was no objection.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I want to support the author of this amendment for his
carefully crafted amendment and excellent remarks. I believe it is
imperative that we maintain an effective and efficient process for
designating foreign terrorist organizations and understand better the
threat posed by those terrorist organizations and their links to
weapons of mass destruction.
I understand, as the gentleman said, that the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on International Relations have been
working on a stand-alone bill to require the Secretary of State to
review designations every 4 years, not every 6, as this amendment
provides.
I think this additional flexibility would be a good thing and would
suggest, for example, that a bill, which I assume will be taken up at
another time, should include a provision allowing the Secretary of
State to remove groups from the list of foreign terrorist organizations
if they renounce terrorism. This is one way of using our soft power
instead of relying solely on military power to influence groups on the
list. I would hope that these details and others could be worked out
separately, or in the conference on this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that from 1999 to 2000, I
served as a member of the so-called Bremer Commission on Terrorism,
headed by former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who now serves as civil
administrator in Iraq. The issue of listing groups and states as
terrorist actors was something we considered carefully. In fact, we
spoke out about one such state.
I think this is an excellent tool to help defeat the threats we face.
I really want to commend the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly)
for offering this improvement to our intelligence authorization bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my good friend,
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my friend, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) for offering this amendment.
[[Page H4842]]
In 1996, following a series of terrorist attacks throughout the
world, Congress acted to make clear that this country is not to be used
as a staging ground for those who seek to commit acts of terrorism
against persons in other countries.
One of the components in the Committee on the Judiciary's 1996 anti-
terrorism legislation was to authorize the Secretary of State to
designate foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs, that threaten U.S.
residents or the national security of the United States.
Seven years of experience with the designation process has shown that
it is needlessly burdensome, draining resources that are needed in the
war on terrorism. There are now some 37 designated FTOs, and the
redesignation of each requires intensive interagency review and the
preparation of a voluminous administrative record. Which can take
months, of course.
Few of the designated FTOs ever challenge their designation. For
example, it is unlikely that al Qaeda will seek judicial review of the
Secretary's designation of them as FTOs in the D.C. Circuit Court.
Nevertheless, every 2 years the Federal Government must compile the
record against them.
State and Justice Department officials have informed the Committee on
the Judiciary that the cost of repeatedly proving that FTOs have
retained their terrorist characteristics diverts resources from other
pressing counterterrorism work, including pursuit of additional
designations.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Gallegly) addresses each of these concerns in a way that still
assures appropriate review. The text of this amendment tracks language
in a bill that has been reviewed by the Committee on the Judiciary.
This amendment would free up critical anti-terrorism resources that are
now expended on the onerous and, for most groups, largely pointless
task of redesignation, while assuring that affected groups have the
opportunity to seek appropriate review.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my support for this amendment,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my friend, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman), for her positive comments and for the support.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 3 printed
in House Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Boehlert
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Boehlert:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL OF
LIBYA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Libya has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism
by the Department of State each year since 1979.
(2) A German court found the Libyan Government guilty of
the East Berlin La Belle disco bombing of 1986, in which two
US servicemen were killed.
(3) A Scottish court in January 2001 found a former Libyan
official guilty of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
(4) Libya received and deserved world's condemnations for
these horrific acts against innocents.
(5) In March 2003, while Coalition Forces were preparing to
liberate Iraq, Libya quietly approached members of the
intelligence services of the United States and United Kingdom
and indicted a willingness to discuss Libya's weapons of mass
destruction programs.
(6) On December 19, 2003, after nine months of intense
negotiations, Libya publicly announced that it was prepared
to eliminate all elements of its clandestine nuclear and
chemical weapons programs.
(7) The United States, the United Kingdom, partners in the
Proliferation Security Initiative and key arms control
agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW), have worked in a multilateral and concerted
fashion with Libya in an effort to completely dismantle
Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to
deliver them.
(8) Because of the hard work by the men and women of the
intelligence community, United States policymakers were able
to work successfully to convince Libya to relinquish its WMD
programs.
(9) On January 27, 2004, a cargo plane flew from Libya to
Knoxville, Tennessee, carrying 55,000 pounds of equipment and
documents relating to Libya's nuclear weapons and missile
programs.
(10) Documents relating to those programs indicate that
Libya had purchased a virtual ``turnkey facility'' to produce
parts for gas centrifuges together with assistance to
assemble and test these centrifuges, and was otherwise
attempting to develop a large uranium enrichment plant which
could have produced enough fuel for several nuclear bombs a
year.
(11) On January 24, 2004, Libya announced that it would
accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
(12) On March 4, 2004, Libya submitted its Chemical Weapons
Convention declaration, including a full declaration of its
chemical weapons, an inventory of its production capacity, a
description of any industrial activity that could be involved
in making illegal weapons, and a plan for destroying any
banned materials.
(13) All of Libya's known chemical munitions have since
been destroyed and the country's stocks of mustard gas have
been consolidated within a single secure facility under the
supervision of the OPCW.
(14) On May 6, 2004, a cargo ship departed Libya for the
United States carrying an additional 1,000 tons of weapons of
mass destruction equipment, including centrifuge parts and
components needed to enrich uranium, the Libyan uranium
conversion facility and all associated equipment, five SCUD-C
missiles and launchers, and two partial missiles.
(15) In testimony before the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives on May 10, 2004,
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance,
Paula DeSutter, indicated that Libya had signed the
additional protocol for the IAEA in Vienna and announced
``the complete dismantlement of Libya's longest range and
most sophisticated missiles and the elimination of all of
Libya's declared chemical munitions''.
(16) International inspectors and monitors are expected to
remain on the ground with full cooperation from Libya to
ensure that Libya possesses no biological weapons programs
and that its weapons of mass destruction programs have been
fully dismantled and or converted to civilian use.
(17) The United States and Libya currently are engaged in
talks to enter a third phase of negotiations focused on
follow-up, verification, and long-term monitoring to ensure
that Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the
means to deliver them have been completely dismantled, as
well as plans for the retraining of Libyan scientists and
technicians for peaceful work.
(18) Libya's cooperation with international inspectors and
revelations about procurement networks have helped identify
numerous black market suppliers in an ``international
supermarket'' for nuclear parts and weapons designs that also
has aided such countries as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
(19) Other countries voluntarily have dismantled their
weapons of mass destruction programs, but Libya is the first
and only country on the Department of State's list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism to do so.
(20) Libya's decision to shed it pariah status and divest
itself of its weapons of mass destruction programs can be
directly attributed to the demonstrated resolve of the United
States in the global war against terrorism, the liberation of
Iraq by United States Armed Forces and Coalition Forces, and
the adoption of policies in targeting and seizing shipments
of such weapons.
(21) It is appropriate to pursue a policy of cautious and
deliberate re-engagement with Libya based upon verifiable
results, but the United States should not restore full
diplomatic relations with Libya unless and until Libya has--
(A) agreed and submitted to comprehensive monitoring of the
full dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programs;
(B) severed all links to and support for acts of
international terrorism;
(C) ceased all support for insurgency groups which have
destabilized countries in Africa;
(D) demonstrated respect for human rights and the rule of
law;
(E) implemented its pledge to cooperate in the further
investigation of the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103; and
(F) settled all legal claims relating to past acts of
international terrorism, including but not limited to the
bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and the La Belle Discotheque.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the world has been made safer with the dismantling and
removal of Libya's weapons of mass destruction and the means
to deliver them;
(2) this would not have been possible if not for the
demonstrated resolve of the United
[[Page H4843]]
States in the global war on terror and in the liberation of
Iraq by United States and Coalition Forces;
(3) the President should be commended for having the
courage to undertake those policies which persuaded Libya to
agree to relinquish such weapons; and
(4) other countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea,
should follow Libya's example, and voluntarily dismantle
their weapons of mass destruction and submit their programs
to international inspections.
{time} 1815
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Boehlert) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
Modification to Amendment Offered by Mr. Boehlert
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the
amendment be modified in the form at the desk.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Boehlert:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL OF
LIBYA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Libya has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism
by the Department of State each year since 1979.
(2) A German court found the Libyan Government guilty of
the East Berlin La Belle disco bombing of 1986, in which two
US servicemen were killed.
(3) A Scottish court in January 2001 found a former Libyan
official guilty of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
(4) Libya received and deserved world's condemnations for
these horrific acts against innocents.
(5) ``As a result of Libya's support for international
terrorism and its destabilizing role in the international
community, the United States maintained a comprehensive
economic embargo on Libya for more than two decades, which
was aided by multilateral sanctions imposed by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 742 in 1992, and which
together hobbled the development of the Libyan economy.''
(6) In March 2003, while Coalition Forces were preparing to
liberate Iraq, Libya once again quietly approached members of
the intelligence services of the United States and United
Kingdom and indicted a willingness to discuss Libya's weapons
of mass destruction programs, as it had previously in the
1990's.
(7) On December 19, 2003, after nine months of intense
negotiations, Libya publicly announced that it was prepared
to eliminate all elements of its clandestine nuclear and
chemical weapons programs.
(8) The United States, the United Kingdom, partners in the
Proliferation Security Initiative and key arms control
agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW), have worked in a multilateral and concerted
fashion with Libya in an effort to completely dismantle
Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to
deliver them.
(9) Because of the hard work by the men and women of the
intelligence community, United States policymakers were able
to work successfully to convince Libya to relinquish its WMD
programs.
(10) On January 27, 2004, a cargo plane flew from Libya to
Knoxville, Tennessee, carrying 55,000 pounds of equipment and
documents relating to Libya's nuclear weapons and missile
programs.
(11) Documents relating to those programs indicate that
Libya had purchased a virtual ``turnkey facility'' to produce
parts for gas centrifuges together with assistance to
assemble and test these centrifuges, and was otherwise
attempting to develop a large uranium enrichment plant which
could have produced enough fuel for several nuclear bombs a
year.
(12) On January 24, 2004, Libya announced that it would
accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
(13) On March 4, 2004, Libya submitted its Chemical Weapons
Convention declaration, including a full declaration of its
chemical weapons, an inventory of its production capacity, a
description of any industrial activity that could be involved
in making illegal weapons, and a plan for destroying any
banned materials.
(14) All of Libya's known chemical munitions have since
been destroyed and the country's stocks of mustard gas have
been consolidated within a single secure facility under the
supervision of the OPCW.
(15) On May 6, 2004, a cargo ship departed Libya for the
United States carrying an additional 1,000 tons of weapons of
mass destruction equipment, including centrifuge parts and
components needed to enrich uranium, the Libyan uranium
conversion facility and all associated equipment, five SCUD-C
missiles and launchers, and two partial missiles.
(16) In testimony before the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives on May 10, 2004,
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance,
Paula DeSutter, indicated that Libya had signed the
additional protocol for the IAEA in Vienna and announced
``the complete dismantlement of Libya's longest range and
most sophisticated missiles and the elimination of all of
Libya's declared chemical munitions''.
(17) International inspectors and monitors are expected to
remain on the ground with full cooperation from Libya to
ensure that Libya possesses no biological weapons programs
and that its weapons of mass destruction programs have been
fully dismantled and or converted to civilian use.
(18) The United States and Libya currently are engaged in
talks to enter a third phase of negotiations focused on
follow-up, verification, and long-term monitoring to ensure
that Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and the
means to deliver them have been completely dismantled, as
well as plans for the retraining of Libyan scientists and
technicians for peaceful work.
(19) Libya's cooperation with international inspectors and
revelations about procurement networks have helped identify
numerous black market suppliers in an ``international
supermarket'' for nuclear parts and weapons designs that also
has aided such countries as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
(20) Other countries voluntarily have dismantled their
weapons of mass destruction programs, but Libya is the first
and only country on the Department of State's list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism to do so.
(21) Libya's decision to shed it pariah status and divest
itself of its weapons of mass destruction programs can be
directly attributed to decades of United States and
multilateral economic sanctions against Libya, the
demonstrated resolve of the United States in the global war
against terrorism, the liberation of Iraq by United States
Armed Forces and Coalition Forces, and the adoption of
policies in targeting and seizing shipments of such weapons.
(22) It is appropriate to pursue a policy of cautious and
deliberate re-engagement with Libya based upon verifiable
results, but the United States should not restore full
diplomatic relations with Libya unless and until Libya has--
(A) agreed and submitted to comprehensive monitoring of the
full dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programs;
(B) severed all links to and support for acts of
international terrorism;
(C) ceased all support for insurgency groups which have
destabilized countries in Africa;
(D) demonstrated respect for human rights and the rule of
law;
(E) implemented its pledge to cooperate in the further
investigation of the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103; and
(F) settled all legal claims relating to past acts of
international terrorism, including but not limited to the
bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and the La Belle Discotheque.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the world has been made safer with the dismantling and
removal of Libya's weapons of mass destruction and the means
to deliver them;
(2) this would not have been possible if not for decades of
United States and multilateral sanctions against Libya, the
demonstrated resolve of the United States in the global war
on terror and the liberation of Iraq by United States and
Coalition Forces;
(3) the President and previous Administrations should be
commended for having the courage to undertake those policies
which persuaded Libya to agree to relinquish such weapons;
and
(4) other countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea,
should follow Libya's example, and voluntarily dismantle
their weapons of mass destruction and submit their programs
to international inspections.
Mr. BOEHLERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the modified amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, though I
will not object, I want to be sure that the language that has not been
read is consistent with the language I just reviewed.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentlewoman that that is
the case.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
[[Page H4844]]
Let me tell my colleagues a little bit about the genesis of this
amendment. Early in February, as a senior member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, I was asked to lead a delegation for
a mission to Iraq and Afghanistan. That delegation included the
distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking
member of the committee, and there were four others. There were six of
us. We planned a most ambitious schedule for 6 days: six countries, 6
days.
Our purpose was not to determine the progress on the Constitution,
important though that was; not to check on the morale of the troops,
important though that always is; not to check on how we were spending
our money on the reconstruction, and that too is very important. Our
purpose as members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
was to meet with members of the intelligence community on-site in that
war zone to hear from them in their own words their assessment of the
situation. I want to compliment all of the members of that delegation
for the outstanding contribution they made to that mission.
But before we were going and still in the planning stages, I had a
call from the State Department, Ambassador Burns, who directs the Near
East desk. He said, Mr. Chairman, I would like you and the delegation
to consider making an addition to your trip, another stop. I said, have
you looked at our schedule? Six countries in 6 days. We do not have
time to wind our watch. He said, let me talk to you about it. Then he
came up to Capitol Hill; and in the secure sanctuary of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence rooms on the fourth floor of the
Capitol, he said, We would like you to go to Libya. We would like your
delegation to meet with Colonel Qadhafi. I said, Are you kidding? Are
you serious? Libya is engaged in state-sponsored acts of terrorism
against American citizens. It has endured U.N. sanctions; that has been
going on for 20 years; disregarded world condemnation, and dismissed
diplomatic settlements. What has changed? And he said, in the secure
sanctuary of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence quarters on
the fourth floor of the Capitol, There is movement; There is progress.
We think it would be very valuable for your bipartisan delegation to go
to Libya to meet Colonel Qadhafi, because we want to demonstrate in
tangible form that if he begins to cooperate with us, we will cooperate
with him.
After checking with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), she
agreed. She thought it would be a good idea, and off we went. We spent
8 hours in the country, the final 2 hours in a tent in the middle of
the Libyan desert outside of Surt, Colonel Qadhafi's hometown. We
talked about weapons of mass destruction. We talked about the war on
terrorism. We talked about the shooting down of Pan Am Flight 103,
which has a searing impact on my soul forever more because there were
35 students from Syracuse University on that flight. We talked about
all of the gut-wrenching issues that are so important to our security
and the security of the Free World, and it was a meaningful discussion.
And the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) can characterize it
from her standpoint what she thought of it.
Then we completed the rest of our mission. We went to Jordan, we went
to Iraq, we went to Afghanistan, we went to Turkey. This was a world-
wind visit of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, very
serious business, doing very important work. As a matter of fact, 3 of
the 6 days, we did not even sleep in a hotel; we slept in the airplane.
We got back home, and we reported everything to the committee and to
the State Department.
Since then, there has been a great opening up with Libya. Colonel
Qadhafi, I do not think he went to bed one night and suddenly woke up
and said, Hey, those guys are right and I have been wrong. I am going
to change my ways. I think he looked around at the world and he said,
the war on terrorism could negatively impact him like it negatively
impacted his neighbor to the north, who is now behind bars, Saddam
Hussein. I think he said that he wants to be concerned about his legacy
and in what shape he was going to leave that country. I think he
decided that it would be best to cooperate.
What has happened since then? He has turned over the weapons of mass
destruction, he has made his country open for inspection, and he is
cooperating fully.
Does that mean we can clap our hands and say, boy, is this not a
great victory? Although it is a great victory as far as it goes, and it
does prove that leadership really results in something positive if we
work together. But the fact of the matter is, we have to continue to be
cautious, but we have to be very deliberate.
That country is moving in the right direction. Let us hope they
continue that movement. We want signals to be sent to others. We want
Iran and North Korea and other nations, others who are on the list of
countries that sponsor state terrorism, to get the message; and we
think that this amendment that I am offering, this sense of the
Congress amendment, will do the right thing in the appropriate way.
Let me add that there are a number of Members on both sides of the
aisle that have worked very cooperatively on this. The gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos) had some suggestions for language. That is what
my modifying amendment includes, the suggestions he made. That is the
way we work best together, when we reach across the center aisle and
find common ground.
So I would urge the adoption of my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will
control the time on this side; and I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) not only
for the amendment but for, as he said, engaging the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos) in a constructive effort to improve the
amendment, and I think it is a lot better. Frankly, I wish that our
bill that we are considering and voting on today had engaged the
minority more constructively at an earlier stage; I think it would have
been a lot better.
I do support the Boehlert amendment. I fondly remember our trip, six
countries, 6 days. I think the gentleman left out Sicily, so we might
add 7 countries in 6 days.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. BOEHLERT. The only reason we left out Sicily, because the initial
was 6 countries in 6 days; but as the gentlewoman will recall, when we
added Libya, there were requirements on the pilots in that they could
not fly a certain amount of time beyond their standard time, so we
could not go any farther than Sicily. We had to exit Libya, but we
could not go any farther than Sicily, so we stayed overnight and got up
the next morning and off we went.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thought our Sicily
stop was outstanding, which is why I brought it up.
But I think that the improvements made to this amendment by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) are noteworthy. What he did, as
I understand it, was to insert a bit of the history here, the role of
sanctions initiated by President Reagan, the role of international
legal negotiations to get Libya to renounce terrorism and turn over
terrorism suspects to international courts, and the role of diplomacy
in previous administrations and by the British and others before the
beginning of this administration. Though this administration did play a
role, and I commend it, in President Qadhafi's stunning decision to do
the right thing, that should be reflected, and is, in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I will put two very important articles on this subject
in the Record. One is by Dr. Flynt Leverett entitled ``Why Libya Gave
Up the Bomb'' from the January 23, 2004, New York Times; and the second
is a Middle East Institute Policy Brief by two former assistant
Secretaries of State and former ambassadors, Martin Indyk and Edward S.
Walker entitled ``What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue
States?'' dated April 7, 2004.
Finally, let me make two other points. We have seen in recent days
troubling allegations that Colonel Qadhafi was himself involved in
ordering assassinations of Saudi leaders. These
[[Page H4845]]
are, of course, press reports. But these stories remind us that the
success of our policies toward Libya remain an open question, and I am
sure the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) agrees with me that we
need to be clear-eyed and diligent to make certain that these promises
by Colonel Qadhafi are kept, and that in other respects, he does not
convert to any of his old habits.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York, the sponsor of
the amendment.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Let
me stress we have to be cautious, but deliberate. But as a favorite son
of the gentlewoman's State, the great President that we just lost, I am
reminded of his admonition: trust, but verify.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for those comments
and strongly agree with them.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just mention that on that trip that
was described, we did spend a day and evening in Baghdad. It was my
second visit. We met with troops, but we also met with all of our
intelligence personnel at the scene in addition to the leaders of the
CPA. What is troubling about that, and I believe the gentleman from
Florida (Chairman Goss) has commented on this in another appearance,
our appearance yesterday in the Committee on Rules, because the timing
of our trip was February 2004. While we were in Baghdad, General Taguba
was doing his investigation of prison abuse and so forth in Baghdad,
and we were never told by these intelligence leaders that that
investigation was ongoing. That was wrong. That diminishes our
oversight, and those folks whom we support as robustly as we can need
to be fully candid with our committee, especially when we are seeking
them out to try to help them.
Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by saying that I support the
gentleman's amendment as improved by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos).
[From the New York Times, 23 January 2004]
Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,
(By Flynt Leverett)
Washington.--As President Bush made clear in his State of
the Union address, he sees the striking developments in
relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war
on terrorism. The idea is that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's
apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was
a largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which
thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out
the prospect of similar progress with other states that
support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and
brutalize their own people.
However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq
war, the president misrepresents the real lessons of the
Libyan case. This confusion undermines our chances of getting
countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead.
The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to
the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's
first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should
even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of
international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans
decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with
the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton
administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton
White House made clear that no movement toward better
relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities
stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi
ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence
officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the
Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999
Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations
sanctions against Libya.
Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the
State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush
administration picked up on those discussions and induced the
Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With
our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a
``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to
satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the
Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the
actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the
case.
We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya
met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain
would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted
permanently. This script became the basis for three-party
negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue.
By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the
conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was
evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed,
Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya
to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation
agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted
responsibility for its officials' actions.
But during these two years of talks, American negotiators
consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie
situation would lead to no more than elimination of United
Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United
States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns,
particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass
destruction.
This is the content in which Libyan officials approached
the United States and Britain last spring to discuss
dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which
had not yet started, was not the driving force behind
Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of
credible diplomatic representations by the United States
over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so
was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic
goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo
was offered: American officials indicated that a
verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would
lead the removal of our own sanctions, perhaps by the end
of this year.
The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime
to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons
of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also
make clear the potential benefits of cooperation.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take
this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and
Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as
well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing
Iranian or Syrian behavior.
The president's lack of initiative on this point is
especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath
of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has a singular
opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and
Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic
elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through
diplomatic channels and to former officials (including
myself) their interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United
States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to
terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security
guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations
with Washington.
Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President
Bashar al-Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last
week--have told me that they want a better strategic
understanding with the United States. To achieve this,
however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what
Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to
terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.
As Mr. Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if
it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in
return.
One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more
constructive course with Libya was that the White House,
uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's
neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of
carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots
could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial
decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie
case was approved by an informal coalition made up of
Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to
the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass
destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the
shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of
the loop.
Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's
bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security
Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course
involving Iran and Syria. However, until the administration
learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy
toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the
mind of ideology.
Flynn Leverett, a visiting fellow with the Saban Center for
Middle East Politics at the Brookings Institution, was senior
director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security
Council from 2002 to 2003.
____
[From the Middle East Institute, April 7, 2004]
What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?
(By Ambassador Martin S. Indyk; Ambassador Edward S. Walker)
Summary. Ambassadors Martin Indyk and Edward Walker
discussed the bilateral negotiations begun in 1999 between
the United States and Libya that led to Libyan leader Colonel
Mu'ammar Qadhafi's radical change in foreign policy. These
talks began during the Clinton Administration as part of a
broader strategy that sought to ``graduate'' rogue states
into the international community and establish normal
relationships with the United States. Although initially wary
of the process, the Bush Administration successfully forged
ahead with the secret negotiations bringing about the recent
rapprochement between the two countries.
Brief. When the secret US-Libyan negotiations began in
1999, Libya was engaged in an effective campaign in the
United Nations to cease the multilateral sanctions imposed on
[[Page H4846]]
it by the international community. The United States was in a
difficult position because it was the only member that
refused to lift the sanctions and therefore was in danger of
becoming isolated in the Security Council. Had the United
States merely vetoed a new UN resolution to lift the
sanctions, the international consensus that made the
sanctions regime effective would have eroded, and this
potentially would have led to the failure of the US
objectives regarding Libya: the halting of state sponsorship
of terrorism, an admission of responsibility for the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the
payment of compensation to families of Pan Am Flight 103's
victims.
A New Strategy. The United States' primary short-term goal
in the negotiations was to maintain the sanctions. At the
same time, the US was pursuing a new strategy that went
considerably beyond a policy of containment. The goal of this
broader strategy was to try to change the behavior of rogue
states and ``graduate'' them into the international community
and normalize relations with the United States. Libya was a
good test case for this new strategy because the broad
international consensus that Colonel Qadhafi's actions were
unacceptable provided the US with more flexibility. As for
the Libyan goals, Qadhafi, having abandoned his pan-Arab
aspirations, made a deliberate tactical decision to
normalize relations with America.
The Negotiations. The negotiations began in May 1999, with
Musa Kusa, Colonel Qadhafi's head of intelligence services,
leading the Libyan delegation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt strongly backed
the process and at times even provided logistical support.
The US put forth two initial conditions which Colonel Qadhafi
fulfilled immediately: first, that Libya halt all efforts in
the UN to have the sanctions lifted; and second, that the
bilateral dialogue be kept secret. Surprisingly, Libya was
prepared to accept subsequent US requirements with little
negotiation. Among the additional requirements were the
closure of all terrorist camps in the country, acknowledging
responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist operation,
paying compensation to families of the victims, and
disclosing weapons of mass destruction (at the time only
consisting of chemical weapons, as Libya had yet to begin a
nuclear weapons program).
Ambassador Indyk suggested these negotiations could have
proceeded more quickly, possibly concluding prior to the 2000
election season, had the United States not periodically
instituted new demands to ensure Colonel Qadhafi's
consistency and compliance. Another complicating factor was a
strong and vocal anti-Libyan constituency among the families
of Pan Am Flight 103 victims who slowed down the
reconciliation. The negotiations were also put on hold for
the 2000 American presidential elections out of concern that
the process would be leaked to the press and result in a
scandal. Once elected, although initially wary of the
process, the Bush Administration resumed talks in a more
public forum and ``took them to their natural conclusion,''
which has led to the recent public US-Libyan rapprochement.
Although this has been a success story for this new
strategy, it is not necessarily applicable to all rogue
states. There were specific conditions with regard to Libya
that made the process work. First, the international
community was united in condemning Libya's terrorist actions.
Though the United Nations contemplated lifting sanctions, the
international consensus against Libya was largely still
intact. Second, the United States had shown previously that
it was willing to use military force against Libya, after the
1986 West Berlin nightclub bombing. Finally, Qadhafi had a
change of heart. He decided that he wanted American companies
specifically to develop Libya's oil fields and this strongly
influenced his decision-making. The United States was able to
use the carrot and the stick effectively throughout the
process, and Colonel Qadhafi consistently reinforced his
willingness to comply with US demands.
The Ambassadors added that one way to improve this type of
strategy in the future would be for the US Administration to
articulate from the outset the final goals of the engagement
and identify concrete steps for compliance. On a final note,
both Indyk and Walker believe that the new approach has been
very effective and extend credit to the George W. Bush
Administration for seeing this unusual policy to its
conclusion.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I will complete the balance of my time by
just once again emphasizing that all is not over, all is not hunky-
dory, as the phrase goes; but there has been significant movement in
the right direction, thanks to good intelligence, thanks to firm and
decisive leadership. But we have to go forward with the admonition that
we trust, but verify.
So I would urge strong support of this amendment for all the reasons
that have just been enumerated by the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman) and this gentleman, and I would urge a ``yes'' vote on my
amendment.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I voted against the Boehlert Amendment to
the Intelligence Authorizations bill for 2005, H.R. 4548, due to the
language which suggested that the war against Iraq and the policies of
our commander-in-chief were the major factors in Libya's change with
respect to the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction. It was, in fact, concerted multilateral economic and
diplomatic pressure which brought Libya's leader, Col. Qaddafi, to his
senses to cut a deal to end U.S. and multilateral sanctions and relieve
Libya's diplomatic isolation. I agree with the Ranking Member of the
International Relations Committee, who insisted that language be added
noting the effect sanctions had on the Libyan leader's policies.
However, I cannot support legislation which suggests that the
President's policy in Iraq played the major role in affecting policy in
Tripoli.
I also voted against the Rogers Amendment. Though I agree with many
of its provisions, I cannot support its partisan tone.
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment represents another
example of the Republican leadership playing politics with important
matters of national security. The decision of Libya to renounce its
program to develop weapons of mass destruction represents an important
victory for U.S. diplomatic and foreign policy efforts. However, the
attempt to directly tie that success to the war in Iraq is not
supported by the facts. Consequently, while I agree with much that is
contained in this amendment, I will not engage in this politically
motivated farce.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered
by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Boehlert) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House
Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION,
AND INTERROGATION OF TERRORISTS ARE FUNDAMENTAL
TO THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERROR.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the people of the
United States were too often brutalized again and again by
deadly terrorist violence, as evidenced by the hundreds of
American deaths in the Beirut and Lockerbie bombings, the
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the destruction of
the Khobar Towers military barracks, the bombing of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the vicious
attacks on the USS Cole in 2000.
(2) The terrorist violence targeted against the United
States became more emboldened after each attack, culminating
in the deadly attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, which killed thousands of
innocent Americans, including innocent women and children.
(3) Since September 11, 2001, the citizens of the United
States have remained the priority target of terrorist
violence, with journalists and employees of non-governmental
organizations being held hostage, tortured, and decapitated
in the name of terror.
(4) Congress has authorized the President to use all
necessary and appropriate means to defeat terrorism ; and on
numerous occasions since September 11, 2001, and throughout
the Global War on Terror, the interrogation of detainees has
yielded valuable intelligence that has saved the lives of
American military personnel and American citizens at home and
abroad.
(5) The interrogation of detainees has also provided highly
valuable insights into the structure of terrorist
organizations, their target selection process, and the
identities of key operational and logistical personnel that
were previously unknown to the Intelligence Community.
(6) The lawful interrogation of detainees is consistent
with the United States Constitution.
(7) The abuses against detainees documented at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq were deplorable aberrations that were not part
of United States policy and were not in keeping with the
finest traditions of the United States military and the
honorable men and women who serve.
[[Page H4847]]
(8) The loss of interrogation-derived information would
have a disastrous effect on the Nation's intelligence
collection and counterterrorism efforts and would constitute
a damaging reversal in the Global War on Terror during this
critical time.
(9) The apprehension, detention, and interrogation of
terrorists are essential elements to successfully waging the
Global War on Terror.
(10) The interrogation of detainees can and should continue
by the United States within the bounds of the United States
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the apprehension, detention, and interrogation of terrorists
are fundamental to the successful prosecution of the Global
War on Terror.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
My amendment is pretty simple. It expresses the sense of Congress
that the apprehension, detention, and legal interrogation of terrorists
is imperative to winning the war on terrorism and stopping the
barbarians.
The terrorist thugs that we are fighting today are well-organized,
well-financed forces who have publicly declared war on the United
States of America and the Free World. They have a global network of
hide-outs and cells, set up solely to wage war on the United States and
kill innocent American citizens.
{time} 1830
They have carried out attack after attack on Americans. They attacked
the USS Cole. They attacked our barracks. They attacked our embassies,
and we will always remember the highly coordinated attacks of September
11 on our own land.
This Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and
appropriate means to defeat terrorism. On numerous occasions since
September 11 and throughout the global war on terror, the interrogation
of detainees has yielded valuable intelligence. This intelligence has
saved the lives of American military personnel and American citizens at
home and abroad. The interrogation of detainees has also provided
highly valuable insights into the structure of terrorist organizations
and their target selection process and the identities of key
operational and logistical personnel who were previously unknown.
The reported abuses against detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq has led some to question our interrogation policy. Make no
mistake. What happened at Abu Ghraib was not part of U.S. policy, not
keeping with the finest traditions of the United States military.
The careers of those people are over. They are being punished.
However, the deplorable actions of some should not jeopardize the use
of interrogation by our armed services, and we should not let it
tarnish the sterling representation of our military.
The loss of interrogation-derived information would have a disastrous
effect on our Nation's intelligence, collection and counterterrorism
efforts. It would constitute a damaging reversal in the global war on
terror at this critical time.
Support this amendment for the safety of our troops for Americans all
over the globe, and for the war on terror. It is imperative that lawful
interrogation of detainees continue, and this Congress ought to support
it.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Who seeks to control the time in opposition to the
amendment?
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will
control the time on our side.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
There was no objection.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I will support the amendment, though I wish it had
included a clear statement about the importance of U.S. obligations to
adhere to international laws, conventions and treatises to prevent
torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of human beings.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most troubling aspects of this whole
detainee issue, besides the absolutely reprehensible abuse of
prisoners, is the all-out assault on the rule of law that is clearly
revealed in legal memos that seem to justify abuse and even torture of
detainees.
None of us is naive here, and as a member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, I strongly believe in the importance of
interrogations and understand that interrogations can yield information
that protect thousands or millions of Americans. We have to interrogate
prisoners, but over the many years of our country's history, we have
always done those interrogations consistent with the rule of law, and
only recently have some very troubling memoranda surfaced at the
highest levels of the Justice Department and the Defense Department
that raise questions and that actually assert that the President of the
United States in his role as commander in chief could actually be above
the law.
I thought, Mr. Chairman, that we had defeated that idea at Runnymede
centuries and centuries ago and that our country was built on a
foundation of the rule of law, and I worry, Mr. Chairman, that if we do
not observe the rule of law, not only do we undercut our moral
authority, but we endanger our troops who might be treated just the way
some of our people are treating other troops.
Now, let me add quickly that the beheading of Americans and other
nationals is absolutely outrageous, and nowhere do I think that
behavior is consistent with even rational or humane behavior. It is
abhorrent and appalling, and I strongly condemn it.
But in conclusion, I think it is important that we support this
amendment, but I think it is also important that as we do support this
amendment, we think about the fact that the rule of law must always
apply as we treat detainees and proceed with the important work of
interrogations.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) for her comments, and I agree that it is
barbarous what is going on over there.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Johnson) for bringing this amendment forward and for yielding me the
time.
As my ranking member has said, the use of interrogation is absolutely
critical. It is a very important tool in the war on terrorism. Getting
information timely, not only saves lives for our forces, but in the
type of unconventional war we are fighting today, it is critical to
know where the next bad surprise is going to come from, because these
folks do not fight fair, as you say.
Equally, in order to protect the tool that we have, the proper use of
interrogation, we need to prevent the abuse of interrogation. We all
understand that, and unfortunately, I think that those of us who
understand it and have looked into it are a little puzzled by the
fixation that the liberal media has assigned to some of this, what I
would call, aberration problem that took place at Abu Ghraib, which was
admittedly terrible, but I believe it is an aberration.
I would like to point out to the American people that our committee
does have oversight over interrogation, and we have looked into what
has happened in the intelligence aspects, the interrogation aspects. We
have had numerous briefings, and we had a rather full-scale day of
hearings settled for, I guess it was last Friday. Unfortunately, that
was preempted by the sad events with President Reagan's, the national
day of mourning for State ceremony for former President of the United
States, Ronald Reagan. So the government was closed, and obviously we
have had to postpone.
But we are on top of the hearings in keeping up with this, and we
have reams of material and reports, and we are obviously going to have
more, because more reports are taking place.
[[Page H4848]]
I think the purpose of the gentleman's amendment is very, very
important. We must not lose sight that interrogation is a critical
tool, and despite the hype and the sensationalism that the liberal
media is fixing on, and it is a shame they do not talk more about the
cruelty and the barbarity, as the gentleman has alluded to, of the
enemy than they do of some people who got out of control on our team.
I would also like to say that for the record, it is my understanding,
and we do not know all of the facts yet, that perhaps the reason that
the gentlewoman did not get an intelligence briefing in February while
she was in Iraq is because the prisoners that were involved, we are
finding out, were prisoners of crimes, of murder and rape and so forth,
and not necessarily subjects of intelligence interest.
Now, that needs to be pursued further, but you can understand that if
they are just criminals, that there would not be a huge reason to go
out and get the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence involved,
its abuse of prisoner handling, if that is the issue.
So we have got an area of jurisdiction there where we will sort out.
I do think that it is extremely important that we support this
amendment. And I thank the gentleman for bringing it forward. I think
it is a huge improvement to our bill, and I will be very happy to
accept it from our perspective.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Texas that I
appreciate his comments welcoming my comments. That, again, is in the
spirit of bipartisanship. We all do better when we are bipartisan.
I would just also make a comment to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss). I certainly agree that a lot of material is in our committee
spaces, but we will consider an amendment later this afternoon on this
subject of the committee's ability to oversee the detainee problem.
Some of us remain skeptical that our committee has gotten all the
material we need and certainly skeptical that we have gotten adequate
candid testimony from administration officials.
I would also point out to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) that
while we were in Baghdad, we should have been told about some issues
directly relevant to our jurisdiction, such as this issue of ghosting
of detainees as described by General Taguba in his report, and that is
the placing of detainees without revealing their numbers or their
identity in prisons so that, as I understand it, the International Red
Cross and other outside observers would not be aware of their
existence. This is a serious issue directly relevant to our
jurisdiction. I believe that it was known to those we met with in
Baghdad and they should have informed us; at least that is my personal
opinion.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Holt), another member of our committee to comment on the Johnson
amendment.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, the amendment by our colleague from Texas
indeed states a correct proposition that the detention and lawful
interrogation of terrorists is fundamental to our national security.
The key word, of course, is ``lawful.'' And perhaps the amendment could
have been improved by spelling out more explicitly the importance of
adhering to international convention, international law, international
standards.
There is no doubt that the gentleman from Texas has the admiration
and appreciation of every Member here in this body for his service, and
no one knows better than he, he has very personal and strong reasons
for caring about the treatment of detainees and prisoners. And, in
fact, I just wanted to underscore the point that I am sure the
gentleman knows better than I, that the reason we do adhere to
international standards, is for the protection of our own servicemen
and women who may indeed become prisoners themselves.
We certainly deplore the barbaric treatment of Americans, Koreans and
others by the terrorists. We understand that non-state terrorists
sometimes do not feel bound by the international standards, but the
gentleman's legislation with an emphasis on the word ``lawful'' makes a
good point.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make a point about the fact
that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) had invited several of
us on the committee to go to Guantanamo on two different occasions. We
spent 2 full days on two separate occasions touring and observing and
paying attention. And there is absolutely no question the work that
goes on there is absolutely critical to our ability to win the war on
terror. And it is absolutely critical to our work and the work of law
enforcement people in this country to find those people that are still
here in America, trying to hurt our country and trying to hurt our
system.
And that is why the amendment of the gentleman from Texas is so
important because it does point up the importance of the work that goes
on. And the work that goes on in the Guantanamo is very professional
work. It is done by the book. It is done in a way that, I think, has
elicited the kind of information that has really helped those in this
country and around the world get the information they need.
And so I support the amendment and I support those that are doing the
hard work in Guantanamo because it will make a difference in our
ability to win the war on terror.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I see no additional speakers on our side. I
support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I advocate lawful and legal
interrogation, and it must continue because it does save lives on our
side. And I would also like to point out that the Bush administration
has recently declassified and released hundreds of pages of internal
documents that show that torture against detainees has never been
authorized and will never be authorized by our Nation.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I voted against the amendment because
while the Abu Ghraib prison abuses should not be part of the United
States' policy, the evidence is not clear that it was not part of the
policy of the Bush administration. Given the disturbing documents that
are coming to light, this amendment seemed to be partisan wishful
thinking rather than a clear expression of policy supported by
objective analysis.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of
my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and
pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson)
will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
It is now in order to consider amendment number 5 printed in House
Report 108-561.
{time} 1845
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) The men and women of the intelligence community are the
backbone of the Nation's efforts to gather and collect the
intelligence which is vital to the national security of the
United States.
(2) The men and women of the intelligence community are
great patriots who perform their jobs without fan fair and
all too often without receiving the proper credit.
(3) The men and women of the intelligence community are
combating vastly different threats to the Nation's security
compared to their Cold War colleagues.
[[Page H4849]]
(4) Threats to the United States have evolved through the
use of technology and non-state actions, demanding
alternatives to traditional diplomatic actions.
(5) The 1995 ``Deutch Guidelines'' regarding the
recruitment of foreign assets impeded human intelligence
collection efforts and contributed to the creation of a risk
averse environment. Despite repeated efforts by the
intelligence oversight committees of Congress to convince the
Director of Central Intelligence to drop the guidelines,
these guidelines stood until formally repealed in 2001 by an
Act of Congress.
(6) The President's budget request for the intelligence
community fell by 11 percent from 1993 to 1995.
(7) Congress cut the President's budget request for the
intelligence community each year from 1992 through 1994.
(8) The cutbacks in resources and political support during
the middle of the previous decade has caused nearly
irreversible damage.
(9) Widespread risk aversion in clandestine HUMINT
collection and intelligence analysis resulted from lack of
resources and, more importantly, of political support for the
mission during the middle of the previous decade.
(10) Unnecessarily cumbersome legal impediments to the
clandestine HUMINT collection mission were raised during the
middle of the previous decade, leaving our intelligence
officers unable to penetrate legitimate target organizations,
such as terrorist groups.
(11) Congress and the current President have worked
cooperatively to restore funding, personnel levels, and
political support for intelligence.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the intelligence community should be revitalized by
investing in the missions, people, and capabilities of the
community; and
(2) the efforts of the men and women of the intelligence
community should be recognized and commended.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
might consume.
I rise today, and I am not one that normally comes to the floor; but
given my time as a special agent with the FBI and watching the
intelligence community get really abused in the 1990s and to see this
very partisan debate engaged in this Intelligence authorization, I felt
compelled to come to the floor, at least to try to interject some
common sense and some plea that we could get back to the serious work
of protecting the United States of America. One way we do that is we
stand tall and we stand together and we commend those who are risking
their lives every day in what is an art, a skill, to some degree a
science, of collecting intelligence around the world.
The 1990s was brutal to intelligence collection. Funding was reduced.
As a matter of fact, the number of intelligence operatives declined by
27 percent from 1992 to 1999. From 1991 to 1997, the number of stations
declined by 30 percent. The number of assets declined by 40 percent.
The intelligence reporting declined by approximately 50 percent. As a
matter of fact, George Tenet said in front of the commission, When I
became DCI, I found a community and a CIA whose dollars were declining
and whose expertise was ebbing.
There was a feeling in the community of intelligence that they were
the stepchild; they were the sinister folks who we did not need to
spend money on anymore, who had passed their prime after the close of
the Cold War. They became the great awful folks that we wanted to blame
for a lot of things.
As a matter of fact, in the Deutch guidelines of 1995, they basically
said that CIA operatives around the world could not associate with
unsavory characters. I have to tell my colleagues that as an agent of
the FBI, if you were not dealing with some unsavory characters, you
were not catching bad guys. That is exactly what we needed to do. My
colleagues can imagine the morale and the confusing message that we
send to somebody who is risking their life in some remote corner of the
world, dealing with somebody who would just as soon slit your throat as
to say hi, and say to them, boy, you cannot deal with unsavory
characters to save and defend the United States of America; it might
embarrass us somewhere along the way.
Well, if we are going to defeat terrorism, we need to deal exactly
with those unsavory characters. The gentlemanly days of Ivy League
spies are over. The threat today are those who behead their hostages.
The threat today are those who use illegal operations and criminal
enterprise to conduct horrible acts against the United States,
including flying airplanes into buildings.
So what we do by this amendment is say, yes, we have made some
mistakes; yes, we did not hold you in high regard in the last decade,
but we do today and we appreciate your work. You will not be on TV. You
probably will not write a book. You probably will not be famous, but
you are risking your life every single day for the defense of the
United States.
I talked to a CIA station chief just this weekend who said our
business is really to steal secrets, and all we want is the
appreciation of what we do, the art of getting to them before they get
to us.
These are great Americans, and when we tell them not to do something,
they will not do it. When we tell them that we care and believe in
them, they are going to do it. So this amendment is exactly that. It is
us standing together, trying to set aside our partisan differences on
what should never be a partisan issue, the safety and security of the
United States of America.
So, to every FBI agent who gets up in the morning and worries that on
their watch something bad is going to happen, to every CIA agent, to
every other intelligence operative that we have employed by the United
States of America who stands tall as a patriot for their Nation, we
ought to say today, we recognize we did not treat you well, but we
understand how valuable you are today, and we will stand with you. We
will stand with you all the way. We are going to give you the resources
you need, and we are going to give you the respect that you should
command.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Who seeks to control the time in opposition to the
amendment?
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, and
I will control the time on our side.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me just say to the sponsor of the amendment that all of us in
this House, on a bipartisan basis, recognize and respect and honor the
heroism and sacrifice of the men and women in the intelligence
community. I have spoken to it two or three times already today. That
is not the issue. The issue is additional language in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) for the time.
First, we appreciate the gentleman from Michigan's (Mr. Rogers)
service, and I agree with a lot of the comments he made about coming
together and supporting our men and women who really toil in the
intelligence community. They toil tirelessly in the shadows for sake of
our Nation's security.
Today, we have heard complaints about our side being involved in
partisan politics when, in fact, we are just trying to debate an issue
that we disagree on; but I believe that certain parts of this amendment
deal with a lot of politics, and I think it is important when we deal
with the issue of politics that we then follow the facts because we
need to be bipartisan as it relates to intelligence.
The problem with this amendment, basically, is that the facts are as
follows: first, the cuts in the Intelligence budget began after the
first Bush administration. The first President Bush ordered a 17.5
across-the-board cut in intelligence staffing from 1991 to 1997.
Now, let us talk about the reasons for some of these cuts. It was the
end of the Cold War. The entire intelligence community was going
through a transition that we are still going through today. So let us
follow the facts.
House Republicans supported a 6 percent cut in President Clinton's
Intelligence budget by voice vote in 1992. The Republicans have
controlled the Congress in the last 10 years, which includes the purse
strings. In 1996, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense; the
gentleman from Florida (Mr.
[[Page H4850]]
Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and
Senator Warner were cosigners of the Brown-Rudman report calling for
further staffing reductions in intelligence, 3 years after the World
Trade Center bombing in 1993.
Senate Republicans cut $400 million from President Clinton's
Intelligence budget in 1998, and these cuts were later restored.
In 1999, President Clinton's CIA Director, George Tenet, secured the
largest single increase in intelligence funding in 15 years.
House Republicans increased President Clinton's fiscal year 2000
budget by just 1 percent.
From 1990 to 2003, overwhelming bipartisan majorities have supported
every intelligence budget by a roll call or voice vote.
I think we all recognize what this amendment really is. Let us get
back to national security, and let us get away from the politics.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Simmons), whose service
in the CIA has been unparalleled, and his service to his country is
unmatched.
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.
I rise in support of the amendment. As my colleague from Michigan
mentioned, I spent 10 years in the Central Intelligence Agency. For all
of those 10 years, I was a case officer. Five of those 10 years I
served abroad on what I feel are difficult and dangerous missions. We
have people today overseas serving under similarly difficult and
dangerous conditions.
The life of a CIA officer operating undercover overseas is not easy.
They are required to penetrate a host government, a terrorist
organization, or some other entity that may do harm to our Nation. Of
definition, you are going to be dealing with unsavory characters. Of
definition, you are going to have to do things that you would not
normally do to accomplish your mission.
This is stressful and this is dangerous, and so you can imagine what
it must be like to operate in this environment when the DCI in 1995
issues the Deutch Guidelines, where cumbersome legal impediments are
placed upon the clandestine operative in his or her effort to
accomplish their mission.
I think this resolution correctly points out some of the difficulties
that we have encountered over the last 3 years, and I would argue that
some of those difficulties were encountered on both sides of the aisle,
no question about it.
But I think it is also incumbent that we use this opportunity, this
Intelligence authorization bill to discuss some of these issues so the
American people better understand how regulations like the Deutch
regulations, which sound good on the surface, which restrict us from
dealing with unsavory characters, in fact, work to defeat the
fundamental mission of our intelligence men and women operating
undercover overseas.
I thank the gentleman for his amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to agree with the comments of the last speaker and commend his
service as part of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings great
expertise to this House, and I as one Member value it enormously.
He may not know that the Bremer Commission on which I served
recommended that the Deutch Guidelines not apply in the case of
recruitment of terrorist spies. We, too, found that, though well-
intended, and I believe they were well-intended, those guidelines
inhibited the aggressive recruitment of people who had the
qualifications to penetrate the worst terrorist organizations, which we
need them to do. Yes, these are unsavory characters, and yes, we need
them, provided that they are reasonably vetted so that we know that
they are reliable, but nonetheless, yes, we need them. I do not want to
be heard to be ambivalent about this at all.
A few years ago, our committee found that those guidelines had not
been rescinded; and on a bipartisan basis, we directed that the DCI
rescind them and replace them, and that was done at our direction. That
was one of our impressive bipartisan actions, and so I would just point
out that, while the language of this amendment commending our people in
the field who take risk on our behalf is excellent, the problem we are
having on this side is with the findings that very narrowly focus on a
very few years of history.
The history is longer, and let me say in the spirit of bipartisanship
that we all got it wrong after the Cold War. We all thought the world
would be more peaceful. We all thought there would be a peace dividend.
That is why the 41st President, President Bush, began to draw down both
the Defense and Intelligence budgets, anticipating a more peaceful
world, which obviously did not come to pass.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, well, I know that we like to have it both
ways around here, all of us do; but you cannot have it both ways. You
cannot come to the floor tonight and say that we are not doing enough
and then vote against this amendment.
This amendment says that in the 1990s we did not put enough money in.
You all know that. The cash cow when Clinton came into office was
Defense and Intelligence, and what he did was he took the cash cow and
he used the money for a lot of other things as all of you supported
over there.
So the idea that we are not doing enough but they did enough sort of
belies belief here, and what the gentleman's amendment talks about is
the fact that in the 1990s they took the cash cow, which was
Intelligence and Defense, emasculated it, drew it down as far as they
could and used it on a lot of other things. These charts prove that.
Then the idea that the former head of the CIA, President Herbert
Walker Bush, did not do that, that is fiction, too. You all know that.
So you cannot come here and have it both ways. You cannot say you are
saying that the chairman did not put a good mark up here because he did
not fund fully the things that you want and yet during the 1990s they
did. You know what, it does not work that way, but I guess it does work
that way because you can come here and say anything you want; but the
facts are the facts.
The gentleman has a good amendment, and you all ought to be
supporting that.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much more time do we have?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 5
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) has 2\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California has the right to
close.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would just point out to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood)
that the findings section of this amendment claims there was a funding
reduction in the Intelligence budget of 11 percent between 1993 and
1995. This narrow period matches a period when President Clinton was in
office and Democrats still controlled the Congress.
{time} 1900
But the decline commenced in the first Bush administration, in 1990,
as the Soviet empire was collapsing. And the trend continued through
the 6-year period of Republican control of Congress until 9-11.
It is good that we have increased the budget. I hope everyone in this
House supports those increases. Certainly those of us on this side of
the debate are talking about full funding of counterterrorism, because
it turns out that the world was not more peaceful after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. The world was more dangerous, and all of us underestimated
the lethality of the threats we faced.
In hindsight, we all, over three administrations, should have done a
lot more. In foresight, hopefully together on a bipartisan basis, we
will.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murphy).
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the rhetoric of this debate is not without
its dangers. While this evening's discussion is ostensibly about the
intelligence reauthorization, and I welcome
[[Page H4851]]
the more temperate approach tonight has, on other days the vituperative
words here and also on the campaign trails, I believe, may have harmful
consequences that demand our attention.
We may be responsible for giving weapons of intelligence to the
terrorists themselves. In World War II, the Germans launched V2 rockets
towards England and waited to learn where they fell. Newspaper and
radio accounts of the damage could help the Nazis adjust their fire
accordingly.
Now, you do not have to be a psychologist to understand the behavior
of terrorists towards us is based upon the feedback they get from us.
Are they getting their ideas and marching orders from the evening news?
Politicians look to incite anger and blame over gas prices. Does this
lead to bombing of refineries?
Politicians raise doubt about Iraqi security strength. Is that why
they attack police barracks?
Politicians questioned if Iraqi leaders were ready to take over. Did
that contribute to assassinations of Iraqi leaders?
Politicians screamed about enemy prisoner abuse. Did that contribute
to the capture, torture, and decapitation of American citizens?
And politicians questioned if Americans could tolerate casualties of
our soldiers. Could that be encouraging attacks on our troops?
Terrorists watch the evening news for our reactions to their crimes,
listen to our speeches, listen for calls to run away, watch the polls,
and are emboldened by any sign we are weakening, and are thwarted by
signs we remain steadfast. We tell them where, how, and how severe to
strike next. Our intelligence is important here.
After U.S. politicians began to apply the words ``Vietnam'' and
``quagmire'' in Iraq, al Qaeda added the same words to their daily
lexicon.
Terrorists are looking for ways to sway public opinion. Look at
Madrid. And now the ultimate question before them is: How will a direct
attack on the U.S.A. affect our fall elections?
I believe these concerns are real. But even if only a remote chance
of a link, should we not stop, think, and ask where we must draw the
line.
And while we deliberate the intelligence bill tonight, let us stop
aiding the enemies of freedom through politicized debate here or on the
campaign trails. Unless we do, we risk having the blood of Americans on
our hands. I say support the amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on our side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 4
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) has \1/
2\ minute remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I would subscribe to the comments of the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Simmons), and I would like to point out the problem
with this amendment. It says it is the sense of Congress that the
intelligence community should be revitalized by investing in its
missions, people, and capabilities of the community. And, of course,
that the efforts of the men and women of the intelligence community
should be recognized and commended.
This is commendable. This is what we would like to do. But if you
read the findings of this, you find out what is really at play here. It
is a gratuitous swipe at an administration that has long been out of
office.
If, in fact, we want to revitalize the community by reinvesting in
its missions, we should be doing exactly what we have been talking
about today, funding counterterrorism at something more than 30 percent
of what the community, these people, say they need to carry out their
missions and the capabilities that they need. Yes, we should revitalize
by reinvesting. That is what we are asking to do today.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume just to clarify and point out that in fiscal year 1993,
President Bush requested a 4 percent increase, and the Democrat
Congress that year cut the request by 10 percent, effectively reducing
the funding by 5 percent from the 1992 appropriation.
I understand the politics of being a convert to intelligence. Thank
you. Let us stand together and say, okay, that time has gone, we are
going to move forward, we are going to stand with the intelligence
community.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I actually urge support of this. When
something bad is going to happen, we want to make sure that it is the
bad guys that get us and not the good guys. And we are concerned that
we have not, in our own country, focused enough on that subject.
I think this amendment helps the good guys and hurts the bad guys, so
I urge its support.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I do not think we have any further speakers on this amendment, but I
would like to enter into a dialogue with the amendment's sponsor to
suggest to him that we might agree by unanimous consent that the sense
of Congress in his resolution be the entire resolution.
We strike the findings, because our side feels that they are not
complete and that some of them may be misleading. And that, as I said,
on a bipartisan basis we all were wrong in 1990 when the wall came down
and we expected a more peaceful world.
Would the gentleman be amenable to striking the findings and having
his resolution be the Sense of Congress, as he has drafted it, which I
would predict would be adopted unanimously?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, facts are very stubborn things.
Given the sense of where the intelligence community is today, they are
beleaguered at every corner. For years, their hands were tied behind
their back. And now you have commissions coming out and say, gee, we
tied your hands and now we are faulting you for not being super heroes
and doing super work without the funding and resources.
I think it is accurate, and I think we should make that statement
that we all recognize those shortcomings of 1990s, but we will stand
with you today. It is an important commitment for the morale of the
intelligence officers in the field.
Ms. HARMAN. Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed
in that answer only because I think there is plenty of blame to go
around over three or four administrations and findings that made that
clear, I think, would be more helpful.
Let me reiterate my strong view, and the view of everyone that I can
imagine on our side, that we support the men and women of the
intelligence community. That is something I have said over and over and
over again in our committee briefings, hearings, and travels.
Everywhere we go around the globe, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) and I and others have traveled to places like Pyongyang, and
Baghdad and Kabul and Libya and elsewhere. We have always thanked the
men and women of the intelligence community with whom we have met.
I wish that this would have been drafted on a bipartisan basis with
what we would view as a fairer statement of findings over a longer
period of time. I think that that would do more honor to the capable
men and women who are now in harm's way. So I regrettably urge a ``no''
vote on this amendment.
Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, I stand in strong support of the Rogers
Amendment recognizing the vital, groundbreaking work of our
intelligence community.
As a former FBI special agent, I well understand the importance of
human intelligence gathering. The patriots of our intelligence
community are frequently unsung heroes, not receiving due credit for
their tireless efforts. Due to the nature of their work, they don't
make the headlines, but their work will continue to derail terrorist
activities and thus prevent headlines from being made.
Mr. Chairman, we're facing significant new threats in the post-Cold
War era, and certainly since September 11, 2001. New hot spots have
emerged throughout the world, and new havens for terrorists and their
supporters. The threats we encounter are no longer solely state-based,
and require new methods to combat them.
Unfortunately, changing our Cold War ways has not kept pace with
these new threats. It
[[Page H4852]]
has taken too long to reverse the Church Commission's outdated and
overreaching reforms that crippled our intelligence abilities,
restricting human intelligence and limiting people from getting out in
the field. The 2002 Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks confirmed
that the lack of reliable human sources in al Qaeda ``significantly
limited the [intelligence] community's ability to acquire intelligence
that could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks.''
While human intelligence can be the force multiplier in many
instances, our intelligence community has not received the funding or
the support it requires to conduct operations. Through the leadership
of Chairman Goss and others, we're continuing to work toward
revitalizing the community, giving our operatives what they need to
continue their work and respond to the new threats we face. Their work
stands at the center of our global war on terrorism.
I salute Mike Rogers for introducing this amendment to recognize the
dedication and importance of our intelligence community, and thank
Chairman Goss for crafting this authorization to meet our current and
future threats.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers)
will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House
Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ackerman
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Ackerman:
At the end of title III, insert the following new section:
SEC. 304. REPORTS ON PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO CURB PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TO FIGHT
TERRORISM.
(a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress classified
reports on the following matters:
(1) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan, or
individuals or entities in Pakistan, to acquire or transfer
weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, or
missile equipment and technology, to any other nation,
entity, or individual.
(2) The steps taken by the Government of Pakistan to combat
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
technologies.
(3) The steps taken by the Government of Pakistan to
safeguard nuclear weapons and related technologies in the
possession of the Government of Pakistan.
(4) The size of the stockpile of fissile material of the
Government of Pakistan and whether any additional fissile
material has been produced.
(5) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan to fight Al
Qaeda and the Taliban as well as to dismantle terrorist
networks operating inside of Pakistan.
(6) The efforts by the Government of Pakistan to establish
and strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan.
(b) Deadline for Submittal of Reports.--(1) The Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit the first report required
under subsection (a) not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(2) The Director shall submit subsequent reports required
under subsection (a) on April 1 of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
and 2009.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Weapons of mass destruction.--The term ``weapons of
mass destruction'' has the meaning given such term in section
1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996. (Public Law 104-201).
(3) Missile equipment and technology.--The term ``missile
equipment and technology'' has the meaning given such term in
section 74(a)(5) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2797c(a)(5)).
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686 the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Last year, Mr. Chairman, President Bush announced a 5-year, $3
billion aid package for Pakistan in return for Pakistan's continued
cooperation in the global war on terrorism. At that time, the
President, through his spokesman, said that Congress would be looking
closely at Pakistan's efforts on nuclear nonproliferation, on combating
al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups, and the
reestablishment of democracy.
Without question, Pakistani cooperation in the war on terrorism will
be key to our success. Yet since the President's announcement, the
media has been filled with reports of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan's nuclear
network, where it turns out two-thirds of the axis got their nuclear
technology and that Khan's agents tried to sell it to the other third.
In addition, there have been recent reports of uneven cooperation
from Pakistan with regard to terrorism generally, and al-Qaeda in
particular. These reports reach to the very heart of the
administration's justification for supporting Pakistan.
Lastly, I do not think anyone can credibly say that the so-called
referendum on General Musharraf's rule, or the parliamentary elections
held last year, were either fair or free. Real democratization in
Pakistan just does not seem to be high on General Musharraf's list, and
we must do much more than to pretend it is high on ours.
My amendment would require the Director of Central Intelligence to
issue a classified, that is classified report to the appropriate
committees of Congress regarding, one, the efforts of any Pakistani
entity or individuals to acquire or transfer weapons of mass
destruction and related technologies or missile equipment and
technology to any other nation, entity, or individual; two, Pakistan's
efforts to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them; three, Pakistani steps to ensure that their own
nuclear weapons are secure; four, Pakistani efforts to dismantle
terrorist networks operating inside Pakistan, including but not limited
to al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and, finally, five, Pakistani steps to
restore democracy.
The point, Mr. Chairman, of my amendment, is to help Members
establish, on a classified basis, some of the facts about Pakistan's
efforts and cooperation on all of these subjects. We will all be asked
to support substantial military and economic assistance to Pakistan
over the next several years, and I strongly support that proposition,
but I believe that Members should understand the whole picture as they
are being asked to approve this substantial assistance.
While I understand that executive agencies generally do not like
reporting requirements, we are a coequal part of government, and we
have to learn the facts and the truth, we have to authorize and
appropriate the money, and we must be informed. I have personally, as
well as others have personally, tried to get the information from the
administration, particularly regarding A.Q. Khan, and those efforts
have been rebuffed.
I do not believe my amendment would be unduly burdensome to the CIA,
since they are supposed to be following the events in Pakistan anyway.
I am merely asking that they put their information into some useful
form for Members.
Mr. Chairman, the administration has said repeatedly and properly
that weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that they may be
acquired by terrorists is the single biggest threat facing the United
States, and in Pakistan, we have the epicenter of both of those
threats. Our relationship with Pakistan is a complicated one and
presents the United States with one of its most difficult near-term
foreign policy challenges. I think the Members must make intelligent
decisions regarding Pakistan, and we should have as much information on
a classified basis as possible.
Mr. Chairman, I urge Members to support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, and I yield myself such
time as I may consume.
[[Page H4853]]
Mr. Chairman, I do not have huge heartburn over this at all, but I am
a little concerned on a couple of points.
The first is that Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in a very
delicate part of the world with this global war of terrorism. I think
it is important to remember that Pakistan's stability and continued
cooperation in the war on terror is of paramount importance to the
United States' national interest at this time, and we all know it.
Without Pakistan's help, the war on terror would be much more difficult
to fight and to win.
Anyone who doubts Pakistan's commitment need only see last week's
report that Pakistani forces killed one of the country's best known,
most wanted pro al-Qaeda militants, that would be Nek Mohammed, in a
missile strike. Pakistani security forces have killed or captured
dozens of al-Qaeda operatives since 9-11 and have sustained significant
casualties in so doing, and considered high-level casualties there,
too, I am sorry to say.
President Musharraf, moreover, is walking a political tightrope in
helping us, as all of us who have been in that country know, yet he
believes that the war on terror must be won, and is willing to take
significant political, and I would say personal risk on his part to do
it.
The stories about A.Q. Khan's proliferation exploits were not a
surprise to the intelligence community. This was an example of very
good work, and it is work that is continuing.
{time} 1915
The intelligence community and State Department are working
diligently, constructively, carefully and quietly on the sensitive
matters referred to in this amendment. The committees of jurisdiction
are being kept well informed about the status of things.
The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, I know the
motivation is good, but nevertheless this requires the Director of
Central Intelligence to report to eight congressional committees on
Pakistan's efforts to curb WMD proliferation, fight terrorism,
safeguard nuclear weapons, strengthen Pakistan's democratic
institutions, and disclose the size of Pakistan's fissile material
stockpile. Actually that is happening. I think that is all going on. I
do not have any problem reiterating it, but I am a little concerned the
amendment might be misconstrued by some, given the sensitive state of
affairs in the region; and frankly I do not think it is helpful to U.S.
interests.
As I say, I think much of the oversight noted in what he is trying to
accomplish is already being done by the committees of jurisdiction. As
I say, I do not have huge heartburn over this, but I am worried that it
could upset a delicate balance.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am glad that the gentleman does not
have heartburn. I appreciate his sentiments. Nobody is suggesting that
we oppose aid to Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time and commend him for this amendment and rise in support.
I do agree with Chairman Goss that our committee is already studying
these issues. I also agree with Chairman Goss that these are touchy
issues because we certainly want to communicate our strong support for
the Government of Pakistan which has, after all, been an ally of ours
in this very, very difficult global war on terror and which continues
to take major risks on our behalf. So, yes, that is true.
On the other hand, I believe it is important to run to ground key
questions, including the breadth and scope of the proliferation headed
by A.Q. Khan, the number of customers, the degree of cooperation with
other rogue states, and whether at any level there was complicity of
the Pakistani Government. These are tough questions, and I think that
what is requested in this amendment, which is a report on these
questions, will certainly burden the agencies. Yes, it will. On the
other hand, it will give us some answers that we need.
On balance, I think it is commendable that we focus additional
attention on the damage done with respect to proliferation around the
world by A.Q. Khan and his network and we recognize that there is a
place, I think the place is now, in our consideration of these issues
to get the clear answers we deserve.
I support this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed
in House Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Shays
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be read. It is short.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment will be read in full.
There was no objection.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Shays:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the Sense of Congress that the head of each element
of the intelligence community, including the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury
should make available upon a request from a committee of
Congress with jurisdiction over matters relating to the
Office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program of the United
Nations, any information and documents in the possession or
control of such element in connection with any investigation
of that Office by such a committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 686, the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Shays) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I obviously move the adoption of the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Ose).
Mr. OSE. I thank the gentleman from Connecticut for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, before you came to Congress doing business, were you
ever ripped off? Just plainly and simply ripped off? Mr. Chairman, this
oil-for-food program is a rip-off to trump any scheme or action
perpetrated on any member of any country anytime anywhere. This oil-
for-food program got hijacked, pure and simple.
The way it worked was, Iraq complained about not having enough money
to buy food or medicine for its people, so the United Nations frankly
in what turned out to be a moment of great generosity set up a program
whereby a limited amount of Iraqi oil could be brought to market and
sold to willing buyers for the purpose of generating revenue that Iraq
could then use through the United Nations to buy food and medicine for
its people.
Lo and behold, the grand bazaar of Baghdad turned out to be a rip-off
of all rip-offs. Saddam Hussein hijacked this program, arguably with
the knowledge beforehand of certain members of the United Nations staff
responsible for oversight to make sure this did not happen and lined
his pockets with up to $10 billion of surcharges and levies on this
program. Over the course of the oil-for-food program, $67 billion worth
of oil was sold. Half of that $67 billion in turn was used to purchase
food and medicine and other supplies for the benefit of the Iraqi
people. Keep in mind that under the United Nations resolution that set
this program up, the purpose of these oil sales was to provide food and
medicine to the starving and unhealthy population in Iraq.
However, let me tell my colleagues what the dictator of Baghdad
purchased for the people of Iraq in part. The people of Iraq were asked
to consume 1,500 ping-pong tables. They were provided with all sorts of
soft ice cream machines. They purchased overpriced dental chairs from
China. They even were able to acquire a warehouse full of undelivered
wheelchairs and cigarettes. They paid $2 billion for presidential
palaces. They bought 300 Mercedes-Benz sedans. They paid for a $200
million Olympic stadium. They bought limos. They even bought defective
ultrasound machines from Algeria to feed their people with.
The purpose of the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment is to
harness
[[Page H4854]]
the energies and talents of America's agencies to help us get to the
bottom of this. There is absolutely no rationale for allowing this kind
of a rip-off to occur. The gentleman from Connecticut's amendment
directs American agencies to cooperate with the different committees of
Congress to get to the bottom of this.
I would close, Mr. Chairman, by, in effect, pardon my phrase,
throwing back at the Secretary-General his words. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said, ``I want to get to the truth and I want to get to the
bottom of this.'' Mr. Chairman, we want the truth as well. We want some
answers. We want to know, what was the purpose of Cotecna in this
dynamic process? How come we had to send stuff through Jordan at
discounts of upwards of 67 percent to true value? How come we were able
to ship stuff through Syria for only a 33 percent discount? This thing
begs for an investigation. Interestingly enough, between Benon Sevan
and Kojo Annan and the people who were responsible for this, the future
holds answers that are just going to fascinate us all.
I urge adoption of this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Who claims time in opposition to the amendment?
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will
control the time on this side.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentlewoman from California is
recognized for 10 minutes.
There was no objection.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as a strong supporter of congressional oversight, I
believe that information should be readily available to those
congressional committees of jurisdiction conducting investigations,
including investigations of the U.N. oil-for-food program. Therefore, I
am happy to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Connecticut and feel it is very constructive.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), a member of our committee.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, one of the issues we have been
debating today is the issue of oversight with respect to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. I am a member of that committee, but
I am also a member of the Subcommittee on National Security of the
Committee on Government Reform of which the gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. Shays) is our chairman. I support this amendment. I find that the
gentleman from Connecticut is taking his responsibility for oversight
very seriously. Not only has he ruled and really been in charge of this
committee and trying to seek and follow the facts but he has gone to
Iraq. He has done his investigation. It is important that we follow the
facts and that we move forward because this oil-for-food program is a
rip-off. People were taken advantage of. Our citizens were taken
advantage of, as were the Iraqi citizens. We must follow this
investigation.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. OSE. The gentleman from Maryland is very accurate in terms of
talking about the oil-for-food program. I just want to highlight one
thing. Some of the revenues that were used in this program in effect
were used to buy food that had spoiled. We paid people to deliver food
under this program that was spoiled. And Saddam collected commissions
or levies or tariffs or something on it. We need to get to the bottom
of this. I cannot tell the gentleman how pleased I am to have both
sides interested in making this happen.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Reclaiming my time, there is also an issue of Mr.
Chalabi, who made allegations that he had evidence concerning this
issue. We had under oath certain representatives representing Mr.
Chalabi that were going to come forward with evidence. That did not
occur. It is important that we move forward in a bipartisan way and
follow the facts.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I
do not think I need to use the whole debate, particularly given the
gracious support of both sides of the aisle, the chairman of the full
committee and ranking member, and say that they have always been a
pleasure to work with. I thank the gentlewoman from California so much
for all the work that she does and the gentleman from Florida. The
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) has been a tremendous
supporter for our efforts. The gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) has
really brought out a lot in the hearing that we had.
We know that we could not allow the sanctions to deprive Iraqi
citizens of food and medicine. The problem was they did not get the
food they paid for and they did not get the medicines they paid for,
because Saddam Hussein was basically allowed to run the program with
the oversight of the U.N. that chose not to provide oversight,
particularly the Chinese and the Russians who did not believe that
there should even be sanctions and did not go out of their way to make
this system work.
So we had countries that knowingly allowed Saddam to rip off his own
people. He undersold oil and then got huge kickbacks, and he overpaid
for commodities and got huge kickbacks, $4.4 billion in the
overcharges, the surcharges for the oil and the kickbacks on
humanitarian purchases and an estimated $5.7 billion going through
Syria. The Syrians and the Russians and, frankly, the French were not
helpful in this process.
What I rejoice in was that this story was really outed by the free
press in Iraq. We all knew that this was a corrupt program; but what
happened was the Iraqi Governing Council, some in it, leaked
information to their now free press that printed the names of almost
300 people. Well over 200. They were high-ranking government officials
including, frankly, Kofi Annan's son allegedly involved, Benon Sevan in
charge of the program, and so we have now an investigation of the U.N.
But Mr. Volker will tell you, it is kind of like being in the Senate.
It is unanimous consent. He has to get the cooperation of everyone. He
does not have the ability to just say, I want this information. If I
don't get it we're going to subpoena it. So he is first looking at the
U.N. and what they are doing to try to, in my judgment, go carefully to
build credibility so he can go after what he thinks are more serious
problems. The bottom line is we need to encourage much more aggressive
activity on the part of the U.N. We can only do that if we get the
information, information from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and our criminal justice system. I want to also compliment
the Committee on International Relations. They are working so well with
our subcommittee and our subcommittee is working so well with them.
{time} 1930
We are trading information. There is more than any one committee can
do, and ultimately I think we will get to the truth of it. I just would
say that the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) was absolutely correct
when he said that this is one of the largest rip-offs to any country,
and it was a community rip-off by other nations. They allowed Saddam to
make billions of dollars at the expense of his own people.
And it really suggests why in some cases some countries may not have
been interested in our allowing the Iraqis to overthrow Saddam, getting
this information that will expose him. I think they all thought it
would just be quiet and that this program would continue ad infinitum.
I have spoken longer that I have chosen. I do not really have
anything else to say other than to thank my colleagues and to them on a
bipartisan basis we are going to get at the truth.
From its inception in 1996, the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program
(OFF) was susceptible to political manipulation and financial
corruption. Trusting Saddam Hussein to exercise sovereign control over
billions of dollars of oil sales and commodity purchases invited the
illicit premiums and kickback schemes now coming to light.
But much is still not known about the exact details of Oil-for-Food
transactions. That is one reason my Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations convened a hearing on
April 21st: to help pierce the veil of secrecy that still shrouds the
largest humanitarian aid effort in history.
This much we know: The Hussein regime reaped an estimated $10.1
billion from this
[[Page H4855]]
program: $5.7 in smuggled oil; $4.4 in oil surcharges and kickbacks on
humanitarian purchases through the Oil-for-Food Program. There is no
innocent explanation for this.
At the hearing, the Subcommittee heard the program, while successful
in many ways, was riddled with corruption and the independent efforts
of the Iraqis to investigate the fraud was being stifled by the
Coalition Provisional Authority.
We want the State Department, the CPA, the intelligence community,
and the U.N. to know there has to be a full accounting of all Oil-for-
Food transactions, even if that unaccustomed degree of transparency
embarrasses some members of the Security Council.
Two months ago, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan assured me he wants
to get to the bottom of this scandal and restore faith in the ability
of the U.N. to do its job. Subsequently, the Secretary General
appointed Paul Volcker to lead an independent panel to look into the
Oil-for-Food Program.
While Mr. Volcker brings expertise and prestige to the task, we are
concerned about the slow pace of the U.N. investigation. The Volcker
panel has just announced the hiring of senior staff. Nevertheless, they
continue to say an interim report, possibly this summer, will address
the conduct of U.N. employees and allegations about the Secretary
General's son involvement.
But we also need to know more than what just happened at the U.N. We
also need to know what happened at the U.S. Mission. We need to know
what our intelligence community knew and knows.
Many of the allegations are true, we just don't know which ones yet.
We should be long past asking whether something went wrong in OFF. It's
time to find out exactly what went wrong and who is responsible.
Our staff has been through the minutes of the U.N. ``661 Committee''
of Security Council members responsible for sanctions monitoring and
oversight of OFF. Those minutes tell a story of diplomatic obfuscation
and an obvious, purposeful unwillingness to acknowledge the program was
being corrupted. Questions about oil or commodity contracts were
dismissed as dubious media rumors beneath the dignity of the U.N. to
answer, while Saddam was given the undeserved benefit of every doubt.
We cannot ignore the profoundly serious allegations of malfeasance in
the Oil-for-Food Program. To do so would be to deny the Iraqi people
the accounting they deserve and leave the U.N. under an ominous cloud.
This is the Iraqi's money we're talking about, so the Iraqi Governing
Council and its successor should get cooperation from the CPA and the
State Department in conducting its inquiries.
In Iraq, and elsewhere, the world needs an impeccably clean,
transparent U.N. The dominant instrument of multilateral diplomacy
should embody our highest principles and aspirations, not
systematically sink to the lowest common denominator of political
profiteering.
This emerging scandal is a huge black mark against the United Nations
and only a prompt and thorough accounting, including punishment for any
found culpable, will restore U.N. credibility and integrity.
That is why it is critical to get to the bottom of the corruption. In
order to do that we need for the intelligence community to better
assist the Congress in its investigations.
Mr. Chairman, this Sense of Congress will help address the
difficulties many committees have had obtaining information and
documents--especially from the intelligence community--pertaining to
the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program. This amendment should reinforce the
importance Congress places on the Oil-for-Food investigations.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As I have stated earlier and others on our side have stated, we
support this amendment. We think congressional oversight matters.
Committees can make a big difference, and on a bipartisan basis we
think this amendment should be supported by the whole House.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays)
will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House
Report 108-561.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Kucinich
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Chairman. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
At the end of title III (page 11, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 304. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON EVIDENCE OF
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND AL-
QAEDA.
(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of the evidence of
any relationship, existing before September 11, 2001, between
the regime of Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, referenced in all
intelligence reporting of the Central Intelligence Agency,
including products, briefings and memoranda, distributed to
the White House and Congress.
(b) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General
shall submit to Congress a report on the audit conducted
under subsection (a).
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