[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 84 (Thursday, June 17, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6913-S6941]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 2400, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2400) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2005 for military activities for the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Services, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Reed amendment No. 3352, to increase the end strength for 
     Active-Duty personnel of the Army for fiscal year 2005 by 
     20,000 to 502,400.
       Warner amendment No. 3450 (to amendment No. 3352), to 
     provide for funding the increased number of Army Active-Duty 
     personnel out of fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Missouri, Mr. Bond, will be recognized to call up the 
Bond-Harkin amendment.


                           Amendment No. 3384

  Mr. WARNER. I wonder if the Senator will yield for a minute? The 
Senator from Missouri, perhaps the Senator from Iowa, could they advise 
the Senate with regard to your desire to make a change to the 
amendment? Has that been completed yet?
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I would advise the distinguished chairman of 
the committee that we have made a modification on this to change the 
offset to an across-the-board reduction in the DOE appropriations. 
Discussions are continuing with you. We would like to have the same 
treatment for these workers as the other workers who were described in 
the Bunning amendment.
  This is a work in progress. We do have an across-the-board offset in 
authorization for all DOE programs in this bill, but, obviously, we are 
going to have to continue to work with you and work in conference to 
make sure this is an effective, agreeable offset.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. I would say we will continue to work. At the 
moment, from the managers' perspective, at least this manager would 
have to take a close look at this.
  I hope in a short time we could establish a time agreement so we 
could move on with other matters.
  Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Iowa.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Missouri is 
recognized to offer his amendment under the previous order.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator from Missouri yield for a question?
  Mr. BOND. I am happy to yield to the distinguished minority whip.
  Mr. REID. I am wondering if the two proponents of this legislation, 
the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Missouri, would give us a 
general idea of how long they will speak on this?
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I believe we can have the discussions on the 
substance of amendment No. 3384 as we work with the managers on both 
sides and perhaps the Finance Committee to make sure we have the 
appropriate offset.
  The amendment I wish to address, and I know Senator Harkin and 
Senator Talent will address it, is the Energy Workers Special Exposure 
Cohort Designation Act of 2004, which I will be offering on behalf of 
myself, Senator Harkin, and Senator Talent.
  It will designate former nuclear production facilities in Missouri 
and Iowa as special exposure cohorts under the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. This was a very 
compassionate act designed to provide lump sum payments of $150,000 to 
people who had worked in the nuclear weapons production program from 
1942 to 1967--way before we understood the dangers of radiation--and 
who suffered very high levels of radiation and have now been diagnosed, 
suffered, and many have died from multiple cases of cancer.
  This problem was brought to my attention by Denise Brock, whose 
father had died while waiting for the bureaucracy to work through the 
steps set up under the program to qualify for that particular $150,000 
compensation.
  There are a very convoluted set of steps that have to be followed 
unless you are in a special cohort. There were four States that were 
designated as having needs that automatically qualified these workers.
  We have found upon research that the exposure to the workers in 
Missouri was in many instances the highest exposure in any place. My 
colleague and I have met with those workers. Eight workers came into my 
office with Ms. Brock last spring, in May. Since then, three of them 
have died. They had multiple cancers. A brave fellow that I met when I 
met with the group in St. Charles County several months ago, Jim 
Mitalski, wheelchair-bound because cancer was in his right foot, had at 
least three other cancers. I am sad to say he slipped into a coma 
yesterday. His doctors suggest this may be his final coma. He has not 
been compensated.
  The Mallinkrodt workers, who worked at the St. Louis downtown site 
from 1942 to 1958 and moved out to the Weldon Springs facility in St. 
Charles County, which operated until 1967, were exposed to levels of 
radionuclides and radioactive materials that were much greater than the 
current maximum allowable Federal standards. Many workers were exposed 
to 200 times the recommended levels of maximum exposure.
  The chief safety officer for the Atomic Energy Commission during the 
Mallinkrodt St. Louis operations described that as one of the two worst 
plants with respect to worker exposures. Workers were excreting in 
excess of a milligram of uranium per day, which caused kidney damage.
  A recent epidemiological survey found excess levels of nephritis 
kidney cancer from inhalation of uranium dust.
  The Department of Energy has admitted that those Mallinkrodt workers 
were subjected to risks and had their health endangered as a result of 
working with these highly radioactive materials.
  The Department of Energy reported that workers at the Weldon Springs 
feed materials plant handled plutonium and recycled uranium which were 
highly radioactive. NIOSH admits that the operation at the St. Louis 
downtown site consisted of intense periods of processing extremely high 
levels of radionuclides. The institute has virtually no personnel 
monitoring data for Mallinkrodt workers which would be necessary for 
them to reconstruct the dosages to make them qualify under the act. 
Under these circumstances, I believe simple justice and equity demands 
that we provide assistance for these severely ill workers and for their 
surviving families.

[[Page S6914]]

  This amendment would add the Mallinkrodt facilities, along with the 
Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, to the four existing special exposure 
cohort sites. These are sites where a group of employees with specific 
cancers who worked at specific nuclear facilities or participated under 
certain nuclear weapons tests and met other requirements are eligible 
for expedited compensation. This special exposure cohort designation 
would make the workers at these Missouri and Iowa sites eligible for 
the expedited compensation as opposed to requiring them to participate 
in the long, complex, and cumbersome bureaucratic process known as 
``dose reconstruction.'' They are faced with a situation where the 
bureaucrats are asking them to go back and help them reconstruct the 
dosages over 50 years ago--or more. They have no records. They are very 
sick people. They are dying of multiple cancers, the kinds of cancers 
and other problems caused by exposure to radioactivity. It is not 
feasible for them to go back and reconstruct. Without the records, we 
know that these people are seriously ill and are afflicted with all 
kinds of cancers. We, therefore, ask our colleagues if they will accept 
the amendment as we work to modify the offset.
  The total cost over 10 years for the people who worked in the 
Missouri and Iowa sites is expected to be $180 million. That is over 10 
years. Given the fact that these people are suffering from very serious 
cancers, I hope my colleagues will join Senator Harkin, Senator Talent, 
and me in saying these people badly need the assistance this 
designation will provide them.
  I will withhold submitting the amendment until we have further 
discussions with the managers to ascertain their desires and the 
appropriate offset. But offset or no, let me reemphasize to my 
colleagues that $180 million for people who are suffering mightily from 
multiple cancers is the least we can do to take care of the brave 
atomic workers who helped us develop the weapons that ended World War 
II and who are now paying every day with the suffering from the 
exposure to that radioactivity.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. TALENT. Madam President, I rise today in support of the Bond-
Harkin amendment. I am going to be brief because I think my colleague 
from Missouri has covered the ground. I imagine the Senator from Iowa 
will wish to speak further.
  I want to begin by recognizing the work they have both put into this 
amendment. My friend from Missouri has been a tiger in support of 
compensation for these employees. He was moved--as I was moved and as 
the Senator from Iowa was moved--by the unique claim these individuals 
have on justice. This is not some kind of giveaway, but it is just 
compensation that is owed to them for the sacrifices they made on 
behalf of this country. That is really what this amounts to.
  I was pleased to cosponsor this amendment. I am grateful to the 
Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Michigan for their attempts 
to work this out. I hope we can do that. I know they want to. I know 
they recognize the justice of the claims.
  We certainly understand the importance of doing this the right way. I 
just hope we can do this. At the end of the day, if we have to put it 
in without all of the t's crossed and the i's dotted and work on it in 
conference, I hope we can do that because we will have other 
opportunities further down the road in the Defense bill to tie up any 
loose ends which may exist. Certainly the Senators from Missouri and 
Iowa have worked in good faith, as I have, in trying to make this 
acceptable to the managers of the bill.
  In Missouri, an estimated 3,500 people worked at sites which handled 
and processed highly radioactive material. These workers were exposed--
and in most instances unknowingly--to dangerous levels of radiation. It 
is not necessarily important to blame people for that. Those were in 
many cases the early years of nuclear work and people just didn't know, 
and it was necessary to do this work. That is why, without trying to 
point fingers, Congress created the Energy Employees Occupational 
Illness Compensation Program Act--EEOICPA--of 2000, which was designed 
to provide these employees with the compensation they deserve.
  Unfortunately, the process, as any of us know who sit on the Armed 
Services Committee or on the Energy Committee--both of which I sit on--
is complex, it is disjointed, and in many cases outright mishandled. As 
a result, in Missouri, hundreds of claims have been filed by surviving 
individuals who have received not only no compensation but no progress 
in the processing of their claims. In many cases those individuals 
faced 200 times the dosage of radiation that would be considered 
acceptable today. We know that happened because we know the nature of 
the processes in which they were working, and we can see the illnesses 
they now have.
  That doesn't mean they can go back and reconstruct from worksheets 
that no longer exist--and which they wouldn't have access to anyway--
exactly what happened on a given day 50 or 60 years ago, which is the 
reason Senator Bond explained so lucidly we need a special exposure 
cohort, or an SEC, to expedite compensation for these employees. The 
amendment would simply allow these employees to be included in an SEC. 
They already exist for employees in other States.
  An SEC is a group of employees with specific cancers who worked at 
specific nuclear facilities or who meet other requirements under the 
act. The designation would provide former employees at the site with 
expedited compensation for going through the lengthy and oftentimes 
impossible process of dose reconstruction.
  I could go on. I know the bill handlers want to get the bill 
finished. The program so far has one of the most abysmal records of 
performance which I have witnessed in my now 10 years in the Congress 
on one side of the Capitol or the other. As the Department of Energy 
and the Department of Labor create bureaucratic paperwork burdens for 
sick former employees, this amendment, which would remove the barrier 
of dose reconstruction for those cases, is a small step forward toward 
giving them the justice which they so clearly deserve.
  I believe workers in Missouri and Iowa ought to qualify for inclusion 
in the SEC.
  It is a pleasure for me to cosponsor this amendment. I hope we can 
work out the issues that remain surrounding it and get it included in 
the bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, my colleague, Senator Bond from 
Missouri, and I are on the floor today to basically work with the 
committee to do the right thing. We are here to simply add former 
atomic workers, nuclear workers, who worked in our ammunition plants in 
Missouri and Iowa, to a group of workers who are already eligible for 
special compensation.
  This category is already in effect for workers from Kentucky, Ohio, 
Alaska, and Tennessee. But since the original legislation was passed in 
2000, we have learned a great deal more about the facilities in Iowa 
and Missouri which makes it necessary to include these workers as well.
  I spoke at length on this issue yesterday on the floor. I will not go 
over those again. I want to make a couple of brief points today.
  In Iowa, between 1947 and 1975, almost 4,000 people were employed 
handling nuclear weapons. So great was the secrecy that 5 and a half 
years later we still don't know exactly to what the workers were 
exposed.
  At the time the bill passed in 2000, Congress recognized that there 
were likely to be more situations where it was simply not feasible to 
reconstruct workers' doses because the records don't exist, or they are 
inadequate, because it might take so long to reconstruct a dose for a 
group of workers that they would all be dead before we would have an 
answer to determine their eligibility. That is precisely the situation 
we find ourselves in in Iowa, and the workers also find themselves in 
in Missouri.
  Speaking just about the Iowa facility, the Army ammunition facility 
in

[[Page S6915]]

Burlington was in operation from 1947 to 1975. The people who worked 
there and who are still alive today are elderly. Many are sick and many 
have cancers. They are ill and they are dying. Yet almost 4 years into 
this program, only 38 Iowans have received compensation. That is 
because after 3 years of hard work by researchers at the University of 
Iowa, and at the same time by the National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health, we have learned that Iowa has the worst records 
documenting worker exposure to radioactivity of any facility in the 
country. Without good documents, you simply cannot do good dose 
reconstruction.
  When Congress passed this law, they explicitly said workers could be 
added to a cohort when the records didn't exist to make it feasible to 
do dose reconstruction. Now, NIOSH has concluded that there are no 
records anywhere that document the level of internal radiation 
exposures to which workers at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant were 
exposed. None, no records.
  With regard to external doses, up until 1968, the highest percent of 
the DOE employees who were monitored was 7 percent, or 23 workers out 
of a workforce of 800.
  It is time to admit that both in Iowa and Missouri we have two sites 
where it simply is not possible to perform dose reconstruction. The 
Government simply doesn't know what went on at these facilities and to 
what the workers were exposed. That makes it impossible to do timely 
dose reconstruction.

  Some may say the law provides for people to be added to a cohort 
administratively. Well, 10 days ago, after 3\1/2\ years of waiting, the 
Department of Health and Human Services issued a rule setting out the 
procedure. This only occurred as a result of congressional pressure. 
The process set out under the rule is likely to take several more years 
because there are no statutory deadlines that must be met.
  So the workers who worked there, who had high exposure to radioactive 
materials, who are sick and many have had multiple cancers, quite 
frankly, cannot wait any longer.
  We took an important step in fixing about half of this program 
yesterday with the Bunning amendment. Now it is time to finish the job 
and give the workers in Iowa and Missouri the same ability to be 
compensated as those workers in Kentucky, Ohio, Alaska, and Tennessee.
  Again, my colleague from Missouri has an amendment now that is being 
worked out. We hope it is going to be accepted once all of the T's are 
crossed and I's are dotted. Basically, it is an equity argument to make 
sure these workers will be treated fairly and in the same manner as 
workers who were exposed in other places.
  I have met with these workers, as Senator Bond has, and it just tears 
your heart out. These were patriotic individuals. I have talked to some 
of them who told me they were told what they did was top secret and 
they could not discuss it with anybody, not even their doctors. So 
years later, because they were patriotic, hard-working Americans, they 
never told anyone about the kind of work they did. In fact, I had to 
work with some of my colleagues a few years ago to get the Department 
of Defense to get them a written document that said it is OK for them 
now to talk about what they did. So, as a result of that, we are now 
getting a clearer picture of the kind of work these individuals did. 
They handled highly radioactive materials. Many times, they did not 
even wear dose badges. They had no idea what they were handling. When 
you listen to workers talk about how, when they worked, certain things 
would happen to them, such as the hairs on their arms and legs would 
stand up when they were getting near this material, they had no idea 
what it was.
  Sadly, many of them have already died. Sadly, many of them died at an 
early age and they left young children. Some of their kids who are 
alive today tell me about how their father died and how they had all 
these illnesses and sores and cancers. Many died when they were in 
their forties or early fifties. They had no idea it was because of the 
radiation exposure they had when they worked in those plants.
  I think it is time for us to do this, acknowledge their patriotic 
service, the work they did, the dangers they were exposed to and were 
never really told about. What Senator Bond and I are seeking to do is 
simply make this equitable. There is no reason why his workers in 
Missouri, or mine in Iowa, should be treated any differently than those 
in the four States I mentioned. I believe those in the four States 
should be compensated, too, and they have been. We thought ours were 
going to be compensated, but in the intervening 4 years, we found out 
that no records exist. So they cannot do the dose reconstruction. They 
have tried to get around it, but they cannot. So we are left on the 
floor of the Senate to make this equity argument in the hope the Senate 
will concur and allow us to move ahead in a way that, hopefully, before 
the year is out, we will be able to include these workers in this 
special cohort that will allow them to be compensated out of a fund 
that was established 4 years ago to compensate these workers. The fund 
still has, as I am told, plenty of money in it. So we are not actually 
spending any new money. We are simply adding some people to the fund to 
be compensated.
  I am hopeful we can get this all worked out and that we can accept 
this amendment and move ahead to adequately compensate and acknowledge 
the work these people did, at least in Iowa and Missouri. I thank my 
colleague, Senator Bond, for his leadership on this issue. I thank 
Senator Talent for his comments earlier.
  Madam President, I yield the floor, and I will be back when we have 
the amendment fully ready.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Washington.


                    Amendment No. 3427, As Modified

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I call up amendment No. 3427 and ask 
unanimous consent to have the amendment, which is at the desk, 
modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, and I do not intend to 
object, I think the managers are doing our very best to move along this 
morning. We have had a number of unexpected switches by a number of 
Senators who start amendments and stop them for various reasons. We are 
prepared now to go ahead with the amendment of the Senator from 
Washington. But I say to our colleagues, when they have informed the 
managers they are prepared to go ahead, and then abruptly have to stop, 
it makes it increasingly difficult for us to work on this bill.
  I thank the Democratic whip. He has been most helpful. We have lost a 
lot of time this morning due to unexpected decisions.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, if the Senator will yield, we on this side 
certainly understand the travails of the managers of this bill. Several 
days ago, we had written on our sheet ``voice vote.'' We thought the 
amendment of the Senator from Washington had been accepted. There were 
miscommuni- cations and, of course, that happens. It is certainly no 
fault of the Senator from Washington. She was ready several days ago, 
and we told her not to push it because we thought it would be accepted.
  Mr. WARNER. We will proceed with the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3427, as modified.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To facilitate the availability of child care for the children 
   of members of the Armed Forces on active duty in connection with 
         Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

[[Page S6916]]

     SEC. 653. CHILD CARE FOR CHILDREN OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES 
                   ON ACTIVE DUTY FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
                   OR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

       (a) Child Care for Children Without Access to Military 
     Child Care.--(1) In any case where the children of a covered 
     member of the Armed Forces are geographically dispersed and 
     do not have practical access to a military child development 
     center, the Secretary of Defense may, to the extent funds are 
     available for such purpose, provide such funds as are 
     necessary permit the member's family to secure access for 
     such children to State licensed child care and development 
     programs and activities in the private sector that are 
     similar in scope and quality to the child care and 
     development programs and activities the Secretary would 
     otherwise provide access to under subchapter II of chapter 88 
     of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable 
     provisions of law.
       (2) Funds may be provided under paragraph (1) in accordance 
     with the provisions of section 1798 of title 10, United 
     States Code, or by such other mechanism as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate.
       (3) The Secretary shall prescribe in regulations priorities 
     for the allocation of funds for the provision of access to 
     child care under paragraph (1) in circumstances where funds 
     are inadequate to provide all children described in that 
     paragraph with access to child care as described in that 
     paragraph.
       (b) Preservation of Services and Programs.--The Secretary 
     shall provide for the attendance and participation of 
     children in military child development centers and child care 
     and development programs and activities under subsection (a) 
     in a manner that preserves the scope and quality of child 
     care and development programs and activities otherwise 
     provided by the Secretary.
       (c) Funding.--Amounts otherwise available to the Department 
     of Defense and the military departments under this Act may be 
     available for purposes of providing access to child care 
     under subsection (a).
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``covered members of the Armed Forces'' means 
     members of the Armed Forces on active duty, including members 
     of the Reserves who are called or ordered to active duty 
     under a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) 
     of title 10, United States Code, for Operation Enduring 
     Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom.
       (2) The term ``military child development center'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 1800(1) of title 10, 
     United States Code.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, as my colleagues know, I have been 
working for several months on proposals to help ease the burden on 
Guard and Reserve families who have a loved one serving our country. 
Today, I am offering an amendment to help families get childcare so a 
parent can go back to work while their spouse is deployed overseas.
  This amendment applies to activated only, and it is discretionary. I 
want to make sure that is clear. I think there was a misunderstanding 
with regard to that issue. It is for activated soldiers, and it is 
discretionary. This will help relieve the childcare squeeze that is 
hurting so many families who are silently sacrificing for all of us.
  Hopefully, with the success of this amendment, the Senate will then 
have adopted several proposals to help our Guard and Reserve families 
get health care through TRICARE, pay for their equipment, help them 
stay on their payrolls through employer tax credits, and, today, with a 
critical piece on childcare.
  Each one of these steps is part of the much larger effort to help 
ease the burden on families who are trying so hard to make ends meet 
while their spouse serves our country overseas.
  Six months ago, on January 9, I sat down with members of the Guard's 
81st Armored Brigade and their families at Camp Murray in Fort Lewis, 
WA, and at that meeting Guard and Reserve members told me about the 
tremendous challenges their spouse and their children would face once 
they were deployed.
  I could see how worried and concerned they were that they would not 
have time to get their families on sound footing with a job, with 
childcare, and with health care before they deployed to Iraq. I 
listened closely to all of their concerns, and I spent several weeks 
crafting a bill to address a number of those issues.
  On February 12, I introduced S. 2068, the Guard and Reserve Enhanced 
Benefit Act. That is a comprehensive bill that will minimize the 
challenges at home when these brave men and women leave their jobs, 
leave their schools, and leave their families to protect our homeland 
and fight terrorism.
  Since that meeting back in January, many of the Guard and Reserve 
members with whom I met have now been deployed to Iraq. Currently, more 
than 5,400 brave Washington National Guard and Reserve soldiers have 
been activated, including 3,200 members of the 81st Armored Brigade who 
are serving in Iraq today. They are part of the more than 168,000 Guard 
and Reserve troops who have been called to active duty from States 
around the country.
  Our Washington Guard and Reserve troops are among the more than 
22,000 total troops from Washington State who are supporting Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
  As I have talked with family members since the deployment, I have 
learned a lot about the tremendous challenges they are facing. Today, I 
want to report back to them on the steps we have taken in the Senate to 
help ease their burden.
  I am proud that in the past month, the Senate has delivered on three 
of those challenges I outlined in my bill back in February. The first 
one we delivered on was health care. My bill proposed providing access 
to TRICARE for all members of the Guard and Reserve, and their 
families, regardless of their employment or insurance status. That is 
an issue that Senators Daschle, Reid, Graham, and others have been 
working very hard on over the years. I was a cosponsor of that TRICARE 
amendment. I voted for it on June 2, and I am very pleased that it 
passed the full Senate.
  Now we need the House of Representatives to agree that our citizen 
soldiers and their families deserve health care.
  Secondly, we made progress on another challenge: the strains facing 
those who employ Guard and Reserve members. My bill offered tax credits 
to employers to encourage their support of activated Guard and Reserve. 
It is something that Senator Kerry and Senator Landrieu have worked on. 
I was the original cosponsor of an amendment to provide a tax credit to 
employers who continue to pay active Reserve and Guard employees, and 
that passed the Senate with my support on May 11.
  Third, we have provided help for soldiers and families who had to 
provide equipment because the military did not provide it to them in a 
timely fashion. Back on October 17, on the Senate floor, I told the 
story of SPL Ian Willet, who was deployed to Iraq on his 21st birthday 
last September. His father David wrote to me and told me that Ian and 
his family will have to buy equipment that the military should have 
provided.

  This week in the Senate we did the right thing for soldiers such as 
SPL Ian Willet and his family. On Monday, I voted for an amendment 
directing the Secretary of Defense to provide reimbursement to soldiers 
who face this hardship. I was proud to be a cosponsor of the Dodd 
amendment that passed this body by an overwhelming margin.
  Today, the Senate has the opportunity to pass the Murray childcare 
amendment, and that will be another important and critical step forward 
for families who are sacrificing for all of us.
  I have raised these issues time and again on the Senate floor because 
I believe if the American people are told about the silent sacrifices 
that so many families are making, they will demand that we do more.
  President Bush is visiting Fort Lewis in my State tomorrow, and I 
hope during his visit he shines a bright light on the sacrifices that 
families are making while their loved ones serve our country overseas. 
I think it is critical that he hears directly from these families, as I 
have, about the burdens our Guard and Reserve are facing today. It is 
important that he support the steps we have taken in the Senate to help 
those families with health care, payroll, equipment, and, today, 
childcare. I hope the President will make it clear to those in the 
House of Representatives that the support we provided in the Senate 
cannot be removed from the Defense bill in the dark of night.
  One critical support we need to take care of is this amendment on 
childcare that I am offering today. I offer this amendment in honor of 
all the Guard and Reserve troops who are sacrificing for us overseas, 
and I offer this amendment in honor of their spouses and their children 
who are sacrificing so much for us at home.
  Let me explain why childcare is such a challenge for many of our 
military families. Often when a member of the Guard or Reserve is 
deployed overseas,

[[Page S6917]]

the remaining spouse has to go to work to support the family and to 
make up for the income their spouse has given up because of their 
military service. Unfortunately today, as we all know, high-quality 
childcare is very expensive and often out of reach of a single parent.
  In addition, many Guard and Reserve families do not live anywhere 
near a military installation, so they cannot use the services that are 
available.
  I will tell my colleagues about a Washington wife and a mother whose 
life was turned upside down when her husband was called to active duty. 
Danielle and Jack Lucas have three children. They worked opposite 
shifts to avoid the cost of daycare. In February, Jack was told to 
report to the 81st Armored Brigade at Fort Lewis. Danielle scrambled to 
figure out how to keep her job and care for her children, including a 
newborn. Unfortunately, as so many of us find, the cost of daycare was 
prohibitive and she was forced to quit her job, after 10 years of work, 
when her husband was deployed.
  Jack's monthly military pay was $1,000 less than his civilian job. So 
when it became impossible to make ends meet, Danielle moved to another 
part of my State where rent was less expensive. She has now gone back 
to work, but the cost of daycare is still not affordable. She juggles 
today with help from her family and her friends to watch her three 
children, and she often has as many as three different people watching 
her children in one 8-hour period.

  While SPL Jack Lucas is taking the same risks as all Active-Duty 
soldiers in Iraq, his family has faced emotional and financial turmoil 
that will be alleviated with the Murray amendment. We cannot continue 
to ignore the needs of our Guard and Reserve families.
  Unfortunately, Danielle's situation is not an isolated case. When MAJ 
Jake Callahan was called back to duty, his wife Kathleen and two small 
children were suddenly faced with a childcare dilemma. Kathleen's job 
requires her to travel and attend work events on weekends and evenings, 
but her son has special needs, and the cost of childcare is financially 
out of the question. Kathleen struggles with the stress of abandoning 
her career now or continuing to rely heavily on her family for 
childcare.
  Kathleen is not alone. Lisa Palmer made the difficult decision to 
quit her job as a registered nurse when her husband was deployed to 
Iraq with the 81st Armored Brigade. After her husband was deployed, her 
two sons began experiencing severe emotional problems due to their 
father's departure. Lisa believed it was important for one parent to be 
at home to help her sons through these challenges. Her son's 
depression, his nightmares, his overwhelming sadness require constant 
assurance and support by her. Lisa has now started to work part time at 
the hospital to help lessen the tremendous financial strain of their 
greatly reduced family income. However, like Danielle and Kathleen, 
Lisa is only able to do so by leaning heavily on her family and friends 
to provide childcare.
  All three of these women tell me they honestly do not know how they 
are going to make it through until their husbands return home. The 
current support system for our deployed and activated Guard and Reserve 
families is broken. We need a fix to keep our families strong while 
their spouses serve our Nation. Unless we soften the tremendous burdens 
they face, we may have trouble retaining the soldiers we have and 
recruiting the new soldiers we need.
  This amendment is about easing the burden on those who serve us 
today, recognizing that we ask more of them so we need to provide them 
with more support, ensuring that we can recruit and retain our Guard 
and Reserve members for our future security.
  I have heard some of my colleagues argue that some of these Guard and 
Reserve proposals are too expensive. We may hear that claim again 
today. But I think we need to look at the costs of abandoning these 
families who are serving. We need to look at how much pain it causes 
them. I have talked with these families. They are trying to serve our 
country honorably, but they cannot do it when they are so worried about 
how they are going to keep their children safe and secure while they 
work to keep their families financially capable. We need to look at how 
this issue threatens our ability to recruit and retain the voluntary 
military we need to protect us.
  We are spending $5 billion a month on the war in Iraq, and virtually 
all of this spending goes right to the deficit that our grandchildren 
are going to inherit. Supporting our Guard and Reserve families is not 
cheap but we need to do it if we still want to have a Guard and Reserve 
system after all of these long, extended deployments. These families 
are part of our war effort. They are part of the war on terrorism. They 
are part of the war in Iraq. They are part of our homeland security 
efforts.
  All of our military families are sacrificing today. Our Guard and 
Reserve troops are doing the right thing. They are meeting their 
obligations. They are protecting our people and they are serving our 
country with honor.
  We have to acknowledge that our unprecedented deployment of Guard and 
Reserve Forces is creating tremendous new hardships that we have not 
had to deal with before. The amendment before the Senate now gives us 
the opportunity to do the right thing for these families and for the 
loved ones who are serving. We are asking so much of our Guard and 
Reserve members and their families. We have an obligation to make it 
easier for their spouses and their children during these long 
deployments.
  The Murray childcare amendment and the other steps we have taken tell 
our Guard and Reserve soldiers that they can serve our country 
overseas, even on long deployments, and know their families will be 
financially secure and they will be able to get childcare and health 
care.
  So my message to our Guard and Reserve families is: We gave you 
access to health care through TRICARE. We made sure you were reimbursed 
if you had to buy protective equipment. We made sure employers can 
continue to keep your loved ones on the payroll by providing employer 
tax credits. Today, this body will assure you that you have an ease of 
mind when it comes to your children that you left behind, that they 
have the childcare that is so critical to the well-being of your 
family.
  We made progress. We have much more to do. We need to keep the 
pressure on to make sure when we get to conference behind closed doors 
these measures are not lost.
  There are several other elements of my original comprehensive bill 
that have not been addressed yet, but today I think it is extremely 
important that we adopt this amendment.
  The DOD is supportive of this amendment. It is for our activated 
soldiers. I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment today. I hope we 
can do it efficiently and quickly because I think we will send a strong 
message to those who are serving us so honorably overseas today.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend our colleague. This is a subject 
that certainly will be approached in a very bipartisan way.
  I am wondering, do we have any procedural requirement on that family 
who needs childcare, to express some sort of need for it before it is 
automatically granted? Would the Secretary adopt regulations? I just 
ask the distinguished Presiding Officer if I may enter into a colloquy 
with our distinguished colleague on that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, this would allow the DOD Secretary of 
Defense to promulgate the process for the families to go through. It 
would be discretionary for him.
  Mr. WARNER. That is very helpful.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, of course.
  Mr. LEVIN. In the form of a question to the Senator from Washington, 
whose amendment fills in such a gap and really meets such an incredibly 
important need for childcare, but is it not true that in section 
(a)(3), the bottom of page 2, you do provide specifically:

       The Secretary shall prescribe in regulations priorities for 
     the allocation of funds for provision of access to child 
     care. . . .

  So the amendment itself does provide for those regulations to be 
adopted by the Secretary of Defense?
  Mrs. MURRAY. The Senator is absolutely correct. I think it is also 
important to point out there is no direct

[[Page S6918]]

spending. It simply authorizes the Secretary of Defense to help 
geographically dispersed Active-Duty military families.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank our colleague. I asked the question so as to make 
it a part of the record of the proceedings today. So often when 
Congress acts on an amendment such as this, which is so important to so 
many families, they suddenly hear from Washington, ``You got 
childcare.'' But I think we better put in a caution: Yes, childcare 
hopefully will be made available, but there has to be some showing of a 
requirement. Because it is my understanding the Department of Defense 
now has a number of childcare centers here in the Greater Washington 
area. Frankly, the adequacy is questionable. Some families do not have 
access to them. But those families, I point out, might not be able to 
meet the criteria in the opening section 1:

       In any case where the children of a covered member of the 
     Armed Forces are geographically dispersed. . . .

  Those families theoretically are not geographically dispersed, but 
they are caught in between the class that you are establishing and 
those who are near a major military installation here in Washington, 
yet there are inadequate childcare facilities.
  Those are the types of things that are going to have to be worked out 
should this become law.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, there is no doubt the childcare is an 
issue that is very difficult for many families, and to provide all this 
support for every family is something that will be extremely difficult. 
We all acknowledge that. But there is a specific group of families 
serving us overseas today in Iraq and Afghanistan who are absolutely 
excluded from any help whatsoever. My amendment assures that they are 
not excluded.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. We definitely want to care for those. Those 
families who are not serving overseas yet have been pulled up abruptly 
from Reserve or Guard status, yet where the husband or the wife--
whichever the case the uniform may be worn--is not deployed overseas, 
they may have a critical problem, too.
  Mrs. MURRAY. The amendment before us is in support of all activated 
personnel.
  Mr. WARNER. You make reference to those families overseas repeatedly. 
I just want to make sure about some of those at home.
  Mrs. MURRAY. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. On the basis of that, we are prepared to accept the 
amendment on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me first commend the Senator from 
Washington. She has been tenacious, absolutely determined to provide 
childcare for military personnel. She has devised this amendment to 
take care of the ones who are currently employed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, because their families surely are the ones who, first and 
foremost, we have to try to take care of, where they have no other 
alternative on base because they are geographically dispersed.
  This amendment provides funds for childcare for members of the Armed 
Forces who do not have access to military childcare programs because 
they are geographically dispersed and there is no military childcare 
program available to them. These will mainly be Guard and Reserve 
people but not exclusively. There may be families of Active-Duty people 
who are normally on active duty, who because their loved one is now in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, for instance, take the family back home and who 
also will have access to childcare because of this amendment.
  It is discretionary spending. I note the Department of Defense 
supports this amendment. It seems to me the fact that the Senator from 
Washington was able to work with the Department of Defense to actually 
obtain their support for her amendment is a notable success for which 
she is entitled to the commendation of this body and the thanks of this 
Nation.
  I hope this amendment will be adopted by the Senate. I do not know if 
a rollcall is necessary. If it is, I hope we strongly support this 
amendment, and I commend Senator Murray for her tenacity and for the 
sensitivity which she shows in so many issues, but in this case on the 
childcare needs of this country.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have indicated that colleagues on this 
side of the aisle are very anxious to work to make this childcare 
available subject to the availability of funds, as the amendment 
states. We are prepared to move on, make it totally bipartisan, and 
voice-vote this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, without objection the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3427) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are prepared to proceed with the 
amendment on important aspects of missile defense by our colleague from 
California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3368

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3368.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3368.

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To allow deployment of the ground-based midcourse defense 
element of the national ballistic missile defense system only after the 
   mission-related capabilities of the system have been confirmed by 
                    operationally realistic testing)

       On page 33, after line 25, insert the following:

     SEC. 224. LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE 
                   DEFENSE ELEMENT OF THE NATIONAL BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

       The ground-based midcourse defense element of the national 
     ballistic missile defense system may not be deployed for 
     initial defensive operations before the Secretary of Defense 
     certifies to Congress that the capabilities of the system to 
     perform its national ballistic missile defense missions have 
     been confirmed by operationally realistic testing of the 
     system.

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, we are going to face a series of 
amendments on the missile defense system, and I believe I have an 
amendment which I am surprised we even have to have a long debate about 
because it is so straightforward. It says let us not spend the money to 
deploy the system until it has been tested and until it has been 
certified as passing those tests by the one office that has the 
capability of doing it, which is the Office of Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation.
  We want to ensure that the ballistic missile defense system the 
President plans to deploy later this year has passed these tests.
  In 1983, Congress created the Office of the Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation--DOT&E. It is now headed by Mr. Thomas Christie.
  The Office of DOT&E was created under the ``fly before you buy'' law. 
``Fly before you buy'' makes a lot of sense for our taxpayers. Frankly, 
when it comes to defending our country, my goodness, how much more 
important can it be before we tell our people they are protected that 
we actually know they are protected and that the tests which have been 
done have been signed off on by the very office that has been created 
for that purpose?
  The office oversees the operational testing programs of all major 
military systems. Operational testing is intended to be as realistic as 
possible. This includes testing at night, testing in bad weather, using 
soldiers rather than contractors who have a special interest in the 
outcome of the test, and using expected enemy countermeasures.
  Let me repeat that. In order to have operational tests that you can 
trust, the testing has to be done under realistic circumstances. We 
don't know if our enemy is going to attack us on a beautiful, clear day 
with the wind blowing at a certain rate. The fact is, we need to test 
under the harshest conditions so that we know what we are deploying 
works. It must be a realistic test. Most importantly, the tests must be 
conducted by the Office of DOT&E--

[[Page S6919]]

the program that is developing the weapons system.
  I am sure you are going to hear people stand up and fight against 
this amendment.
  I have to tell you that if you really look at the facts, they do not 
have them on this side. If I were to ask one of my constituents, who 
knew nothing about this at all, who they would rather have testing our 
military systems to make sure they work, the contractor, who has an 
economic interest in it; the program director, who has an economic 
interest in getting the program funded; or basically an independent 
office that was set up by Congress, the Office of Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, I think the answer would be clear. 
People would want an objective test.
  My amendment requires that the Secretary of Defense confirm that the 
ground-based, midcourse missile defense system has passed these 
operational tests prior to deployment for initial defensive operations. 
It is very simple--fly before you buy, test before you deploy, common 
sense, following the wishes of Congress that knew this was a problem 
when we set up that office.
  Here is why it is important. This amendment is important because the 
current plan of the Missile Defense Agency does not include any 
operational testing at any time in the foreseeable future.
  Let me say that again. The current plan of the Missile Defense Agency 
does not include any operational testing at any time in the foreseeable 
future. And this statement I just made has been confirmed by the Office 
of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

  Imagine: We are about to spend $10 billion on this program. It is the 
biggest program in the defense budget, as I understand it, and we are 
going to deploy without operational testing.
  On December 17, 2002, President Bush announced that the United States 
will declare a midcourse ballistic missile defense system ready for 
defense operations at the end of the year. That is interesting. He 
declared and announced that we would be ready to deploy before the 
system was tested. He should say: Assuming it passes the tests by the 
appropriate evaluation agency, which is DOT&E. But he didn't say that. 
The Pentagon's current plan is to deploy the first interceptor missile 
in late July, and before the system becomes operational by the end of 
September when five interceptors are in place at Fort Greeley, AK. The 
Missile Defense Agency hopes to have a total of 10 interceptor missiles 
in place by the end of January 5 at both Fort Greeley and Vandenberg 
Air Force Base in California.
  They are moving ahead without any operational testing done by the 
office that was created to do this.
  This plan that I described to you, known as Block 2004, will 
eventually result in the deployment of 20 missile interceptors by the 
end of next year.
  There is a serious problem here. We have no way of knowing that these 
interceptor missiles will actually be able to protect us from an 
incoming ballistic missile attack. The system President Bush is 
deploying has been tested eight times--not by the Director of the 
Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, it has been tested by the 
DOD. The contractor was involved in those tests, and the program 
director was involved in those tests of the Missile Defense Agency, but 
not the office that has been created to be the objective tester. The 
tests were conducted, again, by the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency 
in cooperation with the contractor--not the DOT&E.
  These tests were highly scripted. They occurred in an unrealistic 
test environment, and only five of the eight were successful.
  Here is the GAO report.
  The date is April of 2004. This is a relatively new report. In this 
report, the GAO criticizes the administration's plan, saying:

       as a result of testing shortfalls and the limited time 
     available to test the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] 
     being fielded, system effectiveness will be largely unproven 
     when the initial capability goes on alert at the end of 
     September 2004.

  That is when the initial five missiles will be deployed.
  This report from the General Accounting Office, which is the 
investigative arm of the Congress, goes on to say:

       the Missile Defense Agency predicts with confidence that 
     the September 2004 defensive capability will provide 
     protection of the United States against limited attacks from 
     Northeast Asia. However, testing in 2003 did little to 
     demonstrate the predicted effectiveness of the system's 
     capability to defeat ballistic missiles as an integrated 
     system.

  And from the GAO, who we pay a lot of money to, to advise us, they go 
on to say:

       None of the components of the defensive capability have yet 
     to be flight tested in their fielded configuration (i.e., 
     using production-representative hardware).

  My friends, the GAO has essentially exposed the fact that the 
President plans a ``Wizard of Oz'' defense. We have seen the Wizard of 
Oz. That Wizard of Oz was scary, but when you pull back the curtain, it 
was just some little guy.
  I want to see a successful missile defense system. I want to see it 
work. Ever since I have been in Congress, I have been voting 
continually for research, research, so we have one system in place that 
works. It would be the greatest to have. We may eventually have it. I 
hope to God we do. I am from California. I want a missile defense 
system. I am worried. I am just as worried, however, that if we tell 
our people they are defended and we do not have objective testing 
behind it, it will be a very hard blow to people and a waste of money 
that, God knows, we need in other areas of the military and in other 
ways to defend our people from the suitcase bomb or an attack on a 
nuclear power plant, which we know the terrorists are looking at.
  The President's decision, in my view, before the testing is done, is 
a waste of our resources. The total amount requested for missile 
defense in 2005 is $10.2 billion, more than any other defense system in 
one year ever.
  To put this $10.2 billion in perspective, let me read the budgets of 
some of the programs in agencies critical to protecting us from the 
threat of terrorism. I have a chart listing what we spend in other 
areas that are key in our fight against terrorism.
  The entire missile defense system is $10.2 billion. That includes 
everything, research and everything else. I am talking about the 
deployment costs, which are about $3.7 billion of the $10 billion. This 
chart shows the $10.2 billion, which is the entire missile defense 
cost. The money we are talking about spending is $3.7 billion to deploy 
these 20 missiles.
  Look what we have spent on the other areas to protect our people. The 
customs and border protection is $6.2 billion. My colleague, Senator 
McCain, right now is holding a hearing--unfortunately I could not do it 
because I had to be here--on our problems at the border, protecting 
our borders from terrorism. The fact is, we need to spend more in high-
tech equipment to better protect our people from terrorists crossing 
the border. The total is $6.2 billion, compared to $10.2 billion on 
missile defense; Transportation security, $5.3 billion; Coast Guard, 
$7.4 billion; FEMA, $4.8 billion; Office of Domestic Preparedness, $3.5 
billion. This is what we are talking about spending on this 
deployment--$3.7 billion of the $10 billion--before it is operationally 
tested by the office that is supposed to do that.

  We know the customs and border protection is the front line in 
protecting the American public against terrorism. Transportation 
Security Administration--we all know what happened on 9/11; they are 
responsible for keeping our airlines safe but also our railroads and 
our ports secure--$5.3 billion, and we are going to spend $3.7 billion 
on an untested deployment? Coast Guard, $7.4 billion. Imagine that is 
what we spend on the Coast Guard, and they are right in the line of 
fire. I visit my Coast Guard ports all the time. They are the lead 
Federal agency in maritime safety. They are so important. We spend $7.4 
billion. And we are spending $10.2 billion on the entire missile 
defense and ready to toss out $3.7 billion of that in this initial 
deployment.
  All of FEMA, the lead agency for preparing us to respond to all 
domestic disasters, including acts of terrorism, $4.8 billion. We are 
about to spend $3.7 billion on an untested system, and we are spending 
$4.8 billion on FEMA.
  Office of Domestic Preparedness, $3.5 billion, which is less than we 
will spend on an untested system. They are the

[[Page S6920]]

lead agency responsible for preparing the Nation against terrorism by 
assisting States and local governments in preparing for terrorists 
acts.
  The Presiding Officer must hear the same things I hear at home from 
the police officers, from nurses, from the first responders, the 
firefighters. They are hurting. They need our help. Would it not be 
better at the moment now not to waste $3.7 billion on this initial 
deployment, if we have that extra funding, but to put it into the fight 
on terrorism?
  My amendment does not cut any money from this program. My amendment 
does not cut one dollar from the program. However, it says, do not 
spend the money until the system is operationally tested. We will have 
other attempts because other people will be taking out some funding. I 
do not touch the funding. All I say is, test it before you deploy it. 
If the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation comes back with a good 
report, then I say please deploy but not until that time.
  We are at war with al-Qaida and with terrorism. The only four nations 
that have ever successfully tested a nuclear capable intercontinental 
missile are Russia, France, Britain, and China. We are not at war with 
them.
  We will talk about Korea and Iran. There are fears, and I share the 
fears, that this technology could get into the hands of the wrong 
countries or somehow a terrorist could get his or her hands on one of 
these missiles. That is why I want to protect our country against the 
potential of this kind of a strike. However, I do not want a make-
believe system. I do not want a Wizard of Oz system.
  I want a system I can look my people in the eye and say: We spent 
$3.7 billion deploying the first aspects of this system, and we know it 
works. I think my people deserve to know that.
  When I was in the House, I was on the Armed Services Committee, and I 
worked very hard on procurement reforms. I enjoyed so much being on the 
Armed Services Committee in the House. I was there for years. We had 
some wonderful debates. What we found is: ``Fly before you buy'' is 
essential. And that is all we are saying. We want to know the system 
works. We want to be able to tell the people the system works. And, 
clearly, we should look at the threat we face.
  Now, the reason I am for this program, the reason I have voted for 
this program many times for research, is because I want to have a 
system that works. Why? North Korea. I am very fearful of North Korea. 
Although I believe we can try our best and do more to negotiate with 
them, there is no question I am worried about a potential missile 
system in North Korea.
  But here is the issue. We have a capability that is not talked about 
that much here, but the Pentagon's former Director of DOT&E, Philip 
Coyle, has said: We would never wait until North Korea has launched a 
missile attack. ``We'd blow it up on the ground.'' We have the 
capability to know when these missiles are being moved into place. Let 
me repeat what Philip Coyle said, the Pentagon's former Director of 
DOT&E:

       We would never wait until the thing was launched. We'd blow 
     it up on the ground.

  Now, I subscribe to that theory. I want to blow it up on the ground. 
I think Philip Coyle is right. With our capabilities, we could see any 
movement, and we would know. But wouldn't it be great to intercept a 
missile once it is in the air? Absolutely. If we could not destroy it 
before it was launched, definitely. But let's operationally test the 
system first, with the people who are hired to do this for the 
taxpayers.
  Now, let's hear what the Union of Concerned Scientists is saying. 
They are an independent nongovernmental organization. They released an 
analysis of the President's plan to deploy a missile defense system. 
Let me read you two of their findings:

       The Block 2004 missile defense will have no demonstrated 
     capability to defend against a real attack since all flight 
     intercept tests have been conducted under highly scripted 
     conditions with the defense given advance information about 
     the attack details.

  Now, do we think our enemies are going to place a call to us and say 
here is what we are going to do; here is what time we are going to do 
it; here is the weather we are going to do it in; here is the day? No. 
The fact is, we have not realistically tested this system.
  This is what the Union of Concerned Scientists says:

       Unsophisticated countermeasures that could readily be 
     implemented by countries such as North Korea remain an 
     unsolved problem for mid-course defenses against long-range 
     missiles.

  So they are calling our countermeasures that we are using 
unsophisticated. It is a problem. This means that any country able to 
launch an ICBM is also capable of using countermeasures to fool our 
interceptors.
  The Union of Concerned Scientists report ends with their 
recommendation that the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency should:

       [H]alt its deployment of the Block 20O4 Ground-based Mid-
     course Defense system and Congress should require MDA to 
     conduct operationally realistic testing of the system before 
     it is deployed.

  I thank the Union of Concerned Scientists because it was their very 
clear writing that led me to this amendment. In addition, common sense 
led me to this amendment. In addition, many former generals who have 
spoken out on this led me to this amendment. I agree with the 
scientists. That is why my amendment says that before we declare the 
system operational, we should know that it has been tested in a 
realistic manner.
  I want to show you the list of 49 generals who have written on this 
issue. I say to the Presiding Officer, I think you would find this very 
interesting. This is a list of 49 generals and admirals who call for 
missile defense postponement because they do not believe the testing is 
adequate.
  In a recent statement these 49 generals and admirals have written to 
President Bush asking that the deployment of a ground-based midcourse 
missile defense system be postponed. Their letter points out that the 
Pentagon has waived the operational testing requirements that are 
essential to determining whether this highly complex system of systems 
is effective and suitable.
  The last paragraph of their letter sums up the concerns of these 
generals and admirals:

       As you have said, Mr. President, our highest priority is to 
     prevent terrorists from acquiring and deploying weapons of 
     mass destruction. We agree. We therefore recommend, as the 
     militarily responsible course of action--

  The militarily responsible course of action--

     that you postpone operational deployment of the expensive and 
     untested GMD system and transfer the associated funding to 
     accelerated programs to secure the multitude of facilities 
     containing nuclear weapons and materials and to protect our 
     ports and borders against terrorists who may attempt to 
     smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
this letter signed by 49 retired generals and admirals.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   March 26, 2004.
     President George W. Bush,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: In December 2002, you ordered the 
     deployment of a ground-based strategic mid-course ballistic 
     missile defense (GMD) capability, now scheduled to become 
     operational before the end of September 2004. You explained 
     that its purpose is to defend our nation against rogue states 
     that may attack us with a single or a limited number of 
     ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.
       To meet this deployment deadline, the Pentagon has waived 
     the operational testing requirements that are essential to 
     determining whether or not this highly complex system of 
     systems is effective and suitable. The Defense Department's 
     Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated on March 
     11, 2004, that operational testing is not in the plan ``for 
     the foreseeable future.'' Moreover, the General Accounting 
     Office pointed out in a recent report that only two of 10 
     critical technologies of the GMD system components have been 
     verified as workable by adequate developmental testing.
       Another important consideration is balancing the high costs 
     of missile defense with funding allocated to other national 
     security programs. Since President Reagan's strategic defense 
     initiative speech in March 1983, a conservative estimate of 
     about $130 billion, not adjusted upward for inflation, has 
     been spent on missile defense, much of it on GMD. Your Fiscal 
     Year 2005 budget for missile defense is $10.2 billion, with 
     $3.7 billion allocated to GMD. Some $53 billion is programmed 
     for missile defense over the next five years, with much more 
     to follow. Deploying a highly complex weapons system

[[Page S6921]]

     prior to testing it adequately can increase costs 
     significantly.
       U.S. technology, already deployed, can pinpoint the source 
     of a ballistic missile launch. It is, therefore, highly 
     unlikely that any state would dare to attack the U.S. or 
     allow a terrorist to do so from its territory with a missile 
     armed with a weapon of mass destruction, thereby risking 
     annihilation from a devastating U.S. retaliatory strike.
       As you have said, Mr. President, our highest priority is to 
     prevent terrorists from acquiring and employing weapons of 
     mass destruction. We agree. We therefore recommend, as the 
     militarily responsible course of action, that you postpone 
     operational deployment of the expensive and untested GMD 
     system and transfer the associated funding to accelerated 
     programs to secure the multitude of facilities containing 
     nuclear weapons and materials and to protect our ports and 
     borders against terrorists who may attempt to smuggle weapons 
     of mass destruction into the United States.

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, the admirals and generals are essentially 
asking to take that money, that $3.7 billion, out of the $10 billion, 
and divert it to other programs. I am not doing that. I am simply 
fencing the money and saying: You can spend it when the tests pass. So 
they are really asking more than I am doing.
  The people who wrote this letter are some of our most distinguished 
military men and women. I am going to read the names of these generals 
and admirals:
  ADM William J. Crowe, United States Navy, Retired; GEN Alfred G. 
Hansen, United States Air Force, Retired; GEN Joseph Hoar, U.S. Marine 
Corps, Retired; LTG Henry E. Emerson, Army, Retired; LTG Robert Gard, 
Jr., Army, Retired; VADM Carl Hanson, Navy, Retired; LTG James 
Hollingsworth, Army, Retired; LTG Arlen Jameson, Air Force, Retired; 
LTG Robert Kelley, Air Force, Retired; LTG John Kjellstrom, Army, 
Retired; LTG Dennis McAuliffe, Army, retired;--they are all retired, so 
I will not continue to say that--LTG Charles P. Otstott, Army; LTG 
Thomas Rienzi, Army; VADM John Shanahan, Navy; LTG Dewitt Smith, Jr., 
Army; LTG Horace G. Taylor, Army; LTG James Thompson, Army; LTG 
Alexander Weyand, Army; MG Robert Appleby, Army.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator from California yield for a question?
  Mrs. BOXER. Yes.
  Mr. REID. I have spoken to the two managers. Senator Levin wants to 
speak in support of your amendment for 5 minutes. They want 25 minutes 
to respond to your statement.
  Mrs. BOXER. Sure.
  Mr. REID. We would like to set a vote for around 12:30.
  Mrs. BOXER. OK.
  Mr. REID. Which is 40 minutes from now.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, and no second degrees prior to the vote.
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mrs. BOXER. I am happy to take another 7, 8 minutes and then finish.
  Mr. WARNER. That runs us into about 35 minutes on your time.
  Mrs. BOXER. I will finish in 5 minutes.
  Mr. REID. Yes. Senator Boxer will speak for 5 minutes. He will speak 
for 5 minutes. That will give you 40 minutes and will be about evenly 
balanced.

  I ask unanimous consent that on the pending Boxer amendment, there be 
10 minutes left on the proponents' side, 5 minutes for Senator Boxer, 
and 5 minutes for Senator Levin, and the remaining time be under the 
control of Senator Warner, and that there be a vote at 12:30 with no 
second-degree amendments prior to the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, could we state no later 
than 12:30? We may be yielding back time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator so modify his request.
  Mr. REID. Yes, and that Senator Boxer could have 1 minute prior to 
the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. We will take on this side equal time with 1 minute prior 
to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. May I ask the Senator, I do get a vote on this?
  Mr. REID. Yes, at 12:30.
  Mrs. BOXER. The reason I am reading these names is because these are 
names we know. These are our heroes: Major General Appleby, Major 
General Boatner, Major General Bradshaw, Major General Brady, Major 
General Burns, Rear Admiral Center, Major General Crawford, Major 
General Edmonds, Rear Admiral Elliot, Major General Faith, Rear Admiral 
Gormley, Major General Griffitts, Rear Admiral Grojean, Major General 
Haddock, Major General Holbein, Major General Hyman, Major General 
Jackson, Major General Lawson, Major General Luchsinger, Major General 
LeCleir, Major General Willoughby, Brigadier General Cannon, Brigadier 
General Costa, Brigadier General Cowan, Brigadier General Foote, 
Brigadier General Forney, Brigadier General Grubbs, Brigadier General 
Hastings, Brigadier General Johns, Brigadier General Roush.
  This is not easy for these people to come out here now and do this. 
They believe, as I do, and as I hope colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle feel--and I don't know what will happen with this--that with all 
of the threats we face today, we have to take care of everything. But 
for goodness' sake, before we make a $3.7 billion deployment decision, 
let us test the system with the agency that was set up to do it, not 
with the program that is kind of fighting for its life always because 
that is what happens around here, whether it is in the military or any 
service. You can't rest with that and with the contractors that have 
the economic stake. This separate objective office is the one.
  I stand with the scientists who say we need the realistic test. I 
stand with the 49 former generals and admirals who say the militarily 
responsible course is not to spend this money until these tests pass. 
The Pentagon's current Director of the DOT&E, Thomas Christie, says we 
can't be sure the system will work against a real North Korean missile. 
So why wouldn't we fly before we buy? Why wouldn't we be sure that we 
are spending the money for the taxpayers in a wise way?
  I want this as much as anybody else. I want this very much to work. 
But I don't want to spend the money until we know we have tested the 
system realistically, and that is common sense.
  Again, I named the names of these admirals. They want to go even 
further. They want to postpone this. I am saying let's not take away 
the money. Keep the money in place. Let's just make sure the 
appropriate agency does the testing. That appropriate agency is the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. It is very simple. I hope 
my colleagues will support this. We are being told by the people who 
know that it is not ready yet for deployment.
  I thank my colleagues for their patience. I yield the floor. I look 
forward to a good vote.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. 
I would like to enter into a brief colloquy with our colleague from 
California. If we can keep the answers short, I want to frame, for 
those Members following this debate, my perception of what your 
amendment does. I start by pointing out that last year, this body, this 
Congress, in a conference report, approved 20 ground-based 
interceptors--they have been authorized--16 of which will be based at 
Fort Greely, AK, and four of which will be placed at Vandenberg, CA. 
They are being fielded as part of a missile defense test bed. This test 
bed is required for operational realistic testing and provides some 
measure of operational capability which serves as a basis for the IDO.
  Is that basically a correct statement of what we did last year?
  Mrs. BOXER. I am sorry. My staff was pointing out something. You are 
asking me if what?
  Mr. WARNER. What we did last year, this body authorized moving ahead 
on 20 test bed sites, 16 in Alaska and the balance in your State. Am I 
correct?
  Mrs. BOXER. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Is not the purpose of your amendment to stop that 
process?
  Mrs. BOXER. Absolutely not.
  Mr. WARNER. Then how do you proceed to do any testing if you stop the 
test bed?
  Mrs. BOXER. We want operational testing. We want the tests to be done 
by the appropriate office. That is the purpose of the amendment. That 
is exactly what the generals are saying. That is what the admirals are 
saying.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
  Mrs. BOXER. Sure.
  Mr. WARNER. I interpret it quite differently. The amendment would 
prohibit deployment of the ground-based midcourse missile defense 
system until

[[Page S6922]]

the Secretary certifies to Congress that the capabilities of the system 
to perform its national missile defense missions have been demonstrated 
in operationally realistic testing.
  We authorized precisely what was to be done last year. We are 
proceeding on that basis right now. And as I look at this amendment, it 
would be in effect to reverse what we did last year and start off in an 
entirely different direction. The test bed capabilities will include 
space, ground, sea-based sensors, missile defense interceptors, battle 
management facilities, software, command and control, and 
communications facilities. To provide additional realism, military 
operators participate in the tests, and the warfighter is developing a 
concept of operations.
  So, basically, what we are doing, if we were to adopt this amendment, 
is to put a halt on this system.
  As I said, I rise in strong opposition to the Boxer amendment. This 
amendment would prohibit deployment of the ground-based midcourse 
missile defense system until the Secretary certifies to Congress that 
the capabilities of the system to perform its national missile defense 
missions have been demonstrated in operationally realistic testing.
  This amendment, however, is flawed.
  Let me start by noting that the Missile Defense Agency, with the 
strong support of the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation, is fielding an extensive missile defense test bed. This 
test bed is key to operationally realistic testing.
  The test bed capabilities will include space, ground, and sea-based 
sensors; missile defense interceptors; battle management facilities and 
software; and command, control, and communications facilities and 
software. To provide additional realism, military operators participate 
in the tests, and the warfighter is developing a concept of operations.
  The test bed facilities, the participation of military operators, and 
a good concept of operations provide MDA the ability to test 
realistically but also provide the initial defensive capability of the 
BMD System. This initial capability is based on the operational 
capabilities inherent in the test bed. We are, in fact, on track to 
field an initial, limited defensive capability later this year. That is 
what a number of Senators have described as a missile defense 
deployment.
  Indeed, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command strongly supports the 
early operational exploitation of test bed capabilities. He is the 
individual charged with assessing the military utility of the BMD 
system. He testified forcefully to our committee that the BMD system 
provides a useful military capability, contributes to deterrence, and 
provides a useful option to military commanders and national command 
authorities, even in the early phases of testing. He testified that he 
intends to ``take full and early operational advantage of the system's 
anti-missile capabilities under development.'' He also wrote in a 
recent letter, ``U.S. STRATCOM supports the continued appropriate 
development of missile defense capabilities . . . under the 
evolutionary approach of concurrent test and operation.''
  The amendment does not recognize the connection between the test bed 
and the fielding of operational capability. If you prohibit this 
``deployment,'' you prohibit operationally realistic testing--and 
prevent the very basis for the certification that the amendment 
requires.

  The BMD system is already being rigorously tested. I would argue that 
it is one of the most thoroughly tested systems--at this point in its 
development--that we have. It has gone through thousands of hours of 
ground testing. The ground-based midcourse missile defense element that 
we are discussing has achieved successful intercepts in five of eight 
tests and proven the basic soundness of the hit-to-kill technology. The 
operational test community is deeply involved in the test program, each 
test includes operational test goals in addition to developmental test 
goals.
  Each test already includes a measure of operational realism. That 
testing will continue and will become progressively more realistic and 
challenging as the system matures. Testing successes will provide 
greater confidence that the system is performing as we expect it will.
  I would further note that the fielding of BMD systems is threat 
driven. Serious ballistic missile threats exist today and will increase 
in the future. Congress addressed this issue years ago in the National 
Missile Defense Act of 1999, which states that it is the policy of the 
United States to deploy a national missile defense as soon as 
technologically possible. The Senate passed that act by a vote of 97-3. 
We need to proceed expeditiously with fielding.
  This is entirely consistent with past practice. Our nation has often 
fielded military systems without completion of operational testing in 
response to an urgent military need. These systems include the Joint 
STARS system in the first Persian Gulf War, and the Global Hawk and 
Predator UAVs in the war on terror. Deployment of these systems--which 
had not completed testing--greatly increased the security of our 
nation. The same will be true when we have fielded the missile defense 
system.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  I ask the chairman of the subcommittee to address the Senate and 
allocate the time on this side.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for yielding to me. 
Senator Kyl was on the Senate floor. I thought I would go ahead and 
give him an opportunity to make some comments. I would like to make 
some comments following his remarks.
  Mr. WARNER. Does the Senator from Colorado agree with me as to what 
this amendment does?
  Mr. ALLARD. I do. If you take down the test bed, you in effect are 
going to stop the progress of the missile defense program. The real 
issue is, if you take down any part of it, it is so intertwined and 
interconnected, you slow down and stop the whole system. Your comments 
are very pertinent. They are very much in order. I have tremendous 
concern that this in effect is going to undo what the Congress has 
worked so hard to do.
  If you remember, initially the legislation directed that we move 
forward on missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. We are 
ready to move ahead, and we need to.
  I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, with regard to the amendment before us, the 
chairman of the committee and of the subcommittee have made precisely 
the right point. Congress has passed a law to get us to this point 
today, to begin the kind of operational testing that everybody agrees 
we need to do, that even critics of the missile defense program want us 
to do. Yet now they say let's stop building the missiles that would be 
used for the operational testing.
  The essence of this is captured in one of the first comments of the 
Senator from California.
  She talked about the concept of ``fly before you buy,'' which 
ordinarily is the way we buy military equipment but not always. She 
noted that is one of the reasons why the Office of Test and Evaluation 
was created, and she noted there had been problems as a result of the 
fact that not all of the operational testing had been done on this 
program.
  Let me quote from the person who heads that office, the Director for 
Operational Test and Evaluation, Thomas Christie, on this precise issue 
in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

     . . . I think the issue we're talking about here is the 
     building of missiles that will be put into silos that are 
     part of the test bed, and we have to have this test bed in 
     order to do some of the testing that will become more 
     realistic engagements, geometrics, for example, than we've 
     been able to do before. And some of these attributes of this 
     test bed are in response to criticism that came from my 
     office and my predecessor in previous administrations. . . .

  Mr. President, that is the precise point. The criticism has been that 
not all of the testing has been under the kind of realistic conditions 
that would be the real battlefield we need to be able to test against. 
It has been done by contractors, and, of course, that is the way you 
have to start out to test the components and make sure they work. 
Eventually, you have to build the missiles, put them into the ground, 
and test them in real conditions. What better way to do that than to 
put them in the actual silos in which they will have to be located in 
Alaska?

[[Page S6923]]

  By the way, when Thomas Christie speaks of this, he talks about the 
places for the best chance of intercepting missiles, where we think 
they might come in. Where is that? Alaska. Weather conditions in Alaska 
are not necessarily the best. We have to test these missiles under 
conditions where there would be several feet of snow or ice on top of 
the missile silo, the lid that has to be blown off for the ground-based 
missile interceptor to be shot off. That is why we have to have 
missiles precisely in the place where they can be tested under these 
operational conditions. That is precisely why we have to, A, authorize 
and, B, fund this group of 10 missiles which will be part of the test 
bed.
  Now, the fact that they may also have the capability in an extreme 
emergency of actually shooting down a hostile missile should not be a 
bad thing. If, God forbid, a hostile country should challenge us and 
either mistakenly launch a missile at us or intentionally do so against 
us, wouldn't it be nice to have the missile in the silo to shoot it 
down with? I fear some opponents--certainly not anybody on the Senate 
floor--would say you cannot do that because we have not certified yet 
that it is an operational system.
  In the 1991 gulf war, for example, when we had an air defense system 
called Patriot and Saddam Hussein began sending Scud missiles at our 
troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, we actually sent that air defense 
system to Saudi Arabia, doing some fixes to it on the way over, and we 
put it on the ground. As the Scuds were launched, we fired Patriot 
missiles at them. We didn't hit them all, but I think we hit something 
like about a third of the Scud missiles.
  That system wasn't designed to shoot down missiles. It had never been 
operationally tested and hadn't been certified for deployment, but in 
an emergency we needed it. We have done that with other systems, such 
as JSTARS and some of our unmanned aerial vehicles. There are some 
other programs we can talk about that we didn't ``fly before we buy'' 
with those systems. We had them in a developmental process, and all of 
a sudden we needed them and we used them. Thank God, they were there to 
be used.

  So even if we had to use one of these missiles in an emergency, God 
forbid, would anybody object to us doing that? Would we have to say, 
wait a minute, we don't have the certification called for in the Boxer 
amendment yet? Sorry, we cannot defend ourselves.
  I think not. It is an unrealistic requirement. More importantly, it 
is a requirement that even the head of the group that we have set up, 
the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Office, has said is 
unnecessary.
  We need to move forward in building these missiles so we can put them 
in the silos and conduct the operational tests that we all agree need 
to be conducted.
  I note that our colleague from California said she has always voted 
for research. I accept her word on that. But part of the problem for 
missile defense is that a lot of us vote for research, but when it 
comes to bending the metal, actually building the system and putting it 
into the ground, that is when people say we need to slow up, we have 
not done enough testing, we are not sure it will work against 
everything. So we have spent an awful lot of money on missile defense 
and, frankly, a lot of research, but we have not been able to put 
something into the ground.
  President Bush said, when he came into office, we are going to put 
something into the ground that will work. We may have to let it evolve 
as it moves forward, and we will make changes as we learn more and 
more. But that is all right. At least we have an initial capability 
that might work, God forbid, should somebody accidentally launch 
something against us, or even do so intentionally. I look at our 
weapons systems, such as the F-16s that are tested at Luke Air Force 
Base in Arizona. I am not sure which version of the F-16 we are flying 
now, but it is not the A, B, C, or D. We build systems and we keep 
improving them. We evolve in our technology and keep putting that new 
technology into the systems.
  That is precisely what we have decided to do with missile defense, 
rather than trying to come up with the perfect system that will defeat 
any kind of offensive system against us. We understand we need to start 
with something that will be rudimentary and at least will deal with a 
threat coming from a country like--let's say North Korea, and it may 
not work against one of the old Soviet systems, for example. But as we 
get better, we will include those new technologies into these systems, 
improve them; so as our adversaries develop systems, we will be one 
step ahead of them.
  Finally, part of the purpose of this is deterrence. It is not just to 
be able to defeat a missile that might be thrown against us. The 
message we want to send to North Korea, Iran, and other countries is 
the same one we sent to Soviet Union, which it heard loudly and 
clearly. It was the message President Reagan sent: We have the economy 
to outspend you, out-research you, out-build you, and we are going to 
build a missile defense that will defeat you. Why go to the trouble, 
since you cannot afford to do it, of trying to build an offensive 
system that we can defeat? That is the message we want to send to these 
potential enemies. We can deploy a system and we will always be able to 
have a system that will defeat what you throw against us. Why take the 
time and trouble to develop that kind of system? It has a deterrent 
effect as well.

  We need to move forward with this system and defeat the Boxer 
amendment. Both Chairman Warner and the Senator from Colorado, Senator 
Allard, are precisely correct in their opposition to this amendment.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Senator for his statement. I recognize in a 
public way his great work on this particular issue, and his comments 
are very enlightening.
  I will yield myself 6 minutes.
  I rise in strong opposition to the Boxer amendment. Today, we face a 
clear threat from long-range missiles in North Korea. Iran has made no 
secret of its intent to develop long-range missiles. We may have to 
deal with that threat in the not-too-distant future. That is the truth.
  Consequently, I have great concern about this amendment, which seems 
relatively straightforward but it is potentially devastating to the 
effort to defend our Nation from long-range missile threats. I say 
``seems straightforward'' because I can actually read this amendment 
three different ways. None of these readings seem useful to the defense 
of this country.
  If I focus on mission, I would note that Admiral James Ellis, 
Commander of Strategic Command, has testified to our committee that the 
ground-based midcourse element of the ballistic missile defense system 
enhances deterrence and provides him a militarily useful capability. On 
that basis, perhaps the Secretary could provide the certification 
required by the amendment, even at this stage of the testing. I don't 
believe that is what the Senator from California has in mind.
  If I focus on operations, I might read this amendment to say we can 
deploy all we want, but we cannot use what we deployed operationally. 
Taken literally, that would mean if North Korea or some other nation 
would launch a missile at us, we would be forbidden by law from trying 
to defend ourselves. I don't believe that is what the Senator has in 
mind either. Of course, to be able to try to intercept such a missile, 
the ground-based midcourse element would have to be on alert and 
operationally ready. This is precisely why Admiral Ellis strongly 
supports taking advantage of the operational capabilities of the 
missile defense test bed.
  That brings us to the third reading focusing on deployment. If I read 
the amendment correctly, it would impose a prohibition on any 
deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. Any 
additional deployment would be prohibited until the Secretary of 
Defense certifies that operationally realistic testing has demonstrated 
that the ground-based midcourse defense element can perform its 
mission.
  If that is the Senator's intent, as I read this, if this amendment 
were to become law at the beginning of the new fiscal year, no further 
fielding of ground-based midcourse interceptors, radars, battle 
management facilities, command and control facilities, or 
communications assets would be permitted. These are the components of 
the BMD test bed on which the initial defense capability of the GMD 
element are based.

[[Page S6924]]

  This has the potential to cause extraordinary harm to the GMD effort 
by disrupting ongoing efforts to acquire assets for the BMD test bed, 
including all of the assets I just mentioned. Recovering from this 
disruption, depending on how long fielding of capabilities were to be 
suspended, could take years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 
But beyond that, as a consequence of this disruption, and the 
consequent harm to the BMD test bed, it is not clear to me at all how 
the Missile Defense Agency could achieve the operationally realistic 
testing that all of us support.
  Furthermore, I believe this amendment fails to grasp the essentials 
of how the Department of Defense and the Missile Defense Agency are 
attempting to field missile defenses as effectively and expeditiously 
as possible.
  The ballistic missile defense program is a spiral development effort. 
That means, in essence, develop missile defenses and field those 
defenses if the warfighter believes the capability has military utility 
without necessarily waiting for the 100-percent solution. Further 
development then allows those defenses to be improved in subsequent 
spirals.
  This amendment does not seem to take account of this spiral 
development, that the ground midcourse defense system element will be 
able to perform at a certain level early in its fielding and will 
improve in its capabilities over time or that continued testing will 
demonstrate new capabilities as they are developed. Testing, which 
already incorporates operational goals and some measure of operational 
realism, gets more realistic and more rigorous with time.
  This method of development, testing, and fielding does not seem to me 
to be compatible with the one-time certification by the Secretary. We 
all support operationally realistic testing, but banning deployment 
until a certification appears to me to be self-defeating.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment.
  I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues a quote by 
Christie, who is the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation 
Program:

       I continue to strongly support the construction and 
     integration of the BMDS test bed. This test bed will provide 
     the elements that make up the initial defense operations or. 
     . . .

the architecture of the missile defense system.
  Who is this director? He is the chief tester. This is what the chief 
tester himself is saying about how important it is that we move forward 
with spiral development where we can operationally show in a test bed 
the dual capability.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham of South Carolina). The Senator has 
used 6 minutes.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield--how much time 
does the Senator from Alabama wish?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Five minutes.
  Mr. ALLARD. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Allard for his great 
leadership on the issue of national missile defense, space technology, 
and all the related issues. We are fortunate to have him as chairman of 
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. He understands the issue. He has 
been dealing with it for many years. He studied it and brought his 
scientific background to the issue. I agree with him, and I also very 
much agree with the comments of our distinguished Senator Jon Kyl from 
Arizona, who also has studied this issue for many years.
  We voted back when President Clinton was President, and he signed the 
bill to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as 
technologically feasible. It was an amendment, I recall, by Senator 
Thad Cochran and Senator Joe Lieberman. It passed by a very large vote, 
and we made a commitment to do that. There was a lot of debate about it 
then.
  I think some people still are somewhat motivated by their criticism 
of President Reagan's Star Wars maybe; that this would not work; it 
could not work. They just did not like it. But we voted on it after a 
national commission had reported unanimously that we needed to have 
this defense. Overwhelmingly the Senators voted for it. Since then, 
there has been a steadfast effort to slow, delay, and undermine the 
actual deployment of this system.
  We are now on the move to deploy this system in September in Alaska, 
to put, I believe, five missiles in the ground, and this will give us 
the ability to conduct realistic testing, the kind of testing that can 
actually deal with the realistic conditions around the world, our radar 
systems, our interceptor systems, the nature of the launch facilities 
in Alaska, which is the perfect place, people have convinced us, to 
deploy a system and cover all the United States. It will protect us 
now. It has military capability to protect this country when deployed.
  It also could, in addition to perhaps a threat from a nation such as 
North Korea that actually rattled its missiles a number of times and 
are working steadfastly to improve their missile system, help us deal 
with an accidental launch from a country that has a missile defense 
program. It would give us the ability to have protection today for the 
entire United States. That is what we committed to do.
  We voted to begin this deployment in September, and General Kadish 
and his entire team, General Holly and others, have worked so hard to 
prove the feasibility of this system. A bullet can meet a bullet. We 
have done it. We know it will work. Now we need to set up an 
operational system, a very realistic system, deploy these missiles, and 
continue to test them. We will learn to make them even better to deal 
with some of the problems we have not anticipated today from this 
deployment and the testing that can occur there.
  We are doing this as part of the spiral development, the idea that 
when you are developing a new system such as this, it is not possible 
to anticipate everything that may occur, every challenge that may be 
out there, and as we learn, we continue to improve the system.
  We in Congress in the past have made mistakes sometimes about 
mandating a new weapon system, a new production, and then demand it 
meet 10 characteristics, when we may find, as we go along in the 
development of it, if we drop off 1 of those characteristics and keep 9 
of them, we have even more capability and a better system. We are 
giving them some freedom to deploy and test as they go.
  I believe we are well on the way under Senator Allard's leadership 
and Senator Warner, the chairman of our committee, to deal with any 
scientific difficulties that have come up in the past.
  I thank the Chair for recognizing me to speak on this issue. I join 
with Chairman Warner and Chairman Allard in urging defeat of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the pending amendment would prevent 
deployment of the missile defense system before that missile defense 
system is shown to be workable by operationally realistic testing. That 
is what we are supposed to do around here. This is nothing new. What is 
new is the deployment of a system before it has been realistically 
tested and operationally tested with no plans to ever test the system.
  There are a couple of examples where we have deployed systems, but we 
have never deployed a system without a plan to at least operationally 
test at some point. There are no such plans here. It violates the 
spirit and, in one case, the letter of the law relative to testing and 
relative to ``fly before you buy.''
  These laws are intended to prevent the purchase and deployment to the 
field of billions of dollars in military equipment prior to it being 
adequately tested. What we have heard on the floor is a giant 
rationalization for deploying a system which may or may not work. We 
have been told this morning that we have to deploy in Alaska because 
that is where the operational testing is going to take place. How can 
there be operational testing unless these missiles are put in the 
ground?
  The problem is, that is not accurate. There is not going to be flight 
testing of these missiles from Alaska. That is not just me saying that; 
this is what the Department of Defense has told us. I will quote from 
the DOT&E fiscal year 2003 annual report:

       Due to safety considerations, no tests are currently 
     planned to launch interceptors from the operational missile 
     fields.


[[Page S6925]]


  I am going to repeat it:

       Due to safety considerations, no tests are currently 
     planned to launch interceptors from the operational missile 
     fields.

  So these missiles are not going to be put in Alaska in order to have 
some place from which to operationally test a missile. It is not going 
to happen.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.
  Mrs. BOXER. So when Senator Warner says essentially we need to go 
ahead because we are going to test this once they are deployed, what I 
hear my colleague saying the Pentagon told him, and they put it in 
writing, is because of safety concerns there will be no operational 
testing at those sites; is that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. At these sites, they are not going to be fired. So you 
want to deploy before you test. Do not deploy because you think that is 
where you are going to be testing from. We are not. That is according 
to the Department of Defense.
  Now another reason we are given is that will work against the real 
North Korean missile threat. That is what we are told. Yet on March 11, 
the Pentagon's own chief tester, Tom Christie, testified in front of 
the Armed Services Committee and Senator Jack Reed asked him whether it 
was true that at this time we cannot be sure the actual missile defense 
system would work against a real North Korean missile threat, to which 
Mr. Christie replied, ``I would say that's true.''
  Now, there are good arguments to test a missile defense system which 
will work. It seems to me to say that a missile defense system which 
may or may not work, which we have not tested operationally or 
realistically, is a deterrent against some potential threat, is totally 
inaccurate as well. It is wishful thinking. Something is not deterred 
with a system which may not work. There is testing to get a system 
which does work and then deterrence may be possible, because if there 
is going to be a missile attack against us, we always have to remember 
that the people who would shoot at us, No. 1, would destroy themselves, 
not us. They may or may not destroy us depending on how accurate the 
missile is, but they would destroy themselves because the retaliation 
would be swift, clear, certain, and massive. That is the deterrent that 
works and has always worked in the area of missiles.
  Nonetheless, if one wants a defense against such an attack, if they 
do not think they can deter an attack by the certainty of massive 
retaliation, if they think some country is going to shoot a missile at 
us even though it will lead to their own destruction, then the value of 
that system would be ``if it works.'' But no operational testing here.
   Senator Boxer's amendment would prevent deployment of the 
administration's national missile defense before the capabilities of 
the system have been confirmed by operationally realistic testing. This 
amendment does exactly the right thing. The administration currently 
plans to deploy a national missile defense before the capabilities of 
the system have been confirmed by operationally realistic testing. This 
violates the entire spirit, if not the letter, of the ``fly-before-you-
buy'' laws, because these laws are intended to prevent the purchase and 
deployment to the field of billions of dollars of military equipment 
prior to it being adequately tested to show that it would work in 
actual combat.
   Sometime in September of this year, the Bush administration will 
declare a national missile defense system deployed and operational, 
probably with much fanfare. However, the system has never been 
realistically tested, against targets that actually look like an enemy 
missile. Instead, the targets have had beacons on them, telling the 
national missile defense where they are, instead of using the national 
missile defense radars to do that. An enemy missile will not have a 
beacon on it. Yet, the DoD has never yet tested this system without the 
target having one. Nor has the system been tested against targets that 
look like a threat missile might look, with the simple countermeasures 
that any ICBM-capable country would almost certainly have.
   The Pentagon's chief test official, who is required by law to 
independently oversee and approve all operational testing of major 
weapon systems, has not been given any authority over the missile 
defense test plans. This chief test official is the only true 
independent judge of the Pentagon's weapon system. The law established 
his position to ensure that political or other pressures did not result 
in a weapon system being deployed before it was ready. But the Bush 
administration has consistently tried to marginalize the role of the 
Pentagon's test official in missile defense.
   The result is that the testing for the national missile defense 
system has remained unrealistically simple. The tests have been 
designed to ensure test success, and ``rack up the score,'' not to 
ensure the system actually works in wartime. Despite the artificial 
simplicity of the tests, the last major test of the system was a 
failure. That was back in December of 2002, and the DoD has not 
conducted another such test in the 18 months since then. This long 
delay has been due to a number of developmental problems with the 
system's interceptors. The Pentagon still has not fixed the 
developmental problems with the system, which is why the next test, 
originally scheduled for March, has been delayed by 4 months. Yet 
despite these continuing problems, test failures, and the substantial 
delays, the administration still plans to deploy the system in 
September, as it has for more than a year. This is putting perceived 
political advantages of a Presidential election-year before technical 
reality, and fiscal responsibility.
   Senator Boxer's amendment would require realistic operational tests, 
under the control of the Pentagon's chief tester, prior to deployment 
of a national missile defense. I support Senator Boxer's amendment, 
which would put common sense ahead of missile defense politics, and 
would reinforce the intent of existing ``fly-before-you-buy'' laws 
which protect men and women in uniform, the taxpayer, and our national 
security. I urge others to support this amendment as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. ALLARD. My colleague said all we have to have is mutually assured 
deterrence. That is a policy out of the cold war: Blow me up and I am 
going to blow you up. We are past that in this day and age. We are 
dealing with leaders in other countries who do not care, and that is 
where our threat is coming from, it is coming from countries such as 
Iran and North Korea. We need to figure out a new system, and we need 
to get it in place as quickly as we possibly can to make sure we can 
continue to provide the security to this country that the American 
people expect. The missile defense system is the answer.
  We are talking about a test bed that is overlapping with an 
operational capability, and anything we do to delay the operational 
capability, we delay testing. When testing is delayed, the cost of the 
program is run up and the program is delayed out. Then pretty soon 
there are cost overruns and then the opposition says, well, we cannot 
move forward because of all of these delays and cost overruns.
  The fact is, we are on schedule. We expect to get these missiles in 
the ground this fall, and we are going to begin to have a system in 
place where we can defend this country from an unexpected missile 
attack that may occur out of North Korea or Iran.
  Mr. Christie, who I had quoted earlier, in simple terms, was our 
chief tester, and he states that the test bed is necessary for 
evolution improvement to the ballistic missile defense system, and that 
the challenge is to do testing in a manner that will improve the system 
while supporting an operational system.
  Stating something Mr. Christie said from his recent testimony to the 
full committee, he says that fielding the test bed provides an 
opportunity to gather operational data on system performance, safety, 
survivability, availability, and maintainability. We should expect 
these data to drive system enhancements. The challenge will be in 
achieving a defensive posture that is flexible enough to accommodate 
the necessary changes to hardware, software, and processes that will be 
necessary to maintain a highly available

[[Page S6926]]

ballistic missile defense system, while supporting a comprehensive 
testing program that is designed to mature, improve, and demonstrate 
mission capabilities through continued development.
  Mr. Christie believes the Missile Defense Agency test program is a 
strong one, and that it is working. Unnecessary delays are unnecessary. 
We simply cannot tolerate those. This issue is too important to the 
security of this country. So I am asking that my colleagues join me in 
opposing the Boxer amendment. This is a devastating amendment. It is 
creating all sorts of problems as far as the defense of this country is 
concerned, and it is going to severely hinder what we are trying to do 
with ballistic missile defense.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, is there any time for me to rebut some of 
what was said?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California has 1 minute 20 
seconds remaining; the Senator from Colorado has 8 minutes 20 seconds 
remaining.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will take this time to rebut some of 
what has been said.
  The amendment I am offering with Senator Levin does not cut one slim 
dime from the National Missile Defense Program. All it says is, let us 
make sure the system works before we expend $3.7 billion to deploy it. 
How people can say that is devastating is beyond belief.
  If one wants to talk about devastating, devastating is investing 
money in something that will not work when it is needed. Devastating is 
something where the people of this country are told they are protected 
when they are not because the agency that was set up to test this is 
not in charge of the operational testing.
  The opponents to this amendment also say something else over and over 
again: It is important we deploy these. Then we will test.
  The fact is, the Pentagon themselves--and I ask unanimous consent to 
have printed in the Record this Pentagon report in which they say:

       Due to safety considerations, no tests are currently 
     planned to launch interceptors from the operational missile 
     fields.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          [From the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation]

                         FY 2003 Annual Report


 dod programs, army programs, navy and marine corps programs, and air 
                             force programs

     Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
       The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is an 
     integrated collection of components that perform dedicated 
     functions during an ICBM engagement. As planned, the GMD 
     element includes the following components:
       GMD Fire Control and Communications. The communications 
     network links the entire element architecture via fiber optic 
     links and satellite communications. For IDO, all fire control 
     will be conducted within the GMD element.
       Long-range sensors, including the Upgraded Early Warning 
     Radar, the COBRADANE radar, and the Ground-Based Radar 
     Prototype. In December 2005, a sea-based X-band (SBX) radar 
     is to be incorporated.
       Ground Based Interceptors and emplacements, consisting of a 
     silo-based ICBM-class booster motor stack and the 
     Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The plan for the 2004 Test 
     Bed plan places six Ground Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, 
     Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. In 
     2005, plans are to place ten more at Fort Greely.
       GMD soon plans to interface with other BMDS elements and 
     existing operational systems through external system 
     interfaces. Through FY06, these plans include GMD interfacing 
     with the Aegis SPY-1B radars and satellite-based sensors and 
     communications.
       To date, the GMD program has demonstrated the technical 
     feasibility of hit-to-kill negation of simple target 
     complexes in a limited set of engagement conditions. The GMD 
     test program in FY03 was hindered by a lack of production 
     representative test articles and from test infrastructure 
     limitations. Delays in production and testing of the two 
     objective booster designs have put tremendous pressure on the 
     test schedule immediately prior to fielding. The most 
     significant test and infrastructure limitations and 
     mitigation plans are described in the table below.

           MAJOR GMD TEST LIMITATIONS AND MDA MITIGATION PLANS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Limitation                 Comments         MDA mitigation plan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lack of a deployable boost    The Orbital booster   MDA is proceeding
 vehicle.                      has been tested in    with deployment
                               developmental         plans emphasizing
                               flight tests          the Orbital
                               without attempted     booster. Testing
                               intercepts. The       will continue with
                               Lockheed booster      both designs as
                               testing has slipped   Lockheed booster
                               such that it may      production resumes.
                               not be available
                               for IDO.
Lack of a realistically       The GMD test radar    GMD is developing a
 placed midcourse sensor.      is collected at the   mobile, sea-based
                               interceptor launch    radar. The
                               site. The FPQ-14      scheduled
                               radar, a non-         employment of this
                               deployable asset      radar in the GMD
                               that tracks a         Test Bed occurs in
                               transmitter           the post-2005 time
                               attached to the       frame.
                               test target,
                               currently
                               accomplishes the
                               midcourse tracking
                               and discrimination
                               functions.
Fixed intercept point.......  All of the flight     The 2004 Test Bed
                               tests to date have    expands the flyout
                               had similar flyout    range and
                               and engagement        engagement
                               parameters. This      conditions. Space
                               limitation includes   debris creation
                               range constraints     remains a problem.a
                               and a requirement     Transitioning
                               not to create space   between testing and
                               debris.               operations is a
                                                     concern.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a These factors constrain test engagements to relatively low target
  intercept altitudes and downward directed velocities for both the
  target and interceptor.

       Intercept Flight Test-9 (IFT-9) took place on October 14, 
     2002, resulting in a successful intercept. The target suite 
     consisted of a mock warhead and a number of decoys launched 
     from the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, towards the 
     Reagan Test Site. IFT-9 (largely a replay of IFT-8) was 
     designed to increase confidence in the GMD capability to 
     execute hit-to-kill intercepts. Overall, the test execution 
     was nominal although the EKV experienced the track gate 
     anomaly previously observed in IFT-7 and IFT-8. The software 
     changes incorporated in IFT-9 to mitigate this problem were 
     not successful. Further changes were made prior to IFT-10.
       In December 2002, GMD attempted a night intercept in IFT-
     10. In this test, the EKV failed to separate from the 
     surrogate boost vehicle and therefore the ability to 
     intercept the target could not be tested. The failure to 
     separate was attributed to a quality control failure combined 
     with shock and vibration loads on the EKV. As a result, 
     corrective measures taken to fix the track gate anomaly found 
     in previous tests could not be used.
       GMD suspended intercept flight testing after the EKV failed 
     to separate from the surrogate booster in IFT-10. IFT-11 and 
     IFT-12 that employed the problematic surrogate booster were 
     eliminated from the schedule. This decision was reasonable 
     given the increased risk of surrogate boost vehicle failure, 
     the resources that would have to be diverted from tactical 
     booster development to fix the problems, and the limited 
     amount of additional information to be gained in IFT-11 and 
     IFT-12 over that available from previous flight tests. It 
     does, however, leave very limited time for demonstration of 
     boost vehicle performance, integration of the boost vehicle 
     to the new, upgraded EKV, and demonstration of integrated 
     boost vehicle/interceptor performance. IFT-13A and IFT-13B 
     remain in the schedule as non-intercept flight tests to 
     confirm booster integration and performance. IFT-13C was 
     added to the schedule and represents a significant exercise 
     of the Test Bed infrastructure. It will be the first system-
     level flight test to use the Kodiak, Alaska, facility to 
     launch a target missile. While it is not a planned intercept 
     attempt, it will fully exercise the system and may result in 
     an intercept. IFT-13C also addresses a long-standing concern 
     over target presentation that has not yet been tested. IFT-14 
     and IFT-15 are the next official intercept attempts and are 
     scheduled for May 2004 and July 2004, respectively.
       The Orbital Sciences Corporation booster was successfully 
     tested with a mock EKV on August 16, 2003. Shock and 
     vibration environments were measured and compared to previous 
     test levels. Preliminary analyses suggest that the new 
     booster produces lower than expected vibrations at the EKV. 
     Performance of the real EKV mated with the Orbital booster 
     will be demonstrated in IFT-14 prior to IDO. Similar 
     demonstration flights for the Lockheed Martin booster design 
     are slipping due to technical difficulties and several 
     explosions at the missile propellant mixing facility. Silos 
     and related construction projects at Fort Greely, Alaska; 
     Kodiak, Alaska; and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 
     are proceeding on schedule. Due to safety considerations, no 
     tests are currently planned to launch interceptors from the 
     operational missile fields.
       To date, EKV discrimination and homing have been 
     demonstrated against simple target complexes in a limited set 
     of engagement conditions. Demonstrations of EKV performance 
     are needed at higher closing velocities and against targets 
     with signatures, countermeasures, and flight dynamics more 
     closely matching the projected threat. In addition, system 
     discrimination performance against target suites for which 
     there is imperfect a

[[Page S6927]]

     prior knowledge remains uncertain. GMD is developing a SBX 
     radar mounted on a semi-submersible platform. The SBX radar, 
     scheduled for incorporation into the GMD element in December 
     2005, is designed to be a more capable and flexible midcourse 
     sensor for supporting GMD engagements. This radar will 
     improve the operational realism of the flight test program by 
     providing a moveable mid-course sensor.
       A flight demonstration of the BMDS capability using Aegis 
     SPY-1B data (particularly for defense of Hawaii) is planned 
     for IFT-15 in FY04. A flight demonstration of COBRADANE is 
     currently not planned, and its capability will need to be 
     demonstrated by other means until an air-launched target is 
     developed. IFT-14 and IFT-15, scheduled for FY04, are 
     intended to provide demonstrations of integrated boost 
     vehicle/EKV performance. Even with successful intercepts in 
     both of these attempts, the small number of tests would limit 
     confidence in the integrated interceptor performance.
  Mrs. BOXER. Here we have a situation where you have an amendment that 
does not cut any money from this, that just says fly before you buy. I 
hope my colleagues will approve it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I know we are under a time agreement. I ask 
unanimous consent for a couple of minutes to report on what is 
happening with the bill so far. I was asked this morning to give a 
report on this. I would like to do that.
  Mr. ALLARD. Would you repeat your request?
  Mr. REID. I would like a couple of minutes to give the Senate a 
report on what we have done on the bill so far, the number of 
amendments and such.
  Mr. ALLARD. On the Defense authorization bill? We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have been on this bill 12 days counting 
today, but 4 of those days are our famous--or infamous, however you 
look at it--Mondays and Fridays. So actually we spent 8 days on this 
bill. When we dispose of this amendment, the Boxer amendment, we will 
have disposed of 79 amendments. During this period of time, counting 
the Boxer amendment, we will have had 12 rollcall votes.
  For a Defense authorization bill, we have not spent an inordinate 
amount of time on it. We have not spent very much time at all. There 
have been very few quorum calls. The quorum calls we had this week have 
been most productive. We have been able to work out the problem dealing 
with the South Carolina situation, as the Presiding Officer knows. We 
were able to work out various other problems with the quorum calls we 
had. Even having had quorum calls, they were very short. So I think we 
have accomplished quite a bit in a very short period of time on this 
bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to call on the Senator from 
Mississippi and yield him 3 minutes to comment on the Boxer amendment. 
I want to recognize, in a public way, that he is the one who carried 
the initial amendments on the missile defense system that said we move 
forward when technologically feasible and he has been a real leader in 
the defense of this country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the distinguished Senator from Colorado for 
yielding to me. I also thank him for his leadership on this issue in 
the Armed Services Committee. He has been a key proponent and a very 
persuasive supporter of the National Missile Defense Program and 
missile defense generally.
  This amendment would undermine the ability of our Department of 
Defense to go forward in the deployment and protection of our country 
through the use of ballistic missile technology and capabilities. These 
capabilities have been developed in response to legislation that was 
approved by the Congress and signed by the Chief Executive to develop a 
missile defense capability that could defend the United States against 
missile attack.
  We have made great progress since those initial authorizations were 
approved by the Congress. We are now in a position of actually 
deploying a system that is workable. The testimony of General Kadish 
before our Appropriations Committee and before the Armed Services 
Committee has clearly indicated the successful progress of this program 
to date. We should continue to support it and we should defeat this 
Boxer amendment.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to know what time remains on 
the Boxer amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes 50 seconds.
  Mr. ALLARD. On our side. How about the other side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired, other than the 2 minutes 
preceding the vote.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 2 minutes. I 
would like to make a couple of summary comments.
  First, technologically we are ready to move ahead. The various 
components of this missile defense system have been shown to be 
functional and scientifically can happen. What needs to be established 
is all the communications systems that run from California to Alaska to 
Colorado, to some of our space satellites, to some of our ships at sea, 
to the Hawaiian Islands, to the Kwajalein Islands, over thousands and 
thousands of miles, that they can communicate with one another.
  There is only one way to do that. You have to put together a large 
test bed. This test bed happens to also be the same thing we would use 
to operationally defend ourselves. To not continue on a dual pathway 
does not make any sense at all. That is why it is so very important 
that we defeat this Boxer amendment.
  Mr. Christie, who is the tester, is the one who has been following 
this. It has been stated time and time again that he is satisfied with 
the progress, the way we are moving forward. He is the expert. He says: 
You are doing a good job. Keep it up. I am satisfied. I am responsible 
and accountable for how this program has gone ahead. He has been before 
the committee and made that statement.
  It is very important that we defeat this Boxer amendment. I ask my 
colleagues to join me.
  I think the chairman has a concern or two he wants to raise. I yield 
the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to advise Senators, Senator Levin 
and I have conferred. We have the next amendment following this vote to 
be provided by the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed, No. 3354. I 
reserve the right to put on a second-degree amendment. As soon as we 
provide the second-degree amendment to the other side, it is my 
expectation, during the course of the deliberations, we will be able to 
work out a time agreement.
  Mr. LEVIN. Hopefully, we can work out a time agreement after we see 
the second-degree amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. There is no restriction. Offer the 
amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. And the second-degree amendment is not available at this 
point?
  Mr. WARNER. It momentarily will be available. I think we can yield 
back all time. I didn't know whether the Senator wanted another minute 
to speak to the amendment. Did she ask for it?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 
1 minute.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator.
  I think we have had a good debate. I am just saying to colleagues, 
these are the names of retired admirals and generals you all admire. 
They are saying we have to delay this deployment because we have no 
idea that this system works.
  To my colleagues who said let's deploy it and then test it, the 
Pentagon in its own words has said they can't do it. It is not safe. 
Here it is. They say:

       Due to safety considerations, no tests are currently 
     planned to launch interceptors from the operational missile 
     fields.

  So the Pentagon has said very clearly--and good for them because it 
would be too dangerous--they are not going to operationally test from 
the missile fields. So what are we doing? We are investing $3.7 billion 
out of the $10 billion to move forward with a system that is untested.
  For those people who say this is a devastating amendment, why do they 
support ``fly before you buy,'' which is the way we do things around 
here? This is a way to get around realistic testing. That doesn't make 
us any safer; it makes us weaker. It makes us vulnerable.
  So I hope you will stand with these 49 generals and admirals and 
Senator

[[Page S6928]]

Levin and me and vote for the Boxer-Levin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to our colleagues, this issue was acted upon last 
year. Money was authorized and appropriated. The program is underway. 
The effect of this amendment is to cancel what the Congress did last 
year.
  I yield the remainder of our time. I think a vote is now in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on 
agreeing to the amendment.
  Mr. REID. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Talent). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 42, nays 57, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 124 Leg.]

                                YEAS--42

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham (FL)
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                                NAYS--57

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Kerry
       
  The amendment (No. 3368) was rejected.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ALLARD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we have advised the Senate that the 
Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed, will have an amendment.
  Mr. President, if the Senator is ready to send his amendment to the 
desk, then I would like to send up a second-degree amendment, and we 
will proceed.
  Mr. REED addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield the 
floor?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3354

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3354.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Reed] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3354.

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To require baselines for and testing of block configurations 
                of the Ballistic Missile Defense System)

       On page 33, after line 25, insert the following:

     SEC. 224. BASELINES AND OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FOR 
                   BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

       (a) Operational Tests.--(1) The Director of the Missile 
     Defense Agency shall prepare for and conduct, on an 
     independent basis, operationally realistic tests of each 
     block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
     being fielded.
       (2) The tests shall be designed to permit the evaluation of 
     each block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     System being fielded by the Director of Operational Test and 
     Evaluation.
       (3) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall carry 
     out tests under paragraph (1) through an independent agent, 
     assigned by the Director for such purpose, who shall plan and 
     manage such tests.
       (b) Approval of Plans for Tests.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall assign the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
     the responsibility for approving each plan for tests 
     developed under subsection (a).
       (c) Evaluation.--(1) The Director of Operational Test and 
     Evaluation shall evaluate the results of each test conducted 
     under subsection (a) as soon as practicable after the 
     completion of such test.
       (2) The Director shall submit to the Secretary of Defense 
     and the congressional defense committees a report on the 
     evaluation of each test conducted under subsection (a) upon 
     completion of the evaluation of such test under paragraph 
     (1).
       (d) Cost, Schedule, and Performance Baselines.--(1) The 
     Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall establish cost, 
     schedule, and performance baselines for each block 
     configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System being 
     fielded. The cost baseline for a block configuration shall 
     include full life cycle costs for the block configuration.
       (2) The Director shall include the baselines established 
     under paragraph (1) in the first Selected Acquisition Report 
     for the Ballistic Missile Defense System that is submitted to 
     Congress under section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, 
     after the establishment of such baselines.
       (3) The Director shall also include in the Selected 
     Acquisition Report submitted to Congress under paragraph (2) 
     the significant assumptions used in determining the 
     performance baseline under paragraph (1), including any 
     assumptions regarding threat missile countermeasures and 
     decoys.
       (e) Variations Against Baselines.--In the event the cost, 
     schedule, or performance of any block configuration of the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense System varies significantly (as 
     determined by the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Agency) from the applicable baseline established under 
     subsection (d), the Director shall include such variation, 
     and the reasons for such variation, in the Selected 
     Acquisition Report submitted to Congress under section 2432 
     of title 10, United States Code.
       (f) Modifications of Baselines.--In the event the Director 
     of the Missile Defense Agency elects to undertake any 
     modification of a baseline established under subsection (d), 
     the Director shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report setting forth the reasons for such 
     modification.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.


                Amendment No. 3453 To Amendment No. 3354

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I send an amendment to the 
desk in the second degree to the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the second-degree 
amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3453 to amendment No. 3354.

  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe and apply 
 criteria for operationally realistic testing of fieldable prototypes 
           developed under ballistic missile defense program)

       In the matter proposed to be inserted, strike subsections 
     (a) and (b) and insert the following:
       (a) Testing Criteria.--Not later than February 1, 2005, the 
     Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of 
     Operational Test and Evaluation, shall prescribe appropriate 
     criteria for operationally realistic testing of fieldable 
     prototypes developed under the ballistic missile defense 
     spiral development program. The Secretary shall submit a copy 
     of the prescribed criteria to the congressional defense 
     committees.
       (b) Use of Criteria.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall 
     ensure that, not later than October 1, 2005, a test of the 
     ballistic missile defense system is conducted consistent with 
     the criteria prescribed under subsection (a).
       (2) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that each block 
     configuration of the ballistic missile defense system is 
     tested consistent with the criteria prescribed under 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Relationship to Other Law.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to exempt any spiral development program 
     of the Department of Defense, after completion of the spiral 
     development, from the applicability of any provision of 
     chapter 144 of title 10, United States Code, or section 139, 
     181, 2366, 2399, or 2400 of such title in accordance with the 
     terms and conditions of such provision.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we would be happy, on this side, to work 
out a time agreement as soon as the Senator from Rhode Island is able 
to indicate to us the amount of time he desires. We will quickly 
respond as to the amount of time we would desire.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I think if I could have an hour on my side.

[[Page S6929]]

  Mr. WARNER. I say to the Senator, an entire hour on your side?
  Mr. REED. I would not attempt to simply fill the hour. I would yield 
back time if we have reached a point where we have sufficiently 
discussed it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would request we have an hour on this 
side, with the expectation we will be able to yield time back.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor and 
makes a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am happy to yield to the Senator for 
purposes of a statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Michigan wish to be 
recognized?
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, the suggestion of an hour on this side relative to the 
Reed amendment, would that include the proposed time for the second-
degree amendment to be offered by Senator Warner? Does the hour that 
you have estimated you would need include time for debate on the Warner 
second degree?
  The next question is this: If the Warner second-degree amendment 
prevails, which is a substitute, then the question is, Would the hour 
that you are referring to, then--without seeing, knowing exactly what 
would be in the second-degree amendment that would be offered--cover 
the debate time for your second-degree amendment to the substitute?
  Mr. REED. If I may respond, it would be appropriate if we took an 
hour debating both the Reed first degree and the Warner second degree. 
At the conclusion of a vote on the Warner second-degree amendment, then 
there would be no time agreement entered into. It would be my intention 
to offer----
  Mr. LEVIN. If that substitute were adopted----
  Mr. REID. Could I be recognized? Would anybody be insulted if I asked 
for a quorum call?
  Mr. WARNER. No.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are moving along in a very cooperative 
spirit. We are going to ask for a time agreement on the Reed amendment 
and the Warner second-degree amendment as a package. They will be 
considered in the course of 2 hours, hopefully less. At the conclusion 
of the debate on these two amendments, we will then proceed to a record 
vote on the Warner amendment. In the event the Warner amendment 
prevails, then the Chair would recognize the Senator from Rhode Island 
for the purpose of a perfecting amendment, which he has a right to do 
under the rules, but in order to keep the sequence moving, I would like 
to advise the Senate that it would be done in that way. At this time, 
until we see the perfecting amendment, we cannot set a time agreement 
on that. But it would be my hope that we can move along expeditiously, 
first by crunching the 2 hours to less, moving to a vote, and then the 
perfecting amendment and concluding, hopefully, a brief colloquy, 
debate on that, and vote, if that becomes necessary. Have I correctly 
stated it?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, of course, there would be no amendments in 
order to either of the amendments, the one of Senator Reed or your 
second degree.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. But there would be in order an amendment 
to the perfecting amendment.
  Mr. REID. I understand that. I have no objection to that. We have no 
objection to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. So the Chair gets it straight, if the Senator 
from Virginia could clarify, this is a request for a 2-hour time 
agreement on the second-degree amendment?
  Mr. WARNER. Let me try that again. We have before the Senate at this 
time the underlying Reed amendment. We have the Warner amendment in the 
second degree. We ask for an hour on each. At the conclusion of that 
period of time, which I hope will be less than 2 hours, the Senate 
would proceed to a record vote on the Warner amendment. I am asking for 
the yeas and nays incorporated in this. After that is taken, the Chair 
would then recognize the Senator from Rhode Island for the purpose 
presumably of offering a perfecting amendment.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, however, if the Warner amendment does not 
pass, then we would vote on the underlying Reed amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Immediately.
  Mr. WARNER. Immediately.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that following the 
votes or vote, whatever the case may be, there will be probably a 
number of judges we might be called to vote on. My point is at around 3 
or thereabouts, there could be a series of as many as four or five 
votes.
  Mr. WARNER. That is a leadership request, I so advise the Democratic 
whip.
  Mr. REID. It is not a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. WARNER. It is just an advisory for Senators. But I understand 
that my leader will be making that request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia asked for the yeas 
and nays on the second-degree amendment; is that correct?
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Are the yeas and nays ordered on the underlying amendment 
of the Senator from Rhode Island? If not, I so ask.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator, it is not in 
order to request the yeas and nays on the first-degree amendment at 
this time without consent.
  Does the Senator from Virginia yield the floor?
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time under the unanimous consent 
agreement?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise to offer an amendment which would implement the 
recommendations of the General Accounting Office for missile defense 
testing and base alignment. Last month the GAO issued a report on 
missile defense entitled ``Missile Defense Actions Are Needed To 
Enhance Testing And Accountability.'' In its report, the GAO makes some 
commonsense recommendations to improve the testing of missile defense 
and to increase accountability of Congress for missile defense 
programming.
  The principal recommendation is that at some point there is developed 
and executed a plan for operational testing. That is a very critical 
point. As the GAO pointed out, they would recommend to the Missile 
Defense Agency that they prepare for and conduct, on an independent 
basis, not within the purview of the Missile Defense Agency but on an 
independent basis, operationally realistic tests of those missile 
defenses. This is the way we develop and deploy major weapons systems 
in the United States. We do initial testing. We prove out the 
technologies. But before we field them, we go ahead and do a test on 
their operational capacities. That is the basic approach. It is a good 
approach, a sound approach. The GAO recommendations would make the 
missile defense programs consistent in this regard with all other 
programs.
  The second aspect of the proposed amendment would be to require the 
Missile Defense Agency to require course baselines so that we know how 
much we are spending with respect to missile defense. We know what the 
course goals are. We know when they are exceeded or when they are 
constrained by good planning and good management. These are two 
fundamental aspects of any sound military procurement program.
  Missile defense is one of the most complicated programs we will ever 
attempt to field in the history of this country.
  I believe it is appropriate at this juncture to take a look at this 
missile defense system as it exists today. I think you will hopefully 
concur with

[[Page S6930]]

me that we do need some realistic operational testing.
  First, this is the basic architecture of the system. The system we 
are deploying in Alaska is designed principally, if not exclusively, to 
counter one potential threat--the threat of a missile coming from North 
Korea. Now, the system is composed of several major elements. I will 
review them.
  First is the DSP early warning satellite. This is a defense system 
that has been flying since the 1970s. It is well proven, but 
essentially all this system does is spot the lift-off of an enemy 
missile, or potential adversary missile, coming out of North Korea or 
anyplace else. It was put up in the 1970s as part of the cold war to 
identify a Russian missile or Chinese missile being ignited. That is a 
rather established technology. It provides just the cue that an enemy 
missile has been launched.
  The next part of the proposed system is the Aegis ships. They have 
radar, but it was designed not to track ICBMs. Rather, it is to track 
cruise missiles and close-in aircraft. They are being essentially 
pushed into the role of trying to acquire the target after it lifts off 
and track it as far as it can. It really cannot track that far because 
of built-in limitations. Again, this version was not designed to track 
long-range ICBMs. Their radar doesn't seem to be powerful enough to 
protect and track accurately to places such as Hawaii. Also, these 
Aegis ships have never guided an interceptor to its target in a single 
intercept test. They have done preliminary activities but have not 
guided an interceptor to a target in a test. The operational tracking 
software of Aegis has never been tested in an integrated test. So you 
have one element that is still not quite up to the speed we would like 
it to be in terms of the Aegis system.
  The next part is the Cobra Dane radar system in Alaska. Cobra Dane is 
another 1970s version. It has been updated, but it has no real 
discrimination capability in terms of determining what a missile 
warhead would be or what a decoy would be. It is incapable of tracking 
a North Korean missile bound for Hawaii. So, again, we have a problem 
in terms of providing coverage. It has never been used in an intercept 
test, and there are no plans to do so because we do not have an ICBM 
target that can fly in Cobra Dane's field of view. Then we were going 
to have to replace Cobra Dane and x-band radar on Shemya Island. We 
don't have the x-based, land-based system. We are working on a sea-
based x-band radar, not primarily for operational use but for test use, 
to be ready in fiscal year 2005.
  The final one is the interceptor with the kill vehicle on top. Both 
the interceptor and kill vehicle are brand-new, and neither have been 
tested together in an intercept test. The new version of the kill 
vehicle hasn't been flight tested at all. It is coming off of 
production. There are new systems within the kill vehicle. It is an 
improvement, we hope, over the previous prototypes but has not yet been 
flight tested. Problems with the kill vehicle are seen as delaying the 
next scheduled test. That is the IFT-13c. That test is being touted by 
the Missile Defense Agency as a fly-by. So the next test--the one 
before this system is declared deployable and deployed--is not designed 
to knock the missile down but to simply fly by it. If it does knock it 
down, I am sure the Missile Defense Agency will take great pleasure in 
it, with great claim. By declaring it just a fly-by, they will have 
wiggle room for saying the test succeeded and saying we didn't intend 
to knock it down either. Ask yourself, if we are deploying a missile 
system in a most recent test to fly by the missile, is that going to 
protect the U.S.? I don't think that is the case.

  My amendment would require that we do operational testing, which is 
something done on every major system. It is under the purview of Dr. 
Tom Christie in the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Department of 
Defense. He is charged by Congress with independently evaluating these 
systems on behalf of the Defense Department.
  Some argue that we need to go ahead and deploy this system right 
away, that we have done it before, and that is fine. It turns out that 
we have deployed systems before in emergencies, such as the Predator in 
Kosovo in 1999. That system had already on the books operational 
testing plans. Indeed, when this emergency deployment was completed, 
that operational test was carried out the following year, 2000. This 
system is a rudimentary system with huge gaps in technology, which has 
never been fully tested on an integrated basis. None of these parts 
have been put together in one intercept test yet. This system has no 
plans for operational testing, which denies the obvious point of the 
custom and practice and the law in many cases.
  The JSTAR surveillance system is another one which individuals will 
say was put into the fray before it was operationally tested. That is 
also true. In 1991, JSTARs were deployed in Desert Storm. Following the 
deployment, even though the Senate Armed Services Committee was so 
impressed that they wanted to deploy it without testing, the Air Force 
insisted upon operational testing. They found defects because of the 
testing. They completed the operational testing in 1995, and this 
testing revealed problems with respect to the inability to operate at 
the right altitude and inadequate mission reliability. These were 
corrected, so the JSTAR system is much more reliable today than it 
would have been without operational testing.
  Once again, this system is untested in a systematic way, and it is 
not even scheduled for operational testing. The point of my amendment 
is not to delay or defer this deployment; it is simply to say at some 
point in time--some point when the Missile Defense Agency feels they 
are ready for operational testing--we should at least have operational 
testing. I believe that is absolutely critical.
  There are examples now, too, of the tests that have been conducted. 
These suggest that the tests are not up to the level of operational 
testing. For example, for the tests conducted so far on this system, 
all of the targets have had beacons on them, telling the National 
Missile Defense Agency and the shooters, if you will, the exact 
location of the missiles coming in. I don't think anybody believes that 
an adversary would put a beacon on the missile to warn us. Those are 
the types of rudimentary tests taking place today. They are important 
tests but not operational tests. Indeed, I asked the Director of the 
MDA in March when we would stop using beacons on our target vehicles. 
He simply said he didn't know. That is not exactly the kind of 
realistic testing the General Accounting Office called for.
  I mentioned Cobra Dane, which is the radar that is a critical piece. 
It will track this target for a long way, and it would hopefully be 
able to discriminate between decoys and the actual warheads. But we 
have, as I mentioned before, no plans to test this radar because we 
lack an appropriate testing vehicle, ICBM.

  The other point, which is very important--and it goes to the heart of 
realistic testing--is that every intelligence analyst who looks at this 
problem has suggested that if a nation is capable of putting a nuclear 
device on a long-range missile, and particularly if they are so 
motivated to use it against us, they are likely to be just as capable 
of having sophisticated decoys or even rudimentary decoys on the 
missile.
  We have never conducted tests against very sophisticated or even 
realistic decoys. As a result, we are prepared to deploy a system that 
has not been adequately tested. But more importantly, there are no 
plans to adequately test it.
  My amendment would simply ask the Department of Defense, through the 
normal procedures, through the Office of Test and Evaluation, to 
prepare such plans and conduct those tests when appropriate.
  These are just some of the examples I have given with respect to this 
particular system. There is a whole laundry list of what should be done 
to ensure that this system, when deployed, is appropriately ready for 
the challenge. This chart shows yes and no in terms of obvious 
parameters for a system that is about to be fielded. Most of the 
parameters have not been accomplished. In fact, the vast majority have 
not been accomplished.
  There is no full system operational test. There are no tests, to my 
mind, that have integrated every part of this system, from Cobra Dane, 
the Aegis warships, to the interceptor with the new-kill vehicle with 
the new booster

[[Page S6931]]

attached and flying out and engaging a target.
  There is no full system operational test scheduled. We are not 
talking about a situation where we have to wait a few months or a year 
and there is an operational test planned for. By the way, these 
operational tests are not something that can be done on 2 or 3 days' 
notice. These takes months and months to prepare and plan and are 
extremely costly.
  I do not really know, because it is hard to figure out the budget for 
MDA, whether they have put aside money for operational testing. It is 
hard to tell. We are not even scheduling these tests.
  It has not been tested in bad weather. It has not been tested at 
night. Experts in the field indicate that is a very important aspect of 
ensuring the system will work.
  Again, I do not think there is any American who does not want to see 
a workable system in place, but we have to raise questions when we have 
not done the testing to assure the American public that this system 
will work and will work as it is designed to work.
  Tested three-stage booster and intercept test: This new package of 
the booster and kill vehicle has not been tested yet.
  Tested without interceptor knowing in advance warheads infrared and 
radar signature, I mentioned that before. All of the data of the enemy 
warhead is essentially given to the forces that are trying to engage 
it. That is not a realistic test.
  It has not been tested against a tumbling warhead, when the warhead 
detaches from the boost vehicle and spinning. That has not been tested.
  Tested against realistic decoys and countermeasures: Realistic decoys 
would be something that looked like a warhead; just one other body that 
looks like a warhead. We have not done that. The decoys that have been 
used to date have been large spheres that look completely unlike the 
warhead.

  It has not been tested against complex decoys. These are much more 
sophisticated decoys. We certainly have not done that. We have not 
reached the realistic level, let alone the complex level.
  It has not been tested against more than one warhead on a missile. 
Again, if there is a nation out there that is capable of producing a 
nuclear warhead and putting it on a missile, they are probably 
capable--it may take a little longer--of producing multiple warheads 
and putting them on a missile.
  It has not been tested against more than one incoming missile. If 
North Korea is going to attack us, why would they do something that 
would spell doom, first because of our overwhelming power to deter 
them, but second, what makes us think they will fire just one missile 
at us? I would assume they would fire multiple missiles, and we have 
not tested against that.
  Again I mention this, we have not tested this without a GPS system, a 
beacon on the adversary missile and warhead.
  Tests have been conducted by the contractors and managers. That is 
the first ``yes'' accomplished.
  Tests overseen by Pentagon's independent test office: No, and that is 
the core of our debate today, because looking at the chairman's 
amendment to my amendment, what they are essentially saying is: Listen, 
we do not want the independent tester to look at this; we want the 
Secretary of Defense to prescribe this. That is not the way to do this 
because it just invites all of the problems with individuals testing 
themselves.
  This is not as much a technical problem as a problem of human nature. 
You tend to pass every test you give yourself, particularly if it is 
important you pass the test. That is why we set up, in the eighties, 
this Office of Test and Evaluation with an individual who is appointed 
by the President, not the Secretary of Defense, to conduct these tests.
  SBIRS high early warning satellites: This will be the follow-on to 
the DSP satellites. SBIRS is not yet flying. The original plan was to 
have SBIRS in this system instead of the old DSP system.
  SSTS space tracking and surveillance system: This is another system 
not in place.
  Cobra Dane radar upgraded: Yes, it has been upgraded, but not the x-
band radar contemplated for this system. It does not have the power of 
the x-band. Even with this upgrade, it is still not capable of the 
discrimination that you need to separate decoys from the warheads.
  The ground-based x-band radar I mentioned is not deployed. It has 
been essentially canceled.
  Sea-based x-band radar is being developed. It is not yet deployed.
  Question: Will it protect Hawaii? It is a question because of the 
coverage of the Cobra Dane, because the fact the Aegis system is 
providing an important part of the tracking system.
  Fly before you buy: We are certainly violating that. We are buying 
the system without flying. That is the fundamental problem we are 
facing today. Yet we are going to declare the system operational. We 
can argue about that, and we have. Senator Boxer had an amendment which 
talked to that specifically.
  My amendment is not about deploying the system. My amendment is about 
conducting operational tests at some juncture. I believe this 
operational testing scheme has hit a nerve because, as I saw the 
chairman's substitute to my amendment, he basically said yes, we will 
do operational--in fact, he specifies a date. I believe it is October 
of 2005. That is pretty ambitious since we are not planning for any 
tests yet. It is also pretty ambitious since we do not have a suitable 
missile target vehicle that could fly from the vicinity of North Korea 
and go through the space in which Cobra Dane operates.
  As a result, in a very short time, we would have to build a target 
missile, we would have to plan for the test, and we would have to 
integrate all these other pieces. Yet that is what the amendment 
offered by my colleague from Virginia would say.
  The problem with the amendment is that it takes out of the loop the 
one person who is there to guarantee the independence, the rigor, and 
the accuracy of this test, and that is the Director of the Office of 
Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. That is something I think is 
critical.
  Again, given this list of items to be accomplished, it seems stunning 
to me that we are actually debating about whether we should just 
authorize and require at some point--and at this point, after 
deployment--operational testing, or at least to plan it. But that is 
the substance of the debate, and just as importantly, not just the 
operational testing, but the fact it is going to be conducted by an 
independent agency within the Pentagon, not by the people who are 
graded by whether they pass or fail. Again, not high tech but human 
nature. I think more people are comfortable with having someone 
objectively design the test and supervise the test than having the 
people who have everything to lose and everything to gain do that.
  There is one other aspect of my amendment I want to mention, which is 
important, and that is the notion of baselines. The GAO came back to us 
and said: No one seems to know how much the system is costing because 
there are no baselines.
  They pointed out, for example, that there was a $1 billion overrun of 
the cost goal of missile defense to be fielded starting in September, 
but the Department of Defense never explained to Congress this overrun. 
Instead, they simply changed the cost goal.
  How can we evaluate this system? How can we make difficult choices 
between investing in missile defense and increasing the end strength of 
our Army, if MDA suddenly says, well, our objective was X, but we found 
it cost us a billion dollars more, so now it is X plus one billion? We 
have to have a baseline. This is all designed to have appropriate 
control and appropriate notification to the Congress about the status 
of this very complex system.
  Additionally, this cost goal change was surprising because the GAO 
also noted that originally the system in Alaska to be deployed in 
September was to have 10 interceptors, and now it is 5. So not only did 
they change the cost goal by increasing the amount of money they are 
spending, but they lowered the number of interceptors and also, I think 
by fair inference, the capability of the system. High cost, lower 
capability, but yet it was not communicated to us.
  My amendment would ask them to prepare the baseline, to communicate 
to us when those baselines are exceeded. If we do not have that, then 
we will

[[Page S6932]]

not have the ability to do our job, which is to supervise appropriately 
and oversee the activities of the Missile Defense Agency in the 
development of this very complicated system.
  There has been a great debate about whether we should deploy this 
system. I found it interesting to note that President Reagan was 
approached years ago by some Congressmen and Congresswomen who wanted 
to deploy then the existing system. This was in August of 1986. 
According to the Frances Fitzgerald's book about President Reagan ``Way 
Out There in the Blue,'' here is what he told those Congressmen:

       I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy [to 
     deploy a missile defense] but to deploy systems of limited 
     effectiveness now would divert limited funds and delay our 
     main research. It could well erode support for the program 
     before it's permitted to reach its potential.

  Once again, we are not debating today the deployment in this 
amendment. We have had that debate previously with Senator Boxer. We 
are not debating deployment. We are simply debating let us plan to do 
the operational testing. Let us get that operational testing done at 
some point because otherwise we are literally getting a system that is 
untried. No one wants the first time this system is fully operationally 
tested to be in the deplorable and horrific situation of a missile 
heading toward us.
  So I would hope that we could, in fact, adopt the Reed amendment, 
have operational testing planned for it, have baselines established to 
be able to monitor this system as we should and be able, I hope, to 
assure the American public that when we say it is in service, it will 
work. There is a difference between telling them it works and proving 
it in operational and realistic testing. I hope we can do that.
  I reserve the remainder of my time in response to my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields the floor and reserves the 
remainder of his time.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Reed amendment 
that was before us prior to the amendment from Senator Warner, and I 
want to talk about that briefly. Then I want to talk about the second-
degree amendment by Senator Warner.
  With respect to the Reed amendment, from my standpoint and the 
standpoint of the Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon's office of 
Test and Evaluation and Formal Operation, tests at this juncture simply 
would not be helpful.
  According to a letter I received on May 17, 2004--and I think this is 
the most current position--the letter from the Pentagon's Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, Mr. Tom Christie, in response to 
several questions I asked him, Mr. Christie writes--he is the chief 
tester we referred to, and he is responsible for overseeing much of the 
testing that goes on at the Department of Defense and obviously has a 
deep interest in what is happening as far as accountability in the 
missile defense system.
  Mr. Christie writes, and this is important:

       The Ground-based Midcourse Defense element is currently at 
     a maturity level that requires continued developmental 
     testing with oversight and assistance from operational test 
     personnel.

  I would add at this point that the Missile Defense Agency is 
currently stressing the system is involved in every developmental test 
to ensure that they are as realistic as possible.
  Mr. Christie continues in his letter:

       Conducting realistic operational testing in the near-term 
     for the GMD element would be premature and not beneficial to 
     the program.

  I ask unanimous consent that his letter of May 17, 2004, be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           Office of the Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, May 17, 2004.
     Hon. Wayne Allard,
     U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Allard: Thank you for your May 11, 2004, 
     letter concerning my role in the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     System (BMDS).
       The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is building a BMDS test 
     bed that is essential to support realistic testing, and is 
     absolutely essential for conducting adequate operational 
     testing in the future. The test bed is also key to developing 
     operational concepts, techniques, and procedures, while 
     allowing my office to exploit and characterize its inherent 
     defensive capability.
       The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is 
     currently at a maturity level that requires continued 
     developmental testing with oversight and assistance from 
     operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational 
     testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be 
     premature and not beneficial to the program.
       My office has unprecedented access to GMD, and I am 
     satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and 
     the test community. I will continue to advise the Secretary 
     of Defense and the Director, MDA, on the BMDS test program. I 
     will also provide my characterization of system capabilities, 
     and my assessment of test program adequacy annually, as 
     required by Congress.
           Sincerely,
                                               Thomas P. Christie,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. ALLARD. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Mr. Christie expressed his support for the approach the Missile Defense 
Agency is taking to incorporate operational realism in the 
developmental test and is conducting, in his words, continuous 
operational assessments of the ballistic missile defense system.
  We must consider that missile defense is a capabilities-based spiral 
development evolutionary acquisition program--this is a mouthful--and 
under this approach the missile defense programs are designed to focus 
on developing capabilities to meet a range of possible threats. These 
programs are developed incrementally in blocks with the recognition 
that full capability would not be reached in the first block.
  Missile defense does not have a final architecture that is defined in 
the first block but will continue to evolve over time. Therefore, 
testing of the system should occur as we continue to develop it.
  We should also consider rethinking how we do formal tests and 
evaluation. Formal operational testing carries with it certain 
requirements. There can be no developmental goals because of that. 
Contractors cannot be involved.
  The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must approve the 
operational test plans. Even the current Director of Operational Test 
and Evaluation recognizes the need to adopt a new acquisition paradigm 
for tests and evaluation.
  Here is what Mr. Christie said about that in his speech just 2 months 
ago:

       The concept of milestone driven operational test and 
     evaluation appears to be becoming a process of the past. 
     Either we change our way of doing business, adapt to the new 
     acquisition paradigms and the realities of the war on 
     terrorism, or we will find ourselves becoming irrelevant with 
     dire consequences for our operational forces. . . . Users 
     need up to the minute, continuous test and evaluation to keep 
     them informed of system capabilities and limitations. Even 
     after fielding, the acquisition community needs continuous 
     evaluation to feed spiral development and other evolutionary 
     acquisition concepts.

  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Mr. Christie's speech be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Test and Evaluation in the ``New World of 2004''--Tuesday, March 2

                   (By the Honorable Thomas Christie)

       Let me express my thanks to Gen. Farrell and the leadership 
     of NDIA for, once again, affording me the opportunity to 
     discuss with you some of my views and concerns with T&E. I 
     have had the opportunity to do this for the last two years, 
     and recall that, when I spoke in Savannah [March 2002], I 
     warned you that I might sound like a ``stick-in-the-mud'' or 
     some sort of Cassandra because I couldn't help but say that I 
     had seen and heard all this acquisition reform stuff before. 
     I'm not sure my remarks here this morning will paint a much 
     different picture than I presented in my talk in Savannah, 
     where I contended that the problems we face as operational 
     testers may have to take different forms than previously, but 
     remain formidable. Recall that the Cassandra I referred to 
     was a princess of Troy who could foresee the future--but the 
     penalty for her gift was that the Gods made it so that no one 
     would believe her. If you don't believe--I will understand.
       The theme for this Conference is ``Operational Test and 
     Evaluation: Twenty Years and Counting: Doing OT&E Better 
     After Twenty Years of Practice.'' That title seems

[[Page S6933]]

     to imply two things: that we are doing OT&E better after 
     twenty years and that we have been doing OT&E only in the 
     last twenty years. Our conference chairman, Jim O'Bryon has 
     assembled many of the historic--I won't say ancient--
     personalities in the field. I challenge each of them to 
     demonstrate that we are doing OT&E better after twenty years 
     of so-called practice. I would offer my observation--or at 
     least concern--that program offices and developers appear at 
     times to be learning faster how to avoid testing then we are 
     learning to do it better. This conference should consider 
     that.
       I think Jim may have confused the ``Practice makes 
     Perfect'' adage with the professional use of the word 
     practice. Doctors have a practice; and I always worry about 
     that when I go to them. I don't want them to practice on ME. 
     For a variety of reasons, Program Managers don't want T&E to 
     be practiced on them either. I know Walt Hollis used to think 
     that they taught ``Test Avoidance 101'' to program managers 
     at the Defense Systems Management College.
       This morning, I thought it would be appropriate for us to 
     spend some time thinking about the history of OT&E in 
     preparation for the insight to be offered by the elder 
     statesmen that you will hear from over the next few days: 
     first, the early reform efforts that set the stage for the 
     creation of DOT&E then, a little bit of history of the 
     office itself, and I am sure that we will get more of that 
     during the conference because all the living DOT&Es will be 
     here; then, finally, we should discuss some of the challenges 
     that the fast changing acquisition process and 
     accompanying practices are posing.


                          early reform efforts

       While I know that the theme of this conference is about the 
     twentieth anniversary of the law on OT&E, for me, OT&E's 
     relevance to OSD goes back, not twenty years, but well over 
     thirty years. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, also known 
     as the Fitzhugh Commission, addressed a whole host of defense 
     management issues, to include ``Defense acquisition policies 
     and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and 
     quality.''
       This Commission found the acquisition strategies in being 
     then to be ``highly inflexible . . . and also based on the 
     false premise that technological difficulties can be foreseen 
     prior to the detailed engineering effort on specific 
     hardware.''
       With respect to OT&E, the Blue Ribbon Presidential 
     Commission made several cogent observations. Let me, once 
     again, recall for you four of them, because they relate to 
     early involvement by operational testers, joint test 
     capability, and T&E funding--all of which are coming around 
     again as important issues:
       It has been customary to think of OT&E in terms of physical 
     testing. While operational testing is a very important 
     activity . . . it is emphasized that the goal is operational 
     evaluation and that physical testing is only one means of 
     attaining that goal. This is an important point, since it is 
     often argued that operational testing must await production 
     of an adequate number of operationally-configured systems; 
     and, by this time, it is too late to use the information 
     gathered to help decide whether to procure the new system or 
     even influence in any significance way the nature of the 
     system procured.
       If OT&E, as a total process, is to be effective, it must 
     extend over the entire life cycle of a system, from initial 
     requirements to extending its life by adaptation to new uses. 
     It must use analytical studies, operations research, systems 
     analysis, component testing, testing of other systems, and 
     eventually testing of the system itself.
       There is no effective method for conducting OT&E that cuts 
     across Service lines although, in most actual combat 
     environments, the U.S. must conduct combined operations.
       Because funds earmarked for OT&E do not have separate 
     status in the budget, or in program elements, they are often 
     vulnerable to diversion to other purposes.


                             dot&e history

       Some ten or more years after the recommendations of the 
     Fitzhugh Commission, the Congress perceived a lack of 
     responsiveness on the part of the Office of the Secretary of 
     Defense with respect to the call for an independent entity 
     overseeing and reporting on OT&E. Congress then legislated 
     the creation of the D,OT&E in 1983. As many of us recall, the 
     Congressional Military Reform Caucus of the 1980s played the 
     key role in this initiative. Among the players in that reform 
     caucus and that legislation were names you would still 
     recognize: Dave Pryor, Bill Roth, Nancy Kassenbaum, Denny 
     Smith, Dick Cheney, Newt Gingrich, . . . They pushed through 
     legislation that created the DOT&E over the adamant 
     objections of the Pentagon, particularly from the acquisition 
     office at that time. Over the past twenty years, these 
     reformers and their successors have protected the office and 
     the independence of OT&E from continued pressures to 
     eliminate or downgrade its function and to vitiate the 
     independence and influence of the OT&E community throughout 
     the Department.
       To my three predecessors as DOT&Es, we testers as well as 
     the men and women in our combat forces owe a great debt of 
     gratitude for their courageous efforts in protecting and 
     nourishing the independence and relevance of OT&E. Over the 
     years, each in some way stood up when it counted and made 
     significant contributions to strengthened testing in the 
     Department.
       It took over a year and a half after the landmark 
     legislation of 1983 to actually get the DOT&E office up and 
     running and to bring the first Director--Jack Krings--on-
     board.
       Jack did a masterful job of putting the office together and 
     on its feet. He took the initiative--against the grain in 
     most cases--to initiate many of the processes and activities 
     that we take for granted now: the notion of Early Operational 
     Assessments; responsive reports on systems to the decision-
     makers in the building and on the Hill; the Central T&E 
     Investment Program; and DOT&E oversight of the Automated 
     Information Systems.
       Cliff Duncan, who headed the office during the first 
     President Bush's administration, expanded on many of Jack's 
     initiatives, pushed earlier involvement by OTers and enhanced 
     the evaluation capabilities of the organization with 
     particular focus on Independent Evaluations by DOT&E.
       In the 1990s, when the budgets for testing and the 
     infrastructure were being slashed by the Services, there was 
     not a greater champion for testing than Phil Coyle. And I 
     believe his vision for ``testing as learning'' and ``making 
     it all count'' will continue to guide DOT&E as it adapts 
     to new acquisition strategies.
       Over the years, we've developed a ritual here at the NDIA 
     Conference. That is, every year we give Phil Coyle a copy of 
     the Annual Report. We won't disappoint him this year. Here is 
     your very own copy. All the rest of you will be able to see 
     what is in it early tomorrow, when it appears on Phil's web 
     site.
       One thing that Phil tried very hard to promote while he was 
     the DOT&E was the proper use of models and situations. It fit 
     in well with the Blue Ribbon Panel comment: that the goal is 
     operational evaluation and that physical testing is only one 
     means of attaining that goal. He had one of the most 
     favorable environments in which to promote modeling and 
     simulation that will be around for many administrations: the 
     use of modeling and simulation in T&E became one of the 
     ``Bill Perry's Themes.'' But, in the end, despite Phil's 
     dedicated efforts, I contend that modeling and simulation in 
     support of T&E has been a mixed bag, at best.


 my legacy: early involvement, no surprises and the warfighter as the 
                                customer

       As I walked through this short history, you may have 
     wondered what my hopes and desires for the office are. Making 
     early involvement pay off, cutting down on surprises, better 
     serving the operator--these are among my hopes.
       Of course, early involvement is not new to DOT&E. Jack 
     Krings did the first early operational assessment, and Phil 
     Coyle worked hard to great effect to make it the normal way 
     of doing business. There is tremendous power that comes from 
     having operational testers involved early. Some of that power 
     is technical, and some of it comes from the added credibility 
     of having an independent tester looking at the system from 
     the outset.
       Obviously, if operational testers, to include my office, 
     are involved in programs from the outset--reviewing 
     requirements or desired capabilities; developing and 
     assessing test plans, to include development testing; 
     participating in critical design reviews; monitoring closely 
     DT along with the deficiencies and corrections that arise 
     from it--all of these efforts help to preclude the big 
     surprises at the last stage of programs that operational 
     testers are blamed for.


                     the warfighter is the customer

       Another direction that I have emphasized is a refocus on 
     who our customer really is. The operational test community, 
     to include DOT&E, should consider the prime customer for 
     its efforts to be the user--the men and women in the 
     trenches, on-board the ships, flying our fighter/attack 
     aircraft, maintaining our complex systems, etc., etc. We 
     are in an era where we are rushing to field new equipment 
     to the warfighters in the Global War on Terrorism. We need 
     to be timely and we need to tell it like it is in 
     informing them of the capabilities and limitations of the 
     new system they are being asked to employ in the field.
       In that context, I see a critical need to expand our 
     contacts with operational users across-the-board and to 
     cultivate them as principal recipients of our assessments. 
     Right or wrong, the concept of milestone-driven OT&E appears 
     to be becoming a process of the past. Either we change our 
     way of doing business, adapt to the new acquisition paradigms 
     and the realities of the war on terrorism, or we will find 
     ourselves becoming irrelevant with dire consequences for our 
     operational forces. When so many of our systems go to war 
     before IOT&E and before full rate production, users need up-
     to-the-minute, continuous T&E to keep them informed of system 
     capabilities and limitations. Even after fielding, the 
     acquisition community needs continuous evaluation to feed 
     spiral development and other evolutionary acquisition 
     concepts.


                      mission focus/joint testing

       Also important, I would like to continue the evolving 
     improvements to the OT&E process we have seen over the years: 
     early involvement--testable operational requirements; backing 
     away from the ``pass/fail'' mentality; truly testing for 
     learning; mission-oriented focus; more emphasis on 
     evaluation. These are all very ``old-time,'' but

[[Page S6934]]

     just as true now as in 1970. Developing and fielding joint 
     force capabilities requires adequate, realistic test and 
     evaluation in a joint operational context. To do this, the 
     Department will need to provide new testing capabilities and 
     institutionalize the evaluation of joint system effectiveness 
     as part of new capabilities-based processes. DOT&E has been 
     directed to develop a roadmap no later than May 2004 that 
     addresses the changes necessary to ensure that test and 
     evaluation is conducted in a joint environment to enhance 
     fielding of needed joint capabilities. We are working with 
     the Service and Defense Agency test communities to satisfy 
     this direction.


                      acquisition system comments

       You all know that the acquisition process changes much 
     faster than we actually acquire anything. DoD would be much 
     better off if we could produce systems as fast as we produce 
     new Acquisition Regulations. So a major acquisition program 
     during its development passes through, not just milestones 
     that used to be called 1,2,3 and are now called A, B, C, but 
     perhaps even several whole acquisition processes. Programs, 
     such as the V-22 Osprey and the F-22 Raptor, have seen an 
     acquisition system that has been called Need-Based, then one 
     called Simulation-Based, then one called (in the Air Force) 
     Reality-Based, and now one called Capability-Based. These 
     changes are not at the root of the problems encountered by 
     these programs, but they certainly haven't helped. The 
     situation may be getting worse rather than better: I believe 
     I am the first DOT&E to sign two versions of the 5000.2 and 
     I've been in the job less than three years.


               testing to support new acquisition styles

       Among the major new initiatives, as I just mentioned, is 
     Capabilities-Based Acquisition. The idea here, as I see it, 
     is a continuous process of design, development and testing of 
     a new concept or system until we demonstrate and validate a 
     level of capability deemed worth considering for procurement 
     and deployment. At that point, the decision-maker--hopefully, 
     based on the informed advice of the potential user as well as 
     the acquisition and testing communities--decides that the 
     system has indeed demonstrated a needed warfighting 
     capability and approves advancing it, perhaps into full-scale 
     engineering development, or even directly into production and 
     deployment to our operational forces. One of the features of 
     this approach is that, up to this point, there are no hard 
     and fast requirements, threat-based or otherwise, against 
     which to measure the operational effectiveness or suitability 
     of the system. I said two years ago, ``How all this will work 
     in detail is still a little murky.'' We are still feeling our 
     way. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is a major test 
     bed, in fact, for the operational test community in working 
     with this new acquisition paradigm. In this approach to 
     acquisition, we testers won't be making judgments as to a 
     system's effectiveness or suitability against some ORD-based 
     bench-marks, but rather presenting our best judgment as to 
     the capability demonstrated to-date in whatever 
     environments--open-air testing, hardware-in-the-loop, or 
     human-in-the-loop--the system has been subjected to. 
     Interesting enough, we have some helpful guidance in a 
     statement in the new 5000.1 DoD Directive: The Defense 
     Acquisition System. The Directive has only three policies 
     identified, the second of which I quote: ``The primary 
     objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire quality 
     products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements 
     to mission capability and operational support, in a timely 
     manner, and at a fair and reasonable price.''


             methodology: mission focus/comparison testing

       This directs me, as I see it, to define some marks on the 
     wall with respect to capabilities that must be improved upon. 
     It also keeps a strong mission-oriented focus. The 
     ``measurable improvement'' phase in the new 5000.1 also 
     highlights the need for comparative evaluations to show 
     improvement. When formal requirements are missing, the 
     current mission capability provides a natural point from 
     which to measure any improvement. This may seem like a simple 
     idea. And we have used it in a number of cases to assist the 
     evaluation. For example, in one Army system, the requirements 
     had specified a timeline for movement after shooting. Well, 
     that requirement was not met in testing, but did that mean 
     the system was ineffective? When we compared the actual time 
     to that of the current system, we found that the new system 
     provided significantly better survivability, even though it 
     did not meet the ``Requirement.'' We used the comparison as 
     part of the justification for calling the system effective.
       Now the comparison test idea is often criticized--
     understandably so in many instances--as being expensive. We 
     need to move to collect data on the capabilities of current 
     systems and forces from ongoing exercises in order to avoid 
     burdening new programs with the time and resources needed to 
     test and collect such data to establish a baseline. But that 
     will require establishing meaningful, accredited databases 
     for operational capabilities of existing forces/equipment/
     TTPs. As Walt well knows, the information from tests--the 
     databases--quickly become unusable. Archiving the databases 
     should be part of a more robust T&E infrastructure.


       testing to support acquisition: t&e infrastructure/people

       While Spiral Development and Block Upgrades might be 
     somewhat different animals, their treatment by the T&E 
     community is somewhat similar. As an aside, we have quite a 
     bit of experience with such approaches, particularly in 
     testing software-intensive systems to include the myriad of 
     automated information systems. Here, we plan our T&E 
     strategies to assess incremental improvements in capabilities 
     as opposed to using the full-up, or ultimate, system 
     requirements spelled out in an operational requirements 
     document as a benchmark. At the least, our assessments should 
     consider whether each spiral or block provides a measurable 
     improvement in military capability over its predecessor. What 
     may be called spiral or block developments, may just be 
     the block upgrades of the past. The T&E community has 
     dealt with those for quite some time now. We should step 
     back now and translate our lessons learned in this context 
     into more concrete policies or strategies for the future.
       Undoubtedly, the biggest financial commitment by a program 
     in this context will be to field the first spiral or Block I. 
     Therefore, at a minimum, Block I should clearly demonstrate 
     that it does not represent a decrease in military capability 
     over legacy systems. In addition, If new functionality is 
     added in a spiral or block, we will probably need to carry 
     out some level of regression testing. There will also have to 
     be some assessment of the growth potential of this spiral or 
     block.
       The new functionality--if it is to be worth the disruption 
     to the force by requiring retraining, additional training or 
     new operational concepts--ought to represent a significant 
     improvement that should be easy to confirm. We should accept 
     it as our responsibility to confirm, not only that 
     improvement, but that the system continues to be effective 
     and suitable for combat after fielding. In spiral 
     developments, we will need a formal feedback mechanism--
     spiral reporting, so to speak--to ensure that problems or 
     deficiencies identified in T&E for each spiral are addressed 
     and corrected by the developer. The information needs during 
     spiral development seem to include at least: (1) what is the 
     added capability of the new spiral, (2) what direction should 
     the next spiral take to address the residual deficiencies of 
     the incomplete system and (3) is the new spiral's increase in 
     capability worth the disruption of introducing it into the 
     force--the reconfiguration, the revised training or the 
     changed tactics, techniques and procedures the new spiral 
     might imply.
       These considerations lead me to a need for some form of 
     continuous testing, evaluation and reporting even after the 
     system is deployed. Presumably, with increased use of 
     spirals, there will be many more potential engineering change 
     proposals. Hopefully, priorities accorded these proposals 
     will be based on evaluation of data that shows what needs to 
     be fixed depending on the most value to the war fighter.
       We need to look to the future beyond the items addressed 
     above--the increasing complexity of systems and tactics to be 
     tested, the need for better trained people in the T&E 
     business, the massive amounts of data becoming available and 
     the concomitant requirement for more sophisticated evaluation 
     techniques/approaches.


            t&e infrastructure/tools/modeling and simulation

       Let me address in some fashion the modeling and simulation 
     disappointment which I inferred earlier. A success story in 
     this context is the AIM-9X. But you have to understand the 
     very special circumstances of that success. First and 
     foremost, the contractor was willing to go down the path. The 
     model was developed by the contractor and was open to the 
     government. The DT program was used to develop and validate 
     the model. The model was a design tool. The OT program also 
     validated the model. The close collaboration of government 
     and contractor was necessary where there are too many cases 
     to cover in a live test program. In the Aim-9X, there were 
     over 500 scenarios that were in the Operational Requirements 
     Document.
       However, the experience with M&S, overall, has been a major 
     disappointment of promises undelivered. Why? First, there 
     have been unreasonable expectations. Surely, some design 
     problems can be modeled, but these tend to be small changes 
     in well-understood designs. Defense systems do not tend to be 
     of this ilk. When the system technology is cutting edge, its 
     real limits are probably not well understood. You cannot 
     replace testing with modeling in that case. As Jack Krings 
     used to say, model to interpolate, not extrapolate.
       Second is the money problem. Many program managers would 
     like to finance the development of models with money from 
     testing--trade off testing for modeling. That timing is off--
     modeling, to be successful, has to start early; using OT 
     money is too late. The trade is not what ought to be the 
     goal. Defense systems encounter a lot of problems in 
     development--a fact that the OT community is painfully aware 
     of because so many of those problems appear in IOT&E. To 
     overcome these, in the best case, takes additional time and 
     money. The role of modeling should be as something extra that 
     can be done to help the success of the program--not some 
     trade off with testing.


              t&e infrastructure/resources/t&e cycle time

       Unfortunately, I am concerned that our T&E infrastructure 
     is not in the best of

[[Page S6935]]

     shape needed to meet the challenges of the future. Past 
     failures of the acquisition process, with all the program 
     slips, have tended to ease the burden faced by the test 
     ranges. Lord knows what would happen if all the programs that 
     claimed to be ready for testing in 2004 actually showed up 
     for testing. If the latest acquisition initiatives deliver 
     what they hope for, then a greater fraction of programs 
     should be ready for testing on or near their schedules. In 
     this respect, I fear the T&E community might not be prepared 
     for success in acquisition reform. A capable test 
     infrastructure to include appropriate targets, 
     instrumentation, etc., will have to be available at our test 
     ranges and facilities.
       So, what's the bottom line? First and foremost, we have a 
     lot to be proud of over the past several years in our 
     demonstrated flexibility and responsiveness to an ever-
     changing acquisition landscape. Our record of early 
     involvement and the fruits of that involvement are also 
     praiseworthy. We have not choice but to continue and even 
     expand our involvement earlier and continuously throughout 
     the life cycle of systems. But, I am concerned with the 
     increasing demands on our resources necessary to make those 
     involvements continue to pay off.
       We need to do more in cultivating and serving the users, 
     the operational forces, as prime customers for our products. 
     The Joint Test and Evaluation Capability should play a big 
     role here. Warfighters need to know the capabilities and 
     limitations of the new systems they are deploying, based on 
     our best estimates of what the testing to-date has 
     demonstrated.
       The Joint Test and Evaluation Capability will probably 
     borrow a lot from the Joint Training Capability. One key that 
     I believe will connect them is the careful enumeration of the 
     military tasks that is catalogued in the Universal Joint Task 
     List. The tasks, standards, and conditions there can be a 
     basis for comparison of current and new capabilities. It 
     ought to be an important item in the new ``Requirements 
     Generation'' process we will hear about later that is called 
     JCIDS--the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
     System.
       While acquisition reform has aimed at making substantial 
     reductions in cycle-time, by at least a half in most cases, 
     we in the testing community should be looking at ways of 
     cutting testing turn-around times in half.
       I reject the claims of the many critics of the testing 
     process that overall OT&E costs and schedules are excessive--
     in fact, they're a very small part of system costs (recent 
     Rand study); the costs of skipping tests, of avoiding 
     adequate tests, of skimping on either DT or OT can be huge 
     (as well as cause loss of lives). We started the RAH-66 
     Comanche, V-22 Osprey and F-22 Raptor programs in the early 
     1980s. After roughly $7 billion and twenty years of effort, 
     the Comanche is being terminated while still several years 
     from its IOT&E and a production decision. The V-22 program 
     has spent over $16 billion and taken more than twenty years, 
     during which it unfortunately skimped on DT and paid the 
     price in a failed OPEVAL in 2000. It is now embarked on an 
     event-driven test program that will culminate in a second 
     OPEVAL in early 2005. After $36 billion and nearly twenty 
     years in development, the F-22 is about to enter its IOT&E 
     heading for a production decision this coming fall. Now, I 
     challenge you to show me where operational testing has held 
     these programs up or has cost us an arm and a leg as some of 
     our critics would claim.
       In closing, I continue to believe the T&E community--in 
     both industry and government, both technical and operational 
     testers--has served the department very well over the years. 
     The success of our operational forces in the last several 
     conflicts reflects that dedication to deploying systems 
     proven effective, suitable and survivable on our ranges and 
     in our facilities. But, the increasing complexity of systems 
     and tactics should be tested, the need for better trained 
     people in the T&E busienss, the massive amounts of data 
     becoming available and the concomitant requirement for more 
     sophisticated evaluation techniques/approaches, all call for 
     new and innovative strategies and capabilities for T&E. I 
     hope this conference does not degenerate into a reminiscence 
     session. We face challenges in the future as we have in the 
     past in ensuring that our soldiers, sailors and airmen are 
     equipped with the best equipment our nation can provide.
  Mr. ALLARD. This quote that I just shared describes exactly what he 
is doing with testing and the Missile Defense Program. Heavy 
involvement in the developmental test program, with the intent to 
achieve operational test goals during development, continued test 
evaluation assessments to keep the warfighter informed of system 
capabilities and limitations, and continuous evaluation after fielding 
to feed spiral development. That is the role the Director of the OT&E 
describes for himself, and that is the role he is playing in missile 
defense testing.
  Everyone on both sides of the aisle, and I would add everyone in the 
Pentagon, supports operational realistic testing of the ballistic 
missile defense system, and that is why we are building a missile 
defense test bed today. That is why the Director of OT&E has over 100 
operational test agents influencing and providing input for the GMD. 
That is why military operators are being used in the tests. Perhaps 
more importantly, that is why operational test goals are incorporated 
into each developmental test.
  Now, make no mistake, the threat drives this program. We are building 
missile defenses to meet that threat. The test bed is needed to perform 
operationally realistic tests of the ballistic missile defense system 
and testing will proceed, becoming progressively more realistic, and 
will improve the system. Yet it is these same test bed capabilities 
that would afford us an early operational capability.
  We cannot forget that we have no defense against long-range missiles. 
The Armed Services Committee has seen intelligence information which 
illustrates, more than ever, that the ballistic missile threat is real 
and growing. We are vulnerable and it is time to change that 
vulnerability. We need a missile defense capability in the field as 
soon as possible. For that reason, I will oppose the Reed amendment as 
it was introduced, and I urge my colleagues to oppose those efforts 
that would tie up our system in a way that adds delays and adds to our 
inability to defend ourselves from emerging threats in other parts of 
the world.
  With the Warner second-degree amendment, my view of this amendment of 
Senator Reed changes; that is, if we adopt the Warner amendment. This 
is why I think we need to support Senator Warner's amendment. The 
intent is to assure that the Department of Defense conducts operational 
realistic testing of the BMD system and to support Senator Warner's 
second-degree amendment because I believe we will achieve our common 
goal of operational, realistic testing while avoiding some of the 
potential pitfalls.
  Everyone on both sides supports operational realistic testing, as I 
mentioned earlier, on the ballistic missile system. I certainly support 
the Senator's intent to make sure the BMD system is tested. The 
question is how best to test effectively while improving system 
capabilities and fielding capabilities as quickly as we can.
  Formal operation and testing carries with it certain requirements 
where there can be no developmental goals. Contractors cannot be 
involved and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation approves 
of the operational test plan.
  I think the Warner amendment improves on what was proposed by the 
Senator from Rhode Island. This is operational testing.
  Again, as I said earlier, we are looking at a two-way path here. 
While we are doing testing, we want to get something in place that is 
operational. The more we tie this down in a step-by-step process, which 
happens with the Reed amendment, with accountability on every little 
finite step in development, the more you delay the process and the more 
you add to the cost of the program. That is why I am supporting the 
Warner amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. ALLARD. I ask for an additional 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. He is yielded an 
additional minute.
  Mr. ALLARD. What happens with the step-by-step process in the Reed 
amendment which leads to delays and additional costs, the Warner 
amendment refines that down so it is more streamlined and becomes 
palatable to us who would like to see rapid deployment of some kind of 
missile defense system for this country.
  It is not going to be perfect. That is why we have spiral 
development. We are going to develop it and improve upon it with time. 
This is a process we have used before. It works and it is something 
that is going to assure us that we will have security rapidly deployed 
for this country where we have emerging threats in Iran and North 
Korea.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. He yields 
the floor. Who yields time?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island has 35 minutes 
38 seconds remaining.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, if you could interrupt in 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.

[[Page S6936]]

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I was very interested in hearing about the 
letter from Mr. Christie. I have not seen it. I am getting a copy of 
it.
  But as I heard my colleague from Colorado, Mr. Christie seems to be 
saying that this system is not ready for operational testing yet, that 
it was premature to operationally test it. But it is ready for 
deployment in September? I think the notion of deployment is this thing 
is ready to operate; certainly it is at least ready to begin the 
threshold operation for testing. So I can't think of anything else that 
more strongly emphasizes the need for operational testing.
  We have all heard the terminology, evolutionary spiral development, 
new techniques, et cetera, but the basic question here is: Does it 
work? No evolutionary spiral jargon avoids that question. Related to 
the question, does it work, is: What can it do? What do we expect this 
system to do? And then, of course, you validate that by testing under 
realistic conditions.
  None of this is taking place. None of this is planned. I believe my 
colleagues when they say they want to see this operational testing. But 
there is no plan to operationally test now.

  I find interesting the notion that Mr. Christie says it is premature 
to test, yet in the amendment to my amendment offered by Senator Warner 
there is a specific deadline of October 1, 2005, that a test will be 
completed.
  My amendment doesn't do that because I do recognize the fact that 
these are very difficult technological issues, that there is great 
concern about getting the system up and running. There are multiple 
pieces from space-based radar to ships at sea to land-based radar to 
booster rockets and kill vehicles. Yet interestingly enough, the Warner 
amendment would lock in a date of October 1, 2005, to test the 
ballistic missile system. Yet Mr. Christie is talking about it is too 
premature, et cetera.
  I think the approach I have taken is simply saying at some time in 
the future we need operational testing. Please lay out a plan--a plan, 
of course, can be modified--and before these new steps in the process 
are put into effect, let's have the operational testing. I think it 
makes a great deal more sense.
  Also, there is a question about limiting developmental testing and 
operational testing by saying, when you do operational testing, you 
can't do developmental testing. Actually both can be conducted in 
virtually the same test. I think one of the major differences between 
developmental testing and operational testing is that developmental 
testing is designed by the proponent agency and the contractors and 
they are supervised by the proponent agencies and contractors. 
Operational testing is designed by Dr. Christie's office, the Office of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, and supervised and conducted by those 
individuals from that particular office. It is quite appropriate. It is 
done frequently.
  The Patriot was an example of a system that had both operational and 
developmental testing taking place. Indeed, the Patriot is another good 
example of the need for operational testing.
  The upgrade PAC-3 missile defense system had a very good record when 
it was in its developmental phase. It was just doing extremely well. 
Then they started the operational combat, realistic test phase, and the 
Patriot PAC-3 failed each of these operational tests. It had four 
consecutive operational test failures. What did that suggest to you 
about this system? This system might pass all these tests, as some have 
argued watered down as they are, but it could pass all of them. Well, 
the PAC-3 system passed all the development tests and then had four 
consecutive failures in a row in an operational test.
  If we have four consecutive failures in a real operational test of 
this system, I think the American people will be quite shocked, given 
the fact we are not planning any operational test, yet we are deploying 
the system.
  Luckily, with the PAC-3, there was time to fix the problem.
  These operational tests were not only conducted, but the problems 
were fixed. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the system was deployed. It 
worked very well when it engaged missiles. But again, there are still 
some difficulties. At least one friendly aircraft was engaged and 
destroyed by a PAC-3 system. Two were destroyed, suggesting that all 
the problems with the system in terms of target identification, in 
terms of proper response and enemy versus friendly targets in the air 
have not been fully resolved. It is a complex system. This system is 
much more complex and complicated. But the PAC-3 is a very good example 
of what we should be doing here--that is, operational testing, learning 
from those tests, fix the system, and keep doing it continuously.
  Again, I think it is an interesting notion about this spiral 
development and everything else. There has to be consistent, constant 
testing because that is how you learn so you can make the changes. Yet, 
again, we don't have an operational test planned for this particular 
system. I believe we have to have something like that. Again, the 
national missile system is very complex. We have to have this system.
  Part of the Warner amendment to my amendment takes out the Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation and lets the Secretary of Defense 
prescribe the criteria. Let me suggest that in the last several years, 
Dr. Christie has been advising and consulting. But nothing has happened 
in terms of operational testing. Each year, he reports to his superiors 
and to the public at large. In each one of those reports, he calls for 
more realistic testing. Apparently he is consulting and is not 
particularly effective. But that is exactly what the Warner amendment 
to my amendment would do--simply make him a consultant.
  The reality is, as a consultant, his voice would be no more prominent 
than it is today. We don't have an operational testing plan. We have 
not conducted operational testing yet, and yet we are deploying the 
system. It seems to me that the Warner amendment waters down further 
the operational testing. He calls it operational testing, but then it 
takes out the operational testing, giving it to the Secretary of 
Defense.
  We have seen that this Secretary of Defense is committed to getting 
this program into the ground by September of this year regardless. That 
doesn't give me and I don't think it should give the public the 
confidence that a rigorous realistic testing scheme will be developed. 
But then the amendment goes on to say within a year we are going to 
have that, we are going to mandate the test. It seems to be slightly 
schizophrenic. We don't want the normal procedures, we don't want the 
Director of Test and Evaluation to be doing it, we want the Secretary 
of Defense to do it, but he is going to do it by October 1 of 2005.
  Again, I don't think the amendment really responds to the problem and 
the issue. The issue and the problem is developing, as we have done for 
every other system. PAC-3 is an excellent example of operational 
testing and planning, and then ensuring that the operational tests take 
place--not just calling for operational tests but having the 
independent operational testing agency within the Pentagon designing 
and conducting the test. That is what my amendment does. It doesn't 
call for any specific deadline. If the conclusion of Mr. Christie were 
to be that it couldn't be feasible for 18 months or 2 years, at least 
we have gotten an operational test plan, and we will conduct the test. 
That, to me, would be a vast improvement over the current situation.
  I hope my colleagues will not favorably respond to Senator Warner's 
amendment and give me a chance to have this amendment agreed to.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I support the Warner amendment to the Reed 
amendment because it adds flexibility with accountability. The second-
degree amendment will allow the Missile Defense Program to field 
capabilities expeditiously and to improve those capabilities rapidly 
and avoids the disadvantages I see in Senator Reed's approach, which 
requires realistic testing broken off into blocks.
  Specifically, Senator Warner's second-degree amendment will require 
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of OT&E, to 
set forth formal criteria to define operationally realistic testing for 
the ballistic missile defense system as a spiral development program. 
It will require operationally realistic testing consistent

[[Page S6937]]

with those criteria during the fiscal year 2005, and it will require 
operationally realistic testing of each block or spiral of the 
ballistic missile defense system.
  The Warner second-degree amendment provides the flexibility needed to 
incorporate both operational test goals and developmental test goals in 
missile defense tests--flexibility that is denied in the Reed 
amendment. Thus, it avoids the substantial replanning, delay, and 
additional costs that would result if the Reed amendment is adopted.
  But the second-degree amendment also helps ensure that the testing of 
the missile defense system is realistic and will result in a well-
tested system that will be capable of defending our Nation. It requires 
a formal and appropriate role for the Director of OT&E, and it requires 
this realistic testing to be conducted during fiscal year 2005--almost 
certainly sooner than the formal OT&E required in Senator Reed's 
amendment, perhaps even sooner.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Warner second-degree amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am just a bit taken aback by the claim of 
flexibility. The Warner amendment actually sets out a date certain when 
the tests will be conducted. Particularly, since it is a year away, 
particularly Mr. Christie is talking about it is premature because it 
is in the developmental stage. I thought his letter was quite specific. 
The ground-based midcourse defense element is currently at a material 
level which requires continued developmental testing with oversight and 
assistance from operational testing personnel conducting realistic 
testing in the near term. I guess the question is, What is ``in the 
near term''? I suggest it would be a year or more. It would be 
premature and not beneficial to the program.
  Let me reiterate that this is an extraordinary letter. It says 
basically this system is not mature enough to test, but we are going to 
deploy it. I think that is very unusual, particularly given the history 
of having other systems where, even though they had not completed their 
operational testing--like the Predator and JSTARS--the plan for 
operational testing had already been sketched out--not by the Secretary 
of Defense but by the Office of the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation.
  I think the flexibility is in my central amendment. It talks about 
before you deploy a block or a spiral--the new terminology might be 
``spiral,'' but what they are going to do essentially is what we do so 
often: build the system to a certain capability; then, through tests or 
experience or through actual field trials, develop new software, new 
technology, and new complements that can make it better. At a certain 
point, rather than just simply tweaking here and there, you go back in 
and you develop a new block. That is roughly to me what the spiral 
development is, minus the catchphrase. Before you do that, we should 
have operational testing.
  I think this is a very critical aspect. My amendment does not intend 
to stifle flexibility. It has no correlation with deployment. That is 
an issue that is going to be determined--and has been determined. We 
had votes on that, but somewhere along the line we need to do 
operational testing.
  I must say I would be much more impressed with the degree of 
commitment to this operational testing if at least we had a plan for 
operational tests, a plan prepared by Mr. Christie. We do not have 
that. At least that would signal that we are serious about operational 
testing. In fact, that should have been done. It says this system is so 
immature that we cannot even get to the point of developing a plan to 
test.

  Once again, the amendment is not only reasonable but it is 
compelling. This is what we do when we develop systems. Again, I 
suggest it is something we should do.
  There is another aspect of my amendment which is very important and 
that is the baseline. Again, we have to know how much is being spent, 
what are the cost goals, what are the capability goals with respect to 
the system.
  The GAO discovered--we did not discover this because of the way the 
books are kept--a $1 billion cost overrun. Rather than reporting it, 
making it obvious or tracking it, they simply changed the cost goals. 
In conjunction with that, we find that rather than having 10 
interceptors, as they originally talked about in terms of cost goals, 
they now have 5 interceptors. The situation is that the costs have gone 
up by $1 billion and capability has gone down by half. Now we have a 
situation where we were unaware of it until the GAO discovered this.
  Call it spiral development, call it evolutionary development, that 
should not be. One would hope this sophisticated development process, 
this new form of development, would mean that costs are more 
transparent, more accurate, and the capability is more obvious. That 
does not seem to be the case.
  Along with the notion of developing operational testing is developing 
the baseline. None of that is in the Warner substitute to my amendment. 
I cannot see any discussion of establishing baselines, of making sure 
the costs are appropriate, of alerting Congress to overruns, rather 
than just changing goals.
  I hope my amendment would be adopted and could be adopted.
  I yield the floor, and ask at the conclusion we might think about 
whether it is appropriate to continue debating or to yield back time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, on this side, most Members have said 
whatever they want to say.
  I, again, state we have a number of amendments we dealt with last 
year and this year which, in effect, add delays because of an excess 
reevaluation of the program. What we are striving for is a commonsense 
approach to accountability in the missile defense program without so 
much evaluation that we delay it. Each delay adds more and more costs 
to the program. Then those people who oppose the missile defense 
program will use that as a reason to defeat the program.
  The fact is, right now we are in the process of putting those 
missiles in the ground. This fall we expect them to be operational. In 
order to have the proper developmental process in place, we have to 
have a test bed. While we are putting the test bed in place, it 
requires such a wide area we might as well make it operationally 
functional at the same time. That is what we are trying to do.
  The Warner amendment provides the flexibility but still the 
accountability that we need. I am happy with what he has laid out in 
that amendment.
  Dr. Thomas Christie has indicated time and time again that he is 
satisfied with his current role and the role his office plays in 
ballistic missile defense testing. He has testified. He states in his 
recent letter to me--and maybe I need to read the substance of this 
letter just to give my colleague an opportunity to hear clearly what 
his position is--the following:

       The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is building a BMDS test 
     bed that is essential to support realistic testing, and is 
     absolutely essential for conducting adequate operational 
     testing in the future. The test bed is also key to developing 
     operational concepts, techniques, and procedures, while 
     allowing my office to exploit and characterize its inherent 
     defense capability.
       The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is 
     currently at a maturity level that requires continued 
     developmental testing with oversight and assistance from 
     operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational 
     testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be 
     premature and not beneficial to the program.
       My office has unprecedented access to GMD, and I am 
     satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and 
     the test community. I will continue to advise the Secretary 
     of Defense and the Director, MDA, on the BMDS test program. I 
     will also provide my characterization of system capabilities, 
     and my assessment of test program adequacy annually, as 
     required by Congress.

  This is the chief accountability officer. He is responsible to make 
sure everything is ready to move forward. He is satisfied. There is no 
doubt that he is satisfied with the way things are going.
  In order to meet some of Senator Reed's concerns, the Warner 
amendment allows that. We address some of his concerns. Now we need to 
adopt the Warner amendment so we can still have the flexibility we need 
to deal with changing technology and perhaps

[[Page S6938]]

some unexpected events as we move forward.
  I don't think anyone who has watched the development of military 
systems ever figures we have it right the first time. We come awfully 
close. With each passing year, new technology evolves and new ideas 
evolve and there are things we can do to improve the system. That is 
what spiral development is all about.
  Again, Dr. Christie indicates that he is satisfied with his role and 
the role his office plays in the Missile Defense Program. He states 
that his office has ``unprecedented access'' to the ground-based 
midcourse effort and that cooperation is very good between the program 
office and his office.
  He testified that he makes recommendations related to the 
developmental test program and his office has the ability to bring 
input into and influence the GMD test program.
  Again, to quote Dr. Christie:

       My staff and I remain involved on a daily basis with the 
     Missile Defense System and the BMDS element program offices 
     in order to ensure that operational tests are addressed in 
     their testing.
       We have over 100 operational test agents involved in the 
     missile defense test program. A considerable amount of 
     resources are being put forward to make sure we have 
     accountability.

  He goes on and indicates again that he is clearly satisfied with 
emphasis on operational test goals in the BMD system test plan. I will 
quote directly:

       The GMD [Ground-based Midcourse] program combined test 
     force effectively integrated the operational testers into the 
     program development activities and the test design and 
     planning efforts.

  He approved the operational test goals for the last three integrated 
flight tests.
  He recently testified as follows:

       While I am very encouraged by the improved testing 
     environment and capability that the BMDS test bed will 
     provide, I am even more pleased with the increased emphasis 
     on system integration and user involvement that I have seen 
     over the past year.

  We go on and on about his testimony as to how he has testified. The 
fact is, it is working. We are ready to put it in the ground this fall. 
We all recognize there are going to be improvements as we move along, 
but we are in a position to make those improvements.
  I think the commonsense approach is to support the Warner amendment. 
I support it and encourage my colleagues to support it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Rhode 
Island have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 20 minutes 20 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask the Senator if he will yield me 8 minutes.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Rhode 
Island simply says that the usual rules will apply in this case, that 
we are not going to change the rules because some people believe 
strongly this is an important weapons system. We have lots of important 
weapons systems of which we apply the rules that you must have 
operational testing at some point.
  Now, there have been a couple of instances where operational testing 
has been delayed until after there has been some deployment, but there 
has been operational testing then. There have been plans for 
operational testing. The two examples which are used frequently are 
JSTARS and an unmanned aerial vehicle called Predator. Those are the 
two examples that have been used where a system has been deployed or 
partially deployed, and then the operational testing has occurred after 
that deployment.
  But in those two cases--this is the critical issue which the Senator 
from Rhode Island addresses--as in all other cases, operational testing 
has occurred; and it has been designed by and implemented by the 
independent Office of Test and Evaluation.
  The difference between the amendment offered by the Senator from 
Rhode Island and the second-degree amendment offered by the Senator 
from Virginia is that the Senator from Rhode Island preserves the rule, 
which as far as I can tell has never been violated, that the Office of 
Test and Evaluation does the testing. That is an independent test 
office.
  Too often these days we see rules being ignored in order to meet some 
particular goal: We are not going to apply the Constitution here 
because we have needs over here. We are not going to apply the usual 
rules as to how we treat captives and how we treat prisoners because we 
have other needs over here. We are going to bend rules. We are going to 
ignore rules because of some particular goal that exists.
  In this case, there is a proposal made that we ignore the rule, which 
has been in place for I don't know how many years, with a very 
important purpose behind it: that we have independent testing of 
weapons systems before or during or at some point after deployment by 
an independent test office--not by the Department of Defense in 
consultation with the test office but by that test office itself. It is 
the way we have protected our men and women in the military, to make 
sure that weapons systems work. It is the way we have protected this 
Nation, by making sure that weapons systems work.
  We should not make an exception for it here. No matter how strongly 
people feel national missile defense will contribute to our national 
security, it will only contribute to our security if it works. To make 
sure it works, you need an independent testing office to do the testing 
and to lay out the criteria--not to consult, not to have a voice, but 
to do what they do with all other weapons systems that we deploy, which 
is to do the testing themselves.

  This amendment does not prevent the administration from deploying 
missile defenses prior to operational testing. That was the amendment 
which was just defeated. This amendment allows that deployment but says 
you have to have operational testing sometime, at some point, and--this 
is the difference between the first-degree and the second-degree 
amendment--in the case of the first-degree amendment, that testing has 
to be done by that independent Office of Test and Evaluation, as all 
other testing of all other weapons systems that we have been able to 
research. You have to have plans. You have to make a decision: Yes, we 
are going to test this, and we are going to have our independent Office 
of Test and Evaluation do it.
  Now, as I said, some defense programs have been deployed before 
operational testing was completed, and among them is the Predator, 
which was deployed in Kosovo in 1999, prior to the initial operational 
test and evaluation. But the operational testing for the Predator was 
planned for long before the Kosovo deployment, and it was completed in 
the next year after that deployment. The testing was done by that 
independent office, not by people who are out there in the field 
arguing for a system, but independently by the independent test office.
  The JSTARS surveillance aircraft is another example of a military 
system which was deployed prior to operational testing. There was a 
great need. It was decided they could do the operational testing after 
the deployment. So two JSTARS aircraft were deployed during Desert 
Storm in 1991.
  Interestingly enough, following that deployment, the Senate Armed 
Services Committee wanted to accelerate the program, but the Air Force 
thought the effort in the gulf war had not alleviated the need for 
operational testing. Indeed, it illuminated areas that needed more 
attention in development. So operational testing was performed on 
JSTARS in 1995, and the operational tests revealed some significant 
problems. Some of those problems in JSTARS, which independent 
operational testing--and the word ``independent'' is just as important 
as the word ``operational'' and just as important as the word 
``testing''--those independent operational tests revealed some 
significant problems, including the inability to operate at the 
required altitude, inadequate tactics and procedures, and inadequate 
mission reliability and time-on-station.
  What this amendment would do is to insist that the usual rules about 
operational testing by an independent test office apply here, not 
before deployment--that approach was defeated when the Boxer amendment 
was defeated--but at least sometime, and sometime is critically 
important, and just as critical is that those tests be done not just in 
consultation with but by the Office of Test and Evaluation.

[[Page S6939]]

  If you do not like the rules, change the rules, change the law about 
OT&E, the Office of Test and Evaluation, change the law, but do not 
simply say we are going to ignore the law here because that law has an 
important purpose. That law requiring independent test and evaluation 
is a law which every Member of this body ought to defend. We fought a 
long time to put it in place. It has had some wonderful results. Our 
weapons systems have worked better because we have an independent 
office that does the testing.
  So it is not good enough, as the second-degree amendment says: Well, 
we will have some consultation with that independent office. That does 
not give them the critical decision as to whether a weapons system is 
effective or is not effective. To put billions of dollars into systems 
which are not shown to be effective at some point, which are not 
operationally tested at some point by an independent office, is to 
increase the likelihood that billions of dollars will be wasted.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Six minutes?
  Mr. REED. Six minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant Democratic leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, first, I share a name with the sponsor of 
this amendment. I have, once in a while, given him some advice. When it 
comes to military matters, there is no one who I have greater 
confidence in than the Senator from Rhode Island. He is the only Member 
of the Senate who is a graduate of the United States Military Academy 
at West Point. He is someone who has taught at that fine school. He is 
someone who has maintained his military contacts. And he is a student 
of what has been going on in the military since his retirement from the 
military. So I feel very confident and comfortable that the Senator--
being a member of this most important committee, the Armed Services 
Committee, and having offered this amendment--is trying to do what he 
believes is the right thing for this country.
  I express my appreciation to him for his studious efforts in offering 
this amendment and for often answering my questions about the military. 
He is such a valuable person to have in the Senate.
  As I told the majority leader a few weeks ago, when I get up in the 
morning, the first thing I read is the sports page. I do that because 
there is always some good news in it. The rest of the newspaper you 
have to search hard for the good news. But after I finish the sports 
page, I reluctantly go to the first section of the paper.
  This morning I went to the Washington Post. On the front page is a 
story. We have all seen the headlines about the 9/11 Commission, that 
according to available evidence, Iraq and Saddam Hussein had nothing to 
do with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Another front-page story dealt 
with Abu Ghraib prison and some of the abuses that took place there.
  On page 3 there is a feature story about a soldier that has been laid 
to rest in Arlington Cemetery. Page 4, there is some discussion about 
what we did yesterday dealing with the Leahy amendment.
  The reason I mention these items very briefly is, you have to go all 
the way to page A19--I was stunned when I read this--the fourth 
paragraph, to read:

       Three U.S. soldiers were also killed Wednesday. . . .

  It is like a throwaway.

       Three U.S. soldiers were also killed Wednesday. . . .

  Three more deaths didn't warrant anything better than a throwaway 
line in the fourth paragraph on the 19th page of this newspaper.
  We know these soldiers who have been killed--more than 800--are 
fathers, sons, neighbors, loved ones, all different categories. The 
families of these men and some women who have lost their lives since 
the war are paying a terrible price. I am stunned that we have come to 
the point in this war where we now say:

       Three U.S. soldiers were also killed Wednesday. . . .

  I don't know how to describe how I felt when I read that. These three 
soldiers deserved more than that.
  I hope we are not at a point where the death of American soldiers in 
combat is considered so routine that it is barely mentioned, and 
instead of meritorious placement in a newspaper, it is buried. We need 
to do better than that.
  Hopefully, one of the things this bill will do is focus attention on 
the sacrifices being made by the men and women in Iraq. I hope the 
families of these three men get more attention than page A19 in the 
future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Alabama is here. I 
appreciate Senator Sessions serving on the Strategic Subcommittee with 
me and serving on the Armed Services Committee. He works very hard on 
that committee. The defense of this country is important. He agrees 
with that. He brings a stroke of common sense to our deliberations 
which I, for one, truly appreciate. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator 
from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Allard for his 
leadership and his expertise. He is becoming perhaps the most 
authoritative Member of the Senate on this issue. He has worked on 
national missile defense since he has been in the Senate. It is great 
to work with him.
  We do need to do the right thing. We have committed as a country to 
deploy a national missile defense system. We voted to deploy that 
system as soon as technologically feasible. That was back in the 1990s, 
and President Clinton signed the statute we passed. I believe it got 
90-plus votes in the Senate. Although there were a lot of people who 
were opposed to it until the very end, in the end everybody realized 
that we needed to defend America, and we had the capability of doing 
so.
  There has been a cottage industry of skeptics out there that has made 
fun of President Reagan. They called his vision for national missile 
defense Star Wars. Then when President Reagan said no to Gorbachev's 
proposal in Reykjavik, which accepted so many of the things President 
Reagan wanted so badly but told President Reagan he would have to stop 
national missile defense, he thought about that very hard on the eve of 
the reelection campaign. He knew he would be criticized, but he said, 
no; national missile defense is important to America. It was important 
to peace in the world because, instead of worrying about how many of 
the enemy we could kill, we could begin focusing on how to protect our 
people from being killed by missile attacks. It was a defining moment 
in the cold war. One expert recently said that was the moment that 
signaled the end of the Soviet Union.
  We debated it here in the late 1990s. Senator Thad Cochran and Joe 
Lieberman proposed the deploying amendment to go from research and talk 
to actual deploying and setting a goal for it. We had a bipartisan 
national commission that unanimously voted that the threat to the 
United States from missile attack was real, more imminent than 
intelligence agencies had previously said, and that we needed to move 
forward to deploy a system.
  Under General Kadish, we have achieved a magnificent result. General 
Kadish--history will record--has been a tremendous leader, a man of 
substance and honesty and stability and good judgment, under all kinds 
of pressure. He has been beaten.
  Senator Levin, the ranking member on our committee, is such a fine 
Senator. He and Senator Reed have been critics of the program. They 
have raised questions about the program. I don't think it has hurt the 
program. It has probably helped the program. I know they have never 
been big fans of it. We made that decision.
  We are going forward today. The amendment Senator Reed has proposed, 
I am afraid, would cost us in the long run and provide little benefit. 
The provisions for cost, schedule, and performance baselines that he 
mandates have essentially been adopted now by the Department of 
Defense. It was part of a General Accounting Office study, and the 
Department of Defense has gone along with that study.
  The provision for conducting operationally realistic tests for each 
block configuration is not unreasonable. Each test we conduct today, 
however, has developmental objectives. And

[[Page S6940]]

since this statute would prohibit the agency from approving 
developmental tests, we would have a real problem there. Those tests 
may be a problem. Each test would have developmental capabilities. It 
would require a significant replanning of the test program, slow the 
development, and increase costs in the long run.
  We made a commitment to a new type of strategy for developing this 
unprecedented system. It is called spiral development. We said to the 
military, you develop this system. We are not going to put you in a 
straitjacket. We are going to allow you to move forward. And as you 
bring on new science and new capabilities, you decide and make 
recommendations to us as to how you would deploy it.
  Maybe we decided it would be unwise for us to mandate exactly how 
this system should come out. I think that is what I would have as my 
biggest complaint with Senator Reed's well-meaning amendment. I think 
it puts too much restraint on the freedom and initiative of the leaders 
in the Department of Defense to be creative in making the system and 
utilizing the money we put into the system effectively to come up with 
the best results.
  I have been extremely proud of what has been accomplished so far. In 
September, we will deploy a missile in Alaska--the spot in the world 
that allows us to protect all of our States. It can knock down missiles 
that might be produced by the North Koreans, who have acted bizarrely 
many times in recent years. It would also allow us to knock down a 
missile launched by mistake, which could happen at any time. It would 
not be a complete system yet, and we will begin to test from that 
platform. In other words, to have a national missile defense system, 
you have to have a headquarters, radar, a communications system, Aegis-
deployed radar to pick up missiles as soon as possible after launch.
  This system has to work together as a coherent whole, and you need to 
have the ability to identify early an incoming missile and knock it 
down. We have proven hit-to-kill technology, bullet hitting bullet, 
that has been proven in quite a number of tests, and we continue to try 
to make it even better. I think the best way to test the system is to 
go forward with the plan we have today, get it in the ground so we can 
test it in the harsh Alaskan winters, and in the summer, when the 
humidity is up and maybe there is condensation in the tubes, and we can 
see how the radar works, and we can make sure we can have communication 
with our ships and see how the command structure works in order to make 
a decision. That is the way we need to test.
  General Kadish and his team have accomplished a technological feat 
that many people in this country believe is second only to putting a 
man on the Moon. It is incredible. They have proven that they love 
America, that they are willing to advance rapidly toward a goal but at 
the same time be honest and prudent with the taxpayers' money.
  I would not favor an amendment that would constrict them too much. 
That is what I am afraid this amendment does. That is why I am 
supportive of Chairman Warner's proposal, which I think would 
accomplish much of what Senator Reed would favor, without adverse 
consequences.
  I thank the Chair and yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island has 7 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from Colorado has 29 minutes remaining.
  Mr. ALLARD. Does the Senator from Rhode Island wish to draw this to a 
close and move to a vote?
  Mr. REED. I think I will speak for about 5 minutes, and at that point 
we can call for a vote.
  Mr. ALLARD. And I will make just a brief closing comment for about a 
minute or two. Why don't we go ahead. The Senator can make his 
statement, then I will make my brief statement, and we will move 
forward to a vote. I think we may have to go into a quorum call briefly 
before the vote and get things in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, first, I want to emphasize, again, that this 
amendment does not affect the deployment decisions that have been made 
with respect to the missile system. Again, also, we have all talked 
about operational testing, its importance, and that you have to do it. 
I would be much more confident if, in fact, there was at least a plan 
today for operational testing. Mr. Christie and the Department of 
Defense could have developed that over the last year or two. His letter 
said this system is so immature that I cannot even begin to think about 
operational testing.
  Once again, let me raise the obvious. If it is that immature, then 
what do we have up in Alaska? Is it going to be a deployed missile 
system or a test bed? Or is it going to be both? That is the real core 
of my amendment. The real core is that sometimes, unrelated to 
deployment, we have to have operational testing.
  I argue that my amendment provides even more flexibility to the 
Department of Defense because it doesn't set a date certain of October 
1, 2005, when this test must be conducted. I don't think we can make 
that date, frankly. I think we will find ourselves back here on the 
next Defense authorization bill striking that, extending it, or pushing 
it out because, to me, that is an unrealistic, inflexible deadline.
  For that reason alone, I urge my colleagues to think particularly 
about the Warner amendment. There is a suggestion I would unduly hobble 
development. As I read Senator Warner's language, he directs the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure that each block configuration of the 
ballistic missile system is consistent with the operational scheme, 
which is precisely what I am saying. But I am not dictating a specific 
time to do that. The real key difference between Senator Warner's 
proposal and mine is that he is reversing the customary and prudent way 
to do independent operational testing. He is taking away the 
independence.

  The independence, institutionally, is found in Mr. Christie's office, 
the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, not in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. Everybody here has to recognize that there is no 
more political, ideological issue than missile defense in terms of the 
national security debate. It has been that way for 20 years.
  To suggest that the Secretary of Defense and members of the Cabinet 
are going to be as independent as someone whose job and career it has 
been to render objective judgments about weapons systems and 
deployability and effectiveness is, I think, defying logic. This is not 
rocket science, it is human behavior. Why are we going to build into 
the system all those objective judgments and objective pressures that 
any Secretary, regardless of party, regardless of administration, must 
feel when something this big is before him to decide?
  That is why we created a system 20 years ago where there is an 
independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, with a director 
appointed by the President and who is not directly subject to political 
whims, the whims of contractors, or the needs of contractors to make 
sure the funds keep flowing. That is the big distinction between our 
amendments. We want operational testing, but we want it to be 
independent. That is the GAO recommendation--independent, realistic 
operational testing.
  We are not specifying to do it next week. We are not saying you 
cannot deploy until you test. In fact, I am removing myself from the 
timing. As I said before, I think it is unrealistic to assume that 
there can be an accurate operational test by October 1 of next year. It 
is not going to slow down the deployment or development; I don't think 
so. It is going to make sure we learn from each step, each mistake, and 
each achievement. That is what good operational testing does.
  I feel very strongly that the Warner amendment is trying to talk 
about operational testing, but the heart of it is not. It is subjective 
evaluation that has been going on now for years with respect to this 
missile program. I think we have to get back to independent evaluation. 
We can do it with my amendment, and we can also ensure that we get 
baseline information about how much is being spent, and the MDA cannot, 
in 1 year, decide that they are a billion dollars off in the cost 
estimate so they change the cost estimate.

[[Page S6941]]

That is another example documented by GAO of the temptation to funding 
programs when you are the tester and the testee. That is what the 
Warner amendment would do.
  So I hope, sincerely, that the Warner amendment can be defeated and 
that we can move on and adopt the Reed amendment. In the spirit of our 
prior comments, I will yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to make a 
very brief comment, and that is this: The key argument is that the 
Pentagon's chief tester says the operational test is premature. The 
Warner second-degree amendment requires the definition of ``realistic 
testing,'' and it requires a test according to these criteria next 
year. That means we will get realistic testing years sooner than with 
the Reed amendment.
  The Warner second-degree amendment provides a formal and appropriate 
role for the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation in a 
developmental program. That is an unusual step and actually enhances 
his role in the ballistic missile test program. It does all this 
without incurring the cost and delay of the Reed amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and ask my 
colleagues to vote in support of the Warner amendment.
  Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request that I need to 
propound.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the vote in 
relation to the pending Warner second-degree amendment, the Senate 
proceed to executive session and consecutive votes on the confirmation 
of the following nominations: James L. Robart, Roger Benitez, and Jane 
Boyle. I further ask unanimous consent that prior to each of the judge 
votes there be 4 minutes equally divided for debate on the nominations; 
provided further, that following the votes, the President be notified 
of the Senate's action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant Democratic leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I, first, ask the distinguished acting 
manager to modify his request to have the votes following the Warner 
second-degree amendment vote to be 10-minute votes.
  Mr. ALLARD. I agree to modify the request to 10-minute votes on the 
two following the initial vote--or does the Senator want all three of 
them?
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. ALLARD. On all three of them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Further, Mr. President, under the order, as I understand 
it, prior to voting on the judges, the Senator from Rhode Island has a 
right to offer an amendment to his amendment, if the Warner amendment 
is adopted. The order was he would have the right to offer an 
amendment; is that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the previous order.
  Mr. REID. So it is my understanding the Senator from Rhode Island 
will not offer that amendment now. I ask unanimous consent also, Mr. 
President--and I think this is in keeping with what Senator Warner 
wanted--that following the disposition of these judges, we return to 
the Defense bill and that the Senator from Rhode Island be recognized 
to offer another amendment that has already been indicated--I do not 
know the number of it. It is his second missile defense amendment.
  Mr. ALLARD. Missile defense is OK.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand we may need to ask for the 
yeas and nays.
  Mr. REID. I ask for the yeas and nays on the Warner amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered on the 
pending second-degree amendment.
  Mr. ALLARD. We are ready to proceed to the vote, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Warner 
amendment No. 3453. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk call the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 55, nays 44, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 125 Leg.]

                                YEAS--55

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--44

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham (FL)
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

      
     Kerry
      
  The amendment (No. 3453) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ALLARD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3354

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to have a clarification about 
the standing order with regard to the amendment of the distinguished 
Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as amended.
  Without objection, the amendment, as amended, is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3354) was agreed to.

                          ____________________