[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 76 (Thursday, June 3, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H3773-H3777]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE CASE FOR A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is recognized
for 60 minutes.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, ``China is a sleeping giant. Let her lie and
sleep, for when she awakens, she will astonish the world,'' wrote
Napoleon Bonaparte. I would like to title this speech ``The Case for a
Special Relationship With China.''
Great nations almost always miss important changes outside their
world. Such errors threaten their future in ways they never dreamed.
History also has examples of leaders who saw challenges early and
responded well.
The leaders of Great Britain's late empire entirely missed the rise
of the United States. Britain suffered years of combat in World Wars I
and II before their American allies joined the fight. During both wars,
the British Empire teetered in the balance. Conversely, President
Truman wisely perceived his challenge in the Soviet Union and responded
well. His actions contributed mightily to the winning of the Cold War.
In the 19th century, not everyone missed the rise of the United
States. As early as 1835, Alexander de Tocqueville saw in the future
clearly when he wrote, ``Americans are already able to make their flag
respected. In a few years, they will be able to make it feared.''
Looking from Westminster across the Thames River in 1870, the British
Empire's leaders did not share de Tocqueville's view. It was an easy
mistake for them to make. Queen Victoria presided over the largest
economic block on Earth. In the glare of an empire where the sun never
set, her ministers largely ignored the significance of their American
cousins.
Well-schooled leaders of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were
distracted by a number of small wars at
[[Page H3774]]
the fringe of their empire, Abyssinia, South Africa, Egypt and Sudan,
to name a few. In 1868, The Illustrated London News warned, ``We can
ill afford a perpetual succession of little wars,'' but few took
notice. European continental leaders were equally unaware of the
American change that was under way in their century. German Chancellor
Bismarck discounted the United States when he wrote, ``There is a
providence that protects fools, drunkards, children and the United
States of America.''
After only one single Victorian generation, America's economy grew to
be twice the size of Britain's. By 1900, many of the British Empire's
leaders dimly perceived the threat from Germany but remained unaware of
how their world had changed across the Atlantic. It was hard for many
leaders to take America seriously when Belgium's Armed Forces
outnumbered the U.S. Army.
As a result of their ignorance, England's leaders entered the First
World War without the backing of the American arsenal. In 3 short
years, from 1914 to 1917, they exhausted the wealth of the empire.
Finally, America joined the allies of World War I, but only on
President Wilson's terms. It took British leaders two generations of
conflict to understand how important America had become to them.
Today, London's policy towards the United States is rightfully called
the ``special relationship.'' Are there changes under way which call
for American attention? Could the leaders of America's foreign policy
make a similar mistake? In our vision of America's future, are there
any countries deserving another special relationship?
Our history is filled with examples of countries where economic
growth rapidly turned into political and military power. The rise of
Japan, Germany and even some Gulf states show that economic expansion
has an inevitable political and military impact. For the United States
to be effective in foreign policy, the President needs advisers who see
the world not just as it is but as it will become. When the White House
advisers fail to outline strategic change, they doom our President to
using short-term expedience to cope with a long-term threat.
With a clear strategic view, the advisers of President Truman served
our country well. Writing his famous long telegram from the rubble of
1946 Moscow, U.S. Foreign Service Officer George Kennan correctly
outlined the emerging threat from the Soviet Union. By removing
President Roosevelt's friendly ``Uncle Joe'' veneer from Stalin, George
Kennan warned his President clearly about the coming Cold War. The
Soviet Union, in his view, was becoming a colossus, demanding more than
short-term American expedience. The struggle between East and West
could only be won with a strategic plan by the West.
Truman's answer to the challenge of the Cold War was massive. He
backed his short-term military defense of South Korea with a long-term
set of new institutions: the Marshall Plan, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, the
Strategic Air Command, the United Nations and the Voice of America, to
name a few.
After four decades of struggle, the East abandoned the Berlin Wall.
In the heady days after communism's fall, many felt the U.S. stood
unopposed at the dawn of a new Pax Americana. Francis Fujiyama asked in
the Washington Post, ``is this the end of history?''
History hardly ended, but the idea of American supremacy is now
strong. America's Armed Forces won stunning victories: 1991 in Kuwait,
1995 in Bosnia, 1999 in Kosovo and 2003 in Iraq. Who can challenge
America?
Despite our ascendency, we must ask the question, is there a major
change in the world for which the U.S. should prepare? As Truman did in
the 1940s, should the United States create institutions that respond to
this change?
The American view of foreign policy has more to do with our European
past than our Asian present. By a two-to-one margin, Americans believe
that our policy towards Europe is more important than Asia, but our
trade with Asia surpassed Europe a generation ago. Today, American
trade with Asia totals 50 percent more than our trade with Europe. The
U.S. State Department has just 579 full-time Americans stationed in
Asia, compared to over 1,300 in Europe and the countries of the former
Soviet Union. Asian economies are both larger and growing faster than
Europe. Beyond the Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore, the growth rates of China and India clearly show that most
of our history in the 21st century will be written in Asia.
One country looms large across the future of the United States,
China. China's absence from the first rank of world powers is a
historical anomaly. Throughout recorded history, the Chinese people
were responsible for many of the advances of modern society: paper,
gunpowder, even spaghetti.
Seventy years before Columbus, China's famous explorer, Admiral Cheng
Ho, mapped much of the Arab world from a ship that was twice the size
of the Santa Maria. But for the Emperor's decision to recall the fleet,
China would have discovered Europe, not the other way around.
As recently as the 1830s, China produced one-third of the Earth's
wealth. Most of her advances and talent were squandered by corrupt
governments, wars and a Chinese dictatorship. Despite a massive
population and storied culture, China declined into socialist poverty.
Under Mao, the Chinese people lost two generations of progress and were
home to the worst famine of the 20th century. But following Mao
Zedong's death, Deng Xiaoping led a Chinese economic reform of historic
proportions. It is very difficult for many Americans today to
understand the breadth and scope of this historic change.
When we accurately look at today's China, we note it produces more
steel than the United States, consumes twice the grain of the United
States, has built highways twice the length of Germany and France
combined, graduates three times the number of engineers as India, and
is home to over 200 million cable TV subscribers. It replaced Mexico as
America's number two trading partner, and it replaced America as
Japan's number one trading partner. There are 200 cities with
populations over 1 million, and the economy doubles every 8 years. We
now estimate that its economy will be larger than the United States in
the next decade.
China is not only growing year to year, it has sustained a growth
rate of over 9 percent annually for a generation. Given the difference
in price of many domestic goods in China, economists now debate how to
measure the size of the Chinese economy, using a traditional gross
domestic product or a more up-to-date purchasing power parity to take
into account the lower cost of Chinese domestic goods.
Either way, the effect of China's sustained growth has profound
proportions. Under a GDP measurement, the United States economy now
stands at $11 trillion, whereas China's economy stands at only $1.5
trillion; but using purchasing power parities, our $11 trillion economy
stands next to China's $7 trillion economy.
Using purchasing power measurements, the International Monetary Fund
projects China will be home to the world's largest economy as early as
2007, during the next American President's administration. Koishi
Ishiyama recently wrote that China's rise can be compared to the Shock
and Awe operation in Iraq.
Foreign direct investment did not significantly exist in China before
1980, and while such investment in all other developing countries fell
in 2002, it rose by 15 percent in China, netting $52 billion in new
investments.
The pace of China's growth is also accelerating. In the next 10
years, the City of Beijing will double its supply of housing. The
Chinese highway system and the number of cable TV subscribers will also
double in size. While this change is dimly seen in official Washington,
it is having a profound effect on the Chinese people.
China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic games will be one of many
upcoming international events in China. China last year became the
third country on Earth to orbit a human in one of its own space
vehicles.
{time} 1800
Next year, China plans to orbit a two-man vehicle, the Shenzhou VI,
on its way to building its own space station and lunar rover.
[[Page H3775]]
China's progress can be overstated. Over 200 million Chinese still
live on less than $1 a day. There is a great gap now opening between
the poorer western provinces of China and the new-found wealth of
China's east coast. Environmental challenges also loom, including over
100 of China's cities with air pollution exceeding the World Health
Organization's guidelines for sulfur dioxide.
The World Bank's World Development Report still ranks China at number
76 out of 129 countries measured for personal income; and despite
progress, the World Bank estimates that Chinese per capita income
totals just $1,000 per year.
Such low numbers, though, hide profound progress. Between 1978 and
1998, the World Bank estimates the number of poor people in the world
fell by 8 million. The number of people who were poor outside China
actually rose by 82 million. But the world's total numbers were
compensated by the profound reduction in Chinese poverty. From 1978 to
1999, Chinese adult illiteracy fell from 37 percent to 17 percent,
while infant mortality dropped from 41 per live births in 1978 to 30 in
1999.
Changes in China had an impact on Americans as well. Motorola now
employs over 10,000 people in China and owns the country's best-
recognized trademark. By last year, over 1,500 U.S. firms invested $25
billion in China. One U.S. corporate executive advised the Congress
that his top three issues in Washington were China, China, and China.
The story of Wal-Mart shows the profound change that is under way
both in China and in the United States. Unlike traditional retailers
such as Sears Roebuck or J.C. Penney, Sam Walton recognized the
importance of China and the advantage of its lower-cost merchandise.
Relying heavily on Chinese suppliers, Wal-Mart grew to become America's
largest employer. Selling in nearly every town in America, Wal-Mart
doubled its purchases of Chinese goods to $12 billion per year. And
last year, Wal-Mart sold 10 percent of everything that China made. In
many ways, the face of all-American Wal-Mart is really the face of
China, Incorporated.
There are many examples of how China's transformation influenced
America's private sector. Like British merchant bankers who understood
America's rise and bankrolled the Union Pacific Railroad, companies
like Boeing, General Electric, Baker MacKenzie, and hundreds of other
U.S. private sector interests understand what is happening and are
risking a great deal to capitalize on the opportunities presented by
the rise of China.
But this understanding is not well understood by America's
government. Like their British Government forefathers that missed
America's rise, there is little evidence that the Federal Government
perceives or is moving to realign the world to the rise of China. Many
European powers discounted turn-of the-century America and its puny
Armed Forces. Many Americans likewise dismissed the capabilities of the
People's Liberation Army and its potential to change the course of
Asian history. By China's own plan, military modernization ranks fourth
in their list of four modernizations.
Following the recent victories of America's Armed Forces, the raw
size of a country's army is no longer evidence of its future prowess in
battle. The People's Liberation Army, numbering 2.4 million, still
stands as the world's largest; but it looks anachronistic and unable to
enforce the will of China's leaders very far from its borders.
A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force under former Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown estimated last year that China was ``at least 2
decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and
capability.'' According to the Pentagon, Chinese military leaders
closely studied NATO's operation over Kosovo and described it as the
first ``no-contact'' war.
In the post-Cold War world, Deng Xiaoping gave a key directive to the
Chinese security establishment based on his ``24-character strategy''
and that was, ``keep cool-headed to observe. Be composed to make
reactions. Stand firmly. Hide our capabilities. Bide our time. Never
try to take the lead, and be able to accomplish something.''
While seeking short-term opportunities with the United States, the
Pentagon reported, ``China's leaders assert the United States seeks to
maintain a dominant strategic position while containing the growth of
Chinese power, ultimately dividing and Westernizing China.''
Much of China's military budget and plans were influenced by scenes
of conflict in the Balkans and Iraq played out on televisions tuned to
the 24-hour news channels. After the U.S. victory in Kosovo, China's
leaders seriously considered upgrading the fourth-ranked priority they
attach to their military. The army developed a new response doctrine
called the ``Three Attack and Three Defenses,'' focusing on attacking
stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters, while defending
against precision strikes, electronic warfare, and enemy
reconnaissance. Chinese Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General
Zheng Shenxia noted that without adopting a preemptive doctrine, the
chances of a PLA victory are limited.
In November 2002, China overhauled its Politburo Standing Committee,
the center of the Chinese Government decision-making. Every member of
the politburo was replaced except Hu Jintao. Following this shakeup,
senior leaders reaffirmed their emphasis on economic growth, but did
increase funding for military modernization. Acknowledging its weakness
in the face of such complete U.S. victories, Chinese leaders tempered
their sense of vulnerability, knowing that unlike Kosovo, China is a
nuclear power. Its 2002 defense White Paper, in contrast to its 2000
White Paper, did not explicitly criticize U.S. deployments in Asia.
The main mission of the Chinese military is to fight and win a
conflict over Taiwan. In March 2002, Chinese Finance Minister Xiang
Huaicheng announced a 17.5 percent increase in its official defense
spending. While China reports an official defense budget of
approximately $20 billion, its actual spending ranges to twice or three
times that level, totaling $45 billion to $67 billion annually. The
Department of Defense and the Council on Foreign Relations both
estimate that annual spending in real terms could increase three to
four-fold over the levels I just quoted by 2020. Most defense
modernization spending occurs outside the public defense budget.
Chinese military spending in this range roughly equals the $65
billion spent by Russia and dramatically exceeds the $43 billion
Japanese defense budget or the $38 billion British military budget. A
three-fold increase in spending by China would put their military
budget above all other nations, except the United States.
China's rising military budget masks a structural problem in its
military. Since large armies no longer guarantee success, China has cut
the size of her armed forces from 1997 to 2000 by reducing 500,000 men,
including 11 percent of her naval personnel, 12 percent of her air
force personnel, and 18 percent of her army personnel. Sixty of 100
maneuver divisions were collapsed into the remaining structure of 40
divisions and 40 brigades. The air force retired older aircraft,
dropping from over 5,000 aircraft at the end of the 1990s to 3,500 now.
Of the remaining aircraft, only 150 are modern fourth-generation
fighters. China still regards its military as too ``infantry-heavy''
with an army so large as to ``impede rapid deployment and equipment
modernization.''
By reducing the size of the armed forces, China provided funding
dedicated to military modernization. The air force is adding advanced
SU-30MKK fourth-generation fighter aircraft, AA-12/ADDER active-radar
guided air-to-air missiles, and a new SU-30 naval variant capable of
carrying air-launched, anti-shipping cruise missiles. The Navy added
four SOVREMENNYY-class guided missile destroyers and produced its own
new design SONG-class diesel-electric submarines, the first with
quieter skewed propellers. It took delivery of four quiet KILO-class
diesel-electric submarines and has another eight submarines under
contract, all equipped with a new 3M-54E Novator Alpha anti-shipping
cruise missile. Given the sum of investment and rapid modernization,
China did forgo one important upgrade, and her navy has now shelved
plans for its own aircraft carrier.
[[Page H3776]]
The pace of development accelerated for China's army. The land forces
are developing a light tank, an amphibious tank, and an amphibious-
armored personnel carrier, all added to over 1,500 type-96 main battle
tanks that are already delivered. This kind of new equipment is now
flowing to China's revamped three airborne and two marine brigades.
The Ministry of Defense now emphasizes recruitment, retention, and
more training for officers and key NCOs. Training now emphasizes small-
scale specialized maneuvers under the new doctrine of fighting a
limited war under high-tech conditions. All infantry divisions now have
armor, up from only half in 1997.
Since 1989, China has been cut off from most U.S. and European
military technology. Its defense establishment cannot innovate as fast
as it could if it had access to foreign equipment. China's leaders
responded with a foreign policy emphasizing cooperation and good
relations with the United States. Over time, such a strategy could
reopen their access to key Western technologies, even in the military
field.
The transformation of China's new military power is clearest in its
missile force. China maintains a limited force, including 20 nuclear
missiles capable of hitting targets in the United States. A number of
U.S. Government agencies project that this rise in the missile force
will lift by a factor of three to over 60 missiles capable of striking
the United States, using the new CSS-4 Mod 2 ICBM. This Chinese force
will be augmented by the brand-new solid-fuel DF-31 ICBM and an
entirely new generation of Chinese nuclear submarines, the 094-class,
carrying a naval variant of the DF-31. China is also developing two
other classes of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is
also developing a heavy-lift space launch vehicle, capable of lifting
25 tons into low orbit by 2007.
These developments pale when compared to China's expanding arsenal of
medium-range missiles all aimed at Taiwan. China currently has a force
of 450 such missiles and is adding 75 each year. Beyond large nuclear
additions to China's armed forces, China places a very high priority on
information warfare. The PLA believes that the U.S. Department of
Defense is too dependent on networks that are vulnerable to attack. By
attacking these systems, planners in China's army believe the U.S.
forces could be degraded ``anonymously.''
The anonymity of information attacks could play a key role even now.
The House of Representatives recently reported regular attempts by
computer systems located in China to enter the main computer server of
the House Committee on Armed Services. The Pentagon may have referred
to this when it recently reported that China ``places unusual emphasis
on a host of new information warfare forces instead of information
superiority and the system of systems approaches popular in the United
States.''
{time} 1815
There have been several official references about leveraging China's
growing presence on the Internet, including references to a ``people's
war'' in ``net warfare'', suggesting a stronger role in nationalist
hacking.
China also has a commitment to electronic warfare equaled only by the
United States. Unlike many countries now totally dependent on U.S.
leadership in this exotic field, China is developing electronic jamming
aircraft for several variants and may have several programs to develop
escort jammers on transports, tactical aircraft and unmanned aerial
vehicle platforms. It has equipped the Su-30 with anti-radiation
missiles that work on the same principle of U.S. weapons that were so
crucial to our own victories. China's anti-radiation missile, the FT-
2000, is described in their sales brochures as an ``AWACS killer.'' The
PLA is also producing state-of-the-art technology to improve intercept,
direction finding and jamming. It may also be producing jammers for use
against America's most successful weapon, the satellite-guided JDAM
munition that so accurately uses the U.S. Global Positioning System.
Their efforts also include producing laser weapons, such as the man-
portable ZM-87, advertised for blinding human vision and electro-
optical sensors, radio-frequency weapons and possibly a ground-based
anti-satellite weapon. They have also invested considerably in
developing short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles, including
an unmanned combat aerial vehicle.
According to the Chinese military publication Junshi Wenzhai, China
has already produced an ``Assassin's Mace'' or trump card to counter
U.S. superiority in the Western Pacific. One article identifies five
major, quote, Assassin's Maces, unquote, including fighter bombers,
submarines, anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and mines designed to destroy
foreign aircraft carriers. These systems would be backed by new
research by China on other technologies, including kinetic energy and
low-observable platforms.
This research can be accelerated by acquiring foreign technologies
such as the recent activities of two Chinese students at universities
collecting information on Terfenol-D, an invention of the U.S.
Department of Energy's Ames laboratory.
These developments show that China's growing economic power may
already be translating into military power. It is clear that most large
American companies already perceive the size and importance of China.
What is not clear is if the U.S. Government has made a similar
intellectual leap to understand the new geography of the 21st century.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department conducted a major study of the
needs of the U.S. Government in China. The Beyond China 2000 Action
Plan cut 55 people from permanent U.S. Government desks in China. The
State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs noted the
decision reflected, quote, hard-nosed decisions, unquote. Congress
recently ordered the State Department to review the future needs of the
U.S. Government in China by 2010. In its February report, it is
difficult to see what measures the State Department used to justify
reducing the size of the U.S. Government in China.
In 1975, the new U.S. liaison officer in Beijing under Ambassador
George Herbert Walker Bush, who later became president, processed 651
non-immigrant visas to the United States. In 2003, U.S. consular
officers handled 320,000 such applications. From a handful, the number
of Chinese students rose to over 60,000 in the U.S. last year.
Only 38 Americans registered with the Beijing liaison office in 1975.
Today, over 3,600 Americans are registered in addition to over 1
million American tourists visiting China each year. The State
Department admitted to Congress noting that staffing in the U.S.
embassy in Beijing and the Consulates General is currently inadequate
to the growing workload.
The workload of the U.S. Government in China is growing for other
reasons. In 2001 alone, China joined the international coalition
against terrorism, the World Trade Organization, hosted the Asian-
Pacific Economic Conference, and won the bidding of the 2008 Olympic
games. These issues came in addition to key concerns regarding nuclear
nonproliferation, human rights, intellectual property, and religious
freedom.
The State Department projects that the number of U.S. Government
agencies wishing to station personnel permanently in China will rise
from 12 agencies to over 20 by 2010. Several agencies, including the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, developed but then halted
plans to deploy in China. The United States broke new ground on a new
embassy complex last February. With the new embassy, the State
Department plans only a modest increase in official Americans stationed
in China from 960 to 1,200.
Plans to expand America's eyes and ears in China do not depend only
on the size of our embassy in Beijing. They also depend on increasing
the number of Americans in the diplomatic service who can master a very
difficult language. In 2000, the State Department launched its China
2000 Initiative. The mission of the Initiative was to develop
infrastructure to meet the projected physical and human needs,
including language. This Initiative is very small, modestly increasing
the number of Chinese students in the State Department annually from
only five to only 15. The Initiative also includes some advanced
training for just five students in Beijing and a mail program for
lessons to
[[Page H3777]]
only 30 other students to maintain Chinese language proficiency.
Such efforts appear grossly inadequate compared to China's central
role in the 21st century. With the largest trade surplus, the largest
economy, the largest military budget outside the United States, China
deserves a special relationship with the United States.
In November, 2002, a task force under Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi
released their report designating China as Japan's top foreign policy
priority for the future. The decision makes sense for Japan but, given
China's growth, its position on the U.N. Security Council, and the
future size of its economy, it may make sense for the United States to
do this as well.
Our country has been the home of the world's largest economy for 130
years, but that is about to change; and this change will be one of the
most profound shifts of the new century. There was a time early in the
history of the United States when our national income was not at the
top of the international heap. Today, under our Pax Americana, it may
be difficult for us to reconnect with our forefathers and mothers who
were forced to depend only on diplomacy in the face of very long odds.
Avidly, we retell parts of U.S. history, the Revolution, the Civil
War, and the victories of World War I and II, all to stoke American
pride; and these examples are used to confirm the superiority of our
own ideals. But American history has less-well-known examples of when
we struggled without our traditional advantage in material and money.
I put this question to the House, when was the last time that U.S.
Armed Forces faced a military from a country whose economy was larger
than our own? One summer day in August, 1814, comes to mind. British
soldiers and marines marched on in Washington in one of the last acts
of the War of 1812. U.S. forces met them in what we now call the Battle
of Bladensburg. The battle went so badly for the Americans that British
called it the ``Bladensburg races'' because U.S. forces ran away so
quickly. Britain's 85th Foot Regiment still displays eagle-flagged
standards of two American regiments captured that day. The following
day British forces burned the Capitol and Executive Mansion to the
ground.
History reminds us that the United States has not and will not always
be the Nation on Earth with the largest economy. With an America of
unquestioned commercial dominance, we can afford to make diplomatic
mistakes. In a world where America holds fewer cards, we cannot afford
miscalculation.
We are quickly nearing a world in which China will play a central
role in the diplomatic life of the United States. British diplomats
before the world wars would have scoffed at the notion of their
American cousins playing a central role in world politics. Let us hope
that the new American diplomats of the 21st century understand how
quickly the post Cold War world has changed.
Our President Truman set the record of his time for being an
unpopular president. In 1946, he stood at just 32 percent in the polls.
Thankfully, he steeled his heart and made the tough decisions needed to
design a successful campaign through the Cold War against the Soviet
Union. America and freedom won the Cold War without fighting World War
III.
When we look towards the 21st century and China's coming role in its
history, will our leaders lay the foundation for America's diplomatic
success? I ask that question to the House tonight.
And I thank Reed Bundy of my staff for helping me prepare these
remarks.
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