[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 72 (Thursday, May 20, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5929-S5934]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005--Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I join with my colleague in requesting Senators to send
in as many amendments as they possibly can. The Senator from Michigan
and I will be here tomorrow in hopes that we can clear amendments.
There are days when clearances could be facilitated. I think tomorrow
is one of those days.
I say to my good colleague, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, am
I correct in that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I say to my good friend from Virginia, he is absolutely
not only correct but I would join his plea to our colleagues that we
make good use of time tomorrow. If Senators are not here, their staff
can deliver amendments so at least we can begin to consider them. We
can make good use of tomorrow so when we come back we will have to use
up less of the Senate's time.
So I join the chairman's plea that Members on both sides of the
aisle, who have not filed amendments or given our staffs amendments, do
that tomorrow. Let us try to work through some of them. We could clear
them tomorrow and, even if we do not have contested amendments
tomorrow, we could make some progress on this bill.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
The distinguished Senator from Nevada, the Democratic whip, pointed
out that he has a count of over 100-odd amendments with which we have
to deal. So there is a formidable task ahead of us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. The reason I speak as we close out this
evening is to comment on a few things about the amendment pending
before the Senate in regard to an effort to do two things: to make sure
the $350 million that is available for the Department of Energy to
provide cleanup in the States of Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina
can move forward without any strings attached, and to ratify an
agreement that the State of South Carolina has entered into with the
Department of Energy concerning 51 tanks containing high-level waste.
I really do very much like my colleague from Washington, Senator
Cantwell, but we dramatically disagree on this. I cannot emphasize how
dramatically we do disagree about what is at stake and what we are
trying to accomplish.
My senior Senator from South Carolina could not have been possibly
better to me since I have been in the Senate almost 18 months now. He
is going through some accusations that I find not consistent with who
Senator Hollings is. I am not going to dwell on that, but I believe
that most of us who
[[Page S5930]]
know Senator Hollings very well believe he gives everybody the same
treatment: Really hard. He is a fair man. He is a good man. We have
some disagreement about how to handle the amendment before us, but I
did not come to this issue without some time, attention, and thought to
the matter.
Well over a year I have been involved with my State working with the
Department of Energy to make sure that the 51 tanks that have high-
level waste as a result of the cold war legacy material at the Savannah
River site is cleaned up in a way that is environmentally sound for
South Carolina, good for the taxpayer, and it makes sense.
I have a letter from the Governor of South Carolina. Contrary to what
Senator Hollings suggested, the Governor of South Carolina not only
knows what we are doing, he encourages what we are doing. I received a
letter to that effect. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
State of South Carolina,
Office of the Governor,
Columbia, SC, May 20, 2004.
Hon. Lindsey O. Graham,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Graham: I am writing in support Section 3116,
Defense Site Acceleration Completion in the FY 2005
Department of Defense Authorization bill, S. 2400. More
specifically, this section of the bill will allow for an
accelerated clean up of the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina.
This Administration is concerned about the prospect of
long-term storage of radioactive waste in aging tanks at the
Savannah River Site. Under the current Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, the cleanup process could leave the waste in those
storage tanks for an additional 30 years.
However, the amendment allows the U.S. Department of
Energy, working with the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control, to move more quickly to clean up
the Savannah River Site. In fact, the estimated cleanup time
will be reduced by 23 years, at a savings of $16 billion to
the taxpayers.
Most important is ensuring that the State of South Carolina
will be able to retain an oversight role in the cleanup
process. According to analysis by the South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, the state's
environmental regulatory agency, the clean up process will
still require an equal partnership with the State.
As you move through the legislative process, we urge you
and your colleagues to retain two very important goals for
South Carolina: 1. allow for a more accelerated clean up
process, and 2. provide strong language to protect the
State's sovereignty within the process of accelerated
cleanup.
Thank you for your leadership in the United States Senate.
I look forward to working with you on this and many other
matters of importance to our State.
Sincerely,
Mark Sanford.
Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. I am going to read from it. The
question Senator Hollings raised was, well, if our Governor knew about
this he would not agree to this because he is a good environmentalist.
We will agree on this: Our Governor is a good environmentalist. He
has been a great Governor trying to change the culture of the way we do
business in South Carolina. I have been working with him for well over
a year to make sure our State gets those tanks cleaned up in our
lifetime and we do not have to worry about ground water leakage.
The folks in Washington have a real problem on their hands, and I
want to help them. The people in Idaho have problems on their hands,
and I want to help them. I do not think they are being very responsible
in terms of how we are dealing with each other's problems.
Here is a chronology of what has been going on in these three States.
Idaho, South Carolina, and Washington have been separately negotiating
with the Department of Energy about trying to agree on standards in
their States to remediate the high-level waste that is left over from
the cold war. Washington has a particular problem where they have tanks
that are leaking into the ground water. That needs to be fixed sooner
rather than later.
The question is, What is clean? The question is, Are we going to
allow South Carolina, Idaho, and Washington to work with the Department
of Energy to take care of their specific needs and specific problems in
an environmentally sound manner or are we going to give one group a
veto power over everybody else?
I hope we do not. January 26, 2004, Congressman Hastings and Senators
Murray and Cantwell sent a letter to Governor Locke and Secretary
Abraham asking them to work together to resolve the ongoing dispute
pertaining to waste classification.
On February 2, the deputy secretary and Governor Locke connected.
Governor Locke indicated he would designate someone to enter into a
discussion on behalf of the State of Washington.
That has been going on in South Carolina far before January 26. It is
going on in Idaho. About 8 or 9 years ago Idaho reached agreement about
certain aspects of cleaning up of the Idaho sites. Each site has a
different problem and it is working with DOE in a way that is good for
everyone, the State and at the Federal level, to clean up these sites.
The reason we are in court in Idaho is DOE unilaterally issued an
order that gave them the authority to set the cleanup standards without
consulting with the States. They were trying to change the game or the
agreement Idaho had with DOE, and Idaho sued and we--South Carolina and
Washington--joined as a friend of the court, saying we will not sit on
the sidelines and watch the Department of Energy have the unilateral
right to set cleanup standards. That is what we agree upon.
The amendment I have before the Senate does two important things. It
does not allow the Department of Defense to withhold funds to Idaho and
Washington unless they reach a similar agreement with South Carolina.
It does not make what is going on in South Carolina a Presidential
event, in terms of how it affects other States. It limits what is going
on in South Carolina to South Carolina. It does not disadvantage
Washington or Idaho. They have the right, the obligation to enter into
an agreement, if any, with DOE. What we are doing in South Carolina
only affects South Carolina. I will tell you in a moment what people in
South Carolina who are in charge of our environmental needs say about
this agreement. I will read the letter from the Governor here in a
moment.
The Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the State of
Washington, along with the State of Idaho, exchanged drafts and held
conversations between January and April. There is a lot of paperwork
out there that shows Idaho and Washington have been trying to do the
same thing we have been doing in South Carolina. Here is the
difference. We reached an agreement South Carolina likes that will get
our tanks cleaned up in an environmentally sound manner. And listen to
this, it allows the tanks to be cleaned up, remediated, and closed 23
years ahead of schedule, and it saves $16 billion to the American
taxpayer.
I hope Washington and Idaho can get there. If they ever do get there,
if they ever do reach an agreement with the Department of Energy where
the Governor says I like it, where the environmental regulators say I
like it, where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission says this is waste
incidental to reprocessing, that this can be done in a way that is
environmentally sound--I hope I will help, not stand in the way.
So much was said that is so wrong about this issue. To my two friends
from Idaho, you have taken some political abuse here that is so far
from the truth that it is mind-boggling. What Senators Crapo and Craig
have been doing is they have been working with me, in conjunction with
all three States, to make sure they get the money they are entitled to
regardless of what we do in South Carolina, and they have been kind
enough to work with me to make sure my State's agreement can go
forward. We are doing nothing to prejudice the lawsuit of the State of
Idaho or their ability to reach an independent agreement. I can assure
you, this is not blindsiding anybody because there is paperwork from
January all the way through to recent months between Idaho and
Washington, talking with DOE about trying to find an agreement.
On February 25, 2004, Jessie Roberson, the Assistant Secretary for
Energy for Environmental Management came before Senator Allard in a
hearing and talked about this extensively. He was asked numerous
questions.
I ask unanimous consent to have an excerpt of that hearing printed in
the Record.
[[Page S5931]]
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Transcript on Waste Incidental to Reprocessing, Strategic Forces
Subcommittee Hearing, February 25, 2004
questions by senator wayne allard to ms. jessie roberson, assistant
secretary of energy for environmental management
ALLARD: Well, thank you very much for your participation.
It's invaluable to this committee.
I'm going to be referring in my questioning to WIR, which
stands for Waste Incidental Reprocessing. And I think it
would behoove the committee to hear, Secretary Roberson, you
summarize what the WIR issue is.
ROBERSON: Thank you, Chairman Allard. Thank you, Senator,
as well.
Clean-up of tank waste at Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah
River represents the greatest risk-reduction effort in the
department's entire clean-up program.
ALLARD: And this all falls under Waste Incidental
Reprocessing, is that correct?
ROBERSON: Absolutely.
ALLARD: Okay.
ROBERSON: And I'll explain what portion of the program that
specifically applies to.
ALLARD: Very good.
ROBERSON: Okay, we have planned at these three sites to
clean up tank waste, plans agreed to with our host states and
that the NRC had also carefully reviewed. At each site, our
plans acknowledge we would remove as much tank waste as we
could. We would separate the tank waste into two factions.
The first is a high-activity faction containing over 95
percent of the radioactivity, which we would classify as
high-level waste and treat and dispose of in the repository
for spent fuel and high-level waste called for by the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act.
And then a low-activity faction, which we would classify as
low-level waste, incidental to reprocessing and, depending on
its characteristics, treat and dispose of in an appropriate
disposal facility for such material.
We would then determine whether we could demonstrate that
disposing of a small amount of residues remaining in the
tank, generally around one percent of the original volume, by
immobilizing it in place and determine--to ensure that it
would be comparable to the public health and safety
requirements for disposal of low-level waste in a near-
surface disposal facility. If it would, our plans were to
classify the residues as low-level waste, incidental to
reprocessing, to immobilize them in the tank and close the
tanks with these residues in place.
A key element of these plans is the classification of the
tank waste.
The problem we have encountered is that in July of 2003, an
Idaho district court struck down the waste incident to
reprocessing portion of DOE Order 435.1, the DOE order
addressing how DOE and its contractors classify waste under
the Atomic Energy Act. As a result, we now face uncertainty
in implementing the very plans our host states had agreed
made technical sense.
The classification of this waste is key to determining how
to dispose of it. Therefore, if we're unable to resolve this
issue regarding waste incidental to reprocessing, we face
leaving these tank wastes in place far longer than we and our
host states had anticipated. In fact, such delay would likely
create more serious health and safety risk to workers and
members of the public by leaving the waste in tanks longer
and risking leaks to ground water.
ALLARD: Madam Secretary, why do you have to leave any of
the waste residues behind?
ROBERSON: Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly describe the
size of these tanks and the nature of the waste removal in
question. Each tank can hold as much as 1.3 million gallons
of liquid waste. At Hanford, for example, the tanks are 75
feet in diameter, and the tanks are of differing shapes. Some
are concave, which means they don't have a flat bottom.
ALLARD: I guess that's about the size of this room . . . .
(CROSSTALK)
ROBERSON: Under the tri-party agreement at Hanford between
DOE, Washington state and EPA, which governs the clean-up at
that site, the goal is that we retrieve 99 percent of the
tank waste. If all of the remaining waste were on the bottom
of the tank, it would be just under one inch thick.
Because of radiological concerns with exposure for workers,
tank waste removal must be done remotely. In addition, these
tanks usually sit below 10 feet of soil cover. Our retrieval
equipment must fit into openings two inches to two feet wide.
And tank structures are not designed to support heavy loads
for which equipment must be deployed to do the tank cleaning.
So it is not a simple task to scrape the last remaining tank
residues from a tank.
Further, much of the waste residues are expected to have a
stiff consistency. Most removal techniques require directing
pressurized water streams at the remaining waste to
immobilize it and to move it to a location which can be
pumped.
ROBERSON: We have spent over 10 years working on
technologies to improve removal opportunities of the waste
from these tanks.
Finally, many of the tanks are over 40 years old. And a
number of them have known leak sites, requiring us to
exercise great care to preclude water leaking from the tank.
As I said, DOE spent tens of millions of dollars exploring
how to get as much residual waste as possible out of the
tanks.
ALLARD: What is the material you plan to leave in the
tanks?
ROBERSON: We think the residues, when stabilized, are
appropriately considered low-level waste, suitable for
shallow land burial. Analysis will be performed to ensure
that they meet performance objectives established by DOE and
the NRC for low-level waste performance objectives.
In fact, that is what the order that was struck down by the
judge's ruling required.
ALLARD: Now, shouldn't the waste characteristics and the
risks they pose be what matters in terms of safe disposal
rather than the process that created the waste?
ROBERSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we believe so. And we believe
that that is the philosophy behind the clean-up plans in
place for those sites.
ALLARD: And how much more than your current estimates might
this cost the American taxpayers?
ROBERSON: Our preliminary assessment was that it would cost
as much as $50 billion more over the life-cycle of the
department's clean-up program and extend that life-cycle by
decades to have to process all of our tank waste as high-
level waste for disposal in a geologic repository, including
exhuming the tanks themselves, cutting them up and packaging
them for disposal.
ALLARD: So what is the risk if you have to do that?
ROBERSON: Clearly, the risk to workers, and frankly to the
environment, is much larger if we have to exhume tanks. Given
that we cannot proceed with our clean-up plans that were
based on our waste classification order, we risk leaving
waste in tanks much longer than we had planned right now.
We also add to environmental risk by the need to dispose of
the large amounts of metals resulting from the almost 250
large tanks and the associated equipment. Our analysis thus
far indicates that we would increase worker exposure 10
fold. We would increase costs 10 fold and achieve no
meaningful improvement in environmental protection.
ALLARD: So I don't see what the rational benefit is to the
American taxpayer from the department having to implement the
Idaho district court decision.
ROBERSON: Frankly, Senator, we don't see it either, which
is why we are pursuing this. Rather than accelerating clean-
up of tank waste in agreement with our host states, we face
stopping much of that work.
ALLARD: What is your plan for resolving this WIR issue:
ROBERSON: Accelerated clean up of tank waste is a top
priority for the entire department and the states that host
our facilities. As pointed out in the General Accounting
Office report completed last year, the WIR, waste incidental
to reprocessing issue, poses a significant vulnerability for
the department.
Consistent with both the GAO recommendations to seek
legislative clarification regarding DOE's authority to
classify tank waste and with the request by the House
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee last year, we
proposed draft legislation to Congress that would clarify our
authority for managing such waste.
We have since held discussions with affected states over
the impact the Idaho district court decision had on our
activities in Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah River, in order to
seek to address issues they have raised about our proposed
legislative approach.
In addition, we've just filed our opening brief in our
appeal of the Idaho court decision to continue our litigation
efforts to resolve the WIR issue. Without timely resolution
to this issue, not only could we be unable to implement our
clean-up plans, but DOE also could be forced to realign its
resources across the complex in a manner that would
significantly distort the department's clean-up and other
priorities.
ALLARD: What about the $350 million, and what does it take
to get that money released?
ROBERSON: The Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request
includes $350 million in a high-level waste proposal that
reflects the need to satisfactorily resolve this issue to
support clean-up. These funds will be requested only to the
extent that legal uncertainties concerning disposition of
these wastes are resolved.
Until we can resolve the legal uncertainties related to
WIR, it does not make sense for us to proceed with projects
that prepare tank waste for disposition as other than high-
level waste destined for deep geologic depository.
ALLARD: I want to thank you for your response.
Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. There was another Energy and Water
hearing where the same topic was brought before the Congress. The topic
is, how are you doing with your efforts to reach agreements with the
three States in question to find cleanup standards they can agree to
that are environmentally sound, that will allow things to go forward in
a more expeditious manner?
The truth is, we have spent billions of dollars talking about
cleaning up and we have done nothing but let tanks leak and have waste
stay around for years and decades. Now we have a new model. Now we have
new money, $350
[[Page S5932]]
million of new dollars, and we are using commonsense approaches to
cleanup.
What are we trying to do in South Carolina? If I can explain very
quickly. I am not a scientist, but I do have fairly good common sense.
The 51 tanks that have high-level waste, those tanks will be cleaned
up. The liquid in those tanks will be converted to glass logs, it is
called vitrification, and that will be sent to Yucca Mountain.
What we are trying to do is clean these tanks up in a manner
consistent with safety for South Carolina. The amendment says no tank
can be closed unless the State of South Carolina issues a closure
permit. The letter from my Governor says, not only am I aware of what
you are doing, Senator Graham, I support it because it will allow the
tanks to be closed up 23 years ahead of schedule, it will save money,
and we don't have to worry about tanks deteriorating.
The plan is to take all of the liquid out and the film on the bottom,
which will be 1 to 1.5 inches, treated with concrete and other
materials and the tank will be closed. To get that 1 to 1.5 inches out
of the bottom of that tank will cost $16 billion and take 23 additional
years and put people's lives at risk for no good reason, no good
environmental reason.
Every State is trying to define what is clean for their State.
Washington is trying to do the same thing. Maybe they will want half an
inch. I don't know what they want. Idaho is trying to do the same
thing. We have done it and I have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
report that says what is left in that tank after treatment is waste
incidental to reprocessing, not high-level waste.
The people in my State who regulate the environment have sent a
letter saying we want this agreement because we have final say over
where you close the tank and the standards we have negotiated we think
are good for South Carolina. The only reason we are having this
argument is they don't want one State to go--I guess some groups want
to have the leverage of all three States to get standards they believe
are better than those by the South Carolina folks who regulate our
environment, and they are trying to use some standard that may not be
necessary for Idaho and South Carolina. We don't have the same problems
they do in Washington.
I will stand behind any Senator from Washington to make sure DOE
doesn't run over them. I will stand behind any Senator from Idaho to
make sure they can negotiate on their own terms. I am asking this body
to approve an agreement that is environmentally sound, fiscally
responsible, that affects South Carolina, and is what all three States
are trying to achieve.
I have had printed in the Record the letter from my Governor. I have
had printed the study from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I ask
unanimous consent to have printed the letter from the Department of
Health and Environment Control in South Carolina, saying this is good
for the State, they retain control over the tanks, and this is
environmentally sound.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
June 30, 2000.
Mr. Roy J. Schepens,
Assistant Manager for High-Level Waste, U.S. Department of
Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, SC.
Savannah River Site High Level Waste Tank closure: Classification of
Residual Waste as Incidental
Dear Mr. Schepens: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) has completed the review of the tank closure
methodology for the high-level waste (HLW) tanks at the
Savannah River Site (SRS). Under the terms and conditions of
the Department of Energy (DOE)/NRC Memorandum of
Understanding and the DOE/NRC Interagency Agreement, both
dated July 9, 1997, the NRC is acting in an advisory capacity
and is not providing regulatory approval. The focus of the
review was whether or not the residual waste left in the HLW
tanks, after cleaning, could be labeled as incidental waste.
The criteria for incidental waste were approved by the
Commission in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated
February 16, 1993, in response to SECY-92-391, ``Denial of
PRM 60-4--Petition for Rulemaking from the States of
Washington and Oregon Regarding Classification of Radioactive
Waste at Hanford,'' and described in the March 2, 1993,
letter from R. Bernero, NRC, to J. Lytle, DOE. The review
focused on DOE's ``Regulatory Basis for Incidental Waste
Classification at the Savannah River Site High-Level Waste
Tank Farms,'' ``High-Level Waste Tank Closure Program Plan,''
``Environmental Radiological Analysis, Fate and Transport
Modeling of Residual Contaminants and Human Health Impacts
from the F-Area High-Level Waste Tank Farm,'' ``Industrial
Wastewater Closure Module for the High-Level Waste Tank 17
System,'' and ``Industrial Wastewater Closure Module for the
High-Level Waste Tank 20 System.'' It also included the
responses (letter from R. Schepens, DOE, to K. Stablein, NRC,
September 30, 1998) to the request for additional
information, as well as information resulting from the April
1, 1999, public meeting between NRC and DOE staff. The
results of the NRC staff review are enclosed to provide input
to your decision. DOE is responsible for determining whether
the residual tank waste can be classified as incidental.
Your tank closure methodology proposes using the incidental
waste criteria approved by the Commission in the February 16,
1993 SRM and stated in the March 2, 1993, letter from R.
Bernero, NRC, to J. Lytle, DOE, that were established for the
treatment and disposal of removed HLW. In reviewing your
methodology, staff took a generic performance-based approach
rather than strictly applying the criteria developed in 1993.
Criterion One from the March 1993, letter specified that ``.
. . wastes have been processed (or will be further processed)
to remove key radionuclides to the maximum extent that is
technically and economically practical.'' DOE identified only
water washing and oxalic acid washing as technically
feasible with regards to removal of key radionuclides
following bulk waste removal. Water washing and bulk waste
removal have been shown to be capable of removing 98
percent of the initial tank activity. Depending on the
initial sludge inventories, oxalic acid washing, or
comparable cleaning, will be required on selected tanks,
although it is not considered to be economically practical
for all 51 tanks.
The sampling methods used to characterize the HLW tanks at
SRS have been evaluated. Several different sampling
techniques were used. In general, the sampling process for
Tanks 17 and 20 was adequate. NRC staff has concluded that
available removal technologies have been extensively examined
to determine those that are both technically and economically
practical, and that the residual waste left in the tanks is
limited to waste that cannot be removed by application of
those technologies currently considered technically and
economically practical for HLW tank cleaning. As the HLW tank
closure process evolves over the next several decades the
technical and economic feasibility of other waste removal
options should continue to be evaluated.
The staff recommends that a set waste sampling protocol
should be developed and followed. The number of samples
obtained will be a function of the tank contents, as well as
the homogeneity of the sludge. All sample results should be
compared to process estimates to ensure consistency and
accuracy. Any significant inconsistencies resulting from tank
sampling and process history should result in further
sampling.
The staff review generally found that DOE's methodology for
removal of key radionuclides to the maximum extent
economically and technically practical achieves the
objectives of Criterion One.
The staff review of Criterion Two, `` . . . wastes will be
incorporated in a solid physical form at a concentration that
does not exceed the applicable concentration limits for class
C low-level waste as set out in 10 CFR Part 61,'' made use of
information you provided on initial tank inventories and
expected removal efficiencies. Fourteen of the 51 HLW tanks
are anticipated to meet Class C limits by utilizing
concentration averaging with only bulk waste removal and
water washing. The other 37 tanks would require chemical
cleaning via oxalic acid washing to meet Class C limits, even
with the application of concentration averaging. DOE,
therefore, plans to rely on alternative considerations of the
classification of waste, rather than planning to use oxalic
acid cleaning to meet Class C concentration limits. In
particular, DOE relies on its plans to solidify the waste in
layers of grout, some 30 feet below the surface of the
ground, and relies on the disposal site, which it considers
to be stable. In addition, it appears that there is
reasonable assurance that the performance objectives of 10
CFR Part 61, Subpart C can be met without meeting the Class C
concentration limits for all tanks. These considerations are
similar to those in 10 CFR 61.58 of the Commission's
regulations, and are viewed by DOE as providing comparable
protection to an inadvertent intruder. Staff believes that
concentration averaging in accordance with the Branch
Technical Position on Concentration Averaging, is generally
acceptable in this context to meet Class C concentration
limits, and recognizes that the alternative provisions for
waste classification proposed by DOE are generally similar to
those in 10 CFR 61.58. Staff recommends that DOE develop
site-specific concentration limits for residual waste in the
SRS HLW tanks in order to bound the associated analyses and
to provide a specific benchmark for satisfactory cleaning of
the tanks.
As for the portion of Criterion Two that addresses the
solid physical form, the staff believes that the waste has
been sufficiently immobilized to help prevent inadvertent
intrusion. By utilizing three different types of grout, the
waste is further protected. The initial reducing grout pour
helps to reduce
[[Page S5933]]
the mobility of the radionuclides. The middle layer of grout
provides a solid foundation to guard against subsidence, and,
finally, the top layer of strong grout provides protection
against physical penetration of the waste. Therefore, the
physical form aspect of Criterion Two appears to be achieved
by our methodology.
Assessing Criterion Three, `` . . . wastes are to be
managed, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, so that safety
requirements comparable to the performance objectives set out
in 10 CFR Part 61 are satisfied'' involves the evaluation of
the tank farm performance assessment (PA).
DOE has indicated that it intends to meet a 4 mrem/yr
drinking water dose limit. From standard dose modeling
methodology, the drinking water dose is expected to be the
largest dose contributor pathway. It appears from the
performance assessment that the drinking water dose will be
less than the 4 mrem/yr drinking water dose limit, and by
extrapolation, that the individual dose will be less than the
25 mrem/yr total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) requirement
of 10 CFR 61.41. In meeting the performance objective of
Sec. 61.41, reliance on institutional controls beyond 100
years will not be needed, although DOE has proposed
institutional controls in perpetuity. Future PAs should focus
on meeting the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61
Subpart C and should not rely on any active institutional
controls beyond 100 years. The NRC staff has concluded that
the DOE methodology will achieve safety objectives comparable
to Sec. 61.41.
To show protection of an inadvertent intruder, the standard
agriculture scenario consists of a farmer who lives at the
tank farm, and drills a well near the tank farm and then uses
the well water to irrigate his crops and feed his livestock
as well as himself. DOE-SR has provided only calculated
drinking water doses for this intruder scenario. DOE's
intruder PA showed that the maximum drinking water dose the
farmer would receive via the ground-water pathway was 130
mrem/year at a well distance of 1 meter from the tank farm,
at approximately 700 years. According to DOE-SR, the drinking
water dose pathway is expected to be the highest dose
contributor and, therefore, provides reasonable assurance of
protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion using a
500 mrem/year limit. The DOE-SR analysis assumes all activity
is contained within the reducing grout layer located at the
bottom of each tank, and that this contaminant zone is not
disturbed. This then implies that there is no activity in any
vertical component of the tank structure and, therefore, a
typical construction scenario (with a 10 foot deep basement)
would not disturb any contaminated portion of the tank
structure.
The staff recommends that future performance assessments
for SR tank closures, including individual tank closure
modules, and the H-Tank Farm Fate and Transport Modeling,
include the full agriculture scenario (all pathways) as well
as the discovery scenario, as described in the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement for 10 CFR Part 61. Staff also
notes that closure of ancillary piping and equipment must
consider an inadvertent intruder. That is, performance
assessment must consider disturbed surface piping and
equipment, which, in addition to tank sources, must not
exceed a TEDE of 500 mrem per year (all pathways) for the
discovery and agricultural scenarios. Furthermore, all
external components (e.g., piping) have not been demonstrated
to provide the same protection to an inadvertent intruder as
the residual waste in the HLW tank bottoms. Without the
proper intruder scenarios (e.g., intruder-agriculture) the
NRC does not recognize in-situ disposal of external
components as achieving the objectives of Criterion Three.
The worker is protected by DOE regulations which are
analogous to 10 CFR Part 20. The worker protection
performance objectives of Sec. 61.43 is, therefore,
considered to be adequately addressed. By filling the tanks
with three layers of grout, the site stability performance
objectives of Sec. 61.44 can also be satisfied.
The staff recommends that future tank closure modeling
should include a more thorough PA for all predicted or known
source terms (i.e., all HLW tanks) in the F-Area Tank Farm
and including the following: early degradation of grout,
degradation of ancillary equipment and piping, combined
aquifer scenarios, conservative distribution coefficient
analysis, conservative radionuclide dispersion analysis,
submerged tanks, conservative analysis for the horizontal
versus vertical flux radiouclide transport processes for the
saturated zone, and a complete all-pathways dose assessment.
See the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report for further
details and additional recommendations. In addition, future
tank closure modeling (including individual tank closure
modules, as well as fate and transport modeling for H-Tank
Farm) should not refer to, or be reliant on in any way,
previous modules. This will avoid confusion and errors
associated with outdated data and assumptions.
By generally achieving each of the performance objectives
stated in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, the staff has concluded
that the tank closure methodology is consistent with the
objectives of Criterion Three.
Based on the information provided the staff has concluded
that the methodology for tank closure at SRS appears to
reasonably analyze the relevant considerations for Criterion
One and Criterion Three of the three incidental waste
criteria. DOE would undertake cleanup to the maximum extent
that is technically and economically practical, and would
demonstrate it can meet performance objectives consistent
with those required for disposal of low-level waste. These
commitments, if satisfied, should serve to provide adequate
protection of public health and safety. Further, DOE's
methodology relies on alternative classification
considerations similar to those contained in the Commission's
regulations at 10 CFR 61.58. The NRC staff, from a safety
perspective, therefore does not disagree with DOE-SR's
proposed methodology, contingent upon DOE reaching current
goals for bulk waste removal, as well as water and chemical
washing, such that the performance objectives comparable to
those stated in Subpart C 10 CFR 61 are met. In addition, NRC
judgment as to the adequacy of the methodology is dependent
on verification that the assumptions underlying the analysis
are correct.
The analysis performed regarding the proposed tank closure
methodology for the HLW tanks located at the DOE Savannah
River Site was performed by NRC according to the terms and
conditions of the established Memorandum of Understanding and
the Interagency Agreement. The analysis and resulting NRC
conclusions are specific only to the 51 tanks located at the
DOE Savannah River F and H Area tank farms, and related
piping and equipment. The NRC assessment is a site-specific
evaluation, and is not a precedent for any future decisions
on waste classification scenarios at other sites,
particularly sites under NRC jurisdiction.
Sincerely,
William F. Kane,
Director, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. With that, to be continued. Thank you.
Happy holidays.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal year
2005 Defense authorization bill. I want to first commend Chairman
Warner and Senator Levin, who have continued their tradition of strong
and bipartisan leadership. I also want to thank my friend, colleague
and subcommittee chairman Senator Ensign, for his cooperation and
leadership throughout this process this year.
While I think the bill before us goes a long way to supporting the
needs of our service men and women, I do want to highlight a few
concerns.
First, I am pleased that the administration finally followed
Congress' lead and sent a request for an additional $25 billion to
begin to address the ongoing military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan for the first few months of fiscal year 2005. While I do
not support the structure of the administration's request, in part
because it does not do enough to ensure accountability for how these
funds would be used, I do support its intent, and I think it is
imperative that we include an authorization of additional funding in
the final version of this bill.
Second, while I support every action to aid our brave men and women
in the armed forces, who are making so many sacrifices as they fight
for our freedoms, I am concerned and disappointed by some of the
actions we have taken in the bill we are reporting to the Senate. My
greatest concern lies, as it did last year, in the reductions we have
made in the working capital funds of the military services and defense
agencies. While I disagreed with the cuts in these accounts last year,
the ones this year are even more harmful, as DOD is already tapping
these accounts to the greatest possible extent to get through the
remainder of this fiscal year. So they will already be well below
normal cash balances as they enter fiscal year 2005, and the $1.6
billion in reductions we have recommended in this bill will increase
the risk of readiness problems by decreasing DOD's ability to provide
spare parts, maintenance, and other support for our forces that are
critical to their continued success. By cutting into these accounts, I
believe we are sending a message that we do not support our troops, a
message that I know could not be further from the truth.
Our forces deserve armored vehicles to protect them in Iraq, but they
also deserve the spare parts they need to keep those vehicles running.
When our troops come home, they deserve to have those vehicles
repaired, rather than wait for maintenance from a depot until parts
arrive that could have been ordered earlier if the working capital
funds had had sufficient cash. We owe them the courage to make tough
decisions to ensure that those needs are met now, not when future funds
not yet requested may or may not become available.
On the positive side, I am pleased about our continued support for
military construction and family housing
[[Page S5934]]
needs that are so critical to quality of life for our service men and
women. I also support many of the provisions we have included that will
further improve the management of the department. I particularly
appreciate the bipartisan effort that the staff has made to address a
wide range of procurement issues, environmental issues, and
longstanding DOD financial management problems.
While I support the overall actions taken in this bill, and commend
all of my colleagues for the hard work that they have invested, as
ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee I have mixed feelings
about our actions. We have increased funding for some key programs, but
at the expense of others where the impact might be more easily
obscured. Our experience with the Air Force over the last few years has
shown that there is a direct correlation between increased spare parts
and mission capable rates for aircraft; those spare parts are provided
through the Air Force Working Capital Fund. The Navy expects to have
only a few days of cash on hand at the end of this fiscal year, and may
be forced to bill customers before they actually receive their orders.
And the Army faces a situation where its orders for parts and other key
items exceed its cash on hand by more than 700 percent. Wartime, when
we see a great expansion of customer needs for readiness and large
fluctuations in required support, is not the time to take on more
readiness risk by decreasing cash balances in the working capital
funds. It hurts readiness, and it hurts the men and women who serve in
uniform.
By reducing funding for the readiness accounts and failing to provide
any supplemental funding for 2005, this bill does not do enough to meet
the most pressing needs of our men and women in uniform.
I will support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. I
think it is a good bill that could have been better, and I will
continue to work throughout the rest of the authorization process to
improve it.
____________________