[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 72 (Thursday, May 20, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5929-S5934]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I join with my colleague in requesting Senators to send 
in as many amendments as they possibly can. The Senator from Michigan 
and I will be here tomorrow in hopes that we can clear amendments. 
There are days when clearances could be facilitated. I think tomorrow 
is one of those days.
  I say to my good colleague, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, am 
I correct in that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I say to my good friend from Virginia, he is absolutely 
not only correct but I would join his plea to our colleagues that we 
make good use of time tomorrow. If Senators are not here, their staff 
can deliver amendments so at least we can begin to consider them. We 
can make good use of tomorrow so when we come back we will have to use 
up less of the Senate's time.
  So I join the chairman's plea that Members on both sides of the 
aisle, who have not filed amendments or given our staffs amendments, do 
that tomorrow. Let us try to work through some of them. We could clear 
them tomorrow and, even if we do not have contested amendments 
tomorrow, we could make some progress on this bill.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
  The distinguished Senator from Nevada, the Democratic whip, pointed 
out that he has a count of over 100-odd amendments with which we have 
to deal. So there is a formidable task ahead of us.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. The reason I speak as we close out this 
evening is to comment on a few things about the amendment pending 
before the Senate in regard to an effort to do two things: to make sure 
the $350 million that is available for the Department of Energy to 
provide cleanup in the States of Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina 
can move forward without any strings attached, and to ratify an 
agreement that the State of South Carolina has entered into with the 
Department of Energy concerning 51 tanks containing high-level waste.
  I really do very much like my colleague from Washington, Senator 
Cantwell, but we dramatically disagree on this. I cannot emphasize how 
dramatically we do disagree about what is at stake and what we are 
trying to accomplish.
  My senior Senator from South Carolina could not have been possibly 
better to me since I have been in the Senate almost 18 months now. He 
is going through some accusations that I find not consistent with who 
Senator Hollings is. I am not going to dwell on that, but I believe 
that most of us who

[[Page S5930]]

know Senator Hollings very well believe he gives everybody the same 
treatment: Really hard. He is a fair man. He is a good man. We have 
some disagreement about how to handle the amendment before us, but I 
did not come to this issue without some time, attention, and thought to 
the matter.
  Well over a year I have been involved with my State working with the 
Department of Energy to make sure that the 51 tanks that have high-
level waste as a result of the cold war legacy material at the Savannah 
River site is cleaned up in a way that is environmentally sound for 
South Carolina, good for the taxpayer, and it makes sense.
  I have a letter from the Governor of South Carolina. Contrary to what 
Senator Hollings suggested, the Governor of South Carolina not only 
knows what we are doing, he encourages what we are doing. I received a 
letter to that effect. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          State of South Carolina,


                                       Office of the Governor,

                                       Columbia, SC, May 20, 2004.
     Hon. Lindsey O. Graham,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Graham: I am writing in support Section 3116, 
     Defense Site Acceleration Completion in the FY 2005 
     Department of Defense Authorization bill, S. 2400. More 
     specifically, this section of the bill will allow for an 
     accelerated clean up of the Savannah River Site in South 
     Carolina.
       This Administration is concerned about the prospect of 
     long-term storage of radioactive waste in aging tanks at the 
     Savannah River Site. Under the current Nuclear Waste Policy 
     Act, the cleanup process could leave the waste in those 
     storage tanks for an additional 30 years.
       However, the amendment allows the U.S. Department of 
     Energy, working with the South Carolina Department of Health 
     and Environmental Control, to move more quickly to clean up 
     the Savannah River Site. In fact, the estimated cleanup time 
     will be reduced by 23 years, at a savings of $16 billion to 
     the taxpayers.
       Most important is ensuring that the State of South Carolina 
     will be able to retain an oversight role in the cleanup 
     process. According to analysis by the South Carolina 
     Department of Health and Environmental Control, the state's 
     environmental regulatory agency, the clean up process will 
     still require an equal partnership with the State.
       As you move through the legislative process, we urge you 
     and your colleagues to retain two very important goals for 
     South Carolina: 1. allow for a more accelerated clean up 
     process, and 2. provide strong language to protect the 
     State's sovereignty within the process of accelerated 
     cleanup.
       Thank you for your leadership in the United States Senate. 
     I look forward to working with you on this and many other 
     matters of importance to our State.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Mark Sanford.

  Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. I am going to read from it. The 
question Senator Hollings raised was, well, if our Governor knew about 
this he would not agree to this because he is a good environmentalist.
  We will agree on this: Our Governor is a good environmentalist. He 
has been a great Governor trying to change the culture of the way we do 
business in South Carolina. I have been working with him for well over 
a year to make sure our State gets those tanks cleaned up in our 
lifetime and we do not have to worry about ground water leakage.
  The folks in Washington have a real problem on their hands, and I 
want to help them. The people in Idaho have problems on their hands, 
and I want to help them. I do not think they are being very responsible 
in terms of how we are dealing with each other's problems.
  Here is a chronology of what has been going on in these three States. 
Idaho, South Carolina, and Washington have been separately negotiating 
with the Department of Energy about trying to agree on standards in 
their States to remediate the high-level waste that is left over from 
the cold war. Washington has a particular problem where they have tanks 
that are leaking into the ground water. That needs to be fixed sooner 
rather than later.
  The question is, What is clean? The question is, Are we going to 
allow South Carolina, Idaho, and Washington to work with the Department 
of Energy to take care of their specific needs and specific problems in 
an environmentally sound manner or are we going to give one group a 
veto power over everybody else?
  I hope we do not. January 26, 2004, Congressman Hastings and Senators 
Murray and Cantwell sent a letter to Governor Locke and Secretary 
Abraham asking them to work together to resolve the ongoing dispute 
pertaining to waste classification.
  On February 2, the deputy secretary and Governor Locke connected. 
Governor Locke indicated he would designate someone to enter into a 
discussion on behalf of the State of Washington.
  That has been going on in South Carolina far before January 26. It is 
going on in Idaho. About 8 or 9 years ago Idaho reached agreement about 
certain aspects of cleaning up of the Idaho sites. Each site has a 
different problem and it is working with DOE in a way that is good for 
everyone, the State and at the Federal level, to clean up these sites.
  The reason we are in court in Idaho is DOE unilaterally issued an 
order that gave them the authority to set the cleanup standards without 
consulting with the States. They were trying to change the game or the 
agreement Idaho had with DOE, and Idaho sued and we--South Carolina and 
Washington--joined as a friend of the court, saying we will not sit on 
the sidelines and watch the Department of Energy have the unilateral 
right to set cleanup standards. That is what we agree upon.
  The amendment I have before the Senate does two important things. It 
does not allow the Department of Defense to withhold funds to Idaho and 
Washington unless they reach a similar agreement with South Carolina. 
It does not make what is going on in South Carolina a Presidential 
event, in terms of how it affects other States. It limits what is going 
on in South Carolina to South Carolina. It does not disadvantage 
Washington or Idaho. They have the right, the obligation to enter into 
an agreement, if any, with DOE. What we are doing in South Carolina 
only affects South Carolina. I will tell you in a moment what people in 
South Carolina who are in charge of our environmental needs say about 
this agreement. I will read the letter from the Governor here in a 
moment.
  The Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the State of 
Washington, along with the State of Idaho, exchanged drafts and held 
conversations between January and April. There is a lot of paperwork 
out there that shows Idaho and Washington have been trying to do the 
same thing we have been doing in South Carolina. Here is the 
difference. We reached an agreement South Carolina likes that will get 
our tanks cleaned up in an environmentally sound manner. And listen to 
this, it allows the tanks to be cleaned up, remediated, and closed 23 
years ahead of schedule, and it saves $16 billion to the American 
taxpayer.
  I hope Washington and Idaho can get there. If they ever do get there, 
if they ever do reach an agreement with the Department of Energy where 
the Governor says I like it, where the environmental regulators say I 
like it, where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission says this is waste 
incidental to reprocessing, that this can be done in a way that is 
environmentally sound--I hope I will help, not stand in the way.
  So much was said that is so wrong about this issue. To my two friends 
from Idaho, you have taken some political abuse here that is so far 
from the truth that it is mind-boggling. What Senators Crapo and Craig 
have been doing is they have been working with me, in conjunction with 
all three States, to make sure they get the money they are entitled to 
regardless of what we do in South Carolina, and they have been kind 
enough to work with me to make sure my State's agreement can go 
forward. We are doing nothing to prejudice the lawsuit of the State of 
Idaho or their ability to reach an independent agreement. I can assure 
you, this is not blindsiding anybody because there is paperwork from 
January all the way through to recent months between Idaho and 
Washington, talking with DOE about trying to find an agreement.
  On February 25, 2004, Jessie Roberson, the Assistant Secretary for 
Energy for Environmental Management came before Senator Allard in a 
hearing and talked about this extensively. He was asked numerous 
questions.
  I ask unanimous consent to have an excerpt of that hearing printed in 
the Record.

[[Page S5931]]

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Transcript on Waste Incidental to Reprocessing, Strategic Forces 
                Subcommittee Hearing, February 25, 2004


  questions by senator wayne allard to ms. jessie roberson, assistant 
            secretary of energy for environmental management

       ALLARD: Well, thank you very much for your participation. 
     It's invaluable to this committee.
       I'm going to be referring in my questioning to WIR, which 
     stands for Waste Incidental Reprocessing. And I think it 
     would behoove the committee to hear, Secretary Roberson, you 
     summarize what the WIR issue is.
       ROBERSON: Thank you, Chairman Allard. Thank you, Senator, 
     as well.
       Clean-up of tank waste at Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah 
     River represents the greatest risk-reduction effort in the 
     department's entire clean-up program.
       ALLARD: And this all falls under Waste Incidental 
     Reprocessing, is that correct?
       ROBERSON: Absolutely.
       ALLARD: Okay.
       ROBERSON: And I'll explain what portion of the program that 
     specifically applies to.
       ALLARD: Very good.
       ROBERSON: Okay, we have planned at these three sites to 
     clean up tank waste, plans agreed to with our host states and 
     that the NRC had also carefully reviewed. At each site, our 
     plans acknowledge we would remove as much tank waste as we 
     could. We would separate the tank waste into two factions.
       The first is a high-activity faction containing over 95 
     percent of the radioactivity, which we would classify as 
     high-level waste and treat and dispose of in the repository 
     for spent fuel and high-level waste called for by the Nuclear 
     Waste Policy Act.
       And then a low-activity faction, which we would classify as 
     low-level waste, incidental to reprocessing and, depending on 
     its characteristics, treat and dispose of in an appropriate 
     disposal facility for such material.
       We would then determine whether we could demonstrate that 
     disposing of a small amount of residues remaining in the 
     tank, generally around one percent of the original volume, by 
     immobilizing it in place and determine--to ensure that it 
     would be comparable to the public health and safety 
     requirements for disposal of low-level waste in a near-
     surface disposal facility. If it would, our plans were to 
     classify the residues as low-level waste, incidental to 
     reprocessing, to immobilize them in the tank and close the 
     tanks with these residues in place.
       A key element of these plans is the classification of the 
     tank waste.
       The problem we have encountered is that in July of 2003, an 
     Idaho district court struck down the waste incident to 
     reprocessing portion of DOE Order 435.1, the DOE order 
     addressing how DOE and its contractors classify waste under 
     the Atomic Energy Act. As a result, we now face uncertainty 
     in implementing the very plans our host states had agreed 
     made technical sense.
       The classification of this waste is key to determining how 
     to dispose of it. Therefore, if we're unable to resolve this 
     issue regarding waste incidental to reprocessing, we face 
     leaving these tank wastes in place far longer than we and our 
     host states had anticipated. In fact, such delay would likely 
     create more serious health and safety risk to workers and 
     members of the public by leaving the waste in tanks longer 
     and risking leaks to ground water.
       ALLARD: Madam Secretary, why do you have to leave any of 
     the waste residues behind?
       ROBERSON: Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly describe the 
     size of these tanks and the nature of the waste removal in 
     question. Each tank can hold as much as 1.3 million gallons 
     of liquid waste. At Hanford, for example, the tanks are 75 
     feet in diameter, and the tanks are of differing shapes. Some 
     are concave, which means they don't have a flat bottom.
       ALLARD: I guess that's about the size of this room . . . .
       (CROSSTALK)
       ROBERSON: Under the tri-party agreement at Hanford between 
     DOE, Washington state and EPA, which governs the clean-up at 
     that site, the goal is that we retrieve 99 percent of the 
     tank waste. If all of the remaining waste were on the bottom 
     of the tank, it would be just under one inch thick.
       Because of radiological concerns with exposure for workers, 
     tank waste removal must be done remotely. In addition, these 
     tanks usually sit below 10 feet of soil cover. Our retrieval 
     equipment must fit into openings two inches to two feet wide. 
     And tank structures are not designed to support heavy loads 
     for which equipment must be deployed to do the tank cleaning. 
     So it is not a simple task to scrape the last remaining tank 
     residues from a tank.
       Further, much of the waste residues are expected to have a 
     stiff consistency. Most removal techniques require directing 
     pressurized water streams at the remaining waste to 
     immobilize it and to move it to a location which can be 
     pumped.
       ROBERSON: We have spent over 10 years working on 
     technologies to improve removal opportunities of the waste 
     from these tanks.
       Finally, many of the tanks are over 40 years old. And a 
     number of them have known leak sites, requiring us to 
     exercise great care to preclude water leaking from the tank.
       As I said, DOE spent tens of millions of dollars exploring 
     how to get as much residual waste as possible out of the 
     tanks.
       ALLARD: What is the material you plan to leave in the 
     tanks?
       ROBERSON: We think the residues, when stabilized, are 
     appropriately considered low-level waste, suitable for 
     shallow land burial. Analysis will be performed to ensure 
     that they meet performance objectives established by DOE and 
     the NRC for low-level waste performance objectives.
       In fact, that is what the order that was struck down by the 
     judge's ruling required.
       ALLARD: Now, shouldn't the waste characteristics and the 
     risks they pose be what matters in terms of safe disposal 
     rather than the process that created the waste?
       ROBERSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we believe so. And we believe 
     that that is the philosophy behind the clean-up plans in 
     place for those sites.
       ALLARD: And how much more than your current estimates might 
     this cost the American taxpayers?
       ROBERSON: Our preliminary assessment was that it would cost 
     as much as $50 billion more over the life-cycle of the 
     department's clean-up program and extend that life-cycle by 
     decades to have to process all of our tank waste as high-
     level waste for disposal in a geologic repository, including 
     exhuming the tanks themselves, cutting them up and packaging 
     them for disposal.
       ALLARD: So what is the risk if you have to do that?
       ROBERSON: Clearly, the risk to workers, and frankly to the 
     environment, is much larger if we have to exhume tanks. Given 
     that we cannot proceed with our clean-up plans that were 
     based on our waste classification order, we risk leaving 
     waste in tanks much longer than we had planned right now.
       We also add to environmental risk by the need to dispose of 
     the large amounts of metals resulting from the almost 250 
     large tanks and the associated equipment. Our analysis thus 
     far indicates that we would increase worker exposure 10 
     fold. We would increase costs 10 fold and achieve no 
     meaningful improvement in environmental protection.
       ALLARD: So I don't see what the rational benefit is to the 
     American taxpayer from the department having to implement the 
     Idaho district court decision.
       ROBERSON: Frankly, Senator, we don't see it either, which 
     is why we are pursuing this. Rather than accelerating clean-
     up of tank waste in agreement with our host states, we face 
     stopping much of that work.
       ALLARD: What is your plan for resolving this WIR issue:
       ROBERSON: Accelerated clean up of tank waste is a top 
     priority for the entire department and the states that host 
     our facilities. As pointed out in the General Accounting 
     Office report completed last year, the WIR, waste incidental 
     to reprocessing issue, poses a significant vulnerability for 
     the department.
       Consistent with both the GAO recommendations to seek 
     legislative clarification regarding DOE's authority to 
     classify tank waste and with the request by the House 
     Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee last year, we 
     proposed draft legislation to Congress that would clarify our 
     authority for managing such waste.
       We have since held discussions with affected states over 
     the impact the Idaho district court decision had on our 
     activities in Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah River, in order to 
     seek to address issues they have raised about our proposed 
     legislative approach.
       In addition, we've just filed our opening brief in our 
     appeal of the Idaho court decision to continue our litigation 
     efforts to resolve the WIR issue. Without timely resolution 
     to this issue, not only could we be unable to implement our 
     clean-up plans, but DOE also could be forced to realign its 
     resources across the complex in a manner that would 
     significantly distort the department's clean-up and other 
     priorities.
       ALLARD: What about the $350 million, and what does it take 
     to get that money released?
       ROBERSON: The Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request 
     includes $350 million in a high-level waste proposal that 
     reflects the need to satisfactorily resolve this issue to 
     support clean-up. These funds will be requested only to the 
     extent that legal uncertainties concerning disposition of 
     these wastes are resolved.
       Until we can resolve the legal uncertainties related to 
     WIR, it does not make sense for us to proceed with projects 
     that prepare tank waste for disposition as other than high-
     level waste destined for deep geologic depository.
       ALLARD: I want to thank you for your response.

  Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. There was another Energy and Water 
hearing where the same topic was brought before the Congress. The topic 
is, how are you doing with your efforts to reach agreements with the 
three States in question to find cleanup standards they can agree to 
that are environmentally sound, that will allow things to go forward in 
a more expeditious manner?
  The truth is, we have spent billions of dollars talking about 
cleaning up and we have done nothing but let tanks leak and have waste 
stay around for years and decades. Now we have a new model. Now we have 
new money, $350

[[Page S5932]]

million of new dollars, and we are using commonsense approaches to 
cleanup.
  What are we trying to do in South Carolina? If I can explain very 
quickly. I am not a scientist, but I do have fairly good common sense. 
The 51 tanks that have high-level waste, those tanks will be cleaned 
up. The liquid in those tanks will be converted to glass logs, it is 
called vitrification, and that will be sent to Yucca Mountain.
  What we are trying to do is clean these tanks up in a manner 
consistent with safety for South Carolina. The amendment says no tank 
can be closed unless the State of South Carolina issues a closure 
permit. The letter from my Governor says, not only am I aware of what 
you are doing, Senator Graham, I support it because it will allow the 
tanks to be closed up 23 years ahead of schedule, it will save money, 
and we don't have to worry about tanks deteriorating.
  The plan is to take all of the liquid out and the film on the bottom, 
which will be 1 to 1.5 inches, treated with concrete and other 
materials and the tank will be closed. To get that 1 to 1.5 inches out 
of the bottom of that tank will cost $16 billion and take 23 additional 
years and put people's lives at risk for no good reason, no good 
environmental reason.
  Every State is trying to define what is clean for their State. 
Washington is trying to do the same thing. Maybe they will want half an 
inch. I don't know what they want. Idaho is trying to do the same 
thing. We have done it and I have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
report that says what is left in that tank after treatment is waste 
incidental to reprocessing, not high-level waste.
  The people in my State who regulate the environment have sent a 
letter saying we want this agreement because we have final say over 
where you close the tank and the standards we have negotiated we think 
are good for South Carolina. The only reason we are having this 
argument is they don't want one State to go--I guess some groups want 
to have the leverage of all three States to get standards they believe 
are better than those by the South Carolina folks who regulate our 
environment, and they are trying to use some standard that may not be 
necessary for Idaho and South Carolina. We don't have the same problems 
they do in Washington.
  I will stand behind any Senator from Washington to make sure DOE 
doesn't run over them. I will stand behind any Senator from Idaho to 
make sure they can negotiate on their own terms. I am asking this body 
to approve an agreement that is environmentally sound, fiscally 
responsible, that affects South Carolina, and is what all three States 
are trying to achieve.
  I have had printed in the Record the letter from my Governor. I have 
had printed the study from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed the letter from the Department of 
Health and Environment Control in South Carolina, saying this is good 
for the State, they retain control over the tanks, and this is 
environmentally sound.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                    June 30, 2000.
     Mr. Roy J. Schepens,
     Assistant Manager for High-Level Waste, U.S. Department of 
         Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, SC.

 Savannah River Site High Level Waste Tank closure: Classification of 
                      Residual Waste as Incidental

       Dear Mr. Schepens: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
     (NRC) has completed the review of the tank closure 
     methodology for the high-level waste (HLW) tanks at the 
     Savannah River Site (SRS). Under the terms and conditions of 
     the Department of Energy (DOE)/NRC Memorandum of 
     Understanding and the DOE/NRC Interagency Agreement, both 
     dated July 9, 1997, the NRC is acting in an advisory capacity 
     and is not providing regulatory approval. The focus of the 
     review was whether or not the residual waste left in the HLW 
     tanks, after cleaning, could be labeled as incidental waste. 
     The criteria for incidental waste were approved by the 
     Commission in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated 
     February 16, 1993, in response to SECY-92-391, ``Denial of 
     PRM 60-4--Petition for Rulemaking from the States of 
     Washington and Oregon Regarding Classification of Radioactive 
     Waste at Hanford,'' and described in the March 2, 1993, 
     letter from R. Bernero, NRC, to J. Lytle, DOE. The review 
     focused on DOE's ``Regulatory Basis for Incidental Waste 
     Classification at the Savannah River Site High-Level Waste 
     Tank Farms,'' ``High-Level Waste Tank Closure Program Plan,'' 
     ``Environmental Radiological Analysis, Fate and Transport 
     Modeling of Residual Contaminants and Human Health Impacts 
     from the F-Area High-Level Waste Tank Farm,'' ``Industrial 
     Wastewater Closure Module for the High-Level Waste Tank 17 
     System,'' and ``Industrial Wastewater Closure Module for the 
     High-Level Waste Tank 20 System.'' It also included the 
     responses (letter from R. Schepens, DOE, to K. Stablein, NRC, 
     September 30, 1998) to the request for additional 
     information, as well as information resulting from the April 
     1, 1999, public meeting between NRC and DOE staff. The 
     results of the NRC staff review are enclosed to provide input 
     to your decision. DOE is responsible for determining whether 
     the residual tank waste can be classified as incidental.
       Your tank closure methodology proposes using the incidental 
     waste criteria approved by the Commission in the February 16, 
     1993 SRM and stated in the March 2, 1993, letter from R. 
     Bernero, NRC, to J. Lytle, DOE, that were established for the 
     treatment and disposal of removed HLW. In reviewing your 
     methodology, staff took a generic performance-based approach 
     rather than strictly applying the criteria developed in 1993. 
     Criterion One from the March 1993, letter specified that ``. 
     . . wastes have been processed (or will be further processed) 
     to remove key radionuclides to the maximum extent that is 
     technically and economically practical.'' DOE identified only 
     water washing and oxalic acid washing as technically 
     feasible with regards to removal of key radionuclides 
     following bulk waste removal. Water washing and bulk waste 
     removal have been shown to be capable of removing 98 
     percent of the initial tank activity. Depending on the 
     initial sludge inventories, oxalic acid washing, or 
     comparable cleaning, will be required on selected tanks, 
     although it is not considered to be economically practical 
     for all 51 tanks.
       The sampling methods used to characterize the HLW tanks at 
     SRS have been evaluated. Several different sampling 
     techniques were used. In general, the sampling process for 
     Tanks 17 and 20 was adequate. NRC staff has concluded that 
     available removal technologies have been extensively examined 
     to determine those that are both technically and economically 
     practical, and that the residual waste left in the tanks is 
     limited to waste that cannot be removed by application of 
     those technologies currently considered technically and 
     economically practical for HLW tank cleaning. As the HLW tank 
     closure process evolves over the next several decades the 
     technical and economic feasibility of other waste removal 
     options should continue to be evaluated.
       The staff recommends that a set waste sampling protocol 
     should be developed and followed. The number of samples 
     obtained will be a function of the tank contents, as well as 
     the homogeneity of the sludge. All sample results should be 
     compared to process estimates to ensure consistency and 
     accuracy. Any significant inconsistencies resulting from tank 
     sampling and process history should result in further 
     sampling.
       The staff review generally found that DOE's methodology for 
     removal of key radionuclides to the maximum extent 
     economically and technically practical achieves the 
     objectives of Criterion One.
       The staff review of Criterion Two, `` . . . wastes will be 
     incorporated in a solid physical form at a concentration that 
     does not exceed the applicable concentration limits for class 
     C low-level waste as set out in 10 CFR Part 61,'' made use of 
     information you provided on initial tank inventories and 
     expected removal efficiencies. Fourteen of the 51 HLW tanks 
     are anticipated to meet Class C limits by utilizing 
     concentration averaging with only bulk waste removal and 
     water washing. The other 37 tanks would require chemical 
     cleaning via oxalic acid washing to meet Class C limits, even 
     with the application of concentration averaging. DOE, 
     therefore, plans to rely on alternative considerations of the 
     classification of waste, rather than planning to use oxalic 
     acid cleaning to meet Class C concentration limits. In 
     particular, DOE relies on its plans to solidify the waste in 
     layers of grout, some 30 feet below the surface of the 
     ground, and relies on the disposal site, which it considers 
     to be stable. In addition, it appears that there is 
     reasonable assurance that the performance objectives of 10 
     CFR Part 61, Subpart C can be met without meeting the Class C 
     concentration limits for all tanks. These considerations are 
     similar to those in 10 CFR 61.58 of the Commission's 
     regulations, and are viewed by DOE as providing comparable 
     protection to an inadvertent intruder. Staff believes that 
     concentration averaging in accordance with the Branch 
     Technical Position on Concentration Averaging, is generally 
     acceptable in this context to meet Class C concentration 
     limits, and recognizes that the alternative provisions for 
     waste classification proposed by DOE are generally similar to 
     those in 10 CFR 61.58. Staff recommends that DOE develop 
     site-specific concentration limits for residual waste in the 
     SRS HLW tanks in order to bound the associated analyses and 
     to provide a specific benchmark for satisfactory cleaning of 
     the tanks.
       As for the portion of Criterion Two that addresses the 
     solid physical form, the staff believes that the waste has 
     been sufficiently immobilized to help prevent inadvertent 
     intrusion. By utilizing three different types of grout, the 
     waste is further protected. The initial reducing grout pour 
     helps to reduce

[[Page S5933]]

     the mobility of the radionuclides. The middle layer of grout 
     provides a solid foundation to guard against subsidence, and, 
     finally, the top layer of strong grout provides protection 
     against physical penetration of the waste. Therefore, the 
     physical form aspect of Criterion Two appears to be achieved 
     by our methodology.
       Assessing Criterion Three, `` . . . wastes are to be 
     managed, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, so that safety 
     requirements comparable to the performance objectives set out 
     in 10 CFR Part 61 are satisfied'' involves the evaluation of 
     the tank farm performance assessment (PA).
       DOE has indicated that it intends to meet a 4 mrem/yr 
     drinking water dose limit. From standard dose modeling 
     methodology, the drinking water dose is expected to be the 
     largest dose contributor pathway. It appears from the 
     performance assessment that the drinking water dose will be 
     less than the 4 mrem/yr drinking water dose limit, and by 
     extrapolation, that the individual dose will be less than the 
     25 mrem/yr total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) requirement 
     of 10 CFR 61.41. In meeting the performance objective of 
     Sec. 61.41, reliance on institutional controls beyond 100 
     years will not be needed, although DOE has proposed 
     institutional controls in perpetuity. Future PAs should focus 
     on meeting the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61 
     Subpart C and should not rely on any active institutional 
     controls beyond 100 years. The NRC staff has concluded that 
     the DOE methodology will achieve safety objectives comparable 
     to Sec. 61.41.
       To show protection of an inadvertent intruder, the standard 
     agriculture scenario consists of a farmer who lives at the 
     tank farm, and drills a well near the tank farm and then uses 
     the well water to irrigate his crops and feed his livestock 
     as well as himself. DOE-SR has provided only calculated 
     drinking water doses for this intruder scenario. DOE's 
     intruder PA showed that the maximum drinking water dose the 
     farmer would receive via the ground-water pathway was 130 
     mrem/year at a well distance of 1 meter from the tank farm, 
     at approximately 700 years. According to DOE-SR, the drinking 
     water dose pathway is expected to be the highest dose 
     contributor and, therefore, provides reasonable assurance of 
     protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion using a 
     500 mrem/year limit. The DOE-SR analysis assumes all activity 
     is contained within the reducing grout layer located at the 
     bottom of each tank, and that this contaminant zone is not 
     disturbed. This then implies that there is no activity in any 
     vertical component of the tank structure and, therefore, a 
     typical construction scenario (with a 10 foot deep basement) 
     would not disturb any contaminated portion of the tank 
     structure.
       The staff recommends that future performance assessments 
     for SR tank closures, including individual tank closure 
     modules, and the H-Tank Farm Fate and Transport Modeling, 
     include the full agriculture scenario (all pathways) as well 
     as the discovery scenario, as described in the Draft 
     Environmental Impact Statement for 10 CFR Part 61. Staff also 
     notes that closure of ancillary piping and equipment must 
     consider an inadvertent intruder. That is, performance 
     assessment must consider disturbed surface piping and 
     equipment, which, in addition to tank sources, must not 
     exceed a TEDE of 500 mrem per year (all pathways) for the 
     discovery and agricultural scenarios. Furthermore, all 
     external components (e.g., piping) have not been demonstrated 
     to provide the same protection to an inadvertent intruder as 
     the residual waste in the HLW tank bottoms. Without the 
     proper intruder scenarios (e.g., intruder-agriculture) the 
     NRC does not recognize in-situ disposal of external 
     components as achieving the objectives of Criterion Three.
       The worker is protected by DOE regulations which are 
     analogous to 10 CFR Part 20. The worker protection 
     performance objectives of Sec. 61.43 is, therefore, 
     considered to be adequately addressed. By filling the tanks 
     with three layers of grout, the site stability performance 
     objectives of Sec. 61.44 can also be satisfied.
       The staff recommends that future tank closure modeling 
     should include a more thorough PA for all predicted or known 
     source terms (i.e., all HLW tanks) in the F-Area Tank Farm 
     and including the following: early degradation of grout, 
     degradation of ancillary equipment and piping, combined 
     aquifer scenarios, conservative distribution coefficient 
     analysis, conservative radionuclide dispersion analysis, 
     submerged tanks, conservative analysis for the horizontal 
     versus vertical flux radiouclide transport processes for the 
     saturated zone, and a complete all-pathways dose assessment. 
     See the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report for further 
     details and additional recommendations. In addition, future 
     tank closure modeling (including individual tank closure 
     modules, as well as fate and transport modeling for H-Tank 
     Farm) should not refer to, or be reliant on in any way, 
     previous modules. This will avoid confusion and errors 
     associated with outdated data and assumptions.
       By generally achieving each of the performance objectives 
     stated in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, the staff has concluded 
     that the tank closure methodology is consistent with the 
     objectives of Criterion Three.
       Based on the information provided the staff has concluded 
     that the methodology for tank closure at SRS appears to 
     reasonably analyze the relevant considerations for Criterion 
     One and Criterion Three of the three incidental waste 
     criteria. DOE would undertake cleanup to the maximum extent 
     that is technically and economically practical, and would 
     demonstrate it can meet performance objectives consistent 
     with those required for disposal of low-level waste. These 
     commitments, if satisfied, should serve to provide adequate 
     protection of public health and safety. Further, DOE's 
     methodology relies on alternative classification 
     considerations similar to those contained in the Commission's 
     regulations at 10 CFR 61.58. The NRC staff, from a safety 
     perspective, therefore does not disagree with DOE-SR's 
     proposed methodology, contingent upon DOE reaching current 
     goals for bulk waste removal, as well as water and chemical 
     washing, such that the performance objectives comparable to 
     those stated in Subpart C 10 CFR 61 are met. In addition, NRC 
     judgment as to the adequacy of the methodology is dependent 
     on verification that the assumptions underlying the analysis 
     are correct.
       The analysis performed regarding the proposed tank closure 
     methodology for the HLW tanks located at the DOE Savannah 
     River Site was performed by NRC according to the terms and 
     conditions of the established Memorandum of Understanding and 
     the Interagency Agreement. The analysis and resulting NRC 
     conclusions are specific only to the 51 tanks located at the 
     DOE Savannah River F and H Area tank farms, and related 
     piping and equipment. The NRC assessment is a site-specific 
     evaluation, and is not a precedent for any future decisions 
     on waste classification scenarios at other sites, 
     particularly sites under NRC jurisdiction.
           Sincerely,

                                              William F. Kane,

                                       Director, Office of Nuclear
                                   Material Safety and Safeguards.

  Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. With that, to be continued. Thank you. 
Happy holidays.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal year 
2005 Defense authorization bill. I want to first commend Chairman 
Warner and Senator Levin, who have continued their tradition of strong 
and bipartisan leadership. I also want to thank my friend, colleague 
and subcommittee chairman Senator Ensign, for his cooperation and 
leadership throughout this process this year.
  While I think the bill before us goes a long way to supporting the 
needs of our service men and women, I do want to highlight a few 
concerns.
  First, I am pleased that the administration finally followed 
Congress' lead and sent a request for an additional $25 billion to 
begin to address the ongoing military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for the first few months of fiscal year 2005. While I do 
not support the structure of the administration's request, in part 
because it does not do enough to ensure accountability for how these 
funds would be used, I do support its intent, and I think it is 
imperative that we include an authorization of additional funding in 
the final version of this bill.
  Second, while I support every action to aid our brave men and women 
in the armed forces, who are making so many sacrifices as they fight 
for our freedoms, I am concerned and disappointed by some of the 
actions we have taken in the bill we are reporting to the Senate. My 
greatest concern lies, as it did last year, in the reductions we have 
made in the working capital funds of the military services and defense 
agencies. While I disagreed with the cuts in these accounts last year, 
the ones this year are even more harmful, as DOD is already tapping 
these accounts to the greatest possible extent to get through the 
remainder of this fiscal year. So they will already be well below 
normal cash balances as they enter fiscal year 2005, and the $1.6 
billion in reductions we have recommended in this bill will increase 
the risk of readiness problems by decreasing DOD's ability to provide 
spare parts, maintenance, and other support for our forces that are 
critical to their continued success. By cutting into these accounts, I 
believe we are sending a message that we do not support our troops, a 
message that I know could not be further from the truth.
  Our forces deserve armored vehicles to protect them in Iraq, but they 
also deserve the spare parts they need to keep those vehicles running. 
When our troops come home, they deserve to have those vehicles 
repaired, rather than wait for maintenance from a depot until parts 
arrive that could have been ordered earlier if the working capital 
funds had had sufficient cash. We owe them the courage to make tough 
decisions to ensure that those needs are met now, not when future funds 
not yet requested may or may not become available.
  On the positive side, I am pleased about our continued support for 
military construction and family housing

[[Page S5934]]

needs that are so critical to quality of life for our service men and 
women. I also support many of the provisions we have included that will 
further improve the management of the department. I particularly 
appreciate the bipartisan effort that the staff has made to address a 
wide range of procurement issues, environmental issues, and 
longstanding DOD financial management problems.
  While I support the overall actions taken in this bill, and commend 
all of my colleagues for the hard work that they have invested, as 
ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee I have mixed feelings 
about our actions. We have increased funding for some key programs, but 
at the expense of others where the impact might be more easily 
obscured. Our experience with the Air Force over the last few years has 
shown that there is a direct correlation between increased spare parts 
and mission capable rates for aircraft; those spare parts are provided 
through the Air Force Working Capital Fund. The Navy expects to have 
only a few days of cash on hand at the end of this fiscal year, and may 
be forced to bill customers before they actually receive their orders. 
And the Army faces a situation where its orders for parts and other key 
items exceed its cash on hand by more than 700 percent. Wartime, when 
we see a great expansion of customer needs for readiness and large 
fluctuations in required support, is not the time to take on more 
readiness risk by decreasing cash balances in the working capital 
funds. It hurts readiness, and it hurts the men and women who serve in 
uniform.
  By reducing funding for the readiness accounts and failing to provide 
any supplemental funding for 2005, this bill does not do enough to meet 
the most pressing needs of our men and women in uniform.
  I will support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. I 
think it is a good bill that could have been better, and I will 
continue to work throughout the rest of the authorization process to 
improve it.

                          ____________________