Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 70 (Tuesday, May 18, 2004)

[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 70 (Tuesday, May 18, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5582-S5594]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005--Continued

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, is the pending business amendment No. 3158?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is right. That amendment is
pending.
The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I have confirmed with Senator Snowe and
Senator Lott that they would permit me to set their amendments aside
for 3 minutes so that I could offer a nonproliferation amendment. I ask
the Senate for that privilege.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The pending amendment will be set aside.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. KENNEDY. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, I
ask consent my amendment be in order, as well.
Mr. LOTT. Reserving the right to object, do we have the amendment?
Have the managers had a chance to view that? I don't know that there is
a problem.
Mr. KENNEDY. It is report language. All I want to do is have the same
kind of courtesies. If I could ask, then, at least it be considered
after the floor managers have an opportunity to review the amendment.
If there is an objection, that would be satisfactory with me. But it
is relevant. Otherwise, I will insist on the reading of the amendment.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I don't
intend to, I don't even believe it is my role, I don't know that anyone
has had a chance to look at it.
Mr. KENNEDY. I was waiting for my time. You were next to offer your
amendment and were going to take 90 minutes. I was prepared to remain
here and, hopefully, we are alternating amendments. This is directly
germane. My good friend from New Mexico offered his amendment and asked
for consent to do it. I was trying to get the same courtesies.
I am glad to play by whatever rules the Senator wants to play by, but
if we are waiting our turn to get here and someone asks consent to be
able to advance their amendment, all I am asking is to get the same
kind of consideration. That is the only thing.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, is there a unanimous consent agreement to
set aside an amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). To dispense with the reading of
the amendment.
Mr. REID. Has there been an agreement to set the pending amendment
aside to offer this amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct, there has been.
Mr. REID. I am sorry, Mr. President, if that question was put to the
Senate, I certainly did not hear it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request was made.
Mr. DOMENICI. I made the request and the Lott amendment was pending
and I asked it be set aside for 3 minutes so I could offer an
amendment. That was granted.
Mr. REID. I heard the Senator from New Mexico. I thought he said
there had been an agreement to that effect. If you check the record,
that is what it said.
Mr. DOMENICI. And I said, and I ask the Senate grant me that
privilege, after I made that statement to which you are referring.
Mr. KENNEDY. I ask for the same privilege.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the Senator from----
Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, might I suggest, and I ask
my good friend--and the Senator knows I will support him--could you
withdraw that at this time so Senator Levin and I, together with the
leaders, can determine the order in which we will take amendments?
Mr. KENNEDY. I withdraw my request, in courtesy to my friend from New
Mexico.
I ask consent that I be recognized to offer an amendment at the
conclusion of the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator----
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts in
his typical courteous manner for the way he has handled it. I know the
managers will work with him.
Mr. REID. So the consent now before the body is, following the
disposition of the pending amendment--that is, the amendment of the
Senators from Mississippi and North Dakota--Senator Kennedy be
recognized to offer his amendment?
Mr. WARNER. I have to object. I fervently asked that the two managers
work with our respective leadership and those desiring to bring up
amendments. So I suggest that we continue with the Lott amendment and
you be ever so kind to hold yours in abeyance.
Mr. DOMENICI. They have already agreed on mine and it will take 3
minutes. I don't doubt that.
Mr. LEVIN. No. There has been no agreement on the Domenici amendment.
Mr. DOMENICI. What?
Mr. LEVIN. As I understand, Senator Domenici--and I was distracted--
asked he be allowed to offer the amendment. As I understand it, there
has been no agreement to the amendment, the time agreement on the
amendment. The manager is asking the Senator from New Mexico would he
now withhold that amendment so we can sort this out.
Mr. WARNER. Correct.
Mr. DOMENICI. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, and I ask that we pursue the opportunity
to have a time agreement on the Lott-Dorgan amendment.
First, I ask the distinguished Senator from Mississippi how much time
the Senator desires--and we will talk about it in terms of it being
equally divided.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, we have talked back and forth and we think
that 45 minutes a side should be sufficient.
Mr. WARNER. I ask my distinguished colleague.
Mr. LEVIN. An hour and a half equally divided.
Mr. WARNER. Forth-five minutes to the side?
Mr. LOTT. An hour and a half equally divided.
Mr. WARNER. Well, we want to keep moving with this bill. It seems to
me the subject is pretty well understood. I was hoping maybe an hour.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could respond, we do have Senators who
have not been heard.
Mr. WARNER. Very well, I am agreeable if the----
Mr. LOTT. If we have time and we do not need it all, we can always
yield it back--an idea I like.
Mr. WARNER. This issue has an intensity of its own.
If an hour and a half is agreeable to the Senator from Virginia and
the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the Senators would be willing to modify
their amendment, it is my understanding following the hour and a half
that there would be a vote on or in relation to that amendment with no
second-degree amendments in order.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
Mr. REID. I ask that be part of the consent agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Without objection, the original consent is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, Senator Snowe and Senator Feinstein have

[[Page S5583]]

been patiently waiting, Senator Cochran wishes to speak, as well as
Senator Dorgan.
Would the Senator from New Hampshire have a question?
Mr. GREGG. I would like to get 3 minutes.
Mr. LOTT. Would the Senator be willing to withhold so we can proceed
with the Senator from Maine?
Mr. GREGG. Certainly, unless the Senator from Maine----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Amendment No. 3158

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the
amendment that has been offered by Senator Dorgan, Senator Lott,
Senator Feinstein, and myself to refocus the provisions that are
included in the underlying legislation that authorizes a base closure
round in 2005 from our domestic installation to our overseas military
infrastructure.
I do so because I am firmly convinced today in this unprecedented era
of global war on terrorism, as we continue operations in Afghanistan to
root out the seeds of terror, as we are engaged in ensuring a free Iraq
in the heart of the Middle East, it makes no sense to consider closing
nearly a quarter of our domestic military infrastructure in addition to
the 21 percent that has already been lost over the past 15 years in
America.
I arrive at this debate as a veteran of a number of issues that are
key to our deliberations. First, I have been all too intimately
acquainted with every base closure round since the first occurred in
1987, as well as the accompanying pitfalls, failures, and foibles of
each--and there are many.
Also, in my capacity of both the House and the Senate, as ranking
member of the Operations Subcommittee on the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the House that oversaw terrorism and in my position in the Senate
Armed Services Committee and former Chair of the Seapower Subcommittee.

I cannot and will not ignore the pattern I have discerned of the
failure to ``connect'' the critical ``dots'' in the past, and the
implications of these shortfalls on our ability to project into the
future.
What most concerns me is the inadequacy of the military's threat
assessment projections time after time accompanying the requirement,
including enacting BRAC legislation in 1991 that stipulates the
Secretary of Defense ``shall include a force structure plan for the
Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable
threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning
with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made.''
It is very important to understand the requirements and the
obligations of the Defense Department. They have to make those
projections. Unfortunately, whether they make those projections 20
years into the future or 6-year projections, the track record has been
poor.
I can say this because I have reviewed the military threat
assessments not only contained in the force structure plans the
Department provided, along with their justifications for the 1991 base-
closing round, but also the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, as well as other
key assessments made by the Department during that time, such as the
1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1997 Quadrennial Review, and the 2001
Quadrennial Review.
Specifically, I wondered how actual events and results matched their
expectations. How did their threat assessments dovetail with the new
realities, such as terrorism, asymmetric threat, and homeland security
or homeland defense?
I then went back a little more than 21 years ago to the bombing of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and looked at significant terrorist events
directed against Americans throughout the world, as chronicled by the
State Department. I put it on this chart because I think it is
important to recall exactly what the events have been over the last 20
years with respect to terrorism.
A defining moment in 1983 was when our marines were under attack,
when 242 brave marines were lost because of a suicide bomber.
In 1985, TWA flight 847 was hijacked, and U.S. Navy diver Robert
Stethem was killed. Then, of course, we had the Achille Lauro. Then we
had, of course, the Berlin disco that was bombed, and a number of
American soldiers were killed or injured. We also know what happened
with Pan Am flight 103 that was destroyed over Lockerbie.
These are a few of the significant events that occurred throughout
the 1980s. In fact, I am illustrating only a few of the 17 events that
were identified by the State Department where Americans were the target
of terrorists.
Yet, after all these events, let's look at what was identified in
these base-closing reports that are required under the legislation. We
had a four-page report that was a result of the 1991 base-closing
round, and they submitted a military assessment for the years, because
they have to project out. In this case, it was 1992 to 1997. What did
it have to say?

The most enduring concern for U.S. leadership is that the
Soviet Union remains the one country in the world capable
of destroying the U.S. with a single devastating attack. .
. .
[T]he Soviet state still will have millions of well armed
men in uniform and will remain the strongest military force
on the Eurasian landmass.

But when it came to terrorism, they said: Our efforts to promote
regional stability and to enhance the spread of democracy will continue
to be challenged by insurgencies and terrorism.
So there was only a passing mention of this issue as an impediment to
regional stability and the enhancement of democracy worldwide. But
there was no discussion of it as a context, as a threat to the United
States. There was no mention, as you can see, of it as an asymmetric
threat or as a threat to our homeland security. And then what happened?
On February 26, 1993, we had the bombing of the World Trade Center.
It was badly damaged, and 1,000 people were injured, leaving 6 people
dead. Yet the military threat assessment, issued less than 1 month
later--it would have been a matter of weeks later--in the 1993 base-
closing round report again referred to the regional crises with North
and South Korea, India and Pakistan, the Middle East, and Persian Gulf
States. It went on to say:

[T]he future world military situation will be characterized
by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry,
including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic
missiles and, in some cases, nuclear weapons.

But note in this report there was suddenly, once again, no mention of
terrorism after the World Trade Center bombing less than a few weeks
later, maybe a month. And as to an asymmetric threat? Nothing. And
homeland security? No reference whatsoever to homeland security.
Furthermore, the bottom-up review that occurs within the Defense
Department, which is a wide-ranging review of strategy, resources, and
programs to delineate our national defense strategy for the future,
that was signed out in October of 1993--and, of course, that was about
8 months later--described four new dangers to U.S. interests after the
end of the cold war. Again, no mention of particular asymmetric
threats, homeland security, or anything with respect to terrorism. Even
at that point, they did mention state-sponsored terrorism as a
reference, but, again, they stated the World Trade Center bombing in
1993 was the result of the mastermind Sheikh Omar Rahman, who was a
non-state-sponsored terrorist.
But, as you can see, in 1993, then, we had two Defense Department
reports, one in response to the requirements under the base-closing
process, and the second one was a bottom-up review by the Defense
Department within the same year, having the foreknowledge of what
happened and what transpired at the World Trade Center, and nothing was
referenced with respect to terrorism, asymmetric threat, or homeland
security.
The timeline continues to 1995. We have the Tokyo subway with the
sarin gas. Ironically, that is sarin gas equivalent to what was
discovered in Iraq last week. I was stunned then to look at what
happened in the 1995 force structure report that was also required in
response to the base closure round of 1995 that had to address the
threats between 1995 and 2001. Other than the removal of a few
sentences, it was exactly identical, the same as the 1993

[[Page S5584]]

BRAC threat assessment. So much for rigorous analysis. Still there was
no mention of terrorism, no mention of asymmetric threat, and no
references to homeland security. And this is less--less--than 6 years
before September 11, when we had those catastrophic and devastating
events.

Remember, this particular base closure round is required to project
out 20 years. So now we are referring to a base-closing force structure
plan in 1995, given all the preceding events of terrorism in which
Americans were victims and a target, and there was no identification of
terrorism being a major threat to the United States, or that there was
an asymmetric threat, or that there was a threat to our homeland
security. This was 6 years out.
After the 1995 report, we go to 1996. We have Khobar Towers. We have
the East Africa Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Then, of course, we
have the USS Cole in the year 2000. Again, we do not have any
identification that we are now being threatened, in these base-closing
force structure plans, in our homeland security, or by the threat of
worldwide terrorism.
By 1997, the Department was acknowledging the fact terrorists using
asymmetric means might attack the homeland. Again, I might add, yet it
still remained a fourth-tier concern in their Quadrennial Defense
Review--a fourth-tier concern--in spite of the continuing onslaught of
terrorism around the world.
Then, of course, we have all the preceding events. So this, in my
opinion, raises some serious concerns about the ability of the Defense
Department to project into the future, and particularly when talking
about projecting 20 years out.
I happened to review the Quadrennial Defense Review report issued in
2001. Mind you, that was issued 19 days after the attack of the World
Trade Center on September 11, and it obviously identified that we were
being challenged by adversaries who possessed a wide range of
capabilities regarding asymmetric approaches. Obviously, at that point
it was not an astute observation. But interestingly, in examining the
QDR, there was a lack of mentioning al-Qaida by name--not once. In the
70-page report, there is not one mention of al-Qaida, when we are
talking about 19 days after the events at the World Trade Center on
September 11.
I think this all indicates the significant dose of skepticism with
which we should examine the current force structure plan and the
accompanying threat assessment submitted by the Department to justify
the base-closing rounds of 2005. Considering that we now base decisions
on a 20-year assessment--never mind just 6, and even the 6-year
projections proved spotty at best--and considering the volatile times
in which we live, I have to say that what we received, over a month
later than was required by the base-closing legislation--and I might
add it is about what we expected, not much--indeed, my sense is they
took these assumptions that were made for the Future Year Defense Plan
that the Department submits as part of their overall budget
authorization and simply extended it to 2009.
But even after 20 years of constant assault, of terrorism on
Americans either here or abroad, the Defense Department still has not
matched its force structure with those assumptions. Indeed, they have
avoided the entire issue of these threats that the Nation will face
over the next 20 years by claiming that today's security environment
``is impossible to predict with any confidence which nations,
combination of nations, or non-state actors may threaten U.S. interests
at home and abroad.''
And when the Department claims they have adopted an approach to force
development based on capabilities rather than threat-based requirements
and will need a flexible, adaptive, and joint capability that can
operate across the full spectrum of military contingencies, exactly
what does that mean? That is a very good question. What does that mean?
Clearly, it indicates an uncertainty upon which we should be
considering closing military bases.
It is obvious that the Defense Department is not certain, and this is
not the basis upon which we can make decisions that are irreversible
when it comes to our military infrastructure. Indeed, a retired Navy
captain, Ralph Dean, succinctly placed a column in a Maine newspaper
where he said:

Surprisingly it showed--

In reference to this force structure plan that was recently submitted
by the Defense Department--

virtually no changes in overall force structure during that
long period. This may indicate the Department of Defense is
unable to make projections about the future threat with any
degree of certainty. This uncertainty must be addressed,
because BRAC actions are irreversible.

Exactly. And therein lies the problem. We are required to make
decisions on force structure, on threat assessments based on plans that
are submitted to the Congress and to the base-closing commission. We
are going to make permanent decisions. We cannot retreat from those
decisions once they are made. You cannot retract those decisions once
they are put in motion.
Let's look at the overall picture in the context of the threat
environment in which we live today. How can we possibly project out 20
years to ascertain our military requirements? We are learning in Iraq
that the quantity of troops matters, as DOD is forced to recalibrate
and send an additional 20,000 troops there. Moreover, this underlying
legislation, the Department of Defense reauthorization legislation we
are currently considering, is actually increasing the Army's end
strength of more than 30,000 soldiers. Yet at the same time we are
suggesting that we are going to reduce the number of our bases at home?
Indeed, the BRAC force structure plan of 2005 addresses neither the
potential surge requirements that we may confront in these protracted
struggles, nor the need for more troops.

Indeed, there seems to be some confusion within the Defense
Department between DOD and the services. I saw a report the other day
that interested me that appeared in the Boston Globe making reference
to the fact that the Navy is planning to inactivate a number of
submarines over the next few years. It was reported that the Navy is
conducting a study that might reduce the attack submarine force
substantially downward for the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, and
we are told there are no changes, as indicated in the Future Year
Defense Plan, upon which the force structure plan that was submitted
for this base-closing round was predicated. So how can we be certain of
the type of projections the Defense Department is going to make beyond
the year 2009?
There is no mention of any changes up to 2009 in terms of its force
structure requirements. How then are we going to base the kind of
decisions within the base-closing process when we have not had an
adequate projection of threat assessment for the next 20 years and what
it will require in terms of force and also infrastructure? And what are
the joint warfighting plans that are still being developed? If BRAC
decisions are based on untested joint concepts, then the Department of
Defense could well face limited options down the road because of the
limitations of facilities.
I think it doesn't make any sense at this point to continue with the
domestic base-closing round without a complete understanding and
evaluation of our overseas basing requirements. This amendment will
allow Congress time to conduct adequate oversight to ensure that these
invaluable decisions that we will be making, permanent decisions,
irreversible decisions, do not have implications for the future of our
capacity to respond to the changing threat environment in which we
currently are.
I am hoping that Members of this Senate, however they felt in the
past about the base-closing process, will understand there is an
enormous gap between threat assessments and force structure projections
by the Defense Department and all of the previous base-closure rounds,
and that is a serious problem in the world in which we live and
certainly in the context of needing more flexibility when we are
conducting a war on terrorism. As the President said, this is going to
be an ongoing struggle for a long time in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, we have to reconsider and look abroad for our overseas
facilities as opposed to those at home.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may take.

[[Page S5585]]

I ask my distinguished colleague from Maine, have you had an
opportunity to examine the letter that was sent by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the other Chiefs in which they say ``a
comprehensive overseas basing review is nearly complete.'' I have other
documentation. They have done a conscientious job on the overseas base
structure. They are coming forward with a very balanced program to work
with the existing law.
My concern is, if we dislodge the existing law by adopting this
amendment, it would have the effect of delaying the process another 2
years and putting on to the Department of Defense the added cost of
continuing to maintain structure that they simply do not need for
today's and the foreseeable military strength of our country.
I have to tell my distinguished colleague, in the course of the lunch
period, I talked with a number of individuals. They said: John, the
most persuasive case to me is that I have called home and talked to
several of the communities that have hired the lobbyists, and they
pleaded with me: We can't afford this infrastructure that we felt
necessary to defend our base under the existing 205 BRAC procedure. You
add another 2 years, you are going to draw down those precious small
amounts of tax dollars in those communities by another 2 years. Is the
sentiment in your State to go on for another 2 years with all of the
uncertainty?
A lot of communities cannot attract new business for fear that the
base may leave. They have to have a decision and get on with this.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I appreciate the chairman's comments.
First, with respect to overseas facilities, in this legislation, under
the current law, it requires the Department of Defense to submit that
report only 4\1/2\ months prior to when the base-closure commission's
final decisions are completed. I think that is going to be a totally
inadequate period of time in which to make a current examination as to
whether or not to close the facilities. You can have an impact at home
on domestic installations. We are talking about increasing the number
of troops in the underlying legislation. Where are they going to be
housed? There are a lot of decisions. We have never thoroughly
evaluated overseas installations. I think that needs a thorough
examination. We deserve that.

Frankly, I do not have confidence in the process. I can tell my
colleague, as the Senator from Mississippi has indicated, I have no
confidence in the integrity of the process. They have not been in
position to ever not only provide a credible force structure plan in
identifying the future threats, they have not been accurate in their
projections.
Secondly, if you talk about the examination of savings--and I did not
get into that subject because that is a wide-ranging subject--GAO, in a
report yesterday, said the Department of Defense does not have any
adequate methodology by which to ascertain whether they have made or
achieved any savings. In fact, there may be one base closing round that
has achieved any savings in the first 6 years--maybe.
We are going to be talking about spending a lot of money before we
even get to that process even if we do because it costs so much in
remediation in the cost of closing down those facilities, in
conjunction with the war on terror, in conjunction with the conflict in
Iraq, and all the potential costs associated with that which remain
unknown in the foreseeable future.
That is why I say to the chairman, I think it is important, not for
the sake of expediency and efficiency, but for the sake of fairness in
looking abroad as to exactly what we need. We have more than 700
facilities that have not heretofore been examined. With regard to
forward-deployed forces, many nations would not allow us to put our
troops there when it came to the conflict--Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
The time has come to look at this situation very differently. We are
in a very different environment, as the chairman well knows, and I
appreciate that. But I think the time has come to understand there are
huge gaps in understanding what our future threat environment is going
to be all about, and that has enormous implications for the future.
Finally, may I mention, in this legislation there is a joint
resolution of approval by the Congress in 1997 to make a decision as to
whether to proceed to an additional base-closing round.
Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I know the Senator from California has been
waiting to speak. Will 10 minutes be sufficient, or if she does not
need all that time, we will reallocate the time. I yield up to 10
minutes to the Senator from California.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
I had the privilege of listening to the Senator from Maine. I feel
very privileged to join in this effort along with the Senator from
Mississippi and the Senator from North Dakota. The Senator from Maine
made an excellent case, and I concur wholeheartedly.
Specifically, what we are trying to do with this amendment are two
simple things: modify the 2005 base closure round to make it apply
solely to military installations outside the United States. As Senator
Snowe said, we need to begin to look at the 700 operations and
installations we have around the globe and make some decisions with
respect to them in this new asymmetrical war on terror we face.
Secondly, provide for expedited consideration of a request for a
domestic base closure round in 2007.
I thought the Senator made the excellent point that Congress
authorized the 2005 base closure round in 2001. Our military and our
Nation have been confronted by several new challenges since that time:
9/11, the war on terror, the overthrow of the Taliban and the Hussein
regime, and the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. We now know our
enemy may well be rogue states, may well be nonstate entities who seek
to find weapons of mass destruction. They may well be international
groups which have replaced the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to
American interests and security.
These challenges, we believe, mandate us to reexamine the role and
composition of our military in this new era: What kind of force
structure will be needed? How many troops will be sufficient? And, yes,
what sort of infrastructure and basing needs will be required to meet
these new threats?
It seems very shortsighted to me to proceed with a new round of
domestic base closures that was approved before 9/11 took place and
before any of these questions were raised. In fact, the criteria for
the 2005 base closure round is almost identical to the criteria for the
past four rounds. How can we be sure this process will be fair and
balanced and in the best interest of our military and our national
security interests if it is based on criteria appropriate for 1995?
For example, as Senator Snowe pointed out, there was no Department of
Homeland Security in 1995. We are only beginning to understand how our
domestic military infrastructure can play a role in providing for the
actual defense of our homeland. That is a very important point. I do
not think there is anyone who would say our homeland is beyond attack.
As a matter of fact, I think a majority of us, certainly on the
Intelligence Committee, would say there are very good chances that
there will be another attack; therefore, domestic military has a new
and different role to play in our country.
I do not think now is the time to rush forward. We still have 112,000
troops based in Europe, 37,000 in Korea, 45,000 in Japan in bases
designated, devised, and intended for cold-war-era threats. Those
threats have changed.
We see on the Military Construction Subcommittee how the thinking is
now changing with respect to force structure, the location of force
structure in Korea, as well as in Europe, moving more of the European
components south of the Alps so that we may be able to move them more
rapidly into the Middle East and into Africa.
Suppose after the 2005 round is completed it is determined several
overseas bases need to be closed and the troops relocated to the United
States. Where will they go? Will closed bases have to be reopened?
Let us also remember there is an economic impact on a community that
must be taken into consideration. When a base is closed, jobs are lost,
economic growth is stunted. Even the threat of a base closure is enough
to scare away investment.

[[Page S5586]]

Should we not take a look at our overseas basing structure first
before we ask our communities to make additional sacrifices?
Senator Hutchison, who is the chairman of the Military Construction
Subcommittee, and I, as ranking member, introduced legislation last
year to create a congressional commission to take an objective and
thorough look at our overseas bases. We met with that commission last
week and gave them their charge to look at the mission and then make
some recommendations to us with respect to the placement of bases
needed by that mission.
It seems to me the way one approaches this issue is to build on that
legislation and first look at overseas basing needs in 2005, since they
are, in fact, changing, and then turn to domestic bases, if necessary,
in 2 years' time.
I also want very briefly to mention the impact of base closures on my
home State of California. California has had 29 military bases closed.
It has cost the State more than 93,000 jobs, of which 40,000 were
civilian positions.
According to the executive director of the California Institute for
Federal Policy Research, California lost more jobs than all of the
other States combined in the last four rounds. While at the time we had
only 15 percent of the Nation's military personnel, we shouldered 60
percent of the net personnel cuts. I believe we have sacrificed enough.
If California is called on to make additional sacrifices and
additional bases are closed in a future domestic BRAC round, we should
know that our Government did a complete and thorough examination of the
threats our country will face in the future and the military
capabilities we will need to face those threats.
While we are mentioning this, I also want to raise another real
problem and that is the gross underfunding of cleanup and remediation
of the bases. This has been short funded by literally billions of
dollars. Let me make a couple of points.
It is estimated it will cost $1.3 billion to clean up the former
McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento. That process will not be
finished until 2033. The cleanup of Fort Ord will not be finished until
2031. Castle Air Force Base will not be completed until 2038, and the
list goes on.
What is the rush to close more bases that cannot be rapidly
transitioned into civilian use because of the inability to fund
remediation and cleanup of environmental hazards?
So I think Senator Snowe made an excellent argument with respect to
the need to take a good look at the overseas bases first--700 of them--
and make some decisions with respect to where we are going in this new
asymmetric war on terror and to leave intact America's bases for the
next 2 years and then, in 2007, to consider an expedited round.
I am very proud to join with Senators Dorgan, Lott, and Snowe in this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. I rise in opposition to the Lott amendment and I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, we have to keep in mind that the main
mission is to secure the safety of Americans both at home and abroad. I
believe we are responding to the terrorist threat. We have stood up
Northern Command in the military. We have set up a whole new Department
dealing with homeland security.
At the very beginning of his administration, President Bush made it a
priority to build and transform our military after 8 years of operation
and maintenance funding shortfalls under the previous administration.
Where does one get the money? If the bases and mission are being
transformed, savings have to be figured somewhere. I think it is
entirely appropriate, both at home and abroad, to review our mission.
I agree with many of the points that are being made on this
amendment. We have to look at our bases overseas. Certainly our mission
has changed considerably over there. As opposed to a large frontal
assault, we are now dealing with a terrorist problem which requires a
more mobile and modern military to address that threat.
We have the same threat at home, and we also need to look at whether
bases at home are meeting the mission of the modern threat from
terrorism. Those of us in the Senate have heeded the call of the
President and I am pleased we are about to take the next step in
maintaining a military fully capable of defending our Nation and
meeting our foreign policy goals.
I continue to support the President's plan to transform our military.
This authorization bill builds on the work we in the Congress have
already accomplished toward that end. This amendment tends to undermine
that effort.
I will take this opportunity to review where we are with BRAC.
Congress granted the administration the authority in fiscal year 2002,
that is the National Defense Authorization Act, to conduct a BRAC round
in 2005, providing a critical opportunity to eliminate excess capacity
and achieve additional savings that could be used to modernize and
transform our Armed Forces to address emerging global threats.
The fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act improved the
BRAC language from previous rounds to ensure future infrastructure
satisfies emerging national security requirements and to correct
earlier abuses of the process.
A 2002 GAO report on the 387 closures and realignments in four
previous rounds; that is, in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, reaffirmed
that the Department of Defense generated a substantial net savings of
somewhere around $17.6 billion, and expects the annual savings of $6.6
billion in fiscal year 2003 to grow.
DOD further estimated in March of 2004 that a BRAC round in 2005 will
save $5 billion in 2011 and $8 billion annually thereafter. Now, BRAC
is a key enabler for DOD transformation initiatives, including global
basing and the rebalancing of Active and Reserve Forces.
I believe a delay of the 2005 BRAC round already underway delays the
effort for us to modernize our forces. I cannot accept the argument
that if we do not close bases that somehow or another we are better
off. I think we need to have some savings. We need to save money. In
the long run, there is going to be more money available for us to meet
the changing threat from the terrorists that we now face today.
If we are serious about modernizing our facilities and being ready to
meet the changing mission, we need to defeat the Lott amendment and we
need to move forward with the provision that we have currently in the
Defense authorization bill.
I ask my colleagues to join me in opposing the Lott amendment.
I yield back my time.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining in
support of the amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in support of the amendment have 16
minutes. The opposition to the amendment has 36 minutes.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, does Senator Dorgan wish to use some of the
time at this point?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I would be happy to but I wonder if the
opponents might want to use some of their time.
Mr. LOTT. How much time remains on the opposition side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 36 minutes.
Mr. LOTT. Senator Levin has not spoken and Senator Inhofe is here, so
perhaps we could take some more time off the opposition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the
amendment of Senator Lott and Senator Dorgan. The first argument they
make is that we ought to look first at overseas bases before we have
our commission next year look at the domestic bases. I agree with that.
I think it does make more sense to look at the overseas bases before we
look at ours, and that is exactly what we provided for by law.
We have created a commission which will look at overseas bases and
report back to the Department of Defense and to the Nation by the end
of this year. That commission has now met and I believe they had their
first meeting, in fact, this month and they have already scheduled a
second meeting.

[[Page S5587]]

In terms of the argument that we should surely look at these bases
all around the world before the commission which will be appointed next
year looks at domestic bases, I think the argument is a good one, and
we have provided for that argument.
The Global Posture Review, which is a requirement that the Department
of Defense is now meeting, which is to see whether our forces are
properly deployed around the world in order of addressing where the
likely hotspots are, that Global Posture Review is also going to be
completed this year. So there is a logic, there is a chronology, which
meets the supporters' argument, the proponents of the amendment of
Senator Lott, that there is a sequence which should be followed.
We should first look at the overseas facilities before looking at
ours is a sequence which we now have placed in law for many years.
This, of course, has been in law and is now unfolding, as it was
projected to unfold by law.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of the chiefs have written
us a letter. That letter has been printed in the Record. It is dated
May 18, but I just quote from it to emphasize the importance of going
through with a base realignment and closure round as authorized in the
year 2001, and the importance to our uniformed military leadership.
The letter is addressed to Chairman Warner. It says:

We are writing this letter to emphasize our continued and
unequivocal support for conducting a 2005 round of base
realignment and closure (BRAC), as authorized by the
Congress.
The convergence of ongoing strategy and overseas basing
actions, the transformational direction in all the services
and force structure changes together afford us a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to truly transform the Department's
combat capability in an enduring way. A delay of this BRAC
round, or a modification of the legislation that limits the
Department's flexibility to execute it, will seriously
undermine our ability to fundamentally reconfigure our
infrastructure to best support the transformation of our
forces to meet the security challenges we face now and will
continue to face for the foreseeable future.

There is transformation going on. We are shifting to meet new
threats--the best that we can foresee them. It has been argued that you
can't perfectly foresee future threats. That is true. But that is
surely no argument for not attempting to make the assessments in a
thorough way, in a conscientious way, and then to structure your forces
and to structure your infrastructure in a way that will most readily
and most effectively meet those projected threats.
How can we reconfigure our military, which I think everybody
recognizes is necessary in a new world of new threats, if we freeze
into place the infrastructure that we have in this country? Somehow or
other, the argument is made that because there are changes in the
world, therefore we should not change, we should not allow our
structures here to change. The opposite, it seems to me, is the case.
The world has changed and changed dramatically, and the threats are
very different. Surely we should not be frozen into our current
structures here or around the world in response to a changing threat
environment.
So the more we point out, and accurately so, and the more we argue
how different the threats are following 9/11, it seems to me the more
we should be willing to allow a process to work which first looks at
our structures, our infrastructure, our base structure around the
world, and then next year, after the foreign structures are looked at
and the foreign bases are looked at, then our base-closing commission
will look at the domestic bases.
I believe one of the Senators who spoke argued that the vote in 2001
came prior to 9/11 and that everything has changed since then.
According to the information I have, our vote took place on September
25, 2001, 2 weeks after 9/11, the vote to sustain the title in the bill
which authorized an additional round of base realignments and closures.
I believe that vote--maybe my records are wrong here--took place after
9/11 and not before 9/11.
We also had a vote last year as to whether we should not proceed with
another round of base closings. That vote last year also surely came
after 9/11. We went through the same arguments, essentially, on our
vote last year, whether the world has changed as to whether there are
really savings that are created by the closing of bases.
On the savings point, I would simply give the best information
available to us relative thereto. We have talked about the necessary
closing of and realigning of bases in order to meet the new threats.
But there is also a significant savings issue here as well. Here
quoting from the Department of Defense report of March 2004, which we
required, on page 55, this is the conclusion:

The four prior rounds of base realignments and closures
have generated significant savings for the Department of
Defense. Through fiscal year 2001, the end of the four prior
rounds' implementation period, the Department had accumulated
net savings of about $17 billion over BRAC implementation
costs from the closure and realignment actions approved in
those four rounds.

Then the report goes on to say that:

These BRAC-created savings continue, and the Department
realizes recurring savings of almost $7 billion each year.
These savings were realized even after environmental
restoration funding was processed through BRAC accounts.

So the savings here are real. The necessity of closing unnecessary
bases in order to meet new threats is real. It seems to me, as
difficult as it is for all of us to confront the reality that some of
our bases are in excess and do not meet the current threat situation,
that we ought to proceed.
The amendment as written would require a new act on the part of
Congress in order to restore a round of base closing. This is not a
situation where the base closing is automatically going to take place.
The commission would be allowed to recommend base closings in a future
year. According to this amendment, it would require a subsequent act of
Congress in order to restore a round of base closings in order to have
a commission which would have the power to make those recommendations,
both to the executive branch and to the Congress.
So this is not just simply a matter of delay, even though I think
that would be a serious mistake. This is a matter of eliminating the
round of base closings which is scheduled unless there is a subsequent
enactment by Congress of a bill which would set up a round of base
closing in the year 2007.
If we delay it or if we take the action that is proposed--technically
more than a delay but actually a repeal in the absence of,
subsequently, Congressional legislation--we will be leaving the bases
in this country in limbo. It is hard enough. We all have bases in our
States. It is difficult enough for our bases to go through this
process, and we know that. We have all suffered some pain, some States
more than others--my State a lot. But there is still a lot of real
concern about the existing bases we do have in our State. But to simply
say we are going to leave you in limbo for a few more years and then
see whether Congress in 2007 adopts another round it seems to me is the
worst of all worlds for everybody.
We have a need to realign bases. We have new threats. We have costs
we cannot afford. It seems to me we have a process in place, which is a
logical process looking first at the bases overseas, doing that this
year through a Global Posture Review and through a report of a
commission which specifically has been placed by law in operation to
look at foreign bases, and then next year, according to a law which we
passed in 2001, the next President, whether it is President Bush or
whether it is President Kerry, would then appoint a commission that
would look, in an objective way, at all of the bases, having before it
the work of the commission which is looking at the foreign bases this
year and having before it the Global Posture Review, which is being now
adopted by the Department of Defense.
I want to close with another paragraph from this letter from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Again, this was signed by every one of the
Chiefs. It reads, in the second paragraph, as follows:

A comprehensive overseas basing review is nearly complete.
The continued concentration of forces in Cold War locations
highlights the need for a global repositioning to locations
that best support our strategic goals. In order to ensure
that the Department examines its entire infrastructure, the
rationalization of our domestic infrastructure as conducted
by the BRAC process must closely follow the Global Posture
Review.

In other words, we have a Global Posture Review which is being
adopted

[[Page S5588]]

this year, and for the BRAC process to be delayed or to be rendered
uncertain at least until the year 2007 means there will be a disconnect
between the Global Posture Review, which looks at our force structure
around the world, a disconnect between that and the decision as to
which bases to close.
Our chiefs say both efforts are necessary. Both efforts are
necessary--the Global Posture Review as well as a BRAC process--for a
genuine capabilities-based infrastructure rationalization and for
further transformation of our war-fighting capabilities.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment of the
Senator from Mississippi. I believe it is the proper process by which
we should go forward with BRAC. BRAC is an extraordinarily complicated
undertaking. I participated in four prior BRAC events and I can tell
you from personal experience that it is intense, it is complicated, and
it requires a great deal of planning and thought before it should go
forward.
The Senator from Mississippi is proposing we make the logical step at
taking what is the first first; specifically, that we look at those
overseas bases and see how many should be addressed relative to
closure; and if we decide that a series of bases overseas should be
closed, it is more than likely that much of what they do and what they
are responsible for will have to be moved back to the United States.
When that returning of troops, materiel, and mission comes to the
United States, that is going to adjust how we should approach the BRAC
process here in the United States.
We all recognize there is excess in the military, although the last
four BRAC processes have significantly reduced that. But we also should
go forward in addressing that excess in an orderly and thoughtful
manner. An orderly and thoughtful manner means you look at overseas
bases first and decide which ones should be closed, and then look at
domestic bases to determine whether they are going to have to take on
new responsibility as a result of the closures overseas or whether they
should also be closed.
It is, therefore, an extremely constructive proposal and one which I
strongly support and look forward to voting for, and hopefully it will
pass.
I yield the floor and reserve the time to Senator Lott.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to Senator McCain.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, here we go again. We have now been through
this on several occasions in the past. These are tough decisions. I
think people realize this could have significant impact on the
economies of their States, and of their districts in the case of
Members of the House.
But I think we need to again remind people that we are in a situation
where the defense spending increases and our requirements to fight the
war on terror in general and increased costs of the war in Iraq
absolutely mandate that we do everything we can to institute savings
for the American taxpayers as far as the expenditure of their tax
dollars are concerned.
I don't in any way dispute the fact that when a base is closed it has
a very significant and sometimes short-term devastating impact on a
State or locality in which that base is located.
I do think it is well to point out that Taxpayers With Common Sense
and the Center for Defense Information prepared an independent report
which was released in October of 2001. There may be some surprise by
those of my colleagues who are citing economic concerns as to why they
oppose further base closure rounds. Of the 97 bases closed in four base
closure rounds, 88 percent experienced per capita personal income
growth as high as 36 percent, and averaging nearly 10 percent; 75
percent experienced gains in average earnings per job; 87 percent had
positive employment rates; 68 percent beat the national average; the
average job replacement rate of all bases closed is 102 percent; by the
beginning of 2001, only 3 of the 97 counties had higher unemployment
rates than the BRAC announcement year; and 53 percent had unemployment
rates lower than the national average. I think it is important to put
it in that economic context.
Far, far more important than that is the fact that we are going
through a significant realignment to meet the post-cold-war needs and
challenges.
The Department of Defense is well on its way to establishing an
integrated commonsense basing strategy that will feed directly into the
BRAC process. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is finalizing the
decisions in the integrated global presence and basing strategy that
will specify who will be coming back and who will be going forward as
we transition away from a cold-war posture to a global war on terror
posture.
The decisions from the new global lay-down would be precursors to and
will greatly influence the BRAC process. It will take both processes
acting in a close manner to optimize the deployment of our forces
around the world. Delaying BRAC or disrupting the symbiotic
relationship between the integrated global presence, basing strategy,
and BRAC processes will ultimately minimize our efficiency in the
combat effectiveness of our forces in fighting the global war on
terrorism.
That is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense--
all knowledgeable people who could be viewed as objective outside
observers--agree that we have to move forward with this process. We
have voted on it before. We will vote on it again, maybe, although I
hope not between now and the time that is appointed. I don't think
there is any doubt that at this particular time it would be a serious
mistake for us to delay.
I add again that the economic benefits associated with base closure
are generally very much more positive than negative. I hope my
colleagues will understand the views of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United
States, and all others who strongly feel that we need to move forward
with this process.
I look forward to seeing a list of the bases in my State when the
Senator from Mississippi hands it out. As he handed out a list the last
time, he left my State off the list. I hope he corrects that oversight
this time.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition
to Senate amendment No. 3158, which intends to delay for 2 years the
process of base realignments and closures that is set to begin in 2005.
Nearly 3 years ago, the Senate passed legislation calling for a round
of base closures in 2005. I strongly supported that legislation, and I
continue to believe it is important that we move forward with plans to
realign and eliminate excess military infrastructure.
In March, the Defense Department estimated that we support a defense
infrastructure that is in excess of 24 percent. Rather than continuing
to pay for unneeded or duplicative facilities, our limited defense
dollars can and should be better spent to meet the most pressing needs
of our Armed Forces.
United States military forces remain engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
An American military presence remains important in Asia, including
Korea, and U.S. soldiers are deployed to support peacekeeping
operations in Southeast Europe and other parts of the world. With such
demands on our men and women in uniform, it is imperative that our
military resources are directed to meet our most critical defense
needs.
I agree with the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator Warner and Senator Levin, that we must move
forward with implementation of the BRAC legislation that was passed
during consideration of the fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act.
Two years ago, the Armed Services Committee concluded:

The committee believes that the arguments for allowing the
closure of additional facilities are clear and compelling.
The department has excess facilities. Closing bases saves
money, and the military services have higher priority uses
that could be funded with those savings.

This remains true today. The fact that we remain engaged in efforts
to fight the global war on terrorism and promote peace and stability in
Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world,

[[Page S5589]]

does not mean that we should put the BRAC process on hold. To the
contrary, it makes action even more important. Now, more than ever, we
need the resources that are spent to maintain excess infrastructure to
meet more pressing defense needs.
Our highest-ranking military official, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Richard Myers, agrees with this assessment. In a
letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member of both the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees dated May 18, 2004, General Myers and the
Joint Chiefs concluded:

A delay of the BRAC round, or a modification of the
legislation that limits the Department's flexibility to
execute it, will seriously undermine our ability to
fundamentally reconfigure our infrastructure to best support
the transformation of our forces to meet the security
challenges we face now and will continue to face for the
foreseeable future.

Our highest-ranking men and women in uniform are requesting this
authority so that we can best transform our military, moving beyond the
cold war and preparing for current and future threats to U.S. national
security interests at home and abroad.
Last week, I joined four of my Senate colleagues for a breakfast
meeting with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. During the meeting,
Secretary Rumsfeld shared with us his vision for our global footprint.
In an effort to better meet challenges to national security, the United
States is changing its deployment of forces overseas. As the Secretary
of Defense confirmed at that meeting, the realignment and closure of
military installations, both at home and abroad, is critical as we look
to continue that process.
As a result of prior rounds of base realignments and closures,
through fiscal year 2001, the Department of Defense had accumulated net
savings of approximately $17 billion. Savings continue annually,
freeing up nearly $7 billion each year. These resources have been
reinvested to meet urgent defense needs.
Given the fact that we still have a military infrastructure that is
in excess of 24 percent, we can continue to generate even more savings
with an additional round of base closures. The Defense Department
estimates that an additional round of base closures could save more
than $3 billion, with savings of $5 billion annually thereafter. Given
these savings, there should be little doubt that additional rounds of
closures will help to redirect expenditures where we need them the
most.
As I have long advocated during my time in public office, I believe
we should work harder and smarter and do more with less. That is what
we are being asked to do. By maintaining excess and unneeded military
installations, we are keeping scarce and critical resources from more
important defense priorities. It just doesn't make sense.
Given the looming budget deficit, ongoing military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and other spending needs here at home, it does not
make sense to spend billions of dollars each year on defense
infrastructure that is not needed. We simply cannot afford it.
While I strongly support the BRAC process, I believe that every
facility in Ohio can justify its existence on the merits, and I will
work hard as a partner with local communities and my colleagues in
Ohio's congressional delegation to support Ohio's defense
installations.
I believe that base closures are essential to allowing our men and
women in uniform to best serve the strategic and national security
interests of the United States, and I strongly oppose any amendment
that would delay the base realignments and closures process, or attempt
to stop the process in its entirety.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of this
important amendment to look at closing excess overseas military bases
before moving forward on any future round of base closures in this
country.
Over the past several years, I have consistently opposed additional
rounds of base closures. The loss of a military base can have a
devastating impact on local communities. This is not the time to
subject our fragile national economy to the impact of another round--
especially when the DoD is threatening to close one-quarter of our
domestic bases.
In addition, I object the Department of Defense request for more base
closures when it has failed to clean up former military bases shuttered
during the previous four rounds. It will be decades before
environmental remediation is complete at some former bases in
California. The DoD must meet its responsibilities to the people of
California before moving forward with any future rounds of base
closures.
Given the ongoing war on terrorism and our current military
operations in Iraq, now is not the time to close more bases. We must
ensure that we have sufficient military assets to meet our growing
challenges. At a time that our forces are stretched thin, it does not
make any sense to waste resources in going forward with next year's
round of base closures. These are uncertain times and it is impossible
to know what the force structure of the U.S. military will be in the
near future.
This amendment is a compromise. It allows the base closure process to
move forward next year--but only for our installations overseas. It is
logical to look at excess capacity overseas before looking at our
domestic bases here at home.
I am proud to cosponsor this important amendment and urge my
colleagues to support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Will the Presiding Officer kindly advise the Senate as to
the time allocation remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 14 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. And the Senator from Virginia?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 18 minutes.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, would Senator Warner be willing to yield 2
minutes to the Senator from Mississippi?
Mr. WARNER. Of course; whatever time our distinguished colleague
wants.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and
colleague for yielding to me, but especially I thank him for his
leadership on this issue.
We have had experience with base realignment and closure rounds in my
State over a period of years, and not ad infinitum but ad nauseam.
Economically, these have been disasters for the communities and the
States because they required the hiring of consultants and advisers to
try to come in and prepare the defense for the bases that are located
there. It is a flawed process. It has not worked well. It needs to be
changed.
Senator Lott has pointed to a very real and important concern; that
is, the enormous expenditures we are making overseas for bases and
facilities, many of which are outdated, many of which were placed there
because of cold-war concerns and NATO responsibilities which no longer
exist.
We are seeing troops shifted from European facilities to new
facilities in Italy because that is closer to where the action is in
the Persian Gulf area or the Middle East.
We see changes being made, and the Congress has a role to play
annually to authorize expenditures and to appropriate the funds for
these changes. At any time, if the Congress believes we need to change
those policies, we can make those changes legislatively. If the
President believes that is inappropriate, he has the veto power. We do
not need to turn this over to an unelected commission with no direction
from the Congress.
This amendment gives some direction. First, look at our bases
overseas, and let's make decisions about how we can improve and make
more proficient our deployments there, and then consider proceeding to
a base closure and realignment in the United States.
This amendment makes good sense. I compliment my friend, and I urge
Senators to support the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, some colleagues have represented that this
BRAC, which is law today, preceded September 11. The record is very
clear: Congress authorized BRAC in December of 2001. After careful
discussion with DOD as to whether we still require and should proceed,
eight former Secretaries of Defense wrote Congress in 2002 that support
for another round is unequivocal in light of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.

[[Page S5590]]

I hope that is right in the Record. I hope it does not influence the
earlier statements some of my colleagues made. This situation is
extremely serious. If we were now to virtually repeal that law in many
respects and thrust upon these communities the enormous expense to
continue to try and work their cases such that BRAC does not take their
case, I commend them for it. It is essential they do that. But the cost
is enormous to so many small communities.
This question of the overseas bases, we all recognize that structure
has to be brought down. Our Nation's basic defense policy for years has
been to engage our adversaries beyond our shores. To do that, we had to
have a base structure. We are now addressing how with terrorism there
are no boundaries to the threats. This country no longer is protected
by two mighty oceans. It is a one-world terrorist threat, and every
single American citizen is on the front line in the war on terrorism.
No one is behind any barricade anymore.
The Pentagon recognizes this and is beginning to restructure our
overseas base forces in such a way as to reduce and bring the forces
back home and to have fewer and fewer installations. But they have to
integrate that into the various procedures now going on, consistent
with the law of the land, the BRAC that we passed. For instance,
General Jones and General LaPorte testified before the Armed Services
Committee this year on their plans in Europe and South Korea,
respectively, to draw down and consolidate forces at each location.
The committee has also received testimony from department heads to
submit their Global Posture Review to Congress within the next 3 weeks.
It is on target.
I wish to accord the opportunity for other Members to speak,
including the Senator from Alabama, a valued member of our
subcommittee.
Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak after the
Senator from Alabama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, it has been a great pleasure for me to
work with Senator Warner, the chairman of this committee, and Senator
Levin, the ranking member.
This BRAC issue has been one we have debated for quite a number of
years, and one to which all Members have given serious consideration.
Like a lot of Senators, we have military bases in my State. Year
after year, month after month, we had the top military officers in the
country telling members we needed to be able to spend our money more
effectively; that they should be allowed to reconfigure our base
structure; that it could save money and make this Nation stronger.
I became convinced that was true. And that is why--in December of
2001 we had that vote--I voted for this idea.
I led a delegation last month to Europe. We visited 12 installations
in Europe. We talked with GEN Jimmy Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander
of Europe, and heard from him about his vision for major drawdowns of
our force strength in Europe, consolidation of bases. We could reduce
that number by two-thirds. A huge number needs to be reduced and
consolidated in Europe.
We can bring home, in my view, both infantry divisions and probably
other troops, too. Troops from the Pacific can be brought home and
maintained in the United States so we can keep expeditionary bases
around the world.
That is part of what they are planning this very moment. It will not
be long, and we will hear their report. I think it will be bold. I
don't think it will be a little-bitty deal. I think they will recommend
substantial alterations of past policy.
We do not have the threats in Germany that we had when the Soviet
Union existed. It is not there. We can be much lighter in Europe, and
we can be much more effective in our deployment of forces, keeping much
larger numbers of people in the United States. I don't see a conflict
between allowing this to happen at the same time.
In fact, General Jones said to us in our conversation, he envisioned
it happening at the same time. In other words, we would reconfigure
American bases while we were drawing down the foreign bases, and we
would make our decisions about where they will go as we restructure and
transform existing defense basing structure in the United States. That
is the right way to go.
I have been checking in my State, and some other Senators have heard
from their States. People are ready to get this over with. It has been
out there for several years. The communities have worked on their
bases. They have developed plans and arguments and ideas to demonstrate
to the Department of Defense why they have an enduring installation.
That has been good and healthy and they are prepared to do it. To delay
again is not wise. We voted this down before.
I have the greatest respect for the Senator from Mississippi, my
neighboring State, but this is the right thing to do. I take no
pleasure in it, but it is not like in the mid-1990s when we were
reducing the number of personnel in the military by 40 percent and
reducing equipment and capabilities at the same time. We are still
increasing our Defense Department.
What General Schoomaker envisions is a young person enlisting in the
Army. They can stay at a major enduring base for 7 years without having
to move his or her family around. They can be promoted and be trained.
Units can remain with their integrity and their training capability for
much longer periods of time than we have today.
Fewer, more properly configured bases can help strengthen the
Nation's defense. That is why I have concluded it is right for America.
It is the right way to strengthen our national defense.
Do not let anyone say this BRAC process in some way weakens defense.
I would never vote for it if I thought that was so. In fact, all the
uniform commanders say this will help make us a stronger America.
I thank Chairman Warner for his leadership and courage in this
matter. He certainly has bases in his State, as I do. But we believe it
is the right procedure, after having heard the testimony in the Armed
Services Committee.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. Yes,
we are very proud of our base structure. Almost every one of our
communities now has engaged the lobbyists, and so forth. Listen to
this, I say to the Senator. Delaying BRAC benefits one group; and that
is, the lobbyists and the consultants paid by these communities and,
indeed, State taxpayers.
The Congressional Research Service has estimated over $23 million
will be spent in fiscal 2004 to pay lobbyists and consultants for
services to defend installations. A delay of BRAC by 2 years will cost
the taxpayers of one State, that is paying a firm $50,000 a month, over
$1.2 million.
There is the debate.
Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. WARNER. Yes. We better check on the time.
Mr. President, how much time, please, does the Senator from Virginia
have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. There is 6 minutes. My distinguished colleague from
Mississippi?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 14 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. There is 14 minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, under a unanimous consent agreement, I am
to be recognized, so I do have the floor now, but I will yield to the
Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I beg your pardon. I say to the Senator, you have the
floor now?
Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
Mr. LOTT. He had a unanimous consent earlier to go after Senator
Sessions.
Mr. INHOFE. I will be glad to let you go first.
Mr. WARNER. I will step down.
Mr. SESSIONS. I will yield the floor.
Mr. INHOFE. No. That is fine. I want to be sure I keep my UC in
place. I do not want to lose it.
Mr. SESSIONS. I was going to suggest for the lobbyists, it is time to
bring that to an end. As some wise person told me in Alabama, they
exist to blame the politicians if they close the base, and to claim
credit if it is not closed.

[[Page S5591]]

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from
Oklahoma, if he needs that time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I wish the Senator from Alabama would stay
on the floor for a minute.
First of all, I direct this statement to my chairman, whom I deeply
respect. There are three amendments floating around right now. There is
a lot of confusion as to which one we are voting on now.
I say to the Senator, your statement, the statement from the Senator
from Virginia, and the Senator from Alabama, if, in fact, this is a 2-
year delay, I would agree wholeheartedly. For all the lobbyists in
there--and I have five major installations in my State of Oklahoma--if
this is a 2-year delay, as I have said publicly before, and as I said
as recently as our policy meeting, I would say let's go ahead and do
it, and do it now.
It is my understanding--and I would certainly yield to anyone who
disagrees with this--this is killing this BRAC round; that if it should
become necessary to have it, you would have to reauthorize it in 2007.
That is now my understanding. It is not a delay. This is not the House
language. I would like to ask if there is anyone who would correct me.
If I am wrong, I need to know it.

Apparently, I am not.
Let me ask the author of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Let's ask Senator Lott, who authored it. As I read it,
there is a 2-year delay.
Mr. LOTT. This amendment is not the same as the House language, which
is a 2-year delay.
Mr. INHOFE. That I realize.
Mr. LOTT. This amendment says when you get the global review, you
would go forward with a BRAC for overseas bases, and then have the
domestic round, presuming that is completed. It is not a 2-year delay.
It could be that we would go forward with it after only 1 year. If the
realignment in force restructuring that is going on globally would
occur next year, then it could go forward next year.
Mr. INHOFE. This kills it, and it has to be reauthorized; is that
correct?
Mr. LOTT. That is correct.
Mr. INHOFE. All right. Mr. President, I ask that time not be taken
away from my time because I feel very awkward about this. The Senator
from Alabama talked about spending time with General Jones, which I did
over there. I have spent quite a bit of time, and I think I have a
pretty good idea of what is going on. I have actually been to Bulgaria
and Romania and Ukraine, looking at how we are going to restructure and
bring home our troops who are stationed for these 2- and 3-year periods
with their families, so we could actually get out there and have short
deployments so they would not have to take their families with them. I
think General Jones is right on target. That is going to have a
tremendous effect on what we do in terms of base closures.
I answered a whip check, and I want to correct it right now, so
everyone knows that whip check was not worded properly. It said: Would
you support defeating a 2-year delay? I would support defeating a 2-
year delay for the very reasons that have been outlined here, that we
do not want our communities to have to continue to go through that.
But if you will remember the debate we had when I vigorously opposed
having this fifth round, I used the argument that we are going to be
changing our force structure, that we are going to be making changes
that might make us relook as to what we are going to do in our
installations here in the United States.
I was elected to the House in 1986, so I was there during the
formulation of the BRAC process. I was a staunch supporter for the
first three rounds. For the last one, I did not like the way it went.
It became political. I have had the fear that would happen again. We
closed some 97 installations in the last four rounds, and that is not
only low-hanging fruit; a lot of great installations that were closed.
I believe, if this amendment kills it, and it would have to be
reauthorized after such time that we know what the restructuring looks
like, that I will support this amendment. I am going to find out
between now and when the vote takes place if I am correct. But I
believe my understanding now is correct.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, since we have more time, I believe,
remaining on this side, the side of the proponents of the amendment, I
yield such time as he may consume--the remainder of that time--to
Senator Dorgan, who has been very much involved and a leader in this
process for several years.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Mississippi for
his leadership on this amendment.
Let me address a few of the issues that have been discussed. First of
all, 5 days before September 11, 2001--5 days before September 11--the
first vote occurred in the Senate on this BRAC round. It was September
6, and it was a vote in the Senate Defense Authorization Committee.
That first committee vote, 5 days before September 11, 2001, is what
propelled a base-closing commission proposal to the floor of the
Senate.
The opponents of this amendment are quite correct when they say the
final vote of the Congress occurred after September 11. But the origin
of this, including the vote in the authorizing committee, occurred
before September 11.
The reason I make that point is this: Things are changing. The world
has changed. I will bet on September 6, 2001, there was not one member
of the Armed Services Committee or a Member of the Senate, and I will
bet not one person serving in the Pentagon, who would have predicted
that within a matter of months we would be occupying an old Soviet air
base in Uzbekistan in order to house our troops to prosecute a war in
Afghanistan. No one would have predicted that. No one would have had
the foggiest idea that was in front of us. Yet the world has changed.
We now fight a war against terrorism. We fought a war in Afghanistan,
quite successfully. We are now fighting a war in Iraq. The world is
changing. So our force structure will likely change. Our basing
decisions will change. We no longer have a cold war with the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is gone, it has disappeared.
So what next? Well, my feeling, and the reason I support this
amendment and have worked on this amendment, is we ought to do first
things first. I have voted for four previous base-closing rounds. My
colleague from Oklahoma said we have voted to close some 97--nearly
100--military installations. I have voted for all of that, as I believe
have most of my colleagues. So I am not a bit unwilling to vote to
close military installations. We have done that on four occasions.
In this case, however, as I said, the world is changing very rapidly.
I would ask the question of my colleagues if, in fact, there has been
all of this activity about reevaluating overseas bases, given the
changes in the world, and the fact we are no longer in a cold war, why,
then, do we have nearly 100,000 troops still in Germany? Why?
My colleague from Alabama said, well, we could bring a lot of those
folks back. I think he said we could probably bring a half to two-
thirds of them back to this country.
Well, here is what the Congressional Budget Office said. It said: The
U.S. Army has little or no excess capacity at bases in the United
States. The need to house forces in the U.S. that are now stationed
overseas could preclude some base closures.
So if that is the case--and it is--wouldn't you do first things
first? Wouldn't you decide what it is you are going to do with overseas
bases first so you understand what your obligation is with respect to
bases here at home? If you are going to bring 50,000 Army troops from
Germany back to American soil, where are you going to put them?
Wouldn't you want to make those decisions before you have a base-
closing commission here for domestic bases?
And one other point, I wonder if perhaps, with respect to the
international war on terrorism, and the substantial need for homeland
security, which we did not spend so much time thinking about years ago,
I wonder if when we talk about domestic military installations whether
we might not think about them in a slightly different way.

[[Page S5592]]

Perhaps we need more. I don't know. I would sure like all of these to
be handled and discussed and debated and thought about in a logical
way. Frankly, that has not been the case.
We have a very large Federal budget deficit. We are now going to be
asked for a $25 billion reserve fund to fund the war in Iraq. The
Congress is going to provide that. We are not going to ask the American
men and women in uniform to go in harm's way and then not provide the
funds that are necessary. But at a time when we have a very large
Federal budget deficit and the need to provide funding to prosecute the
war in Iraq, a base-closing commission next year will result in us
spending more money, not saving money, spending more money. If you
question that, look at all the previous rounds and ask yourself what
the result has been of those rounds in the years following the round.
It cost us more money to proceed with the recommendations of the BRAC
Commission.
The Senator from Oklahoma asked the question: What is this amendment?
The amendment is very simple. The amendment says the 2005 BRAC round
shall proceed, but it shall proceed to evaluate and recommend
realignment and closure only with respect to overseas bases. Why is
that the case? Because that ought to be done first. First things first,
but put the horse in front of the cart, evaluate what are the
international, what are the worldwide needs and interests of our
country with respect to our military troops and installations, and then
from that you will determine what kind of military installations and
needs you have in this country domestically.
That is what our amendment does. It provides for the 2005 round to
proceed with respect to overseas bases. Then secondly it says,
following that report and disposition of its recommendations by the
Senate, a motion will be in order by someone who wishes to propose a
motion for a new BRAC round. Under expedited procedures, that motion
shall be considered, and there shall be a vote of the Senate on whether
to implement another BRAC round. The Senator from Oklahoma, with
respect to the question he asked, was absolutely correct.
I have great respect for the chairman and ranking member of this
committee. They do outstanding work. They are both wonderful
legislators, and I regret that we find ourselves on different sides of
this question. I have great respect for their position. But I believe,
as do many of my colleagues who have spoken today, that the better
course for this country, given what we face, our challenges and the
circumstances that now exist, would be to proceed with the amendment,
have an overseas BRAC round next year, decide what it is we want to do
internationally with overseas bases, and then proceed from that basis
and make further judgments.
I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, he has correctly
described how this operates, but the reality is, by killing the
domestic BRAC program and putting it in abeyance subject to a future
vote by the Congress--and mind you, any Member of Congress can trigger
that vote; am I not correct?
Mr. DORGAN. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. All Presidents have supported BRAC. You know that message
is coming up. So what happens to the lobbyist? He tells the community:
Keep me on the payroll, that vote is coming, and you do not know which
way that vote is going to go. They will breathe fear into these
communities, unlike anything before, to keep those lobbyists on the
payroll. Those communities will be shelling out the money year after
year.
I will close with the following comment: We are to soon receive a
letter which will have this statement in it: Base Realignment and
Closure, BRAC--the administration strongly opposes any provision to
modify, delay, or repeal the BRAC authority passed by the Congress 3
years ago. If the President is presented a bill that modifies, delays,
or repeals the BRAC authority, the Secretary of Defense, joining with
other senior advisers, would recommend that the President veto the
bill. Rather than waiting for the resolution of infrastructure issues
as proposed by the committee, BRAC needs to move forward so it can be
done in concert with such a resolution. A delay would postpone the
achievement of a basing structure more suited to 21st century threats
and delay billions and billions of dollars in savings. The current
excesses in base and facility capacity create unnecessary demands on
the Department of Defense resources needed to maintain military
readiness and transform for the future.
I yield to my distinguished colleague from Michigan.
Mr. DORGAN. How much time remains on both sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi controls 2
minutes 22 seconds. The Senator from Virginia has 3 minutes 55 seconds.
Mr. WARNER. I yield that to my distinguished colleague from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there has been a number of votes on BRAC.
Just to clarify, it was not just that the Congress voted to keep a BRAC
process going after 9/11; the Senate itself, on September 25, 2001,
voted to table an amendment which struck the BRAC title. That was after
9/11. It was the Senate itself that voted on that.
Secondly, the point about first things first, it seems to me, is
right. We ought to consider overseas bases first. That is why we
created a commission last year in the 2004 appropriations bill, the
MILCON appropriations bill. We appointed the Commission on Review of
Overseas Military Facility Structures of the United States. That
commission is meeting now. That commission is going to make a report
this year. First things first, that is exactly what we are doing with
that commission--reporting first on overseas structures.
The real question is whether we get to the second thing. This
amendment kills BRAC. I think the sponsors have clarified it. This
kills BRAC unless there is, as the Senator from Virginia points out, a
vote in 2005 to have a BRAC process. That will be the vote that all of
the lobbyists will be pointing to. Every one of our States has bases. A
lot of those bases are nervous. They have hired people to lobby us. Now
the focus will be on a 2005 vote. So the cost to the communities to
keep this pot boiling will continue. The communities will be left in
limbo because these bases' future will be uncertain.

The vote in 2005 will be certain. The outcome will not be certain,
but there will be a vote in 2005. We know that because of the amendment
language. So the beneficiaries of this amendment are the lobbyists and
representatives of the communities, the communities kept nervous, kept
in limbo. Keep the pot boiling; don't resolve this issue. The only
argument to do that is first things first.
We did that. We have our overseas basing commission in place,
appointed, meeting. That is the logical process. We ought to let it
play out.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I think the administration has begun
to address the overseas basing issue. I have visited bases, as have
many of my colleagues. I have seen training constraints where you don't
have the airspace to stay in training or you don't have the artillery
range to stay in training. We have not had enough time to fully look at
overseas bases and also know what our end strength is going to be. We
don't know right this minute what our end strength is going to be and
our force structure because we are having to adapt to some incredible
changes in our security environment.
We are going to have the last round of BRAC at some point, but it
needs to be at the right time, and it needs to be done right. The Lott
amendment would give us that extra time to make sure we do it right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of the time.
This commission on overseas bases is a Global Posture Review. It is
not a closure or realignment process. It is a review of requirements
that should then inform an overseas base process. But it is not a base
closure. This commission which reports in December guarantees that
nothing will happen. I

[[Page S5593]]

want to make sure everybody understands that. We are trying to get an
overseas realignment and base closure process.
Secondly, I am shocked with all this talk about the key factor here
is the lobbyists: We don't want our communities or States to keep these
lobbyists who are going to be working to try to keep the commission
from closing this base or that base. I really can't really believe that
has been the argument.
I have an answer to that. Take them off the payroll. I know how it
has been working. Some of these people have been paid for 4 years, and
there has not been a BRAC process underway. That is why we are here. We
are here as representatives of the people. We do not need these people
on the payroll. Surely, that is not the best argument.
I guarantee this: Some of the communities, some of the bases, some of
the people will say this will give us 2 more years, at least, on life.
We will take those 2 years. The very idea of ``shoot me and get it over
with'' when, as a matter of fact, some of these bases are really
needed--CBO has said there is not excess capacity.
My last point is, if we are going to have a base-closure process,
target the excess bases; do not target every base in America. I urge we
adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. WARNER. All time has expired?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 1 minute 26
seconds remaining.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I simply say to my good friend, a very
valuable adviser for these many years, this BRAC legislation is to take
Congress and remove it, once we make the decision to go forward with a
BRAC, because the very essence of BRAC was so distorted by a certain
political individual some years ago.
I have to tell my dear friend, it took a lot of effort to get this
law in place. To dislodge it and terminate it, as this amendment does--
this is a killer amendment to BRAC--and then leave in limbo these
communities with 2 years of uncertainty, not being able to attract
business, not being able to do things in their community, with this
cloud over their head as to the probability or improbability of their
base remaining, is a dangerous situation.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, has all time expired?
Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to grant my good friend----
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I have an
additional 30 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Thirty minutes?
Mr. LOTT. Thirty seconds, to wrap up this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I want to emphasize again, think about what
we are doing. Think about the time. Think about how much has happened
in the last 2 years. Think of the troops, the Reserve and Guard forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Think about the families, the mothers, and
communities already very much concerned about the future of our
military men and women, where they are going to be, and now add this to
it. I think the timing is wrong. To say we are not going to even
identify what bases will be subject to this review is not the way to
go.
I say again, think about these issues. I do not think we have any
guarantee overseas bases will be realigned. I have evidence to indicate
they will have the same numbers overseas in 2025. We have heard a lot
of talk about realignment overseas and restructuring. It has not
happened. This will make sure we first have overseas bases realigned
and a new structure and then the domestic bases.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3158. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Bunning) is necessarily absent.
I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from
Kentucky (Mr. Bunning) would vote ``yea.''
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), and the Senator from New Jersey
(Mr. Lautenberg) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 49, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 98 Leg.]

YEAS--47

Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Clinton
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gregg
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Johnson
Landrieu
Lott
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Sarbanes
Schumer
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu

NAYS--49

Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chambliss
Coleman
Cornyn
DeWine
Dole
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Hagel
Harkin
Jeffords
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Miller
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--4

Bunning
Inouye
Kerry
Lautenberg
The amendment (No. 3158) was rejected.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank all Senators for their cooperation
today. We made some progress on the bill. But at this time, on behalf
of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a
period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to
10 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will
not object, I want the Record to reflect we were prepared to go ahead
with our amendment this evening for debate and discussion. I understood
the Senator from New Mexico had an amendment. We were here at 3:30 or
so, 4 o'clock. I was reminded by our ranking member about the desire to
move ahead on the Defense authorization bill, so I want to be sure the
ranking member and the floor manager of the bill, my friend and
colleague, knows we are here ready to go with an amendment. It is an
amendment of very significant importance about the Iraq policy. We were
prepared to debate that amendment this evening and have discussion
about this matter. I want to say, I certainly want to cooperate with
the floor manager.
We are all looking forward to the hearing tomorrow morning at 8:30,
when we will have General Abizaid and General Sanchez, and others--
General Miller--who are going to be there, which will necessitate my
attendance. I want to cooperate in every way, and will certainly, but I
do want to indicate many of us who feel strongly about this issue and
the importance of it were prepared to deal with this through the
evening time. But it is evidently the wish of the floor manager to
bring us into morning business. I would like to ask if I cannot at
least have my amendment pending after the Senator

[[Page S5594]]

from--as I understand, the Senator from New Mexico had intended to
offer an amendment. As the floor managers remember, I tried to follow
that Senator, considering the fact we had the Lott amendment, and then
the Domenici amendment, that we might have an amendment from over on
this side.
I want to try to work it out, but I do want to try to at least find
out if we can get in the queue on this issue so we can notify our
Members. I am inquiring from the manager if we cannot at least get the
amendment pending after the disposition of the amendment of the Senator
from New Mexico, before we go into morning business.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in reply to my distinguished colleague on
the Armed Services Committee, at this time I am not in a position to
suggest how we proceed tomorrow, other than to say we, as a matter of
comity, will rotate one amendment to another. The pending business, of
course, at this time on this bill is the Lautenberg amendment. I would
presume if that is disposed of tomorrow, then we would go to an
amendment on our side, and we would then come back to your side.
But at this time I would not be able to participate in trying to line
up with certainty any amendments other than the fact that the
Lautenberg amendment is the pending amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will not object, although it is
perfectly satisfactory with the Senator from New Jersey for us to move
ahead in the way I have outlined here, but if the chairman, the Senator
from Virginia, wants to proceed in that way, it is obviously his right
to do so. I am going to ask at least that my amendment get sent to the
desk, not that it be in order but that it be sent to the desk prior to
the time we go into morning business, if that is agreeable with the
Senator, so it can be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I am not prepared to enter
into any unanimous consent request.
Mr. KENNEDY. Well, Mr. President, then I object.
Mr. WARNER. Filing is a Senator's right.
Mr. KENNEDY. I object, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
Mr. WARNER. He can file, but I did not hear the word ``file.''
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no quorum call.
Mr. REID. I apologize. I thought there was. Will the Senator yield so
the Senator can send his amendment to the desk?
Mr. WARNER. The Senator participates in the withdrawal of the quorum
call. Yes, the quorum call can now be withdrawn. I ask unanimous
consent that the quorum call----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no quorum call. The Senator from
Virginia has the floor.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, there is a unanimous consent request
pending?
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment
to this legislation be printed at the appropriate place at the end of
the discussion on this legislation here today.
Mr. WARNER. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

amendment no. 3174

(Purpose: To require a report on the efforts of the President to
stabilize Iraq and relieve the burden on members of the Armed Forces of
the United States deployed in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region)

On page 247, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:

SEC. 1022. REPORT ON THE STABILIZATION OF IRAQ.

Not later than two weeks after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional
defense committees an unclassified report (with classified
annex, if necessary) on the strategy of the United States for
stabilizing Iraq. The report shall contain a detailed
explanation of the strategy together with the following
information:
(1) A description of the efforts of the President to work
with the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to provide relief for the nearly 150,000 members
of the Armed Forces of the United States who were serving in
Iraq as of May 2004, including efforts to ensure that--
(A) more military forces of other countries are deployed to
Iraq;
(B) more police forces of other countries are deployed to
Iraq; and
(C) more financial resources of other countries are
provided for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.
(2) As a result of such efforts--
(A) a list of the countries that have committed to
deploying military and police forces;
(B) with respect to each such country, the schedule and
level of such deployments; and
(C) an estimate of the number of members of the Armed
Forces that will be able to return to the United States as a
result of such deployments.
(3) A description of the efforts of the President to
develop the police and military forces of Iraq to provide
relief for the nearly 150,000 members of the Armed Forces of
the United States who were serving in Iraq as of May 2004.
(4) As a result of such efforts--
(A) the number of members of the police and military forces
of Iraq that have been trained;
(B) the number of members of the police and military forces
of Iraq that have been deployed; and
(C) an estimate of the number of members of the Armed
Forces of the United States that will be able to return to
the United States as a result of such training and
deployment.
(5) An estimate of--
(A) the number of members of the Armed Forces that will be
required to serve in Iraq during each of the first five years
following the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) the percentage of that force that will be composed of
members of the National Guard and Reserves.

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