Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 62 (Thursday, May 6, 2004)

[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 62 (Thursday, May 6, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4951-S4969]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

National Day Of Prayer

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would also like to bring to the attention
of my colleagues an article from today's Washington Post. It was on
page A-3 carried over to page A-6, and it worries me deeply because it
goes to what I am fearful may have had some underlying and undercurrent
effect on the events of the last several days. It seems to speak to the
extent that we are dehumanizing and minimizing and casting this pall of
accusation over an entire religious group in the world.
Senator Biden pointed out in his remarks here this morning that 1.2
billion people are observers of the Muslim faith.
And today is a national day of prayer in the U.S. It began with a
resolution adopted in the Truman administration in 1952 and has been
followed every year since then. When Harry Truman signed the
congressional resolution he called for ``a suitable day each year other
than a Sunday to be set aside for common prayer.'' Every administration
since 1952 has taken that day out of the calendar year to focus on
common prayer. And it was under the Reagan administration that the
first Thursday of May was set aside as the permanent day each year.
I cannot tell you how disturbing it was to read in this morning's
paper a quote from one of the organizers of this year's day of prayer.
The quote was buried away, but let me read it, because it actually goes
to the heart of what we are talking about. We are told here, this
morning, that they would make ``no apologies'' in today's celebration
of prayer ``about the exclusion of Muslims and others outside of the
`Judeo-Christian tradition' from ceremonies planned by the task force
on Capitol Hill and in state capitals across the country.''

[[Page S4959]]

``They are free to have their own national day of prayer if they want
to,'' she said.
Well, if you have that attitude about common prayer today, and you
exclude religious groups from a national day of prayer, then what have
we come to?
I might point out as well, because the Presiding Officer will
appreciate this--my wife pointed this out to me this morning--in Salt
Lake City, Mormons have complained that they are not allowed to lead
prayers during today's observance. I don't know how you have a national
prayer day in Salt Lake City and exclude the Mormons from
participating.
But this sort of attitude where we are going to selectively choose
religious groups that can be involved, and the particular reference
here to the exclusion of anyone who might be of the Muslim faith, is
troubling to me because it is that sort of an attitude that contributes
to the dehumanization of people and casts aspersions on an entire group
of people.
Indeed, as we talk about what has occurred as a result of the actions
of a few bad apples, I point out the story in today's newspaper because
I think that the attitude of exclusion expressed in the story
contributes to an environment, if you will, that somehow makes these
abuses permissible in the minds of some--that somehow these people are
undeserving of the kind of treatment that every other human ought to
receive--particularly in the hands of a nation that prides itself on
being governed by the rule of law and which respects individual rights.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article in today's
Washington Post entitled ``Bush to Appear On Christian TV For Prayer
Day'' be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Bush To Appear on Christian TV for Prayer Day

(By Alan Cooperman)

President Bush's participation in a National Day of Prayer
ceremony with evangelical Christian leaders at the White
House will be shown tonight, for the first time in prime-time
viewing hours, on Christian cable and satellite TV outlets
nationwide.
For Bush, the broadcast is an opportunity to address a
sympathetic evangelical audience without the risk of
alienating secular or non-Christian viewers, because it will
not be carried in full by the major television networks.
Frank Wright, president of the National Association of
Religious Broadcasters, said more than a million evangelicals
are expected to see the broadcast.
Some civil liberties groups and religious minorities
charged that the National Day of Prayer has lost its
nonpartisan veneer and is being turned into a platform for
evangelical groups to endorse Bush--and vice versa.
``Over the years, the National Day of Prayer has gradually
been adopted more and more by the religious right, and this
year in particular there is such an undercurrent of
partisanship because for the first time they are broadcasting
Bush's message in an election year,'' said the Rev. Barry W.
Lynn, executive director of Americans United for Separation
of Church and State.
The event's organizers denied that it amounts to a tacit
political endorsement.
``We're in an election year, and we believe God cares who's
in those positions of authority,'' said Mark Fried, spokesman
for the National Day of Prayer Task Force. ``But we're not
endorsing a candidate--just praying that God's hand will be
on the election.''
The private task force, which operates from the Colorado
headquarters of the Christian organization Focus on the
Family, has encouraged the nation's churches to organize
potluck suppers and pipe the ceremony into their sanctuaries.
It will be taped in mid-afternoon in the East Room and re-
broadcast during a three-hour, late evening ``Concert of
Prayer'' featuring Christian music stars and other
luminaries, such as Bruce Wilkinson, author of the best-
selling ``Prayer of Jabez.''
``This feed is available to any network anywhere in the
world free of charge, but only religious networks have an
inclination to pick it up,'' Wright said.
Fried said this year's theme is ``Let Freedom Ring.'' He
described it as the evangelical response to efforts to remove
the words ``under God'' from the Pledge of Allegiance and
keep the Ten Commandments out of public buildings.
``Our theme is, there is a small group of activists
unleashing an all-out assault on our religious freedoms. They
are targeting the Christian faith,'' he said.
The National Day of Prayer has been celebrated every year
since 1952, when President Harry S. Truman signed a
congressional resolution calling for ``a suitable day each
year, other than a Sunday to be set aside for common prayer.
Under President Ronald Reagan, the date was set permanently
as the first Thursday in May. Since the mid-1980s, the
ceremony has been organized by the nonprofit task force
headed by two prominent evangelical women: Vonette Bright,
widow of Campus Crusade for Christ founder Bill Bright, and
Shirley Dobson, wife of Focus on the Family founder James C.
Dobson.
As in recent years, today's observances will begin with a
congressional prayer session on Capitol Hill in the morning,
followed by the afternoon ceremony at the White House. Under
President Bill Clinton, Bright said in an interview this
week, the White House observance was private and ``very
definitely lower key'' than under Bush, who has invited print
and television coverage each year.
Although ``we were disappointed'' with Clinton's low-
profile celebration, Bright said, evangelicals did not make
that sentiment public. ``We have as enthusiastically promoted
the Day of Prayer when Democrats were in office as when they
were not,'' she said, adding that any ``politicization'' of
the Day of Prayer ``would be so unfortunate.''
Bright did not hesitate, however, to express admiration for
Bush: ``I don't think he has a political agenda of his own. I
think he's really trying to do what would please God.''
She also made no apologies about the exclusion of Muslims
and others outside of the ``Judeao-Christian tradition'' from
ceremonies planned by the task force on Capitol Hill and in
state capitals across the country. ``They are free to have
their own national day of prayer if they want to,'' she said.
``We are a Christian task force.''
The White House press office and presidential adviser Karl
Rove's office did not respond to calls seeking comment on the
National Day of Prayer observances.
Organizers said some Jewish rabbis, Catholic clergy and
mainline Protestants have been invited to the congressional
and White House ceremonies. But the exclusion of religious
minorities has led to protests in several cities.
In Salt Lake City, Mormons have complained that they are
not allowed to lead prayers during the local observance.
In Oklahoma City, the Rev. W. Bruce Prescott has planned an
interfaith ceremony on the steps of the state Capitol today
to protest the exclusively Christian ceremony inside the
building. ``As a Baptist preacher, it's hard for me to
protest prayer,'' he said. ``What I'd rather do is see if we
can't find a way to do it right.''

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in addition to
my time, I receive 10 minutes from Senator Harkin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, we are currently engaged in a fierce battle to salvage
something, anything, from the administration's effort at regime change
and reconstruction in Iraq. Each day, the costs in lives and dollars
accumulate, as the Iraqi people become more restive and impatient.
International and regional support for our efforts is eroding at a time
when an international effort, as distinct from the administration's
unilateral approach, may be the only effective way to change the
political dynamic and allow us to avoid being trapped in a long,
bloody, and uncertain conflict.
Many Americans are asking how we came to this point. Some are asking
why we must remain. The President has responded with a slogan: ``We
must not waiver.'' What we need is a plan, a plan based on reality, not
on ideology.
The administration launched the preemptive attack on Iraq to counter,
according to their claims, the overwhelming danger of Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction and alleged ties between Saddam Hussein and
terrorists. In the last year, no weapons of mass destruction have been
found, and no strong link has been established between Saddam and
terrorists. Ironically, today, there is no shortage of terrorists in
Iraq. They have been drawn there not by Saddam but by his demise.
Now, the administration returns to the subtext of its justification
for preemptive action in the fall of 2002, the unalloyed evil of
Saddam. That, of course, is a point beyond debate; indeed, a point that
was acknowledged by all sides during the debate in the fall of 2002.
When Secretary Wolfowitz testified recently before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, he continually reiterated the depravity of Saddam
stressing, in his words, the ``density of evil'' that gripped Iraq
under Saddam. Looking backward at Saddam will not help us find a way
ahead today. Today, more relevant than the ``density of evil'' that
gripped Iraq is the ``density of illusion'' that continues to grip the

[[Page S4960]]

administration and the Pentagon. The administration and the Pentagon
stubbornly cling to illusions about the situation in Iraq. Let me
suggest some of the most salient.
For months, they have attempted to convince the world--and, perhaps,
themselves--that Iraqi security forces were capable of making a
significant contribution to establish order and to defeat the
insurgency. No such capability exists at this time, and it may take
years to train a competent and cohesive force that can assume the
security role in Iraq that currently falls primarily upon the United
States.
For months, the Pentagon regaled us with charts showing the
astronomical and rapid growth of Iraqi security forces from mere
handfuls to hundreds of thousands. They repeatedly stressed the
proportional decrease of the American presence as a sign of progress.
All this was wishful thinking and political spinning.
The last few weeks have revealed the fact that a significant number
of Iraqi security forces are ill prepared, ill equipped, and
unmotivated.
A Washington Post article pointed out that on April 5, a new Iraqi
battalion of several hundred Iraqi soldiers refused to join U.S.
Marines in the offensive in Fallujah. In the south, police units as
well as members of the Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps, equivalent to the
National Guard of the United States, refused to engage Sadr's forces.
MG Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq,
estimated that one in 10 members of the Iraqi security forces actually
worked against the U.S. forces and 40 percent simply walked away from
their post because of intimidation during the recent violence in
Fallujah and in the south of Iraq.
The Pentagon likely had indications of problems with these forces.
Several months ago MG Karl Eikenberry was dispatched to Iraq to conduct
a survey of Iraqi security forces. General Eikenberry is an extremely
competent and experienced officer who played a key role in establishing
the new national army in Afghanistan after Operation Enduring Freedom.
For many weeks, I have been attempting to obtain this report to
become informed and to inform my colleagues about the state of
readiness of the Iraqi security forces. The Pentagon has been
completely uncooperative. This lack of cooperation and respect for the
responsibilities of Congress to perform oversight over the Department
of Defense has been characteristic of this administration's approach
throughout the conduct of operations in Iraq, and it has contributed to
the predicament we find ourselves in today. Too often a small group of
civilians in the Pentagon has displaced normal planning functions and
instead, insulated from appropriate congressional oversight, has
hatched plans for the occupation in Iraq that have proven to be
misguided and inept. The formation of credible and effective Iraqi
security forces is imperative, but not just because it reduces the
burden and the threat to our forces. It is imperative we establish
these forces because today our goals for Iraq are being thwarted by a
climate of violence that affects every Iraqi and saps their willingness
to commit to the reform of their country.
We often see the violence in Iraq as those attacks against our
forces. When we do, we miss the pervasive and disturbing violence that
touches the lives of every Iraqi and, in a cruel irony, has many Iraqis
comparing the order under Saddam with the chronic disorder under the
United States.
The following is an article, translated from Arabic, in the April
25th edition of Al Manar, a newspaper from Baghdad:

The Iraqi society has never known or, even in U.S. gang
movies, seen such acts of looting, robbery, and murder as the
current crimes taking place in Iraq today, which cause
newborn's hair to turn gray. The crimes have become so common
that hardly an hour passes without hearing that some people
are being plundered or a number of cars are being stolen. The
drivers of the new and expensive cars have become a target
for the thieves and burglars.
Someone may think that such crimes occur in other places at
night; however, the strange thing is that in Iraq, they take
place during the day for everyone to see. In addition, the
numbers of these looting gangs have become very well known to
the ordinary citizens of Baghdad.
A few days ago, my relative's car was stolen at gun point
in Baghdad, but he managed to escape without being physically
harmed or injured in the incident. Having recovered from the
shock a few days later, his friends advised him to meet with
a former gang leader who enjoyed considerable status and
reputation among the members of the other criminal gangs.
Having no other option, my relative went to see the guy who
promised to take him to the gangs operating in the zone where
his car was stolen.
As promised, the man secretly took my relative to meet well
known gangsters where one of them congratulated him [my
relative] for his good luck because his car was stolen by a
gang ``that only steals cars but does not kill the owners;
otherwise, you would have been killed if it was another
gang.'' The strange thing is that most of the gangsters are
young boys between the age of 15 and 20 years.
After several terrifying trips, my relative found his car
when tough negotiations began. He was asked to pay $500, a
special offer out of honor and respect for their repentant
comrade who brought him to get his car back.

This true story is an example of dozens of other similar robbery,
looting, and murder crimes taking place in Baghdad where stealing and
murdering gangs have dramatically increased. Unless we are able to
protect the people of Iraq from criminal gangs and from situations as
illustrated in these comments in the newspaper, we will fail in our
mission because we have a situation where the basic elements of order,
the basic sense of safety and security have been completely eviscerated
for a vast number of Iraqis.
These are off the TV screens. But this is one of the constant
drumbeats that is turning the people of Iraq to become resentful of our
presence.
The administration has also, together with the Pentagon, consistently
underestimated the number of troops necessary for the successful
occupation of Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks adroitly
planned the air and ground campaign that shattered the Iraqi army in a
matter of days. They correctly judged our overwhelming technological
advantages, together with the extraordinary courage and skill of our
fighting forces, would quickly overwhelm the much larger Iraqi forces.
But winning a swift victory over a conventional military force is not
the same as successfully occupying a large country with a population of
25 million.
From the beginning, our forces, including international allies, were
insufficient to physically and psychologically dominate the scene. The
absence or limited presence of coalition forces in many parts of Iraq
gave the insurgents opportunities to organize and the perception they
could initiate hostile actions against our forces. One of the first
clues I had suggesting a lack of adequate forces was the briefing I
received last July from the 4th Infantry Division in Kirkuk on my first
trip to Iraq. I was taken aback, frankly, to learn there were hundreds,
if not thousands, of Iraqi ammo dumps. Many of them were totally
unsecured while others had some security barriers but were not secured
by military personnel. This was the case all over the country.
Today munitions in these ammo dumps are being used to craft the
improvised explosive devices that bedevil our forces. This is one
example indicating additional troops could have been used effectively.
Another indication of the insufficient number of coalition military
forces is the proliferation of private security forces. Why is it
necessary to have 20,000 armed private security guards in Iraq
performing essential military duties? The answer is simple. We did not
deploy sufficient military forces. These private security forces are
generally highly trained professionals, typically veterans of our
special operations forces. But their presence raises numerous
questions.

How, for example, do they coordinate with our military forces? What
rules of engagement may they use? What is their legal status,
particularly after June 30, when limited sovereignty is transferred to
some Iraqi authority? I am still awaiting the answer to these questions
from the Pentagon. Once again, my request has not been responded to
promptly with detailed information or any information.
Last September, Senator Hagel and I proposed an amendment to the
supplemental appropriations bill to increase the size of our Army by
10,000 soldiers. That is a necessary initial step to provide the
manpower to continue to commit further forces to Iraq and to continue
to meet the worldwide demands

[[Page S4961]]

upon our Army. The Senate supported that amendment. Unfortunately, the
administration vociferously opposed it. They claimed Iraq was just a
spike and that in the months ahead, the Army could begin to withdraw
forces.
In January, they suddenly reversed this position and announced they
would take steps to increase the Army by 30,000 soldiers by tapping
into the supplemental appropriations bill. I am pleased the Pentagon is
finally convinced we need more forces for our Army, but they still
maintain this is a temporary emergency condition that is best funded
through the supplemental appropriations process.
The reality is, this condition is not temporary. If we are serious
about succeeding in Iraq and meeting other demands throughout the
world, we must admit this is a task that will take many years and a
larger army for many years. We must provide for increases in end
strength for our Army in the regular budget process, not the
supplemental, by directing more resources to the Army from the other
services or by increasing the overall defense budget.
The administration and the Pentagon continually insist that we are
being opposed by a small group of unrepentant holdouts from the former
Baathist regime and an even smaller cadre of terrorists who have
flocked to Iraq after the defeat of Saddam.
This view dangerously misconstrues the growing resentment of the Iraq
population to our presence and the very real possibility that many
Iraqis will sympathize with the insurgents not because they agree with
their political or religious views but because they see them as fellow
Iraqis resisting a foreign occupation.
Anthony Cordesman, a very prescient analyst at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that ``it is important
to note that an ABC poll in February found a large core of hostility to
the Coalition before the tensions unleashed by current fighting, and
that core involved many Shi'ites as well as Sunnis.'' And, as reported
in a new USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll, ``only a third of the Iraqi people
now believe that the American-led occupation of their country is doing
more good than harm, and a solid majority support an immediate pullout
even though they fear that could put them in greater danger . . .''
Although half the Iraqis who responded to the poll said that they and
their families were better off now then under Saddam, 71 percent of the
respondents when asked to classify the Americans as ``liberators'' or
``occupiers'' chose ``occupier.'' The figure increases to 81 percent if
you exclude respondents from the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. More
startling is the fact that more than half the respondents outside of
the Kurdish region ``say killing U.S. troops can be justified in at
least some cases.''
What might have begun as the desperate acts of diehards from Saddam's
regime has rapidly morphed into a widespread resentment of the United
States as ``occupiers.'' The insurgents have touched a nationalistic
nerve that vastly complicates our efforts. Popular support is the
critical element in political warfare, and the administration is
squandering that support.
The latest revelations of gross abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu
Ghraib prison have further fanned the flames of resentment and anger.
It is an aberration in the conduct of American soldiers, but its
occurrence has confirmed in a very suspicious population the worst lies
spread by our adversaries. In addition, these actions have poisoned our
already strained relations with many countries and their citizens
around the world.
For months now, the Coalition Provisional Authority has been in
power, and the administration touted that as an example of our
reconstruction efforts. Frankly, I believe it has been dysfunctional
from the beginning.
The President vested the Department of Defense with extraordinary
powers in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Even before the
initiation of military operations, the decision was made to exclude
experts from the State Department from planning for the reconstruction
and administration of Iraq. The task was given to a small group of
ideologues in the Department of Defense. They relied on the self-
serving declarations of Chalabi and the exile crowd to assume away most
of the problems that we later encountered in Iraq. Problems such as a
dilapidated infrastructure an ancient rivalries between religious and
ethnic factions were conveniently ignored as the ``neocons'' predicted
that we would be welcomed with open arms in a country that was
economically and culturally ready for a rapid transition to democracy.
The institutional responsibilities for the transformation of Iraq
were given to Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional
Authority, the ``CPA''. And, in this regard, the record is one of
confusion and ineptness.
The decision to disband the Iraqi army threw thousands of desperate
and dangerous individuals onto the streets of Iraq. Many of these
individuals formed the heart of the insurgency that continues to attack
our troops.
The decision to eliminate the Baath party from the civic life of Iraq
was quite correct in principle, but carried to such extremes that it
alienated the Sunni community and provided additional fuel for the
growing fires of resistance. To add insult to injury, the process of
debaathification was placed under the control of Chalabi, a figure of
immense distrust and dislike in Iraq.
I first heard these complaints from our military commanders last
November during one of my trips to Iraq. They complained that thousands
of teachers were being excluded from schools at a time when there was a
concerted effort to reopen schools throughout the country. These
officers explained that membership in the Baath Party was obligatory
for anyone who hoped to obtain a job like teaching in Iraq. Most of
these individuals were motivated not by political impulses but by
economic and career goals. Nevertheless, they were categorically
excluded subject to the discretion of Chalabi. It was a situation that
further antagonized the Sunni community. The policy has been belatedly
amended but not after doing great damage.
This episode also illustrates the gap between the CPA and the
military commanders that actually were doing the work of rebuilding
Iraq. The CPA existed in a security bubble in Baghdad disconnected from
the field where Army division commanders and their staffs were taking
pragmatic actions to restore services, rebuild communities and instill
hope in the people of Iraq. The CPA added little to these actions
except indecision that simply complicated the action of commanders on
the ground.
In the past few days, a revealing memorandum by someone who served in
the CPA has surfaced that provided additional details illustrating the
incompetence of the CPA. The anonymous author of the memo is a fan of
Chalabi and is hopeful for success in Iraq. This makes his criticism
even more telling.
He describes the CPA as handling ``an issue like six-year-olds play
soccer: Someone kicks the ball and one hundred people chase after it
hoping to be noticed, without a care as to what happens on the field.''
My view is that the CPA quickly became a 30-day summer camp for
``neocons.'' Subject-matter experts were displaced by ideological true
believers who rotated in and out at a dizzying rate.
The CPA installed the Iraqi Governing Council composed of
representatives from the major factions and then allowed the Governing
Council to pick ministers to run the major ministries, like Oil and
Public Works. The result was nepotism and corruption. As the memo
points out, ``both for political and organizational reasons, the
decision to allow the Governing Council to pick 25 ministers did the
greatest damage. Not only did we endorse nepotism, with men choosing
their sons and brothers-in-law; but we also failed to use our
prerogative to shape a system that would work . . . our failure to
promote accountability has hurt us.
I met with a member of the Iraqi Governing Council on March 17 in
Baghdad. He explained to me the importance of the June 30 date. As
Chalabi explained it to him, it is important because on that date they
get to ``write the checks.'' I am sure there are competent and
patriotic Iraqis involved in the Governing Council, but I am deeply
skeptical of many, like Chalabi, who seem interested only in self-
promotion based on deceit and deception.
Despite the institutional failings of the CPA, it has acquired some
hard-

[[Page S4962]]

won experience. That experience disappears on July 1 as our new Embassy
replaces the CPA. I fear that we will witness once again a lack of
coordination and direction as a new team tries to organize itself in
the complicated and unforgiving environment of Iraq. I was hoping to
hear Ambassador Negroponte describe in detail the organization and
policies that will guide the new Embassy. I didn't hear much.
There are numerous questions. What is the status of contracts with
the CPA, particularly contracts with security firms? Will American
civilian contractors in Iraq be subject to Iraq law or United States
jurisdiction? How will the Embassy be organized to avoid being
``captive'' in the Green Zone in Baghdad? How will responsibilities be
divided between the Department of State and the Department of Defense?
I'm still waiting for good answers.
We are in danger of repeating the mistakes we made a year ago. Once
again, we are approaching a critical juncture without a plan, just a
new set of players. And the clock is ticking.
The administration is pinning most of its hopes for political
progress in Iraq on the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi entity on
June 30. In doing so, they confuse the difference between sovereignty
and legitimacy. The new Iraqi entity--yet to be devised or to be
fleshed out with Iraqis--may have some formal powers that may qualify
it as a sovereign for the purposes of international law, but I doubt
that the vast majority of Iraqi citizens will see it as a legitimate
government. This new entity lacks the key components that people
ascribe to legitimate governments. Legitimate governments are created
by internal political forces, preferably by elections, and legitimate
governments control their territory.
This new entity will be a creation of the United States with the
belated and uncertain participation of the United Nations, and this new
government will exist because American military forces control the
territory of Iraq.
In a sense, the administration has already made June 30 both
irreversible and irrelevant. Having held out the prospect of a
transition to Iraqi rule on June 30, it is impossible to turn back. But
on July 1, a prevailing sentiment in Iraq is likely to be
disappointment and a sense that the United States has, once again,
failed to carry out its word. This will further aggravate tensions, not
diminish them.
We can hope the participation of the United Nations will give us a
reprieve from this fate, but the administration's disdain for and
distrust of the United Nations suggests to me that the current
arrangement of necessity will not be sufficient to truly give a sense
of legitimacy despite recent efforts.
The surest route to legitimacy is through elections, but we are far
from that day. Indeed, that day may continue to recede. Recent polling
in Iraq underlines a disturbing fact:

Seventy-five percent of the Iraqis polled--that's the
largest percentage of people agreeing on virtually any
issue--say they would never join a political party and oppose
the existence of a political party.

If that is the case, the likelihood of a democratic Iraq is many
years away.
The administration's gravest illusion has been and continues to be
that the United States can do it alone.
Recent events show the necessity for significant international
involvement, not unilateral action. The administration has made
overtures to the United Nations, but, as I have suggested, these
overtures smack more of political expediency than a new realization of
the value of broad-based collective action.
The monetary cost alone to the United States is staggering. We have
spent $100 billion on the effort in Iraq with no end in sight. More
importantly, we have lost 767 men and women of our Armed Forces.
Indeed, according to an article in today's Washington Post, Yale
economist William D. Nordhaus has estimated that the additional $25
billion just requested for the war in Iraq will make it more costly
than the inflation-adjusted expenditures of the Revolutionary War, the
War of 1812, the Mexican-American war, the Spanish-American War, and
the Persian Gulf war combined.
These monetary costs are just a fraction of what we will end up
paying. Each day we are accruing significant costs to recapitalize the
equipment and materiel we are using up at alarming rates. The aircraft
and the tactical and logistical vehicles will require massive overhauls
and replacement. None of these costs are being adequately addressed in
or outside the supplemental budgetary process or the regular budgetary
process.
Without broad-based international support, we will be unable to
accomplish our political goals, and we will be hard pressed to sustain
the billions of dollars necessary to sustain our effort in Iraq. As
long as we dominate the military and political forces deployed to Iraq,
we will be seen as occupiers serving our self-interest rather than a
force to advance the interests of the Iraqi people.
The administration has long maintained that Iraq is the ``central
front'' in the war on terrorism. They are badly mistaken. The ``central
front'' in the war on terrorism is the United States. The ultimate
objective of our terrorist adversaries is to once again inflict a
catastrophic attack against the United States. They are not distracted
in this objective by Iraq. We should not be either.
Today, al-Qaida and sympathetic terrorist cells throughout the world
continue to plot to conduct an attack against the United States or the
homelands of our allies.
The insurgents that we are engaging in Iraq may hate us with the same
intensity as an al-Qaida operative, but they have chosen a different
path--a path of guerrilla war against our military forces and the
citizens of Iraq. The majority are Iraqis motivated by specific
grievances involving our presence in Iraq. The ``foreign fighters'' who
are in Iraq are drawn by the desire to fight the infidel. They are
temperamentally and technically much different than the plotters who
attacked us on September 11. In contrast, there are still many al-Qaida
and associated operatives who continue to plan stealthy attacks against
Americans rather than seek out a guerilla war against our military
forces. To assume we will lure these terrorists into Iraq and destroy
them there is a dangerous misperception.
Once again, the value of a truly international approach to the war on
terror becomes more evident. The key element in this struggle is
intelligence, not simply military might. This intelligence is not the
province of one country, even a country with the resources of the
United States. It is the sum of the collective efforts of many
countries. To the extent we have alienated other countries or made
their intelligence contributions more difficult, then we have
diminished the key element in defeating those who continue to plot to
strike our homeland.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time expired.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed an
additional 5 minutes and that the other side be given an additional 5
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, considering all of this, it is alarming to
see the inattention that the administration is paying to homeland
security.
What is also very disconcerting about the administration's view is
that they see al-Qaida as an institution rather than an ideology. It is
an ideology, and it is an ideology that is spreading in the Islamic
world despite our huge efforts in Iraq, some might say even because of
our efforts in Iraq.
This ideological battle will not be won by military means alone. It
will be won by providing Muslim populations around the world with a
compelling alternative to the jihad as a means of enhancing their sense
of empowerment and defusing their sense of frustration.
Education and economic development spring to mind as ways to begin to
counter the appeal of the jihad. Once again, our choice of massive
military involvement in Iraq has constrained the resources that we can
deploy throughout the Muslim world to directly challenge the ideology
of al-Qaida through education and economic development. Here also is
another example of where an international approach would have given us
much more credibility and, potentially, more resources to advance this
agenda of education and economic development.
The administration entered Iraq with illusions, and they struggle
today in Iraq because of these illusions. The unfolding crisis in Iraq
can no longer tolerate illusion. It demands a realistic assessment of
the risks and resources, and a pragmatic plan to prevail.

[[Page S4963]]

The administration must develop a true plan for the war's financing
with realistic numbers in a timely manner.
The administration must commit more soldiers to the struggle in Iraq.
This means increasing the overall end strength of the Army through the
regular budget process.
The administration must recognize that the struggle in Iraq is
separate from the war on terrorism and that the war on terrorism
requires more robust funding at home to protect America.
The administration must recognize and admit that we are committed to
a long and dangerous struggle in Iraq that will cover many years and
cost many billions of dollars. The administration must seek to truly
institutionalize our efforts in Iraq.
A government that deceives its people may sustain itself for a while.
Lincoln reminded us that ``you can fool some of the people some of the
time,'' but a government that deceives itself is doomed to failure, and
its policies are doomed to failure.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I know we have a time limitation. I think
I was allocated some time earlier. Is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is allocated 20 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will support John Negroponte to be
America's first ambassador to Iraq since the gulf war, and I will speak
about it in more detail in a moment.
First I want to say a few words about the larger issues of Iraq and
the enormously important challenge we face at an enormously important
time for our Nation. The stakes could not be higher for the safety of
135,000 American soldiers serving in Iraq, for the future of Iraq and
its 25 million citizens, for America's role in the world in the years
ahead, and for America's own security in the weeks, let alone the
years, ahead.
For the stability of the entire Middle East, America's ambassador
must convey to the new Iraqi government and the Iraqi people America's
hopes for Iraq that it soon become a free, stable and prosperous and
peaceful nation that respects the rights of its own citizens.
We pray that mission accomplished has not become mission impossible.
America's respect and reputation in the world have never been lower in
the entire history of our Nation. Where do we go to get our respect and
reputation back? Where do we go to bring a respectable end to the
nightmare for America that Iraq has become?
I worry that the actions of our Government may no longer keep America
true to the ideals of the Nation's Founders so long ago.
I hope the appointment of Ambassador Negroponte, a career diplomat,
will mark a new beginning of serious American engagement in the real
problems in Iraq.
Too often, the Bush administration has been blinded by its arrogance
on Iraq and refused to recognize the cold, hard truth about its failed
policies. Time and again, the President has looked at events in Iraq
through rose-colored glasses, ignored the administration's many
mistakes in Iraq, and has failed to speak with candor either to the
American or the Iraqi people.
Ambassador Negroponte could not be entering this position at a more
challenging time. The allegations of prisoner abuse have shaken the
faith of the Iraqi people and the international community in the
benevolence of the U.S. involvement in Iraq. The new ambassador must
start to rebuild their trust.
In his April 20, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke at length about the
human rights abuses under Saddam. Seven of the 23 pages of his prepared
testimony addressed the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein.
One of the goals of the U.S. occupation of Iraq should have been to
herald a new day of human rights for the Iraqi people. Instead, many
Iraqis are equating America's crimes to those committed by Saddam
Hussein, using the same prison and the same torture rooms.
There is no question that this is not the case. There is no question
that Saddam's crimes were crueler and more horrific and more widespread
by any objective standard.
But the reports of torture by American soldiers, and the reports that
these abuses took place at the direction of Army intelligence officers,
CIA agents, and private contractors, are deeply damaging to our cause
in Iraq and our reputation and interests in the world.
Nobody questions the commitment and skill of the vast majority of our
soldiers. They are performing admirably under extraordinarily difficult
circumstances. I have no doubt that these despicable incidents are even
more painful for them than they are for the rest of America. I am
concerned, however, that allegations of prisoner abuse are not limited
to this one Baghdad prison. GEN. George Casey has said that this
military has conducted at least 25 criminal investigations into deaths
and 10 criminal investigations into other allegations of misconduct
involving detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Without a question, these reports of abuse strike at the heart of the
moral argument for the administration's war in Iraq.
It is clear that we need a full and independent investigation. The
American people need the truth. Congress needs answers. There must be a
full investigation and full accountability, including a comprehensive
review of all detention and interrogation polices used by military and
intelligence officials abroad, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and
elsewhere.
We need to know when the torture started, why was it kept secret for
so long, and why we had to learn about it from the media. No one should
be immune to questions, including the President.
This is President Bush's war. It is the result of his radical
doctrine of preventive war and American unilateralism run amok.
President Bush has spoken frequently about the dignity and human
rights of the Iraqi people, and he made it a major justification for
the war.
In the East Room of the White house on March 19, 2004, President Bush
asked: ``Who would prefer that Saddam's torture chambers still be
open?''
In the Cabinet room on December 24, 2003, the day Saddam was
captured, President Bush said:

For the vast majority of Iraqi citizens who wish to live as
free men and women, this event brings further assurance that
the torture chambers and the secret police are gone forever.

The President has failed the Iraqi people, and he has failed America.
He has presided over America's steepest and deepest fall from grace in
the history of our country.
The buck stops at the Oval Office. The tragedy unfolding in Iraq is
the direct result of a colossal failure of leadership. It is a failure
of calamitous proportions. The President should apologize to the Iraqi
people and accept full responsibility.
In the wake of this tragedy, Ambassador Negroponte will face an
uphill battle regaining the enormous ground we have lost in winning the
hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.
America's vision to rebuild Iraqi and provide new hope and
opportunity was grand and noble, but we have not delivered on our
promise. Far too many Iraqis have come to the conclusion that America
is able, but unwilling, to meet their basic needs. The frustration with
our unfulfilled promises is feeding into massive hatred for America and
our soldiers, who are paying with their lives.
Last fall, President Bush requested $20 billion in emergency
reconstruction assistance from Congress to provide basic services for
the Iraqi people. Congress wrote a large check to the Iraqi people, but
the administration still has not delivered it.
Ambassador Bremer spoke of the urgent need for this assistance in the
Senate Appropriations Committee on September 22, 2003:

[[Page S4964]]

This is urgent. . . . Most Iraqis welcomed us as
liberators. Now the reality of foreign troops on the streets
is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us
as occupiers and not liberators. This was perhaps inevitable,
but faster progress on reconstruction will help.

Acting in good faith, the Congress approved this funding 3 weeks
later.
Despite the desperate need for reconstruction assistance in Iraq, the
Bush administration has spent only a small portion of these funds. A
mere 14 percent of the billions provided by Congress last October has
been obligated for reconstruction projects. The administration has not
clearly told the Congress how much has actually been spent. It may not
even know.
According to the most recent report to the Congress from the Office
of Management and Budget: Nearly $3.6 billion was intended for public
works projects, including nearly $3 billion for drinking water, but
only $32 million has been obligated overall, and only $14 million has
been obligated on drinking water; $443 million was intended for
improvements in hospitals and health clinics, but the coalition
government has obligated nothing.
Mr. President, $300 million was designated for health care equipment
and modernization, but nothing has been obligated and $90 million was
designated to build and repair schools, but less than a quarter of it
has been obligated.
Our half-hearted attempt to take the face of America off the
occupation will inevitably exacerbate Ambassador Negroponte's
diplomatic challenges.
Our proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 30th
and take the face of America off the occupation is nothing more than
that--a proposal. It's not even a real transfer of sovereignty.
At the very time we are talking about transferring sovereignty,
President Bush is developing a grandiose plan to build a super embassy
in Baghdad, staffed by 1,000 Americans. We will still have 135,000
American soldiers on the ground in Iraq for the foreseeable future.
The new embassy's significance is clear. This administration wants
Baghdad to be America's new colonial beachhead in the Middle East. As
one American official said it will be just like ``Saigon, circa 1969.''
By comparison, 147 Americans now work at the American Embassy in
Afghanistan, a country with 4 million more people than Iraq; 500
Americans work at the American Embassy in Egypt, a country nearly three
times the population of Iraq; and 293 Americans work at the American
Embassy in India, a country of 1.8 billion people.
In fact, the administration is diverting funds intended for Iraq's
reconstruction to support this Fortress America Embassy. According to
an April 30th article in the Washington Post, $184 million has been
reassigned from drinking water projects to pay for the operations of
the U.S. embassy. Another $29 million has been reallocated from
projects such as democracy building to the administrative expenses of
USAID.
And we wonder why the Iraqis hate us, why hatred for the American
occupation continues to grow.
We all have a stake in Iraq's success--the administration, the
American people, the Iraqi people. Ambassador Negroponte has an
enormous responsibility to ensure that our policy toward Iraq is based
in reality and shaped by the facts on the ground.
As the Ambassador embarks on this new assignment, he must not gloss
over the truth, even if it is painful. He must speak with candor to the
American people and the Iraqi people about America's objectives, our
strategy, and our successes, and he must be equally candid about our
failures.
He would be wise not to follow in the footsteps of so many in the
Bush administration who may have spoken candidly about the bleak
situation in Iraq to the President in private, but who constantly
sought in public to put a positive face on the clear failures.
The stakes are high and the challenges are many. I wish Ambassador
Negroponte great success and the best of luck. He will need both if
America is to succeed in stabilizing Iraq, delivering on our promise of
freedom and democracy, and bringing our troops home with dignity and
honor. I urge my colleagues to approve his nomination.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
Mr. REID. I request the time run equally against both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: Does the Senator
from Iowa have a certain amount of time? And if so, what is that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa has been allocated 20
minutes.
Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate that.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the nomination of John D.
Negroponte to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. I understand and agree
America needs a representative there, more so now than ever. We need
someone in Iraq who has a sterling record, an unassailable record in
terms of his or her support for fundamental human rights and for the
rule of law, someone who has no blot on their career record of having
been involved in the kind of abuses that have come to light recently in
Iraq under our military jurisdiction.
After the terrible revelations of the abuses under our watch at the
prison at Abu Ghraib--more is coming to light in Afghanistan, and we do
not know what is happening in Guantanamo--I believe nominating
Ambassador Negroponte to this vital post would send entirely the wrong
message. He is not the right person for this job at this time.
Why do I say that? Ambassador Negroponte served as U.S. Ambassador to
Honduras from October 1981 through May of 1985. During this time, Mr.
Negroponte showed a callous disregard for human rights abuses through
his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras. I speak of this from
firsthand knowledge. I traveled to Honduras during this period and I
visited one of the Contra camps along the border of Honduras and
Nicaragua with then Ambassador Negroponte. At that time, there were
many allegations that a so-called Battalion 316--which was supervised
and trained by our CIA and by some of our military personnel--had been
involved in some very egregious human rights abuses, including the
disappearances of people, including the disappearance and alleged
torture and murder of a Catholic priest.
At the time of my visit to the camp with Mr. Negroponte, I asked a
number of questions about Battalion 316 and the alleged human rights
abuses. I was told there were no such human rights abuses committed by
the Honduran military. It became clear to me I was misled, and quite
frankly I was not given answers to my questions about the human rights
abuses being committed by Battalion 316. I believe Ambassador
Negroponte knowingly misinformed me and knowingly misinformed the U.S.
State Department about gross violations of human rights in Honduras
during his tenure.
I refer to a series of articles written in the Baltimore Sun in 1995.
A June 19, 1995 article was talking about Ambassador Negroponte.

I will read further from this article:

Why should an experienced U.S. diplomat send false reports
to the State Department concealing damaging information about
the nation he was assigned to? Simple. For one thing, some of
his superiors wanted it that way. They weren't fooled. They
were part of a conspiracy to mislead Congress and the U.S.
public. The Reagan administration, which dispatched Mr.
Negroponte to replace an ambassador who was reporting
unwelcome facts, had an overriding policy objective in
Central America: to stop what it perceived as a threatened
communist takeover. Nothing else mattered.
Mr. Negroponte later told a Senate panel he never saw any
``convincing substantiation'' that the notorious unit was
``involved in death squad type activities.'' If so,

[[Page S4965]]

he outdid the three monkeys who saw no evil, heard no evil
and spoke no evil. The evidence was all around him, including
in his own embassy. A diplomat who tried to write a truthful
human rights report was ordered to remove the damaging
information. More than 300 articles about military abuses
appeared in the Honduran newspapers that year alone. Hundreds
marched through the capital in protests. A dissident Honduran
legislator personally appealed to Mr. Negroponte.

I ask unanimous consent to have the articles from June 19, 1995,
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Baltimore Sun, June 19, 1995]

Hear No Evil, See No Evil . . .

An ambassador, someone cynically once said, is sent abroad
to lie for his country. U.S. career diplomat John D.
Negroponte confused that with lying to his country. As U.S.
ambassador to Honduras during the early '80s, Mr. Negroponte
systematically suppressed reports to Washington describing
kidnappings and murders of political dissidents by a secret
unit of the Honduran army. Instead he was responsible for
false reports to Washington that portrayed the Honduran
regime as committed to democracy and the rule of law.
Why should an experienced U.S. diplomat send false reports
to the State Department concealing damaging information about
the nation he was assigned to? Simple. For one thing, some of
his superiors wanted it that way. They weren't fooled. They
were part of a conspiracy to mislead Congress and the U.S.
public. The Reagan administration, which dispatched Mr.
Negroponte to replace an ambassador who was reporting
unwelcome facts, had an overriding policy objective in
Central America: to stop what it perceived as a threatened
communist takeover. Nothing else mattered.
Each year, U.S. embassies report on human rights abuses and
the State Department passes the information on to Congress.
Nations that consistently violate human rights are barred
from receiving U.S. military aid. By ignoring the clear,
unavoidable evidence that Hondurans were being kidnapped,
tortured, raped and murdered by a special unit under the
command of the army chief of staff, the Reagan administration
was able to boost military aid to Honduras from $3.9 million
in 1980 to $77.4 million four years later.
Mr. Negroponte later told a Senate panel he never saw any
``convincing substantiation'' that the notorious unit was
``involved in death squad type activities.'' If so, he outdid
the three monkeys who saw no evil, heard no evil and spoke no
evil. The evidence was all around him, including in his own
embassy. A diplomat who tried to write a truthful human
rights report was ordered to remove the damaging information.
More than 300 articles about military abuses appeared in
Honduran newspapers that year. Hundreds marched through the
capital in protests. A dissident Honduran legislator
personally appealed to Mr. Negroponte.
In the last of four articles resulting from a 14-month
investigation, Sun reporters Ginger Thompson and Gary Cohn
quote liberally from the 1982 and 1983 human rights reports
on Honduras. Each quotation is matched by persuasive evidence
it is a shameless lie. Even the Honduran government has now
acknowledged the atrocities. But not Mr. Negroponte, the
hard-line cold warrior who considered Henry Kissinger a
softie on Vietnam.
Now ambassador to the Philippines, Mr. Negroponte has
refuse to respond to questions repeatedly directed at him by
The Sun. But he can't ignore pointed questions from President
Clinton, whose personal representative in Manila is Mr.
Negroponte. Despite the State Department's support of Mr.
Negroponte, the president can't possibly want someone of this
ilk representing the U.S. abroad.

Mr. HARKIN. Ambassador Negroponte's reports to his superiors in the
State Department resulted in the Congress being misled as to the scope
and nature of gross human rights violations that were committed by
Battalion 316, an elite U.S trained unit of the Honduran military
involved in some of the worst human rights abuses in Central America.
In a letter to The Economist in 1982, Ambassador Negroponte wrote, it
is simply untrue that death squads have made appearances in Honduras.
This is from our Ambassador to Honduras at the very time death squads
were openly operating in Honduras under Battalion 316. Yet he said it
is untrue that they have made an appearance in Honduras.
We now have history. We now know Mr. Negroponte was not telling us
the truth.
From 1981 to 1984, over 150 people disappeared in Honduras, including
an American priest, Father James Carney. His body has never been
recovered. All indications at that time pointed to Battalion 316. There
had been reports that they interrogated him and he was severely
tortured and killed. I am not suggesting Ambassador Negroponte was
responsible for Father Carney's disappearance. What I am saying,
however, is Ambassador Negroponte turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to
the human rights abuses in Honduras during his watch. During that
period, Ambassador Negroponte was in very close contact, perhaps almost
on a daily basis, with GEN Gustavo Alvarez, the Commander in Chief of
the Honduran military, and the architect of Battalion 316.
For Ambassador Negroponte in 1982 to say it is simply untrue that
death squads have made appearances in Honduras--this is going to be our
Ambassador to Iraq at this time?
In 1989, during a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, on his nomination to be Ambassador to Mexico, Ambassador
Negroponte was questioned about the human rights violations by this
elite battalion which became known as Battalion 316. His response was
that he had ``never seen any convincing substantiation they were
involved in death-squad type activities.'' Yet, as a Baltimore Sun
article pointed out, the evidence was all around him, including in his
own embassy. A diplomat who tried to write a truthful human rights
report was ordered to remove the damaging information, and Mr.
Negroponte was the Ambassador at that time.
Mr. President, the Baltimore Sun, in 1995, devoted a series of
articles on what happened in Honduras and what happened in terms of Mr.
Negroponte's involvement at that time. For the benefit of those who
might want to read the Record and catch up on Mr. Negroponte's past and
what he did while he was Ambassador to Honduras, I commend these
articles to them.
Mr. President, I think it should be clear to all of us why human
rights questions and concerns should be at the forefront of today's
debate and why someone with the background of Mr. Negroponte is not the
right person to send to Iraq, because it is going to come out, it will
come out about Mr. Negroponte's involvement with Battalion 316. It will
come out about Mr. Negroponte's efforts in Honduras to suppress
information Congress needed at that time. It will come out that Mr.
Negroponte was untruthful to his superiors at the State Department. It
should be clear to us why he should not go there at this time.
We are shocked and shaken by the pictures of abuse against Iraqis at
the hands of U.S. personnel. Our image as a country is at stake. But it
is not just our image, it is the very essence of our Nation, our
fundamental respect for human rights, our fundamental respect for the
dignity and worth of each individual, the essence of what we are trying
to tell the world, that we are for freedom, that we are for individual
liberties, that we oppose torture in all its forms. There is no reason
why people should be tortured in prisons, and we should not be involved
in it.
The photographs we have seen also have a personal association for me.
When I first saw these pictures, I was taken back in time--34 years to
be exact--to 1970, July of 1970, when I was a staff person in the House
of Representatives, and I was sent with a commission to Vietnam.
We had heard all these reports about these tiger cages in which
people were brutally tortured, killed. Our State Department denied
their existence, our military denied the existence of them; these were
all just Communist conspiracy stories.
Well, I had heard enough about them and others had heard enough about
them that I began to look into it, and because of some luck, because of
the courage of Congressman William Anderson of Tennessee,
and Congressman Augustus Hawkins of California, a young man by the name
of Don Luce, and the bravery of a young Vietnamese man who gave us the
maps on how to find this prison, we were able to uncover the notorious
tiger cages on Con Son Island.

Fortunately, I had a camera. Fortunately, I had a hidden tape
recorder. Because when I came back and we reported on this, we were
told they were not that bad. Well, then LIFE magazine published my
pictures and the world saw how bad they really were. North Vietnamese,
Vietcong, and civilian opponents of the war in South Vietnam were all
bunched into these tiger cages, in clear violation of human rights,
fundamental human rights, and in clear violation of the Geneva
Convention. We had been asking the North

[[Page S4966]]

Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva Convention in terms of their
treatment of our prisoners in North Vietnam. Yet, here we were
condoning, supervising, the very same kind of abuses of people, in
clear violation of the Geneva Convention.
Well, then I was told, well, as to what these people were telling
me--because the interpreter was pro-Communist--that he was telling me
the wrong things, because I did not speak Vietnamese, you see. I did
not speak Vietnamese, and they said the person interpreting for me had
a bias toward the Communists, so I could not believe what I was being
told. So they sent another group over to hear all these glowing
reports. What they did not know at the time is that I had a hidden tape
recorder. No one knew that except me. I tape recorded everything that
was said.
I was fired from my job. I was told I would never again work in the
U.S. Congress because of my actions in letting these pictures out and
telling the truth about what was happening on Con Son Island. I was
brought before a congressional committee and was charged that what I
was reporting was false because I did not speak Vietnamese, and that my
interpreter was a well-known ``Communist sympathizer.'' But I had my
tape recorder and I taped everything that was said.
I turned it over to the Library of Congress to transcribe, and they
transcribed every single word. Not only what I had been saying was
confirmed, but there was even more on the recording that was not
interpreted for me, more evidence of the cruel, torturous conditions in
these tiger cages, how people had been tortured and killed, and how we,
the U.S. Government, had provided not only the funding but the
supervision for these prisons.
So when I saw these pictures from Iraq, it brought back Con Son
Island and the tiger cages. I thought we had learned our lesson. Yes,
war is not a nice thing. War is terrible. But that is why we have
Geneva Conventions. That is why we have these international treaties. I
thought we learned after Con Son and the tiger cages that we ought not
to be involved in those things, that we ought to make sure whoever runs
these prisons, whoever has charge of prisoners of war, treats the
prisoners according to the Geneva Convention. Yet here we are back
again--34 years later--and we see the same kinds of things happening in
this prison.
I do not know who took those pictures. I read in the paper today it
was a young man and that he may be in some serious trouble. Well,
whoever took those pictures, I want them to know they have a friend and
an ally in this Senator from Iowa. I will do whatever I can to ensure
that no harm in any way comes to them, that they are able to speak out
without fear of any reprisal about what they saw and what went on in
those prisons.
We have to let the sunlight in--the best disinfectant. Let's show it
for what it was. Let's show what happened there. And let's tell the
world, once again, that we are going to make sure we have in place
policies, programs, things that will never let this happen again.
The lead editorial in this morning's Washington Post made it very
clear when they said:

Beginning more than two years ago, Mr. Rumsfeld decided to
overturn decades of previous practice by the U.S. military in
its handling of detainees in foreign countries. His Pentagon
ruled that the United States would no longer be bound by the
Geneva Conventions; that Army regulations on the
interrogation of prisoners would not be observed; and that
many detainees would be held incommunicado and without any
independent mechanism of review. Abuses will take place in
any prison system. But Mr. Rumsfeld's decisions helped create
a lawless regime in which prisoners in both Iraq and
Afghanistan have been humiliated, beaten, tortured, and
murdered--and in which, until recently, no one has been held
accountable.

I agree with those who want a full investigation. I believe we should
investigate. But I don't want to see this just pinned on a few soldiers
at the bottom. Yes, they have to be held responsible, too. No military
person has to follow an illegitimate order of anyone placed in
authority above him or her. These were illegitimate orders. If they
were ordered to do such things, who gave those orders? Who supervised
it? How far up the chain of command did it go?
The bottom line is, the Constitution of the United States puts a
civilian in charge of our military. It is that civilian, by his or her
actions, statements, policies, programs, that filter down to that
private, that sergeant out in the field. Mr. Rumsfeld, because of his
actions and his statements and his policies during his tenure as
Secretary of Defense, is ultimately responsible. That is why I have
called today for his resignation. If he doesn't resign, the President
of the United States should dismiss him forthwith.
Seeing no one else asking for time on the floor, I ask unanimous
consent that I have an additional 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. Because of what has happened, and for our country, we
speak of patriotism a lot, patriotism of our brave soldiers and airmen
and seamen in Iraq and around the world, the patriotism of those in our
country who fight for justice, fight for those less fortunate.
Patriotism takes on a lot of different forms. I think Mr. Rumsfeld has
to show some patriotism. He has to put the good of his country above
his own self-interest and his own self-esteem. It is time for him to
recognize that we need a new Secretary of Defense to change the
policies and the programs that Mr. Rumsfeld instituted, that, as the
Washington Post editorial said, led to this kind of a situation.
I ask unanimous consent that the editorial in the Washington Post
this morning, May 6, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 6, 2004]

Mr. Rumsfeld's Responsibility

The horrific abuses by American interrogators and guards at
the Abu Ghraib prison and at other facilities maintained by
the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan can be traced, in
part, to policy decisions and public statements of Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. Beginning more than two years
ago, Mr. Rumsfeld decided to overturn decades of previous
practice by the U.S. military in its handling of detainees in
foreign countries. His Pentagon ruled that the United States
would no longer be bound by the Geneva Conventions; that Army
regulations on the interrogation of prisoners would not be
observed; and that many detainees would be held incommunicado
and without any independent mechanism of review. Abuses will
take place in any prison system. But Mr. Rumsfeld's decisions
helped create a lawless regime in which prisoners in both
Iraq and Afghanistan have been humiliated, beaten, tortured
and murdered--and in which, until recently, no one has been
held accountable.
The lawlessness began in January 2002 when Mr. Rumsfeld
publicly declared that hundreds of people detained by U.S.
and allied forces in Afghanistan ``do not have any rights''
under the Geneva Conventions. That was not the case: At a
minimum, all those arrested in the war zone were entitled
under the conventions to a formal hearing to determine
whether they were prisoners of war or unlawful combatants. No
such hearings were held, but then Mr. Rumsfeld made clear
that U.S. observance of the convention was now optional.
Prisoners, he said, would be treated ``for the most part'' in
``a manner that is reasonably consistent'' with the
conventions--which, the secretary breezily suggested, was
outdated.
In one important respect, Mr. Rumsfeld was correct: Not
only could captured al Qaeda members be legitimately deprived
of Geneva Convention guarantees (once the required hearing
was held) but such treatment was in many cases necessary to
obtain vital intelligence and prevent terrorists from
communicating with confederates abroad. But if the United
States was to resort to that exceptional practice, Mr.
Rumsfeld should have established procedures to ensure that it
did so without violating international conventions against
torture and that only suspects who truly needed such
extraordinary handling were treated that way. Outside
controls or independent reviews could have provided such
safeguards. Instead, Mr. Rumsfeld allowed detainees to be
indiscriminately designated as beyond the law--and made
humane treatment dependent on the goodwill of U.S. personnel.
Much of what has happened at the U.S. detention center in
Guantanamo Bay is shrouded in secrecy. But according to an
official Army report, a system was established at the camp
under which military guards were expected to ``set the
conditions'' for intelligence investigations. The report by
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba says the system was later
introduced at military facilities at Bagram airbase in
Afghanistan and the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, even though it
violates Army regulations forbidding guards to participate in
interrogations.
The Taguba report and others by human rights groups reveal
that the detention system Mr. Rumsfeld oversees has become so
grossly distorted that military police have abused or
tortured prisoners under the direction of civilian
contractors and intelligence officers outside the military
chain of command--not in ``exceptional'' cases, as Mr.

[[Page S4967]]

Rumsfeld said Tuesday, but systematically. Army guards have
held ``ghost'' prisoners detained by the CIA and even hidden
these prisoners from the International Red Cross. Meanwhile,
Mr. Rumsfeld's contempt for the Geneva Conventions has
trickled down: The Taguba report says that guards at Abu
Ghraib had not been instructed on them and that no copies
were posted in the facility.
The abuses that have done so much harm to the U.S. mission
in Iraq might have been prevented had Mr. Rumsfeld been
responsive to earlier reports of violations. Instead, he
publicly dismissed or minimized such accounts. He and his
staff ignored detailed reports by respected human rights
groups about criminal activity at U.S.-run prisons in
Afghanistan, and they refused to provide access to facilities
or respond to most questions. In December 2002, two Afghan
detainees died in events that were ruled homicides by medical
officials; only when the New York Times obtained the story
did the Pentagon confirm that an investigation was underway,
and no results have yet been announced. Not until other media
obtained the photos from Abu Ghraib did Mr. Rumsfeld fully
acknowledge what had happened, and not until Tuesday did his
department disclose that 25 prisoners have died in U.S.
custody in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accountability for those
deaths has been virtually nonexistent: One soldier was
punished with a dishonorable discharge.
On Monday Mr. Rumsfeld's spokesman said that the secretary
had not read Mr. Taguba's report, which was completed in
early March. Yesterday Mr. Rumsfeld told a television
interviewer that he still hadn't finished reading it, and he
repeated his view that the Geneva Conventions ``did not
precisely apply'' but were only ``basic rules'' for handling
prisoners. His message remains the same: that the United
States need not be bound by international law and that the
crimes Mr. Taguba reported are not, for him, a priority. That
attitude has undermined the American military's observance of
basic human rights and damaged this country's ability to
prevail in the war on terrorism.

Mr. HARKIN. We are all upset about what happened. Our country was
founded on the principles of democracy, the inalienable rights of
individuals. We were right to condemn Saddam Hussein for his state-
sponsored torture in Iraq. We are right to condemn anyone, whether it
is in Uganda or those who led the Rwandan massacre, the generals who
now run Burma, or those who set up the Soviet gulags during that long
cold war where so many were tortured and killed by the Soviets. We have
always been right to speak out against those and to do what we can to
uphold the inalienable rights of individuals. We are not perfect. No
country is; no individual is. But our obligation is to make sure that
when this country makes a mistake, we right it. We don't try to cover
it up. We don't try to excuse it. We bring it out, show it for what it
is, and then institute policies, programs, procedures to make sure that
human rights abuses under our watch will never happen again.
The bravery of our men and women in Iraq, under intolerable
conditions, is a source of pride to all of us. As Senator Kennedy said,
what has happened with these pictures, these terrible human rights
abuses, I believe, has to pain our wonderful young men and women in
uniform more than it pains us. Most of them, I am sure, are as abhorred
by this as we are. I know they are wondering how something like this
could have happened. It has to be demoralizing for our military as it
is demoralizing for us. That is why 34 years ago, when the pictures of
the tiger cages came out, it led to reforms. I believe it helped lead
to the end of that terrible conflict in Vietnam and brought our troops
home.
I hope these pictures, as awful as they are, about what happened in
the Abu Ghraib prison, will now provoke us to act, to straighten out
the system, to make sure this does not happen again.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used his additional 5 minutes.
Mr. HARKIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. I believe that our President has to apologize to the
Iraqi people. He went on television yesterday. As I understand from all
the articles I read, he gave a slight slap on the wrist to Secretary
Rumsfeld and said he still supported him. I am sorry. Sometimes it
takes a big person to admit wrong and to apologize. I believe that is
what we need to do for the Iraqi people, to let them know, not by words
but by deeds, that this does not reflect who we are as a people. We are
better than that. We are bigger than that.
Because of what has happened, because of the pall this has cast over
our involvement in Iraq, for those reasons and for the history of John
Negroponte and what he did during his tenure in Honduras during a time
of gross violations of human rights, he should not be the highest
ranking diplomat in Iraq. I suppose the skids are greased for him to
get this appointment. But I don't think there are too many here who
remember Mr. Negroponte and what he did in Honduras, but I don't
forget. I don't forget what happened there. I don't forget that Mr.
Negroponte was one of those individuals closely aligned with General
Gustavo Alvarez and Battalion 316. I don't forget that it was Mr.
Negroponte who turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to the human rights
abuses in Honduras at that time.
So to send Mr. Negroponte to Iraq would send entirely the wrong
message at this time.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time
under the quorum call be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call roll.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed
to speak for 5 minutes using the time that Senator Levin had.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, at 5 o'clock we are going to vote on
whether to confirm Mr. Negroponte to be our Ambassador. I want to make
clear a couple of points. I voted against Mr. Negroponte for the very
issues Senator Harkin talked about in his history when he was in Latin
America, during what I believed to be a massive coverup of human rights
abuses, which was very troubling. When Mr. Negroponte went there, there
was a meeting with him and I said: You are now in a new job, and
although I am not voting for you, I want to work with you. We did work
together on a treaty banning child soldiers. He worked very well with
us on that. There were times when I called him to talk about issues of
concern and he was very accommodating.
I am going to vote for him today to give him another chance at a job
that is so dangerous and so worrisome, because we have a policy in Iraq
that is not working. He is willing to go there. I give him tremendous
credit for that and I give credit to his family. I also think his ties
with people in the United Nations, as we try to get more nations
involved, could be helpful. I am not sure, but it could be helpful.
I want to express my reservation, now that we see on the agenda of
the United States of America one of the worst scandals I think we have
seen in a very long time--this prison scandal, which has such enormous
ramifications. As one of my colleagues said, it has undone a thousand
gestures of kindness and goodness our troops have demonstrated to the
Iraqi people and to the people of Afghanistan.
People say, Senator, you should not vote for Mr. Negroponte because
now we have this other human rights scandal. Well, I feel Mr.
Negroponte knows we are watching everything now. America has a way of
getting to the truth. The other day I made a speech about making sure
that truth will not be a casualty of this war. We need to know the
truth. I can tell you, I have never seen anything uglier.
When the press came to me and asked how I am going to vote for Mr.
Negroponte, I said I want to give him this opportunity. I also feel we
ought to be looking to the Commander in Chief right now.
It isn't Mr. Negroponte who is responsible for what has gone on here.
It

[[Page S4968]]

is, in the end, the Commander in Chief, and I wish this Commander in
Chief would do what others of both political parties did and step up to
the plate and admit it. We all make mistakes. God knows I have made
many. We do not like to admit them because it shows our fallibility,
perhaps our lack of wisdom or experience. But in the end, you have to
do that.
There have been so many mistakes made since this Iraq situation
turned into the nightmare that it is--and let me put it right on the
table because I do not come to this table without a certain point of
view. I did not vote to go it alone in this war. I worried about going
it alone in this war. Now we have to ask ourselves, whether we voted
for it or against it, what do we do now? Of course, that is the
important question. And what mistakes have been made? There are so many
mistakes.
The military campaign was brilliant.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mrs. BOXER. I ask for an additional 2 minutes per side, and I will
finish up. Excuse me, I ask if I can have an additional 5 minutes from
leader time, and then I will finish up.
Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, 5 minutes?
Mrs. BOXER. Yes, and I will be done.
Mr. McCAIN. I do not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I see Senator McCain here, one of our
heroes in America. He is my chairman and friend. I went over to him one
day--I don't know if he remembers this. I was so worried about this
war, and he said something that turned out to be true. He said: It will
be over in 2 weeks. He was right, in essence. It was maybe a little
longer. That first military campaign was brilliant. And I said: But,
Senator, I am worried about how many we are going to lose.
He said: It's going to be OK, Barbara.
He was right. But there wasn't a plan in place after that, and we all
know that. Yet when the President was asked by the press, Did you ever
make any mistakes, couldn't he think of that one?
Dick Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Biden, Senator Hagel, Senator Kerry, Senator Dodd, Senator Chafee,
myself, and others on the Foreign Relations Committee came together and
said: Where is the plan? We said that before the first shot was fired.
So that was a mistake.
Then when the President landed on the carrier and he said major
combat was over, ``Mission Accomplished'' behind him, that was a
mistake.
Then when the world said--after that moment, we had them in our hands
that day, the whole world when the President landed on that carrier:
Can we help you in Iraq? The President said: If you did not go in with
us, you cannot rebuild; you are not getting anything. So the spoils of
the war were not going to be shared with anyone except those who went
into Iraq. It was a mistake in the end. We would have had everyone in
there with us. It would have been different.
When the United Nations building was blown up, an opportunity to say
then and show leadership that this has turned into a war against terror
and the terrorists are here now--and by the way, they were not before.
We know that from State Department documents. They are there now. We
had an opportunity to say: United Nations, you have been attacked; come
with us. We did not do that.

Now this horrific vision in these prisons. I heard one commentator
say: What about the vision of the Americans who were slaughtered and
hung on the bridges? Yes, sickening, horrifying, hellish. We cannot go
down that road because this is America.
When I was growing up, I knew America was different. This editorial
that ran today in the Washington Post opened up my mind because I did
not call for anybody's firing. I think the Commander in Chief is
responsible, and he has to decide who he is holding responsible. This
is an interesting editorial. It said, When did the trouble start? It is
when Don Rumsfeld, and I assume with the permission of the President,
said: We are not going to pay any attention to the Geneva Convention.
None of these rules are going to apply. And now what has happened?
We don't know all the details, but if it is true, and we do not know
that yet, what we see in the paper--and these are real photographs--I
do not know that for sure, but if it is true, what we are seeing is
something that has stained this country, that has burdened this country
and scarred this country, that has undermined everything in which we
all believe, Democrats, Republicans, Independents, Greens. It does not
matter what party; it is about America.
I think it is mistake after mistake after mistake after mistake after
mistake. What do we do now? I think Joe Biden has great ideas on that.
He says the Iraqi people have to want democracy as much as we want it
for them. I do believe it is time to test that. We are sending our
people into a caldron. We cannot keep going down this course. We have
to modify it and change it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator
from California be allowed 2 additional minutes to finish up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, as usual, my friend is very generous of
spirit.
Stay the course, modify the course, change the course--we need to
change the dynamics of this. Some have suggested tearing down the
prison. I think that might be an excellent idea to show our remorse,
our sorrow, and our outrage. They say a picture is worth a thousand
words. These pictures say terrible things, and we by our actions have
to undo those pictures.
My understanding is that a lot of these people who were conducting
themselves in this atrocious fashion were kids. They were never
trained. They did not understand. They were told: Just do whatever you
have to do to get people to talk.
I do not know if that is all true. We will get to the bottom of it.
But one thing I do know is, you do not stay on a course when it is not
working. We have lost over 700 of our beautiful people, some young, 18,
19, some 30, 40 years old leaving behind children. Some 3,000 plus have
been wounded. And why doesn't Paul Wolfowitz know these numbers? What
is wrong with him that he doesn't know these numbers? It is wrong.
These are lives. These young people are not just some faceless,
nameless cutout of a soldier.
Mr. President, I am so filled with sadness. Every time I come to the
Senate floor to read the name of Californians who have died--I know
they are the best.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mrs. BOXER. My word to them is: You are the best, and we will get to
the bottom of this.
Mr. President, I thank Senator McCain for his generosity.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from California. I do
remember our conversation. I also remember she and I discussed the fact
that the post-conflict era was going to be extremely difficult. She
made a very balanced statement today, and I thank her for that as we
all go through this very difficult time in the history of our country.
Mr. President, we will be having a hearing tomorrow with Secretary
Rumsfeld, and after that hearing, a lot of us, I hope, will be better
informed, not just members of the committee, but others will be better
informed as to the dimensions of this terrible situation which we have
seen so graphically demonstrated on the abuse of human rights.
I also am convinced again that the sooner we get this issue resolved
and move forward and make sure it never happens again, it is very
important because we have to go about the business of winning this
conflict. We cannot let this terrible situation, as tragic as it is,
divert us from our purpose of winning this conflict which we cannot
afford to lose. We have plenty of time to debate and discuss that in
the future.
I also would like to comment on my friend John Negroponte. I have
known John Negroponte ever since he was ambassador to Mexico, where he
did an outstanding job. He has held a broad variety of positions in
both Republican and Democrat administrations. I believe he will perform
admirably in the

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position for which the President of the United States has nominated
him.
There probably would have been a lot less discussion about Mr.
Negroponte's qualifications if it had not been for the difficulties we
are experiencing in Iraq at the moment, but I would also point out it
also lends some urgency to getting this highly qualified, patriotic
American in position as we prepare to turn over the government of Iraq
to the Iraqi people, which I think all of us are in agreement should be
done as quickly as possible.