[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 62 (Thursday, May 6, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H2663-H2666]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2443, COAST GUARD AND MARITIME
TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 2003
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2443) to authorize appropriations for
the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2004, to amend various laws
administered by the Coast Guard, and for other purposes, with Senate
amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the
conference asked by the Senate.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Filner
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Filner moves that the managers on the part of the House
at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
on the bill (H.R. 2443) to authorize appropriations for the
Coast Guard for fiscal year 2004, to amend various laws
administered by the Coast Guard, and for other purposes, be
instructed to insist on the language contained in section 415
of the House bill that requires foreign-flag vessels to have
their vessel security plans approved by the United States
Coast Guard before entering a port in the United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Filner) will be recognized for 30 minutes and the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo) will be recognized for 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The motion that the House has before it is really very simple. It
instructs the House conferees on the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act to insist on our House provision on section 415.
Section 415 simply clarifies that all foreign-flag vessels that may be
involved in a security incident in the United States must submit their
vessel security plans to the Coast Guard for their review and approval
before they enter the United States. It is pretty simple. We are trying
to make sure that we do not have a terrorist incident caused by a ship
coming to our shores.
We have seen clear evidence that terrorists have the means and
capability to use vessels as a weapon. We all know about the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole. Most recently, insurgents in Iraq blew up their boat
filled with explosives when a U.S. boarding team tried to inspect their
vessel. Two members of our Navy and one member of the Coast Guard died
in that attack.
When this Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act
in November of 2002, foreign vessel owners were clearly required to
submit vessel security plans to the United States Coast Guard. They
were prohibited from operating after July 1 of this year if those plans
were not approved and if they were not operating in accordance with
those plans. But in the month after this MTSA, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, was enacted, the Coast Guard went to
London and agreed to amendments to the Safety of Life At Sea Convention
to require security standards for all vessels engaged in international
trade. These amendments are called the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code, or as we refer to them, the ISPS Code.
The Coast Guard never told Congress that they were intending to
overturn the new security law by allowing foreign-flag vessels to enter
the United States if their security plans were approved not by the
Coast Guard but by the government in which the ship is flagged. As many
Members know, thousands of ship owners choose to register their ships
in so-called ``flag of convenience'' countries. The ship owners do this
to save money because they know that these governments flaunt
international law by not enforcing the international maritime
conventions to which they are a party.
Mr. Speaker, our Nation has learned a great deal about terrorism
since 9/11. One thing we have clearly learned is that not every nation
in the world is our friend. Each day hundreds of ships enter U.S. ports
with dangerous and hazardous cargoes. A weapon of mass destruction, a
biological agent could easily be smuggled aboard a vessel in a foreign
port. Look at some of the largest registries in the world, like Panama,
Malta and Cyprus, and you will find vessels that are often detained by
the Coast Guard for violations of international safety laws. Now we
expect those same governments to protect U.S. citizens by making sure
that their vessels have adequately implemented security plans? Give me
a break! I for one am not willing to delegate our security
responsibilities to the governments of Panama or Malta or Cyprus.
I raised this issue with the Coast Guard at two separate hearings.
The Coast Guard argued that they do not have the resources to approve
the security plans for the thousands of foreign-flag vessels that come
to our country. I have a simple thing to say, as I said to the
commandant: send us a budget request, and we will fight for every
nickel you need to review and approve the foreign vessel security
plans. The resources will be there if you ask for them. But do not
compromise the security of our coastal communities and our whole Nation
by placing our security in the hands of these foreign governments.
When Congress wrote the Maritime Transportation Security Act in 2002,
we realized that it is up to the United States Government through the
United States Coast Guard to protect our citizens. I urge my
colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to support the motion to instruct the
conferees on H.R. 2443 to insist on the House provisions requiring all
foreign-flag vessels, any one of which may
[[Page H2664]]
be a potential terrorist threat, to submit their security plans to the
Coast Guard for review and approval before they enter the United
States. We ask this in law. We ask now to reinforce the law.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
On behalf of Chairman Young and myself, I have a couple of remarks
about this motion. We support section 415 and allowed it to be included
in the House bill with the agreement that we would continue to work to
improve the language. It is very important that we ensure that all
vessels, including foreign vessels, have security plans. However, to
protect the United States, we need to support the Coast Guard's efforts
as they board and inspect vessels coming into U.S. waters.
However, the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security have
expressed strong concerns about the current House language. They are
concerned about requiring submission and secretarial approval of all
foreign vessel security plans. They are concerned that this requirement
could undermine extensive progress on vessel security planning already
made in the international arena and would impose an unsupportable
resource drain on the Coast Guard. They are concerned that this could
conflict with provisions of the Safety of Life At Sea Convention and
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. This would
place the United States at a significant disadvantage when demanding
that other nations comply with their responsibilities and would
significantly degrade our ability to negotiate new international
requirements.
Additionally, other nations could retaliate and demand to review and
approve U.S. security plans before our vessels were allowed to trade in
their ports. I believe that this is a real danger. Ultimately, the
sharing of sensitive U.S. vessel security plans with all nations may
not be in the best interests of our own national security. I would like
to continue to explore whether acceptance of foreign vessel security
plans approved under the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code with aggressive Coast Guard verification and enforcement might
better achieve our national maritime security goals.
There is concern that the number of plans that could potentially be
subject to review is staggering. Worldwide, there are approximately
40,000 vessels required to have security plans. If section 415 were
enacted, the Coast Guard would be required to review the security plan
of each of these vessels that wanted to visit the United States. In
recent years, approximately 8,000 vessels per year have visited the
United States, making roughly 50,000 port calls.
{time} 1100
Without significant additional resources, our diversion of resources
from some other area, the Coast Guard could not accomplish this review
and approval process in a timely manner. The cost of this effort would
be substantial, and the Coast Guard is not funded in this effort.
The gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young) and I pledge to continue to
work with our colleagues and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr.
Oberstar), the Democratic ranking member, and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Filner) to address their concerns on this homeland
security issue.
Today we will support this motion, but would strongly recommend that
we continue to discuss this issue with the Coast Guard and the maritime
shipping industry and our colleagues in the other body to improve and
merge our other bills to ensure that the country and our security is
protected.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I was a little surprised the gentleman was going to accept the motion
after speaking out against it, but I appreciate that, and I hope we
fight for this at the conference committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me
this time.
I was just meeting with some constituents in my office, and when I
came in I heard the chairman speaking, and it sounded to me as though
he was strongly opposed to our motion to instruct to better protect our
ports and national security, but apparently from what I heard, he is
going to support the motion. So I am a little confused.
But let me make the points that I think need to be made about this.
We have a law, a national law, a law in the United States of America,
that says under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, that foreign-
flagged, that is, vessels that sail to the United States many times
with very obscure ownership, in fact, the way international maritime
law works, Osama bin Laden could very well own some of these
freighters, but we would not be able to find that out.
So we are working on that problem and the Coast Guard has made some
slight progress, but not enough in terms of lifting the veil of secrecy
around who actually owns these ships, which I think is essential to our
national security, but in the interim under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, these foreign-flagged ships of unknown ownership with
crews who are not very well identified, that is, there are no foolproof
counterfeit-proof IDs or certification for the crews, many of them have
false documents, many of them are of a dubious lineage, no security
checks that are meaningfully conducted on those people, are cruising in
and out of the ports of the United States, and what we have today is a
little better than before 9-11.
Proposals I had made subsequent to a ship accident have been
implemented by the Coast Guard to hold the vessels that are in
international align and to require manifests and other things and do
boardings when they think they are necessary, and that is all well and
good. But the Maritime Transportation Security Act goes one step
further. They are supposed to have a plan that has been approved by the
United States Coast Guard, these foreign-flagged vessels of uncertain
lineage. Now, the issue before us is are we going to allow foreign
classification societies, flags of convenience, and others to certify
these plans in foreign languages with no review by the Coast Guard and
just assume that everything is hunky-dory? That is really the issue
that is before us.
I mean, let us take Liberia, for instance. There is no government in
Liberia, pretty plain and simple, but they are a major flag of
convenience for these freighters, these freighters which may be owned
by Osama bin Laden. We really do not know. But they are done in an
obscure way through nonexistent countries like Liberia. They exist, but
they do not have a functioning government. They certainly do not have a
Coast Guard. In fact, the government of Liberia, I think, recently
moved. They were in Reston. I think they moved somewhere else in
Virginia. They have a bunch of ex-Coast Guard people who are running
their registry, which is just a for-profit thing they do, a flag of
convenience, so that vessel owners, whoever they might be, can avoid
the strictures of U.S. law for crewing and for safety and a whole host
of other reasons.
I have never been comfortable with this arrangement, but I am
particularly uncomfortable with an arrangement where the nonexistent
government of Liberia will be certifying vessel security plans without
any review by the Coast Guard, except perhaps the retired Coast Guard
who are being paid a fabulous salary to pretend that there is a
government in Liberia and that they are processing these plans on
behalf of that government.
That is the situation we are confronted with. This does not give me
great comfort. And, in fact, the international standards say, well,
these nonexistent governments of Liberia, or its substandard performers
like Panama, Malta, and Cyprus, again, all who are just trying to make
money on flagging ships, and if they get tough with those people, like
make them have an actual real vessel security plan, really certify the
crews, well, they will just go to another country or so-called country,
as in the case of Liberia, and get a flag from them for a few bucks
more or less.
That is what it is all about. They are trying to avoid safety,
security, crewing requirements, and all that. And this becomes to me
another major security loophole for the United States of
[[Page H2665]]
America to say that Malta, Cyprus, Liberia, who do not care about the
interests of the United States in these matters, would certify in
foreign languages these vessel security plans. This is not adequate. It
does not meet laws that were enacted with, I think, virtually unanimous
support of the United States Congress under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. They undermine the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
And then as I came in, I heard my chairman, with whom I have tremendous
respect and he is a great advocate for the Coast Guard and he has
helped them get more money, saying if we made the Coast Guard review
these plans, they would not have enough people. They would need more
resources.
Then let us ask for the resources. This is a pattern I keep hearing
from the administration. Yesterday I was at a hearing with the
Transportation Security Administration folks, and we were raising
concerns about rail and port security in the Railroads Subcommittee,
and I said, Look, just be honest with us. Tell us you do not have
enough people and you need more money. And they cannot do that because
the political minders down at the White House are watching them. They
cannot ask for more money for homeland security. We cannot ask for
enough money to help the Coast Guard. I mean, the Coast Guard could
contract this out if they do not have the staff, and the administration
loves contracting out. We could hire a firm, a U.S. firm, who has
security credentials or something else to certify these plans. But to
allow Liberia, which does not have a government, to approve these plans
of ships of unknown lineage and ownership in foreign languages and say
that meets U.S. law, that is providing optimal homeland security for
the United States of America, is absolutely wrong.
So I hope that the ranking member was right in saying that the
chairman will support this. I hope he will and I hope he will not just
support it with his vote, but he will support it wholeheartedly through
conference. We need these protections for homeland security. And if it
is a matter of a few more dollars, then let us ask for that money so we
do it compliant with our law and not with a loophole-ridden
international organization that does not give a darn about U.S.
security.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I thank the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio) for his comments. The
gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young) and I do support this, but as we have
worked through the committee all along in a very strong bipartisan way,
we are expressing that there are some legitimate concerns such as our
turning over our vessel security plans to this nonexistent government
of Liberia. These are things that we should be talking about. These are
things that we want to talk about so that in the end the final product
that we have is a product that will ensure our national and homeland
security.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I have been informed that there are no ships
with American flags going to Liberia.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), ranking member of the full Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, ranking member, for
his stout defense of the committee position and for his splendid
service, and I also wanted to express my great appreciation to the
gentleman from Alaska, the chairman of the full committee, who has,
from his first day in this body, been a stout defender and advocate of
the U.S. Coast Guard. He sometimes calls it ``my Coast Guard,'' and
rightly so, because Alaska has the largest coastline to protect in all
of the Coast Guard's work.
And I have enormous respect for the gentleman from New Jersey, who
has one of the largest Coast Guard facilities, perhaps the largest in
his district, who has chaired the subcommittee with great distinction.
But I must say I am disappointed in the Coast Guard and in the
administration, whoever it is. It is uncertain. The Coast Guard has
been shifted from the Department of Transportation to the Department of
Homeland Security. We hardly know who is the Secretary to whom they
report for all the various functions of the Coast Guard, or whether
this message is coming from the White House or the Office of Management
and Budget. Whatever it is, the Coast Guard is on the wrong track.
We passed the port security bill, known as the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, in November, 2002, hard on the heels of
all of the horrific events of September 11 and in the spirit of vastly
improving security in all of the modes of transportation. We had
extensive discussion, debate within our committee, all aimed at one
objective, protecting transportation in America from terrorist threats.
Every step of the way, the purpose was to elevate security in
transportation, make it substantially better, not just an increment,
not just a little step better. And I was at the White House for the
signing of the bill. I think the gentleman from New Jersey was there as
well, as I recall. A delegation from the other body was there.
The President was very proud of that bill. Hardly was the Coast Guard
involved in the International Maritime Organization negotiations on the
Safety at Sea law, negotiating something that really undercuts a main
thrust of this legislation. When we crafted this bill, the MTSA, the
original law, I drew on our experience in aviation in the aftermath of
Pan Am 103. I served on that commission with the gentleman from
Arkansas, Mr. Hammerschmidt, and one of the great failings we saw was
that the United States really did not have the ability to go into
foreign countries' aviation programs and see whether they had a strong
security program, whether they were doing security inspections and
screening of passengers, screening of luggage, screening of mail, as we
were doing and as we were proposing to do in even stronger fashion; so
we crafted in that legislation language to establish foreign security
liaison officers within the FAA in foreign countries with the authority
to go in and inspect, with the authority to look at aviation security
plans of foreign governments.
And I took that theme and introduced it into our Maritime
Transportation Security Act. It was missing one word. I sort of take
the responsibility for it. We did not put the word ``foreign'' vessel,
thinking that was pretty clear that vessels coming into U.S. ports that
are suspect would be from other countries. The Coast Guard went and
negotiated away that power of the U.S. to inspect the security plans of
other countries and to see whether vessels operating under a foreign
flag were in compliance with the security plan of the country of
registry of that vessel.
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Well, seeing that shortcoming, in the course of hearings that the
chairman of the committee conducted, the issue came up. It was raised
by members on both sides in the course of our hearings. So the language
was tightened up, just to make it very clear we would have the ability
to inspect, that the Coast Guard have the ability to inspect, the
security plans of foreign governments.
Now, why is that a concern? Because this is the document that the
U.S. Coast Guard negotiated, the Safety of Actions At Sea. It was 17
December 2002, and the relevant language, ``Ship security plans are not
subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by a contracting
government to carry out control compliance measures in accordance with
regulations specified in section 9.8.1.''
Here is section 9.8.1. ``Officers,'' meaning U.S. Coast Guard in this
case, ``will have limited access to the specific section of the plan
allowed in the exception, only with the consent of the contracting
government,'' meaning Malta, Liberia, Panama, the Philippines, ``or the
master of the ship concerned. Parts of the code are considered as
confidential and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise
agreed by the contracting governments concerned.''
Did our President not say, the President of the United States say,
and has he not said repeatedly, ``I will never ask permission of the
United Nations to defend the United States. I will never ask permission
of a foreign government to protect the citizens of the United States.
We are not going with a permission slip''?
[[Page H2666]]
This is a permission slip. This is what has been agreed to. I heard
what the chairman said, that, oh, if we insist on protecting our
interests, then other governments will insist on inspecting security
plans of the United States.
We have only 37 American-flagged vessels in international commerce.
They do not call on ports at Malta and Liberia. That is not the issue.
The issue is whether we, the biggest trading Nation in the world, 11
million containers coming into the United States every year, will have
the ability to see whether those ships were loaded in accordance with
the security plan that meets our standards and will protect our
security, and that there is not anything going on those ships that does
not belong on those ships, like bombs, nuclear devices, weapons of mass
biological destruction.
We do this already with aviation. Why can we not do it for maritime?
Time and again, we have heard our biggest threat, the biggest unknown
is what might be in a vessel coming into a U.S. port, what could be
there that could destroy a city, not only on the coastal plain of the
United States, but in the interior as containers move from the port to
the interior of the country.
Now, why have this motion to instruct? The purpose is that the
Senate, excuse me, the other body, has language in its version of our
bill that simply accepts the international convention. The Senate
version simply recognizes the ISPS Code, security plans drawn up by
foreign-flag states, and allows the country of registry to do the
signoff.
Well, I know from experience and having been at this for some time
that in those countries of foreign registry, very frequently the
security plan is contracted out to some private entity, a private
entity that has been approved by the classification societies. And as
we know, those international ship classification societies are not
repositories of great strength and great courage and great oversight or
great concern about security. So I do not want to see a security plan
and have us just on faith accept a security plan of another country of
registry, done by a contractor, which we do not even review.
Furthermore, under the international convention, which I just read,
the Coast Guard has to get the equivalent of a search warrant. They
have to have probable cause. They have to find something that they say,
we know there is something wrong. We have evidence that this ship has
been improperly loaded and there may be ricin stored in one of these
containers, or the equivalent thereof.
Why do we have to do that? That is nonsense. Are we going to protect
America, are we going to protect our shores, are we going to protect
our ports, or are we just simply going to leave it to the good will and
good offices of other countries? We do not do that in aviation, and we
ought not to be doing it for port security.
Why do I take the time to say this? Because I feel very strongly
about this. I have given 25 years of my service in this body to
security in aviation and to maritime security, to on-land security. A
good part of my career has been on aviation safety and aviation
security, and I do not think that we should do anything less than the
best.
So, yes, we had that language in our bill. I think we need to have
this vote here on that language to reinforce the position of the
conferees when we go to the other body because their language simply
embraces the international convention. We have to tell them, wait a
minute, that is not good enough. That does not do a good enough job. If
you are serious about protecting our ports and protecting the homeland
of the United States, with 11 million containers coming in, 8,000
vessels calling at our ports every year, let us get serious about it
and make sure we provide the Coast Guard with the personnel and
financial resources to carry out this mission.
It is crucially important. Either we are serious about port security
or we are not; and not being serious is swallowing this International
Convention on Safety of Life At Sea.
That is not safe. I will trust the U.S. Coast Guard. I know what the
men and women of the Coast Guard can do. They are serious, they are
experienced, and they will do the job of security.
So let us reaffirm the position of the House. Let us make sure when
we go to conference, we stand firm; that the four principal negotiators
on the part of the House are backed up by the voice of this body, so
that we stand firm on this language. Let us give the Coast Guard the
authority it needs. Let us stand up to make sure that we are protecting
our ports. Protect the House position, protect security in the homeland
of the United States through the one major Achilles heel afflicting us
right now, and that is port security.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, we are in agreement with so many points
that the gentleman made. No Member and no one should get the impression
that any of us are not completely committed to maritime anti-terrorism,
to homeland and port security. What we are saying here is we believe
there needs to be just a little bit of additional fine tuning.
But in principle, I agree. I will support the gentleman's motion to
instruct, and I thank the gentleman very much.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman.
We will stand firm in conference.
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the motion.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present, and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
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