[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 62 (Thursday, May 6, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H2663-H2666]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2443, COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
                       TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 2003

  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the 
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2443) to authorize appropriations for 
the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2004, to amend various laws 
administered by the Coast Guard, and for other purposes, with Senate 
amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the 
conference asked by the Senate.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.


                Motion to Instruct Offered by Mr. Filner

  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Filner moves that the managers on the part of the House 
     at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
     on the bill (H.R. 2443) to authorize appropriations for the 
     Coast Guard for fiscal year 2004, to amend various laws 
     administered by the Coast Guard, and for other purposes, be 
     instructed to insist on the language contained in section 415 
     of the House bill that requires foreign-flag vessels to have 
     their vessel security plans approved by the United States 
     Coast Guard before entering a port in the United States.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Filner) will be recognized for 30 minutes and the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo) will be recognized for 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The motion that the House has before it is really very simple. It 
instructs the House conferees on the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act to insist on our House provision on section 415. 
Section 415 simply clarifies that all foreign-flag vessels that may be 
involved in a security incident in the United States must submit their 
vessel security plans to the Coast Guard for their review and approval 
before they enter the United States. It is pretty simple. We are trying 
to make sure that we do not have a terrorist incident caused by a ship 
coming to our shores.
  We have seen clear evidence that terrorists have the means and 
capability to use vessels as a weapon. We all know about the attack on 
the U.S.S. Cole. Most recently, insurgents in Iraq blew up their boat 
filled with explosives when a U.S. boarding team tried to inspect their 
vessel. Two members of our Navy and one member of the Coast Guard died 
in that attack.
  When this Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
in November of 2002, foreign vessel owners were clearly required to 
submit vessel security plans to the United States Coast Guard. They 
were prohibited from operating after July 1 of this year if those plans 
were not approved and if they were not operating in accordance with 
those plans. But in the month after this MTSA, the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, was enacted, the Coast Guard went to 
London and agreed to amendments to the Safety of Life At Sea Convention 
to require security standards for all vessels engaged in international 
trade. These amendments are called the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code, or as we refer to them, the ISPS Code.
  The Coast Guard never told Congress that they were intending to 
overturn the new security law by allowing foreign-flag vessels to enter 
the United States if their security plans were approved not by the 
Coast Guard but by the government in which the ship is flagged. As many 
Members know, thousands of ship owners choose to register their ships 
in so-called ``flag of convenience'' countries. The ship owners do this 
to save money because they know that these governments flaunt 
international law by not enforcing the international maritime 
conventions to which they are a party.
  Mr. Speaker, our Nation has learned a great deal about terrorism 
since 9/11. One thing we have clearly learned is that not every nation 
in the world is our friend. Each day hundreds of ships enter U.S. ports 
with dangerous and hazardous cargoes. A weapon of mass destruction, a 
biological agent could easily be smuggled aboard a vessel in a foreign 
port. Look at some of the largest registries in the world, like Panama, 
Malta and Cyprus, and you will find vessels that are often detained by 
the Coast Guard for violations of international safety laws. Now we 
expect those same governments to protect U.S. citizens by making sure 
that their vessels have adequately implemented security plans? Give me 
a break! I for one am not willing to delegate our security 
responsibilities to the governments of Panama or Malta or Cyprus.
  I raised this issue with the Coast Guard at two separate hearings. 
The Coast Guard argued that they do not have the resources to approve 
the security plans for the thousands of foreign-flag vessels that come 
to our country. I have a simple thing to say, as I said to the 
commandant: send us a budget request, and we will fight for every 
nickel you need to review and approve the foreign vessel security 
plans. The resources will be there if you ask for them. But do not 
compromise the security of our coastal communities and our whole Nation 
by placing our security in the hands of these foreign governments.
  When Congress wrote the Maritime Transportation Security Act in 2002, 
we realized that it is up to the United States Government through the 
United States Coast Guard to protect our citizens. I urge my 
colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to support the motion to instruct the 
conferees on H.R. 2443 to insist on the House provisions requiring all 
foreign-flag vessels, any one of which may

[[Page H2664]]

be a potential terrorist threat, to submit their security plans to the 
Coast Guard for review and approval before they enter the United 
States. We ask this in law. We ask now to reinforce the law.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  On behalf of Chairman Young and myself, I have a couple of remarks 
about this motion. We support section 415 and allowed it to be included 
in the House bill with the agreement that we would continue to work to 
improve the language. It is very important that we ensure that all 
vessels, including foreign vessels, have security plans. However, to 
protect the United States, we need to support the Coast Guard's efforts 
as they board and inspect vessels coming into U.S. waters.
  However, the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security have 
expressed strong concerns about the current House language. They are 
concerned about requiring submission and secretarial approval of all 
foreign vessel security plans. They are concerned that this requirement 
could undermine extensive progress on vessel security planning already 
made in the international arena and would impose an unsupportable 
resource drain on the Coast Guard. They are concerned that this could 
conflict with provisions of the Safety of Life At Sea Convention and 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. This would 
place the United States at a significant disadvantage when demanding 
that other nations comply with their responsibilities and would 
significantly degrade our ability to negotiate new international 
requirements.
  Additionally, other nations could retaliate and demand to review and 
approve U.S. security plans before our vessels were allowed to trade in 
their ports. I believe that this is a real danger. Ultimately, the 
sharing of sensitive U.S. vessel security plans with all nations may 
not be in the best interests of our own national security. I would like 
to continue to explore whether acceptance of foreign vessel security 
plans approved under the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code with aggressive Coast Guard verification and enforcement might 
better achieve our national maritime security goals.
  There is concern that the number of plans that could potentially be 
subject to review is staggering. Worldwide, there are approximately 
40,000 vessels required to have security plans. If section 415 were 
enacted, the Coast Guard would be required to review the security plan 
of each of these vessels that wanted to visit the United States. In 
recent years, approximately 8,000 vessels per year have visited the 
United States, making roughly 50,000 port calls.

                              {time}  1100

  Without significant additional resources, our diversion of resources 
from some other area, the Coast Guard could not accomplish this review 
and approval process in a timely manner. The cost of this effort would 
be substantial, and the Coast Guard is not funded in this effort.
  The gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young) and I pledge to continue to 
work with our colleagues and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. 
Oberstar), the Democratic ranking member, and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Filner) to address their concerns on this homeland 
security issue.
  Today we will support this motion, but would strongly recommend that 
we continue to discuss this issue with the Coast Guard and the maritime 
shipping industry and our colleagues in the other body to improve and 
merge our other bills to ensure that the country and our security is 
protected.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I was a little surprised the gentleman was going to accept the motion 
after speaking out against it, but I appreciate that, and I hope we 
fight for this at the conference committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me 
this time.
  I was just meeting with some constituents in my office, and when I 
came in I heard the chairman speaking, and it sounded to me as though 
he was strongly opposed to our motion to instruct to better protect our 
ports and national security, but apparently from what I heard, he is 
going to support the motion. So I am a little confused.
  But let me make the points that I think need to be made about this. 
We have a law, a national law, a law in the United States of America, 
that says under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, that foreign-
flagged, that is, vessels that sail to the United States many times 
with very obscure ownership, in fact, the way international maritime 
law works, Osama bin Laden could very well own some of these 
freighters, but we would not be able to find that out.
  So we are working on that problem and the Coast Guard has made some 
slight progress, but not enough in terms of lifting the veil of secrecy 
around who actually owns these ships, which I think is essential to our 
national security, but in the interim under the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act, these foreign-flagged ships of unknown ownership with 
crews who are not very well identified, that is, there are no foolproof 
counterfeit-proof IDs or certification for the crews, many of them have 
false documents, many of them are of a dubious lineage, no security 
checks that are meaningfully conducted on those people, are cruising in 
and out of the ports of the United States, and what we have today is a 
little better than before 9-11.
  Proposals I had made subsequent to a ship accident have been 
implemented by the Coast Guard to hold the vessels that are in 
international align and to require manifests and other things and do 
boardings when they think they are necessary, and that is all well and 
good. But the Maritime Transportation Security Act goes one step 
further. They are supposed to have a plan that has been approved by the 
United States Coast Guard, these foreign-flagged vessels of uncertain 
lineage. Now, the issue before us is are we going to allow foreign 
classification societies, flags of convenience, and others to certify 
these plans in foreign languages with no review by the Coast Guard and 
just assume that everything is hunky-dory? That is really the issue 
that is before us.
  I mean, let us take Liberia, for instance. There is no government in 
Liberia, pretty plain and simple, but they are a major flag of 
convenience for these freighters, these freighters which may be owned 
by Osama bin Laden. We really do not know. But they are done in an 
obscure way through nonexistent countries like Liberia. They exist, but 
they do not have a functioning government. They certainly do not have a 
Coast Guard. In fact, the government of Liberia, I think, recently 
moved. They were in Reston. I think they moved somewhere else in 
Virginia. They have a bunch of ex-Coast Guard people who are running 
their registry, which is just a for-profit thing they do, a flag of 
convenience, so that vessel owners, whoever they might be, can avoid 
the strictures of U.S. law for crewing and for safety and a whole host 
of other reasons.
  I have never been comfortable with this arrangement, but I am 
particularly uncomfortable with an arrangement where the nonexistent 
government of Liberia will be certifying vessel security plans without 
any review by the Coast Guard, except perhaps the retired Coast Guard 
who are being paid a fabulous salary to pretend that there is a 
government in Liberia and that they are processing these plans on 
behalf of that government.
  That is the situation we are confronted with. This does not give me 
great comfort. And, in fact, the international standards say, well, 
these nonexistent governments of Liberia, or its substandard performers 
like Panama, Malta, and Cyprus, again, all who are just trying to make 
money on flagging ships, and if they get tough with those people, like 
make them have an actual real vessel security plan, really certify the 
crews, well, they will just go to another country or so-called country, 
as in the case of Liberia, and get a flag from them for a few bucks 
more or less.
  That is what it is all about. They are trying to avoid safety, 
security, crewing requirements, and all that. And this becomes to me 
another major security loophole for the United States of

[[Page H2665]]

America to say that Malta, Cyprus, Liberia, who do not care about the 
interests of the United States in these matters, would certify in 
foreign languages these vessel security plans. This is not adequate. It 
does not meet laws that were enacted with, I think, virtually unanimous 
support of the United States Congress under the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act. They undermine the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 
And then as I came in, I heard my chairman, with whom I have tremendous 
respect and he is a great advocate for the Coast Guard and he has 
helped them get more money, saying if we made the Coast Guard review 
these plans, they would not have enough people. They would need more 
resources.
  Then let us ask for the resources. This is a pattern I keep hearing 
from the administration. Yesterday I was at a hearing with the 
Transportation Security Administration folks, and we were raising 
concerns about rail and port security in the Railroads Subcommittee, 
and I said, Look, just be honest with us. Tell us you do not have 
enough people and you need more money. And they cannot do that because 
the political minders down at the White House are watching them. They 
cannot ask for more money for homeland security. We cannot ask for 
enough money to help the Coast Guard. I mean, the Coast Guard could 
contract this out if they do not have the staff, and the administration 
loves contracting out. We could hire a firm, a U.S. firm, who has 
security credentials or something else to certify these plans. But to 
allow Liberia, which does not have a government, to approve these plans 
of ships of unknown lineage and ownership in foreign languages and say 
that meets U.S. law, that is providing optimal homeland security for 
the United States of America, is absolutely wrong.
  So I hope that the ranking member was right in saying that the 
chairman will support this. I hope he will and I hope he will not just 
support it with his vote, but he will support it wholeheartedly through 
conference. We need these protections for homeland security. And if it 
is a matter of a few more dollars, then let us ask for that money so we 
do it compliant with our law and not with a loophole-ridden 
international organization that does not give a darn about U.S. 
security.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio) for his comments. The 
gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young) and I do support this, but as we have 
worked through the committee all along in a very strong bipartisan way, 
we are expressing that there are some legitimate concerns such as our 
turning over our vessel security plans to this nonexistent government 
of Liberia. These are things that we should be talking about. These are 
things that we want to talk about so that in the end the final product 
that we have is a product that will ensure our national and homeland 
security.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I have been informed that there are no ships 
with American flags going to Liberia.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), ranking member of the full Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, ranking member, for 
his stout defense of the committee position and for his splendid 
service, and I also wanted to express my great appreciation to the 
gentleman from Alaska, the chairman of the full committee, who has, 
from his first day in this body, been a stout defender and advocate of 
the U.S. Coast Guard. He sometimes calls it ``my Coast Guard,'' and 
rightly so, because Alaska has the largest coastline to protect in all 
of the Coast Guard's work.
  And I have enormous respect for the gentleman from New Jersey, who 
has one of the largest Coast Guard facilities, perhaps the largest in 
his district, who has chaired the subcommittee with great distinction.
  But I must say I am disappointed in the Coast Guard and in the 
administration, whoever it is. It is uncertain. The Coast Guard has 
been shifted from the Department of Transportation to the Department of 
Homeland Security. We hardly know who is the Secretary to whom they 
report for all the various functions of the Coast Guard, or whether 
this message is coming from the White House or the Office of Management 
and Budget. Whatever it is, the Coast Guard is on the wrong track.
  We passed the port security bill, known as the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, in November, 2002, hard on the heels of 
all of the horrific events of September 11 and in the spirit of vastly 
improving security in all of the modes of transportation. We had 
extensive discussion, debate within our committee, all aimed at one 
objective, protecting transportation in America from terrorist threats. 
Every step of the way, the purpose was to elevate security in 
transportation, make it substantially better, not just an increment, 
not just a little step better. And I was at the White House for the 
signing of the bill. I think the gentleman from New Jersey was there as 
well, as I recall. A delegation from the other body was there.
  The President was very proud of that bill. Hardly was the Coast Guard 
involved in the International Maritime Organization negotiations on the 
Safety at Sea law, negotiating something that really undercuts a main 
thrust of this legislation. When we crafted this bill, the MTSA, the 
original law, I drew on our experience in aviation in the aftermath of 
Pan Am 103. I served on that commission with the gentleman from 
Arkansas, Mr. Hammerschmidt, and one of the great failings we saw was 
that the United States really did not have the ability to go into 
foreign countries' aviation programs and see whether they had a strong 
security program, whether they were doing security inspections and 
screening of passengers, screening of luggage, screening of mail, as we 
were doing and as we were proposing to do in even stronger fashion; so 
we crafted in that legislation language to establish foreign security 
liaison officers within the FAA in foreign countries with the authority 
to go in and inspect, with the authority to look at aviation security 
plans of foreign governments.
  And I took that theme and introduced it into our Maritime 
Transportation Security Act. It was missing one word. I sort of take 
the responsibility for it. We did not put the word ``foreign'' vessel, 
thinking that was pretty clear that vessels coming into U.S. ports that 
are suspect would be from other countries. The Coast Guard went and 
negotiated away that power of the U.S. to inspect the security plans of 
other countries and to see whether vessels operating under a foreign 
flag were in compliance with the security plan of the country of 
registry of that vessel.

                              {time}  1115

  Well, seeing that shortcoming, in the course of hearings that the 
chairman of the committee conducted, the issue came up. It was raised 
by members on both sides in the course of our hearings. So the language 
was tightened up, just to make it very clear we would have the ability 
to inspect, that the Coast Guard have the ability to inspect, the 
security plans of foreign governments.
  Now, why is that a concern? Because this is the document that the 
U.S. Coast Guard negotiated, the Safety of Actions At Sea. It was 17 
December 2002, and the relevant language, ``Ship security plans are not 
subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by a contracting 
government to carry out control compliance measures in accordance with 
regulations specified in section 9.8.1.''
  Here is section 9.8.1. ``Officers,'' meaning U.S. Coast Guard in this 
case, ``will have limited access to the specific section of the plan 
allowed in the exception, only with the consent of the contracting 
government,'' meaning Malta, Liberia, Panama, the Philippines, ``or the 
master of the ship concerned. Parts of the code are considered as 
confidential and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise 
agreed by the contracting governments concerned.''
  Did our President not say, the President of the United States say, 
and has he not said repeatedly, ``I will never ask permission of the 
United Nations to defend the United States. I will never ask permission 
of a foreign government to protect the citizens of the United States. 
We are not going with a permission slip''?

[[Page H2666]]

  This is a permission slip. This is what has been agreed to. I heard 
what the chairman said, that, oh, if we insist on protecting our 
interests, then other governments will insist on inspecting security 
plans of the United States.
  We have only 37 American-flagged vessels in international commerce. 
They do not call on ports at Malta and Liberia. That is not the issue. 
The issue is whether we, the biggest trading Nation in the world, 11 
million containers coming into the United States every year, will have 
the ability to see whether those ships were loaded in accordance with 
the security plan that meets our standards and will protect our 
security, and that there is not anything going on those ships that does 
not belong on those ships, like bombs, nuclear devices, weapons of mass 
biological destruction.
  We do this already with aviation. Why can we not do it for maritime? 
Time and again, we have heard our biggest threat, the biggest unknown 
is what might be in a vessel coming into a U.S. port, what could be 
there that could destroy a city, not only on the coastal plain of the 
United States, but in the interior as containers move from the port to 
the interior of the country.
  Now, why have this motion to instruct? The purpose is that the 
Senate, excuse me, the other body, has language in its version of our 
bill that simply accepts the international convention. The Senate 
version simply recognizes the ISPS Code, security plans drawn up by 
foreign-flag states, and allows the country of registry to do the 
signoff.
  Well, I know from experience and having been at this for some time 
that in those countries of foreign registry, very frequently the 
security plan is contracted out to some private entity, a private 
entity that has been approved by the classification societies. And as 
we know, those international ship classification societies are not 
repositories of great strength and great courage and great oversight or 
great concern about security. So I do not want to see a security plan 
and have us just on faith accept a security plan of another country of 
registry, done by a contractor, which we do not even review.
  Furthermore, under the international convention, which I just read, 
the Coast Guard has to get the equivalent of a search warrant. They 
have to have probable cause. They have to find something that they say, 
we know there is something wrong. We have evidence that this ship has 
been improperly loaded and there may be ricin stored in one of these 
containers, or the equivalent thereof.
  Why do we have to do that? That is nonsense. Are we going to protect 
America, are we going to protect our shores, are we going to protect 
our ports, or are we just simply going to leave it to the good will and 
good offices of other countries? We do not do that in aviation, and we 
ought not to be doing it for port security.
  Why do I take the time to say this? Because I feel very strongly 
about this. I have given 25 years of my service in this body to 
security in aviation and to maritime security, to on-land security. A 
good part of my career has been on aviation safety and aviation 
security, and I do not think that we should do anything less than the 
best.
  So, yes, we had that language in our bill. I think we need to have 
this vote here on that language to reinforce the position of the 
conferees when we go to the other body because their language simply 
embraces the international convention. We have to tell them, wait a 
minute, that is not good enough. That does not do a good enough job. If 
you are serious about protecting our ports and protecting the homeland 
of the United States, with 11 million containers coming in, 8,000 
vessels calling at our ports every year, let us get serious about it 
and make sure we provide the Coast Guard with the personnel and 
financial resources to carry out this mission.
  It is crucially important. Either we are serious about port security 
or we are not; and not being serious is swallowing this International 
Convention on Safety of Life At Sea.
  That is not safe. I will trust the U.S. Coast Guard. I know what the 
men and women of the Coast Guard can do. They are serious, they are 
experienced, and they will do the job of security.
  So let us reaffirm the position of the House. Let us make sure when 
we go to conference, we stand firm; that the four principal negotiators 
on the part of the House are backed up by the voice of this body, so 
that we stand firm on this language. Let us give the Coast Guard the 
authority it needs. Let us stand up to make sure that we are protecting 
our ports. Protect the House position, protect security in the homeland 
of the United States through the one major Achilles heel afflicting us 
right now, and that is port security.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, we are in agreement with so many points 
that the gentleman made. No Member and no one should get the impression 
that any of us are not completely committed to maritime anti-terrorism, 
to homeland and port security. What we are saying here is we believe 
there needs to be just a little bit of additional fine tuning.
  But in principle, I agree. I will support the gentleman's motion to 
instruct, and I thank the gentleman very much.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman. 
We will stand firm in conference.
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). Without objection, the 
previous question is ordered on the motion.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
  The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present, and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

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