[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 61 (Wednesday, May 5, 2004)]
[House]
[Pages H2617-H2623]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXPRESSING CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS TO
PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 398) expressing the
concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce
nuclear weapons.
The Clerk read as follows:
H. Con. Res. 398
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert
the international community to Iran's covert nuclear
activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear
weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed
to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment
Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003,
after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by
an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a
nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
[[Page H2618]]
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly
enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per
year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to
report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically,
the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--
the processing and use of that material, and the facilities
involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003
to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear
material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to
cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about
its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of
Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation,
Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as
required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to
resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment
activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and
any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its
nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and
to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol
between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards
to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within
Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely
and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's
nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director
General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had
conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear
Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint
statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to
suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as
defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of
unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had
satisfied international concerns about its nuclear
development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment
centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and
2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium
hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a
laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of
uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another
violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had
irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed
them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal
obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards
Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for
further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the
Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all
enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to
produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to
import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic
activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and
confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has
concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the
IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24,
2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception
regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to
disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more
advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from
foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving
experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that
is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a
firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations
of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous
assurances to the IAEA and the international community for
full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend
uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized
that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and
manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and
equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium
enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council
of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its
research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium enrichment
centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no
intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October
16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of
Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a
``full picture of its nuclear activities'' and ``full
transparency'';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full
transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of
September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency
and to ``leave no stone unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its
peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed
to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology,
and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black
market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether
Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has
refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude
an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for
the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to
sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons
development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious
concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003
did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's
past and present nuclear programme considered essential by
the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that
the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced
centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing
activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser
enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle
highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the
development of its enrichment technology to its current
extent, and that a number of other questions remain
unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in
Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on
the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature,
extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned
heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding
the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest
against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13,
2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit
inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into
serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about
its nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in
dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international
community, its receipt from other countries of the means to
enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated
its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to
acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's
continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community
about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending
all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the
provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the
Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the
application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18
years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has
forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a
nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment,
and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's
nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-
applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of
February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along
with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not
disclose other research programs, constitute ample
[[Page H2619]]
evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with
the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all
efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to
immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all
nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and
importing related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full
unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the
investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new
openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which
Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear
weapons program and to provide full, complete, and
transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has
enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high
confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently
ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a
permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what
further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to
persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to
the IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent
and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United
States, and the international community regarding Iran's
military nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities
not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil
field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and
Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their
agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid
natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their
commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain
from or cease all investment and investment-related
activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign
commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any
nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and
calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran
and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the
Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are
satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting
Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate
such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to
individuals, sites, and all information related to the
investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their
export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to
prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop
nuclear programs that could support the development of
nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest
opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the
IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are
necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate
Iran's nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon
states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards
agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a
military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under
the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to
consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts
by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this
resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
General Leave
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material on H. Con. Res. 398.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Indiana?
There was no objection.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res. 398, a
resolution which condemns Iran's continued violations of its
obligations and commitments regarding its nuclear program; expresses
Congress' grave concern over Iran's efforts to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons, which threaten not only that region, but
possibly the world; and calls for a series of steps to be undertaken by
various parties to address this threat.
I am proud to be a cosponsor of this measure, and I commend the
gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the ranking member, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), on this bipartisan effort and
for their leadership.
Mr. Speaker, after getting caught with its hand in the cookie jar,
the Iranian regime was forced to admit in the fall of 2002 that it had
nuclear facilities that it had failed to declare to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. From that time onward, Iran has engaged in a
systematic campaign of deception and manipulation to hide its true
intentions and to keep its large-scale nuclear efforts a secret.
For at least 18 years, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert
nuclear program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the
manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, most of which,
according to recent IAEA reporting, are owned by military industrial
organizations.
It has an enrichment facility designed for the simultaneous operation
of large numbers of centrifuges, and a large, partially-underground
facility at Natanz, intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges.
Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment
which uses lasers, a complex technology rarely used by even the most
advanced countries because it is not cost efficient.
Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional
nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor at
Arak, a type of reactor that would be well-suited for plutonium
production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which
endangers not only the region, but the world.
According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian
regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number of
activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a
small amount of plutonium. This same report noted that Iran's
deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear
cycle.
Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran's nuclear program was
not for weapons development and could not conclude that it was solely
for ``peaceful purposes.''
Iran's most recent breaches of its obligations include failing to
disclose work on advanced P-2 centrifuges for uranium enrichment and
work on Polonium 210, an element which could be used in nuclear
explosions.
As a result, Iran has forfeited its right to develop a nuclear fuel
cycle and should immediately and unconditionally cease all nuclear
enrichment activities.
H. Con. Res. 398 enumerates a series of steps that should be
undertaken to, number one, hold the Iranian regime accountable for its
nuclear program; and, two, establish a clear precedent that such
proliferation efforts, efforts which clearly threaten international
peace and security, will not be tolerated. Those who pursue them will
have to suffer the consequences.
{time} 1830
The Iranian Government needs to think very, very strongly about that.
Among the demands it places on the International Atomic Energy
Agency, it urges the IAEA Board of Governors to quickly report the
Iranian case to the U.N. Security Council for further action, which
should include steps to prevent Iran from engaging in further
clandestine nuclear activities. It also urges the U.N. Security Council
to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT who violate
their commitments forfeit their rights under this treaty.
[[Page H2620]]
As President Bush said on February 11 of this year, ``Proliferators
must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the
material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal
weapons.''
Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 calls upon the international community,
through different venues, to use all appropriate means to deter and
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all
nuclear cooperation with Iran until certain conditions are met.
Given the ongoing developments in the political and economic
relationship of the European Union countries and Iran, the resolution
calls upon the EU countries to suspend bilateral trade agreements with
this pariah state until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all
nuclear weapons development efforts. Also, given the severity of Iran's
proliferation activities and heeding the lessons from Libya, H. Con.
Res. 398 asks the European Union to go a step further and consider
sanctions as a means of compelling Iran to comply with these
international obligations and expressed commitments.
It calls on governments whose nationals, businesses, and other
entities are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities to,
one, fully investigate such a relationship; two, grant full access to
the IAEA to conduct its own parallel investigations; and, three,
immediately review and rectify export control regulations and practices
to prevent further assistance to countries seeking a nuclear weapons
capacity.
These are not just in keeping with President Bush's
counterproliferation initiatives as outlined in February of this year,
but also affirm the tenets of the U.S.-led resolution adopted by the
U.N. Security Council just last Wednesday.
Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 reinforces longstanding congressional
efforts to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the funds to pursue
and expand their threatening activities, in particular, their
proliferation activities. It calls on all countries to take steps to
end investment-related efforts that in some way support Iran's energy
sector.
This is particularly relevant given plans announced by Iran on Sunday
aiming for a six-fold increase in its petrochemical revenues to $20
billion a year by the year 2015. It is further relevant given, for
example, the April 25 announcement that French oil giant Total was
awarded a $1.2 billion contract to develop phase 11 of the massive
South Pars gas field in Iran.
H. Con. Res. 398, therefore, also calls for immediate enforcement of
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Iran.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would simply like to refer to a recent
statement made by Iran's so-called moderate leader, Mohammad Khatami,
while Iran was blocking access to IAEA inspectors. He said Iran ``has
no obligation toward anybody other than what our interests require.''
Placing this in further context, I draw my colleagues' attention to
Iran's display last fall of its newly deployed advanced medium-range
ballistic missiles which military analysts say could reach Israel or
U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. Television photographs of the display
showed one of the missile carriers with a sign that read, ``We will
stomp on America,'' and that says it all, as far as I am concerned. We
must stop their nuclear proliferation program.
A terrorist state like Iran must not, cannot, be allowed to obtain a
nuclear weapons capability, and we need to do whatever is necessary to
stop them. Let us send a clear message to Iran, and to all other
potential proliferators, that we will not tolerate this behavior, we
will not sit idly by as Iran threatens our Nation, our interests, and
global security.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to render their strong support to
this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this important
resolution, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to the chairman of our committee,
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and to my friend, the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Burton), for their leadership on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, for over a decade, the United States has been trying to
alert the entire world to Iran's efforts to covertly develop nuclear
weapons. Finally, the rest of the world seems at least ready to listen.
Now we must convince them to act.
For many years, Iran has deceived the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the entire world about the true purpose of its supposedly
peaceful nuclear energy program. The ayatollahs of terrorism have,
through the international nuclear black market, acquired equipment and
facilities to produce nuclear weapons-grade uranium. As a result of
IAEA inspections over the past 15 months, we now know that Iran has
acquired designs for sophisticated uranium enrichment equipment and
that Iran has been lying about this for years. Iran has even
experimented with materials that could be used to initiate a nuclear
detonation.
Given that Iran used the same supplier network that provided Libya
with the blueprint for a nuclear warhead, we must assume that Iran has
an operable nuclear bomb design.
Iran is rightly condemned as a state sponsor of terrorism responsible
for funding numerous terrorist groups that murder and maim innocent
civilians. Imagine then, Mr. Speaker, this terrorist state armed with
nuclear weapons.
This is the threat we face. Iran must not under any circumstances be
allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. We must keep the pressure on Iran,
as we did on Libya, to step off this most dangerous path. We must keep
the pressure on our friends and allies in the European Union and
elsewhere who mistakenly believe that continued trade and investment
will somehow cause the ayatollahs to give up their multiyear quest for
nuclear weapons.
We must also keep the pressure on the IAEA's Board of Governors to
again condemn Iran at their June meeting and to formally refer Iran's
breaches of its safeguards and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
obligations to the United Nations Security Council.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution also sets a new standard for states to
have access to technology for peaceful nuclear purposes. It declares
that Iran, through its repeated and flagrant violations of its
international obligations, has forfeited the right to be trusted with
technology that can be misused to produce weapons-grade uranium and
plutonium.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution and to send a
message to Iran and the entire world that enough is enough. It is past
time to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. A nuclear Iran
threatens us all. Driven by its extremist ideology, it might attack and
surely could blackmail our friends in the region. Iran's nuclearization
would spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We must not
let that happen.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo), a member of the committee.
Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time. I just want to add my support to this endeavor and this
resolution. Certainly, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the
author of the resolution, and the committee itself and the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Burton) have been extremely articulate in laying out
the points that we should pursue and in encouraging us to bring this
resolution and have stated, again articulately, why we should support
it. I want to add to those issues that we have laid out some other
things that are not specifically identified in the resolution, but I
think are important for us to consider.
We must recognize that much of what we know today about Iran and
certainly what we know about its nuclear production capabilities, and
not just capabilities, but what they have already done, comes to us not
as a result of information identified by the international inspection
regime. It comes to us as a result of the fact that Iranian dissidents
have, at great risk, made this information available to the West.
On more than one occasion, these Iranian dissidents have provided us
[[Page H2621]]
with information that we now know to be accurate. It has become
invaluable in many ways, and they should be credited for what they have
done. It is also important to note that many of these people who have
taken refuge in Iraq are under the control and the protection right now
of American forces over there. It is also I think important to
understand that Iran, the mullahs in Iran are today demanding that
these people be returned, forcibly returned to Iran to face certain
death. It is inconceivable I think that we would agree to such a
situation, especially in light of the information that they have
provided and the valuable asset that they in fact are in that part of
the world.
We also recognize that much of the difficulty we now face in Iraq is
a result of Iran's interference, sending people across that border,
inflaming the passions that we now witness in the form of acts of
violence against Americans and American troops over there.
So all of these things, as I say, I am glad they have been said, but
I just did not want to let this resolution go by without a reference to
the people who have worked so hard to bring the information forward and
who have struggled for a long time for a free Iran. They are dedicated
to that proposition. They are dedicated to a free secular country, a
democratic country over there, and I think it would be certainly
heartless, it would be a tragedy if we were to abandon them, if we were
to actually allow them to be returned to, as I say, certain death in
that country.
So I just wanted to add that dimension to this debate. Again, I thank
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), the gentleman from California
(Mr. Lantos), and the committee for bringing this resolution forward.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to my
friend, the gentleman from the State of Washington (Mr. Baird).
Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend and colleague, the
ranking member of this committee, and the chairman for their
initiative. I think it is long past time for this Nation to express
grave concern and work with the international community to thwart
Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and I applaud them for this
resolution.
I do, however, feel compelled to ask an inquiry of the chairman and
the ranking member, and it is this: we have seen, I believe, a growing
concern about possible usurpation by the administration of
congressional authority, particularly in regard to war-making and the
use of force. I thoroughly intend to support this sound resolution. I
just would like clarification that the resolution does not, in its
efforts to rein in the Iranian nuclear program, authorize the President
to use force.
I yield to my distinguished ranking member to address this.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding, and I am
very pleased to respond to his inquiry.
This resolution is not and cannot be construed to be an authorization
for the use of force against Iran. It calls upon all of the state
parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to take all appropriate
measures to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear
weapons, including economic sanctions and international pressure.
{time} 1845
The international sanctions on Libya were ultimately successful in
convincing Colonel Qaddafi to give up all of his programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction. This is the model that the world community
needs to pursue with Iraq.
Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for that clarification.
I intend to support this most worthy proposal, and I think it is
important that we establish for the record that this Congress is not
intending with this legislation to authorize the use of force without
approval of the Congress.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Sherman).
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I speak as the ranking Democrat on the
subcommittee that deals with terrorism and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
I want to clarify of the backgrounds that we face with Iran. First,
Iran has a large amount of natural gas. This natural gas is flared.
They do not need to generate electricity with nuclear plants. In fact,
they can without pollution and at very low costs generate electricity
using the natural gas that goes to waste under the present system.
Second, we talk here of the Iranian government. That is very
different from the Iranian people who among all the peoples of the
Middle East are among those who are most pro-American and, frankly, who
are not terribly interested in seeing their country acquire nuclear
weapons. We should remember that weapons of mass destruction is a
rather vague term that encompasses mustard gas on the one hand and
nuclear weapons on the other, and we should not be confused.
Since World War I, I doubt more than a dozen Americans have been
killed using chemical or biological weapons. And while Saddam killed
many using mustard gas, he did so against highly unsophisticated
civilians in a third world situation.
In contrast, nuclear weapons if used in an American city would kill
hundreds of thousands of people or millions of people. We can not put
these in the same category. And let us not think that a missile defense
system will save us. Iran would like to have intercontinental ballistic
missiles and the glory of just being able to push a button and see the
missile fly off. But the government of Iran sees it is as easy to
smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States as it is to smuggle
into person or a bale of marijuana. A nuclear weapon is as detectable,
it is as large as a person.
Thus, a nuclear weapon created in Iran could be smuggled into any of
our districts. Keep in mind that the government in Iran has sought
again and again to kill as many Americans as possible. It is harboring
top operatives of al Qaeda, including bin Laden's own son. It is
harboring the individual who caused the bombings in Rihad that killed 7
Americans. It is responsible for the deaths at Khobar Tower and earlier
deaths of our people in Saudi Arabia, killing at least 2 dozen
Americans.
This is a government in Iran which, if it has nuclear weapons, will
marry a desire to kill Americans with a capacity to kill us by the
hundreds of thousands.
Now, this is a great resolution. But it is only a resolution. What we
need to do is to marry our desire to rein in the nuclear program with a
real bill with real teeth. I have introduced to this House, and we have
quite a number of co-sponsors for the Iran Freedom and Democracy
Support Act. That Act would provide real money to those working for
peace and democracy in Iran. That Act would impose real economic
sanctions and we need to pass this resolution today or tomorrow and
then go on to deploying real money and real economic sanctions in an
effort to deal with the Iranian program.
Look at what happened with Libya. They faced multi-lateral economic
sanctions and they agreed to abandon their nuclear program. Now, they
are getting for an investment, they are getting international air
flights, et cetera. This administration promised us an aggressive
defense of America. And it has given us only an invasion of Iraq which
had apparently no weapons of mass destruction at all. North Korea has 3
years further in developing its nuclear weapons. Iran has proceeded
virtually unimpeded, and we have not used the tools available to us,
not to invade but to dissuade.
We have the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. We used it against Libya. We
failed again and again to use it and waived it again and again when our
so-called allies invested billions of dollars in the Iranian oil
sector.
Mr. Speaker, just recently we gave a wink and a nod to a $2.8 billion
Japanese investments in the Iranian oil sector. We have given winks and
nods as half a billion dollars has gone from the World Bank, 25 percent
of it is our money, goes to this government that is developing nuclear
weapons to kill our people, and year after year, we allow $150 million
worth of caviar and carpets to come into this country providing a
market to industries controlled by some of the most regressive forces
in Iran.
It is time for to us bring real economic sanctions starting with our
own trade and stopping that $150 million of imports. Then turning to
our allies and saying enough is enough. If you want
[[Page H2622]]
to help us, bring the economic pressure. Then the people of Iran will
recognize that they can not allow their leaders to proceed down this
nuclear road. That it is bad for world stability and bad for their own
economy.
And we are not asking for participation in an invasion. Just for
strict economic sanctions. We can use our economic power to do it, or
we can continue the feckless policy that marked our behavior before
September 11.
This is a great resolution. We should pass it. It is only a
resolution. It is time to bring real economic sanctions to bear.
Otherwise, this resolution will pass. They will laugh at us in Tehran,
and they will go forward with their nuclear program.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to compliment my colleague on a very fine
statement.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to thank the gentleman from
California (Mr. Sherman). And to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Burton), I salute your concern about Iraq's nuclear activities. I join
you in stating that I do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, I cannot support this resolution.
I believe that if Members read the text carefully, they may agree.
This resolution includes an endorsement I believe of the doctrine of
preventive war. Preventive war is attacking another country that does
not pose an imminent threat but which some might argue could pose a
threat. This is not a legitimate or legal reason for going to war. It
ends up being an illegal war or war not in self-defense.
To be specific, the doctrine is, I believe, contained in part 2 of
the resolution which reads, ``Calls upon all state parties to the
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.'' This clause contains two
elements of preventive war. The first is a tacit endorsement of regime
change, ``all appropriate means to prevent Iran.''
All appropriate means is nearly the same language used in Senate
Joint Resolution 54, which the Congress passed in 1998. That resolution
called upon the President to ``take appropriate action to bring Iraq
into compliance.''
We did not know then that such language would be construed only 5
years later to mean that the Congress endorsed regime change in Iraq,
but that is what the administration construed it to mean.
Second, I believe this clause envisions unilateral action by the
United States. It ``calls upon the United States to use all appropriate
means.'' That means it is a policy of Congress that the United States,
without necessarily receiving any support from the world community, and
without the concurrence of the United Nations, could act unilaterally.
This combination calling on all state parties to use all appropriate
means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and calling upon
the United States to use all appropriate means, this combination
endorses the doctrine of preventive war.
This country was dragged into war with Iraq based on false statements
to Congress. Iraq has proved to have been of little threat to the
United States, but that did not stop the war's authors from going
forward with the arguments that Iraq could one day be a threat.
In this historical context, I believe it is vitally important to call
this to the attention of Congress so that Congress can avoid giving its
endorsement of what could prove to be an unprovoked attack, unilateral
regime change again.
So I oppose this resolution and I ask my colleagues to vote no.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me start off by saying you cannot take one section
of the bill, and I have great respect for the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich). He and I have been colleagues and have worked together on a
number of bills, and I have a very high regard for him. However, let us
look at the whole bill and not just one or two phrases in it, because I
think it clarifies the whole intent of the bill and I think it
illuminates the concern I think that the gentleman has.
If we look on page 8 where the gentleman was just talking about, it
says ``calls upon all state parties to the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, including the United States, to
use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other
cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until
Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA
for the application of safeguards.''
But then we go over to page 10. Understand section 9 there it says it
``further calls upon the European Union to consider what further
measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to
fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA.''
Then you go to page 11, section C, and it says, ``calls on all
countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that
these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-
related activities that support Iran's energy industry.''
Go down to line 15 and it says, ``calls upon Russia to suspend
nuclear cooperation with Iran.''
The thing that I think will really allay some of the gentleman's
concerns, on page 12, section 13, it says, ``urges the IAEA Board of
Governors at its earliest opportunity to report to the United Nations
Security Council that Iran is in non-compliance with its agreements
with the IAEA; urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary
to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear
activities; urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, who commit
violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment
or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support
a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT
to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities.''
It further states on page 13, and I hope this will allay some of his
concerns, under section 16, ``further urges the United Nations Security
Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection
efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and urges the President to keep the
Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed
in this resolution.''
I do not think there is anything in there, and the gentleman and I
are good friends, that would give the President carte blanche to go
ahead and invade Iran or start a war with them. Although, I think it is
important that Iran feel a little uncertainty, although I do not think
this bill does it, a little uncertainty about what might happen if they
continue this program.
{time} 1900
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I want to say that I think that the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California
(Mr. Lantos) serve this country well and that there are probably no
people stronger in defense of America than both of them. I have total
confidence in that, and I just want to express my appreciation for
being able to express my misgivings about the language of this bill,
but I want to thank the gentlemen for the service that they are giving
in expressing the importance of this.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Before closing, Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to my friend
from Ohio by saying that it is not the intention of this author of this
resolution to view this resolution as one authorizing unilateral use of
force against Iran.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this
resolution.
[[Page H2623]]
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Before I yield back the balance of my time, I just hope that the
Iranian leaders realize that when they continue down this path, they
ultimately not only endanger the entire Middle East and maybe areas
beyond, and who knows maybe ultimately the United States, but they
endanger their own security as well; and it would be far better for
them to start thinking about complying with the U.N. resolutions and
stopping their nuclear program before there are problems down the road.
This resolution, as my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos), just said, does not give the President unilateral authority.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, the resolution we are considering today
directly confronts what may become a clear and present threat to
American security.
For 18 years, the government of Iran has hidden information on its
nuclear program from international inspectors. Iran is a signatory to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a regime which
is effective only as long as its signatories are fully committed to
full and complete disclosure of any nuclear program for any purpose.
The international community has already given Iran the benefit of the
doubt. With its rich natural resources, the country does not even need
the atomic energy it claims to be producing for peaceful purposes. Why
in the world would a country soaked in oil require a nuclear fuel cycle
and the enriched uranium that goes along with it? Mr. Speaker, it does
not take a detective to smell a rat on this one.
This is very serious business. There is no greater nightmare for this
generation of Americans that the idea of a 9/11-style attack involving
weapons of mass destruction. Ongoing research into Libya's weapons
program, which appears to be a model for compliance and disarmament
among all rogue states, demonstrates that the shadowy network of
nuclear proliferation is even deeper and more frightening than we had
previously suspected. Putting our trust in Iran's undemocratic,
fundamentalist leadership to voluntarily safeguard this technology of
terror is not an option.
With this resolution, we demand that Iran honor its stated
commitments and obligations. The Iranian regime must grant the IAEA
inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the
investigation of its nuclear activities. And our efforts to secure
cooperation must be in concert with our European allies and other
responsible members of the international community. As we learned on
March 11th of this year, no one in the civilized world is safe from
terrorism.
And we must be diligent, earnest, and serious in our message. This
means that, in the short term, the IAEA must report that Iran is in
noncompliance with its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty;
the European Union and other allies in the war on terror must be active
partners in sanctioning the Iranian regime economically; and the
President should act to enforce the appropriate provisions of the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.
Mr. Speaker, American troops have already deposed a regime whose
cooperation on WMD disclosure was not sufficient. No one should doubt
our resolve in keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
terrorists. We cannot trust the ayatollabs in Tehran to responsibly
handle technology that could be used against American civilians. If the
Nonproliferation regime is broken, it must be fixed. Quickly.
I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, while all of us rightly focused on the
continuing effort to secure and stabilize Iraq, none of us can close
our eyes to the ominous and growing danger posed by the government of
Iran.
That is why I strongly support this important bipartisan resolution
brought to the floor today by the chairman and ranking democrat on the
Committee on International Relations (Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos).
This resolution condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's
continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the international community about its nuclear programs and
activities.
For example, Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel
enrichment plant and facility at Natanz, until both were revealed by an
opposition group.
It confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion
processes, but only after it denied doing so.
According to a February report by the director general of the IAEA,
Iran continues to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities.
This resolution also calls on the United States, as well as all state
parties to the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to use
(and I quote) ``All appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.''
The fact is, our national security demands that we do everything in
our power to prevent Iran from developing and acquiring nuclear
weapons.
The Iranian government is hostile to the interests of the United
States. It is a state sponsor of terrorism.
It is a committed enemy of the state of Israel, our staunch ally and
the lone democracy in this most volatile region.
It is vital that we speak with one voice on this issue of utmost
gravity. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, Iran has repeatedly denied that it is trying
to develop nuclear weapons. But it is increasingly difficult to
conceive of any other plausible explanation for its efforts to enrich
uranium and develop other nuclear-related capabilities. And even harder
to understand why else it would try so hard to conceal these activities
from the international community. As reported by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has failed time and time again to comply
with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has
also failed to provide a full disclosure of all nuclear activities to
the IAEA, and engaged in a pattern of lies and deception.
Since Iran's covert nuclear program was exposed to the world in
February 2003, IAEA inspectors have found traces of highly enriched
uranium, discovered that Iran had reprocessed a small amount of
plutonium, and forced Iranian officials to reveal critical information
about advanced centrifuge designs and components. These and other
revelations about Iran's nuclear program are even more troubling in
light of Iran's extensive ties to international terrorist
organizations.
According to the just-released State Department report on Patterns of
Global Terrorism, ``Iran remained the most active state sponsor of
terrorism in 2003.'' The report notes that some members of al-Qaeda
``have found virtual safehaven'' in Iran, while Iranian authorities
continue to provide Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and
other radical terrorist organizations with ``funding, safehaven,
training, and weapons.''
Iran also continues an aggressive program to develop ballistic
missiles. According to the Congressional Research Service, Iran has
hundreds of short-range missiles, and possibly 10-20 long-range Shahab-
3 missiles, which may be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Mr. Speaker, Iran has absolutely no need for a nuclear deterrent.
Over the last two and a half years, we have taken care of Iran's only
two enemies--the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.
Nor does Iran--with 7 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and
the second largest natural gas reserves on the planet--have a
demonstrated need for civilian nuclear power.
We must continue to make it clear--to our European allies, who have
generally favored a more conciliatory approach to Iran--and to the
unelected rulers in Tehran, who continue to lead the Iranian people
down this perilous path--that we will not sit idly by and allow Iran to
become a nuclear weapons state.
This resolution is an important part of that effort, and I urge its
adoption.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cole). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) that the House
suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res.
398.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of
those present have voted in the affirmative.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
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