[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 56 (Wednesday, April 28, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4486-S4488]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                A CREDIBILITY GAP ON NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address what I 
consider a large and serious issue--U.S. nuclear weapons policy--and 
update the Senate on what has been happening.
  In particular, I am concerned about the apparent reopening of the 
nuclear door by the United States and the further research and 
development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.
  I serve as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, on both 
the Energy and Water and Defense Subcommittees, and have had an 
opportunity to participate in the committee and conference debates on 
this issue.
  Despite earlier claims to the contrary, by all appearances the Bush 
Administration is seeking to develop a new generation of nuclear 
weapons.
  This includes both the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which is a 
100-kiloton ``bunker buster'', and so-called Advanced Concepts, which 
translate into low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, below 5 kilotons.
  The first hints of this policy came in the administration's 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review--which was leaked to the press in early 2002.
  The review cited the need to develop a new generation of tactical 
nuclear weapons, blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear 
forces.
  According to press reports, it named seven countries against which it 
would consider launching a nuclear first strike: North Korea, Iraq, 
Iran, Syria, Lybia, China, and Russia.
  And it proposed a ``new triad,'' in which nuclear and conventional 
weapons co-exist along the same continuum.
  This blurs the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons 
and suggests that they could be used as offensive weapons.
  Subsequently, in the Defense Authorization Bill last year the 
Administration sought, and ultimately obtained permission, to repeal 
the 10-year old Spratt-Furse Amendment, which prohibited research to 
develop a low-yield, less than 5 kiloton, nuclear weapon.
  Spratt-Furse has served as a ``brake'' on nuclear weapons development 
for the past decade. Now, it is gone.
  I argued against the repeal of Spratt-Furse on the floor, and working 
with Senator Kennedy, I offered an amendment to maintain it. 
Unfortunately, we did not prevail.
  What really concerns me is that, throughout all of this, the 
Administration continues to deny their intention to develop new nuclear 
weapons.
  For example, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, in a Washington 
Post op-ed on July 21, 2003, stated: ``. . . we are not planning to 
develop any new nuclear weapons at all.''
  And Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in response to a question I 
asked him at a Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on May 14, 
2003, stated that the work the Administration was undertaking was 
``just a study'', and that there were no plans to build new weapons.
  This defies credibility.
  Well, if one really wants to know what is happening, the best thing 
to do is to track where the Administration is asking for and spending 
money.
  And when you do, you find that the administration is putting major 
resources into researching new nuclear weapons.
  For instance, last year's budget request included: $15 million for 
the study of the development of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator; $6 
million in funding for Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts, including the 
study for development of low-yield, battlefield weapons; $24 million to 
increase the Nevada Test Site's time-to-test readiness posture from the 
current 36 months to 18 months; and, $22 million for site selection for 
the Modern Pit Facility, which is a facility to build nuclear triggers 
for our Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons.
  This would be a $4 billion plant to make up to 450 new ``pits'' per 
year, some of which could be designed for new weapons.
  Four-hundred-and-fifty pits is larger than China's entire nuclear 
arsenal, so this production capacity raises questions about the number 
of weapons the Administration wants in the U.S. arsenal.
  Currently, the United States has approximately 15,000 warheads. Under 
the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. is to decrease its strategic nuclear force 
to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012.
  To maintain a 2,200 warhead nuclear force at replacement level, we 
would only need to build 50 pits a year, not 450. Fifty pits a year can 
be handled at Los Alamos. So why build a new facility, with a 
production capacity of 450 pits a year?

  This country doesn't need that much production unless plans are 
underway to increase the size of our nuclear arsenal, including a new 
generation of nuclear weapons.
  Last year, those of us opposed to developing tactical nuclear weapons 
did have some success in limiting these programs.
  Working with others in the House and Senate, we managed to: cut the 
funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in half, to $7.5 
million; condition $4 million of the $6 million for Advanced Concepts 
on further reporting and planning on Stockpile Stewardship; and contain 
spending on the Modern Pit Facility to $10 million, a $12 million 
reduction.
  Critically, we also managed to win passage of a requirement that any 
move to develop a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator further than the 6.2A 
phase require a specific congressional authorization.
  As many of my colleagues know, there is a formal set of phases by 
which new and modified nuclear weapons move through research, 
development, production, deployment, and retirement.
  As a recent CRS report states, ``The Key phases for Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator are: phase 6.2, feasibility study and down select; 
phase 6.2A, design definition and cost study; phase 6.3, development 
engineering in which the nuclear weapons labs produce a completed 
warhead design; and phase 6.4, production engineering, in which the 
design is a adopted for production and a system to manufacture the 
weapon is created.''
  So when the administration wants to move beyond 6.2A to 6.3 and into 
the development engineering phase, they need specific Congressional 
authorization.
  Continuing its efforts, the administration came back this year and 
asked for significantly more funding for research into new nuclear 
weapons.
  Indeed, the administration's budget requests before Congress this 
year total some $96.5 million, and makes it clear that there are those 
in this administration who are deadly serious about the development and 
deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons.
  The administration's FY 2005 budget request calls for: $27.5 million 
for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator; $9 million for Advanced 
Concepts Initiative, which includes so-called ``low yield'' weapons 
(under 5 kilotons); and $30 million for the Modern Pit Facility.
  This is just the tip of the iceberg. The Congressional Research 
Service now reports that the administration's own long-term budget 
plans, including $485 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator 
between 2005 and 2009, ``cast doubt'' on the contention that the study 
of new nuclear weapons are, in fact, only a study.
  This ramp-up in funding can mean one thing: the administration is 
determined to develop and deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons.
  Yes, the administration is seeking to re-open the nuclear door and is 
seeking more ``usable'' nuclear weapons:
  The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, for use in launching first 
strikes to reach deeply embedded command bunkers; and
  Tactical nuclear weapons, for possible use on the battlefield.

[[Page S4487]]

  The logic of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, for instance, is 
that there are certain scenarios in which the United States could need 
a nuclear weapon to destroy deeply buried targets--such as command 
bunkers--which could not be effectively targeted by conventional 
weapons.
  The goal would be to develop a weapon that could burrow into the 
earth deep enough so that it would be ``antiseptic'', with fallout 
contained deep beneath the surface, 500-1000 feet below the surface.
  There are three problems with this:
  First, a casing that can drill down 800-1000 feet before the warhead 
explodes does not exist. While the U.S. has technologically 
sophisticated missiles, there is no such casing at this time.
  Second, advanced conventional munitions can shut down air vents, cut-
off electricity, and render these targets harmless.
  Third, and most critically, it is not possible to contain the 
radioactive fallout from these weapons--and the radioactive fallout is 
enormous.
  According to Stanford University physicist Sidney Drell, even a one-
kiloton weapon detonated 20-50 feet underground would dig a crater the 
size of ground zero and eject a million cubic feet of radioactive 
debris into the air. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is a 100 
megaton weapon, so magnify that by 100-fold.

  You would need to burrow more than 800 feet into the earth before the 
weapon exploded in order to contain the fallout from the Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator. The maximum feasible depth we can bury a warhead into 
the earth today is about 35 feet.
  Use of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator would be a cataclysm of 
the highest order. Using one might well take out a buried North Korean 
bunker, but would also kill tens of thousands, if not hundreds of 
thousands in both North and South Korea and, depending on wind 
patterns, either China and Japan as well.
  So the idea that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator would provide 
the United States with a usable nuclear weapon--perhaps even a weapon 
that would be an effective first strike weapon--is absurd.
  Furthermore, it represents a major departure from U.S. policy and 
makes our nation less safe--not more.
  This is in fact part of the administration's broader policy in the 
international arena that can best be summed up in two words: Arrogant 
unilateralism.
  This administration has: engaged in unnecessarily belligerent 
unilateralist rhetoric and action; dismissed arms control and 
nonproliferation efforts as ineffective; emphasized the role of pre-
emptive military action; and pursued new nuclear weapon capabilities.
  The administration is sending the destabilizing message that nuclear 
weapons have utility, thereby encouraging the proliferation the United 
States seeks to prevent.
  Instead, I believe that the United States' top priority for nuclear 
security should be preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and the means to deliver them.
  Leading non-proliferation efforts and actions, and convincing the 
world to follow, that's how the world will be safer today and safer 
tomorrow.
  U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: I am not a supporter of unilateral 
disarmament. I am a supporter of treaties, agreements, and programs 
with strong enforcement and interdiction programs to accomplish multi-
lateral disarmament.
  I believe that this Nation should always be in a position to protect 
itself, with a strong military, and the most advanced technology 
available to that military.
  But I believe that moving ahead with these programs is folly.
  First, who would want to send their son or daughter to a battlefield 
with tactical nuclear weapons?
  Second, under what circumstances would a President push the ``Red 
Button'' for a nuclear first strike that would launch a nuclear missile 
of 100 kilotons, 4 or 5 times more devastating than Hiroshima, which 
killed 140,000 in just the first four months after the Bomb was 
dropped.
  The United States has the most advanced conventional strike forces in 
the world. We have conventional bombs that can burrow into the earth 
and deliver thousands of pounds of explosives.
  If the United States develops new nuclear weapons, what do we think 
India will do?
  If the United States develops new nuclear weapons, what do we think 
Pakistan will do?
  And what about Iran and North Korea?
  Does this encourage them to develop battlefield nuclear weapons? I 
believe it does.
  This administration is placing too great an emphasis on efforts to 
develop and deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons.
  This is the wrong policy and, in my view, will only cause America to 
be placed in greater jeopardy in the future.
  What should be done?
  First, Congress should cut the funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator and Advanced Concepts entirely.
  Second, Congress should close an inadvertent loophole that appears to 
allow the Administration to go forward with design engineering of low-
yield or other Advanced Concepts weapons, but requires specific 
Congressional action for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
  Congress should put the same restrictions on Advance Systems that are 
required for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator--and require specific 
Congressional authorization for design engineering and development of 
battlefield nuclear weapons.
  I will propose such an amendment most likely in mark-up or Conference 
Committee.
  Third, Congress should postpone funding for the Modern Pit Facility 
until we receive a joint laboratory report that will include the finds 
of ``accelerated aging'' experiment, due in 2006,
  Although it is true that the pits in current U.S. warheads are 
expected to slowly deteriorate as they age--and at some point will need 
to be replaced if the warheads are to remain in the stockpile--until 
that study is completed we simply have insufficient data to measure 
either the urgency by which pits need to be replaced or how many pits a 
year the United States needs to be able to manufacture to meet 
replacement needs.
  Finally, Congress should deny any funding for new nuclear weapons 
until the reports we are awaiting justify these programs, including:
  The report on stockpile stewardship required by last year's Energy 
and Water bill and which is intended to help inform decision making; 
and,
  A formal report that spells out the specific military necessity of 
any of these new weapons. Usually, the military requirements for a 
specific weapons system--nuclear or nonnuclear are provided before well 
before funds are provided for design engineering.
  These steps are necessary to bring this administration's unrestrained 
enthusiasm for developing new nuclear weapons under control, and assure 
that the United States proceeds in this area with all the seriousness 
and restraint that is fitting for a great power.
  Now, I want to take a moment to say what I believe the United States 
should be doing with regard to nuclear policy.
  First and foremost, the United States must work with others in the 
international community to address the larger nuclear non-proliferation 
problem.
  Proliferation poses a clear and present danger not only to our nation 
but to the world.
  President Bush offered a glimmer of hope two months ago, when he 
called for international cooperation on controlling the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  In his speech, President Bush called for: expanding efforts to obtain 
multilateral cooperation in interdicting land, sea and air shipments of 
WMD-related equipment, materials and technology.
  Early adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution that would 
require all Nations to criminalize certain proliferation-related 
activities, enact strict export control regulations, and ensure 
adequate security for nuclear and other sensitive materials within 
their borders.
  Expansion of threat-reduction assistance programs that are designed 
to secure sensitive materials and prevent former weapons scientists 
from selling their expertise on the black market.

[[Page S4488]]

  Closing a loophole in the Nonproliferation Treaty--NPT--that has 
enabled countries like Iran to acquire dual-use facilities capable of 
producing bomb-grade plutonium under the guise of a civil nuclear 
energy program.

  Strengthening verification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by 
calling on countries to adhere to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's--IAEA--Additional Protocol.
  The creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board to deal with 
verification and compliance.
  Ensuring that no country under investigation for violating nuclear 
proliferation obligations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board 
of Governors.
  These are important steps, but they do not amount to a comprehensive 
non-proliferation strategy.
  Building on what the President suggested, I believe the following 
actions are needed to implement a comprehensive approach to non-
proliferation:
  First, the U.S. should support strengthened international monitoring 
and inspection capabilities, such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's Additional Protocol.
  The Additional Protocol is an addendum to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which would expand the amount of information that Nations will 
have to provide the IAEA--including, the location, operational status, 
and production of any uranium and thorium mines.
  It also would expand IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear 
facilities by providing the agency with authority to visit, on short or 
no notice, any facility to investigate questions or inconsistencies in 
a state's nuclear declarations.
  The Additional Protocol has now passed the Senate, and I believe that 
the United States must work with the IAEA to give it reality and force.
  Second, the U.S. and other global powers can no longer ignore the 
possession of nuclear weapons by allies and friends.
  India and Pakistan are not a direct threat to the United States, but 
they do threaten one another, and, as we recently learned, Pakistan has 
been at the hub of a global black market in nuclear technology.
  According to a press report last Friday, it is possible that India is 
now seeking to develop a low-yield nuclear weapon of less than one 
kiloton, following in the footsteps of the Bush administration's 
nuclear weapons policy.
  Such a move by India would likely be extremely destabilizing for 
Asia. We must realize that the way in which the United States and our 
friends and allies approach nuclear weapons has a profound impact on 
global security, and we must be willing to make sure that our friends, 
no less than states of concern, adopt a responsible approach to nuclear 
weapons.
  Third, the international community must consider new ways to restrict 
access to dangerous nuclear technologies.
  The Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantee of access to ``peaceful'' 
nuclear technology has allowed states such as Iran to acquire uranium 
enrichment or plutonium production facilities useful for weapons 
without adequate oversight and monitoring.
  I support efforts in the UN Security Council to effectively 
criminalize trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, and work with 
other nations to make sure that effective means to control the spread 
of any WMD technology are in place.
  Fourth, the United States should expand and accelerate Nunn-Lugar 
threat reduction programs.
  This initiative has helped make the United States and the world safer 
over the past 10 years by improving security and taking much of the 
Soviet era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons arsenal and 
infrastructure out of circulation. Yet funding for Nunn-Lugar has 
remained flat at about $1 billion annually over the past several years.
  The bipartisan Baker-Cutler Commission proposed last year that U.S. 
efforts for nuclear security should be increased to $30 billion over 
ten years, and I believe it is critical that we increase Nunn-Lugar 
funding so that resources are commensurate with the challenge.
  Fifth, we must redouble our efforts to secure and remove all 
unprotected nuclear material, especially material at the world's most 
vulnerable sites.
  During the Cold War more than twenty tons of HEU were distributed 
around the world to research reactors and other facilities. Most of 
this material is poorly guarded and much is stored at extremely 
vulnerable sites.
  Along with Senators Reed, Nelson, and Levin I recently introduced 
legislation to give our government the direction, tools, and resources 
necessary to secure and remove nuclear materials from around the world 
in an expeditious manner by creating a single, integrated U.S. 
government program, with a defined budget and resources, to facilitate 
the removal of these materials. It is my hope that Congress will take 
action on this legislation soon.
  Sixth, the United States should work to achieve a global halt to the 
production of weapons usable fissile materials through the Fissile 
Material Cut off Treaty--FMCT.
  Progress on multilateral negotiations to end the supply of new 
material for nuclear bombs has been stalled for years.
  Now, a shift in China's position opens the way for progress. 
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has decided to reevaluate its 
support for such an agreement.
  Seventh, the United States should seek to engage in discussions with 
``states of proliferation concern'' to look for ways to bring such 
states into the community of responsible nations.
  These are states that have nuclear weapons or may be pursuing them 
and include: India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Syria, 
Brazil, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
  Despite the administration's claim of a Libya success story, other 
nations appear to be drawing different conclusions from the 
Administration's approach on these issues.
  We are experiencing on-going crises involving the North Korean 
nuclear weapons programs, and Iran now appears to be on the verge of a 
nuclear weapons capability.
  Finally, the United States and other nuclear weapon states must 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their own thinking.
  For the United States to be increasing funding for the research and 
development of a new generation of nuclear weapons even as we are 
telling others that they should not pursue these weapons themselves may 
well provoke the very proliferation we seek to prevent.
  I strongly support a robust military to safeguard America's National 
Security interests.
  But I believe we will make our nation and our allies less secure--not 
more--if the United States opens the door to the development, testing, 
and deployment of new tactical and `low-yield' nuclear weapons.
  The administration claims that it is not seeking to develop these 
nuclear weapons.
  But I think we've seen that the facts demonstrate that this is not 
the case.
  That is why those of us who do not want the nuclear door opened need 
to stand firm and oppose these efforts by the administration to develop 
these weapons.

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