[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 49 (Thursday, April 8, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4051-S4052]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. GRAHAM of Florida (for himself, Mrs. Clinton, Mrs. Boxer, 
        Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. 
        Hollings, and Mrs. Lincoln):
  S. 2313. A bill to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require 
a voter-verified permanent record or hardcopy under title III of such 
Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules and 
Administration.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, the people of the United States 
learned many things from the election of 2000. I believe the most 
important lesson was that voting equipment should produce a clear paper 
record of each voter's intentions for use in a manual recount. 
Americans remember well that the outcome of the 2000 presidential 
election was determined by whether a ``chad'' was hanging, pregnant, or 
dimpled.
  More recently we have found that, despite the passage of election 
reform legislation in 2002 called the Help America Vote Act, our 
electoral system is still experiencing difficulties. The 2004 
presidential primaries have produced accounts of voting irregularities. 
This is especially distressing considering another national election is 
just months away. Voters in several States, including California, 
Maryland, Georgia and my own State of Florida have experienced problems 
casting their votes and seeing them accurately counted.
  On the Tuesday, March 9, 2004, presidential primary in Palm Beach 
County, FL, the ``oops factor'' again reared its ugly head, casting 
doubt in the minds of many Floridians about whether or not their votes 
actually counted. An error on the part of poll workers--pressing the 
wrong button to activate voting machines--prevented many from voting in 
the Democratic primary. A technological error in the tabulation of 
ballots in Bay County, FL showed Congressman Dick Gephardt winning the 
primary by a 2-to-1 margin. Fortunately, Bay County uses a paper ballot 
system so they could refer to their paper trail to rectify the error.
  This is not the first election since 2000 where the value of a paper 
record has been apparent. Just this past January, victory in a South 
Florida Republican primary election for a vacant seat in the State 
legislature was determined by just 12 votes. In that election, 137 
blank ballots were cast on electronic voting machines that do not 
produce a paper record. A candidate requested a manual recount, only to 
find such a recount impossible without paper records verifying the 
intent of those 137 voters.
  In Georgia's Presidential Primary, ``smart cards'' containing ballot 
information for electronic machines were left unprogrammed. Technical 
irregularities in Maryland elections prevented at least one voter form 
voting--and he wrote about it in the Washington Post.
  These incidents and many others are clear evidence that we need 
voting machines that produce an individual paper record for all votes 
cast. While the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) included provisions 
requiring paper records for manual audits, we have come to find out 
that voting jurisdictions are not interpreting these provision the way 
Congress intended.
  I am pleased to join Senators Clinton and Boxer in introducing the 
Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act (RECORD 
Act). This legislation will ensure that all voting jurisdictions will 
have machines that produce voter-verifiable paper records, so that they 
will be as prepared as they can be to count every vote come this 
November. It is critical that Congress take every possible step to 
prevent any resemblance between Election Day 2000 and Election Day 
2004.
  Once a month I spend a day working side-by-side with the people of 
Florida. On Saturday, March 6, 2003, I spent my 399th Workday as an 
elections worker for the Miami-Dade County Division of Elections. 
Veteran Supervisor of Elections Connie Kaplan assured me that

[[Page S4052]]

electronic voting machines are accurate. The things I learned on the 
job reinforced that assessment. But several voters expressed confusion 
about the layout of the electronic ballots, and uncertainty about 
whether or not their votes had been cast. It was clear to me that 
voters would be more confident that their votes would be counted if 
there were a paper record of those votes. In light of reported 
irregularities and security concerns, this voter apprehension is 
legitimate. In order to be certain about the accuracy and security of 
computer voting systems we need a paper record to confirm every vote 
cast.
  Modern society is replete with electronic machines that provide the 
most basic services: ATMs, train ticket vending machines, gasoline pay-
at-the-pump stations. All of these machines produce paper records. The 
votes of America's citizens are at least as important as these 
transactions. People do not and should not blindly trust the accuracy 
of computer voting technologies. Congress must pass the RECORD Act so 
that Americans can have confidence that their votes will be counted.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator Graham in 
introducing the ``Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative 
Democracy Act of 2004'' (``RECORD'' Act) because there is no civic 
action more important in a democracy than voting. Yet right now, many 
Americans have concerns about the integrity of the electoral system. We 
must restore trust in our voting, and we must do it now.
  Electronic voting systems, specifically touch-screen voting machines, 
are being increasingly used across the nation. Indeed, according to 
Election Data Services, it is estimated that this November, at least 50 
million voters this year will vote on touch-screen voting machines.
  These machines have benefits but there are major concerns with the 
security of these machines and the current ability of voters to verify 
their votes through a paper record. This legislation effectively 
addresses both of these vitally important issues.
  In New York, electronic voting is on the horizon. Some machines will 
be used next year in the New York City mayoral race. As New Yorkers 
start to use this new technology, I want them to be absolutely certain 
their right to elect the leaders of their choice won't be at risk for 
want of a simple fix like this.
  When you use an ATM, you get a paper receipt. Right now, when you 
cast an electronic vote, you get nothing. You have no way of knowing 
that the selections you've made on the touch screen will be recorded 
and counted.
  This legislation will ensure that voters will be able to verify a 
paper ballot that accurately reflects their intentions and that will be 
locked away and will be the official ballot in a recount. This 
legislation will also address the security issues surrounding 
electronic voting systems.
  Why is this so critical? Because we know from computer experts that 
these systems are vulnerable to hacking--and that with just a push of a 
button, hackers could turn Kerry votes to Bush votes. Think about that.
  Indeed, a number of recent studies, including the July 2001 study by 
Caltech/MIT, the July 2003 study by Johns Hopkins and Rice 
universities, the September 2003 study by Science Applications 
International, and the two November 2003 studies conducted by Compuware 
corporation and InfoSENTRY, pointed to significant and disturbing 
security risks in electronic voting systems and related administrative 
procedures and processes.
  According to the Johns Hopkins study, these voting machines are 
incapable of detecting their own mistakes. Specifically, as one of the 
authors noted, there is no way to validate the outcome of an election 
using the current crop of machines. Errors can't be detected and, in my 
opinion, that is a threat to all of us.
  There were also problems with these machines in the recent 
presidential primaries. Counties in California, Georgia, and Maryland 
reported problems with encoders, the devices that allow touch-screen 
voting machines to display the candidate and ballot measures specific 
to one county.
  We already know of stories from Florida in which there was a special 
election for one office, and the computer election system recorded 120 
people as there but not voting.
  These security concerns have only been inflamed by statements from 
people like Walden O'Dell--the CEO of Diebold, a major electronic 
voting machine manufacturer--who said he would do anything to ensure 
that President Bush would be re-elected.
  So we have a system that is vulnerable to attack, that provides no 
real accountability to ensure accuracy and, to add to our concerns, an 
e-voting manufacturer demonstrating his tremendous partisanship. This 
should give us all pause.
  This legislation will require the use of voter verifiable paper 
ballots so that each and every voter will be able to confirm that his 
or her vote was accurately cast and recorded. The verified paper ballot 
will be deemed the official record for purposes of a recount and at 
least 2 percent of all ballots in all jurisdictions in each State and 2 
percent of the ballots of military and overseas voters will be counted 
at random.
  One hundred and fifty million will also be appropriated to the 
Election Assistance Commission in order to help States implement the 
paper ballot system.
  To ensure greater security of electronic voting systems, the Act 
authorizes the use of only open source software. Manufacturers will 
also have to satisfy a number of security standards concerning the 
development, maintenance, and transfer of software used in electronic 
voting systems.
  This legislation also provides $10 million to the Election Assistance 
Commission to help it administer the implementation of verification 
systems and improved security measures nationally, and $2 million to 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology for consultation 
services to State and local governments regarding voter verification 
and the security of their electronic voting machines.
  The Commission must receive this additional administrative funding 
because unfortunately, even though the Help America Vote Act of 2002 
authorized $10 million annually to help the Commission do its work, 
Congress in the fiscal year 2004 omnibus appropriations legislation 
appropriated less than $2 million to the Commission, making it that 
much more difficult for the Commission to do its work.
  Lastly, the Act requires the Election Assistance Commission to report 
to Congress within 3 months of enactment on operational and management 
systems that should be used in Federal elections and within 6 months of 
enactment on a proposed security review and certification process for 
all voting systems.
  Our Nation is the greatest nation on earth and it is the leading 
democracy in the world. In fact, the Bush Administration takes pride in 
promoting democracy around the world--and they should. But we also have 
to do everything in our power to ensure democracy here. Central to our 
democracy is the ability of Americans to have confidence in the voting 
system used to register and record their votes. This is a fundamental 
standard that must be met. We are currently, however, falling short of 
that standard.
  And let me say one more thing. The election this November is going to 
be one of the most important of my lifetime. And every pundit in 
America says it will be close, because we are still so divided. If we 
have huge problems again, if we have another debacle like Palm Beach 
voting for Buchanan, people will fundamentally lose confidence in our 
democracy and in their vote. We cannot let that happen.
  This legislation is good insurance against that risk. For all of 
those who believe that in a democracy, there is no more important task 
than assuring the sanctity of votes, this should be an easy step to 
take to assure it. I ask all of my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
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