[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 49 (Thursday, April 8, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4049-S4050]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Nelson of Florida, and Mr. 
        Reed):
  S. 2310. A bill to promote the national security of the United States 
by facilitating the removal of potential nuclear weapons materials from 
vulnerable sites around the world, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation 
to address one of the critical security issues in the post 9/11 world: 
the existence of hundreds of vulnerable facilities around the world 
with nuclear materials. If keeping weapons of mass destruction, WMD, 
out of the hands of terrorists is at the top of our foreign policy 
agenda, then removing weapons-usable material from facilities where it 
is susceptible to terrorist theft or should diversion be a top priority 
for U.S. national security policy.
  Yet, currently, there is no single, integrated U.S. government 
program, with a defined budget and resources, to facilitate the removal 
of these materials. The legislation I introduce today with Senators 
Bill Nelson, and Reed will: establish a presidential task force in the 
Department of Energy on nuclear removal; provide a specific mandate for 
a program to remove nuclear materials from vulnerable sites around the 
world as quickly as possible; provide specific direction to allow the 
use of flexible incentives, tailored to each site, to secure host-
country cooperation in removing the nuclear materials, and; authorize 
$40 million in Fiscal Year 2005 to carry out the functions of this 
bill.
  There are hundreds of facilities around the world that store from 
kilograms to tons of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, HEU. The 
State Department has identified 24 of these locations as high priority 
sites.
  President Bush singled out terrorist nuclear attacks on the United 
States as the defining threat our nation will face in the future. In 
making the case against Saddam Hussein, he argued: ``If the Iraqi 
regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of uranium a little 
bigger than a softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a 
year.''
  What he did not mention is that with the same amount of uranium, al 
Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, or any terrorist organization could do the 
same and smuggle the weapon across U.S. borders. And the fact that AQ 
Khan's network put actual bomb designs on the black market only 
heightens the need to make sure the ingredients are not available.
  In response to this threat, the Administration has focused its 
efforts on removing vulnerable international nuclear materials through 
four projects: the take-back to Russia of HEU fuels from Soviet-
supplied reactors; the on-going effort to convert Soviet-designed 
research reactors from HEU to non-bomb-grade fuels; the decades-long 
effort to convert U.S.-supplied research reactors from HEU to LEU, and; 
the on-going effort to take back U.S.-supplied HEU.
  This represents an important first step, but I am deeply concerned 
that these efforts are not sufficient and do not adequately address the 
seriousness of the issue.
  The current approach will take 10-20 years to complete at the current 
rate of about 1 facility per year. This is a time frame out of synch 
with near-term dangers.
  Under the current approach to the take-back of Soviet-supplied HEU, 
there have been only two successful HEU removals in more than two 
years, at Vinca and at Pitesti. But the Vinca operation also required 
the contribution of $5 million from the Nuclear Threat Initiative to 
complete, because of the administration's claim of inadequate authority 
to pursue various activities to facilitate Serbian cooperation.
  The U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement on a broader take-back effort 
has taken years to complete--and even once final Russian government 
approval is secured, there are a wide range of other issues delaying 
progress within Russia, including the need to prepare environmental 
assessments of types that have never before been done in Russia, that 
will require sustained, high-level pressure to overcome.
  U.S. efforts to convert HEU-fueled reactors within Russia are still 
moving slowly on the technical front, in part because of insufficient 
funding, and we are only now beginning to take the first steps toward 
providing incentives directly to facilities to give up their HEU.
  The scope of the HEU conversion effort in Russia is inadequate. It 
covers only research reactors. Outside the scope of current efforts are 
critical assemblies, pulsed powered reactors, and civilian and military 
naval fuels. This leaves numerous vulnerable HEU stockpiles scattered 
across the FSU.
  Under the current U.S. HEU take-back effort, the return of U.S.-
origin HEU fuels, if no new incentives are offered, tons of U.S.-
supplied HEU will remain abroad when the program is complete, this is 
DOE's official projection.
  Under the current U.S. HEU reactor conversion effort, if no new 
incentives are offered, scores of U.S.-supplied reactors may continue 
to use HEU indefinitely.
  A report released last year from the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University described a scenario in which a 10 
kiloton nuclear bomb is smuggled into Manhattan and detonated resulting 
in the loss of 500,000 people and causing $1 trillion in direct 
economic damage.
  We must do everything in our power to prevent such an event from ever 
occurring.
  We need a presidential task force in the Department of Energy on 
nuclear removal. We must provide a specific mandate for a program to 
remove nuclear materials from vulnerable sites around the world as 
quickly as possible and provide specific direction to allow the use of 
flexible incentives, tailored to each site, to secure host-country 
cooperation in removing the nuclear materials.

[[Page S4050]]

  And, yes, we need additional funding to get the job done.
  This legislation will give our government the direction, tools, and 
resources necessary to remove nuclear materials from vulnerable sites 
around the world in an expeditious manner. We have little time to 
spare. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2310

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS 
                   FROM VULNERABLE SITES WORLDWIDE.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     removing potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable 
     sites around the world would reduce the possibility that such 
     materials could fall into the hands of al Qaeda or other 
     groups and states hostile to the United States, and should be 
     a top priority for achieving the national security of the 
     United States.
       (b) Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal.--(1) The 
     President shall establish in the Department of Energy a task 
     force to be known as the Task Force on Nuclear Material 
     Removal (in this section referred to as the ``Task Force'').
       (2) The head of the Task Force shall be the Director of the 
     Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal, who shall be 
     appointed by the President for that purpose.
       (3) The Director of the Task Force shall report directly to 
     the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
     of the National Nuclear Security Administration regarding the 
     activities of the Task Force under this section.
       (4)(A) The Secretary of Energy, the Administrator for 
     Nuclear Security, and the Deputy Administrator for Defense 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation shall assign to the Task Force 
     personnel having such experience and expertise as is 
     necessary to permit the Task Force to carry out its mission 
     under this section.
       (B) The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator for 
     Nuclear Security shall jointly consult with the Assistant to 
     the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of 
     State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission, the heads of other appropriate 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and 
     appropriate international organizations in order to identify 
     and establish mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the 
     Task Force is able to draw quickly on the capabilities of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government and such 
     international organizations to carry out its mission under 
     this section.
       (C) Mechanisms under subparagraph (B) may include the 
     assignment to the Task Force of personnel of the Department 
     of Energy and of other departments and agencies of the 
     Federal Government.
       (5) The President may establish within the Executive Office 
     of the President a mechanism for coordinating the activities 
     of the Task Force under this section.
       (c) Mission.--The mission of the Task Force shall be to 
     ensure that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely 
     removed from the most vulnerable sites around the world as 
     soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (d) Assistance.--To assist the Task Force in carrying out 
     its mission under this section, the Secretary of Energy may--
       (1) provide funds to remove potential nuclear weapons 
     materials from vulnerable sites, including funds to cover the 
     costs of--
       (A) transporting such materials from such sites to secure 
     facilities;
       (B) providing interim security upgrades for such materials 
     pending their removal from their current sites;
       (C) managing such materials after their arrival at secure 
     facilities;
       (D) purchasing such materials;
       (E) converting such sites to the use of low-enriched 
     uranium fuels;
       (F) assisting in the closure and decommissioning of such 
     sites; and
       (G) providing incentives to facilitate the removal of such 
     materials from vulnerable facilities;
       (2) arrange for the shipment of potential nuclear weapons 
     materials to the United States, or to other countries willing 
     to accept such materials and able to provide high levels of 
     security for such materials, and dispose of such materials, 
     in order to ensure that United States national security 
     objectives are accomplished as quickly and effectively as 
     possible; and
       (3) provide funds to upgrade security and accounting at 
     sites where, as determined by the Secretary, potential 
     nuclear weapons materials will remain for an extended period 
     in order to ensure that such materials are secure against 
     plausible potential threats, and will remain so in the 
     future.
       (e) Report.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the submittal 
     to Congress of the budget of the President for fiscal year 
     2006 pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
     Code, the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with other 
     relevant Federal Government and international agencies, shall 
     submit to Congress a report that includes the following:
       (A) A list of the sites determined by the Task Force to be 
     of the highest priorities for removal of potential nuclear 
     weapons materials, based on the quantity and attractiveness 
     of such materials at such sites and the risk of theft or 
     diversion of such materials for weapons purposes.
       (B) An inventory of all sites worldwide where highly-
     enriched uranium or separated plutonium is located, 
     including, to the extent practicable, a prioritized 
     assessment of the terrorism and proliferation risk posed by 
     such materials at each such site, based on the quantity of 
     such materials, the attractiveness of such materials for use 
     in nuclear weapons, the current level of security and 
     accounting for such materials, and the level of threat 
     (including the effects of terrorist or criminal activity and 
     the pay and morale of personnel and guards) in the country or 
     region where such sites are located.
       (C) A strategic plan, including measurable milestones and 
     metrics, for accomplishing the mission of the Task Force 
     under this section.
       (D) An estimate of the funds required to complete the 
     mission of the Task Force under this section, set forth by 
     year until anticipated completion of the mission.
       (E) The recommendations of the Secretary on whether any 
     further legislative actions or international agreements are 
     necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission of 
     the Task Force.
       (F) Such other information on the status of activities 
     under this section as the Secretary considers appropriate.
       (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex.
       (f) Potential Nuclear Weapons Material Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``potential nuclear weapons material'' 
     means plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, or other material 
     capable of sustaining an explosive nuclear chain reaction, 
     including irradiated materials if the radiation field from 
     such materials is not sufficient to prevent the theft and use 
     of such materials for an explosive nuclear chain reaction.
       (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal 
     year 2005 for activities of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration in carrying out programs necessary for 
     national security for purposes of defense nuclear 
     nonproliferation activities, $40,000,000 to carry out this 
     section.
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