[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 33 (Tuesday, March 16, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E379-E384]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   PREVENT INDONESIA FROM RECEIVING IMET FUNDING IN FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. JOEL HEFLEY

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, March 16, 2004

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I offered an amendment that was intended to 
cut $600,000 out of the IMET account to prevent Indonesia from 
receiving IMET funding in fiscal year 2004.
  As many members are aware, I offered an amendment to the Foreign 
Service Re-Authorization Act of 2004 and 2005 that would limit 
Indonesia's participation in the IMET program. My amendment would limit 
Indonesia from receiving International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) funds until the President certifies to Congress that the 
Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are taking 
effective measures, including cooperating with the Director of the FBI, 
in conducting a full investigation of the attack and to criminally 
prosecute the individuals responsible for the attack.
  For those members that are not aware, on August 31, 2002, the staff 
of the International School in West Papua, Indonesia decided to take a 
picnic. The teachers lived and worked in Tembagapura, a company town 
located high in the mountains near the Grasberg gold

[[Page E380]]

and copper mine. The group of eleven people, including a 6-year-old 
child, drove in two vehicles to a picnic site about 10 miles away on 
the road to Timika. Because it began to rain, they decided to return to 
town for lunch.
  The road they were traveling on is not an ordinary road. The road is 
surrounded by the gold and copper mine, and is heavily guarded by the 
Indonesian military. At both ends of this mountain road are military 
check points, which seals the road and control access to Tembagapura.
  As they returned home, the group was brutally attacked by a band of 
terrorists. Two Americans, Ted Burgon (from Oregon) and Rick Spier 
(from Colorado), and an Indonesian man were killed in the ambush. The 
attack, which occurred less than a half-mile away from an Indonesian 
military check point, went on for approximately 45 minutes. Hundreds of 
rounds were fired at the teachers and their vehicles. Most of the 
survivors, including the 6-year-old child, were shot. Several of the 
teachers were shot multiple times and suffered horrible injuries.
  Ted Burgon of Sunriver, Oregon was killed and his wife Nancy suffered 
facial cuts and abrasions. Rick Spier of Littleton, Colorado was 
killed, and his wife Patsy was shot in the back and foot. Francine 
Goodfriend of Rockford, Illinois was shot and has a spinal cord injury. 
Steven Emma of Broward County, Florida was shot in the legs, buttocks, 
and suffered injuries to his back. Lynn Poston of Olga, Washington was 
shot in the shoulder and legs. Suandra Hopkins of Sunriver, Oregon was 
shot in the side, legs, and pellets around the eye and his wife Taia 
was shot in the buttocks.
  Following the attack, the Indonesian Police promptly began an 
investigation. They collected evidence, interviewed witnesses and 
reconstructed the ambush. The Indonesian Police issued a report (that I 
ask for unanimous consent to submit for the Record) concluding, ``there 
is a strong possibility that the Tambagapura case was perpetrated by 
members of the Indonesian National Army Force, however, it still needs 
to be investigated further.''
  In early November 2002, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that 
``United States intelligence agencies have intercepted messages between 
Indonesian army commanders indicating that they were involved in 
staging an ambush at the remote mine in which three school teachers, 
two of them Americans, were killed. . . .'' The Washington Post has 
reported these same intelligence intercepts.

  Despite this intelligence, the investigation of the attack has 
faltered. The Indonesian Police have been effectively removed from the 
case due to their report that implicated the military. The two senior 
Indonesian police officers who uncovered evidence of the army's 
involvement have been transferred to new posts, and the investigation 
has now been handed over to a joint military police team. Not 
surprisingly, the Indonesian military has exonerated itself. American 
investigative teams, including the FBI, have not been able to complete 
their investigations due mainly to the Indonesian military's refusal to 
cooperate and its tampering of evidence.
  The evasions and obstructions of the Indonesian military are wholly 
unacceptable, and it is incumbent upon this Congress to see that a 
thorough investigation is conducted. The victims of this brutal attack 
deserve no less. My amendment is, therefore, intended to ensure that 
the perpetrators of this heinous crime against Americans are brought to 
justice. To the extent that the Indonesian military was involved, the 
United States should insist on criminal prosecution of all involved 
parties.
  Mr. Speaker, the amendment is important. It gives voice to our 
commitment that the United States will hold accountable the 
perpetrators and protectors of terrorism. We will exhaust every means 
to protect our citizens. We will pursue terrorists wherever they may be 
and hold to account. We will demand justice for attacks against our 
citizens and withhold aid from those countries that do not cooperate in 
bringing terrorists to justice. As President Bush has stated, ``if you 
are not with us you are against us.'' It is time for Indonesia to 
choose who it will align itself with, the terrorists or the coalition 
of nations that bring them to justice.

                             Report Summary


                      I. SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 2002

       1. Location of the Incident: Mile 62-63. In between two 
     Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and 
     Security stations, height, steep gorge on the right hand 
     side, hill on the left hand side, foggy, difficult to escape.
       2. Victim: 3 (three) died, 11 (eleven) heavy/light injured, 
     not specified.
       3. Evidence:
       2 (two) Toyota LWB land cruiser, 2 (two) dump trucks, 1 
     (one) trailer truck;
       94 (ninety four) bullet shells--5.56 mm caliber;
       6 (six) bullet shells--7.62 51 mm caliber;
       1 (one) broken magazine;
       134 (one hundred thirty four) shooting holes on 5 (five) 
     evidence vehicles (not included those that hit the 
     windshields, approximately more than 200 (two hundreds) 
     rounds; and
       Broken windshields.
       4. Witnesses: 3 (three) witnesses saw that there were 
     around 3 (three) shooters with the following identifications:
       Wore striped dress without any attributes;
       Wore green ``sebo'' (camouflage paint that is worn on the 
     face); and
       Carried black long barrel rifle.
       5. The victims: They saw approximately 11 (eleven) shooters 
     with the following identifications:
       1 (one) person wore a black shirt and striped pants;
       1 (one) person wore military boots;
       6 (six) persons ran into the bushes in front of the 
     location of the incident; and
       3 (three) persons ran in the direction of Timika.


                     II. SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2002

       1. 08:45 East Indonesian Time (EIT): Processing team, led 
     by the Head of the County Police of Mimika and the Head of 
     the Detective Unit, was repeatedly shot at around the 
     location of the incident.
       2. 11:00 EIT: Vacuum Condition (VC) of the member of 
     Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and 
     Security--
       11:40 EIT:
       Mr. X was shot to death; and
       Mr. Suherman, Private of the Highest Rank, was shot in his 
     right thigh.
       13:30 EIT:
       Head of the Provincial Police, Territorial Military 
     Commander, Military Regiment Commander, Military District 
     Commander, Head of the County Police, and Task Force 
     Commander and Security #515 of Army Strategic Reserve Command 
     + the journalists arrived at the location of the incident;
       Mr. X's dead body was laid down on the side of the road;
       No puddle of blood or flowing of blood occurred in the 
     location where Mr. X was placed on the side of the road;
       Stiff dead body (left hand cannot be folded); and
       The dead body has not been identified, approximate age is 
     25 years old, without shoes, Papuan ethnic.
       15:30 EIT: Mr. X's dead body was transferred to Tembagapura 
     Hospital, based on Dr. Kunto Rahardjo's report, the person 
     had been dead for more than 6 (six) hours, small maggots/
     larvas was found on the intestine in the open stomach.
       3. 3 (three) witnesses have seen Mr. X around Station #515 
     in Banti village.


  III. MR X'S CORPSE CONDITION (AUTOPSY RESULT BY DR. AGUNG, FORENSIC 
            SPECIALIST FROM INDONESIAN POLICE HEADQUARTERS)

       1. 4 (four) wounds were caused by the shooting:
       2 (two) shots on the left-hand side of the back;
       1 (one) shot on the upper right hand; and
       1 (one) shot on the right side.
       2. The wound direction on the body: vertical.
       3. The victim was suffering from Testicle Hydrocele for 
     approximately 2 (two) years (the scrotum diameter is 16 cm.).


           IV. RECONSTRUCTION ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

       1. Nothing significant happened on August 31, 2002.
       2. September 1, 2002:
       The distance between First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan (Mr. X's 
     shooter) and Mr. X is approximately 75 meters, there are many 
     sight hindrances and shooting impediments in between).
       The colleagues of the First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan 
     standing within 1-4 meters from Mr. Wayan could not see Mr. 
     X. and his friends.
       The location where Mr. X was shot is very narrow 
     (approximately 0.5 meter), on the side of a very deep gorge, 
     there was no blood stain in that place.
       In between the evening of August 31 (aftermath of the 
     incident 13:40 EIT) and September 1, 2002, the location of 
     the incident was guarded strongly by the Task Force and 
     Security of Army Strategic Reserve Command #515, and has been 
     searched carefully so there will be very small probability 
     that the Rebellious Movement Group still exists there.


                     V. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2002

       1. There was shooting to the vehicle of the Army Strategic 
     Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 63 (1300 
     meters from the station of Army Strategic Reserve Command 
     #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 64).
       2. No victim and no evidence.


                    VI. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002

       1. 09:30 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade 
     and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and 
     Security crossed the bridge at Mile 62, saw that there were 3 
     (three) members of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 
     Task Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.
       2. 11:00 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade 
     and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and 
     Security crossed the Mile 62 bridge, saw that there was 1 
     (one) member of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task 
     Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.
       3. 11:30 EIT, the investigation team that was led by Police 
     Commissioner Adjunct Mr. Helmy Kwarta was on the way to 
     Tembagapura Sectional Police and was shot

[[Page E381]]

     at repeatedly at Mile 61 (Translator's note: the original 
     Indonesian language does not say specifically, whether the 
     vehicle was shot at or the person, whether anyone was injured 
     or died).
       4. 10:30 EIT, the logistic vehicle of the Army Strategic 
     Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security was shot at 
     repeatedly by an unidentified shooter. 8 (eight) bullet 
     holes, 2 (two) from outside and 6 (six) from the inside of 
     the vehicle were found on the vehicle body.
       5. Approximately 1 (one) hour before, the Territorial 
     Military Commander group went down from Tembagapura and 
     passed the shooting area down to Timika.
       6. While the investigation team continued their travel to 
     Tembagapura Sectional Police, the Vice Commander of the Army 
     Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security on 
     behalf of Infantry Major Mr. Aksan Widjaya stopped the team 
     at the place close to the bridge at Mile 62 and told the team 
     that there is/are bomb/s under the bridge. (Translator's 
     note, in the Indonesian language it is not clear about 
     the singular or plural, so it is not clear if there was 
     only one bomb, or more than one).
       7. 3 (three) Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) Detonators, 2 (two) 
     ABC brand batteries and 3 (three) detonator cables 
     approximately 20 meters long were found.
       8. At the same time, the Vice Commander of the Army 
     Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security said, 
     ``This is to inform the Head of the Provincial Police and 
     Territorial Military Commander, please do not always accuse 
     the Indonesian Army Force.''
       9. The Power Gel (the same as the one that is used by PT 
     FIC = Freeport Indonesia Corporation) has expired.
       10. The investigation that has been done in the PT FIC 
     explosive storage showed that there is no indication that 
     this power gel came from this storage, probably this power 
     gel came from the field, the remaining explosion operation in 
     the field.
       11. The XVII Trikora Territorial Military Commander had 
     made a statement in Jakarta, he said that this Tembagapura 
     case probably was caused by the PT FIC internal conflict and 
     it was not caused by the people from the inside of the 
     forest.


                   VII. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002

       There were 2 (two) unidentified threatening telephone 
     calls:
       1. Number 0901-422907 received a call that came from #358 
     that was used by Task Force and Security (It is confirmed by 
     the print out or a hard copy of the call issued by the MIS 
     Department of PT FIC, and this can be used as evidence).
       2. Number 0901-422907 received a call from a cellular phone 
     number 08124887486. This cellular phone belongs to Sergeant 
     First Class Mr. Jatmiko, the member of the Army Special Force 
     Command Cendrawasih Task Force. (Lieutenant Colonel Mr. 
     Siburian acknowledged in front of Papuan Vice Chairman of the 
     Provincial Police that the cellular phone belonged to one of 
     the member of his team, but it has been sold to a bar 
     waitress on Bar Boulevard).
       3. The following was found on Friday, September 20, 2002: 2 
     (two) bullet shells on the hill, at the location where the 
     Papuan Freedom Organization people had gathered to shoot the 
     Mr. Suherman, Private of the Highest Rank, 7 (seven) bullet 
     holders, and 3 (three) bullet shells of 5.56 caliber.


                     VIII. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2002

       Interrogation result from the victim PATRICIA LYNN SPEIR 
     (from Colorado):
       1. At the time right after the shooting on August 31, 2002 
     and before the ambulance came, the victim saw 3 (three) 
     persons who wore dark blue T-shirts, the victim did not pay 
     attention at the color of the pants. 2 (two) Papuans and 1 
     (one) newcomer were helping the victims.
       2. The victim saw 1 (one) other person with the following 
     identification: non Papuan, wore a black vest, without 
     weapon, at the location of the incident.
       3. While waiting for the ambulance to come, a soldier, non 
     Papuan, in a complete uniform with a jungle hat, wearing a 
     shirt without an insignia, with his long barrel gun still hot 
     (the victim felt it without touching it, the victim felt the 
     heat transfer from the gun barrel to the victim's leg at a 
     510 cm distance), was standing up for approximately 10 
     minutes and almost stepped on the victim's leg without doing 
     anything, with an unfriendly radiant eye.


                         IX. COMMUNITY OPINION

       1. Papuan Freedom Organization does not have the quantity 
     of bullets as the number of bullets that were shot during the 
     incident (approximately 200 bullets were found on August 31, 
     2002), and usually this Papuan Freedom Organization will not 
     spend that much ammunition.
       2. There was no indication of the initiation from the tribe 
     around PT FIC that they were going to attack (such as a 
     traditional ritual, statement, a demonstration, etc.).
       3. Mr. Kelly Kwalik had made a statement that his group was 
     not involved in that incident.
       4. The separatist groups leaders (Tom Beanal, Thaha 
     Alhamid, etc.) stated that they were not involved.
       5. Papuan Freedom Organization never kills white people.
       6. Papuan Freedom Organization always gets involved in a 
     ``Hit and Run'' when they make an attack. The fact is that 
     between September 1 until September 14, 2002 there still were 
     shootings.
       7. The Non Government Organization or NGO such as LSM 
     ELSHAM PAPUA and Toga, Tomas, which are pro-separatists 
     groups, were very active in helping the investigation 
     process.


                               X. OTHERS

       1. The morale of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve 
     Command #515 Task Force and Security is relatively low 
     because of the following:
       a. They only receive the incentive of Rp.125,000. per month 
     for the rank of Tamtama (Private Second Class up to the Head 
     of Corporal) and Rp.150,000. per month for the rank of 
     Bintara (from Lower Ranking Sergeant up to Sergeant Major) (a 
     Javanese anecdote says ``Satu Selawe Njaluk Slamet'' or in a 
     free translation it gives a sarcastic meaning ``For One and 
     Twenty Five you are looking for a Safe'') (Translator's note: 
     Rp. Is the Indonesia currency and stands for Rupiah, in 
     August 2002 the approximate exchange rate is US$1.=Rp.9000., 
     so Rp.125,000/month=US$13.89/month and Rp. 150.000/month 
     US$16.67/month).
       b. For a side income they are often selling food and raw 
     material for food to Timika.
       c. On June 23, 2002, 12 (twelve) members of the Indonesian 
     Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security 
     were caught because they stole copper wire.
       d. Their perks, such as vehicles, telephones, etc., were 
     reduced.
       e. They had a high expectation when they transferred to the 
     location of PT FIC (copper and gold mining), but in fact it 
     is very minimal.
       2. The ``Demonstration Effect'' that took place was caused 
     by the excessive living standard of the PT FIC employees 
     (especially those white employees), including the glaring 
     facilities.


 XI. SEPTEMBER 29, 2002: REPETITION OF INCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION ON THE 
                           SEPTEMBER 1, 2002

       1. It was very difficult to see from the place where the 
     First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan was shooting, whether those 2 
     (two) friends of Mr. X were hiding, or whether they were 
     going to take Mr. X's weapon away from him, or whether they 
     were trying to run away.
       2. It was seen that Mr. X's dead body was dragged by 4 
     (four) members of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve 
     Command #515 Task Force by taking turns, 78 meters through 
     trees roots, wet land and sharp gravels.
       3. Blood spots and hair and broken clothes of Mr. X's were 
     not found along the trail that was used to drag Mr. X's dead 
     body.
       4. Mr. Margono, Private of the Highest Rank, stated that he 
     examined the corpse after the corpse had been laid down on 
     the side of the street, the result was; 5 (five) shooting 
     wounds were found, many charms or amulets and fresh blood 
     were found around the corpse and on Mr. X's clothes.


                           XII. FACT FINDING

       1. The vehicle plate numbers DS 20 PD and DS 54 PD that 
     were used by the Task Force of Cendrawasih Army Special Force 
     Command were vague numbers, and they were not issued by 
     Mimika Police Department.
       2. The number on the sides of the vehicles had been erased.
       3. The PT FIC Management Information System (MIS) 
     Department felt regret because they had given the print out 
     or hard copy of the telephone usage to the Indonesian Police, 
     this is related to the unidentified telephone threats: ``If I 
     knew that this is for the police, I will not print it.''


                       XIII. TEMPORARY CONCLUSION

       1. Based on the above-mentioned indicators, there is a 
     strong possibility that the Temabagapura case was perpetrated 
     by the member of the Indonesian National Army Force, however, 
     it still needs to be investigated further.
       2. Maybe the Indonesian National Army Force investigators 
     should be involved, in order to alleviate further misleading 
     circumstances that could harm somebody's life.

 SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER PROCESSING OF THE WITNESS'S INVESTIGATION OFFICIAL REPORT, MR. DECKY MURIP (OPERATIONAL
                                 TEAM ASSISTANCE OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Contents of investigation official report (witnesses
 No.                    has been sworn in)                          Material to be evaluated and analyzed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1   At 7:30 EIT, August 31, 2002, Mr. Decky Murip         Information should be taken from the First
        (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force     Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force
        Command) was invited by the First Lieutenant Mr.      Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army
        Markus (Army Special Force Command) and other 9       Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr.
        (nine) persons among others are 3 (three) persons--   I Wayan Suradnya (Army Special Force Command),
        First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi, Lower Ranking     Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army
        Sergeant Mr. I Putu Suradnya and Private First        Special Force Command).
        Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas with white Freeport         Note:
        vehicle (side number 0609 that used to be used by      --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
        First Lieutenant Mr. Markus to go from Serayu Hotel    --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
        in Timika to Freeport Tembagapura.                      that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
                                                               --Almost all the community in Timika (Police/
                                                                Indonesian Army/community) know First Lieutenant
                                                                Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command).

[[Page E382]]

 
   2   On August 31, 2002, before Decky Murip went with a    Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
        vehicle with a side number 0609 (used to be used by   Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
        First Lieutenant Mr. Markus), in Serayu Hotel Mr.     Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
        Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army       Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
        Special Force Command) was given two bottles of       Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
        beer with plastic covers tied with a string, the      First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
        others drank from the bottle with the original        Command).
        cover. Because Decky Muruip drank those two bottles  Note:
        with a plastic cover, he lost his Identity Card        --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
        that was saved in his pocket.                          --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
                                                                that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
                                                               --Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
                                                                Special Force Command) was given a special drink
                                                                and then invited to go with the group.
   3   Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army       Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
        Special Force Command), after he drank the two        Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
        bottles with plastic covers and strings jumped into   Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
        the white Freeport vehicle with side number 0609      Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
        with the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus and the driver   Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
        called ``Mas'' with the other 8 (eight) persons       First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
        that wore black vests carrying short black barrel     Command).
        guns (approximately 50 cm. length) and one of them   Note:
        wore a black hat with the white command knife logo.    --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
        They stared from Serayu Hotel in Timika to go up to    --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
        Freeport Tembagapura, and Decky Murip (Operational      that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
        Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) with     --Why parts of the group was dropped off, Decky
        the other 4 (four) persons, the staff members of        Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
        First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force         Special Force Command) + 4 (four) persons had to
        Command) were dropped off after Mile 50 (after          wait and listen to the 4 (four) shots? Was it a
        passing the tunnel), and their task was to wait for     code? Or an execution, was it possible that Mr.
        further command and to listen to the explosion of       X was executed during the sound of explosion
        gun shots for 4X.                                       that was heard by Decky Murip and the other 4
                                                                (four) persons with black vests?
   4   Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army       Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
        Special Force Command) with the other 4 (four)        Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
        persons, the staff members of First Lieutenant Mr.    Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
        Markus (Army Special Force Command) after waiting     Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
        in the place that they were dropped off (after Mile   Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
        50) for a while, they were picked up again by First   First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
        Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command)    Command).
        with a driver called ``Mas'' with the other 4        Note:
        (four) persons, the staff members of First             --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
        Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command)     --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
        with the same vehicle (white vehicle with side          that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
        number 0609) and the total of people were 11         Question: Why after the vehicle went round and
        (eleven) including First Lieutenant Mr. Markus        round without any direction and without stopping,
        (Army Special Force Command) and the driver, they     Markus Cs then brought the group with black vests
        were brought from Mile 50 down toward Timika and      up to the location of the incident at Mile 63, and
        went round and round without any direction and        then asked Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant
        without stopping and then went back up to the         of Army Special Force Command) to go to the hill
        location of the incident at Mile 63.                  in order to chase the Rebellious Movement Group?
                                                             Answer: If Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant
                                                              of Army Special Force command) followed the
                                                              command to go to the hill with the bushes (where
                                                              it was guessed there were people there around the
                                                              location of the incident at Mile 63), probably
                                                              that black vested group that was brought by First
                                                              Lieutenant Mr. Markus, would execute Decky Murip
                                                              (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force
                                                              Command) considered to be the attacker of the
                                                              attack that had just happened on August 31, 2002,
                                                              this would show as if that First Lieutenant Mr.
                                                              Markus and the black vested group had rendered a
                                                              good service in chasing and finding the attacker
                                                              in that day of August 31, 2002. This scenario plan
                                                              in the location of the incident will damage the
                                                              image of the Army Special Force Command
                                                              Cendrawasih Team, because Decky Murip is the
                                                              Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special
                                                              Force Command.
   5   When the group (that was led by First Lieutenant Mr.  Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
        Markus (Army Special Force Command) with a driver     Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
        and 8 (eight) staff members and Decky Murip           Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
        (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special       Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
        Force Command) arrived at the location of the         Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
        incident at Mile 63 toward Tembagapura, they          First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
        stopped and all of them got out of the vehicle and    Command).
        saw the evidence (the victim's vehicle), at that     Note:
        same time Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant      --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
        of Army Special Force Command) was ordered by the      --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
        First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force         that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
        Command) to go to the hill in order to check if      Question: What will happen if Decky Murip
        there were people in the bushes on the hill, but      (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special
        Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army       Force Command) would go to the bushy hills around
        Special Force Command) rejected the order of the      the location of the incident at Mile 63?
        First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force      Answer: Probably he would be a target for shooting
        Command) because he said he felt dizzy which was      by the black vested group that was led by First
        caused by that drink (two bottles with plastic        Lieutenant Mr. Markus.
        covers and strings), and he did not want to go to
        the hill to check the area in the location of the
        incident at Mile 63.
   6   The result of the investigation, Freeport vehicle     Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
        with side number 0609 usually was driven by a         Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) First
        driver named Nathan, on a daily basis Nathan served   Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
        as a driver for the Commander of the Task Force of    Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
        Cendrawasih Army Special Force Command, if the        Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
        Commander was on duty in Timika and Tembagapura.      First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
                                                              Command).
                                                             Note:
                                                               --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
                                                               --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
                                                                that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
   7   The August 31, 2002 chronological group plan was      Referring to the information that was given by
        begun from Serayu Hotel at 7:30 EIT where Decky       Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
        Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army         Special Force Command) that was supported by
        Special Force Command) drank the two bottles with     ELSHAM (ELSHAM is one of the NGO group). The Head
        plastic covers and strings, with the other 4 (four)   of the Tribe, and a Pastor, and they spontaneously
        persons (the staff of the First Lieutenant Mr.        willing to do the Press Conference on the
        Markus member of Army Special Force Command), and     television, therefore it is important for the
        then they were dropped at Mile 50 and the rest of     government of Indonesia to develop a team in order
        the group went up (Tembagapura), but then they came   to clarify the case so it will alleviate the
        back and picked up Decky Murip (Operational Team      conflict between the Indonesian Police that act as
        Assistant of Army Special Force Command) and the      the investigator for managing the case in the
        other 4 (four) people (the staff of the First         location of the incident that is located in a
        Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army Special Force    vital project (PT Freeport) and the misunderstood
        Command), and then they all went back down toward     group. According to January 14, 2002 Operational
        Timika, the vehicle went round and round and then     Regiment Tembaga (Ren Ops Tembaga) that is valid
        went back up and stopped after the incident of        for 365 days (one year) until January 2003, the
        shooting at the location of the incident at Mile      location of the incident that is located in PT
        63, then the group went down from the vehicle (with   Freeport is under the authority of The XVII
        side number 0609) in order to see the evidence, the   Trikora Regional Military Command.
        vehicle that was shot by the ambush. Then Decky      Note:
        Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army special      --The vehicles that were used by Army Special
        Force Command) did not want to follow the order of      Force Command without side numbers (had been
        the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army          erased) with vague numbers ``DS'' were freely
        Special Force Command) to investigate the hill          driven in the area of Timika and go up and down
        around the location of the incident at Mile 63, and     vice versa to Tembagapura.
        then went back down to Timika. Need explanation        --The Indonesian Police that conducted the
        from the Army Special Force Command in order to         investigation in the area that is under the
        clarify the information from Decky Murip                authority of the Indonesian National Army Force,
        (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special         needs to be backed up by a solid team that is
        Force Command). If the information was vague, it        developed by the government of Indonesia,
        was a violation of Article 242 KUPH that said ``to      because it is very sensitive and easy to become
        provide vague information'' to the Police               a conflict between the Indonesian Police and the
        Investigator or to the Army Special Force command.      Indonesian National Army Force (PAM PROVITNAS PT
        And the person will also be charged by Article 310      FREEPORT/OPS TEMBAGA 14 2002 by Trikora Regional
        KUPH that said about ``damaging somebody's              Military Command).
        reputation'' because he/she has defiled the
        reputation of the Special Armed Force Command
        (Indonesian Armed Force). It was getting worse
        since the Press Conference on the television on
        September 25, 2002 at 23:30 EIT or 21:30 West
        Indonesian Time (WIT).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Information:
1. All of the information about Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) has been
  submitted by Vice Chairman of the Provincial Police to The Commander of the Task Force of the Army Special
  Force Command (Cendrawasih Team) in his residence on September 24, 2002 between 09:00-23:00 EIT.
2. The Press Conference, led by Mr. Jhon Rumbiak--EILSHAM (one of the NGO group), was held at September 25, 2002
  at 23:30 IT or 21:30 WIT.
3. Mr. Siburian, the Lieutenant Colonel Infantry and the Commander of Task Force of the Army Special Force
  Command (Cendrawasih team), said that the information provided by those people and the Operational Team
  Assistant did not mean to mention the Cendrawasih Team of Army Special Force Command, and the purpose of Jhon
  Rumbiak and Decky Murip was to manipulate the public opinion in order to make the Army Special Force Command--
  Indonesian National Army Force look bad.

                      the triangle authentication

     The Location of the Incident (TKP)
       1. August 31, 2002--block on Mile 62.
       2. September 1, 2002--block Mile 61 (Police).
       3. September 13, 2002--some members of 515 Task Force 
     regiment were shot at. That happened at Mile 63.
       4. September 14, 2002--the investigation team was shot at. 
     That happened at Mile 62.
       5. September 14, 2002--some members of 515 Task Force 
     regiment were shot at Mile 62, 2 (two) holes from the outside 
     and 4 (four) holes from the inside.
       6. September 14, 2002--found bomb at Mile 62.
       7. September 20, 2002--found explosive at Mile 63.
       8. September 20, 2002--found 7 (seven) bullet holders, 2 
     (two) SS-1 bullet shells, 1 (one) M-16 bullet shell.
     The Rectangle on the Top Left Hand Corner (the explanation is 
         connected to Mr. X)
       1. Larva/maggot inside the intestine of the victim seen 
     from the open stomach.
       2. The stomach and the intestine was empty, found brown 
     color liquid, the person had not eaten for more than 12 
     hours.
       3. The victim had been dead for more than 6 hours when the 
     Tembagapura Hospital received the dead body.
       4. All of the dead body was rigid (rigor mortis).
       5. There were 4 (four) horizontal shooting holes that 
     caused the death of the victim.
       6. The diameter of the testicle is approximately 17 cm., 
     the victim was suffering Testicle Hydrocele.
       7. The last position was at the dent of the hill, with 
     80 deg. steep grade (steep down to a deep gorge).
       8. The dead body was thrown away down 8 meters and was 
     dragged for approximately 78 meters through the tree roots 
     and sharp gravel.
     The Rectangle on the Bottom Left Hand Corner (the explanation 
         is connected to the evidence)
       1. The case of August 31, 2002:
       a. 95 bullet shells 5.56 and 7.62 caliber;
       b. The vehicles of the victim (3 trucks and 2 jeeps);
       c. 3 victims were dead & 11 heavy/light injured; and
       d. Approximately 134 bullet holes.
       2. The case of September 1, 2002:
       a. Mr. X;
       b. The accessories of Mr. X (bag, flashlight, m. tawon, ABC 
     battery, pepsodent, etc.);
       c. Bullet shells 5.56 + 7.62 + 1 broken M-16 magazine;

[[Page E383]]

       d. Mr. X hat with Special Army Force Command logo; and
       e. Black shirt, black jacket, brown short pant.
       Note: m. tawon = minyak tawon = a special medicated oil 
     that is normally used by the people from Indonesia especially 
     people that come from the eastern part of Indonesia.
     The Rectangle on the Right Hand Side (the explanation is 
         connected to the Witnesses)
       1. Dwi Lasmono (the 515 driver), Agus Rahmat (Freeport 
     Security) & Darius (the owner of a local pub in Banti) know 
     Mr. X who was often hanging around close to 515 Station in 
     Banti.
       2. Daud Tandirerung, Yonan Djikwa, and Kamame Mum (driver & 
     passenger of TDS pick up) saw at the location of the incident 
     2 (two) soldiers without attributes shooting at them, these 
     witnesses faced down instantaneously, switched the gear, 
     accelerated the vehicle, and drove away.
       3. Stephen Emma & Francene saw 5-6 young men near 
     adulthood, arose on the side of a trailer, carried long 
     barrel gun and ran into the bushes in front of the location 
     of the incident.
       4. Sandra Hopkins & Kenneth Balk saw (for a minute) a black 
     male, with black shirt, striped pants, with pendant hair, who 
     was looking out toward Tembagapura direction.
       5. The second rank corporal Mr. Wayan shot Mr. X (tsk) from 
     the top of the hill to the exact position of Mr. X (slanted 
     80 deg. at down direction).
       6. The second rank of corporal Mr. Melky was the first 
     person who saw the dead body of Mr. X.
       7. The second lieutenant infantry Mr. Yanto/Highest Rank of 
     Private Mr. Sugi Private Second Class Mr. Slamet/Highest Rank 
     of Private Mr. Margono/Private Second Class Mr. Suriyadi/
     Second Rank Corporal Mr. Putu Dharma & Lower Ranking Sergeant 
     Mr. Ketut, they were all the people who dragged the dead body 
     approximately for 78 meters through rocks and sharp gravel to 
     the side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura.
       8. Dr. Kunto (the head of Tembagapura Hospital) was the 
     first person that saw the larva or maggots in Mr. X 
     intestines.
       9. The Head of the Forensic Laboratory confirmed the 
     findings of Dr. Kunto (Tembagapura Hospital).
       10. Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman (his right thigh 
     was shot).
       11. Timika Military District Commander (the first person 
     who called the Mimika Head of County Police at 12:45 EIT; Mr. 
     X was shot + Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman was shot).
       12. The trailer driver (Mastur) saw one shooter with 
     pendant hair, black face, clean face without beard/moustache 
     wearing striped shirt and pants without attributes, with a 
     long barrel gun.


   THE CASES OF AUGUST 31, 2002 UP TO SEPTEMBER 1, 2002 (TEMBAGAPURA)

     A. Motive
       1. To create a situation that makes people pay attention.
       2. To create a feeling of insecurity for those who use the 
     road between Timika and Tembagapura.
     B. Modus Operandi
       1. Brutal shooting with a fully automatic gun.
       2. There is no specific target for the victim.
       3. Shooting and placing expired explosives around Mile 62 
     and Mile 62.5 and Mile 63 with the position always on the 
     right side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura 
     direction.
     C. Deception:
       1. On August 31, 2002 after the event, Second Lieutenant 
     Infantry Mr. Yanto was shot with an empty bullet at Mile 62.5 
     (the evidence of the bullet shell was kept by Mimika County 
     Police).
       2. On September 1, 2002 the Highest Rank of Private Mr. 
     Suherman was shot in his right thigh at Mile 62.5 (the exact 
     location of the incident was not known yet).
       3. The community around Freeport does not know Mr. X (they 
     kept their mouths shut).
       4. On September 13, 2002, the shooting at the Indonesian 
     Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security 
     at Mile 63 (the attacker was still around the location of the 
     incident).
       5. On September 14, 2002 the vehicle of 515 Bama was shot, 
     2 from outside & 6 bullet holes from the inside of the 
     vehicle itself at Mile 62 (the attacker was still around the 
     location of the incident).
       6. On September 14, 2002 the explosive was found, 3 (three) 
     Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) detonators, 2 (two) ABC batteries 
     and 3 (three) 20 meters detonator cables at Mile 62 (was 
     crystallized & expired)(the attacker was still around the 
     location of the incident).
       7. On September 14, 2002 after the finding of the 
     explosive, the 515 Vice Battalion Commander said, this event 
     will acknowledge to The Territorial Military Commander and 
     Head of the Provincial Police what is the true situation 
     around here, so please do not always blame the Indonesian 
     National Army Force.
       8. In his statement, the Jakarta Territorial Military 
     Commander said that this Tembagapura case may be caused by 
     the PT Freeport Indonesia internal, and not by the people 
     from the forest (the attacker was still around the location 
     of the incident).
       9. On September 14, 2002 the individuals at Mile 50 station 
     were threatened by two phone calls stating that the station 
     would be attacked. The person, making the threats, called 
     from no. 358 (that was used by the Army Strategic Reserve 
     Command #515 Task Force and Security station, The Head of the 
     Section II 515 Task Force Security), where this number at 
     that time was used by Cendrawasih Task Force, and from a 
     cellular phone number 08124887486 that was owned by First 
     Class Sergeant Mr. Jatmiko, the member of Army Special Force 
     Command, Cendrawasih Task Force to 0901-422907 (the 
     supporting document is the call list print out that can be 
     used for evidence)(the attacker was still around the location 
     of the incident).
       10. On September 20, 2002, the Second Lieutenant Infantry 
     Mr. Rahmat found the explosive at Mile 63, 2 Power Gel & 2 
     Cassuary bones (the attacker was still around the location of 
     the incident).
       11. The PT Freeport vehicles still existed and were based 
     on the EPO consideration (EPO=Exploration Production 
     Operation) they might be used without side numbers and with 
     vague license plate numbers, those are:
       a. DS 1154 PD, used by Intelligence Detachment First 
     Lieutenant Mr. Hartono, this vehicle originally has the side 
     number 01-2234.
       b. DS 1149 MA, used by Special Army Force Command Captain 
     lrwan, this vehicle originally has the side number 01-2229.
       c. DS 20 PD, used by Special Army Force Command Mas Jen, 
     this vehicle did not have side number and was not registered 
     in the office of Timika.
       d. DS 54 PD, used by Special Army Force Command and driven 
     by the EPO employee Mr. Nathan and was not registered in the 
     office of Timika.
       e. DS 1330 FB, was under contract by EPO and in that time 
     was used by the Special Army Force Command the First 
     Lieutenant Mr. Lukito, and this vehicle originally has the 
     side number 01-1432 with the newest (renewal) DS 1301 MA, but 
     was not put on yet.
       f. On September 29, 2002 The Head of Unit Traffic Mimika 
     County Police had the pictures as proof of evidence for the 
     above explanation from point (a) up to point (e).
     D. The Alternative of the Existence Mr. X.
       1. Mr. X came by himself with 2 (two) of his friends and 
     they came to the position on the hill below the position of 
     the Second Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan at the top of the hill. 
     Wayan was planning to shoot the police on the road that will 
     come at 8:00 in the morning together with the investigators 
     team at the location of the incident. Then there was an 
     approximate lapse of 3 hours and at 11:40 EIT Mr. X. was 
     pronounced dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of 
     Corporal Mr. Wayan. Those two friends of Mr. X. with black 
     and red shirts ran away and carried Mr. X's weapon, they ran 
     down through the steep gorge. After that, Mr. X dead body was 
     brought down 8 m. and then dragged 78 m to the side of the 
     road after Territorial Military Commander/Head of the 
     Provincial Police/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army 
     Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic 
     Reserve Command/Regiment Commander of Sorong/Head of the 
     Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police came to see and 
     witnessed the dead body of Mr. X, then Mr. X dead body was 
     brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by 
     Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the larva/maggots on the 
     intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X).
       2. Mr. X was shot to death in another location and then 
     brought to the forest and placed on the hill below Wayan's 
     position on the top of the hill, and then there was a lapse 
     of approximately 3 hours, then at 11:40 Mr. X was pronounced 
     dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of Corporal 
     Mr. Wayan at the location of the incident on the back of the 
     hill. Then the dead body of Mr. X was brought down 8 m. and 
     then dragged 78 m to the side of the road after Territorial 
     Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment 
     Commander/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic Reserve 
     Command/Head of the Directorate IPP came to see and witnessed 
     the dead body of Mr. X, then
       Mr. X's dead body was brought to Tembagapura Hospital and 
     then handled directly by Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the 
     larva/maggots on the intestines of the open stomach of Mr. 
     X).
       3. Mr. X was shot to death and then his dead body was 
     delivered and placed on the side of the road in order to be 
     seen and witnessed by Territorial Military Commander/Head of 
     the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the 
     Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 
     515 Army Strategic Reserve Command/Head of the Directorate 
     IPP Papuan Regional Police, then Mr. X's dead body was 
     brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by 
     Dr. Kunto Rahardjo who saw the larva/maggots on the 
     intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X.
     E. Evaluation Analysis
       1. First Alternative: Mr. X suffered from Testicle 
     Hydrocele acute disease (the inflammation of both testicles 
     for approximately more than 1 year and the diameter of the 
     testicle approximately 17 cm.). With his health condition it 
     is impossible for Mr. X to go up to the hill to the location 
     of the incident. (Mr. X's physical/health and mental 
     condition does not support the first alternative).
       2. Second Alternative: It is impossible for the persons who 
     create the scenario. Because it took too long of a time and 
     it was too exhausting for them to go up to the hill and carry 
     the dead body of Mr. X and then carry Mr. X back down to the 
     side of the road in

[[Page E384]]

     order to be seen and witnessed by the Territorial Military 
     Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/
     Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/
     Battalion Commander of 515/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan 
     Regional Police.
       3. Third Alternative: It is the most possible scenario that 
     has been proposed. Mr. X was shot to death before. Then Mr. 
     X's dead body was brought and placed on the side of the road 
     in order to ``invite'' the police investigator team to come 
     and to investigate the location of the incident and at the 
     same time to wait for the coming of the group that consisted 
     of the Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial 
     Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the Cendrawasih 
     Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515/Head of 
     the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police to witness that it 
     is true that Mr. X was the attacker on August 31, 2002 and 
     also the attacker on September 1, 2002.
       4. Referring to the third alternative that it was the most 
     possible scenario. In order to make the case more clear, 10 
     (ten) questions need to be asked:
       (1) Who is Mr. X?
       (2) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was picked up 
     at?
       (3) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was shot before 
     he was placed on the side of the road?
       (4) Who picked up Mr. X and who shot Mr. X?
       (5) Why did they create this kind of scenario for Mr. X?
       (6) Who are the parties that have worked together to 
     develop this Mr. X scenario?
       (7) Is this Mr. X scenario known by the responsible 
     security of PT. FI (OPS TEMBAGA-14)?
       (8) Who is the initiator (the first person) to create this 
     plan or create this Mr. X scenario?
       (9) What kind of vehicle was used to pick up Mr. X and to 
     drop Mr. X's dead body on the side of the road?
       (10) What is the background reason that had triggered the 
     creation of this scenario for Mr. X?
     F. Closing
       This is all about the findings pertaining to Mr. X. It is 
     supported by the data and the facts from:
       1. The condition of Mr. X while he was still alive.
       2. The condition of dead Mr. X at the location of the 
     incident.
       3. The condition of Mr. X when the autopsy was performed.
       4. The condition of Mr. X after he was buried in the Timika 
     public cemetery.

                          ____________________