[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 26 (Wednesday, March 3, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2020-S2021]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[[Page S2020]]
IRAQ INTELLIGENCE AND POSTWAR PLANNING
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in recent weeks, Americans have witnessed
a steady stream of reports that raise grave questions about the
accuracy of statements made by senior Bush administration officials
leading up to the war in Iraq.
The unequivocal administration pronouncements that Saddam Hussein
possessed weapons of mass destruction, was pursuing nuclear
capabilities, and had close ties with al-Qaida have not been proven or
been proven unequivocally wrong.
Implications of these intelligence failures are far-reaching. While
Saddam Hussein may be in prison, just this week CIA Director Tenet
indicated America is still the target of terrorists who seek to kill as
many Americans as possible in any way available to them.
At no time in our Nation's history has the integrity of the people
who use intelligence and the people who produce intelligence been more
vital to national security. Americans need to have confidence in both
our policymakers and our intelligence community. To rebuild that
confidence, Americans have a right to know how the administration and
how our intelligence community could have been so wrong on matters of
such grave import.
For a failure this massive, every aspect of America's national
security policymaking process should be put under the microscope: How
we collect information, how we analyze it, how it gets interpreted by
administration officials, and how the Senate performs its oversight
responsibilities.
Much of the discussion about our Iraq intelligence failures thus far
has focused on our incorrect assessments of the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein. While important, there is another vital piece of this story
that has been overlooked until this point. That is, the
administration's failure to plan for postwar Iraq and the consequences
that would arise from toppling Saddam Hussein.
The administration's myopic approach to planning for post-Saddam Iraq
continues to have consequences for the safety of our troops and the
long-term security of our Nation and its interests. As a result, it is
critical that the Nation learn more about why the administration failed
to plan for the contingencies of a post-Saddam Iraq. As officials from
the Bush administration, the United Nations, and the Iraq Governing
Council seek to reach agreement on the administration's third and
latest proposal for forming the first official post-Saddam government,
we would be wise to look back at what went wrong.
A thorough, bipartisan investigation is warranted.
What makes the unfolding evidence of insufficient post-war planning
most troubling is that, in this instance, contrary to the questions of
weapons of mass destruction, it appears that our intelligence was
right.
There was a consensus among the intelligence community that removing
Saddam would be the easiest part of our efforts to secure and rebuild
Iraq.
Our intelligence community, our military, and numerous independent
groups all concurred in the assessment that our gravest challenges
would come in the days after Saddam was ousted.
The greatest difficulty, all agreed, would come in the days following
the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Senior administration policymakers were
repeatedly warned by other officials within the government, as well as
a raft of independent outside experts, to plan accordingly.
Months before the start of the conflict, these officials and experts
carefully examined these issues and offered concrete proposals to
maximize our chances for bringing about a stable Iraq while minimizing
the risks to our troops and our taxpayers.
For instance, as far back as March 2002, a year before the invasion,
the State Department was working on a $5 million project entitled the
Future of Iraq. Experience from previous conflicts demonstrated the
importance of preparing in advance for our postwar duties.
And experience from the past gave us all a guide as to what to expect
in Iraq.
Although there were many other officials and organizations making
similar assessments, the State Department's Future of Iraq project
provides some useful insights into the information available to the
administration had it chose to listen.
In its 13-volume study plus a one-volume summary and overview, the
Future of Iraq project reached some prescient conclusions.
First, the project said Iraq would be disorderly after liberation and
stressed that the days immediately after liberation would be critical--
to both those who seek to work with us and those who do not.
The removal of Saddam's regime will provide a power vacuum
and create popular anxieties about the viability of all Iraqi
institutions . . . the traumatic and disruptive events
attendant to the regime change will affect all Iraqis, both
Saddam's conspirators and the general populace.
Second, this report stressed the importance of restoring basic
services as quickly as possible after the regime change. The report
``stressed the importance of getting the electrical grid up and running
immediately--[this is] key to water systems, jobs. [This] could go a
long way to determining Iraqis attitudes' toward coalition forces.''
Third, the report warned about the problems created by a wholesale
demobilization of the Iraqi military.
The decommissioning of hundreds of thousands of trained
military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could create
social problems.
Each of these conclusions should have waved a red flag to
administration officials: if addressed effectively, the transition will
be smoother; if ignored, the transition will be more difficult. More
difficult for our troops and more difficult for the Iraqi people.
Unfortunately, the administration apparently chose to ignore these
and many other similar findings offered up by other groups. In fact,
news reports indicate that White House and senior Defense Department
civilian officials actually worked to exclude people who worked on or
shared the views contained in the Future of Iraq report--views that
have proven to be 100 percent correct.
One of the most comprehensive reports about this issue can be found
in James Fallows' article in the January/February 2004 Atlantic Monthly
entitled ``Blind into Baghdad.''
I highly commend this article to my colleagues.
Unfortunately, the many warnings about post-war Iraq fell upon deaf
ears in the administration. For a variety of reasons, senior
administration officials in the White House and senior civilians in the
Defense Department ignored these warnings, instead apparently opting to
rely on dubious sources to back up their rosy predictions about how our
troops would be received by Iraqis and how smooth the transition would
be.
For example, the administration was repeatedly pressed for an
estimate before the start of the war on the number of troops and the
cost of the operation.
Even though press reports indicate administration officials had
signed off on a war plan in November 2002 that spelled out the size of
the forces necessary for an Iraq mission, the administration
persistently claimed not to know the size of the forces needed or their
cost.
As late as February 2003, 2 months after the President had authorized
the deployment of 200,000 troops to the region and less than 2 months
before the start of the conflict, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz
said, ``Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until
we get there on the ground.''
Even worse, the administration suggested that there would be no cost
at all.
Administration officials stated that the proceeds from the sale of
Iraqi oil would be used to pay for the American military presence.
On March 27, 8 days after the war had started, Wolfowitz was again
pressed on a figure and indicated that whatever it turned out to be,
Iraq's oil supplies would keep it low: ``There's a lot of money to pay
for this. It doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing
with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and
relatively soon.''
In April, after more than a month of conflict, Andrew Natsios, the
director of USAID, said the total cost to the taxpayer would be no more
than $1.7 billion. ``We have no plans for any further-on-funding for
this.''
[[Page S2021]]
The administration either knew better at the time or should have
known better.
And our troops and the American people certainly deserved better.
Over 500 Americans have been killed and over 3,000 wounded in Iraq.
Unfortunately, these numbers are likely to continue to grow before our
mission there is complete.
We have already appropriated over $150 billion for this operation,
and this cost could easily double before we are through.
Let me take another example--the administration's statements about
the post-war environment we would encounter and the challenges we would
face.
Although there are a few instances where administration officials
went on the record before the war warning that a war with Iraq could
require a lengthy commitment, administration officials repeatedly
painted the most optimistic portrait possible in order to gain support
for its strategy.
Vice President Cheney's remarks 3 days before the start of the war
typify much of what the administration was telling the American public.
When asked if the American people are prepared for a long, costly
battle with significant casualties, the Vice President said, ``Well, I
don't think it's likely to unfold that way . . . because I really do
believe we will be greeted as liberators.''
This tragic miscalculation allowed the administration to abandon the
intelligence-based, analytical process needed to plan successfully for
the occupation of Iraq. The administration sent a smaller force than
our senior military officials initially recommended.
Our personnel were not suitably prepared for the immense economic,
social, and political complexities that we should have known would
inevitably arise after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And our troops and
the American people were not adequately equipped for the guerrilla
tactics that have become all too common since President Bush declared
an end to major combat operations.
Overall, the administration's overly optimistic attitude about post-
war Iraq has contributed to a far more costly and arduous effort than
needed to be the case.
Mr. President, not long ago, many of my colleagues and I had the
honor of having dinner with more than 100 soldiers and their families
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. These soldiers had all been wounded
while serving their country in Iraq. I hope my colleagues will take the
opportunity to visit these young men and women. After seeing first-hand
the kind of people our country has produced, I have never been more
proud to be an American.
As I think of my night with these brave men and women who have
sacrificed so much and asked for so little in return, I cannot help but
think: Did we do right by them? Did we do everything possible to put
them in a position to succeed at the least possible risk? Did we
provide them with a plan for success and the tools needed to carry it
out?
In a statement last year, General Anthony Zinni, one of the most
respected and distinguished military leaders this country has produced,
commented on what we owed those who we placed in harm's way.
He said:
They should never be put on a battlefield without a
strategic plan, not only for the fighting--our generals will
take care of that--but for the aftermath and winning that
war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept this, if
we accept this level of sacrifice without that level of
planning?
The administration based its post-war planning on blind hope, and
hope is not a plan. We owe it to our troops and ourselves to determine
whether we did everything we could to succeed in Iraq. Our success in
Iraq and future conflicts depends on it. Our need to ensure that we do
right by our troops demands it.
I yield the floor.
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