[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 22 (Thursday, February 26, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1684-S1695]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BURNS (for himself, Mr. Wyden, and Mrs. Boxer):
S. 2131. A bill to regulate the unauthorized installation of computer
software, to require clear disclosure to computer users of certain
computer software features that may pose a threat to user privacy, and
for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, my good friend Senator Burns and I have
pioneered a number of legislative efforts aimed at protecting ordinary
computer users from the tricks and schemes of those who would abuse the
open and interconnected nature of the Internet. From online privacy to
spam, we have sought to establish some basic, commonsense rules to
address sleazy, intrusive, and anti-consumer practices that have arisen
in the new world of the Internet. In each case, our goal has not been
to stifle or restrict legitimate and innovative modes of e-commerce,
but rather to promote them by reining in unfair and annoying behavior
that undermines consumer confidence and use of the Internet.
Today, we continue on that path by introducing the ``SPY BLOCK'' Act,
together with our colleague Senator Boxer.
This legislation will put the brakes on the growing problem of
software being installed secretly on people's computers, for purposes
they might object to if given the chance. Sometimes, the problem is a
``drive-by download,'' where the consumer's mere visit to a website or
decision to click on an advertisement secretly triggers the downloading
of software onto the consumer's machine. Or, it can be a ``double
whammy download,'' where the consumer's voluntary download of one
software program also triggers the inadvertent download of a second
software program which, although it may serve a very different purpose,
has been bundled together with the first one.
Once installed, the unwanted software operates in the background,
performing functions that ordinary computer users cannot detect. As a
result, the computer user may never even know the software is there,
let alone what it is doing. And to add insult to injury, software that
spreads in this fashion often is designed to be nearly impossible to
uninstall.
What might such software do, once it is installed? The legislation we
are introducing today identifies several possible functions that pose
concerns. First, some software, often referred to as ``spyware,''
collects information about the computer user and transmits that
information over the Internet to the spyware's author. Second, software
sometimes referred to as ``adware'' causes pop-up ads to appear on the
user's computer, perhaps based on the user's apparent interests or on
the websites he or she visits. Third, some software essentially hijacks
the computer's processing and communications capability to forward
spam, viruses, or other messages, all without the user's knowledge.
Finally, some software changes user settings--for example, overriding
the user's intended choice of homepage.
If a computer user truly understands what the software is going to do
and knowingly consents to it, that's fine. The issue really comes down
to user knowledge and control. Too often, software like this allows a
third party to wrest control of some of the computer's functions and
commandeer
[[Page S1685]]
them for the third party's own purposes. The software is essentially a
parasite--it attaches itself without consent to the host computer and
taps into the host's resources, making use of them for its own selfish
purposes. Our bill would make such unauthorized practices clearly
unlawful.
How common is all this? There is little hard data, but one report
last year estimated that 20 million people have downloaded software
that serves them targeted advertising. I have to suspect that many of
these downloads did not involve informed consent. It has also been
widely reported that many of the most popular peer-to-peer file sharing
software programs come packaged with other software that is not clearly
disclosed to the user. So the number of affected users is likely very
high.
The bill we are introducing today would, for the first time,
establish a clear legal principle that you cannot cause software to be
installed on somebody else's computer without that person's knowledge
and consent. This general notice and consent requirement could be
satisfied by something as simple as an on-screen dialogue box telling
the user that clicking ``ok'' will trigger the download of, say, a
particular game program. In addition, the bill says that software must
be capable of being uninstalled without resorting to extraordinary and
highly technical procedures.
Beyond these general requirements, the legislation calls for certain
types of software features--those performing the four functions I
discussed a moment ago--to be specifically and separately brought to
the user's attention prior to installation. For example, if a software
program has a spyware feature designed to collect and transmit
information about the user, the user would need to be provided with
sufficient notice based on criteria set forth in the bill. That notice
would need to explain the types of information that would be collected
and the purposes for which the information would be used. Following
this notice, the user would have the option of granting or withholding
consent. In the absence of such notice and consent, it would be
unlawful to download the software onto the user's computer, or
subsequently to use the software to gather information about that user.
The bill contains some exceptions, for example, for pre-installed
software and software features that are necessary to make basic
features like e-mail or Internet browsing function properly.
Enforcement under the bill would be by the Federal Trade Commission and
state Attorneys General.
I recognize that the bill we introduce today may benefit from further
attention and input on the particular wording of the definitions, on
the types of software or software features that should be listed in the
exceptions, and so forth. Senator Burns, Senator Boxer, and I are open
to further discussion about fine tuning the scope of the bill, so that
we don't create a regime that ends up being impractical or imposing
undue burdens on legitimate and useful software. This is the starting
point, not the end point.
It is important, however, to get this process moving. I believe it's
time to send a clear message that unauthorized and privacy-compromising
spyware, adware, and other software are unlawful and punishable. I urge
my colleagues to join Senators Burns, Boxer, and myself in supporting
this bill.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise in support of a measure that I
introduce today, with the support of my colleague, Senator Wyden. We
worked closely on the CAN SPAM bill together, and after four years of
effort finally saw its successful passage last year. I am pleased to
work with Senator Wyden again on another critical issue which is
potentially of even greater concern than junk email given its invasive
nature--that of spyware. I also appreciate the support of another of my
colleagues on the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator Boxer. Together,
we have crafted legislation aimed at ending the insidious operation of
spyware, the SPYBLOCK Act of 2004. By introducing this legislation
today, we take the first step in giving consumers the control to stop
this deceitful practice.
Spyware refers to software that is downloaded onto users' computers
without their knowledge or consent. This sneaky software is then often
used to track the movements of consumers online or even to steal
passwords. The porous gaps spyware creates in a computer's security may
be difficult to close. For example, one popular peer-to-peer file
sharing network routinely installs spyware to track users' information
and retrieves targeted banner ads and popups. As noted by a recent
article in PC Magazine these file-sharing networks may be free, but at
the cost of privacy, not money. Of the 60 million users, few know they
are being watched. Of those who do discover spyware, uninstalling it
may prove more difficult than other software programs. Some spyware
includes tricklers, which reinstall the files as you delete them. Users
may think they are getting rid of the problem, but the reality of the
situation is far different.
The creators of spyware have engineered the technology so that once
it is installed on a computer, it is difficult and sometimes impossible
to remove and in some cases requires the entire hard drive to be erased
to get rid of this poisonous product. Such drastic measures must be
taken, because often spyware tells the installer what websites a user
visits, steals passwords or other sensitive documents on a personal
computer, and also redirects Internet traffic through certain web
sites.
One of the most disturbing aspects about the spyware problem is that
so few consumers are even aware of it. Bearing this factor in mind, the
SPYBLOCK bill relies on a commonsense approach which prohibits the
installation of software on consumers' computers without notice,
consent and reasonable ``uninstall'' procedures.
The notice and consent approach which SPYBLOCK takes would end the
practice of so-called ``drive-by downloads'' which some bad actors use
to secretly download programs onto users' computers without their
knowledge. Under SPYBLOCK, software providers must give consumers clear
and conspicuous notice that a software program will be downloaded to
their computers and requires user consent. This simple provision could
be fulfilled by clicking ``yes'' on a dialog box, for example.
SPYBLOCK also requires notice and consent for other types of
software. In the case of ``Adware,'' providers are required to tell
consumers what types of ads will pop up on users' screens and with what
frequency. Consent is required for software that modifies user settings
or uses ``distributed computing'' methods to utilize the processing
power of individual computers to create larger networks. Finally,
software providers must allow for their programs to be easily
``uninstalled'' by users after they are downloaded. As with the CAN-
SPAM law, enforcement authority would be given to the Federal Trade
Commission. States attorneys general could take action against the
purveyors of spyware.
Clearly, it is time to call the bad actors to account. It is
impossible to understand how any of the individuals or companies using
spyware believe tracking Internet usage, stealing passwords, and
hijacking the processors of someone else's computer, all without their
knowledge, is justifiable.
Working closely with my colleagues Senator Wyden and Senator Boxer, I
am confident we can make major progress on this critical legislation,
before spyware infects a critical mass of computers and renders them
useless. Just trying to keep up with the latest anti-spyware software
poses a tremendous cost to businesses, let alone individuals who have
to spend their time online worried about the next spyware infestation.
Again, I would like to thank Senators Wyden and Boxer for their hard
work on this vital issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this
measure. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2131
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Controlling Invasive and
Unauthorized Software Act''.
SEC. 2. UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE.
(a) Notice, Choice, and Uninstall Procedures.--It is
unlawful for any person who is
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not the user of a protected computer to install computer
software on that computer, or to authorize, permit, or cause
the installation of computer software on that computer,
unless--
(1) the user of the computer has received notice that
satisfies the requirements of section 3;
(2) the user of the computer has granted consent that
satisfies the requirements of section 3; and
(3) the computer software's uninstall procedures satisfy
the requirements of section 3.
(b) Red Herring Prohibition.--It is unlawful for any person
who is not the user of a protected computer to install
computer software on that computer, or to authorize, permit,
or cause the installation of computer software on that
computer, if the design or operation of the computer software
is intended, or may reasonably be expected, to confuse or
mislead the user of the computer concerning the identity of
the person or service responsible for the functions performed
or content displayed by such computer software.
SEC. 3. NOTICE, CONSENT, AND UNINSTALL REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Notice.--For purposes of section 2(a)(1), notice to the
user of a computer shall--
(1) include a clear notification, displayed on the screen
until the user either grants or denies consent to
installation, of the name and general nature of the computer
software that will be installed if the user grants consent;
and
(2) include a separate disclosure, with respect to each
information collection, advertising, distributed computing,
and settings modification feature contained in the computer
software, that--
(A) remains displayed on the screen until the user either
grants or denies consent to that feature;
(B) in the case of an information collection feature,
provides a clear description of--
(i) the type of personal or network information to be
collected and transmitted by the computer software; and
(ii) the purpose for which the personal or network
information is to be collected, transmitted, and used;
(C) in the case of an advertising feature, provides--
(i) a representative full-size example of each type of
advertisement that may be delivered by the computer software;
(ii) a clear description of the estimated frequency with
which each type of advertisement may be delivered; and
(iii) a clear description of how the user can distinguish
each type of advertisement that the computer software
delivers from advertisements generated by other software,
Internet website operators, or services;
(D) in the case of a distributed computing feature,
provides a clear description of--
(i) the types of information or messages the computer
software will cause the computer to transmit;
(ii) the estimated frequency with which the computer
software will cause the computer to transmit such messages or
information;
(iii) the estimated volume of such information or messages,
and the likely impact, if any, on the processing or
communications capacity of the user's computer; and
(iv) the nature, volume, and likely impact on the
computer's processing capacity of any computational or
processing tasks the computer software will cause the
computer to perform in order to generate the information or
messages the computer software will cause the computer to
transmit;
(E) in the case of a settings modification feature,
provides a clear description of the nature of the
modification, its function, and any collateral effects the
modification may produce; and
(F) provides a clear description of procedures the user may
follow to turn off such feature or uninstall the computer
software.
(b) Consent.--For purposes of section 2(a)(2), consent
requires--
(1) consent by the user of the computer to the installation
of the computer software; and
(2) separate affirmative consent by the user of the
computer to each information collection feature, advertising
feature, distributed computing feature, and settings
modification feature contained in the computer software.
(c) Uninstall Procedures.--For purposes of section 2(a)(3),
computer software shall--
(1) appear in the ``Add/Remove Programs'' menu or any
similar feature, if any, provided by each operating system
with which the computer software functions;
(2) be capable of being removed completely using the normal
procedures provided by each operating system with which the
computer software functions for removing computer software;
and
(3) in the case of computer software with an advertising
feature, include an easily identifiable link clearly
associated with each advertisement that the software causes
to be displayed, such that selection of the link by the user
of the computer generates an on-screen window that informs
the user about how to turn off the advertising feature or
uninstall the computer software.
SEC. 4. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CERTAIN COMPUTER SOFTWARE.
It is unlawful for any person who is not the user of a
protected computer to use an information collection,
advertising, distributed computing, or settings modification
feature of computer software installed on that computer, if--
(1) the computer software was installed in violation of
section 2;
(2) the use in question falls outside the scope of what was
described to the user of the computer in the notice provided
pursuant to section 3(a); or
(3) in the case of an information collection feature, the
person using the feature fails to establish and maintain
reasonable procedures to protect the security and integrity
of personal information so collected.
SEC. 5. EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Preinstalled Software.--A person who installs, or
authorizes, permits, or causes the installation of, computer
software on a protected computer before the first retail sale
of the computer shall be deemed to be in compliance with this
Act if the user of the computer receives notice that would
satisfy section 3(a)(2) and grants consent that would satisfy
section 3(b)(2) prior to--
(1) the initial collection of personal or network
information, in the case of any information collection
feature contained in the computer software;
(2) the initial generation of an advertisement on the
computer, in the case of any advertising feature contained in
the computer software;
(3) the initial transmission of information or messages, in
the case of any distributed computing feature contained in
the computer software; and
(4) the initial modification of user settings, in the case
of any settings modification feature.
(b) Other Exceptions.--Sections 3(a)(2), 3(b)(2), and 4 do
not apply to any feature of computer software that is
reasonably needed to--
(1) provide capability for general purpose online browsing,
electronic mail, or instant messaging, or for any optional
function that is directly related to such capability and that
the user knowingly chooses to use;
(2) determine whether or not the user of the computer is
licensed or authorized to use the computer software; and
(3) provide technical support for the use of the computer
software by the user of the computer.
(c) Passive Transmission, Hosting, or Link.--For purposes
of this Act, a person shall not be deemed to have installed
computer software, or authorized, permitted, or caused the
installation of computer software, on a computer solely
because that person provided--
(1) the Internet connection or other transmission
capability through which the software was delivered to the
computer for installation;
(2) the storage or hosting, at the direction of another
person and without selecting the content to be stored or
hosted, of the software or of an Internet website through
which the software was made available for installation; or
(3) a link or reference to an Internet website the content
of which was selected and controlled by another person, and
through which the computer software was made available for
installation.
(d) Software Resident in Temporary Memory.--In the case of
an installation of computer software that falls within the
meaning of section 7(10)(B) but not within the meaning of
section 7(10)(A), the requirements set forth in subsections
(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c) of section 3 shall not apply.
(e) Features Activated by User Options.--In the case of an
information collection, advertising, distributed computing,
or settings modification feature that remains inactive or
turned off unless the user of the computer subsequently
selects certain optional settings or functions provided by
the computer software, the requirements of subsections (a)(2)
and (b)(2) of section 3 may be satisfied by providing the
applicable disclosure and obtaining the applicable consent at
the time the user selects the option that activates the
feature, rather than at the time of initial installation.
SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this
Act shall be enforced by the Commission as if the violation
of this Act were an unfair or deceptive act or practice
proscribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).
(b) Enforcement by Certain Other Agencies.--Compliance with
this Act shall be enforced under--
(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1818), in the case of--
(A) national banks, and Federal branches and Federal
agencies of foreign banks, by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency;
(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than
national banks), branches and agencies of foreign banks
(other than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured
State branches of foreign banks), commercial lending
companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and
organizations operating under section 25 or 25A of the
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 601 and 611), by the Board;
and
(C) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve
System) and insured State branches of foreign banks, by the
Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation;
(2) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1818), by the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, in the case of a savings association the
deposits of which
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are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
(3) the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.)
by the National Credit Union Administration Board with
respect to any Federal credit union;
(4) part A of subtitle VII of title 49, United States Code,
by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air
carrier or foreign air carrier subject to that part;
(5) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (7 U.S.C. 181 et
seq.) (except as provided in section 406 of that Act (7
U.S.C. 226, 227)), by the Secretary of Agriculture with
respect to any activities subject to that Act; and
(6) the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (12 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) by
the Farm Credit Administration with respect to any Federal
land bank, Federal land bank association, Federal
intermediate credit bank, or production credit association.
(c) Exercise of Certain Powers.--For the purpose of the
exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of its
powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a
violation of this Act is deemed to be a violation of a
requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers
under any provision of law specifically referred to in
subsection (b), each of the agencies referred to in that
subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing
compliance with any requirement imposed under this Act, any
other authority conferred on it by law.
(d) Actions by the Commission.--The Commission shall
prevent any person from violating this Act in the same
manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction,
powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41
et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act.
Any entity that violates any provision of that section is
subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and
immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act in
the same manner, by the same means, and with the same
jurisdiction, power, and duties as though all applicable
terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were
incorporated into and made a part of that section.
(e) Preservation of Commission Authority.--Nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to 8 limit the
authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.
SEC. 7. ACTIONS BY STATES.
(a) In General.--
(1) Civil actions.--In any case in which the attorney
general of a State has reason to believe that an interest of
the residents of that State has been or is threatened or
adversely affected by the engagement of any person in a
practice that this Act prohibits, the State, as parens
patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents
of the State in a district court of the United States of
appropriate jurisdiction--
(A) to enjoin that practice;
(B) to enforce compliance with the rule;
(C) to obtain damage, restitution, or other compensation on
behalf of residents of the State; or
(D) to obtain such other relief as the court may consider
to be appropriate.
(2) Notice.--
(A) In general.--Before filing an action under paragraph
(1), the attorney general of the State involved shall provide
to the Commission--
(i) written notice of that action; and
(ii) a copy of the complaint for that action.
(B) Exemption.--
(i) In general.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with
respect to the filing of an action by an attorney general of
a State under this subsection, if the attorney general
determines that it is not feasible to provide the notice
described in that subparagraph before the filing of the
action.
(ii) Notification.--In an action described in clause (i),
the attorney general of a State shall provide notice and a
copy of the complaint to the Commission at the same time as
the attorney general files the action.
(b) Intervention.--
(1) In general.--On receiving notice under subsection
(a)(2), the Commission shall have the right to intervene in
the action that is the subject of the notice.
(2) Effect of intervention.--If the Commission intervenes
in an action under subsection (a), it shall have the right--
(A) to be heard with respect to any matter that arises in
that action; and
(B) to file a petition for appeal.
(c) Construction.--For purposes of bringing any civil
action under subsection (a), nothing in this subtitle shall
be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from
exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by
the laws of that State to--
(1) conduct investigations;
(2) administer oaths or affirmations; or
(3) compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documentary and other evidence.
(d) Actions by the Commission.--In any case in which an
action is instituted by or on behalf of the Commission for
violation of section 2 of this Act, no State may, during the
pendency of that action, institute an action under subsection
(a) against any defendant named in the complaint in that
action for violation of that section.
(e) Venue; Service of Process.--
(1) Venue.--Any action brought under subsection (a) may be
brought in the district court of the United States that meets
applicable requirements relating to venue under section 1391
of title 28, United States Code.
(2) Service of process.--In an action brought under
subsection (a), process may be served in any district in
which the defendant--
(A) is an inhabitant; or
(B) may be found.
SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Advertisement.--The term ``advertisement'' means a
commercial promotion for a product or service, but does not
include promotions for products or services that appear on
computer software help or support pages that are displayed in
response to a request by the user.
(2) Advertising feature.--The term ``advertising feature''
means a function of computer software that, when installed on
a computer, delivers advertisements to the user of that
computer.
(3) Affirmative consent.--The term ``affirmative consent''
means consent expressed through action by the user of a
computer other than default action specified by the
installation sequence and independent from any other consent
solicited from the user during the installation process.
(4) Clear description.--The term ``clear description''
means a description that is clear, conspicuous, concise, and
in a font size that is at least as large as the largest
default font displayed to the user by the software.
(5) Computer software.--The term ``computer software''--
(A) means any program designed to cause a computer to
perform a desired function or functions; and
(B) does not include any cookie.
(6) Cookie.--The term ``cookie'' means a text file--
(A) that is placed on a computer by an Internet service
provider, interactive computer service, or Internet website;
and
(B) the sole function of which is to record information
that can be read or recognized by an Internet service
provider, interactive computer service, or Internet website
when the user of the computer uses or accesses such provider,
service, or website.
(7) Distributed computing feature.--The term ``distributed
computing feature'' means a function of computer software
that, when installed on a computer, transmits information or
messages, other than personal or network information about
the user of the computer, to any other computer without the
knowledge or direction of the user and for purposes unrelated
to the tasks or functions the user intentionally performs
using the computer.
(8) First retail sale.--The term ``first retail sale''
means the first sale of a computer, for a purpose other than
resale, after the manufacture, production, or importation of
the computer. For purposes of this paragraph, the lease of a
computer shall be considered a sale of the computer at
retail.
(9) Information collection feature.--The term ``information
collection feature'' means a function of computer software
that, when installed on a computer, collects personal or
network information about the user of the computer and
transmits such information to any other party on an automatic
basis or at the direction of a party other than the user of
the computer.
(10) Install.--The term ``install'' means--
(A) to write computer software to a computer's persistent
storage medium, such as the computer's hard disk, in such a
way that the computer software is retained on the computer
after the computer is turned off and subsequently restarted;
or
(B) to write computer software to a computer's temporary
memory, such as random access memory, in such a way that the
software is retained and continues to operate after the user
of the computer turns off or exits the Internet service,
interactive computer service, or Internet website from which
the computer software was obtained.
(11) Network Information.--The term ``network information''
means--
(A) an Internet protocol address or domain name of a user's
computer;
(B) a cookie or other unique identifier of a computer user
or a computer user's computer; or
(C) a Uniform Resource Locator or other information that
identifies Internet web sites or other online resources
accessed by a user of a computer.
(12) Personal information.--The term ``personal
information'' means--
(A) a first and last name, whether given at birth or
adoption, assumed, or legally changed;
(B) a home or other physical address including street name,
name of a city or town, and zip code;
(C) an electronic mail address or online username;
(D) a telephone number;
(E) a social security number;
(F) any personal identification number;
(G) a credit card number, any access code associated with
the credit card, or both;
(H) a birth date, birth certificate number, or place of
birth; or
(I) any password or access code.
(13) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given
that term in section 3(32) of the Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. 153(32)).
(14) Protected computer.--The term ``protected computer''
has the meaning given that term in section 1030(e)(2)(B) of
title 18, United States Code.
(15) Settings modification feature.--The term ``settings
modification feature'' means
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a function of computer software that, when installed on a
computer--
(A) modifies an existing user setting, without direction
from the user of the computer, with respect to another
computer software application previously installed on that
computer; or
(B) enables a user setting with respect to another computer
software application previously installed on that computer to
be modified in the future without advance notification to and
consent from the user of the computer.
(16) User of a computer.--The term ``user of a computer''
means an individual who operates a computer with the
authorization of the computer's lawful owner.
SEC. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall take effect 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Corzine, Mrs. Clinton, Mr.
Lautenberg, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Kerry,
Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Reid, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Cantwell, Ms. Mikulski, and
Mr. Edwards):
S. 2132. A bill to prohibit racial profiling; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, three years ago tomorrow, in his first
address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush declared that
racial profiling is wrong and pledged to end it in America. He then
directed his Attorney General to implement this policy.
It is now three years later, and the American people are still
waiting for the President to follow through on his pledge to end racial
profiling.
So, today I join with Representative John Conyers, the distinguished
ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, in re-introducing the
End Racial Profiling Act. We first introduced this bill in 2001,
shortly after the President made his pledge and the Attorney General
asserted that he would work with us on our legislation.
The End Racial Profiling Act would do exactly what the President
promised to do: it would ban racial profiling once and for all and
require Federal, State, and local law enforcement to take steps to end
and prevent racial profiling.
I am very pleased that several of my distinguished colleagues have
joined me on this bill Senators Corzine, Clinton, Lautenberg, Kennedy,
Schumer, Durbin, Kerry, Boxer, Reid, Dodd, Cantwell, Mikulski, and
Edwards.
Racial profiling is the practice by which some law enforcement agents
routinely stop African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Arab
Americans and others simply because of their race, ethnicity, or
national origin. Reports in States from New Jersey to Florida, and
Maryland to Texas all show that African Americans, Hispanics, and
members of other minority groups are being stopped by some police far
in excess of their share of the population and the rate at which they
engage in criminal conduct.
I might add that the urgency for legislation banning racial profiling
is compounded by concerns post-September 11 that racial profiling--not
good police work and following up on legitimate leads--is being used
against Arab and Muslim Americans, or Americans perceived to be Arab or
Muslim.
The September 11 attacks were horrific and I share the determination
of many Americans that finding those responsible and preventing future
attacks should be this Nation's top priority. This is a challenge that
our country can and must meet. But we need improved intelligence and
law enforcement, not racial, ethnic or religious stereotypes, to
protect our Nation from crime and future terrorist attacks.
In fact, I believe that the End Racial Profiling Act is a pro-law
enforcement bill. It will help to restore the trust and confidence of
the communities our law enforcement have pledged to serve and protect.
That confidence is crucial to our success in stopping crime, and in
stopping terrorism. The End Racial Profiling Act is good for law
enforcement and good for America.
I'm very pleased that many state and local law enforcement officials
stand with the sponsors of this bill in condemning racial profiling.
Many law enforcement officials across the country agree that racial
profiling is wrong and should not take place in America. In fact, many
State and local law enforcement officials have begun to take steps to
address the problem, or even the perception of a problem. For example,
in my own State of Wisconsin, law enforcement officials have taken
steps to train police officers, improve academy training, establish
model policies prohibiting racial profiling, and improve relations with
our State's diverse communities. I applaud the efforts of Wisconsin law
enforcement.
But the Federal Government has a vital role in protecting civil
rights and acting as a model for State and local law enforcement. Last
June, the Justice Department issued a policy guidance to Federal law
enforcement agencies banning racial profiling. But while this guidance
is a useful first step, it does not achieve the President's stated goal
of ending racial profiling in America. It does not carry the force of
law and does not apply to State and local law enforcement. Federal
legislation is still very much needed.
Our bill, the End Racial Profiling Act, would ban racial profiling
and allow the Justice Department or individuals the ability to enforce
this prohibition by filing a suit for injunctive relief. The bill would
also require Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to
adopt policies prohibiting racial profiling; to implement effective
complaint procedures; to implement disciplinary procedures for officers
who engage in the practice; and to collect data on stops. In addition,
it requires the Attorney General to report to Congress to allow
Congress and the American people to monitor whether the steps outlined
in the bill to prevent and end racial profiling have been effective.
Like the bill we introduced last Congress, the bill also authorizes
the Attorney General to provide incentive grants to help law
enforcement comply with the ban on racial profiling, including funds to
conduct training of police officers or purchase in-car video cameras.
Finally, we have revised the bill to conform with the definition of
racial profiling in the Justice Department's guidance and to reflect
concerns about racial profiling based on religion in a post-September
11 America.
Let me emphasize that local, State, and Federal law enforcement
agents play a vital role in protecting the public from crime and
protecting the Nation from terrorism. The vast majority of law
enforcement agents nationwide discharge their duties professionally and
without bias and we are all indebted to them for their courage and
dedication. This bill should not be misinterpreted as a criticism of
those who put their lives on the line for the rest of us every day.
Rather, it is a statement that the use of race, ethnicity, religion, or
national origin in deciding which persons should be subject to traffic
stops, stops and frisks, questioning, searches, and seizures is wrong
and ineffective, except where there is specific information linking
persons of a particular race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin
to a crime.
Now, perhaps more than ever before, our Nation cannot afford to waste
precious law enforcement resources or alienate Americans by tolerating
discriminatory practices. It is past time for Congress and the
President to enact comprehensive federal legislation that will end
racial profiling once and for all.
I urge the President to make good on his pledge to end racial
profiling, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the End
Racial Profiling Act.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2132
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``End Racial
Profiling Act of 2004''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and purposes.
TITLE I--PROHIBITION OF RACIAL PROFILING
Sec. 101. Prohibition.
Sec. 102. Enforcement.
TITLE II--PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING BY FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Sec. 201. Policies to eliminate racial profiling.
[[Page S1689]]
TITLE III--PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING BY STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Sec. 301. Policies required for grants.
Sec. 302. Best practices development grants.
TITLE IV--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORTS ON RACIAL PROFILING IN THE
UNITED STATES
Sec. 401. Attorney General to issue reports on racial profiling in the
United States.
Sec. 402. Limitation on use of data.
TITLE V--DEFINITIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. Definitions.
Sec. 502. Severability.
Sec. 503. Savings clause.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Federal, State, and local law enforcement agents play a
vital role in protecting the public from crime and protecting
the Nation from terrorism. The vast majority of law
enforcement agents nationwide discharge their duties
professionally and without bias.
(2) The use by police officers of race, ethnicity,
religion, or national origin in deciding which persons should
be subject to traffic stops, stops and frisks, questioning,
searches, and seizures is improper.
(3) In his address to a Joint Session of Congress on
February 27, 2001, President George W. Bush declared that
``racial profiling is wrong and we will end it in America.''
He directed the Attorney General to implement this policy.
(4) In June 2003, the Department of Justice issued a Policy
Guidance regarding racial profiling by Federal law
enforcement agencies which stated: ``Racial profiling in law
enforcement is not merely wrong, but also ineffective. Race-
based assumptions in law enforcement perpetuate negative
racial stereotypes that are harmful to our rich and diverse
democracy, and materially impair our efforts to maintain a
fair and just society.''
(5) The Department of Justice Guidance is a useful first
step, but does not achieve the President's stated goal of
ending racial profiling in America: it does not apply to
State and local law enforcement agencies, does not contain a
meaningful enforcement mechanism, does not require data
collection, and contains an overbroad exception for
immigration and national security matters.
(6) Current efforts by State and local governments to
eradicate racial profiling and redress the harms it causes,
while also laudable, have been limited in scope and
insufficient to address this national problem. Therefore,
Federal legislation is needed.
(7) Statistical evidence from across the country
demonstrates that racial profiling is a real and measurable
phenomenon.
(8) As of November 15, 2000, the Department of Justice had
14 publicly noticed, ongoing, pattern or practice
investigations involving allegations of racial profiling, and
had filed 5 pattern and practice lawsuits involving
allegations of racial profiling, with 4 of those cases
resolved through consent decrees.
(9) A large majority of individuals subjected to stops and
other enforcement activities based on race, ethnicity,
religion, or national origin are found to be law abiding and
therefore racial profiling is not an effective means to
uncover criminal activity.
(10) A 2001 Department of Justice report on citizen-police
contacts in 1999 found that, although African-Americans and
Hispanics were more likely to be stopped and searched, they
were less likely to be in possession of contraband. On
average, searches and seizures of African-American drivers
yielded evidence only 8 percent of the time, searches and
seizures of Hispanic drivers yielded evidence only 10 percent
of the time, and searches and seizures of white drivers
yielded evidence 17 percent of the time.
(11) A 2000 General Accounting Office report on the
activities of the United States Customs Service during fiscal
year 1998 found that--
(A) black women who were United States citizens were 9
times more likely than white women who were United States
citizens to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down;
(B) black women who were United States citizens were less
than half as likely as white women who were United States
citizens to be found carrying contraband; and
(C) in general, the patterns used to select passengers for
more intrusive searches resulted in women and minorities
being selected at rates that were not consistent with the
rates of finding contraband.
(12) In some jurisdictions, local law enforcement practices
such as ticket and arrest quotas, and similar management
practices, may have the unintended effect of encouraging law
enforcement agents to engage in racial profiling.
(13) Racial profiling harms individuals subjected to it
because they experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger,
resentment, and cynicism when they are unjustifiably treated
as criminal suspects. By discouraging individuals from
traveling freely, racial profiling impairs both interstate
and intrastate commerce.
(14) Racial profiling damages law enforcement and the
criminal justice system as a whole by undermining public
confidence and trust in the police, the courts, and the
criminal law.
(15) In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, many Arabs, Muslims, Central and South Asians, and
Sikhs, as well as other immigrants and Americans of foreign
descent, were treated with generalized suspicion and
subjected to searches and seizures based upon religion and
national origin, without trustworthy information linking
specific individuals to criminal conduct. Such profiling has
failed to produce tangible benefits, yet has created a fear
and mistrust of law enforcement agencies in these
communities.
(16) Racial profiling violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Using race, ethnicity, religion, or
national origin as a proxy for criminal suspicion violates
the constitutional requirement that police and other
government officials accord to all citizens the equal
protection of the law. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
(17) Racial profiling is not adequately addressed through
suppression motions in criminal cases for two reasons. First,
the Supreme Court held, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996), that the racially discriminatory motive of a
police officer in making an otherwise valid traffic stop does
not warrant the suppression of evidence. Second, since most
stops do not result in the discovery of contraband, there is
no criminal prosecution and no evidence to suppress.
(18) A comprehensive national solution is needed to address
racial profiling at the Federal, State, and local levels.
Federal support is needed to combat racial profiling through
specialized training of law enforcement agents, improved
management systems, and the acquisition of technology such as
in-car video cameras.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to enforce the constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and section 5 of
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;
(2) to enforce the constitutional right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;
(3) to enforce the constitutional right to interstate
travel, pursuant to section 2 of article IV of the
Constitution of the United States; and
(4) to regulate interstate commerce, pursuant to clause 3
of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United
States.
TITLE I--PROHIBITION OF RACIAL PROFILING
SEC. 101. PROHIBITION.
No law enforcement agent or law enforcement agency shall
engage in racial profiling.
SEC. 102. ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Remedy.--The United States, or an individual injured by
racial profiling, may enforce this title in a civil action
for declaratory or injunctive relief, filed either in a State
court of general jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States.
(b) Parties.--In any action brought pursuant to this title,
relief may be obtained against--
(1) any governmental unit that employed any law enforcement
agent who engaged in racial profiling;
(2) any agent of such unit who engaged in racial profiling;
and
(3) any person with supervisory authority over such agent.
(c) Nature of Proof.--Proof that the routine or spontaneous
investigatory activities of law enforcement agents in a
jurisdiction have had a disparate impact on racial, ethnic,
or religious minorities shall constitute prima facie evidence
of a violation of this title.
(d) Attorney's Fees.--In any action or proceeding to
enforce this title against any governmental unit, the court
may allow a prevailing plaintiff, other than the United
States, reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs, and
may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee.
TITLE II--PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING BY FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
SEC. 201. POLICIES TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING.
(a) In General.--Federal law enforcement agencies shall--
(1) maintain adequate policies and procedures designed to
eliminate racial profiling; and
(2) cease existing practices that encourage racial
profiling.
(b) Policies.--The policies and procedures described in
subsection (a)(1) shall include--
(1) a prohibition on racial profiling;
(2) the collection of data on routine investigatory
activities sufficient to determine if law enforcement agents
are engaged in racial profiling and submission of that data
to the Attorney General;
(3) independent procedures for receiving, investigating,
and responding meaningfully to complaints alleging racial
profiling by law enforcement agents of the agency;
(4) procedures to discipline law enforcement agents who
engage in racial profiling; and
(5) such other policies or procedures that the Attorney
General deems necessary to eliminate racial profiling.
TITLE III--PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING BY STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
SEC. 301. POLICIES REQUIRED FOR GRANTS.
(a) In General.--An application by a State or governmental
unit for funding under a
[[Page S1690]]
covered program shall include a certification that such unit
and any agency to which it is redistributing program funds--
(1) maintains adequate policies and procedures designed to
eliminate racial profiling; and
(2) has ceased any existing practices that encourage racial
profiling.
(b) Policies.--The policies and procedures described in
subsection (a) shall include--
(1) a prohibition on racial profiling;
(2) the collection of data on routine investigatory
activities sufficient to determine if law enforcement agents
are engaged in racial profiling, and submission of that data
to the Attorney General;
(3) independent procedures for receiving, investigating,
and responding meaningfully to complaints alleging racial
profiling by law enforcement agents;
(4) procedures to discipline law enforcement agents who
engage in racial profiling; and
(5) such other policies or procedures that the Attorney
General deems necessary to eliminate racial profiling.
(c) Noncompliance.--If the Attorney General determines that
a grantee is not in compliance with conditions established
under this title, the Attorney General shall withhold the
grant, in whole or in part, until the grantee establishes
compliance. The Attorney General shall provide notice
regarding State grants and opportunities for private parties
to present evidence to the Attorney General that a grantee is
not in compliance with conditions established under this
title.
SEC. 302. BEST PRACTICES DEVELOPMENT GRANTS.
(a) Grant Authorization.--The Attorney General may make
grants to States, law enforcement agencies and other
governmental units, Indian tribal governments, or other
public and private entities, to develop and implement best
practice devices and systems to ensure the racially neutral
administration of justice.
(b) Uses.--The funds provided pursuant to subsection (a)
may be used to support--
(1) development and implementation of training to prevent
racial profiling and to encourage more respectful interaction
with the public;
(2) acquisition and use of technology to facilitate the
collection of data regarding routine investigatory activities
in order to determine if law enforcement agents are engaged
in racial profiling;
(3) acquisition and use of technology to verify the
accuracy of data collection, including in-car video cameras
and portable computer systems;
(4) development and acquisition of early warning systems
and other feedback systems that help identify officers or
units of officers engaged in or at risk of racial profiling
or other misconduct, including the technology to support such
systems;
(5) establishment or improvement of systems and procedures
for receiving, investigating, and responding meaningfully to
complaints alleging racial, ethnic, or religious bias by law
enforcement agents; and
(6) establishment or improvement of management systems to
ensure that supervisors are held accountable for the conduct
of their subordinates.
(c) Equitable Distribution.--The Attorney General shall
ensure that grants under this section are awarded in a manner
that reserves an equitable share of funding for small and
rural law enforcement agencies.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--The Attorney General
shall make available such sums as are necessary to carry out
this section from amounts appropriated for programs
administered by the Attorney General.
TITLE IV--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORTS ON RACIAL PROFILING IN THE
UNITED STATES
SEC. 401. ATTORNEY GENERAL TO ISSUE REPORTS ON RACIAL
PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 2 years after the enactment
of this Act, and each year thereafter, the Attorney General
shall submit to Congress a report on racial profiling by
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the
United States.
(2) Scope.--The reports issued pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a summary of data collected pursuant to sections
201(b)(2) and 301(b)(2) and any other reliable source of
information regarding racial profiling in the United States;
(B) the status of the adoption and implementation of
policies and procedures by Federal law enforcement agencies
pursuant to section 201;
(C) the status of the adoption and implementation of
policies and procedures by State and local law enforcement
agencies pursuant to sections 301 and 302; and
(D) a description of any other policies and procedures that
the Attorney General believes would facilitate the
elimination of racial profiling.
(b) Data Collection.--Not later than 6 months after the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall by
regulation establish standards for the collection of data
under sections 201(b)(2) and 301(b)(2), including standards
for setting benchmarks against which collected data shall be
measured. Such standards shall result in the collection of
data, including data with respect to stops, searches,
seizures, and arrests, that is sufficiently detailed to
determine whether law enforcement agencies are engaged in
racial profiling and to monitor the effectiveness of policies
and procedures designed to eliminate racial profiling.
(c) Public Access.--Data collected under sections 201(b)(2)
and 301(b)(2) shall be available to the public.
SEC. 402. LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.
Information released pursuant to section 401 shall not
reveal the identity of any individual who is detained or any
law enforcement officer involved in a detention.
TITLE V--DEFINITIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Covered program.--The term ``covered program'' means
any program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds
made available under--
(A) the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law
Enforcement Assistance Programs (part E of title I of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.
3750 et seq.));
(B) the ``Cops on the Beat'' program under part Q of title
I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(42 U.S.C. 3796dd et seq.), but not including any program,
project, or other activity specified in section 1701(d)(8) of
that Act (42 U.S.C. 3796dd(d)(8)); and
(C) the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant program of the
Department of Justice, as described in appropriations Acts.
(2) Governmental unit.--The term ``governmental unit''
means any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of Federal, State, local, or Indian
tribal government.
(3) Law enforcement agency.--The term ``law enforcement
agency'' means a Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal
public agency engaged in the prevention, detection, or
investigation of violations of criminal, immigration, or
customs laws.
(4) Law enforcement agent.--The term ``law enforcement
agent'' means any Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal
official responsible for enforcing criminal, immigration, or
customs laws, including police officers and other agents of
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.
(5) Racial profiling.--The term ``racial profiling'' means
the practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to any
degree, on race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin in
selecting which individuals to subject to routine or
spontaneous investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the
scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the
initial investigatory procedure, except when there is
trustworthy information, relevant to the locality and
timeframe, that links persons of a particular race,
ethnicity, religion, or national origin to an identified
criminal incident or scheme.
(6) Routine or spontaneous investigatory activities.--The
term ``routine or spontaneous investigatory activities''
means the following activities by law enforcement agents:
interviews; traffic stops; pedestrian stops; frisks and other
types of body searches; consensual or nonconsensual searches
of the persons or possessions (including vehicles) of
motorists or pedestrians; inspections and interviews of
entrants into the United States that are more extensive than
those customarily carried out; immigration related workplace
investigations; and such other types of law enforcement
encounters compiled by the FBI and the Justice Department's
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
SEC. 502. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the
application of the provisions of such to any person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 503. SAVINGS CLAUSE.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit legal or
administrative remedies under section 1979 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), section
210401 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14141), the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), and title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.).
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am very pleased to be joining my
colleague Senator Russell Feingold and 12 others in reintroducing the
End Racial Profiling Act.
I first want to recognize Senator Russ Feingold who has been a
tremendous leader on this issue--during the last two sessions he held
the first Senate hearings on racial profiling and he and his staff have
worked tirelessly to elevate the importance of this issue as a matter
of civil rights. I also want to commend Representative John Conyers,
who is introducing companion legislation in the House of
Representatives today. This is just on example of his indefatigable
work to address inequities in our society. I also want to thank
Reverend Reginald Jackson, Executive Director of the New Jersey Black
Ministers' Council. He and the entire council have worked tirelessly
for years to address the issue of racial profiling in New Jersey and
have provided immeasurable assistance in crafting this legislation.
[[Page S1691]]
The practice of racial profiling is the antithesis of America's
belief in fairness and equal protection under the law.
Stopping people on our highways, our streets, and at our borders
because of the color of their skin tears at the very fabric of American
society.
We are a Nation of laws and everyone should receive equal protection
under the law. Our Constitution tolerates nothing less. We should
demand nothing less.
There is no equal protection--there is no equal justice--if law
enforcement agencies engage in policies and practices that are premised
on a theory that the way to stop crime is to go after black and brown
people on the hunch that they are more likely to be criminals.
Let me add, that not only is racial profiling wrong, it is simply not
an effective law enforcement tool. There is no evidence that stopping
people of color adds up to catching bad guys.
In fact, there is statistical evidence which points out that singling
out black motorist or Hispanic motorists for stops and searches doesn't
lead to a higher percentage of arrests. Minority motorists are simply
no more likely to be breaking the law than white motorists.
But unfortunately racial profiling persists.
In 2001, minority motorists accounted for 73 percent of those
searched on the New Jersey turnpike. But even the State Attorney
General admitted that State troopers were twice--I repeat twice--as
likely to find drugs or other illegal items when searching vehicles
driven by whites.
Or take the example of the March 2000 Government Accounting Office
report on the U.S. Customs Service.
The report found that black, Asian, and Hispanic women were four to
nine times more likely than white women to be subjected to X rays after
being frisked or patted down.
But on the basis of the X ray results, black women were less than
half as likely as white women to be found carrying contraband.
This is law enforcement by hunch. No warrants. No probable cause.
And what is the hunch based on?
Race--plain and simple.
No where was this more evident, than in my own home State six years
ago.
Four young men on the New Jersey Turnpike in a minivan--on their way
to North Carolina, hoping to go to school on basketball scholarships.
Two State troopers pulled them off the road, the frightened driver
lost control of the van, two dozens shots rang out. Three of the four
kids were shot.
I spoke to these kids a while ago. One of the them told me he was
asleep when the van was pulled over.
He told me, ``What woke me up was a bullet.''
Stories like this should wake us all up.
The practice of racial profiling broadly undermines the confidence of
the American people in the institutions that we depend on to protect
and defend us. Different rules for different people do not work.
Now--We know that many law enforcement agencies, including some from
my home State, have acknowledged the danger of the practice and have
taken steps to combat it. Indeed, I am proud to report that New Jersey
has banned racial profiling. I commend them for their efforts.
That said, it is clear that this is a national problem that requires
a national response applicable to all.
That is why Senator Feingold and I and many others introduced the End
Racial Profiling Act in 2001 to end this practice. The legislation
provided a clear, enforceable ban on racial profiling and established a
``carrot and stick'' approach to encourage law enforcement to take
steps to end the practice.
The legislation helped bring much-needed attention to this critical
issue and was positively received by the civil rights community and
many in law enforcement. Soon after introduction, Senator Feingold held
very informative hearings on the bill, at which I testified. We heard
from several law enforcement leaders, including Oakland Police Chief
Ronald Davis and Raymond Kelly, former Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service and the New York City Police Department, on the pernicious
impact of racial profiling on the trust between law enforcement and
communities that is essential for successful police work. They
testified that racial profiling is contrary to effective law
enforcement and indeed takes energy and focus away from finding real
criminals.
Then, in June 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines
to prohibit racial profiling by federal law enforcement agencies,
following up on President Bush's statement in his February 27, 2001,
address to a Joint Session of Congress, that racial profiling is
``wrong and we will end it in America.''
In this guidance, the Department stated:
Racial profiling in law enforcement is not merely wrong,
but also ineffective. Race-based assumptions in law
enforcement perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are
harmful to our rich and diverse democracy, and materially
impair our efforts to maintain a fair and just society.
These guidelines, as well as current efforts by State and local
governments, to eradicate racial profiling and redress the harms it
causes, while laudable, have been limited in scope and insufficient to
address this national problem. Quite simply, federal legislation is
still very much needed.
In most respects the legislation we are now introducing today is very
similar to the bill that we introduced in 2001.
It clearly defines racial profiling and bans it.
No routine stops based solely on race, religion, national origin or
ethnicity. Religion is a new addition to the category of protected
classes, in acknowledgment of some of the new law enforcement tactics
developed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. For example,
in the wake of the attacks, Arab-American, Muslim-American, South
Asian-American and Sikh-American communities were made the target of
generalized suspicion and subjected to searches and seizures based upon
their religion and national origin, which has created a fear and
mistrust of law enforcement agencies and failed to produce tangible
investigative benefit.
We will also require the collection of statistics to accurately
measure whether progress is being made. By collecting this data, we
will get a fair picture of law enforcement at work. And we will provide
law enforcement with the information they need to detect problems early
on.
It is not our intention to micromanage law enforcement. Our bill does
not tell law enforcement agencies what data should be collected.
Instead, we direct the Attorney General to develop the standards for
data collection, and he presumably would work with law enforcement in
developing those standards. Our legislation also specifically directs
the Attorney General to also establish standards for setting benchmarks
against which the collected data should be measured--so that no data is
taken out of context, as some in law enforcement rightly fear.
If the numbers reveal a portrait of continued racial profiling, then
the Justice Department or independent third parties can seek relief in
Federal court ordering that remedies be put into effect to end racial
profiling.
Our bill would also put in place procedures to receive and
investigate complaints alleging racial profiling.
It will require procedures to discipline law enforcement officers
engaging in racial profiling.
Finally, we will encourage a climate of cultural change in law
enforcement with a carrot and a stick.
First, the carrot: We recognize that law enforcement shouldn't be
expected to do this alone. So we are saying that if you do the job
right--fairly and equitably--you can be eligible to receive a best
practices development grant--to help pay for programs dealing with
advanced training.
To help pay for the computer technology that is necessary to collect
the data and statistics we have demanded.
We'll help pay for video cameras and recorders for your patrol cars.
We'll help pay for establishing or improving systems for handling
complaints alleging ethnic or racial profiling.
We'll help to establish management systems to ensure that supervisors
are held accountable for the conduct of subordinates.
But if you don't do the job right, there is the stick. If State and
local
[[Page S1692]]
law enforcement agencies refuse to implement procedures to end and
prevent profiling, they will be subject to a loss of Federal law
enforcement funds.
Let me be clear, this bill is not about blaming law enforcement, and
it is not designed to prevent law enforcement from doing its job. In
fact, we believe that it will help our officers maintain the public
trust they need to do their jobs.
If race is a part of a description of a specific suspect involved in
an investigation, this law does not prevent that information from being
distributed. But stopping people on a random or race-based hunch will
be outlawed. Race has been a never-ending battle in this country. It
began with our constitution, when the founding fathers argued over the
rights of slaves. And then we fought a war over race. We fought a war
that ripped our country apart.
Our country emerged whole, but discrimination continued for decades--
discrimination sanctioned in part, unfortunately, by our own Supreme
Court.
But our country's history has always been about change, about growth,
about recognizing those things that weaken us from within.
A generation ago, we began to fight another war--a war founded in
peaceful principles, but a war that killed our heroes, burned our
cities, and shook us once again to the very core.
But we advanced, with important civil rights initiatives like the
Voting Rights Act. Like the public accommodations law. We demanded and
gained laws to fight discrimination in employment, in housing, in
education. Today, it is time for us to take another step. Racial
profiling has bred humiliation, anger, resentment and cynicism
throughout this country. It has weakened respect for the law--by
everyone, not just those offended.
Simply put--it is wrong and we must end it. Today we pledge to do
just that--to define it, to ban it, and to enforce that ban.
______
By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Domenici, and
Mr. Smith):
S. 2134. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement or contract with
Indian tribes meeting certain criteria to carry out projects to protect
Indian forest land; to the Committee on Indian Affairs.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce a bipartisan
bill today that gives Native American tribes a chance to protect their
reservation lands from catastrophic fire. I want to thank my
cosponsors, Chairman Pete Domenici of the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, and Chairman Ben Nighthorse Campbell of the Committee on
Indian Affairs.
Like other Americans, many Native American tribes are concerned about
the risk of catastrophic forest fires spreading from nearby Federal
lands onto their own lands. Last summer, at least 18 reservations were
invaded by fire from adjacent Federal public forest lands.
This bill attempts to give the tribes a chance to defend themselves
and their ancestral lands by involving them in brush-clearing projects
on Federal lands near their reservations.
This is not just a theoretical problem, as tribes from my State know
all too well.
Last fall's devastating wildfires in southern California caused
disproportionate suffering for Native Americans: Over 30,000 acres
burned on 11 tribal reservations. Most tragically, 10 lives were lost
on or near reservations.
I am determined to give the tribes of my State and from around the
country the opportunity to prevent this tragedy from recurring: The
bill sets up a process for the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land
Management to enter into contracts with the tribes for fuel reduction
purposes. If a tribe requests a brush-clearing project on federal lands
near its reservation, the agencies are encouraged to respond within
specific timeframes and suggest remedies for any agency concerns with
the tribe's proposal. There remains free and open competition for
timber contracts on Federal land. However, in determining the
recipients of the contracts, the agencies are encouraged to consider
such factors as tribal treaty rights or cultural and historical
affiliation to the land involved.
Nearly 100 Native American tribes support this legislation, including
most, if not all, the tribes in the State of California.
So I am pleased to introduce this bill today, and I hope my
colleagues will support it.
______
By Mrs. MURRAY (for herself and Ms. Cantwell):
S. 2135. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to
improve the provision of items and services provided to Medicare
beneficiaries residing in rural areas; to the Committee on Finance.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to again join my colleague,
Senator Cantwell, in introducing the MediFair Act of 2004. My bill will
restore fairness to the Medicare program and provide equity for health
care providers participating in Medicare. Most importantly, it will
open doors of care to more seniors and the disabled in my State.
Today, unfair Medicare reimbursement rates are causing doctors to
limit their care for Medicare beneficiaries. Throughout my State,
seniors and the disabled are having a hard time finding a doctor who
will accept new Medicare patients.
Unfortunately, the recently-passed Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 further compromises health
care in Washington State because it reduces Washington State's per
beneficiary payments from 42nd to 45th nationwide. This reduction
places health care providers in my State at an economic disadvantage
and further limits access to health care in Washington State.
My bill will reduce the regional inequities that have resulted in
vastly different levels of care and access to care by ensuring that
every State receives at least the national average of per-patient
spending. This measure will encourage more doctors to accept Medicare
patients and will also guarantee that seniors are not penalized when
they choose to retire in the State of Washington.
In addition to ensuring that no State receives less than the national
average, my legislation will encourage healthy outcomes and efficient
use of Medicare payments. The current Medicare system punishes health
care providers who practice efficient healthcare and healthy outcomes.
Physicians and hospitals in my State are proud of the pioneering role
they have played in providing high quality, cost effective medicine.
Unfortunately, they have been rewarded for their exceptional service by
being paid a fraction of their actual costs.
On the other hand, States that are inefficient and that over-utilize
the system are rewarded with higher states of reimbursement. As we
grapple with an ever-increasing budget deficit. We need to make sure
that every dollar spent on Medicare is used as effectively as possible.
I ask each and every one of my colleagues to join me in restoring
fairness to the Medicare program and increasing access to health care
for Medicare beneficiaries by supporting the MediFair Act.
I want to acknowledge the lead sponsor of the MediFair bill in the
House, Representative Adam Smith, as well as the other cosponsors,
Representative Baird, Representative Dicks, Representative Inslee,
Representative Larsen, and Representative McDermott.
I have been working on addressing the issue of inequitable Medicare
reimbursement policies for a number of years, and I am pleased that we
have made inroads in addressing this issue. I especially appreciate the
efforts by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reward
healthy outcomes, and I look forward to working with HHS in the future
to meet these goals.
Medicare should reward States like Washington that have a proven
tradition of efficient and effective health care. Passing the MediFair
Act will go a long way to improving health care access for seniors in
States like Washington and ensuring that Federal health care dollars
produce the best results possible for our patients.
______
By Mr. ROBERTS:
S. 2136. An original bill to extend the final report date and
termination date
[[Page S1693]]
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
to provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other
purposes; from the Select Committee on Intelligence; placed on the
calendar.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2136
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Final Report Date.--Subsection (b) of section 610 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107-306; 6 U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is
amended by striking ``18 months'' and inserting ``20
months''.
(b) Termination Date.--Subsection (c) of that section is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``60 days'' and inserting
``30 days''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``60-day period'' and
inserting ``30-day period''.
(c) Additional Funding.--Section 611 of that Act (6 U.S.C.
101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Additional Funding.--In addition to the amounts made
available to the Commission under subsection (a) and under
chapter 2 of title II of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11; 117 Stat. 591),
of the amounts appropriated for the programs and activities
of the Federal Government for fiscal year 2004 that remain
available for obligation, not more than $1,000,000 shall be
available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the
activities of the Commission under this title.''; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``this section''.
______
By Mrs. CLINTON:
S. 2139. A bill to provide coverage under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program for individuals employed at
atomic weapons employer facilities during periods of residual
contamination; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I rise to introduce an important piece
of legislation to assist our atomic weapons workers. The legislation
addresses a major flaw in the Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program by expanding eligibility for benefits.
Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program
Act (EEOICPA), workers are eligible for a payment of $150,000 and
medical coverage for expenses associated with the treatment of diseases
contracted due to exposure to radiation at atomic weapons plants.
However, under EEOICPA, workers who became sick from working in
contaminated atomic weapons plants after weapons production ceased are
not eligible for benefits.
In 2003, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
released a Congressionally-mandated report, entitled `` Report on
Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination in Atomic Weapons
Employer and Beryllium Vendor Facilities.'' The report concluded that
``significant'' residual radioactive contamination existed in many of
these plants for years and decades after weapons production ceased,
posing a risk of radiation-related cancers or disease to unknowing
workers.
In fact, the report found that: 97, 44 percent, of covered facilities
have potential for significant residual radioactive contamination
outside of the periods in which atomic weapons-related production
occurred; 88, 40 percent, of such facilities have little potential for
significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods
in which atomic weapons-related production occurred; and 34, 16
percent, of such facilities have insufficient information to make a
determination.
In my State of New York, 16 of 31 covered facilities were found to
have the potential for significant contamination, 10 had little
potential for significant contamination, and 5 of the 31 had
insufficient information.
In other words, more than half of the New York Atomic Weapons
Employer Facilities in New York were contaminated after weapons
production ceased. As a result, workers were exposed to radiation, and
deserve to be eligible for benefits under EEOICPA.
That is why I am introducing the Residual Radioactive Contamination
Compensation Act (RRCCA) today. The bill would extend eligibility for
benefits under EEOICPA to workers who were employed at facilities where
NIOSH has found potential for significant radioactive contamination.
In addition to expanding eligibility to workers employed at
facilities where NIOSH has found potential for significant radioactive
contamination, the Residual Radioactive Contamination Compensation Act
would require NIOSH to update the list of such facilities annually.
This addresses the fact that there was insufficient information for
NIOSH to characterize a number of sites in its 2003 report.
I would also like to take the opportunity to draw attention to
another important issue--the special cohort rule. Under EEOICPA, the
Department of Health and Human Services was to establish procedures so
that workers can petition the government to be included in a ``special
cohort''--meaning that they would be eligible for the program--if their
radiation doses are difficult to estimate but it is likely that they
have radiation-caused illnesses. Despite this important mandate, the
letter notes that ``. . . nearly 39 months after EEOICPA was signed
into law, the promise of ``timely, uniform and adequate compensation''
has not been met.
As a result, I sent a letter to Secretary Thompson, along with
Senator Voinovich and 16 of my other Senate colleagues--Senators
Harkin, Kennedy, Schumer, Murray, DeWine, Alexander, Craig, Bond, and
Talent, Reid, Grassley, Hollings, Cantwell, Domenici, Campbell, and
Bingaman. The letter requested that the Secretary immediately put out
the special cohort rule. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that
letter be printed in the Record.
More than two weeks after the letter was sent, I have still not
received a response. This is unacceptable. The Administration seems to
have no sense of urgency in addressing this issue. But each day that
passes only delays long overdue justice for the Cold War heroes who
worked in our weapons facilities.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Residual Radioactive
Contamination Compensation Act be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
February 11, 2004.
Hon. Tommy G. Thompson,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 200
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: On October 30, 2000, the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA) was signed into law (PL 106-386) as part of the FY
01 Defense Authorization Act. Enactment of EEOICPA was
recognition by Congress and the President that the federal
government needed to act quickly to remedy long-standing
injustices against atomic weapons program workers. The
findings of the Act make the need for the Program abundantly
clear, and include the acknowledgment that:
``Since the inspection of the nuclear weapons program and
for several decades afterwards, a large number of nuclear
weapons workers at sites of the Department of Energy and at
sites of vendors who supplied the Cold War effort were put at
risk without their knowledge and consent for reasons that,
documents reveal, were driven by fears of adverse publicity,
liability, and employee demands for hazardous duty pay.''
The Act further states that:
``the purpose of the compensation program is to provide for
timely, uniform, and adequate compensation of covered
employees and, where applicable, survivors of such employees,
suffering from illnesses incurred by such employees in the
performance of duty for the Department of Energy and certain
of its contractors and subcontractors.''
Yet nearly 39 months after EEOICPA was signed into law, the
promise of ``timely, uniform and adequate compensation'' has
not been met. We are very concerned about the delay in
finalizing the ``special exposure cohort'' petition
procedures by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) pursuant to 42 USC 7384(q).
In this regard, EEOICPA specifically provides:
``. . . members of a class of employees at a Department of
Energy facility, or at an atomic weapons employer facility,
may be treated as members of the Special Exposure Cohort for
purposes of the compensation program if the President, upon
recommendation of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
Health, determines that--
(1) it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy
the radiation dose that the class received; and
[[Page S1694]]
(2) there is reasonable likelihood that such radiation dose
may have endangered the health of members of the class.''
The law further states that, ``the President shall consider
such petitions pursuant to procedures established by the
President.''
Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as Members
of the Special Exposure Cohort were first proposed through a
rulemaking, and then subsequently withdrawn in 2002 after
uniform criticism. Revised rules were proposed in March of
2003, but to date they have not been finalized. Workers have
and continue to be blocked from filing petitions to become
members of the Special Exposure Cohort because HHS has failed
to meet its statutory responsibility to issue these
regulations.
Further delay is denying long-overdue justice for those who
were intended to be covered by the special exposure cohort
provisions of the Act. After over three years, HHS has had
ample time to study this matter, and further delay is simply
inexcusable.
Therefore, we urge you to finalize the special exposure
cohort rules and publish them in the Federal Register
immediately. Our atomic weapons program workers, who are true
Cold War heroes, helped protect our nation and deserve
nothing less. We thank you for your prompt attention to this
matter.
Sincerely,
Members of Congress.
____
S. 2139
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Residual Radioactive
Contamination Compensation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Beginning in the early 1940s, the Department of Energy
and its predecessors, the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Manhattan Engineering District, relied upon hundreds of
private-sector factories and laboratories to develop, test,
and produce atomic weapons for use by the military, and these
facilities became contaminated with radioactive materials
during the process of producing material used for atomic
weapons production.
(2) The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000 (in this section referred to as EEOICPA)
provides health care and lump-sum benefits for radiation-
related cancers and other illnesses to certain covered
workers made sick while they toiled in the nation's nuclear
weapons factories, including vendor facilities. EEOICPA
defines these private-sector vendor facilities as atomic
weapons employer facilities, and employees working in such
facilities while their employers were under contract to
process nuclear weapons materials are defined as atomic
weapons employees.
(3) Many of the atomic weapons employer facilities were not
properly decontaminated after processing radioactive
materials such as thorium, uranium, and radium and retained
significant levels of contamination. Workers who were hired
and employed in such atomic weapons employer facilities after
the date that contracts were ended for production were
potentially exposed to significant amounts of radiation.
Congress was not aware of the presence of residual
radioactive contamination in these facilities when it enacted
EEOICPA, thus inadvertently denying coverage under the law to
those who were unwittingly exposed to radiation left over
from nuclear weapons activities.
(4) In December 2001, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) was enacted,
which required in section 3151(b) that the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health study and issue a final
report to Congress by December 2002 describing which of the
atomic weapons employer facilities had significant residual
radioactive contamination remaining in them after processing
materials for use in atomic weapons and during what time
periods such radioactive contamination remained.
(5) In October 2003, the Institute issued a report, titled
Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination in
Atomic Weapons Employer and Beryllium Vendor Facilities. The
report found that, out of 219 atomic weapons employer
facilities--
(A) 97 (44 percent) of such facilities have potential for
significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the
periods in which atomic weapons-related production occurred;
(B) 88 (40 percent) of such facilities have little
potential for significant residual radioactive contamination
outside of the periods in which atomic weapons-related
production occurred; and
(C) 34 (16 percent) of such facilities have insufficient
information to make a determination.
(6) Congress is now aware that workers were employed in a
substantial number of atomic weapons employer facilities
years after the Manhattan Project ended. These workers were
potentially harmed by legacy residual radioactive
contamination that permeated the walls, the floors, and the
air of their worksites well after the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Energy terminated contracts
for production activities. This exposure to residual
radioactive contamination took place without the knowledge or
consent of these workers.
(7) Congress therefore declares that, based on the
scientific assessment by the Institute, those workers hired
and employed in such facilities during the period after Cold
War production stopped but during which the Institute found
there was significant residual radioactive contamination
should be defined as atomic weapons employees under EEOICPA,
should be eligible to apply for compensation under subtitle B
of EEOICPA, and should have their claims evaluated on the
same basis as those atomic weapons employees who were
employed during the period when processing of radioactive
materials was underway as part of the atomic weapons program.
SEC. 3. COVERAGE UNDER ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS
COMPENSATION PROGRAM OF INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED AT
ATOMIC WEAPONS EMPLOYER FACILITIES DURING
PERIODS OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Paragraph (3) of section 3621 of the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42
U.S.C. 7384l) is amended to read as follows:
(3) The term atomic weapons employee means any of the
following:
(A) An individual employed at an atomic weapons employer
facility during a period when the employer was processing or
producing, for the use by the United States, material that
emitted radiation and was used in the production of an atomic
weapon, excluding uranium mining and milling.
(B) An individual employed--
(i) at an atomic weapons employer facility with respect to
which the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, in its report dated October 2003 and titled Report on
Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic
Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities,
or any update to that report, found that there is a potential
(not including a case in which the Institute found that there
is little potential) for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production
occurred; and
(ii) during a period, as specified in such report or any
update to such report, of significant residual contamination
at that facility.
SEC. 4. UPDATE TO REPORT
In each of 2005, 2006, and 2007, the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health shall
submit to Congress, not later than December 31 of that year,
an update to the report required by section 3151(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
(Public Law 107-107; 42 U.S.C. 7384 note). Each such update
shall--
(1) for each facility for which such report, or any update
to such report, found that insufficient information was
available to determine whether significant residual
contamination was present, determine whether significant
residual contamination was present;
(2) for each facility for which such report, or any update
to such report, found that significant residual contamination
remained present as of the date of the report, determine the
date on which such contamination ceased to be present;
(3) for each facility for which such report, or any update
to such report, found that significant residual contamination
was present but for which the Director has been unable to
determine the extent to which such contamination is
attributable to beryllium or atomic weapons-related
activities, identify the specific dates of coverage
attributable to such activities and, in so identifying,
presume that such contamination is attributable to such
activities until there is evidence of decontamination of
residual contamination identified with beryllium or atomic
weapons-related activities; and
(4) if new information that pertains to the report has been
made available to the Director since that report was
submitted, identify and describe such information.
SEC. 5. PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER
The Director shall ensure that the report referred to in
section 4, and each update required by section 4, are
published in the Federal Register not later than 15 days
after being released.
______
By Ms. CANTWELL (for herself and Mrs. Murray):
S. 2140. A bill to expand the boundary of the Mount Rainier National
Park; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce--along with my
colleague Senator Murray--the Expanding and Making Mount Rainier
National Park More Accessible Act.
This bill authorizes a boundary expansion of Mount Rainier National
Park to allow the National Park Service to acquire 800 acres of land
from private landowners, on a willing seller basis. These lands are
located near the Carbon River and, if acquired, they would be included
in Mount Rainier National Park, one of America's greatest national
parks.
If enacted, the proposed expansion will improve access for visitors,
allow for a new campsite to be built, and save taxpayers money that
will no longer be needed to repair a frequently washed out road.
While this legislation will make Mount Rainier National Park safer
and
[[Page S1695]]
more accessible for families and outdoor enthusiasts, it is important
to note that this expansion will also promote the local economy.
Outdoor recreation is more than an activity in the Northwest, it is
also a key part of our economy. By improving access to the park, my
bill will make it easier for visitors to enjoy the park and to purchase
goods and services in nearby communities.
This expansion will ensure continued access to the park because the
northwest entrance road is continually washed out by seasonal
fluctuations of the glacier-fed Carbon River. The river, which now
flows at a higher elevation than the roadbed, has blocked visitors from
accessing the National Park Service's Ipsut Creek campground and nearby
hiking trails inside the park. The repairs to this road have proven
both costly and short-lived and have strained the National Park
Service's already limited maintenance budget. In the long run, the
expansion will save taxpayers money because the road will not have to
be maintained to current standards. If this bill is enacted, the
National Park Service plans to provide a shuttle service to take
visitors to the Carbon Glacier trailhead. That way, visitors will still
be able to hike to the Carbon Glacier during day trips.
If this bill is enacted, local conservation groups and the National
Park Service will work to reach agreements with landowners in the
proposed expansion area. I am pleased that the current landowners
actively participated in the process and enthusiastically support this
legislation. In fact, they are eager to sell their land to the National
Park Service so that these lands will be permanently protected for the
enjoyment of future generations.
I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Senate as well as
other members of the Washington state congressional delegation to
ensure swift passage of this important legislation.
____________________