[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 20 (Tuesday, February 24, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E210-E211]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       SPEECH OF DR. ARCH BARRETT

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.

                           of south carolina

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 24, 2004

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to enter into the Record a speech 
given by a former staffer of the House Armed Services Committee, Arch 
Barrett. Arch is one of the most unassuming people I know, but was one 
of the most remarkable and able staffers I've met during my 20 years on 
Capitol Hill.
  Arch had an undergraduate degree from both the West Point and 
Harvard, and later got his Ph.D. in political economy and government 
from Harvard. He entered the Air Force as a second lieutenant in 1957, 
saw plenty of action in Vietnam, and retired as a colonel in 1981. 
While in the Air Force, he received the Distinguished Flying Cross, 
Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 12 oak leaf 
clusters, the Joint Service and Air Force Commendation Medals, and the 
Vietnam Service Medal.
  As distinguished as his military record is, his greatest effect on 
the military came after he became a staffer for the House Armed 
Services Committee. If it were not for Arch Barrett, I do not believe 
Congress would have enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Goldwater-
Nichols forced the separate branches of the Armed Services to work 
cooperatively, and our forces would not be nearly as effective today 
had it not been for the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Pentagon fought 
Goldwater-Nichols tooth and nail, and it took us about 4 years to 
actually pass the legislation. Whenever the Pentagon raised an 
objection, we sent Arch Barrett over and he'd argue with the naysayers 
until they ran out of objections and had to relent. It was a virtuoso 
performance by someone who had mastered the subject matter.
  Arch Barrett is now a professor at the Navy Post-Graduate School in 
Monterrey, still serving his country. He gave the graduation address to 
the Naval Postgraduate School's Joint Professional Military Education 
Course in June 2003. In that speech, Arch of course downplayed his own 
role in establishing Goldwater-Nichols, but did recognize important 
contributions from several Members of Congress. One of those is a man 
I, like Arch Barrett, admire--my good friend and colleague from 
Missouri, the Ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, 
Ike Skelton.
  I commend Arch's speech to all those with an interest in the founding 
of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and I am proud to enter it into 
the Record.

    Reflections on Leadership in Defense and Professional Military 
                            Education Reform

                         (By Archie D. Barrett)

       Sixteen years ago, in 1987, Congressman Les Aspin asked me 
     whether there was an uncompleted task in the area of Defense 
     Department restructuring that could be assigned to 
     Representative Ike Skelton. Aspin was the chairman of the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the U. S. House of 
     Representatives. Skelton was a mid-level Democrat on the 
     Committee who was intensely interested in improving the 
     quality and performance of our Armed Forces. I was a member 
     of Mr. Aspin's Committee staff.
       At the time, the Pentagon was making little progress in 
     implementing the education

[[Page E211]]

     provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Act 
     required a reassessment and revamping of professional 
     military education to assure that it supported the new 
     emphasis on joint military planning and operations. I 
     suggested to Chairman Aspin that Rep. Skelton could provide a 
     signal contribution to the improvement of the nation's armed 
     forces if he could be persuaded to lead a congressional panel 
     charged with bringing PME into line with the goals of the 
     Goldwater-Nichols Act. Subsequently, Rep. Skelton seized on 
     the opportunity and ultimately fathered the significant 
     changes in Professional Military Education that have 
     culminated in your presence here as JPME graduates at the 
     Naval Postgraduate School.
       My remarks today will be addressed to the leadership 
     displayed by Rep. Skelton and two other individuals that 
     eventually led to this gathering.
       We usually think of a leader as someone who is in charge or 
     who heads an organization. I for one barely qualify. My most 
     extraordinary experience in that regard was leading aircraft 
     on night combat missions in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam 
     War. But the aircrews I commanded came together for only one 
     mission and very little ``leadership'', as we usually think 
     of it, was involved. On the other hand, many of you in the 
     audience have been, or will be, called upon to lead in the 
     traditional sense. You may rightly ask what I could convey to 
     you on the subject. I certainly asked that question of myself 
     when I began to contemplate this address.
       My answer is that I have had the privilege of observing 
     others use their ability, their positions, and their prestige 
     to exert leadership on matters of great importance to our 
     country. Basically, a leader influences other people to 
     behave as he or she wishes. The leaders I will discuss 
     influenced the behavior of hundreds of thousands of members 
     of the armed forces, including you in this audience. It is 
     because of my experience with those men that I can discuss 
     aspects of leadership.
       At about the time you graduates were attending high school, 
     I retired from the Air Force and joined the staff of the 
     Armed Services Committee. In February 1982, General David 
     Jones, the nation's most senior military officer, testified 
     that there were fundamental flaws in the structure of the 
     highest military body in our Armed Forces, the Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff--or JCS, as it is often called. He proposed that 
     Congress legislate far-reaching changes.
       Gen. Jones was chairman of the JCS. At the time, he was in 
     his late `50s. He was a tall, dark haired, distinguished 
     looking man in his Air Force uniform with the 4 stars on each 
     shoulder.
       The general charged that the JCS, a committee consisting of 
     the chiefs of each service, had difficulty making decisions 
     and providing advice to the President from an overall 
     national defense perspective because each chief aggressively 
     pursued the interests of his own service. Moreover, he 
     claimed, the service chiefs had used their positions on the 
     JCS to weaken the field commanders--the CINCs--whose mission 
     it is to plan and conduct military operations. Each service 
     chief wanted to keep as much control of his soldiers, 
     sailors, airmen, or marines as possible. Each chief also 
     sought to maximize his service's budget for tanks, planes, or 
     ships regardless of the needs of the other services. It is no 
     wonder, then, that when the services were called on to work 
     together in military operations, their joint performance was 
     often unsatisfactory.
       Most of you in this room are accustomed to hearing of 
     nothing but an unbroken string of military successes during 
     your lifetime. Those of us who are older remember a much more 
     uneven pattern of military performances. Jones could point to 
     a whole string of flawed military operations to support his 
     allegations.
       In Vietnam, the JCS disregarded the principle of unity of 
     command. There were two land chains of command and four air 
     chains of command largely because of each service's 
     sensitivity about placing its forces under the command of a 
     general or admiral of another service.
       In 1980, the services were unable to work together in an 
     attempt to rescue American Embassy hostages in Iran. Two 
     aircraft collided on the ground killing several servicemen 
     and dooming the operation. The subsequent investigation 
     revealed gaping disconnects among the services in training 
     for the operation and, once again, flaws in the chain of 
     command.
       Going back to World War II, friendly fire from Navy ships 
     shot down Army aircraft during the invasion of Sicily killing 
     paratroopers and aircrews due to inadequate communications 
     and coordination among the services.
       Also, in World War II, the Army and the Navy divided the 
     Pacific into two commands, one headed by Gen. MacArthur and 
     the other by Admiral Nimitz, because they could not agree on 
     a unified command structure. The result was a near disaster 
     at Leyte Gulf that could have prolonged the war.
       In 1983, a year after Gen. Jones first testified, 241 young 
     servicemen were killed in a terrorist attack on a Marine 
     barracks in Beirut. The investigation revealed glaring 
     inadequacies in the military chain of command that wound its 
     way from the Pentagon through Army, Air Force, and Navy flag 
     officers to the Marine colonel and his unit on the ground.
       In that same year, it took over 6000 U.S. troops to defeat 
     600 Cubans on Grenada. After action reports revealed that 
     inadequate communications among the services hindered naval 
     gunfire and air-to-ground support of the troops in combat.
       These and other flawed military operations were not merely 
     unfortunate incidents. As you well know, the price of 
     substandard performance of our armed forces in war is paid in 
     the lives of young Americans.
       Obviously, General Jones was raising issues of fundamental 
     importance to the American people. But why did the general 
     voice his criticisms on Capitol Hill? Why did Jones not rely 
     on his Commander-in-Chief to address the problems? One answer 
     is that the administration was not interested. A more 
     fundamental answer involves a fact many people do not 
     realize. The Constitution makes the Congress, not the 
     President, responsible for the organization of the nation's 
     defense. The U. S. House of Representatives delegates 
     oversight of that responsibility to the Committee on Armed 
     Services, and further, to one of its subcommittees.
       Representative Richard White, a Democrat from El Paso, was 
     the chairman of the subcommittee responsible for overseeing 
     defense organization in 1982. White was about 70. He was tall 
     and slim. He was soft-spoken. His ruddy complexion reflected 
     the time he had spent in the West Texas sun. His subcommittee 
     focused primarily on investigations--defense contractor 
     fraud, for example. Almost a quarter century had passed since 
     Congress enacted major changes in defense organization. 
     Understandably, Chairman White knew little about the subject. 
     But he was acutely aware that he was responsible for that 
     part of the Constitution that assigned defense organization 
     to Congress.
       In April, White convened hearings to determine whether Gen. 
     Jones' criticisms were valid and to ascertain what action 
     Congress should take. The hearings lasted until late July and 
     covered over 1000 pages. The Reagan Administration strongly 
     opposed reorganization. With few exceptions, the Pentagon 
     witnesses opposed change. On the other hand, many witnesses 
     who had previously served in the Pentagon or White House in 
     high civilian positions sided with Jones. They emphasized 
     that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as constituted, simply did 
     not and could not provide adequate military advice to the 
     President due to the conflicting service interests that 
     dominated the chiefs' thinking. A number of high-ranking 
     retired military officers also agreed with Jones. Others 
     strongly disagreed.
       Mr. White presided over every hearing. Listening to the 
     conflicting views of the witnesses soon provided him the 
     education in defense organization issues that he lacked when 
     the hearings began. He made himself an expert through his 
     perseverance.
       Only a few other congressmen, however, attended the 
     hearings regularly. Focusing on defense organization is about 
     as exciting as watching paint dry. Moreover, with the 
     Pentagon leadership and the President adamantly opposed to 
     changes, few legislators felt that the investment of their 
     time would be worth the effort.
       At the conclusion of the hearings, Chairman White 
     introduced a bill to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He 
     had decided that Jones was right. White's subcommittee 
     approved his bill with few changes. One Congressman stated 
     that he did not know much about the complicated issues 
     addressed in the bill. He could confidently support the bill, 
     he said, because Chairman White had presided over the lengthy 
     hearings and was an expert who knew what must be done.
       White presented his bill to the full Committee on Armed 
     Services in August. The Committee approved it and referred it 
     to the House of Representatives. In the fall, with Chairman 
     White leading the debate, the House passed the bill and 
     referred it to the Senate. In December, Mr. White persuaded 
     Senator Tower, a fellow Texan, to hold a hearing on his bill 
     before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
       That is the end of my story about Rep. White. Soon after 
     the December hearing Congress adjourned and White's bill 
     died, as do all bills that have not been enacted at the end 
     of each Congress. There was no time for the Senate to 
     consider the legislation. Moreover, Mr. White disappeared 
     from Capitol Hill at the same time. You see, he had long ago 
     decided to retire and did not run for reelection even though 
     he would have had no trouble winning another term. 
     Interestingly, by that time General Jones had also retired. 
     He continued to push for reorganization, however.

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