[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 18 (Thursday, February 12, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E178-E180]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             SECURE EXISTING AVIATION LOOPHOLES (SEAL) ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 11, 2004

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, more than two and one-half years after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, dangerous gaps still persist 
in the Nation's aviation security system. Today, I am introducing the 
Secure Existing Aviation Loopholes (SEAL) Act to address the pressing 
security problems that continue to threaten the safety of airline 
passengers and crew members.


         Inspection of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft

  Twenty-two percent of all the cargo that is shipped by air in the 
United States is transported aboard passenger aircraft, amounting to 
about 2.8 million tons of cargo loaded aboard passenger airplanes each 
year. The Department of Homeland Security does not routinely inspect 
cargo transported on passenger planes. Instead, the Department relies 
on paperwork checks of manifests as part of the Department's flawed 
Known Shipper Program and random physical inspections that are randomly 
verified by the Department. This cargo loophole in aviation security 
has been repeatedly exploited. For example, in September 2003, a 
shipping clerk packed himself inside a wooden crate and shipped himself 
undetected from New York to Texas aboard a cargo plane, and Pan Am 
Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb 
contained in unscreened baggage.
  The SEAL Act requires 100 percent physical inspection of cargo that 
is transported on passenger planes. The costs of physical screening, 
estimated to be comparable to the $1.8 billion funding level for 
screening checked baggage, would be offset by a cargo security fee, 
similar to the fee that passenger pay for security measures when they 
purchase airline tickets.


                          Federal Air Marshals

  Ten transatlantic flights were canceled over the weekend of January 
31-February 1, 2004 due to heightened fears of a possible Al Qaeda 
attack, and 16 international flights were canceled or delayed over the 
Christmas and New Year's holidays as a result of specific intelligence 
that the flights might be terrorist targets. The cancellations resulted 
when some European carriers such as Air France and British Airways 
refused to place armed marshals onboard and instead opted to cancel the 
flights. There are no international standards to define what 
constitutes proper training for air marshals. Consequently, air 
marshals on flights that originate overseas and are bound for the U.S. 
may have different training that could be inconsistent with best 
practices.
  The SEAL Act prohibits foreign air carriers from taking off or 
landing in the United States unless a Federal air marshal or an 
equivalent officer of the government of the foreign country is onboard, 
in cases when the Secretary of Homeland Security requests that an air 
marshal or officer of a foreign country travel on the flight.

  Given intelligence indicating that terrorist may try to commandeer 
all-cargo planes and crash them into nuclear power plants and other 
critical infrastructure in the U.S., the SEAL Act provides authority 
for Federal Air Marshals to travel aboard cargo aircraft, as needed. 
The Federal Air Marshal Service does not currently have this authority.


                       Improved Aviation Security

     Flight Attendants
  Flight attendants do not have a discreet, secure and wireless method 
of communicating with pilots in the cockpit, with air marshals who may 
be onboard the aircraft or with authorities on the ground. Flight 
attendants must rely on telephones affixed to the interior of the 
passenger cabin if they need to communicate with pilots via phone or 
with authorities on the ground. These phones can be easily disabled. 
Flight attendants do not have a method of communicating via phone with 
air marshals onboard. On American Airlines Flight 11, which was crashed 
into the Pentagon on September 11th, flight attendants were unable to 
communicate by phone with the cockpit. The Homeland Security Act of 
2002 included the directive that carriers' provide flight attendants 
with a secure, wireless method of communicating with pilots, but this 
provision was inserted in a voluntary section of the Aviation 
Transportation Security Act.
  The SEAL Act makes mandatory the provision of wireless communication 
systems for flight crew and air marshals.
     Crew Training
  Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, air carrier 
responsibilities for security and anti-hijacking training for flight 
crews were set forth in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program, also 
known as the Common Strategy. The Common Strategy was originally 
developed in the 1980s, and it emphasized accommodation of hijackers' 
demands, delaying tactics, and safely landing the airplane. It advised 
air crews to refrain from trying to overpower or negotiate with the 
hijackers. On September 11th, the Common Strategy offered no defense 
against the tactics employed by the hijackers of Flights 11, 77, 93, 
and 175.
  Enacted on December 12, 2003, Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (PL 108-176) made voluntary many of the important 
elements of self-defense training for crew members that had been 
mandatory in Section 1403 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-
296). Training in the following tactics is voluntary under Section 603 
of the 2003 aviation reauthorization, but had been mandatory in Section 
1403 of the Homeland Security Act:
  The SEAL Act will reinstate the requirement established in the 
Homeland Security Act to make counter-terror training for aircraft crew 
mandatory.
     International Cooperation on Aviation Security
  The cancellation of more than two dozen international flights since 
December 2003 suggests significant disagreement between the U.S. and 
some foreign nations over the best way to respond to terrorist threats 
to aviation security. In January 2003, Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary 
of Border and Transportation Security in the Department of Homeland 
Security, met with European officials to discuss aviation security 
measures, including the use of air marshals on international flights to 
the U.S. No agreement was reached with European governments on the 
placement of air marshals on U.S.-bound flights in cases when 
intelligence about terrorist threats against flights is received.

[[Page E179]]

  The SEAL Act directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security to develop a well-constructed plan to improve coordination 
between the Department and its foreign counterparts in the area of 
aviation security. This plan includes development of air marshal 
programs for foreign governments and the provision of technical 
assistance in the formulation of strategies to tighten security 
measures at foreign airports.
     Comprehensive Pre-Flight Screening
  Pre-flight security inspections of the passenger cabins and 
lavatories of commercial aircraft often are performed by low-wage, 
poorly trained contract employees. In September 2003, a college student 
named Nathaniel Heatwole placed box cutters, matches, bleach and 
simulated explosives on Southwest Airlines flights. These items were 
not discovered by airline officials until approximately one month 
later. Heatwole also placed dangerous items on two other Southwest 
flights in February 2003, and they remained undetected until April 
2003. In October 2003, potentially dangerous items were also found on 
US Airways flights.
  The Transportation Security Administration has issued a requirement 
effective in January 2004 for detailed documentation of security 
inspections performed by air carriers prior to each aircraft's first 
departure of the day. The directive affects the documentation of the 
inspections, but does not change the manner in which the security 
inspections are performed by the airline's contract cleaning crew or 
the level of verification that TSA provides to ensure the inspections 
are thoroughly conducted.
  The SEAL Act sets a firm deadline for the improvement of pre-flight 
security inspections of the interior of passenger planes to increase 
the likelihood that any dangerous items hidden in the plane will be 
promptly discovered. The SEAL Act also includes new requirements that 
subject individuals who are performing the pre-flight inspections to 
additional security checks, including passage through a checkpoint to 
detect any metallic objects prior to accessing the plane; screening of 
any items to be carried aboard the plane to detect hazardous substances 
such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials; a 
criminal history background check, social security check and check 
against all terrorist watch lists maintained by the government.


            Control Over Access to Secured Areas of Airports

  Airport workers with access to sensitive areas of airports, including 
the airplanes, are not required to pass through metal detectors or have 
their personal items x-rayed before reporting to work at each of the 
nation's commercial airports. Airport workers have taken advantage of 
lax security controls to commit crimes. For example, in November 2003, 
a massive narcotics smuggling operation that exploited airport security 
weaknesses was broken up at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.
  While criminal background checks are required under current law for 
employees with unescorted access to an airport's sensitive 
identification display area (SIDA), there are no uniform requirements 
applicable to all airport workers that mandate checks of Social 
Security numbers and checks against terrorist watch lists maintained by 
the government.
  The SEAL Act directs the Department of Homeland Security to issue 
regulations within 180 days after the bill's enactment that improve 
control over access to secure areas in airports nationwide. The SEAL 
Act requires all airport workers with access to secure areas of 
airports, including aircraft, to pass through devices to detect for 
metallic objects and have any personal items screened to detect any 
hazardous chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials 
before entering these areas. In addition to criminal background checks, 
the SEAL Act requires that airport employees are checked against 
terrorist watch lists, that workers' Social Security numbers are 
checked against government databases to ensure the documents' 
legitimacy and verify that the Social Security number is assigned to 
the individual presenting it.


                           Aircraft Maneuvers

  In December 2003, a C-17 U.S. transport plane was hit by a missile 
shortly after take off from Baghdad. An engine exploded, but the plane 
returned safely with only one of its 16 people aboard slightly injured. 
In November 2003, an Airbus A300 cargo plane operated by the courier 
company DHL departing from Baghdad to Bahrain was struck by a SAM-7 
ground-to-air missile. The plane's engine caught fire, and it was 
forced to make an emergency landing at Baghdad International Airport. 
None of the plane's crew was injured in the incident.
  Pilots currently receive training on how to fly the aircraft and land 
it safely if engines fail. Pilots are required to receive training on 
how to maneuver and land a two-engine plane with only one functioning 
engine; a three engine plane with only two engines functioning; and a 
four engine plane with only two engines functioning. However, pilots do 
not receive recurrent training in how to maneuver and safely land the 
aircraft in the event of a complete failure of the hydraulic system in 
which normal flight controls are not available. If an aircraft is 
struck by a surface-to-air missile, it may experience such failures, as 
was the case when the DHL cargo plane was hit by a SAM-7 missile in 
Iraq last year.
  The SEAL Act requires air carriers to provide pilots with training in 
flight deck procedures, aircraft maneuvers and best practices that 
enable pilots to respond if the aircraft is struck by a surface-to-air 
missile. The training is designed to increase the likelihood that 
pilots will be capable of safely landing the aircraft and will include 
components that simulate the complete failure of the aircraft's 
hydraulic system and loss of normal flight controls.


                      Aggressive Flying Maneuvers

  According to the FAA, aggressive flying techniques were not part of 
training provided pilots prior to passage of the 2003 FAA 
reauthorization. As of February 2004, a TSA working group is finalizing 
its training recommendations on fleck deck procedures or aircraft 
maneuvers to defend the aircraft. TSA does not expect to recommend any 
maneuvers that could be considered ``aggressive.''
  The SEAL Act recognizes the need to balance the security benefits of 
maneuvers and procedures with the potential risks, in terms of 
passenger safety and the structural limitations of the aircraft. The 
SEAL Act requires the Secretary to issue regulations that require the 
carriers to provide, in conjunction with appropriate law enforcement 
authorities, crew members with training in procedures for communicating 
and coordinating effectively with Federal Air Marshals and law 
enforcement officers during unauthorized attempts to disrupt the normal 
operation of the aircraft.


                         Securing Cockpit Doors

  According to the Coalition of Airline Pilots, approximately 60 
percent of cargo planes are not equipped with cockpit doors that 
separate the flight deck from the aircraft's cargo bay. In September 
2003, a shipping clerk packed himself inside a wooden crate and shipped 
himself undetected from New York to Texas aboard a cargo plane. 
Fortunately, he was an industrious tourist, rather than an industrious 
terrorist.
  Some cargo carriers have installed cockpit doors, but the majority of 
cargo planes still lack any door between cockpit and cargo bay.
  The SEAL Act requires all cargo planes to have reinforced cockpit 
doors, including sturdy partitions surrounding the doors. Within 180 
days after enactment of the legislation, the Secretary is directed to 
issue an order that all cargo aircraft must have, no later than 1 year 
from the date of issuance of the order, a reinforced, lockable door, 
including the surrounding partition, between the pilot and cargo 
compartments.


               Security Requirements for General Aviation

  According to a November 5, 2003 GAO report, Aviation Security: 
Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges (GAO-04-232T), 
``Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general 
aviation, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially 
vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable 
because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before 
takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at 
any point.'' There are more than 200,000 general aviation aircraft, 
which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports. 
According to TSA's working group on general aviation, general aviation 
aircraft are responsible for 77 percent of all air traffic in the U.S.
  TSA is taking some steps, such as developing a risk-based self-
assessment tool for general aviation airports to use to identify 
security concerns, but these steps fall short of what is required.
  The SEAL Act directs the Secretary to establish a no-fly zone around 
the following facilities whenever the threat level reaches Orange or at 
any other level the Secretary deems appropriate: sensitive nuclear 
facilities such as nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons materials 
production facilities, and chemical facilities identified by the 
Environmental Protection Agency at which a release of the facility's 
hazardous materials could threaten the health of over 1 million people, 
and any other facilities the Secretary shall so designate.
  The SEAL Act requires the operators of general aviation airports and 
landing facilities to complete vulnerability assessments developed by 
TSA, which evaluate the facilities' physical security, procedures, 
infrastructure and resources. The SEAL Act also requires TSA to develop 
a plan for addressing vulnerabilities identified by these assessments 
no later than 1 year from the date of enactment.
  Mr. Speaker, we can do better, and we must do more to improve our 
aviation security. I urge my colleagues to support the SEAL Act, which 
will close dangerous loopholes in our airline security system.

[[Page E180]]



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