[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 17 (Wednesday, February 11, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1010-S1011]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      DAVID KAY'S SENATE TESTIMONY

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of focus on the 
recent Senate testimony of David Kay, the former head of the Iraq 
Survey Group. Unfortunately, most media reports have highlighted only 
those statements by Dr. Kay that might be used to criticize the 
administration. They have largely ignored Dr. Kay's assertions that 
Iraq was more dangerous than we even realized prior to the war, that 
Saddam Hussein clearly intended to continue developing weapons of mass 
destruction, and other statements which contradict the false notion 
that the administration ``hyped'' intelligence on Iraq.
  I thought it would be beneficial for the American people to have a 
chance to read Dr. Kay's entire testimony, including his edifying 
exchanges with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  I therefore ask unanimous consent that his entire testimony be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 28, 2004

       (Joined in progress due to committee hearing room audio 
     system).
       WARNER: . . . a further report--and I stress a further 
     report--from Dr. David Kay on his efforts and the efforts of 
     the team which he was privileged to work with, known as ISG. 
     He served as the special adviser to the director of Central 
     Intelligence in determining the status of weapons of mass 
     destruction and related programs in Iraq.
       After assuming this position last July, Dr. Kay made his 
     initial interim official report to this committee on October 
     3rd. As members of the committee are aware, Dr. Kay has 
     stepped down from this position and has been succeeded by Mr. 
     Charles A. Duelfer, a former colleague and member of the U.N. 
     Special Commission with Dr. Kay, who has been appointed by 
     Director Tenet to continue this important mission.
       I met with Mr. Duelfer the day before yesterday and we just 
     momentarily met with him in the Intel Committee room.
       Dr. Kay volunteered--and I emphasize that--volunteered to 
     resume his public service, worked diligently for six months 
     in Iraq under difficult and often dangerous conditions, and 
     just concluded his work last week and reported to the 
     director of Central Intelligence.
       I thank you and I thank your wife for public service.
       Working with General Dayton and the Iraq Survey Group, ISG, 
     your mission was to search for all facts--repeat, all facts--
     relevant to the many issues about Iraq weapons of mass 
     destruction and related programs. You initiated what was and 
     continues--I emphasize continues--to be a very difficult, 
     complex mission that, in you own words, is yet to be 
     completed.
       As you cautioned us when you took up this post in July, 
     patience is required to ensure we complete a thorough 
     assessment of this important issue.
       In this hearing today we hope to receive your assessment of 
     what has been accomplished to date--I repeat, to date--and 
     what in your professional judgment remains to be done by the 
     ISG. It is far too early to reach any final judgments or 
     conclusions.
       In recent days, I mentioned, I met with both General 
     Dayton, I've met extensively with your over the recess 
     period, and Mr. Duelfer, and received the assurance of Dayton 
     and Duelfer that they will be prepared to present to the 
     Congress a second official interim report of the ISG group in 
     the time frame of late March.
       WARNER: It is crucial that the important work of the ISG 
     group go on. Thus far the findings have been significant.
       Dr. Kay has stated that, although we have not found 
     evidence of large stockpiles of WMD, or forward-deployed 
     weapons, the ISG group have made the following evidence as a 
     part of their record that will be forthcoming: first, 
     evidence of Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD programs on 
     a large scale; actual ongoing chemical and biological 
     research programs; an active program to use the deadly 
     chemical ricin as a weapon, a program that was interrupted 
     only by the start of the war in March; and evidence of 
     missile programs; and evidence that in all probability they 
     were going to build those weapons to incorporate in the 
     warheads, what we know not for sure, but certainly the 
     possibility of weapons of mass destruction; evidence that 
     Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgling 
     nuclear program as late as 2001; and, most important, 
     evidence that clearly indicates Saddam Hussein was conducting 
     a wide range of activities in clear contravention of the 
     United Nations resolutions.
       As you recently stated, Dr. Kay--and I quote you--``It was 
     reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. 
     What we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more 
     dangerous place potentially than, in fact, we thought it was 
     even before the war,'' end quote.
       WARNER: Further, you said on NBC's ``Today Show'' on 
     Tuesday that it was, quote, ``absolutely prudent for the U.S. 
     to go to war.''
       Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions. I believe a real 
     and growing threat has been eliminated and a coalition of 
     nations acted prudently in the cause of freedom. I'd be 
     interested if you concur in my conclusions.

[[Page S1011]]

       While some have asserted that the president and his senior 
     advisers may have exaggerated or manipulated prewar 
     intelligence on Iraq's WMD programs, Dr. Kay reached the 
     following conclusion, which I think is different.
       As you stated recently, quote, ``We have to remember that 
     this view of Iraq (prewar assessment of WMD capabilities) was 
     held during the Clinton administration and did not change in 
     the Bush administration. It is not a political got-you issue. 
     Often estimates are different than reality. The important 
     thing is when they differ to understand why,'' end quote.
       That's precisely why I called this meeting, Dr. Kay, to 
     continue the work of this committee in developing a body of 
     fact from which reasonable people, at the conclusion of that 
     collection of facts, can reach their own objective thoughts 
     and conclusions. It's been a difficult process but the ISG 
     work is not completed.
       Now, you have stated that you believe there did not exist 
     large stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. But I 
     hope that you will, in your testimony, indicate that since 
     work is not completed, since Iraq is as big as California and 
     Baghdad approximates the sprawling territory of Los 
     Angeles, that we could find caches and reserves of weapons 
     of mass destruction, chemical or biological or even 
     further evidence about their nuclear program.
       WARNER: We also would hope that you'd address the question 
     of whether or not Saddam Hussein had some kind of, quote, 
     ``breakout capability'' for quickly producing chemical or 
     biological weapons, and was this not a basis for constituting 
     a conclusion that there was an imminent threat from Saddam 
     Hussein and his military?
       Why were the Iraq WMD records systemically looted or 
     destroyed? And why do scientists in custody today continue 
     not to be forthcoming if there was nothing to hide or nothing 
     substantial existed?
       The work of the Iraq Survey Group has shown that Saddam 
     Hussein had WMD intentions, had WMD programs that did 
     survive, and did outwit for 12 years the United National 
     Security Council and the resolutions--indeed, the 
     inspections, in large measure.
       If ultimately, the findings of the Iraq Survey Group do 
     differ from the prewar assessments of our intelligence 
     community, differ from assessments of the United Nations, 
     differ from assessments of intelligence services of many 
     other nations, indeed that is cause for concern. But we are 
     not there yet in terms of the totality of fact on which to 
     draw such serious conclusions.
       Today and tomorrow, our policy-makers must be able to rely 
     on the intelligence they are provided. The safety and 
     security of the men and women of the armed forces are 
     dependent on intelligence and, indeed, the security of our 
     Nation.
       So collectively, all of us--the Congress, the executive 
     branch and other nations--we must vigorously continue to 
     pursue the collection of the facts, as the ISC is doing, and 
     upon that completion, then draw our conclusions and take such 
     corrective measures as may be necessary.
       WARNER: As we speak, over 1,400 individuals--military and 
     civilian--are on the ground in Iraq seeking the facts about 
     Iraq's WMD programs. I have confidence in the commitment and 
     the ability of General Dayton, Mr. Duelfer, your successor, 
     and representatives from our coalition partners to complete 
     this mission. They have some of the best and brightest of our 
     military and our intelligence community to complete this 
     task. And Congress has provided the necessary means, a very 
     substantial appropriation of recent.
       We remain committed to providing the resources that are 
     necessary for the completion of the ISG work.
       Dr. Kay, I thank you for your public service once again.

                          ____________________