[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 12 (Wednesday, February 4, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E114]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            FORMER BUSH INSIDERS NOW FREE TO TELL THE TRUTH

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BARNEY FRANK

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 4, 2004

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, there has been a very 
interesting phenomenon in recent months that demands attention. A 
steady stream of former high-ranking Bush administration officials have 
conscientiously pointed out the inaccuracy of many of the claims the 
administration has made and continues to make about its policies.
  In December, last year, I inserted into these pages a very 
interesting article by Richard Haass, former chief of the policy 
planning staff of the State Department, who confirmed what many of us 
have long argued--namely, that the war in Iraq was a war of choice and 
not of necessity. That is, Mr. Haass made it clear that the decision to 
go to war with Iraq was not driven by a fear that Iraq was any serious 
threat to the United States of a physical sort, but rather was part of 
an administration policy about how the world ought to be structured.
  Most dramatically, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill has been 
widely quoted as a result of the book by Ron Suskind not only 
essentially agreeing with Mr. Haass about the genesis of the Iraq war, 
but making clear the great gap that exists between the reality of Bush 
administration economic policies and the rhetoric they have used to 
describe them.
  Recently, a third high-ranking Bush official has rebutted the 
administration's claims, and buttressed this with reference to actual 
events in which he participated as a member of the administration.
  Flynt Leverett was a high-ranking official at the National Security 
Council from 2002 until 2003, serving as Senior Director for Middle 
Eastern Affairs. In a recent article published in the New York Times, 
he refutes the administration's argument that the decision by Libya to 
renounce nuclear weapons was a direct result of the administration's 
war in Iraq. His argument is a compelling one, combining very 
thoughtful analysis with a good history of the events that led up to 
this. It is impossible to do justice to this thoughtful essay by 
compressing it, so I ask that it be inserted here so that Members and 
others may read it and draw their own conclusions.
  But I do believe that the conclusion of Mr. Leverett's article--
remember he was a high-ranking National Security Council official 
appointed by the Bush administration--is worth underlining:

       Until the Bush administration learns the real lessons of 
     the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue regimes is 
     likely to remain stuck in the mud of ideology.

                       [From the New York Times]

                         A Lesson in Diplomacy


              more than threats led to qaddafi's reversal

                          (By Flynt Leverett)

       Washington.--As President George W. Bush made clear in his 
     State of the Union address, he sees the striking developments 
     in relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the 
     war on terrorism.
       The idea is that Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi's apparent 
     decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was largely 
     a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which thus 
     retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out the 
     prospect of similar progress with other states that support 
     terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and brutalize 
     their own people.
       However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq 
     war, the president misrepresents the real lesson of the 
     Libyan case. This confusion undermines America's chances of 
     getting countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead.
       The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to 
     the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's 
     first year in office. Indeed, some credit should even be 
     given to the second Clinton administration.
       Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, 
     the Libyans decided in the late 1990's to seek normalized 
     relations with the United States, and held secret discussions 
     with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. 
     The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward 
     better relations was possible until Libya met its 
     responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 
     103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
       These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi 
     ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, 
     produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence 
     officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the 
     Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 
     Washington acquiesced to the suspension of UN sanctions 
     against Libya.
       Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the 
     State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush 
     administration picked up on those discussions and induced the 
     Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations.
       With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with 
     a ``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to 
     satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of Pan 
     Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions 
     of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case.
       We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: If Libya 
     met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain 
     would allow UN sanctions to be lifted permanently. This 
     script became the basis for three-party negotiations to 
     resolve the Lockerbie issue.
       By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the 
     conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was 
     evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, 
     Washington allowed the UN sanctions against Libya to be 
     removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation 
     agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted 
     responsibility for its officials' actions.
       But during these two years of talks, American negotiators 
     consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie 
     situation would lead to no more than elimination of UN 
     sanctions. To get out from under the separate U.S. sanctions, 
     Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly 
     regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction.
       This is the context in which Libyan officials approached 
     the United States and Britain last spring to discuss 
     dismantling Libya's, weapons program. The Iraq war, which had 
     not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's 
     move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of 
     credible diplomatic representations by the United States 
     over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so 
     was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic 
     goals.
       Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was 
     offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable 
     dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead to the 
     removal of American sanctions, perhaps by the end of this 
     year.
       The lesson is incontrovertible: To persuade a rogue regime 
     to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons 
     of mass destruction, the United States must not only apply 
     pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of 
     cooperation.
       Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take 
     this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and 
     Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as 
     well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing 
     Iranian or Syrian behavior.
       The President's lack of initiative on this point is 
     especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath 
     of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration had a singular 
     opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and 
     Syria.
       Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic elements of 
     Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through diplomatic 
     channels and to former officials (including myself) their 
     interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United States. 
     Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to terrorist 
     groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security 
     guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations 
     with Washington.
       Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President 
     Bashar Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last 
     week--have told me that they want a better strategic 
     understanding with the United States. To achieve this, 
     however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what 
     Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to 
     terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. 
     As Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if it 
     gives up something, it must know what it will gain in return.
       One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more 
     constructive course with Libya was that the White House, 
     uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's 
     neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of 
     carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots 
     could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial 
     decisions were made.
       The initial approach on the Lockerbie case was approved by 
     an informal coalition made up of Condoleezza Rice, the 
     national security adviser, and Secretary of State Colin 
     Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to the negotiations 
     involving Libyan weapons of mass destruction, the 
     neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the shop of Under 
     Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of the loop.
       Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's 
     bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security 
     Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course 
     involving Iran and Syria.
       However, until the Bush administration learns the real 
     lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue 
     regimes is likely to remain stuck in the mud of ideology.




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