[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 11 (Tuesday, February 3, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S527-S531]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise to speak on an issue about which I 
have spoken a number of times and which I passionately believe needs to 
be addressed--frankly, it is one that is well past the maturation stage 
where it should have been addressed--and that is an independent look at 
our intelligence operations, particularly as they relate to the pre-
Iraqi invasion and how conclusions were drawn, so that can speak to the 
American people about the facts we had.
  It is an issue which I think is essential to the national security of 
the American people. If we don't learn from our mistakes, we are bound 
to make those mistakes again. It is high time we have gotten around to 
it.
  In the past few days, the administration and the world have come to 
understand and acknowledge on a broad basis the colossal intelligence 
failures that led us to war, a war that may have led to good ends, but 
the Nation clearly didn't come to those conclusions on the basis of the 
information we now seem to be discovering.
  There is a question about means to an end that I think is pretty 
simple in the kinds of discussions I think all of us have in the 
families and in the communities in which we live. I don't think we want 
to get into a position where means justify ends when they don't relate 
to them. I just point that out as some of this discussion has evolved.
  On January 8, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the lack of 
connection between Iraq and al-Qaida, stating;

       I've not seen a smoking gun, concrete evidence about that 
     connection.

  We were told something different.
  Then the President, in his latest State of the Union Address, 
referred only to weapons of mass destruction and related program 
activities, whatever that is--a far cry from the active nuclear program 
and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons warned of in his last 
State of the Union Message in 2003.
  It was last week's testimony from David Kay, the man responsible for 
the weapons search in Iraq, that finally brought this matter to 
maturity and captured the attention of the Nation, the administration, 
and the world, and that has really changed the whole context of this 
debate and discussion.
  Dr. Kay, a man who told us last fall that Iraq's nuclear programs 
were only at the most rudimentary level, told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee there was no evidence of stockpiles of chemical or biological 
weapons.
  David Kay has made an important recommendation--one that I think has 
been obvious for a number of months--that an independent inquiry be 
established so that the American people, so that the allies of the 
United States and those who would work with us, so that all of us who 
are involved in policymaking know we have the facts that allow us to 
make good decisions so that we are not committing the lives of our men 
and women in our military to efforts that are based on false premises, 
whether those are intentional or unintentional.
  We need to have the right answers, and that recommendation apparently 
has now led--some might say forced--the President to announce he will 
name a panel to look at the intelligence issues related to Iraq.
  I welcome the President's reversal on this critical need, and I 
suspect we will

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see a reversal of support for that concept among my colleagues, about 
which there have been some healthy debates in the last months.

  This is about the Nation's national security, make no mistake. We 
need to understand on a collection basis, on an analysis basis, and, 
yes, on a use basis, just exactly how we got to the kinds of 
conclusions we did. The means need to be understood so that we can 
connect them with the end, so that we don't make the same mistakes 
again and again.
  I have serious concerns, however, at least from early reports about 
what the details of the President's plan for this commission will be, 
that the response is inadequate--I think seriously inadequate. This 
needs to be an independent commission.
  How do we get to an independent commission? How do we make certain 
that the judgments we get are not designed or at least limited to only 
a mission defined by those we are actually looking at? And second, will 
that commission be allowed to explore the use of intelligence, or the 
misuse, if you will?
  I haven't seen the details. I don't think any of us have. We are 
reading press reports. But if they are true, it would give the 
appearance that we don't want to have a commission that is going to 
deal with the fundamental crux of a lot of these questions. Quite 
obviously, if we don't deal with the crux of the questions, then are we 
going to get results that create credibility with the American people, 
with this body, with the world, on whom we need to count to do things 
as we go forward? Are we going to get to those kinds of conclusions?
  If that is not the case, then I don't think we are headed in the 
right direction. I am very afraid we are moving into something that may 
satisfy a call for a commission to investigate our intelligence, but 
not yet at the fundamental problems that led us to this particular 
decision in Iraq, but also can be and may have well been replicated in 
other areas.
  I actually think the President is right to talk about it in a broader 
context. It is just an issue of, sequentially, which one do we look at 
first. Even by the inspection on the ground, we are told that 15 
percent of the issues haven't been examined on the ground in Iraq. We 
need to deal with where our men and women are being killed now, as 
opposed to putting off and putting together all of these various 
issues.
  We have what some people might say is a tactical issue with respect 
to Iraq and a strategic problem with our intelligence operations in a 
more general context. Fine, we should look at a broader scope of issues 
to get to the restructuring of our intelligence operations, but we need 
to deal with the reality of, how did our intelligence serve us so 
poorly, how were the conclusions so far off the mark? Was there a 
problem with collection? Was there a problem with analysis? Or was 
there a problem in selectivity and use of the intelligence provided?
  As I said, it was last summer when I first offered legislation to 
establish an independent commission. I think we ought to get to a truly 
bipartisan, independent commission, one that is not unlike what we see 
with the 9/11 Commission, headed by the former Governor of New Jersey, 
a Republican, who is doing, in my view, an incredible service to our 
Nation. It is a diligent, independent, bipartisan approach to find out 
the facts that led to that tragedy with which all of us live each and 
every day, whether it is in your local hometown, like it is the case in 
mine, or whether it is in the broader context of the Nation.

  Given the fact that we have had Presidential claims that Iraq had 
sought to purchase uranium in Africa, which could not be justified or 
substantiated by intelligence, is enough to ask the question whether 
intelligence was properly used. It clearly was not, because the 
President himself has denied that that should have been in the State of 
the Union.
  So how did that intelligence get misused? How did that come about? 
Similarly, with regard to the aluminum tube issue, on which a whole 
host of folks have spoken out both publicly, and I have read some 
things privately, that call into question whether that was ever a 
viable concept for intelligence to be used as one of the justifications 
for entering into this conflict.
  How can that happen? We need to have certainty and independence in 
judging how we got to the collection, the analysis, and the use of the 
intelligence. I think that is important if we are going to go forward 
with certainty and credibility with regard to our efforts in using our 
intelligence for proper and effective policy formulation in the years 
ahead. We need it so we can speak to the world with credibility, and it 
will not take place, in my view, if we do not have that independent 
commission.
  So I want to reemphasize the point that use of the information is 
also very important. We have seen time after time, and opinion after 
opinion, of a number of people, outside of the David Kay remarks, that 
much of the use has actually been disputed within the intelligence 
community. I cite in particular an officer from the State Department, 
Gregg Thielmann--and I will try to get his particular title--who has 
made the assertion that we are basically operating under faith-based 
interpretations of a lot of information. He goes back and cites the 
Nigeria uranium and the use of aluminum tubes, disputes about 
stockpiles that were reported, and many elements of different 
perspectives with regard to the intelligence that was available to 
policymakers.
  How did we get such a one-sided view? I think some people would argue 
it might be misuse. Some may argue it is selectivity. I think we need 
an independent commission so we can get to the bottom of these. I think 
we need to understand how the administration could make public 
statements that contradicted some of the analysis or failed to 
incorporate the balance that was actually involved in the communities' 
reports. Why did these reports Congress mandated under the very 
resolution that granted the President the authority to go to war 
include some of those unsubstantiated claims I talked about? Were 
members of the intelligence community pressured to produce analyses 
that conformed to the administration policies? They even set up an 
extra body within the Defense Department to derive points of view that 
would be used in the Defense Department independent of traditional 
agencies that are involved in the intelligence. Did the administration 
officials seek to bypass that normal process by cherry-picking?
  I think all of these questions are real and they are ones that need 
to be independently analyzed. There are plenty of outside experts. I 
think a lot of people have heard about the Carnegie Endowment study 
that reported last week, and I quote:

       Administration officials systematically misrepresented the 
     threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programs.

  They may not have all of the information. That is why we need a 
commission to straighten this out and to give us all confidence that we 
can go forward.
  I spoke about Mr. Thielmann, who was the former director of the 
Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State 
Department. He is incredibly offended by the difference between the 
information he saw and presented to the Secretary of State, as the one 
who is responsible for collating that, and what he has seen stated in 
the public. So how did those kinds of differences come to pass? Why are 
we dealing with such discrepancies?
  The commission I proposed would be established by law independent of 
any executive orders to change its mission, change its role, change its 
scope. Its members would be selected by the leadership of both parties, 
balanced, kind of like the 9/11 Commission which I think people would 
argue as being very independent and is on the right track; receive an 
independent budget so there would not be issues about how thoroughly 
they might be able to pursue particular avenues of research; and would 
be directed to examine every aspect of this critical problem; obviously 
all elements of the collection, all elements of the analysis, and all 
elements of use from top to bottom, from our intelligence operatives to 
the White House.
  By the way, in my view, Congress looks to provide the checks and 
balances that are expected through our constitutional offices.
  I think this commission should be thorough and we need an end result

[[Page S529]]

that gives us all confidence that when we make decisions that send 
120,000, 130,000 or 150,000 of our men and women into battle that they 
are fighting a war based on information that was intended to give pure 
advice as best understood. I do not think the looking back--20/20 
hindsight is always better, but looking back, one has to question 
whether the claims that Saddam Hussein posed a dire and immediate 
threat to the United States were real. It is important that we have a 
full examination, particularly when there were other alternatives that 
would not have necessarily cost American lives, such as continued 
pursuit of U.N. inspections which were claimed to have been 
ineffective, further diplomacy pointless, when in fact apparently all 
of those efforts at U.N. inspections and other things had actually been 
successful. There has been a huge failure, one that is very real in the 
lives of the families who have given up their sons and daughters, and I 
think one that morally requires we have an independent, bipartisan 
commission that gets to answers independently of any of us who have 
been involved in the decisionmaking, because if we do not have that I 
think we are going to always have questions of credibility as we go 
forward.
  So I hope we can work together. I certainly intend to offer either on 
a stand-alone basis or in an amendment format an additional opportunity 
to support a truly independent and bipartisan commission that can get 
to the bottom of something I think is fundamental to the national 
security of this Nation, and make sure all of our sons and daughters 
are fighting wars and protecting America with the kind of information 
that is there for the best interests of us executing our policies, not 
for the best execution of our political desires.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I want to answer some of the concerns raised 
by my colleague from New Jersey. Basically what he is describing is the 
Intelligence Committee. For 8 months, our staffs have interviewed over 
200 people. They have gone through thousands of pages of documents. We 
have investigated all of the charges and all of the concerns that have 
been raised.
  There will be a preliminary report provided to the members of the 
Intelligence Committee on Thursday. Starting afresh with another 
congressional commission is not warranted. The report of the 
Intelligence Committee has not been seen.
  There are certain things that we know we have seen supported. I 
believe everybody believes David Kay is credible. When he testified 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28 this year, he 
said: I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said I actually think this may be one 
of the cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought. I think 
when we have the complete record you are going to discover that after 
1998 it became a regime that was totally corrupt, individuals were out 
for their own protection. In a world where we know others are seeking 
WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and buyer 
meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country than even 
we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate 
estimate.
  There is no question about it not being a fully accurate estimate. 
This is one of the areas where I think all of us would agree, we did 
not have as good intelligence as we should have. We didn't have as good 
intelligence in the 1990s, when we should have. And President Clinton, 
on February 17, 1998, said:

       If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force our 
     purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat 
     posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.

  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a day later, said:

       Iraq is a long way from here but what happens there matters 
     a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue 
     state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 
     against us or our allies is the present greatest security 
     threat we face.

  Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser, said on that same day:

       He will use those weapons of mass destruction again as he 
     has 10 times since 1983.

  All of the people who are making these statements have access to the 
intelligence information that we as Senators get. We realize, based on 
what David Kay stated, that we badly underestimated the ballistic 
missile capability. As a matter of fact, Senator Graham of Florida was 
prescient in a letter he wrote. In a letter dated December 5, 2001, 
signed by many others, he said:

       There is no doubt Saddam Hussein has reinvigorated his 
     weapons program. Reports indicate biological, chemical and 
     nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to prewar 
     status. In addition Saddam continues to redefine ``delivery 
     system'' and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile 
     program to develop long range missiles that will threaten the 
     United States and our allies.

  That one was right on the mark because that is what we found.
  What are the needs? Obviously, when there are not people who speak 
Arabic, when we do not have unofficial agents in the country, we are 
missing out on one of the important elements of a good intelligence 
program. But, you know something. It is not just Iraq. We didn't know 
how far Libya was along until Muammar Qadhafi, not wanting to be pulled 
out of a spider hole by an American soldier standing over him with a 
grenade, decided he would come clean. We were unaware of how far Iran 
has gone. And, clearly, prior to the first gulf war, we did not know 
just how far advanced Saddam Hussein's programs were.
  We also know--and David Kay was clear about this--that we cannot 
account for weapons of mass destruction that he had. There didn't have 
to be a large stockpile. A suitcase full of anthrax or ricin, or even a 
handful, can be a great terrorist weapon, and we will be lucky if we 
find that small amount, particularly after you look at the lengthy 
program of denial, deception, and destruction in which he engaged.
  There is a lot of intelligence that was lacking with respect to 
Saddam Hussein. We have to do a better job. The purpose of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, one of five or six committees already 
investigating it, is to find out not only what we lacked but also to 
recommend changes because the one area on which we would agree is that 
we have to have a better system of intelligence. What we learn is going 
to put us on that track.
  I know the staff has worked hard. I am looking forward to the report. 
I will be surprised if it does not confirm what David Kay says and lay 
out some recommendations. The President has a responsibility as well. 
We have an oversight responsibility. If he wants people to look at it, 
to tell him how to improve it: Good luck. Go ahead. But we have the 
Iraqi Survey Group, internal investigations, and I believe probably the 
best investigation is what the Senate Intelligence Committee has done.

  I apologize. I know my colleague from Illinois wants to speak so I 
will yield the floor.
  Mr. CORZINE. Will the Senator from Missouri be willing to take a 
question with regard to the Senate Intelligence effort?
  Mr. BOND. I will be happy to.
  Mr. CORZINE. First of all, I compliment him. I am quite supportive of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee doing a total rundown on both the 
collection and the analysis that led both to the Iraq situation and 
some of the failures he mentioned with regard to Iran and Libya and 
different points of view. God knows the Pakistani dissemination of 
technology we have read about in the newspapers in recent months is a 
pretty horrific proliferation issue about which I think all of us 
should be concerned.
  But there is this fundamental issue of whether intelligence has been 
misused and whether we are getting the checks and balances in looking 
at the collected and analyzed information. Are we looking at the full 
range of possibilities?
  I ask my colleague from Missouri, am I correct that the chairman of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee said that studying the use of the 
intelligence information was really not part of the efforts the Senate 
Intelligence Committee would take on in this process? I think the 
record would be specific. But is that the case or not?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, to respond to that question, what the 
Intelligence Committee looks at is what is the intelligence that was 
gathered. There

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have been some suggestions that the intelligence was influenced or 
colored by pressure from the administration. David Kay said absolutely 
not. He said he talked to the analysts, there was absolutely no 
information--there was absolutely no information--and he said that 
really the intelligence community owes an apology to the President--and 
I would say to the American people--for not having done it better. But 
they are dealing with a very inexact science.
  If you follow what other elected officials had said prior, during the 
1990s, 2001, 2002--what they were saying shows that they used the same 
intelligence. We are looking at the intelligence, the national 
intelligence estimates and all those things. We look at it, and if you 
want to second-guess, if you want to argue that we should not have gone 
into Iraq, I think David Kay answers that and says the world is far 
safer. It was a much more dangerous situation than we thought.
  Yes, there are errors. There are areas where we overestimated his 
capability. There are areas where we underestimated his capability. But 
the fact remains that Saddam Hussein had so much weaponry, it is going 
to take 18 months just to destroy it. He still may have chemical and 
biological weapons. We look at what the intelligence is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized in morning 
business for 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me say at the outset I commend my 
colleague from New Jersey, Senator Corzine, who came to this floor 
several months ago and said we need an independent commission to look 
at the intelligence that led up to an invasion of Iraq, and the use of 
that intelligence, and called for a vote on that issue. I don't 
remember the final outcome of that vote, but I know I stood with him 
because I thought it was the right thing to do. Many people on our side 
of the aisle and the other side of the aisle resisted that suggestion, 
saying the Senate Intelligence Committee would be able to do this 
investigation.
  But the Senator from New Jersey has hit the nail on the head. Senator 
Roberts, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made it 
clear long ago that our committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
would not look into the use of intelligence but, rather, whether it was 
accurately gathered and presented to the policymakers. That is a 
critically important question and one that would be part of any valid 
investigation.
  But equally important, if not more, is whether or not that 
information, once given to the policymakers, was honestly communicated 
to the American people. I can think of nothing worse in this open forum 
of government than to have the suggestion that there were 
misrepresentations made to the American people on something as critical 
as a decision to invade a sovereign nation. That is the question before 
the Senate.

  This week's Newsweek cover story is based on Dr. David Kay's 
testimony last week before Congress. It has pictures of the leaders of 
the Bush administration and the quote from Dr. Kay, ``We Were All 
Wrong.''
  The obvious question is, Where was the error made? Was it just in the 
collection of intelligence data or was it in the portrayal of that 
data, the description of that data to the American people? That is a 
painful question and a delicate question but an important question.
  Senator Corzine has said for many months we need to have people come 
and ask that question, both questions, in an honest and bipartisan way. 
I salute him for his leadership on this issue. I know he has been 
frustrated by the rejection of the Senate for his proposal, but now it 
is full circle. Now, even the President, who once opposed him, says it 
is time to move to a commission.
  Mr. CORZINE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. CORZINE. It seems to me it is absolutely essential we understand 
how the President of the United States can put those 16 words--which 
were in absolute conflict with the information that generally was 
available in the Intelligence Committee, if I read that properly--into 
the State of the Union Message of 2003 with regard to aluminum tubes 
and with regard to uranium and then later the whole discussion, 
particularly Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. of the use of 
aluminum tubes. This was also in very strong contradiction to much of 
the information that is now available. We could go on, with unmanned 
aerial vehicles and a whole series of other issues.
  So somehow or another there were disputes about the response that one 
should make with regard to collection and analysis of data. And that 
gets at the fundamental question of how did we use or misuse the 
intelligence that was presented. To not come up with an answer that is 
credible to the American people, credible to policymakers in this body, 
and credible to our allies and the world community is a failure of 
leadership on our part. It becomes absolutely essential that any 
independent commission needs to deal with the use, not just the 
collection and analysis.
  Is that how the Senator from Illinois feels?
  Mr. DURBIN. Yes, which is why I supported the early resolution. I 
hope the Senate will return to that. I hope we can find a way to choose 
people who are fair arbiters. There is a fear on the other side that 
something will be done to embarrass the administration before an 
election, especially a feeling we should let the chips fall where they 
may. Can't we find people in this country--I think we can--who will be 
honest, dispassionate, and nonpartisan?
  At issue is not just a question of who comes out ahead on the 
political ledger sheet. The question before the Senate is one of the 
most important elements for America's national defense and security. If 
we had planes being flown in Iraq that were crashing, if we had tanks 
that could not shoot straight, if we had a lot of equipment over there 
that was failing, we would hear very quickly from the press, from the 
public, from the Pentagon, that we need an investigation.
  Here we have a failure of something equally important, a failure of 
intelligence. We need to get to the bottom of it. If we are going to be 
successful in any war on terrorism, we need the very best intelligence 
in the world. Clearly, our intelligence failed us in the leadup to the 
invasion of Iraq.

  We find ourselves today in a situation which is likely to be long 
term, costing American taxpayers $1 billion a week but, more 
importantly, continuing to cost American lives. That is a compelling 
reason to move on this with dispatch.
  I sincerely hope Senator Corzine's suggestion is followed up on as 
quickly as possible.
  Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. DORGAN. I ask the Senator from Illinois if it is not the case 
that the gathering of intelligence--today, tonight, tomorrow morning, 
yesterday--might be the very function that determines whether our 
country is able to determine and prevent a future terrorist attack 
against our country; isn't the intelligence-gathering system that 
important?
  Mr. DURBIN. I say to the Senator from North Dakota, more important 
than it has ever been, since September 11. It is only with valid, 
credible, good intelligence that we are able to anticipate someone who 
is trying to cause harm to the American people or to strike us in our 
territory or to, frankly, attack our special interests around the 
world. Intelligence is a critical part of our national defense.
  Mr. DORGAN. I inquire if the gathering of intelligence is so 
critical--and the Newsweek magazine describes it as a failure in the 
description by Mr. Kay, the top weapons inspector--if, in fact, it is a 
failure, then I would expect that the President of the United States, 
the Congress, and the American people would demand, on an urgent basis, 
that we figure out what happened, what is wrong, and how to fix it. Not 
later, now. The safety and security of this country depends on it.
  With respect to the issue of intelligence, we ought to now 
understand, having the vision in the rearview mirror, the issue is not 
what we think but, rather, what we know when a country changes a 
doctrine, as the President did, with respect to preemptive attacks. If 
you talk about preemption

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you better know things rather than think things.
  I went back and reread the presentation to the United Nations by the 
Secretary of State. When he made that presentation, I thought to 
myself, that is a masterful presentation. And what he did, 
interestingly enough, is say: We know the following; we know the 
following; we know. And he put pictures up and he put up pieces of 
information--we know this from human resources; we know this from 
inspections; we know this from satellite photos.
  They did not know it. What he said we knew turns out to have been 
fundamentally wrong.
  So it seems to me the President, the Congress, and the American 
people ought to demand on an urgent basis there be an independent 
commission to find out what on Earth happened and how do we fix it.
  Let me make one final point, if I might. Can there really be an 
independent commission, when a President, who did not want a commission 
in the first place, and said in recent weeks he did not want a 
commission, now will say our executive branch and our administration 
will create a commission that is independent? Can that really be a 
commission? Or is it not the case that a truly independent commission 
would be one that follows the course that we usually follow on urgent 
issues, and that is, we put in law, a law from Congress, that creates 
and funds a commission and creates a truly independent body to take a 
hard look at what happened.

  The executive branch cannot possibly have a commission that 
investigates itself. This is not about politics. There is no political 
way to talk about safety and security of the American people and our 
great reliance on intelligence.
  This is not about Republicans or Democrats. This is about the future 
of this country and getting it right. It is critically important.
  The Senator from New Jersey and what he has been talking about for 
months about this independent commission is right on the mark, as is 
the Senator from Illinois. I am pleased to join him in this discussion 
about how important intelligence really is.
  I ask that 10 minutes be added to the Senator's allocation for his 
presentation.
  Mr. DURBIN. I think the Senator said something important in relation 
to the September 11 commission, a commission which is headed up by 
former Republican Governor Kean of New Jersey, which has asked for an 
extension of time, so on a bipartisan basis they can ask all the 
questions as to whether or not we did anything wrong that led up to 
September 11, and what we could have done to prevent it.
  Former President Bill Clinton said to a gathering of Senators, I am 
prepared to testify before that commission. I am prepared to cooperate 
with them completely. If there was any shortcoming or failing in my 
administration, so be it. It is more important that the American people 
know that we have done everything in our power to make this a safer 
nation.
  That should be the attitude of all Members. We should swallow our 
political pride and say this is not about partisanship. If an error was 
made by any President, Democrat or Republican, which has put us in 
harm's way or endangered America's security, don't we deserve to know 
that? The fact that the Senate Intelligence Committee has drawn a line 
and said they are not going to even ask the question as to whether the 
intelligence was misused by any member of the Bush administration tells 
me they are being politically protective. They are protecting the 
political interests of the White House instead of the paramount 
concern, which should be protecting the American people.
  I hope, frankly, there is an independent commission that asks hard 
questions of those in the Clinton administration and President George 
W. Bush's administration and any administration that might have some 
bearing on the intelligence capacity of America and on the protection 
of this great Nation. I thank the Senators who joined in on this 
important issue.

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