[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 10 (Monday, February 2, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S337-S341]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM

  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, as Chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence during most of the 107th Congress, I 
worked with colleagues from the House and Senate to accept the 
responsibility of reviewing the horrific events that struck our 
Nation's symbols of commerce and security on September 11, 2001, 
claiming the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans. From New York City and 
the Pentagon to a field in rural Pennsylvania, 9-11 demonstrated the 
vulnerabilities of our free society.
  But in my view, and after the careful review of the Intelligence 
Committees, the most tragic aspect of this day never to be forgotten is 
that it could have been prevented. Had our intelligence agencies been 
better organized and more focused on the problem of international 
terrorism--particularly Osama bin Laden--September 11th would have been 
prevented.
  I also have concluded that, had the President and the Congress 
initiated the reforms that our joint inquiry recommended, we might well 
have avoided the embarrassment of the flawed intelligence on weapons of 
mass destruction--or the misleading use of that intelligence--which 
formed the basis of our war against Iraq.
  Surely, the people of America would be safer today had these reforms 
been undertaken.
  So today, and in remarks in the next 2 days, I would like to review 
with my colleagues the conclusions of the House-Senate joint inquiry.
  We have learned that intelligence failures played a central role in 
the events of 9-11. Let me illustrate some of those failures:
  The Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, was tracking two of the 
hijackers and knew that they had been to a summit meeting of terrorists 
in Malaysia in early January of 2000. However, the CIA failed to inform 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, FAA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS, 
or Customs officials that these individuals were on their way to the 
United States. The result is that when they arrived on a commercial 
airliner in the United States in order to execute their dastardly plan, 
they were welcomed into our country by unwitting entry agents.
  These same two hijackers were living with an FBI asset, but the 
informant failed to ask basic questions. Others in the FBI recognized 
the danger of Islamic extremists using airplanes as weapons of mass 
destruction, but their warnings were ignored by superiors. Still others 
failed to understand the legal avenues available to them that may have 
allowed available investigative techniques to be used to avert the 9-11 
plot.
  Current national security strategy demands more accurate intelligence 
than ever before:

       Terrorists must be found before their strikes. This will 
     require intelligence agents capable of penetrating their 
     cells to provide intelligence early enough to frustrate the 
     terrorists' intentions;
       If preventive or pre-emptive military actions are to be a 
     central part of our national security strategy, to maintain 
     its credibility of those actions with the American people and 
     the world, will require the support of the most credible 
     intelligence;
       If we are to frustrate the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, America must provide an intelligence capability 
     for all of those regions of the world which are suspect.

  Now, as never before, intelligence matters.
  In responding to the events of 9-11, Congress created a joint 
committee consisting of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. A 
bipartisan, bicameral panel of this type had never before been formed 
in the 213 years of the U.S. Congress. Our effort reflected the unique 
circumstances and the national unity we all felt in the immediate 
aftermath of 9-11.
  One of the principal reasons for conducting the inquiry in this way 
was to give our recommendations the maximum credibility, above the 
usual cries of partisanship that frequently taint the work of 
congressional committees. The importance of our task cannot be 
understated. We sought to identify the problems in the intelligence 
community that allowed the 9-11 attacks to go undetected and propose 
solutions to those problems.
  In the end, we were successful in identifying the problems because we 
all understood how much was at stake and that our enemy would not rest 
while we attempted to fix our problems. We were less successful in 
securing consideration of the solutions from the intelligence agencies, 
the White House, and the Congress.
  The fact that we conducted this bipartisan, bicameral inquiry and 
submitted recommendations creates a new heightened level of 
congressional responsibility. If the terrorists are successful in 
another attack in the United States, the American people will demand to 
know what the institutions of government learned from 9-11, and how the 
intelligence agencies, the White House, and the Congress used that 
knowledge to harden the United States against future terrorist attacks. 
Congress was largely able to avoid accountability for 9-11. Mark my 
words: There will be no avoidance of responsibility for the next 
attack.
  There will be no avoiding responsibility for the President. September 
11, 2001, was a wake up call--it told us we had severe deficiencies in 
our intelligence community. If 9-11 was a wake up call, the failure to 
find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a report card on how far 
we have come since 9-11 in correcting the problems in our intelligence 
community. The grade we received on that report card is F. The 
President and Congress have failed to initiate the reforms recommended 
by a series of review panels and our bipartisan, bicameral joint 
committee of inquiry.

[[Page S338]]

  This failure of the President and the Congress has contributed to yet 
another intelligence failure.
  What troubles me more than the President's unwillingness to make the 
necessary changes is his unwillingness to even admit that our Nation 
has a problem. Just last week, the President responded to questions 
about the inaccuracies of his statements about Iraq's WMD capability by 
saying he has ``great confidence in our intelligence community.'' How 
can he have great confidence in our intelligence community after it has 
been proven confused before September 11 and completely wrong on the 
threat posed by Iraq?
  The expected appointment by the President of a commission to review 
the intelligence on which the war in Iraq was predicated is not an 
excuse to delay reform of America's intelligence community. Rather, I 
am concerned that it appears as though the goal is simply to avoid 
political accountability and embarrassment. America continues to be in 
a state of denial. A White House aide was quoted over the weekend as 
saying, ``We cannot afford another one of those''--referring to the 
public outcry after the misstatement of intelligence in the 2003 State 
of the Union speech.
  It has now been more than a year since the joint inquiry made its 
recommendations. This is a good time to review the progress made in 
implementing those recommendations and to identify critical areas of 
reform that have not yet been addressed. Unfortunately, this is not 
going to be a report card that we would like to show to our parents--or 
to our voters. There has been little accomplished with regard to most 
of the recommendations.
  The joint inquiry report made nineteen recommendations for reform. 
Today I would like to discuss those recommendations that fall into the 
category of specific actions to combat terrorism.
  In speeches on Tuesday and Wednesday, I will deal with those that 
involve intelligence community reform and those that deal with the FBI 
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act process.
  Of the nineteen recommendations, there are six that contain specific 
actions to combat terrorism. Recommendation No. 2 directs ``the 
National Security Council to expedite their efforts to examine and 
revamp existing intelligence priorities.'' It further directs the 
President to ``take action to ensure that clear, consistent, and 
current priorities are established and enforced throughout the 
Intelligence Community. Once established, these priorities should be 
reviewed and updated on at least an annual basis to ensure that the 
allocation of Intelligence Community resources reflects and effectively 
addresses the continually evolving threat environment. Finally, the 
establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, and the 
justification for such priorities, should be reported to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees on an annual basis.''
  It was very clear from the work of the joint inquiry that the 
intelligence community had not adapted or changed its intelligence 
priorities to reflect the changing nature of the world. While some 
modifications had been made since the end of the Cold War, our 
intelligence priorities remained states like Russia, China, Iran and 
Iraq. In spite of the fact that George Tenet, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, had declared war on al-Qaida in 1998, al-Qaida was not at 
or even near the top of the intelligence priority list on September 11, 
2001. Only on September 12, 2001, did al-Qaida become priority number 
one.
  It was also clear from our investigation that there was no formal 
process for regularly updating and reviewing intelligence priorities to 
ensure that they reflected changes in the security environment. 
Bureaucratic inertia worked to keep old priorities on the list long 
after they should have dropped down in favor of emerging threats. While 
George Tenet may have recognized that non-state actors like al-Qaida 
needed more attention, this was not widely known or accepted throughout 
the Intelligence Community that he heads. When asked if he was aware 
that George Tenet had declared war on al-Qaida in 1998, a former 
director of the National Security Agency, NSA, our Nation's electronic 
eavesdropping agency, responded that yes, he was aware that George 
Tenet had said that, but he did not think it applied to him or his 
organization.
  A formal process that was clearly understood throughout our 
government would have prevented some of the problems we identified. One 
example involves the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, a pilotless 
drone capable of long-duration flight and armed with high resolution 
cameras and an ability to fire missiles at targets on the ground. The 
Predator has proven to be one of the most effective intelligence 
collection assets we have in the war on terror. Unfortunately, it took 
far too long to build the Predator because of internal disputes in the 
administration. This type of aircraft was not a priority for the Air 
Force and its production was therefore delayed several months. The lack 
of established and accepted intelligence priorities was a major cause 
of the delay in fielding the Predator.
  This issue of setting new priorities was also raised by the National 
Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, also known as the 
Hart-Rudman Commission. This Commission, which issued its final report 
in February of 2001, included a recommendation that ``the President 
order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National 
Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.''
  Unfortunately, at the time the Joint Inquiry issued its report almost 
2 full years after the Hart-Rudman Commission had made its 
recommendation sufficient progress had not been made in setting 
national intelligence priorities. Therefore, we included a 
recommendation on this point. Our investigation determined that the 
failure to have clear, consistent and current intelligence priorities 
that were understood by the entire intelligence community was a 
significant contributing factor to the failure of intelligence on 9-11.
  Since the joint inquiry issued its report, some progress has been 
made in establishing a systematic process for establishing intelligence 
priorities. However, it is not clear that these priorities are being 
communicated to the domestic intelligence agencies responsible for our 
security here at home.
  Recommendation No. 3 focuses its directive on the counter terrorism 
components of the intelligence, military, law enforcement, and homeland 
security agencies, which will be key in counter terrorism. This 
recommendation directs the National Security Council to ``prepare, for 
the President's approval, a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating 
terrorism, both at home and abroad, including the growing terrorism 
threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
associated technologies.''
  There should be an intelligence component of this strategy that 
identifies domestic and foreign based threat levels, programs, plans 
and budgets to address the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other international terrorist groups. The 
strategy should include specific efforts to improve human intelligence, 
better utilize technology to analyze and share data, enhance domestic 
intelligence, maximize the effective use of covert action, which is 
action taken by the United States Government where the role of the 
United States is hidden, develop programs to deal with terrorist 
financing, and facilitate the ability of CIA and military special 
operations forces to conduct joint operations against terrorist 
targets.
  The joint inquiry found that there was no commonly agreed-upon 
approach among the federal agencies for dealing with terrorism. Each 
agency or department seemed to have its own ideas about fighting 
terrorism, and they were all independent actors. Success in the war on 
terror will require a coherent, coordinated effort that can only be 
accomplished by having everyone work toward a common goal outlined in a 
national strategy. Prior to 9-11, the CIA was trying, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to penetrate foreign terrorist organizations and 
disrupt their operations. Unfortunately at the FBI, fighting the war on 
terror meant calculating the threat by counting the number of known 
terrorists, not how many were estimated to have been placed in American 
communities. The FBI was waiting for acts of terror to occur and then 
trying to arrest and convict the guilty party.

[[Page S339]]

  The need for a national strategy to combat terrorism has been the 
subject of several other commission reports. The Gilmore Commission, 
also known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, in 
its second report in December of 2000, recommended that ``the next 
President should develop and present to the Congress a national 
strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office.''
  The broad recommendation to develop a national strategy, as well as 
what should be included as specific components of that strategy, is 
broadly supported by virtually everyone who has analyzed our 
intelligence capabilities.
  In addition to the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission calling 
for a national strategy to combat terrorism, other commissions have 
made recommendations that are consistent with the full joint inquiry 
recommendation on developing a national strategy. For instance, the 
Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, and the Bremer 
Commission, also known as the National Commission on Terrorism, in its 
report of June 2000, all made recommendations calling for improving and 
intensifying our human intelligence efforts with respect to terrorism.
  We should remember that until the hijackers stood up on those four 
airplanes and took control, it was as if their plot had been 
undetected. It was as if their conspiracy represented no violations of 
American laws or regulations. Good intelligence is our principle line 
of defense against these types of terrorist plots. Only by penetrating 
these organizations and by bringing together all available raw 
intelligence into cohesive analytical products will we ever be able to 
feel confident that we can avoid future tragedies. That is the only way 
we will get the timely, accurate intelligence that is required to 
disrupt sophisticated modern terrorist organizations like al-Qaida. 
Improving our human intelligence capability must be Job Number One in 
responding to global terrorists.
  Penetrating these organizations will require a new, more aggressive 
human intelligence capability. Osama and his cohorts are unlikely to 
turn up at an embassy cocktail party. We must be capable of getting 
human sources close to the leaders of these organizations. John Walker 
Lindh was a misguided California college student who became a member of 
al-Qaida and even met Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, John Walker Lindh 
did not work for the CIA.
  The Bremer Commission includes a recommendation to increase funding 
for technology development to exploit terrorist communications, and 
devotes an entire section to improving efforts to attack terrorist 
financing. The Gilmore Commission recommends improving technological 
applications to enhance analysis and dissemination, as well as 
improving domestic intelligence collection.
  In response to the good work done by the Gilmore Commission and the 
recommendation of our Joint Inquiry, a national strategy to combat 
terrorism was issued by the Bush Administration in February of 2003. It 
is difficult to understand how a President who claims that defeating 
terrorism is the principle mission of his presidency took 17 months to 
produce a strategy to accomplish that mission. And even the strategy 
that was produced is inadequate when it comes to defining the 
intelligence components of that strategy. Instead, it calls on the 
intelligence community to review its capabilities and make 
recommendations for improvement. Why would it take 17 months to task 
the intelligence community to do such an assessment?

  The strategy that was produced after this long delay does not meet 
the requirements published in the recommendation of the joint inquiry. 
The Bush administration's strategy is not so much a strategy as a list 
of objectives. What is lacking is clear guidance on how we can achieve 
these objectives. What is also lacking is a level of specificity that 
will allow all agencies in our government to work towards this common 
set of priorities and goals through the common strategy.
  Recommendation No. 4 calls for the establishment of a National 
Intelligence Officer for Terrorism on the National Intelligence 
Council. The National Intelligence Council works directly for the 
Director of Central Intelligence and is responsible for providing 
coordinated analysis of foreign policy issues for the President and 
other senior policymakers. To date, no such position has been 
established. The lack of a central coordinator for terrorism analysis 
has been a continuing shortcoming in the Intelligence Community. While 
there are some outstanding individuals doing analysis on terrorism in 
several of the intelligence community's component organizations, there 
is no single focal point for policymakers to direct analytical requests 
on terrorism.
  A more recent example of the need for an NIO for Terrorism is the 
debate over Iraq's connection to al-Qaida. While the CIA consistently 
reported that they had uncovered no reliable evidence of any links 
between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, others in the government--
particularly at the Defense Department and the White House--made 
repeated statements about a solid link. Implementing this 
recommendation would give us a point of ultimate accountability.
  The joint inquiry found that there was some confusion as to who to go 
to with intelligence queries on terrorism, and there was no arbiter 
within the community to help reconcile various approaches or 
conflicting analyses of terrorism. We found too much mis-communication 
and an inability to identify who was responsible with regard to 
terrorism analysis. There was no individual who could coordinate a 
National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism, something that may have 
helped bring the seriousness of the threat posed by al-Qaida to members 
of the intelligence community outside of CIA. A National Intelligence 
Estimate is the highest level of intelligence analysis produced by the 
intelligence community and represents the best estimate of the entire 
intelligence community.
  Without the establishment of this position, there is also a lack of 
outreach to academia and the private sector on terrorism issues, 
something that is needed in this critical fight. We have national 
intelligence officers for each geographic region as well as several 
crosscutting issues, such as conventional military issues, strategic 
and nuclear programs, and economics and global issues. It is a sign of 
the continuing lack of organizational restructuring to deal with the 
terrorist threat that we still have no national intelligence officer 
for terrorism, yet we have one for economics. This should not be very 
hard to do, yet one full year after issuing our recommendations it has 
not been done.
  Recommendation No. 18 of the joint inquiry report calls on Congress 
and the administration to ensure the full development within the 
Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism 
information fusion center. This center should have full access to all 
terrorism related intelligence and data, participate in the 
intelligence requirements process, and ``integrate intelligence 
information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist 
threats to the United States in light of actual and potential 
vulnerabilities.''
  One example of an intelligence fusion center that functions 
effectively is the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, 
Florida. This organization fuses intelligence information from a wide 
variety of sources in a single facility which is jointly manned by 
military, law enforcement, intelligence and foreign government 
officials. What makes this organization particularly effective is that 
it is able to directly control operational activity to respond 
immediately to the intelligence it gathers. If it identifies a ship 
traveling toward the United States that it believes is carrying illegal 
narcotics, it can direct a Coast Guard vessel to intercept and search 
that ship.
  The failure to bring together all the available intelligence on 
terrorism and to analyze it in a way that is most useful in preventing 
attacks was most evident in our inquiry. The FBI had smart agents 
working in field offices throughout the country who identified 
troubling trends, such as an unusual interest in flight training among 
some foreign visitors. Unfortunately, the FBI was not organized in a 
way that allowed all intelligence on terrorism to go to a central 
location so that it could

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be analyzed as a whole. That problem was compounded by the fact that 
there was little to no information sharing between the FBI, responsible 
for counter-terrorism within the United States, and the CIA, 
responsible for foreign intelligence collection outside the United 
States of America. Too much fell through the cracks.
  This recommendation was directly supported by the legislation, passed 
by Congress and signed by the President, that established the 
Department of Homeland Security. That legislation authorized an 
intelligence component in the new Department to do exactly as was 
recommended by the joint inquiry, including the requirement that this 
new intelligence component have full access to available intelligence 
information. Senators Shelby, Lieberman, and Thompson deserve 
particular credit for their efforts to ensure that the new Department 
of Homeland Security have a robust intelligence organization. The 
intelligence component of the Department of Homeland Security was 
envisioned to be the one place where our domestic vulnerabilities are 
evaluated and mapped against all threats to the homeland. The idea was 
that the threats could come from a variety of sources, not just 
terrorists, and one agency needed to be responsible for having the 
entire picture on its radar screen.
  Unfortunately, the administration has chosen to gut the intelligence 
function at the Department of Homeland Security. The position of 
director of intelligence for the new department has been vacant for 
much of the time the department has been in existence. This is 
indicative of the lack of attention and significance it is given. The 
staff is totally inadequate for the mission outlined in the legislation 
that established the department.
  Instead, the administration has chosen to create a new organization 
at the CIA called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC. While 
this new organization may address some of the problems that we have 
identified, it does not meet the requirements set out in the 
legislative authorization, nor does it meet the criteria set out in the 
Joint Inquiry recommendation.
  Finally, I would like to address Recommendation No. 19 of the joint 
inquiry report. This recommendation calls on ``the intelligence 
community, and particularly the FBI and CIA, to aggressively address 
the possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or 
are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. 
interests. The FBI and CIA should aggressively and thoroughly pursue 
related matters developed through this Joint Inquiry that have been 
referred to them for further investigation.''
  Mr. President, this may be the most important--and at the same time, 
the most troubling recommendation. Significant evidence of foreign 
government involvement in the 9-11 attacks was uncovered by the joint 
inquiry.
  It is incomprehensible why this administration has refused to 
aggressively pursue the leads that our inquiry developed. One example 
of the failure to pursue leads that point to foreign government 
involvement is the refusal of the FBI to aggressively follow the money 
trail that flowed from officials of a foreign government to at least 
some of the terrorists. In spite of being provided evidence by our 
committee, the FBI and the administration refused to use all the law 
enforcement tools at their disposal to follow the money trail. Why 
would the administration not use all of its available powers to track 
this money? In addition, the question of whether other terrorists were 
getting similar support was not pursued. Therefore the extent of the 
involvement of the foreign government has never been fully 
investigated. Recent press reports indicate that there is even more 
suspicious activity than was known at the time we issued our report.
  Another example of the failure to aggressively pursue the sources of 
foreign support of terrorism is reported on Page A14 of today's 
Washington Post. A panel which was established by the United Nations to 
pursue sources of support of al-Qaida has been disbanded. Our 
government joined with Russia and Chile to sponsor a resolution at the 
United Nations that disbanded the panel investigating al-Qaida's 
financing.
  We are talking about the possible involvement of foreign governments 
in the 9-11 attacks. If a government was involved in those attacks, we 
should leave no stone unturned to identify the extent of that 
involvement and hold those responsible accountable. There should be no 
sanctuary from justice for those involved with terrorists, no matter 
who might be embarrassed by such revelations.
  I wish I could be more specific in discussing the involvement of 
foreign governments in the 9-11 plot. Unfortunately, the administration 
will not allow me to do so. After 7 months of effort to de-classify the 
report that we filed on December 20, 2002, the CIA, the FBI and other 
agencies decided to keep significant portions secret. In particular, 
there are 27 pages that were virtually completely censored. These are 
pages 396 through 422 from Part Four of the report, which is entitled, 
``Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive 
National Security Matters.''
  This censorship is troubling for a number of reasons. First, it 
reduces the information available to the public about some of the most 
important government actions--or to be more accurate, inactions--prior 
to September 11. Second, it precludes the American people from asking 
their government legitimate questions, such as:

       Was there a reason that some, but not all, of the 
     terrorists were receiving foreign support while they were in 
     the United States?
       Or is it not more likely that they were all receiving 
     similar support?
       What evidence do we have that the infrastructure of support 
     that existed prior to 9-11 has been dismantled?
       Or is it not more likely that such an infrastructure is 
     still in place for the next generation of terrorists?
       How many trained operatives of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, and 
     other international terrorist organizations are there inside 
     the United States of America?
       What are the skills and capabilities of these operatives?
       What was the scale and skills of Iraqi operatives inside 
     the United States prior to the war in Iraq and at the current 
     date?
       What was the comparative threat to the people of the United 
     States of Iraq and the trained agents of international 
     terrorists placed inside our country?
       Has the number, skill set, funding or ability to avoid 
     disclosure of international terrorist operatives within the 
     United States of America been enhanced by support from 
     foreign governments?
       How professional and aggressive have been the efforts of 
     agencies such as the FBI and the CIA in answering those 
     questions?
       And, how was the information that our government might have 
     had prior to September 11th utilized after September 11th to 
     enhance the security of our homeland and American interests 
     abroad?

  Unfortunately, almost 2\1/2\ years after the tragedy, the 
administration and the Congress--in the main--have not initiated the 
reforms necessary to reduce the chances of another 9-11. Given the 
seriousness of that situation, some of what was withheld from this 
report bordered on the absurd. For examples of the absurdity, some of 
the information censored from these pages actually appears in other 
parts of the report. Let me cite three examples.
  First, much of the censored information about Omar al-Bayoumi is 
available on pages 173-175. Mr. Bayoumi was an employee of the Saudi 
Civil Aviation Authority and a suspected Saudi intelligence agent based 
in California. He had extensive contacts with two of the Saudi 
hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. The same day that 
Bayoumi picked up the hijackers at a restaurant in Los Angeles, he had 
attended a prior meeting at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles. Bayoumi 
co-signed a lease for the two hijackers, paid their first month's rent, 
hosted a welcome party for them, helped them get driver's licenses and 
flight school applications. He also introduced them to others who 
served as their translator and in other support roles.
  Second, much of the censored information about Osama Bassnan, another 
Saudi national who was a neighbor of the two hijackers in San Diego, 
which appears on pages 175 through 177.
  Third, much of the information about a San Diego business manager 
which was censored also appears on pages 179 and 180.
  I would note that the declassified sections of the report point out 
that, despite public assurances from U.S. officials that Saudi Arabia 
has cooperated in counter terrorism efforts, the Joint Inquiry received 
testimony that Saudi officials in fact ``had been uncooperative and 
often did not act on information implicating Saudi nationals.''

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  What this indicates is that in the months following the release of 
our recommendation that the administration ``aggressively'' address the 
foreign government involvement in 9-11, the Bush administration not 
only failed to pursue and investigate foreign government involvement, 
the administration misused the classification process to protect the 
foreign governments that may have been involved in 9-11. There is no 
reason for the Bush administration to continue to shield make-believe 
allies who are supporting, either directly or indirectly, terrorists 
who want to kill Americans.
  The recommendations we have made here are consistent with 
recommendations made by other bodies that have been formed to analyze 
our intelligence structure over the last decade. The political reality 
is that there is a broad agreement that these reforms need to be made, 
yet there is institutional resistance that has been too great to 
overcome.
  Congress has assumed responsibility for reform of the intelligence 
community. Now is the time to act so that we might receive the 
appreciation of the American people for reducing the likelihood of 
another tragedy like 9-11. The consequence of inaction will be 
legitimate, strong and unavoidable criticism should we be struck again.
  If 9-11 was not a big enough shock wave to overcome the resistance to 
change, what will it take?
  I ask unanimous consent that The Washington Post article ``U.N. 
Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                U.N. Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda

                 group had criticized security council

                            (By Colum Lynch)

        United Nations.--The U.N. Security Council quietly 
     dissolved a high-profile independent U.N. panel last month 
     that was established more than 2\1/2\ years ago to prevent 
     the al Qaeda terrorist network from financing its war against 
     the United States and its allies, U.S. and U.N. officials 
     said.
        The move comes six weeks after the panel, headed by 
     Michael Chandler of Britain, concluded in a stinging report 
     that a number of Security Council sanctions against al Qaeda 
     had failed to constrain the terrorist network.
        But Security Council members have denied the move was 
     retribution for the panel's conclusions, saying that the 
     quality of the group's work was uneven and that the group had 
     outlived its usefulness.
        The 15-nation council on Friday adopted a new resolution 
     sponsored by the United States, Russia and Chile that would 
     replace Chandler's panel with what they say will be a more 
     professional body. The new panel is expected to keep 
     monitoring the global war against terrorism but would be 
     subject to closer Security Council coordination and 
     oversight.
       The dispute underscores the challenge of managing an 
     international counterterrorism operation through an 
     organization whose 191 members are frequently criticized for 
     failing to cooperate. It also reflects growing frustration 
     among members that sanctions have done little to interrupt 
     the flow of money and arms to al Qaeda.
       Chandler criticized the decision, saying it would undercut 
     the United Nations' capacity to combat al Qaeda. He suggested 
     that his panel's demise was a result of pressure from 
     influential U.N. members who had been singled out in his 
     reports for failing to take adequate measures to combat al 
     Qaeda.
       ``A number of people were uncomfortable with our last 
     report,'' Chandler said. He said that the Security Council 
     was sending the wrong message and that one of the ``key 
     elements'' of a successful counterterrorism strategy is ``a 
     strong independent monitoring group.''
       Chandler's five-member panel--the monitoring group on al 
     Qaeda--was established in July 2001 to ensure compliance with 
     an arms embargo against the Taliban and a freeze on its 
     financial assets for harboring Osma bin Laden. The mission's 
     mandate was expanded after the Taliban fell in January 2002, 
     granting it broad powers to monitor international compliance 
     with a U.N. financial, travel and arms ban.
       Chandler's reports have provided periodic snapshots of the 
     international campaign against terrorism, often highlighting 
     failings in governments' responses to the al Qaeda threat. In 
     August 2002, after a lull in al Qaeda activities, Chandler 
     provided a prescient forecast of the network's resurgence. 
     ``Al Qaeda is by all accounts `fit and well' and poised to 
     strike,'' the report warned. It was followed by deadly 
     strikes in Bali, Indonesia; Casablanca, Morroco; and Saudi 
     Arabia.
       ``The group functioned very well, providing hard-hitting 
     reports to the Security Council which painted a picture of 
     what was really going on,'' said Victor Comras, a former 
     State Department official who helped write the Dec. 2 report.
       ``I am at a loss to understand why the United States is one 
     of the main players in redrafting the new resolution and 
     allowing the monitoring group to lapse,'' he added. ``The 
     United States was the greatest beneficiary of the monitoring 
     group because it gave them a lever to name and shame'' 
     countries that failed to combat terrorists.
       One U.S. official said that last thing the United States 
     wants is to ``muzzle'' the United Nations. But he said that 
     although Chandler's panel was effective ``at getting 
     headlines,'' his propensity for antagonizing member states 
     could ultimately undermine U.S. efforts to harness the United 
     Nation's support in its anti-terror campaign. Chandler's 
     group ``did a good job,'' said James B. Cunningham, the 
     deputy U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. ``But we are 
     trying to make the committee more effective.''
       Some U.S. and U.N. diplomats said Chandler needlessly 
     alienated potential allies and constituents at the United 
     Nations, including some in the United States. Chandler's 2002 
     report irked Bush administration officials by casting doubt 
     on the success of the U.S.-led effort to block al Qaeda 
     financing. The Bush administration also challenged the 
     veracity of Chandler's assertion in an earlier report that 
     the Treasury Department had ignored warnings from SunTrust 
     Banks that a key plotter in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist 
     attacks had previously transferred large sums of money to an 
     account at a Florida bank branch.
       Chandler infuriated officials from Liechtenstein, Italy and 
     Switzerland with the Dec. 2 report that illustrated how two 
     U.N.-designated terrorist financiers. Youssef Nada and Ahmed 
     Idris Nasreddin, lived, traveled and operated multimillion-
     dollar businesses in their countries in violation of U.N. 
     sanctions.
       Liechtenstein's U.N. ambassador, Christian Wenaweser, one 
     of Chandler's sharpest critics, complained that the Chandler 
     investigation was shoddy and that he failed to adequately 
     acknowledge his government's role in helping build the case 
     against two alleged terrorist financiers. ``We don't question 
     the usefulness of the monitoring group. Quite the contrary. 
     But they have to have a clear mandate and guidelines on how 
     they should and shouldn't do their work,'' Wenaweser said. 
     ``They didn't bother to verify basic facts; they got some 
     things wrong. Travel dates. Spelling of names. Some of the 
     stuff was silly.''
       Chile's U.N. ambassador, Heraldo Munoz, the U.N. terrorism 
     committee's chairman, said the new eight-member panel--called 
     the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team--would 
     give ``more teeth'' to U.N. anti-terror efforts by 
     strengthening the committee's expertise in finance and border 
     controls, and improving its capacity to analyze terrorist 
     trends.
       ``I would like a monitoring team that is efficient, that is 
     independent and that can closely collaborate with the 
     committee,'' Munoz said.

  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak for up to 20 
minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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