[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 7 (Wednesday, January 28, 2004)]
[Senate]
[Pages S315-S316]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DAVID KAY INTERVIEW
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, during the past several days, there has
been a great deal of discussion regarding comments made by David Kay,
who until just recently led our search for weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq.
There are some who have said that statements made by Mr. Kay indicate
that there was no reason to take military action to address the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein. I believe this is, at best, a misunderstanding
of his statements. Mr. Kay clearly believes that removing Saddam
Hussein from power was the right thing to do.
It is in this context that I would like to take this opportunity to
share with my colleagues an interview that Mr. Kay gave yesterday
morning, in which he outlines his thoughts on the dangers presented by
Saddam Hussein.
When asked whether it was prudent to go to war, Mr. Kay responded:
I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I think at the
end of the inspection process we'll paint a picture of Iraq
that was far more dangerous than even we thought it was
before the war. It was of a system collapsing. It was a
country that had the capability in weapons of mass
destruction areas and in which terrorists, like ants to
honey, were going after it.
I believe it is helpful to review his comments in their entirety, and
as such, I ask unanimous consent that the following interview be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the NBC Today Show, Jan. 27, 2004]
Anchor: Matt Lauer
David Kay, former head of Iraq survey group, discusses
searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
MATT LAUER, co-host. The Bush administration now says it
needs more to determine if Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction; this after retired U.S. weapons inspector David
Kay concluded that Saddam Hussein had no such weapons.
David Kay, good morning. Good to have you here.
Mr. DAVID KAY (Former Head Of Iraq Survey Group). Good
morning, Matt.
LAUER. There are some people who say you spent eight months
scouring the country of Iraq for stockpiles of weapons of
mass destruction, chemical, biological, nuclear, and because
you didn't find them, they make a blanket statement. And that
is there US administration misled the American people
building a case for war. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. KAY. I think it's not fair, and it also trivializes
what we did find and the problem we face. The problem we face
is that before the war not only the US administration and US
intelligence, but the French, British, Germans, the UN, all
thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Not
discovering them tells us we've got a more fundamental
problem.
LAUER. But if you didn't find stockpiles of chemical,
biological or nucear weapons, does that mean they never
existed, or does it mean they may have been moved out of Iraq
prior to the war?
Mr. KAY. Well, we've certainly dealt with the possibility
of moving, and we did that by trying to look to see if there
was any signs of their actual production in the period after
'98. And we really haven't found that. I think they were--
there's a little evidence that large weapon stockpiles were
moved. A lot of other stuff may well have been moved.
LAUER. So when you heard reports leading up to the war, and
it's a--unclear where the--where the source of these reports
came from, but that Iraqi troops had been given chemical and
biological weapons. And they were prepared to use them
against advancing US forces. And they could deploy them
within 45 minutes, untrue in your opinion?
Mr. KAY. There's no evidence that they are true at this
point in time.
LAUER. Let me play you a clip from the president's State of
the Union address a year ago.
President George W. Bush (from file footage): ``Year after
year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent
enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of
mass destruction.''
LAUER. In technical terms, was that an inaccurate
statement?
Mr. KAY. Inaccurate in terms of the reality we found on the
ground now. I think it was an accurate statement, given the
intelligence the president and others were begin given then.
LAUER. But also accurate in your opinion because in truth
Saddam Hussein did spend enormous amounts of money to develop
chemical and biological weapons, but according to your report
he just didn't get what he paid for.
Mr. KAY. Well, that was in part the--true. There are a
tremendous amount of con--corruption there and lying that
went on there. Saddam spent huge efforts at these weapons
programs, no doubt about that.
LAUER. So when you say lying, his scientists, or people
were coming to him saying, ``I can develop chemical and
biological weapons for you for the right amount of money.''
They were taking the money, in your opinion, and not
delivering?
Mr. KAY. And not delivering, and reporting back successes
that they were not having. That was quite common down there.
LAUER. So when you spoke to Iraqi scientists, what did they
tell you about the active weapons program in the year leading
up to the war?
Mr. KAY. They describe from 1998 on a Iraq that was
descending into the utter inability to do anything organized.
Corruption was there. They couldn't get the equipment. Money
was wasted. People weren't really concerned about working,
they were concerned about money.
[[Page S316]]
LAUER. But the intent was there?
Mr. KAY. Absolutely. And the intent at the top, of Saddam
to acquire those weapons and to continue to attempt to
acquire those was absolutely there.
LAUER. Almost a year ago Secretary of State Colin Powell
addressed the United Nations. Here's what he had to say.
Secretary of State Colin Powell (from file footage):
``Conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of
between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.''
LAUER. Conservative, or just plain wrong?
Mr. KAY. No, I think that was the estimate based on
information and intelligence before the war. It turns out to
be wrong.
LAUER. So what--what was the problem with the intelligence?
Why were we so wrong?
Mr. KAY. Well, Matt, I think that is the challenge now. And
I think the tendency to say, ``Well, it must have been
pressure from the White House is absolutely wrong.'' In some
ways I wish it had been pressure. It would be easier to solve
the problem. We now have to look--and people forget, Iraq is
not the only place we've been wrong recently. We've been
wrong about Iran, and we've been wrong about Libya's program
there. We clearly need a renovation of our ability to collect
intelligence.
LAUER. Here's what you said to Tom Brokaw. ``Clearly the
intelligence that we went to war on was inaccurate, wrong. We
need to understand why that was.'' But you went on to say,
``I think if anyone was abused by the intelligence, it was
the president of the United States, rather than the other way
around.''
Mr. KAY. That's abso--absolutely my belief. I think, in
fact, the president and all of us were reacting on the basis
of an intelligence product that painted a picture of Iraq
that turned out not to be accurate once we got on the ground.
LAUER. You find--you found that in--in 2000 and 2001 Saddam
Hussein did actively try to develop and start a nuclear
program?
Mr. KAY. He was putting more money into his nuclear
program. He was pushing ahead his long-range missile program
as hard as he could. Look, the man had the intent to acquire
these weapons. He invested huge amounts of money in them. The
fact is, he wasn't successful.
LAUER. In terms of the missile program alone, you feel that
it's obvious and--and undisputable that he violated UN
resolutions by developing weapons, missiles, that had a range
outside of those UN resolutions?
Mr. KAY. Absolutely, Matt. We--we have collected dozens of
examples of where he lied to the UN, violated Resolution
1441, and was in material breach.
LAUER. So based on the information that you have, David,
not what we had prior to the war, but you have, in your
opinion, was it prudent to go to war? Was there an imminent
threat?
Mr. KAY. I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I
think at the end of the inspection process we'll paint a
picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we
thought it was before the war. It was of a system collapsing.
It was a country that had the capability in weapons of mass
destruction areas and in which terrorists, like ants to
honey, were going after it.
LAUER. Do--do you feel that--you know, you've come out and
started saying these things in the last couple of days, do
you feel your words are being misused and misinterpreted in
the political atmosphere that exists today?
Mr. KAY. I think there is a tendency, at this time to say,
``Got you!'' and try to do politics. It think this is
national security, and far more important than momentary
political gain. I hope that's now what's happening.
LAUER. If you spend eight months looking and didn't find
anything, Dick Cheney says, ``In time we could probably find
it.'' You still think we should continue to search?
Mr. KAY. Absolutely. I think the inspection should continue
because among things we don't know enough about are the
foreign countries that helped the Iraqis throughout this
period to acquire the missiles, to develop the nukes, to
develop the chemical and biological. We need that for no
other reason. And sure, we should keep looking.
LAUER. And as we move forward and we look at countries like
Iran, which you brought up, and North Korea, how well suited
do you think we are by our intelligence in those areas at
this date?
Mr. KAY. I think based on the evidence we have now, we are
not as suited as well as we need to be. And I think that is
the challenge, not the political `Gotcha!' contest.
LAUER. David Kay.
David, good to have you here.
Mr. KAY. Good to be here.
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