[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 174 (Tuesday, November 25, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15968-S15969]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           AGROTERRORISM: THE THREAT TO AMERICA'S BREADBASKET

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss how to prepare our 
Nation against a terrorist attack on our agriculture. Senator Collins, 
chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, is to be commended for 
holding a hearing last week on a critical issue which has received 
little congressional attention. I am deeply concerned about our 
agricultural security. In July and October 2001, I held two hearings on 
the Nation's preparedness for a bioterror attack. The threat to our 
agricultural industry by potential terrorists is not imagined; it is 
very real.
  One expert likened the American agricultural industry to a large 
bulls-eye stamped across the United States. Dr. Peter Chalk, a RAND 
policy analyst, testified that an attack on American livestock could be 
extremely attractive to a terrorist for the following four reasons: (1) 
a low level of technology is needed to do considerable damage, (2) at 
least 15 pathogens have the capability of severely harming the 
agriculture industry, (3) a terrorist would not need to be at great 
personal risk in order to carry out a successful attack, and (4) a 
disease could spread quickly throughout a city, state, or even the 
country.
  In Afghanistan, hundreds of pages of U.S. agricultural documents were 
discovered in al-Qaeda's possession. A recent unclassified CIA report 
confirmed that the September 11th hijackers were attempting to gain 
knowledge and access to crop-dusting aircraft which could be used to 
easily contaminate America's food supply.
  An agroterrorisk attack would have severe economic costs to 
agricultural producers, State and Federal Governments, and exporters of 
U.S. food products. The widespread contamination of

[[Page S15969]]

American produce or livestock could cause mass panic and long-lasting 
fear of American produced food products. Dr. Chalk cited a study 
conducted in California that concluded that ``each day of delay in 
instituting effective eradication and control measures would cost the 
state $1 billion in trade sanctions.'' The economic repercussions are 
almost unimaginable.
  Yet within the Federal Government, no agency has the clear 
responsibility for preventing and containing an agroterrorist attack. 
Over 30 Federal agencies have jurisdiction over some part of the 
response process. This bifurcation of jurisdiction contributes to 
confusion among local and State officials as to where to turn for 
assistance and advice. According to a recent General Accounting Office, 
GAO, report Federal agencies are confused about the chain of command. 
The report states that neither the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, 
nor the Department of Agriculture, USDA, believe that they have the 
authority to enforce security at U.S. food processing plants. GAO 
states that ``both FDA and USDA have instructed their field inspection 
personnel to refrain from enforcing any aspects of the security 
guidelines because the agencies generally believe that they lack such 
authority.''

  When questioned at the Governmental Affairs Committee hearing last 
week, Dr. Penrose Albright, Assistant Secretary for Science and 
Technology in the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, indicated that 
the responsibility of leadership would likely fall to DHS in the event 
of an intentional attack on the Nation's agriculture and stated that 
DHS ``takes these responsibilities seriously,'' but stopped short of 
asserting that the new department had overall responsibility. I have 
asked DHS for clarification on this issue.
  Dr. Albright also said that an unintentional contamination of 
American agriculture would not involve DHS. His response demonstrates a 
serious deficiency in the Federal Government's crisis response 
procedure. If there were an incident, who would lead the response in 
the hours or days before the cause of an outbreak was known? One agency 
must shoulder the responsibility for coordinating an immediate response 
regardless of the cause.
  To address these concerns, I introduced two bills, S. 427, the 
Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture 
Security Preparedness Act, to increase the coordination in confronting 
the threat to America's agriculture industry and provide the needed 
resources. My legislation provides for better funding and a better 
coordinated response and defense to an agroterrorist attack.
  The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist States and 
communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry. The 
measure authorizes funds for communities and states to increase their 
ability to handle a crisis. It also encourages animal health 
professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities 
to assist farmers in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist 
threat.
  The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better 
interagency coordination within the Federal Government. The legislation 
establishes senior level liaisons in the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Health and Human Services to coordinate with USDA on 
agricultural disease emergency management and response. The bill also 
requires DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to 
address the risks associated with transporting Animals, plants, and 
people between and around farms.
  No doubt a terrorist attack on American agriculture could have a 
devastating effect on the United States. Our Nation's capability to 
counter such an attack is increasing, but more needs to be done. My two 
bills would help our Nation act now so that a future agroterrorist 
attack can be avoided or quickly responded to before the damage in 
lives or livestock is too great. I urge my colleagues to support this 
overdue legislation.

                          ____________________