[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 173 (Monday, November 24, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15838-S15843]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. CORZINE:
  S. 1946. A bill to establish an independent national commission to 
examine and evaluate the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and 
dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to 
establish an independent, bipartisan commission to examine intelligence 
issues related to Iraq. This commission is necessary because what we 
have discovered on the ground in Iraq has shown our intelligence to be 
wrong. It is necessary because Administration officials misused 
intelligence--that is, they made public statements and submitted 
reports to Congress that the Administration knew at the time to be 
unsupported by the available intelligence. And it is necessary because 
inaccurate and misused intelligence played a role in leading us to war.

[[Page S15839]]

  Accurate, objective, and credible intelligence is a fundamental 
cornerstone of our national security, particularly in an age of shadowy 
terrorist networks and clandestine weapons programs. Unless we improve 
our intelligence, we risk failing to identify serious threats to the 
United States and being distracted by lesser dangers at the expense of 
larger and more urgent security concerns.
  This effort must include not only the collection and analysis of 
intelligence, but the use, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence 
assessments. If the American people are asked to go to war to preempt 
an attack, or--as in the case of Iraq--to prevent a possible future 
threat from emerging, it is critical that the public statements of our 
officials be supported by the available intelligence. If members of 
Congress are to consider authorizing the use of force, particularly 
against countries that have not attacked the United States, they must 
be provided with honest and complete intelligence. And if our allies 
are to be asked to join us in confronting these threats, the 
intelligence that we share with them and that we rely on to bolster our 
case must be credible in the eyes of the world.
  I first proposed an independent commission to examine intelligence 
related to Iraq last summer, when it became clear that President Bush 
had made an important but unsubstantiated claim in his January 2002 
State of the Union address. That claim was, quote: ``The British 
government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa.''
  Although this statement has been dismissed as the ``16 words,'' its 
significant cannot be overstated. The State of the Union address is the 
most important, the most scrutinized speech the President delivers. The 
statement concerned the most important topic a President can discuss--
whether to send Americans to war. And this claim was the most important 
element of the President's argument for war: that there was evidence 
that Saddam Hussein might have the necessary materials to produce a 
nuclear bomb. As for the reference to the British government, it is 
hard to imagine how the use of the word ``learned'' could imply 
anything other than that the United States independently believed that 
the claim was true.

  It turns out that the Bush Administration had ample reason to know at 
the time that what the President was telling the nation could not be 
substantiated. The CIA had sought to dissuade the White House from 
making claims about uranium purchases. And on February 5, a week after 
the State of the Union address, Secretary of State Powell made a 
presentation to the Untied Nations in which he omitted the claim 
precisely because it was not supported by the available intelligence.
  Despite this knowledge, the Administration never issued a 
clarification. As a result, the President's statement stood, as an 
important element of the Administration's case for war. Only last 
summer, after Americans learned from Ambassador Joe Wilson and others 
what Administration officials knew at the time, did the Administration 
acknowledge that the uranium allegation should never have been included 
in the State of the Union Address.
  The case generated outrage across party lines. Republicans as well as 
Democrats expressed serious concern about the credibility of the 
Administration and the country. They stressed that cabinet members, the 
vice president, and the entire administration are responsible for 
honestly representing intelligence. They called for someone in the 
Administration to be held accountable. The Senate passed a resolution 
by voice vote. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
promised to undertake a, quote ``very aggressive review.'' And the Bush 
Administration insisted that it would cooperate. As White House 
spokesman Ari Fleischer stated on June 11, quote: ``The Administration 
welcomes the review. It's important.''
  In July, when I first sought to establish this commission, there was 
no dispute that the use of intelligence, as well as the collection and 
analysis of intelligence, should be examined. Republicans who voted 
against the commission did so, they said, because the commission would 
intrude on the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee. I was, and 
remain supportive of efforts by the committee to look into the use of 
intelligence related to Iraq, an inquiry that is clearly included 
within the committee's jurisdiction. But it was and is my belief that 
an independent, bipartisan commission, building on the findings of 
Congressional and other investigations, could undertake the most 
thorough, depoliticized review possible.
  Now, however, it seems an independent commission is the only 
remaining means left to examine the use, or misuse, of intelligence. On 
November 13, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee announced that 
there would be no examination of how intelligence was used by 
policymakers. I deeply regret this decision by the chairman and 
fervently hope the committee will ultimately exercise its role, 
established in the resolution laying out its jurisdiction, 
in overseeing the, quote: ``use or dissemination'' of intelligence. In 
the meantime, I would expect that an independent commission would 
receive strong bipartisan support.

   It is now beyond question that our intelligence on Iraq was 
inaccurate. After months of searching, investigative teams have yet to 
find stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. David Kay, who heads 
up the Iraqi Survey Group, has stated that Iraq's nuclear program was 
only at the, quote: ``very most rudimentary level.'' The Administration 
has yet to produce evidence of the high-level ties between Iraq and al 
Qaeda that it warned of prior to the war. And now, tragically, we must 
add to the list of intelligence failures the inability to anticipate 
the current resistance to U.S. occupation. Clearly, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding these failings warrant a detailed and 
systematic review.
   But what of the use of intelligence? As important as the State of 
the Union address was, that speech was only part of a larger case made 
by the Administration for war. Administration officials made many 
claims--particularly those related to chemical and biological weapons--
that were expressed in terms that were more specific and more certain 
than the intelligence may have supported. Most troubling, however, were 
the highly dubious assessments and suggestions related to nuclear 
programs and terrorism with which the Administration built its most 
powerful and emotionally potent argument. That argument had three 
elements: 1. That Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and possibly even 
a nuclear weapon; 2. that Saddam Hussein was allied with al Qaeda, and 
that he may have been involved with the terrorist attacks of September 
11; and 3. that the threat was imminent.
   The Administration began to make its argument in the summer of 2002. 
As vice President Cheney stated in an August 26 speech, quote: ``Simply 
stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass 
destruction.'' In an indication of how Administration officials would 
make their case over the next seven months, the vice president insisted 
that the intelligence indicated no doubt, no internal disagreement, and 
no uncertainty.
   Then, on September 12, President bush, in his speech to the United 
Nations, went further, stating, quote: ``right now, Iraq is expanding 
and improving facilities that were used for the production of 
biological weapons.'' the President also made two statements regarding 
Iraq's alleged nuclear program. The first was that Iraq had made, 
quote: ``several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to 
enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.'' He failed to mention that 
neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of State's Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were intended for 
that purpose. The President's second statement added the missing 
ingredient: the uranium itself. As the President stated, quote: 
``Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a 
nuclear weapon within year.'' This was the context for the President's 
claim made in the State of the Union address that Iraq had sought to 
purchase uranium from Africa.

  The Administration continued making its case throughout the fall of 
2002, adding claims concerning ties between Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda. One of many examples was Secretary Rumsfeld's September 26 
statement that the

[[Page S15840]]

Administration had, quote: ``very reliable reporting of senior level 
contacts going back a decade.''
  As Congress deliberated whether to authorize the use of force against 
Iraq, the Administration officials made increasingly alarming 
statements about Iraq's ties to al Qaeda and about its nuclear weapons 
program. On October 7, three days before the vote in the House of 
Representatives and four days before the vote in the Senate, President 
Bush gave a speech in which he said, unequivocally, that, quote: ``We 
know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a 
decade,'' and, quote: ``The evidence indicates the Iraq is 
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.'' He repeated the 
allegations about uranium tubes and the warning about purchases of 
uranium. Then the President put it all together--the implication that 
Iraq was connected to the September 11 attacks, the implication that 
Iraq could have a nuclear bomb at any time, and the warning that Saddam 
Hussein could decide on any day to explode a nuclear bomb in the United 
States. Here is what the President said: ``Why do we need to confront 
it [Saddam] now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of 
September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are 
willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our 
enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use 
biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, 
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear 
evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking 
gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''
  This was the most powerful, dire, and convincing warning a President 
could give. And it was based on one inference that the President has 
acknowledged he never had any evidence of, that Saddam was tied to 
September 11, and another which had already been refuted by many within 
the Administration, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
  Later statements included Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's claims to 
specific knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of biological 
and chemical weapons. On March 11, he stated, quote: ``We know he 
continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to 
different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them 
in residential neighborhoods.'' On March 30, he said, quote: ``We know 
where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, 
west, south and north somewhat.''

  The Administration also continued to insist that the threat was 
imminent--a claim that served to counter arguments that the United 
Nations should be given more time. On February 6, the day after 
Secretary of State Powell made his presentation to the UN, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld made an appeal for immediate action. ``Why now?'' he 
asked. ``The answer is that every week that goes by, his weapons of 
mass destruction programs become more mature.'' That same day, Deputy 
Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``Connections with terrorists, which 
go back decades, and which started some 10 years ago with al Qaeda, are 
growing every day.''
  Finally, on March 16, the day before President Bush's ultimatum to 
Saddam Hussein, Vice President Cheney went beyond claims that Iraq had 
the intent to produce nuclear weapons, and even beyond the claims that 
Iraq was seeking centrifuge equipment or uranium. Rather, the vice 
president stated flatly, quote: ``We believe he has, in fact, 
reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' This assertion, which the vice 
president has recently acknowledged was a misstatement, was not 
corrected. Instead, it was allowed to stand as nearly the final word on 
why we were going to war.
  Questions surrounding the Administration's use of intelligence extend 
beyond public statements, to include reports to and testimony before 
Congress. One example of unsubstantiated reporting was the January 20 
report to Congress, mandated by the use of force resolution, that cited 
Iraq's failure to declare its, quote: ``attempts to acquire uranium and 
the means to enrich it''--the same unsubstantiated claim made in the 
President's State of the Union address.
  This commission would be authorized to examine other intelligence 
issues related to Iraq, as well. The Administration made claims related 
to weapons delivery systems, including President Bush's assertion on 
October 7 that, quote: ``Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or 
biological weapons across broad areas,'' and that Iraq could use them 
for, quote: ``missions targeting the United States.'' There has never 
been evidence that Iraq had UAVs with ranges of thousands of miles.
  Administration officials made claims related to the occupation, 
including Vice President Cheney's March 16 assertion that, quote: ``I 
really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators,'' and Deputy 
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz's November 17 analogy to, quote: ``post-
liberation France.''

  The Administration also downplayed the costs of the occupation. 
Despite White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey's estimate that 
the occupation would cost between $100 and $200 billion--an estimate 
for which he was apparently fired--Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on 
January 19 put the figure at, quote: ``something under $50 billion,'' 
On February 27, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitiz stated that, quote: 
``there's a lot of money there, and to assume that we're going to pay 
for it is just wrong.'' And, on March 27, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz 
stated, quote: ``We're dealing with a country that can really finance 
its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.''
  The independent commission I propose would be authorized to examine 
the relationship between policy makers and the intelligence community. 
Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce 
analyses that conformed to the Administration's policies? Did 
Administration officials seek to bypass the normal analysis process by 
cherry-picking bits of intelligence that suited their agenda, through 
the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense or through 
other special or ad hoc arrangements? Did the Administration base its 
analyses on foreign intelligence sources of dubious credibility? These 
questions must be answered, and corrective measures undertaken, if our 
intelligence community is to be as effective and objective as we need 
it to be.
  Perhaps the most egregious undermining, indeed betrayal, of the 
intelligence community was the identification by senior Administration 
officials of a covert CIA operative. The operative is the spouse of a 
person who has been called a national hero by President George H.W. 
Bush but who questioned the current Administration's statements 
regarding Iraq. The leak of this operative's identity sent an implicit 
warning to others in the intelligence community who might disagree with 
the Administration's positions. It potentially endanged the life of the 
operative and those with whom the operative worked. And it rendered the 
operative's skills, experience and sources permanently useless, thus 
wasting precisely the kind of intelligence asset that the United States 
so desperately needs right now.
  The purpose of this commission is to identify ways in which we can 
learn from past mistakes and thus improve our collection, analysis, 
reporting, use and dissemination of intelligence. The commission's 
members, who will come from both parties, will be prominent Americans 
with experience in intelligence, the armed forces and other relevant 
areas. Their work will build on relevant Congressional and other 
investigations.
   The commission, through an objective, independent, highly 
professional examination process, will help depoliticize an extremely 
complicated and sensitive topic. By reviewing intelligence related to 
Iraq beginning in 1998, it will draw conclusions about the use of 
intelligence by a Democratic as well as Republican Administration. And 
by reporting its recommendations directly to the President and to 
Congress, it will serve as a valuable resource outside the context of 
open political debate. In this respect, I disagree with the Chairman of 
the Intelligence Committee who has stated that the full Congress and 
the public could ``decide for themselves whether the intelligence was 
accurately represented by government officials.''
   This issue is far too serious to simply ignore. Over one hundred 
thousand brave Americans are currently serving

[[Page S15841]]

in Iraq, facing challenges that require accurate and objective 
intelligence. We have an obligation to pursue every opportunity to 
improve that intelligence. Meanwhile, the United States faces other 
threats--from despotic regimes with nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons, from terrorism, and from the horrible possibility that 
terrorists could acquire these weapons. Our ability to confront these 
threats requires that our intelligence be accurate and objective. And, 
as we seek to enlist our friends and allies in our efforts to address 
these common threats, we must ensure that our intelligence is credible.
   Unless we identify and correct the mistakes of the past, we will not 
be safer.
   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed 
in the Record.
   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1946

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Iraq 
     Intelligence Commission Act''.

     SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       There is established the National Commission on Iraq 
     Intelligence (in this Act referred to as the ``Commission'').

     SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of the Commission are as follows:
       (1) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United 
     States intelligence community with respect to the collection 
     of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on 
     the weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems 
     capabilities of Iraq in the period from 1998 until the 
     conclusion of military operations against Iraq under 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom.
       (2) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United 
     States intelligence community with respect to the collection 
     of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on 
     the connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the 
     plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United 
     States or United States interests abroad during the period 
     referred to in paragraph (1).
       (3) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United 
     States intelligence community with respect to the collection 
     of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, 
     during and after the period referred to in paragraph (1), on 
     matters relating to--
       (A) the conduct of military and intelligence operations 
     against Iraq;
       (B) the search for and securing of weapons of mass 
     destruction, related delivery systems capabilities, and 
     conventional weapons in Iraq; and
       (C) the military, political, and economic aspects of the 
     occupation of Iraq.
       (4) To examine and evaluate the quality of the analysis by 
     the United States intelligence community of the available 
     intelligence related to the matters referred to in paragraphs 
     (1) through (3), including intelligence from foreign 
     intelligence services, that served as a basis during the 
     period referred to in paragraph (1) for--
       (A) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers 
     in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations 
     bodies and other consumers; and
       (B) assessments that were used or disseminated by the 
     Executive Branch.
       (5) To examine and evaluate the effect, if any, on the 
     United States intelligence community of the actions of 
     Executive Branch officials regarding the collection, 
     analysis, and reporting on intelligence matters referred to 
     in paragraphs (1) through (3).
       (6) To examine and evaluate the relevant facts and 
     circumstances relating to the use and dissemination by 
     Executive Branch officials of intelligence and intelligence 
     analyses underlying assessment of intelligence matters 
     referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) during the period 
     referred to in paragraph (1), including assessments contained 
     in public speeches, statements, and interviews, reports to 
     and testimony before Congress, and communications with and 
     reports and presentations to United Nations bodies.
       (7) To build on the investigations of other entities, and 
     avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the work, 
     findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other Executive 
     Branch, Congressional, or independent commission 
     investigations into the collection, analysis, reporting, use, 
     and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq by the 
     United States.
       (8) Based on the examinations and evaluations under 
     paragraphs (1) through (6) and the work, findings, 
     conclusions, and recommendations of other investigations 
     referred to in paragraph (7), to identify corrective measures 
     to improve the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and 
     dissemination of intelligence by the Executive Branch, and to 
     report to the President and Congress on the examinations, 
     evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission and 
     on the recommendations of the Commission with respect to such 
     corrective measures.

     SEC. 4. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 
     members, of whom--
       (1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall 
     serve as co-chairman of the Commission;
       (2) 1 member shall be appointed by the leader of the Senate 
     (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the 
     Democratic Party, in consultation with the leader of the 
     House of Representatives (majority or minority leader, as the 
     case may be) of the Democratic Party, who shall serve as co-
     chairman of the Commission;
       (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of 
     the Senate leadership of the Democratic Party;
       (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of 
     the leadership of the House of Representatives of the 
     Republican Party;
       (5) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of 
     the Senate leadership of the Republican Party; and
       (6) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of 
     the leadership of the House of Representatives of the 
     Democratic Party.
       (b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
       (1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members 
     of the Commission shall be from the same political party.
       (2) Nongovernmental appointees.--An individual appointed to 
     the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the 
     Federal Government or any State or local government.
       (3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent 
     United States citizens, with national recognition and 
     significant depth of experience in such professions as 
     governmental service, the armed services, law, intelligence, 
     and foreign affairs.
       (4) Deadline for appointment.--All members of the 
     Commission shall be appointed not later than one month after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (5) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall meet and begin 
     the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable.
       (c) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Commission shall meet upon the joint call of the co-chairmen 
     or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission 
     shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission 
     shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same 
     manner in which the original appointment was made.

     SEC. 5. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.

       The functions of the Commission are--
       (1) to conduct an investigation into the relevant facts and 
     circumstances relating to the collection, analysis, 
     reporting, use, and dissemination by the United States 
     intelligence community and others in the Executive Branch of 
     intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
     including--
       (A) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and 
     quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments 
     made during the period referred to in section 3(1) of--
       (i) weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems 
     capabilities of Iraq;
       (ii) connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for 
     the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the 
     United States or United States interests abroad;
       (B) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and 
     quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments 
     made during after the period referred to in section 3(1) on 
     intelligence matters relating to--
       (i) the conduct of military and intelligence operations 
     against Iraq;
       (ii) the search for and securing of weapons of mass 
     destruction, related delivery systems capabilites, and 
     conventional weapons in Iraq; and
       (iii) the military, political, and economic aspects of the 
     occupation of Iraq;
       (C) an examination and evaluation regarding whether the 
     analytical judgments in the assessments referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) were thorough, timely, objective, 
     independent, and reasonable, based upon intelligence 
     collection;
       (D) an examination and evaluation of the accuracy of the 
     assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) when 
     compared with the results of the investigative efforts of the 
     Iraq Survey Group and other relevant Executive Branch and 
     Congressional entities, and with relevant assessments of the 
     United Nations and other multilateral bodies, foreign 
     governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
     institutions and individuals;
       (E) an examination and evaluation of the quality of the 
     intelligence on Iraq that was provided to the United States 
     intelligence community and Executive Branch policymakers, 
     including by foreign intelligence services, that served as a 
     basis during the period referred to in section 3(1) for--
       (i) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers 
     in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations 
     bodies and other consumers; and
       (ii) assessments that were used or disseminated by the 
     Executive Branch;
       (F) a determination of the extent, if any, to which 
     elements of the United States intelligence community were 
     inappropriately pressured by members of the Executive Branch 
     to produce intelligence consistent with such members policy 
     objectives, and of the extent, if any, to which intelligence 
     was manipulated or misrepresented by members of the Executive 
     Branch or elements under their control;

[[Page S15842]]

       (G) an assessment of the extent to which Congress was kept 
     fully and currently informed about intelligence related to 
     Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;
       (H) a determination of the extent to which the intelligence 
     of the United States intelligence community, and of the 
     United States Armed Forces and coalition forces, were 
     sufficiently accurate, thorough, timely, objective, and 
     independent to prepare such forces to conduct effective 
     military and intelligence operations against Iraq, including 
     the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction 
     and conventional weapons in Iraq, and to prepare such forces 
     and other United States and coalition entities to 
     successfully carry out the military, political, and economic 
     aspects of the occupation of Iraq; and
       (I) an examination, evaluation, and assessment of such 
     other related facts and circumstances that the Commission 
     considers appropriate;
       (2) to identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned 
     from issues related to the collection, analysis, reporting, 
     use, and dissemination of intelligence relating to Iraq and 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom;
       (3) to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to 
     disclosures, if any, by Executive Branch officials of the 
     identify of a covert Central Intelligence Agency official; 
     and
       (4) to submit to the President and Congress the reports 
     provided for by section 11.

     SEC. 6. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the 
     authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member 
     thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act--
       (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and 
     places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, 
     administer such oaths; and
       (B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or 
     otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and 
     the production of such books, records, correspondence, 
     memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such 
     designated subcommittee or designated member may determine 
     advisable.
       (2) Subpoenas.--
       (A) Issuance.--
       (i) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this 
     subsection only--

       (I) by the joint agreement of the co-chairmen; or
       (II) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the 
     Commission.

       (ii) Signature.--Subject to clause (i), subpoenas issued 
     under this subsection may be issued under the signature of a 
     co-chairman or any member designated by 5 members of the 
     Commission, and may be served by any person designated by a 
     co-chairman or by a member designated by 5 members of the 
     Commission.
       (B) Enforcement.--
       (i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to 
     obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a), the United 
     States district court for the judicial district in which the 
     subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or 
     where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order 
     requiring such person to appear at any designated place to 
     testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any 
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
     court as a contempt of that court.
       (ii) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of 
     any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when 
     summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may 
     certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the 
     appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter 
     before the grand jury for its action, under the same 
     statutory authority and procedures as if the United States 
     attorney had received a certification under sections 102 
     through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 
     U.S.C. 192 through 194).
       (b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in 
     such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter 
     into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its 
     duties under this Act.
       (c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from 
     any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, 
     office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the 
     Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and 
     statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department, 
     bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent 
     establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent 
     authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, 
     estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon 
     request made by a co-chairman, the chairman or co-chairman of 
     any subcommittee created by 5 members of the Commission, or 
     any member designated by 5 members of the Commission.
       (2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
     Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and 
     disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff 
     consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and 
     Executive orders.
       (d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) General services administration.--The Administrator of 
     General Services shall provide to the Commission on a 
     reimbursable basis administrative support and other services 
     for the performance of the Commission's functions.
       (2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the 
     assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and 
     agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission 
     such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support 
     services as they may determine advisable and as may be 
     authorized by law.
       (e) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of 
     gifts or donations of services or property.
       (f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as departments and agencies of the United States.

     SEC. 7. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.

       (a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
     U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
       (b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of 
     Reports.--The Commission shall--
       (1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent 
     appropriate; and
       (2) release public versions of the reports provided for by 
     subsections (a) and (b) of section 11.
       (c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission 
     shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection 
     of information provided to or developed for or by the 
     Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, 
     or Executive order.

     SEC. 8. STAFF OF COMMISSION.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Appointment and compensation.--The co-chairmen, acting 
     jointly and in accordance with rules agreed upon by the 
     Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff 
     director and such other personnel as may be necessary to 
     enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without 
     regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
     governing appointments in the competitive service, and 
     without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter 
     III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification 
     and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay 
     fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that 
     payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule 
     under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Personnel as federal employees.--
       (A) In general.--The executive director and any personnel 
     of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under 
     section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of 
     chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
       (B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be 
     construed to apply to members of the Commission.
       (b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be 
     detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the 
     Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, 
     status, and privileges of his or her regular employment 
     without interruption.
       (c) Consultant Services.--The Commission may procure the 
     services of experts and consultants in accordance with 
     section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not 
     to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position 
     at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
     title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 9. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

       (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be 
     compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the 
     annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV 
     of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, for each day during which that member is 
     engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the 
     Commission.
       (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of services for 
     the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the 
     Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) 
     of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 10. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND 
                   STAFF.

       The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall 
     cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to 
     the Commission members and staff appropriate security 
     clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing 
     procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be 
     provided with access to classified information under this Act 
     without the appropriate security clearances.

     SEC. 11. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION.

       (a) Interim Reports.--The Commission may submit to the 
     President and Congress interim reports containing such 
     examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the 
     Commission, and such recommendations with respect to 
     corrective measures (including changes in policies, 
     practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as 
     have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.
       (b) Final Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to 
     the President and Congress a final report containing such 
     examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the 
     Commission, and such recommendations with respect to 
     corrective measures (including changes in

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     policies, practices, organizational structures, and 
     arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of 
     Commission members.
       (c) Termination.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of 
     this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the 
     final report is submitted under subsection (b).
       (2) Administrative activities before termination.--The 
     Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 
     (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including 
     providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its 
     reports and disseminating the final report.

     SEC. 12. FUNDING.

       (a) In General.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government for fiscal year 
     2004, $15,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the 
     Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission 
     under this Act.
       (b) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to 
     the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available 
     until the termination of the Commission.
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