[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 173 (Monday, November 24, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15837-S15838]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. CORZINE:
  S. 1942. A bill to require the President to submit to Congress a 
quarterly report on the projected total cost of United States 
operations in Iraq, including military operations and reconstruction 
efforts, through fiscal year 2008; through fiscal year 2008; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill that will 
ensure that we properly budget for what we are now learning will be a 
long and costly war in Iraq. This legislation, which requires the 
President to submit a report every 90 days on the projected total costs 
of military operations and reconstruction efforts to Iraq is identifcal 
to an amendment I offered to the supplemental appropriations bill to 
October. That announcement was agreed to by unanimously consent. 
Unfortunately, it was removed in conference.
  In recent days, the Administration has finally begun to acknowledge 
what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote in an internal 
memorandum last month: that Iraq will be a ``long, hard slog.'' This 
past Thursday, November 20, President Bush told us that quote, ``We 
could have less troops in Iraq, we could have the same number of troops 
in Iraq, we could have more troops in Iraq, whatever is necessary to 
secure Iraq.'' The following day, the New York Times, citing a ``senior 
Army officer,'' reported that the Army was planning to keep about 
100,000 troops in Iraq through early 2006.
  For over a year, this Administration has downplayed the costs of the 
war in Iraq. Last September, after White House economic advisor 
Lawrence Lindsay put the figure at between $100 billion and $200 
billion, OMB Director Mitch Daniels insisted that that estimate was, 
quote: ``very, very high.'' Mr. Lindsay, whose candor reportedly cost 
him his job, was the Administration official to provide anything close 
to a realistic estimate. In December, Director Daniels put the figure 
at $50 billion to $60 billion. A few weeks later, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld told us that the war would cost under $50 billion.
  As the Administration planned for war, it stopped making any public 
estimates at all. As Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz said in 
February, quote: ``I think it's necessary to preserve some ambiguity of 
exactly where the numbers are.'' Administration officials also insisted 
repeatedly that Iraq would pay for its own reconstruction. To quote 
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz again: ``There's a lot of money there, and 
to assume that we're going to pay for it is just wrong.''
  The Administration failed to include any military or reconstruction 
costs in its Fiscal Year 2004 budget estimate, and refused to submit to 
Congress a budget amendment. As a result, we passed a budget resolution 
that included enormous, fiscally irresponsible tax cuts but no money 
for a war that was already upon us. Even after President Bush had 
issued his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, the Administration, along with 
my Republican colleagues, opposed a series of efforts to put aside 
between $80 billion and $100 billion for the war. Only the following 
week, after the budget resolution was passed, did we receive the first 
supplemental request, for nearly $75 billion, of which nearly $60 
billion was for defense and nearly two and a half billion was for the 
reconstruction of Iraq.
  Even with the war having begun, the Administration continued to 
downplay the expected costs of reconstruction. On March 27, Deputy 
Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``We're dealing with a country that 
can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' And, 
on April 10, Secretary Rumsfeld said, quote: ``I don't know that 
there's much reconstruction to do.''
  These reassurances were contradicted flatly by outside experts. In 
March, a panel led by former Nixon and Ford Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger estimated that the cost of postwar reconstruction would be 
at least $20 billion a year. The panel, which included the first 
President Bush's ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering, 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, and 
former Reagan U.N. ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, concluded that 
President Bush had failed, quote: ``to fully describe to Congress and 
the American people the magnitude of the resources that will be 
required to meet the post-conflict needs'' of Iraq.
  But the Administration continued to insist otherwise. In April, USAID 
Administrator Andrew Natsios was asked whether the Administration was 
sticking to its estimate of total costs. He responded, quote: ``That is 
our plan and that is our intention. And these figures, outlandish 
figures I've seen, I have to say, there a little bit of hoopla involved 
in this. Three months later, OMB Director Josh Bolton promised, quote: 
``We don't anticipate requesting anything additional for the balance of 
the year.''

  Then we got the bill: a second supplemental request for $87 billion, 
of which more than $20 billion was for the reconstruction of Iraq.
  This war--which I opposed--has been far more costly to the American 
taxpayer than was necessary. The Administration's blind assumption that 
we would be greeted as liberators has resulted in unnecessary costs. 
The failure to prevent looting, for example, or to anticipate sabotage, 
has made reconstruction more expensive than the Administration 
promised.
  The Bush Administration's unilateral approach to the war has also 
cost U.S. taxpayers. It is worth remembering that while the first 
Persian Gulf War cost more than $61 billion, our allies paid for all 
but $4.7 billion. Had President Bush managed to enlist more of our 
friends and allies in this effort, the American taxpayer would not be 
footing this enormous bill practically alone.
  We are also paying for the vast majority of reconstruction costs, and 
may be paying more in the future. The World Bank has estimated Iraq's 
reconstruction costs to be $56 billion. Iraq also has $120 billion in 
debts that have not yet been restructured. Outside contributions have 
been relatively meager. The recent donors' conference in Madrid 
produced pledges of $13 billion, but two thirds of that amount was in 
the form of loans. As for Iraqi oil, next year's revenues will be used 
entirely for government operations, leaving nothing for reconstruction.
  It is long past time for the Administration to be more forthcoming 
about the future costs of operations in Iraq. Right now, the only 
estimates come from outside sources, such as the Congressional Budget 
Office, which earlier this month estimated that with 67,000 to 106,000 
military personnel in Iraq, the annual cost of the occupation would be 
between $14 billion and $19 billion. Given recent revelations about the 
Army's current planning, we might now expect those upper range costs, 
at least through 2006. And even these figures seem low considering that 
we are now spending in Iraq at the rate of $4 billion a month, which 
would translate into $48 billion per year.
  We cannot continue to play guessing games with the war in Iraq, our 
national defense, or our children's future. The Congressional Budget 
Office has estimated the Fiscal Year 2004 ``on-budget deficit'' to be 
$644 billion. We have serious domestic needs in everything from health 
care, to education, to the environment. We are not adequately 
protecting ourselves against terrorism, denying our first responders

[[Page S15838]]

the resources they need and leaving critical infrastructure such as 
chemical facilities unguarded. We are underfunding veterans' benefits 
at a time when thousands of new veterans are returning home from Iraq 
wounded and disabled. And we are overstretching our troops and may have 
to consider a significant increase in end-strength. All of these 
priorities are put at risk so long as we fail to budget for future 
costs of the war and occupation in Iraq.
  The Senate clearly recognized the seriousness of this problem when it 
agreed unanimously last month to this legislation. There is simply no 
reason why we should not expect the Administration to plan for the 
future costs of the occupation of Iraq, to budget accordingly, and to 
keep Congress and the American people informed.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1942

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Future Iraq Costs Act''.

     SEC. 2. REPORT ON PROJECTED TOTAL COST OF UNITED STATES 
                   OPERATIONS IN IRAQ.

       (a) Quarterly Report.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to each Member of 
     Congress a report on the projected total cost of United 
     States operations in Iraq, including military operations and 
     reconstruction efforts, through fiscal year 2008.
       (b) Explanation of Changes in Projected Cost.--The 
     President shall include in each report submitted under 
     subsection (a) after the initial report under that subsection 
     an explanation for any change in the total projected total 
     cost of United States operations in Iraq from the projected 
     total cost of such operations stated in the preceding report.
       (c) Termination of Reporting Requirement in Fiscal Year 
     2008.--No report is required under this section after 
     December 31, 2007.
                                 ______