[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 172 (Sunday, November 23, 2003)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2427-E2428]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    FLAWED ELECTIONS IN THE CAUCASUS

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, November 21, 2003

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, as we approach the end of 
session, I would like to take note as Helsinki Commission Chairman of a 
very disturbing trend in the Caucasus republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. At this very moment, thousands of Georgians are engaging 
in a campaign of civil disobedience in the wake of the November 2 
parliamentary elections. Georgian and international monitors registered 
large-scale falsification and ballot stuffing, not to mention the 
exclusion of many thousands of eligible voters. When the Central 
Election Commission gave the largest tallies to President 
Shevardnadze's party and the nominally-opposition but Shevardnadze-
allied Revival Party, opposition leaders organized large demonstrations 
in Tbilisi's main street. There, in the rain and cold, protesters spent 
days demanding the President's resignation and new elections.
  Their efforts, born of rage and despair, have been peaceful and the 
authorities have so far acted with restraint. But Georgia faces a 
genuine crisis, make no mistake. After ten years of growing frustration 
at official incompetence and corruption, the country's impoverished 
public has begun to resist business as usual. Eduard Shevardnadze, 
still lionized in the West for helping to end the Cold War as Soviet 
Foreign Minister, has long been deeply unpopular at home. Demands by 
successive U.S. administrations and international financial 
institutions to curb pervasive corruption have gone unheeded. And the 
November 2 election was a harbinger of the presidential race in 2005, 
when Shevardnadze will not be eligible to run. All participants and 
analysts agree that the outcome of this year's parliamentary contest 
will influence the coming succession.
  How the Georgian drama will play itself out is hard to predict. But 
it is clear that Georgia is not alone in suffering through a crisis of 
trust and legitimacy. On October 17, Azerbaijan held presidential 
elections that, according to OSCE observers, did not meet international 
norms. Serious clashes between opposition backers and the authorities 
erupted in which at least one person was killed and hundreds were 
injured. Law enforcement agencies arrested hundreds of opposition 
activists; though most have since been released, according to human 
rights groups, many were beaten in detention. The Azerbaijani election, 
moreover, marked the transfer of power from President Heydar Aliev to 
his son, establishing the first family dynasty in the former Soviet 
Union. But Ilham Aliev has begun his term under a shadow, tainted by an 
election seen as unfair inside and outside the country and marred by 
the accompanying violence.

  Earlier this year, Armenia held presidential elections in February 
and parliamentary elections in May that also fell short of OSCE 
standards. In February, thousands of protesters marched in the snowy 
streets of Yerevan; perhaps their numbers kept President Robert 
Kocharian from claiming a first round victory and forced him into a 
runoff--a first for a sitting president in the Caucasus. Between the 
two rounds, however, the authorities detained some 200 opposition 
campaign workers and supporters. On election day, they did whatever was 
necessary to win in a landslide. The final judgement of the OSCE 
election observation mission was that ``the overall process failed to 
provide equal conditions for the candidates. Voting, counting and 
tabulation showed serious irregularities, including widespread ballot 
box stuffing.'' The Armenian Assembly of America on March 18 noted that 
``the people of Armenia deserved nothing less than the declared aim of 
their government for free, fair and transparent presidential elections. 
As reported in depth by the OSCE, this achievable standard was not 
met.''
  There was some improvement in the May parliamentary contest, 
concluded the OSCE, especially in the campaign and media coverage. 
Nevertheless, the election ``fell short of international standards . . 
. in a number of key respects, in particular the counting and 
tabulation of votes.''
  In sum, Mr. Speaker, a discouraging and disturbing record for all 
three countries, marked by a consistent pattern of election rigging by 
entrenched elites who have learned that they can ``get away with it.'' 
The international community is prepared to register disapproval, by 
proclaiming these elections--in diplomatic language, to be sure--short 
of OSCE norms. But there have never been any other consequences for 
subverting the democratic process. Nor have opposition parties anywhere 
been able to annul or change the official results of a falsified 
electoral process, or even compel governments to negotiate with them.
  Perhaps Georgia, where the state is relatively weak and discontent 
widespread, will prove the exception--although it is alarming that 
President Shevardnadze has sent his sometime rival Aslan Abashidze, who 
runs the region of Ajaria like a Central Asian potentate, north to gain 
Moscow's support. The prospect of Russia propping up a shaky, 
illegitimate Georgian Government should send shivers down the spine of 
any American. But until and unless an opposition movement registers 
some tangible success, the men in charge of the destinies of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia have no reason to change course. What they are 
doing works and it benefits them, even if it harms their countries' 
chances of developing democracy.

  Even worse, there is little reason to expect changes for the better. 
For years, optimists maintained that however discouraging things were, 
time and constant pressure from Washington and the international 
community would bring gradual change. As we approach 2004, the 13th 
year of independence for the former Soviet republics, that prognosis 
seems increasingly pollyanish. The consolidation of ruling groups, 
determined to remain in power, in control of the state's law 
enforcement and judicial agencies, and disposing of significant wealth, 
makes gradual evolution towards a genuinely democratic mentality and 
practices ever less plausible. Instead, we see evolution towards what 
some analysts call ``semi-authoritarian'' states and others, with 
reference to the Middle East, term ``liberal autocracies.''
  Mr. Speaker, this admittedly depressing analysis leads to several 
worrisome conclusions. First, political opposition and publics in the 
Caucasus have concluded that electoral processes are hopelessly 
corrupted and offer no prospect of fairly competing for power or

[[Page E2428]]

even trying to influence policymaking. Accordingly, they are 
increasingly inclined to mobilize against their leaders and 
governments. Even though victories have thus far eluded them, this turn 
to the ``street'' bespeaks a perennial politics of resentment instead 
of compromise and consensus-building. Second, the gulf between rulers 
and ruled has obvious implications for stability and democracy. Ruling 
elites will try to tamp down actual protest and curb society's 
organizing capability, infringing on their basic liberties; this, in 
turn, will upset the delicate balance between state and society. 
Change, when it comes, may be violent.
  Steadily losing hope, many Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians will 
likely opt out of politics altogether. Many others will emigrate if 
they can. This trend has been marked for years in all three countries; 
Armenians often try to come to the United States; while Azerbaijanis 
and Georgians find it easier to move to Russia. But the departure of 
these highly motivated individuals and their families, who often find 
ways to prosper in their adopted homes, weakens their homelands.
  Washington has observed these tendencies with concern but little 
action. Democracy-building programs may help develop civil society but 
have little impact on leaders who pursue their own interests and are 
quite prepared to dismiss the State Department's criticism of yet 
another rigged election--even if, as happened yesterday, the 
Department, in unprecedentedly strong language, said the Georgian 
election ``results do not accurately reflect the will of the Georgian 
people, but instead reflect massive vote fraud in Ajara and other 
Georgian regions.'' And while we are preoccupied with Iraq and the war 
on terrorism, Moscow has been steadily rebuilding its assets in these 
countries, buying up infrastructure in equity-for-debt deals and 
offering all possible support to those in power.
  Under these circumstances, Mr. Speaker, our chances of influencing 
political evolution in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia may not be very 
great. But they will diminish to zero unless we recognize the problem, 
and soon.

                          ____________________