[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 167 (Tuesday, November 18, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H11434-H11440]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2417, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the 
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and 
for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the 
Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?
  There was no objection.


                Motion to Instruct Offered by Ms. Harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Ms. Harman moves that the managers on the part of the House 
     at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
     on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 2417 be instructed 
     to insist upon section 344 of the House passed bill (relating 
     to the report on lessons learned from military operations in 
     Iraq) and to include in the conference report a requirement 
     that the report be submitted as soon as possible within the 
     scope of conference.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) each 
will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct this bill's conferees to 
insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an 
intelligence ``lessons learned'' report and to include a requirement 
that this report be submitted as soon as possible.
  Section 344 of the House bill requests within 1 year of enactment a 
report from the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence 
lessons learned as a result of military operations in Iraq. But as we 
know all too well, the lives of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and 
-women, Marines and civilians are on the line in Iraq and Afghanistan 
today. There is an urgent need to identify what policymakers, military 
forces, and the intelligence community can be doing better today rather 
than months or years from now.
  As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the war in Iraq is not over, and daily 
reports from Baghdad continue to be grave and disheartening. In the 
last several weeks, we have seen suicide bombings of the International 
Red Cross headquarters and several Baghdad police stations, a rocket 
attack on the al-Rashid Hotel where Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz was staying at the time, mortar attacks inside the U.S.-
controlled Green Zone in central Baghdad, the downing of five U.S. Army 
helicopters, a suicide bombing of Italian military police in An 
Nasariyah, and a steady stream of improvised road-side explosive 
devices directed against U.S. and coalition soldiers.
  Coalition forces are being attacked up to 35 times a day. As of 
today, Mr. Speaker, 181 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Iraq by 
hostile fire since the President announced the end of major combat 
operations on May 1. Clearly, our intelligence efforts on the ground 
are not where they should be. We are only now setting up information 
sharing fusion centers. We have just recently begun to increase the 
number of analysts and intelligence experts. The bottom line is that we 
still know very little about the nature of the insurgency.
  Accurate and actionable intelligence is vital if we are to prevail in 
this continuing conflict, and I and other members of the Committee 
intend to do everything possible to provide our forces with the very 
best intelligence. Lessons learned with respect to both prewar 
intelligence and intelligence support to the war fighters during combat 
operations are a key ingredient in that effort. The intelligence 
community must understand what worked well and what did not work so 
well so that improvements in intelligence support to U.S. and coalition 
forces in Iraq today can be made as quickly as possible. Lessons 
learned are also important if future intelligence assessments of Iran, 
North Korea, and the war on terrorism in general are to be credible.
  The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has said, and I agree, 
that intelligence community reform, or transformation, must be on the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's agenda next year. That 
effort should be informed by an understanding of where U.S. 
intelligence in Iraq needs to be better.

                              {time}  1715

  In the course of a 5-month investigation, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence on a bipartisan basis has identified serious 
shortcomings in the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and ties to terrorism. We found that sketchy and often 
circumstantial evidence produced estimates that likely were 
substantially wrong. At a minimum, the intelligence community 
overstated the strength of the underlying data supporting its 
conclusions.
  Our Senate counterparts are engaged in a similar effort to identify 
intelligence shortcomings and recommend changes. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff have prepared their own assessment of strategic lessons learned 
from the Iraq war, and I strongly supported the Defense Authorization 
bill's requirement of a ``lessons learned'' report from the Department 
of Defense by March of next year.
  Unfortunately, the intelligence community has yet to acknowledge any 
flaws in prewar intelligence. With American lives on the line, the 
problems with prewar intelligence must be addressed and analyzed now. 
An intelligence ``lessons learned'' study cannot await the conclusion 
of David Kay's ongoing WMD search in 9 months or a year from now. 
Regardless of what he finds, we already know there were problems with 
collection, analysis, and the way policymakers used the information.
  Mr. Speaker, I offer this motion to instruct because the best 
intelligence is key to stopping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which will then permit reconstruction and implementation of true self-
government.
  I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) will 
accept my motion and that we will continue to work on a bipartisan 
basis to expedite the report and to implement its findings.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments and, of course, all the 
extraordinary hard work that she has put in on her side with her staff 
and her members. It clearly has been a good exercise in bipartisanship 
which I think distinguishes this House very well on an extremely 
important subject.
  The subject that the gentlewoman has brought up is one of great 
concern to us. A report on lessons learned from the military operations 
in Iraq has a place in the bill, much deserved because it is important, 
and the language that is in there that her proposed instruction goes to 
in terms of the scope of the conference, for Members' benefit, says a 
report not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
act shall be made on lessons learned,

[[Page H11435]]

and we put that kind of a time requirement in, I think, because this is 
an issue we wanted to keep the pressure up on.
  I think that it is pretty obvious that the type of combat that we 
have in Iraq is not what one would call conventional warfare. I do not 
know whether the words low-intensity conflict, low-intensity lethal 
conflict, what the right designation of words are, but it is something 
different, and there is no question that we are making adjustments as 
we go along not only with our military, but in our intelligence. 
Adjustments have, in fact, been made because of lessons learned, some 
of which have been very painful, some of which have not been so 
painful. Adjustments are going to continue to be made, and I know that 
our people are going to do that there because they are very interested 
in making sure that we minimize our casualties, that we enhance our 
advantages in every way possible in this lower-intensity type of 
conflict we are dealing with on a global basis with terrorism, not only 
in Iraq but elsewhere as well.
  I think that it is, as I have said, an important part of the bill to 
learn and adjust and respond under lessons learned or whatever 
designation we wish to make. The gentlewoman has suggested that Defense 
people are talking about March of next year. I am a little wary of 
assigning any arbitrary dates. I do not think that serves us well 
because I have a very strong conviction that lessons learned are not 
going to end on an arbitrary date. I think that they are things that we 
are going to have to deal with as long as we are in Iraq, and I am not 
even so sure that we have it right in our report that 1 year from now, 
we are still not going to be in a position to having lessons learned 
and made adjustments accordingly.
  So I find myself in a position of very much supporting the 
gentlewoman's idea of making sure that we keep the pressure on, and 
within the scope of the conference, I think that saying that within 
this year, hopefully as soon as possible, is a good idea. But I do not 
wish to suggest in any way, shape, or form by that formulation I have 
made that this is a one-time deal. I believe that we will be doing 
lessons learned forever.
  I note that we are about to have an anniversary of a great tragic 
event in our country which was the assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy. I also note that there is new evidence coming out that says 
perhaps we have not learned all we should have learned from that tragic 
event even 40 years later. So in the spirit of the authorization bill, 
which is for a year, and for the spirit of keeping the pressure on 
lessons learned and doing the right thing, I am prepared to accept the 
gentlewoman's amendment in the context of the comments I have made.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for those remarks and 
agree that this is not a one-time deal.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
Boswell), ranking member of the Human Intelligence, Analysis and 
Counterintelligence Subcommittee.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the ranking member for her 
hard work and for her leadership on our committee and our chairman in 
their working together. I appreciate those remarks, and we might call 
it the interim report, but it will be continuing.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to 
insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an 
intelligence ``lessons learned'' report on Iraq and strongly support 
asking for this report to be submitted to Congress as soon as possible.
  Congress does its best work when it asks tough questions. The 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has asked a lot of tough 
questions over the past 7 months about our intelligence on Iraq. In our 
hearings and our briefings, committee members' oversight trips to 
Baghdad, a lot of talk with dozens of the intelligence officers who 
fought the war and continue to fight has taken place. I admire their 
bravery, their patriotism, and their selfless dedication to duty as 
they prepared this country for what was to take place.
  Even as I applaud their efforts, I feel it is my own duty to ask them 
tough questions, questions like, ``What did you do well?'' Questions 
like, ``What did you get wrong? What can be done better in the 
future?''
  It is important to ask these questions because the answers are 
important. The answers are important because we thought we would be 
tripping over chemical and biological weapons all over Iraq, and so far 
we have not found any stockpiles of weapons. We need to know why.
  These answers are also important for the future credibility of the 
U.S. foreign policy on Iran, North Korea, and other challenges around 
the world. And the answers are important for improving intelligence 
now, today, in Iraq, where our fine men and women face a dangerous 
insurgency.
  For these reasons I believe time is of the essence. The time to ask 
and to answer these tough questions must begin now. I believe that 
instructing the conferees to insist on a timely ``lessons learned'' 
study is the right step forward to answering those tough questions and 
to making our country and our troops more secure and to be prepared and 
willing to do better as we go forward from this time on.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes), an excellent committee member.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  I traveled in Iraq in May of this year to observe the situation 
firsthand and to see how our soldiers were fairing in the aftermath of 
major combat operations. The situation was still tense back then, and 
today I think it is even worse.
  I served in Vietnam, as the Members know, and it is an eerie feeling 
to see how similar the situation in Iraq today is to the situation back 
then in Vietnam, insurgents who blend into the local population, the 
constant danger our soldiers face every day, and the steady stream of 
American casualties. The Secretary of Defense has said that Iraq will 
be a ``long, hard slog.'' Our soldiers deserve much better than that. 
We cannot let Iraq become another Vietnam.
  To me that means that we must all be learning lessons as we go along, 
the military, the intelligence community, policymakers, and Congress. 
The Defense Authorization bill asks for a ``lessons learned'' report 
from the Department of Defense by March 31 of next year on military 
operations in Iraq. However, the intelligence community should be 
preparing, I think, its own report, not a year from now, but as soon as 
possible.
  In that vein, let me also reiterate a point that was made by our 
ranking member. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on a 
bipartisan basis, already knows that there were serious deficiencies in 
prewar intelligence on Iraq. In fact, I had such concerns about prewar 
intelligence even before we went to war with Iraq, which prompted me to 
write a letter to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and our 
ranking member (Ms. Harman) prior to the initiation of that war. 
Specifically, my concern was about the connections between Iraq and al 
Qaeda the intelligence community wrote about just as the administration 
was trying to build its case for war in the fall of 2002. The 
intelligence community had not yet previously brought these connections 
to the committee's attention, even though I had been asking questions 
along these lines for some time. The intelligence community must review 
the analysis that it produced in this regard and determine whether 
there are lessons that need to be learned. Our soldiers deserve nothing 
less. Our country deserves nothing less.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes and 10 seconds to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), another committee member, the 
ranking member on the Intelligence Policy and National Security 
Subcommittee.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman), our very distinguished ranking member, for yielding me this 
time.

[[Page H11436]]

  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the 
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our distinguished ranking 
member, has been carefully evaluating the prewar intelligence 
assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's purported 
ties to al Qaeda. This bipartisan investigation has already established 
that the intelligence community significantly overstated the strength 
of its evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, failed 
to convey where hard intelligence left off and assumptions began, and 
dropped caveats from crucial judgments.
  In my view, it is also clear that policymakers went even further 
beyond the intelligence assessments in categorically stating that Iraq 
possessed chemical weapons and had restarted a nuclear program.
  Regarding ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, the intelligence community, 
in my judgment, curiously made the opposite error. Instead of coming to 
an overall conclusion, as it did in the case of Iraq's WMD programs, 
the community simply arrayed everything it had and let policymakers 
come to their own conclusions, which they were only too happy to do. No 
one should expect perfection when trying to unearth secrets from a 
ruthless dictatorship, although a strategy of preempting WMD threats 
appears to impose that very standard. But we must be honest and 
forthcoming about the limits of our knowledge and of our ability to 
penetrate tough targets.
  If Iraq had been littered with WMD as predicted, the substantive and 
methodological shortcomings of our intelligence on Iraq might not have 
even been noticed. But the attention of the world is instead riveted on 
the gulf between our estimates and reality. The credibility of our 
foreign policy requires an explanation. If the world does not witness 
an appraisal and corrective actions, who will have faith in our future 
declarations?
  It is therefore doubly galling and deeply troubling that the 
intelligence community leadership rejects the very notion that its 
estimates were flawed. In this time of peril, it would be dangerously 
irresponsible to indulge this stubbornness and delay the time of 
reckoning.

                              {time}  1730

  Our security requires action now. That is why I support this motion 
to instruct.
  I appreciate what the ranking member has brought forward. It is 
thoughtful, it is responsible, and I thank the chairman for supporting 
the language as well.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), another member of our committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member, the gentlewoman 
from California, for yielding me this time; and I rise in support of 
the motion to instruct conferees to insist on section 344 of the House-
passed bill requesting an intelligence lessons learned report.
  The data we have received so far, and that is thousands of pages of 
raw reports, finished intelligence products, statements by 
administration officials, hearings with key officials, trips by staff 
and members to Iraq, leads me to judge that there have been serious 
deficiencies in collection, in analysis, in reporting, and in use of 
intelligence.
  The chairman mentioned that we are always learning lessons, but the 
case of Iraq presents a particularly good case study that tells us and 
will tell us how our intelligence operation is functioning. I am struck 
so far that the leadership of the intelligence community and senior 
administration officials have seemed unwilling to learn these lessons. 
They have refused to acknowledge any deficiencies in pre-war 
intelligence, and I fear that this stubbornness in spite of the facts 
is harming our intelligence efforts, even today, as our troops fight an 
insurgency in Iraq.
  So in the face of this denial by the administration, I feel that 
Congress must insist in law on a thorough and substantive lessons 
learned report.
  But that is not the end of it. We have a responsibility in our 
committee as well to exert oversight, and I hope we will do that. As 
the committee goes to conference, I also hope that we can make certain 
that we have foreign language programs that will increase the pool of 
linguists in critical languages. Our search for the still-missing Osama 
bin Laden is hampered by language deficiencies of those looking. Dr. 
Kay's search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is hampered by our 
shortage of people who understand the technical terms of chemical, 
nuclear, and biological weapons and a flexibility in local language. So 
there are a number of things that we should be doing in conference, but 
certainly one of them is insisting on a lessons learned record.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie member of the committee.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. A rookie with a bad wing, Mr. Speaker. First, I 
thank the chairman for accepting this report, and I thank the ranking 
member also for yielding me this time.
  I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to insist upon 
section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an intelligence lessons 
learned report on Iraq and strongly support asking for this report to 
be submitted to Congress as soon as possible.
  I was a former Baltimore County executive of one of the larger 
counties in the country, and I know well the challenges, the 
exhilarations, and the pains of leading large organizations. Usually, 
one does not have time to get beyond the crisis that is filling one's 
inbox. But every so often, especially after a major milestone, a 
critical part of leadership of an organization is making sure you are 
asking your people to look back at their failures and successes with 
the benefit of hindsight to see what has worked well and what can be 
done better. It is all part of this experience of improving what you do 
for the next time around so that you are doing the best you possibly 
can for your constituents and taxpayers. It is even more important to 
do so when the lessons you learn about the past can directly help your 
work today.
  This is absolutely the case in our work to win the peace in Iraq. I 
know that our intelligence community had some great successes in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. I have no doubt that there were some serious 
problems. Leadership is about taking on the responsibility to examine 
what has worked well and what can be done better and making sure those 
lessons are learned and implemented.
  The message here is a bipartisan one, and it is a simple one. Let us 
not waste any more time. Let us turn talk into action. Let us turn 
yesterday's problems into tomorrow's solutions. The purpose of this 
motion is to put behind us debates about who is right and who is wrong 
and move on to the next step of fixing problems. It is too important 
for the national security of this country and for our troops protecting 
this Nation in Iraq and around the world.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, how much time is remaining on both sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) has 14\3/4\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. May I inquire whether the chairman is going to have 
speakers? I am curious how we are going to proceed here.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to respond to the gentlewoman. 
The number of requests I have had has been very minimal at this point. 
I do not know whether that will continue or not.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, more Americans have died in Iraq in the 
last 8 months than died during the first 3 years of Vietnam. There are 
three Members of Congress who have not put themselves in the secrecy 
bag in this place, so I represent the 280-some million people in this 
country who do not know what is going on in the secret world. But it is 
very obvious from reading the newspapers, whether one reads the 
American newspapers or the European newspapers, there is an enormous 
fight going on between the intelligence agencies and the White House.
  The Secretary of the Army, or the Secretary of War, or whatever we 
want

[[Page H11437]]

to call Mr. Rumsfeld, saw fit to establish his own agency which gave 
information to the President, and the President stood in this very well 
and told us things which apparently he believed, but have turned out to 
be absolutely fallacious. Nobody, even the President, has come back and 
said it is not true.
  Now, this report, this motion is the minimum that we can do for the 
American people. We want to know why those kids are dying, why the 
intelligence was so bad, and why the President took us over there into 
something that he is now saying, we are not going to cut and run, but 
what he is doing is calling Mr. Bremer over and saying, how can we get 
out of here before the election? Now, we have to hurry. We have to get 
out of here by next June. We were going to have a constitution, and 
then we were going to have an election; but never mind the 
Constitution. Let us have the election, and then we will sort of give 
it to them and run away.
  Now, the kids that have died, and if you go up to Walter Reed 
Hospital and you meet those kids who have lost arms and legs, and you 
say to them, what was the point of what we were doing? If we run out of 
Iraq, leaving chaos behind us, we will have diminished what they did. 
They bravely fought for us. I spent 2 years during Vietnam taking care 
of kids who went through that, and we cannot put these kids through 
that same thing.
  I urge everyone to adopt this resolution, or this motion to instruct. 
It is the minimum.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, what did George Tenet know? What did Colin 
Powell know? What did Donald Rumsfeld know? We need to know why it was 
that the intelligence information relating to the presence of nuclear 
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons in Iraq was so 
flawed. Either our intelligence agencies did not know the truth, or 
they knew the truth, but deliberately exaggerated or distorted the 
truth to advance a decision to go to war that had already been 
predetermined; or the intelligence community allowed itself to be 
bullied or intimidated or cajoled into providing senior Bush 
administration officials with the answers they wanted to get so that 
they could begin a war. Any of these options raise very disturbing 
issues, but we have an obligation to get to the bottom of the 
situation.
  Young men and women are dying in Iraq, and they were supposedly sent 
to Iraq to prevent Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction that 
we now know they did not have. We need to learn the lessons of this 
massive intelligence failure now so that we never have such a situation 
occur in the future. Our brave young men and women should never be 
asked to sacrifice their lives for a war whose justification was 
largely based on faulty or misleading intelligence.
  What did George Tenet know? What did Colin Powell know? What did 
Donald Rumsfeld know? The American people have a right to know.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington State (Mr. Dicks), the former chairman of 
this committee and a great expert on intelligence matters.
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to correct the gentlewoman from 
California. I wanted to be chairman, but never quite made it. I was the 
ranking Democratic member and did serve for 8 years, and it was the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), our distinguished chairman, who I 
miss seeing almost every day for hours, as we did for a few years. I 
want to compliment him for accepting the motion and compliment the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for offering this instruction.
  I would say, based on my experience, the sooner we get lessons 
learned to the Congress, the better off we are going to be in terms of 
getting the fixes that we need in terms of our equipment. I can 
remember General Schwarzkopf coming to the committee and laying out the 
problems we had in Desert Storm, Desert Shield, in the intelligence 
area. He said, I want to be able to look over that battlefield and know 
what the enemy is doing. That led us to push forward UAVs like 
Predator, like Global Hawk. We also had problems with denial and 
deception. This time we did so much better out in the West controlling 
any opportunity they had to bring up Scud missiles, et cetera, et 
cetera.
  But those were because there was a lessons learned process where the 
Congress got information and we could help get the resources and the 
programs necessary to help improve our overall military capability. And 
intelligence lessons learned are also critical.
  And my colleagues, many of them here have already spoken, and there 
is a question of the credibility of the intelligence that was presented 
to the American people, presented to the Congress, presented to members 
at the White House.
  So I think the sooner we clear this up, the sooner we get this 
information out in the open, and the sooner we can work together on a 
bipartisan basis to make the fixes necessary.
  There is a lot of talk about the necessity for additional human 
intelligence. The chairman has been a leader. I can remember the 
chairman's efforts to add additional HUMINT resources to our 
intelligence capability, to build back the HUMINT capability. We are 
finding out that right now we may not have as much of that capability 
as necessary to deal with the problem that we are facing in this 
country. Languages was mentioned by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Holt). That is still a problem. We do not have enough people who speak 
the various languages that are necessary here.
  So again, I want to compliment the chairman for accepting the 
instruction, and I think we will all be better off getting this 
information up here as soon as possible to help the Congress next year 
in the authorization and appropriations process, both the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to make 
some of these fixes that are necessary to improve our overall 
intelligence capability.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman 
of the committee.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate the way that the 
chairman started the discussion about our bipartisan cooperation in the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and actually being 
referred to by Members on both sides of the aisle today. I think that 
is one of our strong points that we need to work hard at preserving. My 
colleague from Iowa, my neighbor, said it is important to ask the tough 
questions in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I 
absolutely agree and I think all of us would. I do not believe we have 
been timid about doing that, not just recently, but throughout.

                              {time}  1745

  And I believe that the administration and the intelligence community, 
regardless of the administration in the office at the moment, is likely 
to have more confidence that they can speak candidly, forthrightly, 
that we do not have to pull things out of them begrudgingly if they 
understand that we use that work well and that we keep the matters that 
are classified very carefully, close to the chest, and use it well.
  I would say that I think I would certainly disagree, and I have not 
heard it here, but I would certainly disagree with any broad-brush, 
sweeping indictment that there were severe problems with intelligence 
collection analysis or the way the policy makers used the information. 
We will be looking at that. We do know that there were gaps in 
intelligence collection, and all of us, I think, have spoken frequently 
about the problems we have with adequate language and cultural affinity 
and certainly about the lack of HUMINT.
  Now, if there is one area of the world, about three or four where we 
had a real gap in HUMINT, it was, of course, in Iraq. And gaps equate 
to information that does not flow to the intelligence community which 
they cannot use, which they cannot respond to us on. So I would say 
that a collection problem

[[Page H11438]]

would exist if senior managers in the ISC were not taking active steps 
to address the known gaps in collection.
  We have heard something just a few minutes ago about lessons learned. 
And, of course, those lessons to be learned do not suddenly appear at 
some point in time in the future. I believe we have been learning 
lessons throughout this last several weeks and months. And I believe 
that the intelligence authorization bill, which we are prepared to 
bring a conference report to this floor soon, does, in fact, reflect 
some of the lessons we have learned in the conflict in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq and the intelligence operations that preceded and continue to 
be conducted in those countries. So lessons learned are being acted on, 
and there is more that we can learn.
  And I think there is no hesitation on having the kind of review that 
will make Members comfortable that we are taking the right steps to 
support the community and, in fact, to demand responses and demand 
actions where changes need to be made.
  So with those comments, Mr. Speaker, I heard the acceptance of the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) of the language of the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman), and I think we can move forward in a 
bipartisan way. I hope, therefore, that our colleagues in the House 
will continue to have confidence in this Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and that in this House, we are operating to the maximum 
extent possible with bipartisan support of the Members and the 
bipartisan activities involving all Members actively involved in the 
process.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, we have no additional speakers. I plan to 
close.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), distinguished subcommittee 
chairman of a critical part of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence which does bring out the point of question of human assets 
and what most people understand about intelligence, and it is a people 
business. He is our subcommittee chairman of the committee that is 
responsible for worrying about those areas of intelligence, and has 
obviously got a critical role to play.
  In addition, the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) has led the 
charge on some of the programs and projects that have been particularly 
difficult. And I am much indebted for the work he has done on this 
bill.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I would like to thank the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, for 
the way he has handled this committee. I think it goes above and beyond 
what we would have expected. Chairman Goss has led this committee 
through some rather difficult times in this war on terrorism and, 
indeed, our war in Iraq.
  There is no question in my mind that a lot of statements have been 
made this evening about the substance of the intelligence, the quality 
of the intelligence. Let me say that our committee has undertaken to 
review the intelligence. We have not made any conclusions at this 
point. We have not reached any determinations. I may have my own 
personal opinions about the quality of the intelligence, as I am sure 
we all do. However, the committee has not done so in a formal basis. I 
wanted to make sure that that was clear.
  But there is sufficient intelligence out there, and I think we all 
have agreed over the time that I have been there and listened to the 
cases being made why Saddam Hussein and this war in Iraq was essential 
to the people, to the efforts of the people of America to go forward. 
But I just wanted to take the time to stand here and sort of challenge 
the idea that there was a flawed intelligence process.
  I think intelligence is a form of art, and it is not something that 
is in concrete. It is an evolving process. We have not yet determined 
all of the facts. We will look into that. Our committee is doing so. 
And I certainly hope that we can continue to do this in the fair and 
bipartisan fashion that this committee has been known for, and 
especially our chairman has been known for over the past 8 years that 
he has been in charge, or 7 years that he has been in charge of this 
committee that I have served on. This is an important time for all of 
us.
  I think we have an opportunity here to do what many of us want and 
that is to learn what it is that we can do to help the intelligence 
community around the world. And by doing our job, and our job is to ask 
the tough questions, we will be better prepared to do just that. And I 
think under the leadership and the guidance of the chairman, we will be 
able to bring to this House a very sound conclusion, a very reasoned 
approach on what it is our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
should be doing, what it is our intelligence community should be doing, 
and how we can best support them.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Hinchey).
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to join those who have congratulated 
the Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
particularly the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss), as well as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), 
our ranking member, for the job that they have done under some very 
difficult circumstances. This is an issue that really needs the kind of 
attention that it seems to be getting under their leadership.
  I think that this motion to instruct is very appropriate, 
particularly at this moment. There has been some recent criticism from 
a variety of sources with regard to the quality of intelligence that 
was available to the administration prior to their advocacy of war in 
Iraq, and prior to the resolution passing this Congress a year ago 
October. It is very important that we understand every aspect of that 
intelligence.
  Now, what we have heard is that the administration has not gotten 
very good intelligence, that they were misled, perhaps, by poor 
intelligence with regard to the connection of Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda, and also on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. But there 
is another aspect of that that ought to be looked at very, very 
carefully and that is essentially this: The administration, many of the 
important people of the administration, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Cheney, 
particularly, were given intelligence, but there is a substantial 
amount of evidence to indicate that when they were given the 
intelligence that there was little or no connection between Saddam 
Hussein and Usama bin Laden and that there was little or no evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, their instructions back to the 
providers of that intelligence, to Mr. Tenet and others, was this: We 
do not like that intelligence, will you go back and get other 
information. And they got that instruction a number of times. That is 
an issue that needs to be looked at very, very carefully.
  The quality of intelligence, yes, but what about the way in which 
that intelligence was received by policymakers within the 
administration. I believe that those policymakers corrupted that 
intelligence, and that is a question that needs to be examined in great 
detail and with complete accuracy.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) who is the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, which is rather 
relevant to this subject.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate all the words about bipartisan. 
I wish that the bipartisanship that has been talked about would have 
been manifested in the vote that we all cast around here to send our 
troops the money that they need to do the job that they are doing.
  It is great to talk about bipartisanship, and it is great to say that 
we all have it, but the truth is when it came time to give the 
resources that are needed in Iraq, some people were not there. Some 
people in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were not 
there. So I think we need to examine the idea of bipartisan and what it 
really means.
  The other comment I want to make is this: I think the instruction is 
fine. We all know it is probably a little bit meaningless because most 
instructions are, but the kind of words that have

[[Page H11439]]

been used around here in a way, the way that I see it, in a way to 
degrade people who work in the intelligence community, I think is a 
little bit despicable. And I want to say a word about people who work 
in the intelligence community, people who work in dark places in this 
world, people who collect information, people who we do not know, who 
most of us do not know, who do the hard work, we get paid for our jobs 
and they get paid too, but we do not get paid to put our life on the 
line in the way that they do.
  We have a wonderful group of people who work very, very hard and are 
very experienced and do a great job collecting information in dark 
places in the world, and they deserve a lot of credit. They do not need 
to have people come on the floor and tell them they are not doing their 
job the right way. What they need to do is have the kind of 
encouragement that those of us who have the oversight responsibility 
and work with people who have the oversight responsibility to say to 
them thank you for a job well done, and thank you for putting your 
lives on the line.
  And this idea that we are not getting right information or it is not 
perfect or it is not what we want or it is not being used the right 
way, in my opinion, is nonsense. And, hopefully, that is what the 
report will bring out a year from now. But we ought to be paying kudos 
and compliments to people in the intelligence community, including, in 
my opinion, from the Director George Tenet all the way up and down the 
line, people who work in places that none of us have ever been. They 
deserve our compliments, our credit, our applause, and anything else we 
can give them. They do a great job.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to thank the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) again for bringing this forward. I think we 
focused on an important part of what we are about and finding out what 
went wrong to make sure that it is fixed, helping those involved in the 
executive branch to do the best job they can and reduce the risk to the 
greatest degree possible in what is a very dangerous business. That is 
a worthy effort.
  I want to point out I certainly agree with the motion. Obviously, I 
did not agree with all of the statements that were made in support of 
the motion. That would not be my job, or relevant, any way.

                              {time}  1800

  I think that Members have heard today that the themes of the bill 
that we have passed, the intelligence authorization bill that the House 
passed, have come out a number of times. Yes, there were gaps in the 
information that we were able through our intelligence community to 
provide with specificity to our decisionmakers.
  I think that is called the fog of war. It is also called 
intelligence. If we knew everything, we probably would not need to have 
an intelligence organization. We certainly would not need to have 
analysts.
  The fact is we do not know everything. We try to get as much as we 
can. We try and analyze it as well as we can. We try to get the value 
added to it. As the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has so 
eloquently said, there are a lot of people taking a lot of risk out 
there in very unpleasant circumstances, as we stand here this evening, 
who deserve an awful lot of credit to get the best we can.
  If there are gaps in it, we will try to provide more resources and a 
different mix of capabilities to reduce those gaps. We have had some 
very good commentary by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) in 
the committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) echoing it here 
today about language problems. We have had public hearings about lack 
of necessary capabilities, whether we call them insufficiencies, or 
whatever word. No question, we have got to do some different things and 
more of them so our decision-makers have an easier time of it and can 
be more convinced that what they are doing is on hard fact to the 
greatest degree possible.
  I think that it is important that Members know that our inquiry is 
ongoing. We have not reached conclusions as was stated. We are in the 
process of reaching conclusions. Our oversight will continue, and we 
will be going about our business. We will get the authorization bill 
conference back as quickly as we can, I hope, and get that matter under 
way. And then we will be right back to business doing our oversight and 
advocacy on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as we do 
every day, working all together.
  I thank all the members of the committee and all the staff, both 
sides of the aisle and those in the middle as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, let me first thank the chairman for accepting this 
motion to instruct and for years of partnership on the committee trying 
to do the Nation's business in the right way. These are very hard 
issues; and they require sober thought, careful articulation and 
collaboration with the intelligence community. We intend to offer 
criticism where we can offer it constructively and to engage in an 
ongoing dialogue with the intelligence community.
  It is an honor to serve as ranking member of this committee. I 
respect its traditions and all the members, and staff who work so hard. 
Let me say to our friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), 
that I agree with him. There are very good people in the intelligence 
community.
  When the chairman and I recently sent some constructive criticism to 
the Director of Central Intelligence, our letter started with a long 
paragraph about how good the people are who do our work for the 
intelligence community. But it is my view that these good people can do 
better and they can do better if we ask tough questions in a 
constructive fashion and if we can help them learn from things they 
have not done as well as they possibly could. So that is what we are 
talking about here.
  We are talking about requesting a lessons learned report as soon as 
possible so that by looking backward on some things that were done not 
as well as possible, we can look forward where we have ongoing force 
protection issues in Iraq and huge intelligence challenges in Iran, 
North Korea and elsewhere, and do things better. Good people with 
better tools performing better.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I think maybe we should freeze-dry this 
debate. It was substantive. It was serious. Like the chairman, I did 
not agree with every single word that was said, but I think every 
single word that was said was said with seriousness and with substance, 
and that is the kind of debate that we should have around here. And, 
oh, by the way, we also should have outcomes like this because the 
chairman has accepted this motion to instruct. I hope that should we 
end up voting on it, the vote will be unanimous or near-unanimous and 
that will, by my lights, be a very big victory for this body.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the 
previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 404, 
nays 12, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 633]

                               YEAS--404

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballance
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine

[[Page H11440]]


     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Janklow
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Majette
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)

                                NAYS--12

     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bonilla
     Burgess
     Everett
     Flake
     Johnson, Sam
     LaHood
     Sessions
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Boyd
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     DeMint
     Dooley (CA)
     Fattah
     Fletcher
     Gephardt
     Isakson
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Kleczka
     Lantos
     Murtha
     Pitts
     Stark
     Sullivan
     Weiner
     Wexler


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson) (during the vote). Members are 
advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1825

  Mr. SESSIONS changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. WELLER and Mr. TURNER of Ohio changed their vote 
from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the motion was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the 
following conferees:
  From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for 
consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and 
modifications committed to conference:
  Messrs. Goss, Bereuter, Boehlert, Gibbons, LaHood, Cunningham, 
Hoekstra, Burr, Everett, Gallegly, Collins, Ms. Harman, Messrs. 
Hastings of Florida, Reyes, Boswell, Peterson of Minnesota, Cramer, Ms. 
Eshoo, Mr. Holt and Mr. Ruppersberger.
  From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense 
tactical intelligence and related activities:
  Messrs. Hunter, Weldon of Pennsylvania and Skelton.
  There was no objection.

                          ____________________