[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 167 (Tuesday, November 18, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15029-S15036]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT T. CLARK TO BE LIEUTENANT GENERAL
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, pursuant to the order of November 14, I
ask that the Senate now proceed to executive session to begin
consideration of Executive Calendar No. 418, the nomination of Maj.
Gen. Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen.
Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who desire
to speak. I will just say a few words. To accommodate my distinguished
colleague from Kentucky, who has been a valiant supporter of this
nomination and very persistent over this long period of time, I will
yield the floor. He then could be followed by the Senator from
Massachusetts and then I would continue my remarks.
I wonder if I just might ask unanimous consent that the Senator from
Virginia proceed for not to exceed 3 or 4 minutes, followed by the
Senator from Kentucky for about 10 or 12 minutes, followed by the
Senator from Massachusetts. How much time does my colleague desire?
Mr. KENNEDY. I think 40 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Not to exceed a period of about 40 minutes for the
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. I think Senator Dayton also had 15 minutes. I think
there is a unanimous consent agreement for this; am I correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. I was not able to hear.
Mr. KENNEDY. I think there is a consent that has been agreed to
whereby there are 2 hours equally divided, with 40 minutes for myself
and 15 minutes for Senator Dayton.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct on that.
Mr. KENNEDY. I will not necessarily take all of that time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
Major General Clark is a highly qualified officer for promotion to
the rank of lieutenant general. I have met with him several times. His
proposed assignment by the Secretary of Defense is to be Commander of
the Fifth U.S. Army.
He was first nominated for this position in the fall of 2002. He has
appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive
session on two separate occasions. On both occasions he conducted
himself with deference and respect not only for the serious issues at
hand but for all persons involved in this tragic sequence of facts
which preceded his nomination.
He expressed great respect for the constitutionally-based advise and
consent power and the responsibility of the Senate to look into this
nomination with great thoroughness. Not surprisingly, General Clark has
the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker,
and the civilian leadership of the Army for this promotion. Indeed, the
Secretary of Defense personally, in a very respectful way, has talked
to me about this nomination and his strong support for this nominee.
I will detail at length later on in the course of this debate the
very thorough steps taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
commend my colleagues on the committee. There were unusual facts
associated with this nomination involving tragic loss of life, a strong
disciplinary action against those who brought about the direct harm to
the victim who gave his life. In the course of that, I and other
members of the committee took it upon ourselves to meet with the family
members of the deceased victim in this particular case. I wish to
commend them. They handled themselves in a manner of great distinction,
given the depth of emotion on their part.
I also commend the former Vice Chief of the Army, General Keane. He
took it upon himself time and time again, working with the
distinguished Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, to repeatedly
go back and reinvestigate certain aspects of this case, I hope to the
satisfaction of all Members, certainly to this Senator and generally
members of the committee.
Mr. President, I yield the floor to accommodate my colleague. I again
thank him for his strong tenacity in supporting this nomination
throughout.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of MG Robert
Clark to the rank of lieutenant general and commander of the Fifth
Army. I first met General Clark over 5 years ago when he was commander
of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY. Since that time, I
have known General Clark to be an honest man and an excellent soldier.
The military communities in Kentucky and Tennessee surrounding Fort
Campbell admire General Clark very much. He is well respected
throughout the Army, and we should be grateful that we have soldiers
like General Clark serving and protecting our Nation.
GEN Jack Keane, who commanded General Clark at Fort Campbell, said
this about him:
In my 37 years of service, I have never met an officer who
is such a tower of character and integrity. His peers,
subordinates, and superiors all respect and admire him for
the truly special person that he is.
General Clark loves the Army and he loves his country. Some may even
say that General Clark was born with the desire to serve his country in
his blood. Both of his grandfathers served in both World War I and
World War II. His father served for 31 years and fought in both World
War II and the Korean conflict. His older brother served in Vietnam.
One of his younger brothers is an Air Force colonel, and another
brother is an Army lieutenant colonel on the front lines in Korea.
The Clark family has made many sacrifices so that future generations
of Americans can live in peace. General Clark has given 33 years of his
life in the armed service to this great Nation. He is a decorated
soldier and has shed his own blood for our country. He led a platoon in
Vietnam, commanded a brigade that was dropped deep into Iraq during
Operation Desert Storm.
As commanding general of the 101st Screaming Eagles, he deployed
himself, with his troops, all over the world, from Kuwait to El
Salvador. Most recently, General Clark has been deputy commander of the
Fifth Army and mobilized Guard and Reserves for homeland defense and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has worn just about every hat the Army has
to offer.
COL Mike Oates, who served under General Clark at Fort Campbell, said
this about him:
He spoke straight to the soldiers. He looked them in the
eye and he set high standards for wearing our equipment and
how we behaved. Discipline is what keeps good units effective
and reliable. He enforced discipline and set the example
himself.
I could go on and on about General Clark's distinguished career. But
I need to address the tragic incident that has held up his nomination,
which occurred while General Clark was at Fort Campbell. A murder
occurred at Fort Campbell on July 5, 1999. PVT Barry Winchell was
killed in a tragic event that none of us should ever forget. Private
Winchell was murdered by a fellow soldier, who is serving--and
deservedly so--a life sentence for this horrendous crime.
I do not wish to address the details of this horrible murder, but I
do wish to
[[Page S15030]]
extend my thoughts and prayers to Private Winchell's family and
friends. I have spoken with General Clark several times about this
tragic incident. I know how sorry he is about the murder of Private
Winchell, especially since it did happen on his post and under his
leadership.
But it is important to note that after the incident--and as the
general court martial convening authority--General Clark approved the
maximum punishment for the convicted murderer.
I want to set the record straight. A small, yet loud minority has
blamed General Clark for this tragic death. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
A man who has given 33 years of his life to protect all Americans--
all Americans--does not deserve to be treated this way. Army
investigations and many interviews were conducted to dispel the
misinformation over this incident. And the Army has recommended General
Clark for nomination to lieutenant general and commander of the Fifth
Army because he is the most qualified soldier for this job.
The President nominated General Clark for this post and important
rank. It is important to note that the Senate Armed Services Committee
approved his nomination.
I thank Committee Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin for
helping to move his nomination through the committee.
Mr. President, our military has an old saying: ``Not for self, but
for country.''
Those who know General Clark in the Army and in the communities in
which he has served all think of him when they hear this statement.
General Clark is a man who has given his entire life not for self but
for God and country. I thank him for it.
We should all be grateful to him for all the sacrifices he has made
for our freedoms and our protections. I urge my colleagues to support
the nomination of GEN Robert Clark. He deserves it and he has earned
it.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may I express appreciation to my colleague
from Kentucky again for his taking long hours to personally look into
this case in a very objective way and in reaching his conclusions.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to remind me when I have
used 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose the nomination of Major General
Clark to the rank of lieutenant general.
I agree that General Clark has a strong record as a soldier. He has
received numerous decorations for his distinguished service and
courage, and he has served in a number of leadership capacities during
his more than 30 years in the Army.
I am concerned, however, about General Clark's performance as
Commanding General at Fort Campbell, KY, at the time of the brutal
murder of PVT Barry Winchell on the base in 1999.
There are few more respected units in the Army than the 101st
Airborne Division at Fort Campbell. The ``Screaming Eagles,'' as the
division is called, has a well-deserved reputation of professionalism,
heroism, and outstanding performance. Yet, in the months leading up to
the murder of Private Winchell, the command climate at Fort Campbell
was seriously deficient. According to a report by the Army inspector
general, Fort Campbell had command-wide low morale, and inadequate
delivery of health care to soldiers and their families, and the
leadership condoned widespread, leader-condoned underage drinking in
the barracks.
There is compelling evidence that anti-gay harassment was pervasive
at Fort Campbell during this period. The inspector general reported
multiple examples of anti-gay graffiti, the use of anti-gray slurs in
cadences by non-commissioned officers during training runs, and routine
remarks and bantering that, in the inspector general's words, ``could
be viewed as harassment.'' Outside groups have documented many
instances of anti-gay harassment in the months leading up to the
murder.
The inspector general also found that prior to the murder, there was
no sustainment training at Fort Campbell on the proper implementation
of the Homosexual Conduct Policy, known as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
and that, as a result, ``most officers, NCOs, and soldiers at Fort
Campbell lacked an understanding and working knowledge of the Policy.''
In his response to my questions, General Clark stated that he agrees
with these findings, but that he was nevertheless not aware of even a
single instance of anti-gay harassment before the murder.
On July 5, 1999, after enduring anti-gay harassment for many months,
including harassment by members of his chain of command, Private
Winchell was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat by a fellow
soldier in his barracks.
It seems clear that if General Clark had exercised his responsibility
to deal with the serious anti-gay harassment that was prevalent at Fort
Campbell during his 17 months of command leading up to the murder of
Private Winchell, the murder would probably not have occurred.
Even more serious, however, was General Clark's performance at Fort
Campbell in the days, weeks, and months following the murder. A brutal
bias-motivated hate crime is an extraordinary event in any community,
civilian or military, and it demands an extraordinary response from the
community's leaders. Such a crime sends the poisonous message that some
members of the community deserve to be victimized solely because of who
they are. The potential for such a crime was magnified in this case
because of the existing climate of anti-gay harassment at Fort
Campbell, but the available evidence indicates that General Clark's
response was not adequate with respect to his contacts with Private
Winchell's family or his command responsibilities at Fort Campbell.
One factual issue which I have repeatedly asked the Army to resolve,
without receiving a satisfactory response, is why General Clark did not
meet with the parents of Private Barry Winchell, Patricia and Wally
Kutteles, in the days following his murder.
Following such a brutal murder it is difficult to believe that such a
meeting did not take place. Any responsible and compassionate
commanding officer would want to meet with and console the parents of
the murdered soldier, even if no request for such a meeting had
formally been made.
I understand that during the 4 days immediately following the murder,
General Clark was at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington
with his wife, who was undergoing tests for a longstanding illness. It
is understandable that General Clark had declined to meet with the
parents for this reason, during that period and did not attend the
memorial service for Private Winchell on July 9. But Clark did not meet
with the parents in the days after his return to Fort Campbell from
Walter Reed Hospital nor in the weeks and months that followed the
Winchell murder. Instead, he states that he never received a request to
meet with the parents, but he would gladly have met with then if he had
received a request to do so.
Patricia Kutteles, Private Winchell's mother, has submitted a sworn
affidavit stating that she and her husband traveled to Fort Campbell
immediately after hearing about her son's murder. She was assigned an
Army liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stratis, as their point of
contact with Fort Campbell and the Army. Two or three days after the
murder, she made a request to Lieutenant Colonel Stratis to meet with
General Clark to talk about her son's death. Lieutenant Colonel Stratis
told her that General Clark was unable to meet with them.
There are three possible explanations for this dispute of fact: Ms.
Kutteles may have submitted a false affidavit, General Clark may have
given false information to the Committee, or General Clark was, for
some reason, not informed by his staff about the parent's request.
Like others on the Armed Services Committee, I have met with the
parents, and I was struck by their sincerity, their patriotism, and
their continuing support for our Armed Forces in spite of the tragedy.
I find it difficult to believe that they are lying or
[[Page S15031]]
mistaken when they say they asked for a meeting with General Clark.
Nevertheless, that appears to be the position of the Army inspector
general, who states in his most recent memorandum, dated October 20,
2003, that the mother's statement in the affidavit is ``unfounded.''
The inspector general states that his office ``determined, after
extensive interviews, none of the key staff members and other relevant
witnesses recalled receiving or learning of such a request.''
I have seen several of the affidavits relied upon by the inspector
general, and I found the statements relied on to be disturbingly non-
responsive. These affidavits fail to resolve the serious factual
dispute about whether the parents requested a meeting with General
Clark, and it seems improper for the Army inspector general to suggest
that no such request was made.
I believe that it is inappropriate for the Senate to act on this
nomination until this issue is more satisfactorily resolved.
General Clark states that he was not aware of any instance of anti-
gay harassment on the base before the murder. At the very least, the
murder should have made painfully clear that anti-gay bias and anti-gay
harassment were real and pressing problems at Fort Campbell, problems
that demanded an immediate and effective response. Yet from the very
start, and throughout the remainder of his command, General Clark and
his office took patently ineffective steps to respond to these specific
problems.
Two days after the murder, the Fort Campbell public affairs office
issued a statement describing the incident as a ``physical altercation
in a post barracks,'' insinuating that Winchell was partly responsible
for his own death. In fact, Winchell was asleep in the barracks when he
was attacked by his killer. General Clark stated that he probably
learned about the false press statement 3 or 4 days later, following
his return to Fort Campbell from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
He said he did not instruct the public affairs office to retract the
statement or issue a correction because ``comments by my command
spokesperson regarding the case might well have influenced the
investigation, or suggested that I had reached premature conclusions
about the case, and might have influenced or tainted the deliberations
of any soldier serving on a court martial-panel.''
It is important for a commanding officer not to make statements that
might influence an investigation or court-martial. But it is well
established in military law that a statement may be made to correct a
false public statement, in order to avoid prejudice to the Government
or the accused.
General Clark's explanation is doubly unconvincing in the light of
the fact that the Fort Campbell public affairs office made a statement,
2 days after Clark returned to Fort Campbell, that there was ``no
evidence'' that Private Winchell was killed because he was gay. This
statement was clearly false, and it also raised a far more serious
issue about whether the command at Fort Campbell was undermining the
ability of the Government to prosecute the murder as a bias-motivated
offense.
In fact, anti-gay harassment continued in the months following the
murder.
The continuing anti-gay harassment at Fort Campbell was also
accompanied by a sudden exodus of soldiers discharged for violations of
the Homosexual Conduct Policy. In the 10 months after the murder, 120
soldiers were discharged from Fort Campbell under this policy, compared
to only 6 such discharges from Fort Campbell during the same time
period in the previous year. In all of 1999, there were 271 such
discharges in the entire Army.
Instead of dealing directly with the problem of anti-gay harassment,
General Clark chose to deny that any problem existed. In an op-ed
article in the New York Times, a year after the murder, he stated that
``There is not, nor has there ever been during my times here, a climate
of homophobia on post.''
In addition, he refused to meet with groups concerned about the
welfare of gay soldiers, including a local gay community group, and the
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, a national organization.
Another of General Clark's most serious failure of leadership after
the murder is the fact that, from all the evidence we have seen, he did
not even once speak out against the specific problems of anti-gay
harassment and anti-gay violence, or implement any training for the
soldiers against it.
He did take general steps after the Winchell murder to address the
quality of life for soldiers at Fort Campbell, and he reinforced
existing programs on the need to treat all soldiers with ``dignity and
respect.'' These measures were helpful, but hardly sufficient to
address the specific problem of anti-gay harassment.
Private Winchell's murder was an anti-gay hate crime, and it called
for, at the very least, a clear and unequivocal statement by Fort
Campbell's commanding officer that violence against homosexuals is
wrong. According to the record, no such statement was ever made.
General Clark has been asked repeatedly for instances in which he
spoke publicly about anti-gay harassment. In his response last November
6, 2002 to written questions, he listed a number of speeches, press
conferences, and publications, but none of these examples dealt with
the specific problem of anti-gay harassment.
For example, General Clark wrote that on January 14, 2000:
I published an article in the post newspaper, The Fort
Campbell Courier, in which I emphasized the quality of
soldiers serving at Fort Campbell, and outlines the
initiatives we had undertaken to eliminate anti-gay
harassment. I also reinforced our longstanding policy of
treating all soldiers with dignity and respect.
In fact the article itself contains no information regarding efforts
to address anti-gay harassment--not even a statement that such
harassment is wrong. The article includes only two references to
homosexuality.
First, General Clark writes that he has requested a review and
assessment:
to determine whether any member of this command violated the
Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct Policy in any
interaction with PFC Barry Winchell.
Second, he writes that he has:
issued a policy on the handling of discharges for homosexual
conduct to ensure these matters preserve the privacy and
dignity of individual soldiers.
There is nothing in the article about anti-gay harassment. It deals
only with the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy.
The article refers only to General Clark's efforts to improve
barracks conditions generally and his ``special emphasis'' on the
dignity of all soldiers. Much of the article is defensive in tone;
General Clark writes that the soldiers at Fort Campbell are the ``best
we have ever had,'' that they are ``intolerant of abuse of anybody for
any reason,'' and that ``leaders'' at Fort Campbell ``set the example
through word and deed.'' He concludes with this sentence:
This is the climate that exists at Fort Campbell, in
contrast to which you have seen on TV and in the papers
during these past few months.
This tone has characterized much of General Clark's public statements
during the remainder of his command at Fort Campbell. On June 9, 2000,
he said at a news conference that he objects:
in the strongest terms to the way our soldiers, and the
climate that embraces them, have been characterized.
At a Rotary Club meeting in March 2000--another event listed by
General Clark as an example of his efforts to address anti-gay
harassment--press reports, say that he:
used the Rotary speech to lambaste the Kentucky New Era and
other area newspapers
for printing an earlier story on his refusal to allow Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network to place an advertisement in the post newspaper.
The ad had listed an anonymous hotline number for the Army inspector
general's office and the telephone number for the organization. General
Clark justified his decision to reject the ad on the ground that the
inspector general's office had all the access it needed to soldiers on
post. Newspaper reports of General Clark's Rotary Club speech contained
no mention of any statement condemning anti-gay harassment.
I have repeatedly asked the Department to investigate this issue
further, to find out whether in fact General Clark made any statements
specifically addressing anti-gay harassment and anti-gay violence
following the
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Winchell murder. But the responses of the Department have been
inadequate.
In response to similar questions by the parents, the inspector
general stated:
During the 6 months following the murder, Major General
Clark was personally involved in talking to Commanders at all
levels about the anti-gay harassment.
There have been other cases where commanding officers have had to
respond to tragedies, and they have done so in a variety of ways that
demonstrate their leadership.
Many have drawn comparisons between General Clark's response in this
case and General John Keane's response to the murder of African
American civilians at Fort Bragg by racist soldiers. After these
murders, General Keane held a 1-year anniversary remembrance and
publicly offered his condolences. He met with the NAACP and the Anti-
Defamation League to discuss the murders and consider ways to improve
the racial climate.
General Keane offered very strong public statements against racism,
and he implemented sensitivity training on the base. General Clark did
none of this.
In all the services, discrimination against gays is codified in the
ban on their service in military. In reporting anti-gay discrimination,
soldiers face potential investigation, further harassment, and even
discharge. This makes this population even more vulnerable to acts of
harassment and violence, which makes it even more essential for leaders
to act quickly and effectively in response to attacks on soldiers
perceived to be gay.
In the recent controversy at the Air Force Academy, the senior
leadership has been held accountable, from the Commandant of the
Academy, to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Commandant of the Air
Force Academy has been held responsible for the shortcomings of his
subordinate commanders.
General Clark never held a single officer responsible for the command
climate that led to the murder of Private Winchell. General Clark did
not take responsibility for addressing the problem of anti-gay
harassment at Fort Campbell after the murder. He should bear the
ultimate responsibility for the climate that led to this tragedy and
for not remedying that climate afterwards.
These are important questions that go to the heart of this officer's
suitability for promotion to lieutenant general. The Senate deserves
better information acting on such a controversial nomination.
I will just review for a few moments the difference between Fort
Bragg and Fort Campbell. This is the difference, the comparison between
General Keane's response to the murder of two African-American
civilians and General Clark's response to the murder of PVT Barry
Winchell. Fort Bragg:
In December 1995, three White Fort Bragg soldiers murdered
two Black North Carolina civilians. Then Fort Bragg
commanding general, LTG John Keane, currently General Keane,
did the following actions after the murder:
At Fort Bragg, an on-base memorial service for
``remembrance and reconciliation'' was held 1 year after the
murders. Lieutenant General Keane publicly communicated
strong condolences.
On General Clark's actions after the murder, he declined to meet with
the Winchell family, did not attend the Winchells' on-base memorial
service held shortly following the murder, and did not hold any
subsequent memorial events.
LTG John Keane invited the NAACP and the ADL to discuss the murders
and work with the base to improve the racial climate. The local NAACP
leader, James Florence, on the NAACP's relationship with Fort Bragg,
said:
Since [the murders] we have had a liaison with Fort Bragg.
We can talk with them almost any time we need.
General Clark declined to meet with the gay groups, declined to meet
with the legal defense funds, and declined to meet with gay veterans
organizations.
There is a dramatic difference between two commanding officers and
how they dealt with the hate crimes. General Keane's response to the
soldiers after the murders? LTG John Keane and the Army launched an
aggressive program to ``weed skinheads and extremists out of the
military.'' General Keane said:
We did not see this cancer coming. We missed the signs,
symbols, and manifestations of extremism.
General Keane implemented sensitivity training at Fort Bragg
regarding race relations. He said:
We've educated our people, in terms of what to look for and
how to deal with it, and when we find soldiers whose
attitudes and behavior are disruptive to good order and
discipline of our unit, we are going to act.
General Clark publicly stated there was not a climate of homophobia
on Fort Campbell, did not make any public statements or issue any
written directives and never publicly communicated an appreciation of
the harm caused by the antigay murder.
There are dramatic differences between how an officer dealt with
this, who continues to serve with great distinction in our service, and
the nominee.
Finally, here is the comparison between General Clark's response to
the murder of PVT Barry Winchell and the response of the Air Force
Academy leaders on sexual assaults. At the Air Force Academy during the
period of 1993 through 2003, 60 cases of sexual assault were reported.
Earlier this year, LTG John Dallager, the academy commandant from 2000
to 2003, lost his third star and retired as a major general because the
Secretary of the Air Force determined he ``did not exercise the degree
of leadership in this situation that we expect of our commanders.''
In September 2003, an independent panel commissioned to review the
climate situation issued a report supporting the demotion of General
Dallager and recommending an additional review to assess the actions
taken by other leaders and holding individuals accountable.
On General Clark, in July 1999, two Fort Campbell soldiers murdered
Barry Winchell because they believed him to be gay. This murder
occurred on the base, in the barracks. This murder and additional
problems with antigay harassment occurred during the tenure of
Commander Clark and there has been no response.
My final point on the ultimate responsibility:
General Dallager is the Academy leader--[this was the
finding]--bearing ultimate responsibility for the failure to
adequately respond to sexual assault issues.
The Panel concurs with the decision . . . to retire General
Dallager. . . .
Retire him.
On the ultimate responsibility, Army leadership doctrine states that
commanders:
. . . have to answer for how their subordinates live and what
they do after work.
That is in the field manual.
In a July 19, 2000 article in the New York Times, General Clark
stated:
There is no, nor has there ever been during my times here,
a climate of homophobia on post.
General Shinseki, on July 21, 2000, stated in a DoD News Briefing:
We take full responsibility for what happened to Private
Winchell. . . .
There is General Shinseki taking responsibility. There is a general.
We take full responsibility for what happened to Private
Winchell.
General Clark has failed to accept similar responsibility in this
case and doesn't deserve the promotion.
On another matter, I believe there is some remaining time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was going to reply to some of the points
my colleague from Massachusetts made. As you well know, the General----
Mr. KENNEDY. May I reserve the remainder of my time? Is this on the
Senator's time?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Since I had the floor, I want this additional comment I
would like to make on another subject, but I also want to respond to
the questions of the Senator, so I will be glad to do whatever you
would like.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary question: We are on this
nomination with 2 hours of debate and 1 hour each divided equally. I
manage this side and Senator Kennedy manages that side. If the Senator
wishes to go on to another matter, I am not sure how the Senator wishes
to handle this.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is not difficult, I think, since I
have 40 minutes. I will use my remaining time and ask that my comments
be inserted into another part of the Record so it doesn't interfere,
and then I will be glad to answer any questions of the Senator.
[[Page S15033]]
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Massachusetts
will accommodate the Senator from Virginia. I would like to make some
comments with respect to his important remarks while they are fresh in
the minds of the listeners. I think it is appropriate that I take a
little time. Then, as far as I am concerned, we will both yield back
our time and the Senator from Massachusetts can take some time on
another matter, if he wishes. Is that helpful?
Mr. KENNEDY. How long did the Senator plan to speak?
Mr. WARNER. I will summarize my comments in about 5 or 6 minutes, at
the conclusion of which we could both yield our time.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if the Senator wants to address the
Senate first, Senator Dayton was yielded 15 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. That is under the order. I didn't realize he just walked
in the Chamber. I am trying to do the best I can to accommodate
everybody and manage the time efficiently. But I do desire at this
point in time an opportunity to reply to my colleague from
Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will yield the floor for that purpose
and ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion I be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senate had a comparison between how
General Keane and General Clark handled problems within their
respective commands. General Clark was the convening authority, and the
tragedy that occurred to which the Senator referred, and which is the
subject of some comments here today, came up through the military
command, was handled by the military courts and the military
authorities, and adjudicated. As the convening authority, I think he
took some prudent steps to make certain that in no way could he be
accused of command influence. The tragedy in General Keane's command
was tried in the civilian courts, and as such he was not the convening
authority. He then had the opportunity to do some things which I
believe General Clark did not.
Out of this tragedy, there were lessons learned in the Army. I think
some important new policy matters were put into the regulations.
Otherwise, not all was lost in this tragic situation.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Army
Inspector General's Report on Fort Campbell at the conclusion of my
remarks. That is the first section of it that addresses a number of
points that are raised by the Senator from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe from reading this report--not in
the words of the Senator from Massachusetts that no one was trying to
stop these tragic situations--that it was generally a positive command
climate. There were some isolated instances of harassment, sexual in
nature. I concede that is in the Record. But the total quantity of
these incidents, in my judgment, was not indicative of a breakdown in
the command responsibilities under General Clark.
General Clark, as I said, came to the committee on two occasions and
subjected himself quite willingly--indeed, under oath; I put him under
oath at the second hearing--and he responded to the cross-examination,
much of which the distinguished colleague from Massachusetts has raised
today.
In conclusion, he has an extremely impressive record of military
service stretching back to 1970. Much of that has been covered by my
colleague from Kentucky.
Mind you, Fort Campbell is an installation that can at times host a
daily population of 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company-
sized units.
In July of 1999, this brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by
an intoxicated 18-year-old soldier who used frightful force against PFC
Barry Winchell. This resulted in his death, allegedly while he was
sleeping. No one underestimates the seriousness of this crime.
Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of
Private First Class Winchell. Like General Clark, we extended our
sympathy and sorrow for their loss. The committee listened very closely
to the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by
General Clark and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at
Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Levin and I asked Private
First Class Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns they
had raised with us at that meeting in a letter, and we would obtain
answers from the Department of Defense--specifically, the Department of
the Army--and share those answers with them. That we did. The parents
sent us a letter and Senator Levin and I forwarded these questions to
the Department. In September, the Department responded to questions and
expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination.
I ask unanimous consent that all of these matters be printed in the
Record at the end of my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, not only the steps taken by the Armed
Services Committee, together with my distinguished colleague Senator
Levin, but indeed by the Department of the Army into other areas
overall reflect, I think, that our committee carefully looked into this
matter and that the Department of the Army was responsive to the
questions raised by my colleagues.
Mr. President, MG Clark is highly qualified for promotion to the rank
of lieutenant general assignment as Commander of the Fifth United
States Army. He was first nominated for this position in the fall of
2002. He has appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
executive session on two separate occasions, and, on both occasions
conducted himself with deferrence and respect for the members of the
committee, and with appreciation for the Constitutionally-based advise
and consent power--and responsibility--of the Senate. Not surprisingly,
General Clark has the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Schoomaker, and the civilian leadership of the Army for this
promotion.
General Clark has an extremely impressive record of military service
stretching back to his commissioning in 1970. General Clark's military
record includes combat service in Viet Nam for which he was awarded the
Bronze Star with Combat ``V.'' He has served as a Battalion Commander
and a Brigade Commander with the renowned ``Screaming Eagles'' of the
101st Airborne Division. In this capacity, he participated in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Major General Clark later
served as Chief of Staff for the 101st Airborne Division, and from 1998
through 2000 as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and
Fort Campbell, KY.
Fort Campbell is an installation that can, at times, host a daily
population of over 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company sized
units. In July 1999, a brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by
a drunken, 18-year-old soldier who bludgeoned Private First Class Barry
Winchell to death in his sleep. This tragic and senseless crime was not
foreseeable--not foreseeable by PFC Winchell's company commander and
certainly not foreseeable by Major General Clark. General Clark capably
and competently fulfilled his responsibility as General court-Martial
convening authority in this murder trial and took steps necessary to
ensure that the perpetrator of this crime and an accomplice were
brought to justice. This was accomplished and the soldier who murdered
PFC Winchell is serving a life sentence.
Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of PFC
Winchell. We, like General Clark, extended our sympathy and sorrow for
their loss. As leaders of the committee, we listened very closely to
the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by
General Clark, and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at
Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
At the conclusion of our meeting, Senator Levin and I asked PFC
Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns that they had
raised with us in a letter, and we would obtain answers from the
department and share those answer with them. The parents did so, and we
sent their questions to the department in June.
[[Page S15034]]
In late September, the department responded to the questions, and
expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination. The
Army undertook to conduct inquiries through the Army Inspector General
in response to the questions raised by the parents, and, I believe, did
respond fully to the issues that were raised.
In late September, Senator Levin and I forwarded the Department's
response to PFC Winchell's parents inviting them to respond. They did
so on October 8th. On October 10, Senator Levin and I forwarded their
letter to the department together with additional questions from
Senator Kennedy requesting comment. We received a response from
secretary Abell and Acting Secretary Brownlee on October 21st and,
shortly thereafter, we conducted our second executive session.
The committee compiled a very thorough record about all the issues
raised by Senator Kennedy and others. I will not go into specific
details, but it is important to note that the Army Inspector General
conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the July
1999 death of PFC Winchell after the court-martial was completed, and
the IG found no basis to support accusations of dereliction of duty and
failure of leadership by General Clark. To the contrary, the
investigation found a positive command climate at Fort Campbell and
refuted the assertions that Major General Clark should have done more
or could have prevented this tragedy.
I am very concerned about ensuring accountability of military
officers, and I have insisted at looking very closely at the actions of
military leaders who are entrusted with command. I am satisfied that
General Clark did not fail in his command responsibility and is fully
deserving of promotion. I urge my colleagues to support this
nomination.
Exhibit I
executive summary
Background
On 5 July 1999, Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell, D
Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, was murdered by a fellow soldier.
Following this incident, and amid claims that PFC Winchell
was murdered because he was or was perceived to be a
homosexual, allegations arose concerning the command climate
at Fort Campbell particularly as it related to the command's
enforcement of the Department of Defense (DOD) Homosexual
Conduct Policy [hereinafter the Policy]. The Army pledged
early on to assess the command climate and investigate the
alleged violations of the Policy; however, to avoid
interfering in the individual judicial proceedings underway,
the Army could not begin that effort until the conclusion of
the two courts-martial arising out of PFC Winchell's death.
On 10 January 2000, the Secretary of the Army (SA) directed
that the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG)
conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of PFC Winchell as it related to the
Policy (enclosed) [hereinafter referred to as directive]. In
addition, the DAIG was tasked to conduct an assessment of the
command climate then existing in PFC Winchell's unit prior to
his death and an overall assessment of the command climate
existing at Fort Campbell prior to PFC Winchell's death,
specifically as it related to the Policy. Finally, the DAIG
was directed to provide an overall assessment of the
Department of the Army's (DA) implementation of the Policy.
The Fort Campbell assessment provided the initial data for
the Army assessment of the Policy. The Army IG will continue
to assess these issues as part of their continuing inspection
program.
Task Force Composition, Training, and Methodology
A Task Force of 27 individuals was established to conduct
the investigation and assessment in accordance with the
directive. The Task Force was composed of inspectors general
(IGs), one legal advisor, and subject matter experts. During
early February, the Task Force received training from the
subject matter experts in the areas of the Policy itself,
Equal Opportunity (EO), interview techniques, and group
dynamics. Further, the Task Force conducted mock individual
interviews and group sensing sessions in order to validate
the assessment strategy. Finally, at the request of the
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN), key leaders of
the Task Force met with representatives of the SLDN to
identify specific concerns of the organization. The SLDN is a
national legal aid organization that assists soldiers
affected by the Policy.
The scope of the assessment included the following:
Interviews with the commanding general, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), both assistant division commanders
who were occupying those positions in July 1999, and
interviews with 47 brigade and battalion-level commanders
from both divisional and nondivisional tenant units.
In addition, the Task Force conducted 68 sensing sessions
composed of soldiers randomly-selected by utilizing the
last two digits of the social security number. In these
sessions, 568 soldiers were interviewed and 1,385 command
climate surveys were administered throughout Fort
Campbell. With respect to the sensing sessions, it should
be noted that all of these soldiers were assigned to Fort
Campbell from the period of April 1999 through February
2000. In addition, participants who completed a command
climate survey were informed that the responses would be
anonymous.
In addition to interviews conducted on Fort Campbell, the
investigation team conducted on-site interviews at Fort
Benning and Fort Leonard Wood, as well as telephonic
interviews with soldiers assigned to Korea, Fort Drum, Fort
Knox, Fort Jackson and the United States Military Academy.
Civilian members of the Fort Campbell community as well as
former members of the Army were also interviewed by the
investigation team.
Finally, Task Force members gathered relevant data through
on-site inspections and additional periodic spot checks of
unit recreation centers, public use areas, and barracks
living areas. Finally, the Task Force secured information by
directly observing on-post soldier events to include physical
fitness training sessions.
History and Background of the Policy
On 29 January 1993, the President directed the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) to review DOD policy on homosexuals in the
military. On 19 July 1993, the SecDef directed the following:
applicants for military service as well as current
servicemembers would not be asked nor required to reveal
their sexual orientation; sexual orientation would not be a
bar to entry into the service or continued service unless
manifested by homosexual conduct; and commanders and
investigating agencies would not initiate investigation
solely to determine a member's sexual orientation. On 30
November 1993, Congress enacted 10 United States Code (USC),
Section 654, policy concerning homosexuality in the armed
forces.
Assessment Results
Finding 1
Objective: Examine alleged violations of the DOD Homosexual
Conduct Policy during the period preceding PFC Winchell's
death.
Findings: 1. A preponderance of evidence indicated that two
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in PFC Winchell's chain of
command and a fellow private (PVT) inquired into PFC
Winchell's sexual orientation. In addition, at least one NCO
referred to PFC Winchell as a ``faggot.''
2. In spite of this, however, the evidence gathered
demonstrated that the chain of command was proactive in
terminating the sporadic incidents of derogatory or offensive
cadences during unit marches and physical training (PT)
formations.
Summary: Evidence obtained from Fort Campbell indicated
that in late May 1999 PFC Winchell asked an NCO from his
unit, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment,
``What would happen if a guy in the military was gay?'' In
responding to that question, the NCO asked PFC Winchell if he
was a homosexual. Testimony revealed that the NCO asked the
question in an effort to offer assistance to PFC Winchell in
getting professional guidance or assistance in addressing the
issue.
Evidence gathered indicated that an NCO in PFC Winchell's
unit referred to PFC Winchell as well as other members of the
unit as ``faggots'' in describing those who failed to perform
to his standards. On one occasion, the NCO referred to PFC
Winchell as a ``faggot'' after PFC Winchell reported to work
in what appeared to be an intoxicated state.
The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that PFC
Winchell's chain of command did not condone demeaning or
derogatory cadences made during the conduct of unit PT. In
those instances where inappropriate remarks were made,
company leaders made on-the-spot corrections.
Finding 2
Objective: Determine whether the local IG's office
responded appropriately to any complaints of violations of
the DOD Policy it may have received prior to PFC Winchell's
death.
Finding: The Fort Campbell IG office properly responded to
the only known complaint of a violation of the Policy prior
to 5 July 1999 when they followed standard Army IG guidance
by recommending PFC Winchell provide his commanders the
opportunity to resolve his complaint prior to direct IG
intervention with the command.
Summary: Immediately after the NCO called PFC Winchell a
``faggot,'' another NCO escorted PFC Winchell to the IG
office to file a complaint. Upon being advised that he should
provide his commander the first opportunity to address the
issue, PFC Winchell was then escorted to his company
commander. Evidence obtained indicated that the company
commander counseled the NCO regarding his inappropriate
remarks.
Finding 3
Objectives: 1. Conduct an overall assessment of the command
climate existing at Fort Campbell prior to 5 July 1999,
specifically as it relates to the application and enforcement
of the DOD Policy.
2. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's chain of
command understood the application and enforcement of the DOD
Policy.
[[Page S15035]]
3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected members
at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which members
felt they understood the Policy and the degree to which the
Policy was being enforced.
4. Assess the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment before 5 July 1999.
Findings: 1. Through sensing sessions, interviews, and
surveys across Fort Campbell, it was determined that the
command climate at Fort Campbell before 5 July 1999 was a
positive environment with exceptions related to medical
support, on- and off-post housing, after-duty-hours
recreation, and shortages of personnel in authorized grades.
Most soldiers indicated satisfaction with their mission,
training, and organizational leadership.
2. With respect to the Policy, it was clear that the chain
of command, from commanding general (CG) through company
leaders, responded appropriately to matters with respect to
enforcement of the Policy.
3. The specific assessment of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment's command climate prior to 5 July
1999 was determined to be poor due primarily to leadership
failure of a senior NCO, perceptions pertaining to underage
drinking, and other factors beyond the direct control of the
company, such as shortages of personnel in authorized grades
and quality of life (QOL) issues.
Summary: In evaluating the overall command climate at Fort
Campbell, personnel were asked to compare the command climate
as it existed in February 2000 with the command climate the
year prior. Overall, personnel indicated that the command
climate was favorable. The majority of personnel questioned
believed that the leadership at Fort Campbell was effective
and concerned and treated personnel favorably. In addition,
the majority of personnel questioned felt that the chain of
command responded appropriately to issues presented to them.
Finally, personnel believed that the leadership led by
example.
QOL issues contributed to low morale at Fort Campbell.
Specifically, issues relating to the conditions in the
barracks, problems associated with medical care at Fort
Campbell, and treatment received by soldiers from the
civilian employees and individuals in the surrounding
civilian communities were the major areas of concern to those
questioned.
In general, the application and enforcement of the Policy
did not appear to be a problem at Fort Campbell. Most leaders
took appropriate action in instances where application of the
Policy was warranted and appeared to be operating well within
the confines of the Policy. Soldiers acknowledged, however,
that the joking and bantering that had occurred prior to July
1999 on a regular basis could be viewed as harassment.
Following training on the Policy and Consideration of Others
(COO), soldiers are now more apt to reconsider uttering
phrases that would likely be considered harassment.
However, the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment, in the period prior to PFC
Winchell's murder was poor. In addition to the QOL issues
identified above, soldiers in PFC Winchell's unit believed
that personnel shortages and underage drinking in the
barracks to the poor command climate. The most significant
factor contributing to the poor command climate, however, was
the presence of an abusive NCO in a leadership position in
the unit.
Finding 4
Objective: Review and resolve allegations by Private Second
Class (PV2) Javier Torres and others of specific violations
of the Policy.
Summary of Findings: The preponderance of evidence did not
support PV2 Torres' allegation that he was personally
harassed at Fort Campbell; however, evidence does support his
allegation of routine personal harassment at Fort Benning and
occasional personal harassment at Fort Knox. The
preponderance of evidence supported PV2 Torres' allegations
that during initial entry training (IET) at Fort Benning, one
drill sergeant improperly addressed or referred to him as a
homosexual, and another PVT provoked a fight with him by
routinely taunting him and referring to him as a homosexual.
The evidence also supported PV2 Torres' allegation that at
Fort Campbell a senior NCO improperly used terms derogatory
to homosexuals while trying to motivate male soldiers to
perform to standard and two NCOs improperly used terms
derogatory to homosexuals while singing cadences during a
physical training run. It did not support his allegations
that an NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly used
anti-homosexual language while conducting training on the
Homosexual Conduct Policy, that a soldier at Fort Knox
improperly inquired into his sexual orientation, and that an
NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly inquired into his
sexual orientation.
The preponderance of evidence supported allegations that an
NCO at Fort Campbell read a joke to soldiers that was
demeaning to homosexuals; anti-homosexual graffiti was
present on a wall of a latrine in a unit area, a latrine
in a public recreation area, and a latrine in a work area
at Fort Campbell; and a nongovernmental civilian, not a
soldier, sent an e-mail containing anti-homosexual
language to a former soldier at Fort Campbell. The
preponderance of evidence did not support allegations that
anti-homosexual comments made by soldiers at Fort Campbell
were the ``norm,'' soldiers made threatening and
inappropriate comments during training on the Policy, an
e-mail with a sound wave file attached that contained
language demeaning to homosexuals was circulated at Fort
Campbell, and an NCO's chain of command improperly
inquired into his sexual orientation.
Finding 5
Objectives: 1. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's
chain of command understood the application and enforcement
of the Policy.
2. Conduct an overall assessment of the command climate
that existed then at Fort Campbell, specifically as it
relates to the application, enforcement, and training
conducted on the Homosexual Conduct Policy.
3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected military
members at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which
members felt they understood the Policy and the degree to
which they believed the Policy was being enforced.
Finding: There was no sustainment training conducted at
Fort Campbell on the Policy before 5 July 1999 because there
was no clearly articulated requirement on how often personnel
were to be trained and who was to receive the training. The
published guidance indicated: ``All officers and enlisted
personnel of the Active Army and Reserve Components will
receive briefings upon entry and periodically thereafter.''
Institutional training of personnel on the implementation and
enforcement of the Policy was ineffective. Most officers,
NCOs, and soldiers at Fort Campbell lacked an understanding
and working knowledge of the Policy prior to 5 July 1999.
Summary: Nearly all soldiers, NCOs, and officers at Fort
Campbell had received training on the Policy at some point in
their military career. The training that was conducted,
however, did not contribute meaningfully to an understanding
or working knowledge of the Policy.
As a result, most personnel did not demonstrate a clear
understanding of their responsibilities under the Policy and
the standards contained within the Policy.
Finding 6
Objective: Assess whether current training materials
adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
Findings: 1. Currently, commanders, leaders, and soldiers
at Fort Campbell do not have a clear understanding of the
Policy because training and informational materials do not
adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
2. Training and informational guidance contain key words
(Don't Ask, Don't Tell) that are not defined in doctrine.
Summary: Based on interviews with commanders, leaders, and
soldiers, the results of the command climate survey, and a
review of records and files at Fort Campbell, it was
determined that the training provided on the Policy is not
clearly written, not tailored to specific audiences based on
rank and duty positions, fails to adequately convey the
substance of the Policy, and is presented in a format which
does not foster open and meaningful discussion on the issues.
Informational materials distributed to Army personnel, to
include a Hot Topics pullout in Soldiers Magazine and a
trifold pamphlet, suffered from the same defects according to
personnel. The use of the terms ``Don't Ask'' and ``Don't
Tell'' in the informational materials without providing
definitions to explain these phrases created a large amount
of anxiety and confusion.
Finding 7
Objective: Provide an overall assessment of the DA's
implementation of the DOD Policy by assessing:
1. Whether the Policy is being fairly applied within units.
2. Whether there are currently any other perceived
deficiencies in the Policy which preclude effective training,
application, and enforcement of the Policy.
Findings: 1. The Policy is being fairly applied at Fort
Campbell; however, the Policy with respect to discharges and
substantial investigations is not being implemented as
intended because commanders perceive an unacceptable risk to
the unit and soldier by retaining soldiers who make
admissions of homosexuality.
2. Commanders have difficulty in balancing their
responsibility to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order,
and discipline while enforcing the Policy. They perceive that
the current implementing instructions restrain their latitude
to conduct inquiries and preclude them from exercising
reasonable discretion in initiating inquiries.
3. AR 600-20 and subsequent Army guidance and messages
regarding the reporting of harassment based on homosexual
orientation do not adequately advise soldiers where or how to
report harassment, and do not adequately advise commanders
and agencies how to process these complaints.
Summary: The Task Force determined that the Policy was
being fairly applied by commanders at Fort Campbell. The
soldiers discharged under Chapter 15 were overall satisfied
with their treatment during the process. The Fort Campbell
commanders expressed concern in complying with the Policy.
They believe it places them in a professional dilemma by
requiring them to choose between retention of a soldier who
declares a propensity for homosexual conduct and discharge
when the truthfulness of his statement of homosexuality is
suspect. They are
[[Page S15036]]
reluctant to conduct inquiries of the truthfulness of an
admission because of the perceived risk to both the unit and
the individual soldier.
Commanders stated to the Task Force that they had
difficulty in balancing the enforcement of the Policy and the
requirement to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order,
and discipline. Commanders expressed concerns that the Policy
precludes them from conducting an inquiry when presented with
credible information of behavior that demonstrates a soldier
may have a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. They
believe the Policy precludes them from exercising reasonable
discretion in determining the necessity to conduct an
inquiry.
Information gathered by the Task Force determined that
guidance on reporting harassment based on sexual orientation
by soldiers and investigation into such harassment by leaders
is unclear and confusing. Soldiers and leaders expressed
frustration with knowing how and to whom to report harassment
and how to handle incidents of this type of harassment. They
expressed the belief that all harassment should be dealt with
uniformly.
In summary commanders and leaders at all levels have an
inherent responsibility for establishing a command climate
that promotes good order and discipline essential to
accomplishing the Army's mission. This responsibility
includes promoting unit cohesion by identifying and
eliminating harassment before it occurs or results in reports
of violations of Army Standards.
____
Exhibit II
Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense
Washington, DC, March 11, 2003.
Hon. John W. Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in reference to the
nomination of Major General Robert T. Clark, United States
Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and
for assignment as Commanding General, Fifth United States
Army that the President recently sent to the Senate. The
President previously forwarded Major General Clark's
nomination to the Senate on September 10, 2002; however, his
nomination was not acted upon by the Senate prior to the
Senate's sine die adjournment on November 22, 2002.
The Secretary of Defense considered reported information
concerning Major General Clark. Major General Clark was in
command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort
Campbell at the time Private First Class Barry Winchell, a
member of the command who was perceived to be homosexual, was
murdered in his barracks by another member of the command.
The Department of the Army Inspector General conducted an
investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding
the death of Private First Class Winchell and the Inspector
General conducted a command climate assessment at Fort
Campbell. Neither the investigation nor the command climate
assessment determined that Major General Clark was culpable.
We previously provided you with a copy of the Department of
the Army Inspector General's Report and this incident was
addressed in detail at an Executive Session of the Senate
Armed Services Committee in the 107th Congress.
I have attached a copy of the following information for
your consideration: chronology of the actions and initiatives
taken by the Department of Defense and the Department of the
Army immediately following the death of Private First Class
Winchell; a detailed chronology of published policies and
actions of the dignity and respect for all soldiers directed
by Major General Clark while serving as the Commanding
General of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell; and
a list of initiatives implemented by Major General Clark with
respect to Homosexual Conduct Policy subsequent to the death
of Private first Class Winchell.
After careful review of all information, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of the Army continued to support
Major General Clark for appointment to the grade of
lieutenant general and for assignment as Commanding General,
Fifth United States Army. When considered in light of Major
General Clark's past performance and future potential, we
believe proceeding with the nomination is clearly in the best
interest of the Department of the Army and the Department of
Defense.
The Department appreciates your assistance in facilitating
the confirmation of pending nominations.
Sincerely,
Charles S. Abell,
Principal Deputy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the chairman of the
committee, Senator Warner, for all of his courtesies during the
consideration of this nominee. I mentioned during my comments that we
wanted to get additional answers. He has been extremely accommodating
to those of us who raised the questions, as he always is as the
chairman of the committee. I thank him for his fairness and ensuring
that all of those who had concerns were able to conduct our concerns in
accordance with the rules. I thank him very much for all of his
courtesies.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
Mr. KENNEDY. Senator Bunning I know has a great interest in this. I
thank him also.
I will address the Senate briefly on another matter which is of
importance and consequence to the Senate. Then I will yield the time
because I know my colleague wants to address this issue. Then we will
be prepared to move to a vote.
How much time do I have remaining, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 17 minutes of the 40 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Chair. If you would let me know when 15
minutes have been used, I would appreciate it.