[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 167 (Tuesday, November 18, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15029-S15036]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


    NOMINATION OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT T. CLARK TO BE LIEUTENANT GENERAL

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, pursuant to the order of November 14, I 
ask that the Senate now proceed to executive session to begin 
consideration of Executive Calendar No. 418, the nomination of Maj. 
Gen. Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. 
Robert T. Clark to be Lieutenant General.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who desire 
to speak. I will just say a few words. To accommodate my distinguished 
colleague from Kentucky, who has been a valiant supporter of this 
nomination and very persistent over this long period of time, I will 
yield the floor. He then could be followed by the Senator from 
Massachusetts and then I would continue my remarks.
  I wonder if I just might ask unanimous consent that the Senator from 
Virginia proceed for not to exceed 3 or 4 minutes, followed by the 
Senator from Kentucky for about 10 or 12 minutes, followed by the 
Senator from Massachusetts. How much time does my colleague desire?
  Mr. KENNEDY. I think 40 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Not to exceed a period of about 40 minutes for the 
Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I think Senator Dayton also had 15 minutes. I think 
there is a unanimous consent agreement for this; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. I was not able to hear.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I think there is a consent that has been agreed to 
whereby there are 2 hours equally divided, with 40 minutes for myself 
and 15 minutes for Senator Dayton.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct on that.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I will not necessarily take all of that time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
  Major General Clark is a highly qualified officer for promotion to 
the rank of lieutenant general. I have met with him several times. His 
proposed assignment by the Secretary of Defense is to be Commander of 
the Fifth U.S. Army.
  He was first nominated for this position in the fall of 2002. He has 
appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive 
session on two separate occasions. On both occasions he conducted 
himself with deference and respect not only for the serious issues at 
hand but for all persons involved in this tragic sequence of facts 
which preceded his nomination.
  He expressed great respect for the constitutionally-based advise and 
consent power and the responsibility of the Senate to look into this 
nomination with great thoroughness. Not surprisingly, General Clark has 
the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, 
and the civilian leadership of the Army for this promotion. Indeed, the 
Secretary of Defense personally, in a very respectful way, has talked 
to me about this nomination and his strong support for this nominee.
  I will detail at length later on in the course of this debate the 
very thorough steps taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I 
commend my colleagues on the committee. There were unusual facts 
associated with this nomination involving tragic loss of life, a strong 
disciplinary action against those who brought about the direct harm to 
the victim who gave his life. In the course of that, I and other 
members of the committee took it upon ourselves to meet with the family 
members of the deceased victim in this particular case. I wish to 
commend them. They handled themselves in a manner of great distinction, 
given the depth of emotion on their part.
  I also commend the former Vice Chief of the Army, General Keane. He 
took it upon himself time and time again, working with the 
distinguished Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, to repeatedly 
go back and reinvestigate certain aspects of this case, I hope to the 
satisfaction of all Members, certainly to this Senator and generally 
members of the committee.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor to accommodate my colleague. I again 
thank him for his strong tenacity in supporting this nomination 
throughout.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of MG Robert 
Clark to the rank of lieutenant general and commander of the Fifth 
Army. I first met General Clark over 5 years ago when he was commander 
of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY. Since that time, I 
have known General Clark to be an honest man and an excellent soldier. 
The military communities in Kentucky and Tennessee surrounding Fort 
Campbell admire General Clark very much. He is well respected 
throughout the Army, and we should be grateful that we have soldiers 
like General Clark serving and protecting our Nation.
  GEN Jack Keane, who commanded General Clark at Fort Campbell, said 
this about him:

       In my 37 years of service, I have never met an officer who 
     is such a tower of character and integrity. His peers, 
     subordinates, and superiors all respect and admire him for 
     the truly special person that he is.

  General Clark loves the Army and he loves his country. Some may even 
say that General Clark was born with the desire to serve his country in 
his blood. Both of his grandfathers served in both World War I and 
World War II. His father served for 31 years and fought in both World 
War II and the Korean conflict. His older brother served in Vietnam. 
One of his younger brothers is an Air Force colonel, and another 
brother is an Army lieutenant colonel on the front lines in Korea.
  The Clark family has made many sacrifices so that future generations 
of Americans can live in peace. General Clark has given 33 years of his 
life in the armed service to this great Nation. He is a decorated 
soldier and has shed his own blood for our country. He led a platoon in 
Vietnam, commanded a brigade that was dropped deep into Iraq during 
Operation Desert Storm.
  As commanding general of the 101st Screaming Eagles, he deployed 
himself, with his troops, all over the world, from Kuwait to El 
Salvador. Most recently, General Clark has been deputy commander of the 
Fifth Army and mobilized Guard and Reserves for homeland defense and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has worn just about every hat the Army has 
to offer.
  COL Mike Oates, who served under General Clark at Fort Campbell, said 
this about him:

       He spoke straight to the soldiers. He looked them in the 
     eye and he set high standards for wearing our equipment and 
     how we behaved. Discipline is what keeps good units effective 
     and reliable. He enforced discipline and set the example 
     himself.

  I could go on and on about General Clark's distinguished career. But 
I need to address the tragic incident that has held up his nomination, 
which occurred while General Clark was at Fort Campbell. A murder 
occurred at Fort Campbell on July 5, 1999. PVT Barry Winchell was 
killed in a tragic event that none of us should ever forget. Private 
Winchell was murdered by a fellow soldier, who is serving--and 
deservedly so--a life sentence for this horrendous crime.
  I do not wish to address the details of this horrible murder, but I 
do wish to

[[Page S15030]]

extend my thoughts and prayers to Private Winchell's family and 
friends. I have spoken with General Clark several times about this 
tragic incident. I know how sorry he is about the murder of Private 
Winchell, especially since it did happen on his post and under his 
leadership.
  But it is important to note that after the incident--and as the 
general court martial convening authority--General Clark approved the 
maximum punishment for the convicted murderer.

  I want to set the record straight. A small, yet loud minority has 
blamed General Clark for this tragic death. Nothing could be further 
from the truth.
  A man who has given 33 years of his life to protect all Americans--
all Americans--does not deserve to be treated this way. Army 
investigations and many interviews were conducted to dispel the 
misinformation over this incident. And the Army has recommended General 
Clark for nomination to lieutenant general and commander of the Fifth 
Army because he is the most qualified soldier for this job.
  The President nominated General Clark for this post and important 
rank. It is important to note that the Senate Armed Services Committee 
approved his nomination.
  I thank Committee Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin for 
helping to move his nomination through the committee.
  Mr. President, our military has an old saying: ``Not for self, but 
for country.''
  Those who know General Clark in the Army and in the communities in 
which he has served all think of him when they hear this statement. 
General Clark is a man who has given his entire life not for self but 
for God and country. I thank him for it.
  We should all be grateful to him for all the sacrifices he has made 
for our freedoms and our protections. I urge my colleagues to support 
the nomination of GEN Robert Clark. He deserves it and he has earned 
it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may I express appreciation to my colleague 
from Kentucky again for his taking long hours to personally look into 
this case in a very objective way and in reaching his conclusions.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to remind me when I have 
used 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose the nomination of Major General 
Clark to the rank of lieutenant general.
  I agree that General Clark has a strong record as a soldier. He has 
received numerous decorations for his distinguished service and 
courage, and he has served in a number of leadership capacities during 
his more than 30 years in the Army.
  I am concerned, however, about General Clark's performance as 
Commanding General at Fort Campbell, KY, at the time of the brutal 
murder of PVT Barry Winchell on the base in 1999.
  There are few more respected units in the Army than the 101st 
Airborne Division at Fort Campbell. The ``Screaming Eagles,'' as the 
division is called, has a well-deserved reputation of professionalism, 
heroism, and outstanding performance. Yet, in the months leading up to 
the murder of Private Winchell, the command climate at Fort Campbell 
was seriously deficient. According to a report by the Army inspector 
general, Fort Campbell had command-wide low morale, and inadequate 
delivery of health care to soldiers and their families, and the 
leadership condoned widespread, leader-condoned underage drinking in 
the barracks.
  There is compelling evidence that anti-gay harassment was pervasive 
at Fort Campbell during this period. The inspector general reported 
multiple examples of anti-gay graffiti, the use of anti-gray slurs in 
cadences by non-commissioned officers during training runs, and routine 
remarks and bantering that, in the inspector general's words, ``could 
be viewed as harassment.'' Outside groups have documented many 
instances of anti-gay harassment in the months leading up to the 
murder.
  The inspector general also found that prior to the murder, there was 
no sustainment training at Fort Campbell on the proper implementation 
of the Homosexual Conduct Policy, known as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' 
and that, as a result, ``most officers, NCOs, and soldiers at Fort 
Campbell lacked an understanding and working knowledge of the Policy.''
  In his response to my questions, General Clark stated that he agrees 
with these findings, but that he was nevertheless not aware of even a 
single instance of anti-gay harassment before the murder.
  On July 5, 1999, after enduring anti-gay harassment for many months, 
including harassment by members of his chain of command, Private 
Winchell was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat by a fellow 
soldier in his barracks.
  It seems clear that if General Clark had exercised his responsibility 
to deal with the serious anti-gay harassment that was prevalent at Fort 
Campbell during his 17 months of command leading up to the murder of 
Private Winchell, the murder would probably not have occurred.
  Even more serious, however, was General Clark's performance at Fort 
Campbell in the days, weeks, and months following the murder. A brutal 
bias-motivated hate crime is an extraordinary event in any community, 
civilian or military, and it demands an extraordinary response from the 
community's leaders. Such a crime sends the poisonous message that some 
members of the community deserve to be victimized solely because of who 
they are. The potential for such a crime was magnified in this case 
because of the existing climate of anti-gay harassment at Fort 
Campbell, but the available evidence indicates that General Clark's 
response was not adequate with respect to his contacts with Private 
Winchell's family or his command responsibilities at Fort Campbell.
  One factual issue which I have repeatedly asked the Army to resolve, 
without receiving a satisfactory response, is why General Clark did not 
meet with the parents of Private Barry Winchell, Patricia and Wally 
Kutteles, in the days following his murder.
  Following such a brutal murder it is difficult to believe that such a 
meeting did not take place. Any responsible and compassionate 
commanding officer would want to meet with and console the parents of 
the murdered soldier, even if no request for such a meeting had 
formally been made.
  I understand that during the 4 days immediately following the murder, 
General Clark was at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington 
with his wife, who was undergoing tests for a longstanding illness. It 
is understandable that General Clark had declined to meet with the 
parents for this reason, during that period and did not attend the 
memorial service for Private Winchell on July 9. But Clark did not meet 
with the parents in the days after his return to Fort Campbell from 
Walter Reed Hospital nor in the weeks and months that followed the 
Winchell murder. Instead, he states that he never received a request to 
meet with the parents, but he would gladly have met with then if he had 
received a request to do so.
  Patricia Kutteles, Private Winchell's mother, has submitted a sworn 
affidavit stating that she and her husband traveled to Fort Campbell 
immediately after hearing about her son's murder. She was assigned an 
Army liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stratis, as their point of 
contact with Fort Campbell and the Army. Two or three days after the 
murder, she made a request to Lieutenant Colonel Stratis to meet with 
General Clark to talk about her son's death. Lieutenant Colonel Stratis 
told her that General Clark was unable to meet with them.
  There are three possible explanations for this dispute of fact: Ms. 
Kutteles may have submitted a false affidavit, General Clark may have 
given false information to the Committee, or General Clark was, for 
some reason, not informed by his staff about the parent's request.
  Like others on the Armed Services Committee, I have met with the 
parents, and I was struck by their sincerity, their patriotism, and 
their continuing support for our Armed Forces in spite of the tragedy. 
I find it difficult to believe that they are lying or

[[Page S15031]]

mistaken when they say they asked for a meeting with General Clark.
  Nevertheless, that appears to be the position of the Army inspector 
general, who states in his most recent memorandum, dated October 20, 
2003, that the mother's statement in the affidavit is ``unfounded.'' 
The inspector general states that his office ``determined, after 
extensive interviews, none of the key staff members and other relevant 
witnesses recalled receiving or learning of such a request.''
  I have seen several of the affidavits relied upon by the inspector 
general, and I found the statements relied on to be disturbingly non-
responsive. These affidavits fail to resolve the serious factual 
dispute about whether the parents requested a meeting with General 
Clark, and it seems improper for the Army inspector general to suggest 
that no such request was made.
  I believe that it is inappropriate for the Senate to act on this 
nomination until this issue is more satisfactorily resolved.
  General Clark states that he was not aware of any instance of anti-
gay harassment on the base before the murder. At the very least, the 
murder should have made painfully clear that anti-gay bias and anti-gay 
harassment were real and pressing problems at Fort Campbell, problems 
that demanded an immediate and effective response. Yet from the very 
start, and throughout the remainder of his command, General Clark and 
his office took patently ineffective steps to respond to these specific 
problems.
  Two days after the murder, the Fort Campbell public affairs office 
issued a statement describing the incident as a ``physical altercation 
in a post barracks,'' insinuating that Winchell was partly responsible 
for his own death. In fact, Winchell was asleep in the barracks when he 
was attacked by his killer. General Clark stated that he probably 
learned about the false press statement 3 or 4 days later, following 
his return to Fort Campbell from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. 
He said he did not instruct the public affairs office to retract the 
statement or issue a correction because ``comments by my command 
spokesperson regarding the case might well have influenced the 
investigation, or suggested that I had reached premature conclusions 
about the case, and might have influenced or tainted the deliberations 
of any soldier serving on a court martial-panel.''
  It is important for a commanding officer not to make statements that 
might influence an investigation or court-martial. But it is well 
established in military law that a statement may be made to correct a 
false public statement, in order to avoid prejudice to the Government 
or the accused.
  General Clark's explanation is doubly unconvincing in the light of 
the fact that the Fort Campbell public affairs office made a statement, 
2 days after Clark returned to Fort Campbell, that there was ``no 
evidence'' that Private Winchell was killed because he was gay. This 
statement was clearly false, and it also raised a far more serious 
issue about whether the command at Fort Campbell was undermining the 
ability of the Government to prosecute the murder as a bias-motivated 
offense.
  In fact, anti-gay harassment continued in the months following the 
murder.
  The continuing anti-gay harassment at Fort Campbell was also 
accompanied by a sudden exodus of soldiers discharged for violations of 
the Homosexual Conduct Policy. In the 10 months after the murder, 120 
soldiers were discharged from Fort Campbell under this policy, compared 
to only 6 such discharges from Fort Campbell during the same time 
period in the previous year. In all of 1999, there were 271 such 
discharges in the entire Army.
  Instead of dealing directly with the problem of anti-gay harassment, 
General Clark chose to deny that any problem existed. In an op-ed 
article in the New York Times, a year after the murder, he stated that 
``There is not, nor has there ever been during my times here, a climate 
of homophobia on post.''
  In addition, he refused to meet with groups concerned about the 
welfare of gay soldiers, including a local gay community group, and the 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, a national organization.
  Another of General Clark's most serious failure of leadership after 
the murder is the fact that, from all the evidence we have seen, he did 
not even once speak out against the specific problems of anti-gay 
harassment and anti-gay violence, or implement any training for the 
soldiers against it.
  He did take general steps after the Winchell murder to address the 
quality of life for soldiers at Fort Campbell, and he reinforced 
existing programs on the need to treat all soldiers with ``dignity and 
respect.'' These measures were helpful, but hardly sufficient to 
address the specific problem of anti-gay harassment.
  Private Winchell's murder was an anti-gay hate crime, and it called 
for, at the very least, a clear and unequivocal statement by Fort 
Campbell's commanding officer that violence against homosexuals is 
wrong. According to the record, no such statement was ever made.
  General Clark has been asked repeatedly for instances in which he 
spoke publicly about anti-gay harassment. In his response last November 
6, 2002 to written questions, he listed a number of speeches, press 
conferences, and publications, but none of these examples dealt with 
the specific problem of anti-gay harassment.
  For example, General Clark wrote that on January 14, 2000:

       I published an article in the post newspaper, The Fort 
     Campbell Courier, in which I emphasized the quality of 
     soldiers serving at Fort Campbell, and outlines the 
     initiatives we had undertaken to eliminate anti-gay 
     harassment. I also reinforced our longstanding policy of 
     treating all soldiers with dignity and respect.

  In fact the article itself contains no information regarding efforts 
to address anti-gay harassment--not even a statement that such 
harassment is wrong. The article includes only two references to 
homosexuality.
  First, General Clark writes that he has requested a review and 
assessment:

     to determine whether any member of this command violated the 
     Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct Policy in any 
     interaction with PFC Barry Winchell.

  Second, he writes that he has:

     issued a policy on the handling of discharges for homosexual 
     conduct to ensure these matters preserve the privacy and 
     dignity of individual soldiers.

  There is nothing in the article about anti-gay harassment. It deals 
only with the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy.
  The article refers only to General Clark's efforts to improve 
barracks conditions generally and his ``special emphasis'' on the 
dignity of all soldiers. Much of the article is defensive in tone; 
General Clark writes that the soldiers at Fort Campbell are the ``best 
we have ever had,'' that they are ``intolerant of abuse of anybody for 
any reason,'' and that ``leaders'' at Fort Campbell ``set the example 
through word and deed.'' He concludes with this sentence:

       This is the climate that exists at Fort Campbell, in 
     contrast to which you have seen on TV and in the papers 
     during these past few months.

  This tone has characterized much of General Clark's public statements 
during the remainder of his command at Fort Campbell. On June 9, 2000, 
he said at a news conference that he objects:

     in the strongest terms to the way our soldiers, and the 
     climate that embraces them, have been characterized.

  At a Rotary Club meeting in March 2000--another event listed by 
General Clark as an example of his efforts to address anti-gay 
harassment--press reports, say that he:

     used the Rotary speech to lambaste the Kentucky New Era and 
     other area newspapers

for printing an earlier story on his refusal to allow Servicemembers 
Legal Defense Network to place an advertisement in the post newspaper.
  The ad had listed an anonymous hotline number for the Army inspector 
general's office and the telephone number for the organization. General 
Clark justified his decision to reject the ad on the ground that the 
inspector general's office had all the access it needed to soldiers on 
post. Newspaper reports of General Clark's Rotary Club speech contained 
no mention of any statement condemning anti-gay harassment.
  I have repeatedly asked the Department to investigate this issue 
further, to find out whether in fact General Clark made any statements 
specifically addressing anti-gay harassment and anti-gay violence 
following the

[[Page S15032]]

Winchell murder. But the responses of the Department have been 
inadequate.
  In response to similar questions by the parents, the inspector 
general stated:

       During the 6 months following the murder, Major General 
     Clark was personally involved in talking to Commanders at all 
     levels about the anti-gay harassment.

  There have been other cases where commanding officers have had to 
respond to tragedies, and they have done so in a variety of ways that 
demonstrate their leadership.
  Many have drawn comparisons between General Clark's response in this 
case and General John Keane's response to the murder of African 
American civilians at Fort Bragg by racist soldiers. After these 
murders, General Keane held a 1-year anniversary remembrance and 
publicly offered his condolences. He met with the NAACP and the Anti-
Defamation League to discuss the murders and consider ways to improve 
the racial climate.
  General Keane offered very strong public statements against racism, 
and he implemented sensitivity training on the base. General Clark did 
none of this.
  In all the services, discrimination against gays is codified in the 
ban on their service in military. In reporting anti-gay discrimination, 
soldiers face potential investigation, further harassment, and even 
discharge. This makes this population even more vulnerable to acts of 
harassment and violence, which makes it even more essential for leaders 
to act quickly and effectively in response to attacks on soldiers 
perceived to be gay.
  In the recent controversy at the Air Force Academy, the senior 
leadership has been held accountable, from the Commandant of the 
Academy, to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Commandant of the Air 
Force Academy has been held responsible for the shortcomings of his 
subordinate commanders.
  General Clark never held a single officer responsible for the command 
climate that led to the murder of Private Winchell. General Clark did 
not take responsibility for addressing the problem of anti-gay 
harassment at Fort Campbell after the murder. He should bear the 
ultimate responsibility for the climate that led to this tragedy and 
for not remedying that climate afterwards.
  These are important questions that go to the heart of this officer's 
suitability for promotion to lieutenant general. The Senate deserves 
better information acting on such a controversial nomination.
  I will just review for a few moments the difference between Fort 
Bragg and Fort Campbell. This is the difference, the comparison between 
General Keane's response to the murder of two African-American 
civilians and General Clark's response to the murder of PVT Barry 
Winchell. Fort Bragg:

       In December 1995, three White Fort Bragg soldiers murdered 
     two Black North Carolina civilians. Then Fort Bragg 
     commanding general, LTG John Keane, currently General Keane, 
     did the following actions after the murder:
       At Fort Bragg, an on-base memorial service for 
     ``remembrance and reconciliation'' was held 1 year after the 
     murders. Lieutenant General Keane publicly communicated 
     strong condolences.

  On General Clark's actions after the murder, he declined to meet with 
the Winchell family, did not attend the Winchells' on-base memorial 
service held shortly following the murder, and did not hold any 
subsequent memorial events.
  LTG John Keane invited the NAACP and the ADL to discuss the murders 
and work with the base to improve the racial climate. The local NAACP 
leader, James Florence, on the NAACP's relationship with Fort Bragg, 
said:

       Since [the murders] we have had a liaison with Fort Bragg. 
     We can talk with them almost any time we need.

  General Clark declined to meet with the gay groups, declined to meet 
with the legal defense funds, and declined to meet with gay veterans 
organizations.
  There is a dramatic difference between two commanding officers and 
how they dealt with the hate crimes. General Keane's response to the 
soldiers after the murders? LTG John Keane and the Army launched an 
aggressive program to ``weed skinheads and extremists out of the 
military.'' General Keane said:

       We did not see this cancer coming. We missed the signs, 
     symbols, and manifestations of extremism.

  General Keane implemented sensitivity training at Fort Bragg 
regarding race relations. He said:

       We've educated our people, in terms of what to look for and 
     how to deal with it, and when we find soldiers whose 
     attitudes and behavior are disruptive to good order and 
     discipline of our unit, we are going to act.

  General Clark publicly stated there was not a climate of homophobia 
on Fort Campbell, did not make any public statements or issue any 
written directives and never publicly communicated an appreciation of 
the harm caused by the antigay murder.
  There are dramatic differences between how an officer dealt with 
this, who continues to serve with great distinction in our service, and 
the nominee.
  Finally, here is the comparison between General Clark's response to 
the murder of PVT Barry Winchell and the response of the Air Force 
Academy leaders on sexual assaults. At the Air Force Academy during the 
period of 1993 through 2003, 60 cases of sexual assault were reported. 
Earlier this year, LTG John Dallager, the academy commandant from 2000 
to 2003, lost his third star and retired as a major general because the 
Secretary of the Air Force determined he ``did not exercise the degree 
of leadership in this situation that we expect of our commanders.''
  In September 2003, an independent panel commissioned to review the 
climate situation issued a report supporting the demotion of General 
Dallager and recommending an additional review to assess the actions 
taken by other leaders and holding individuals accountable.

  On General Clark, in July 1999, two Fort Campbell soldiers murdered 
Barry Winchell because they believed him to be gay. This murder 
occurred on the base, in the barracks. This murder and additional 
problems with antigay harassment occurred during the tenure of 
Commander Clark and there has been no response.
  My final point on the ultimate responsibility:

       General Dallager is the Academy leader--[this was the 
     finding]--bearing ultimate responsibility for the failure to 
     adequately respond to sexual assault issues.
       The Panel concurs with the decision . . . to retire General 
     Dallager. . . .

  Retire him.
  On the ultimate responsibility, Army leadership doctrine states that 
commanders:

     . . . have to answer for how their subordinates live and what 
     they do after work.

  That is in the field manual.
  In a July 19, 2000 article in the New York Times, General Clark 
stated:

       There is no, nor has there ever been during my times here, 
     a climate of homophobia on post.

  General Shinseki, on July 21, 2000, stated in a DoD News Briefing:

       We take full responsibility for what happened to Private 
     Winchell. . . .

  There is General Shinseki taking responsibility. There is a general.

       We take full responsibility for what happened to Private 
     Winchell.

  General Clark has failed to accept similar responsibility in this 
case and doesn't deserve the promotion.
  On another matter, I believe there is some remaining time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was going to reply to some of the points 
my colleague from Massachusetts made. As you well know, the General----
  Mr. KENNEDY. May I reserve the remainder of my time? Is this on the 
Senator's time?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Since I had the floor, I want this additional comment I 
would like to make on another subject, but I also want to respond to 
the questions of the Senator, so I will be glad to do whatever you 
would like.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary question: We are on this 
nomination with 2 hours of debate and 1 hour each divided equally. I 
manage this side and Senator Kennedy manages that side. If the Senator 
wishes to go on to another matter, I am not sure how the Senator wishes 
to handle this.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is not difficult, I think, since I 
have 40 minutes. I will use my remaining time and ask that my comments 
be inserted into another part of the Record so it doesn't interfere, 
and then I will be glad to answer any questions of the Senator.

[[Page S15033]]

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Massachusetts 
will accommodate the Senator from Virginia. I would like to make some 
comments with respect to his important remarks while they are fresh in 
the minds of the listeners. I think it is appropriate that I take a 
little time. Then, as far as I am concerned, we will both yield back 
our time and the Senator from Massachusetts can take some time on 
another matter, if he wishes. Is that helpful?
  Mr. KENNEDY. How long did the Senator plan to speak?
  Mr. WARNER. I will summarize my comments in about 5 or 6 minutes, at 
the conclusion of which we could both yield our time.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if the Senator wants to address the 
Senate first, Senator Dayton was yielded 15 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. That is under the order. I didn't realize he just walked 
in the Chamber. I am trying to do the best I can to accommodate 
everybody and manage the time efficiently. But I do desire at this 
point in time an opportunity to reply to my colleague from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will yield the floor for that purpose 
and ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion I be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senate had a comparison between how 
General Keane and General Clark handled problems within their 
respective commands. General Clark was the convening authority, and the 
tragedy that occurred to which the Senator referred, and which is the 
subject of some comments here today, came up through the military 
command, was handled by the military courts and the military 
authorities, and adjudicated. As the convening authority, I think he 
took some prudent steps to make certain that in no way could he be 
accused of command influence. The tragedy in General Keane's command 
was tried in the civilian courts, and as such he was not the convening 
authority. He then had the opportunity to do some things which I 
believe General Clark did not.
  Out of this tragedy, there were lessons learned in the Army. I think 
some important new policy matters were put into the regulations. 
Otherwise, not all was lost in this tragic situation.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Army 
Inspector General's Report on Fort Campbell at the conclusion of my 
remarks. That is the first section of it that addresses a number of 
points that are raised by the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe from reading this report--not in 
the words of the Senator from Massachusetts that no one was trying to 
stop these tragic situations--that it was generally a positive command 
climate. There were some isolated instances of harassment, sexual in 
nature. I concede that is in the Record. But the total quantity of 
these incidents, in my judgment, was not indicative of a breakdown in 
the command responsibilities under General Clark.
  General Clark, as I said, came to the committee on two occasions and 
subjected himself quite willingly--indeed, under oath; I put him under 
oath at the second hearing--and he responded to the cross-examination, 
much of which the distinguished colleague from Massachusetts has raised 
today.
  In conclusion, he has an extremely impressive record of military 
service stretching back to 1970. Much of that has been covered by my 
colleague from Kentucky.
  Mind you, Fort Campbell is an installation that can at times host a 
daily population of 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company-
sized units.
  In July of 1999, this brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by 
an intoxicated 18-year-old soldier who used frightful force against PFC 
Barry Winchell. This resulted in his death, allegedly while he was 
sleeping. No one underestimates the seriousness of this crime.
  Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of 
Private First Class Winchell. Like General Clark, we extended our 
sympathy and sorrow for their loss. The committee listened very closely 
to the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by 
General Clark and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at 
Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
  At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Levin and I asked Private 
First Class Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns they 
had raised with us at that meeting in a letter, and we would obtain 
answers from the Department of Defense--specifically, the Department of 
the Army--and share those answers with them. That we did. The parents 
sent us a letter and Senator Levin and I forwarded these questions to 
the Department. In September, the Department responded to questions and 
expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination.
  I ask unanimous consent that all of these matters be printed in the 
Record at the end of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, not only the steps taken by the Armed 
Services Committee, together with my distinguished colleague Senator 
Levin, but indeed by the Department of the Army into other areas 
overall reflect, I think, that our committee carefully looked into this 
matter and that the Department of the Army was responsive to the 
questions raised by my colleagues.
  Mr. President, MG Clark is highly qualified for promotion to the rank 
of lieutenant general assignment as Commander of the Fifth United 
States Army. He was first nominated for this position in the fall of 
2002. He has appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
executive session on two separate occasions, and, on both occasions 
conducted himself with deferrence and respect for the members of the 
committee, and with appreciation for the Constitutionally-based advise 
and consent power--and responsibility--of the Senate. Not surprisingly, 
General Clark has the full support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Schoomaker, and the civilian leadership of the Army for this 
promotion.
  General Clark has an extremely impressive record of military service 
stretching back to his commissioning in 1970. General Clark's military 
record includes combat service in Viet Nam for which he was awarded the 
Bronze Star with Combat ``V.'' He has served as a Battalion Commander 
and a Brigade Commander with the renowned ``Screaming Eagles'' of the 
101st Airborne Division. In this capacity, he participated in 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Major General Clark later 
served as Chief of Staff for the 101st Airborne Division, and from 1998 
through 2000 as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and 
Fort Campbell, KY.
  Fort Campbell is an installation that can, at times, host a daily 
population of over 24,000 military personnel and over 200 company sized 
units. In July 1999, a brutal murder was committed at Fort Campbell by 
a drunken, 18-year-old soldier who bludgeoned Private First Class Barry 
Winchell to death in his sleep. This tragic and senseless crime was not 
foreseeable--not foreseeable by PFC Winchell's company commander and 
certainly not foreseeable by Major General Clark. General Clark capably 
and competently fulfilled his responsibility as General court-Martial 
convening authority in this murder trial and took steps necessary to 
ensure that the perpetrator of this crime and an accomplice were 
brought to justice. This was accomplished and the soldier who murdered 
PFC Winchell is serving a life sentence.

  Senator Levin and I met in May of this year with the parents of PFC 
Winchell. We, like General Clark, extended our sympathy and sorrow for 
their loss. As leaders of the committee, we listened very closely to 
the assertions they made about a lack of appropriate treatment by 
General Clark, and shortfalls in discipline and a secure environment at 
Fort Campbell during the time their son was stationed there.
  At the conclusion of our meeting, Senator Levin and I asked PFC 
Winchell's parents to put the questions and concerns that they had 
raised with us in a letter, and we would obtain answers from the 
department and share those answer with them. The parents did so, and we 
sent their questions to the department in June.

[[Page S15034]]

  In late September, the department responded to the questions, and 
expressed continued support for Major General Clark's nomination. The 
Army undertook to conduct inquiries through the Army Inspector General 
in response to the questions raised by the parents, and, I believe, did 
respond fully to the issues that were raised.
  In late September, Senator Levin and I forwarded the Department's 
response to PFC Winchell's parents inviting them to respond. They did 
so on October 8th. On October 10, Senator Levin and I forwarded their 
letter to the department together with additional questions from 
Senator Kennedy requesting comment. We received a response from 
secretary Abell and Acting Secretary Brownlee on October 21st and, 
shortly thereafter, we conducted our second executive session.
  The committee compiled a very thorough record about all the issues 
raised by Senator Kennedy and others. I will not go into specific 
details, but it is important to note that the Army Inspector General 
conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the July 
1999 death of PFC Winchell after the court-martial was completed, and 
the IG found no basis to support accusations of dereliction of duty and 
failure of leadership by General Clark. To the contrary, the 
investigation found a positive command climate at Fort Campbell and 
refuted the assertions that Major General Clark should have done more 
or could have prevented this tragedy.
  I am very concerned about ensuring accountability of military 
officers, and I have insisted at looking very closely at the actions of 
military leaders who are entrusted with command. I am satisfied that 
General Clark did not fail in his command responsibility and is fully 
deserving of promotion. I urge my colleagues to support this 
nomination.

                               Exhibit I


                           executive summary

     Background
       On 5 July 1999, Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell, D 
     Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, Fort 
     Campbell, Kentucky, was murdered by a fellow soldier. 
     Following this incident, and amid claims that PFC Winchell 
     was murdered because he was or was perceived to be a 
     homosexual, allegations arose concerning the command climate 
     at Fort Campbell particularly as it related to the command's 
     enforcement of the Department of Defense (DOD) Homosexual 
     Conduct Policy [hereinafter the Policy]. The Army pledged 
     early on to assess the command climate and investigate the 
     alleged violations of the Policy; however, to avoid 
     interfering in the individual judicial proceedings underway, 
     the Army could not begin that effort until the conclusion of 
     the two courts-martial arising out of PFC Winchell's death.
       On 10 January 2000, the Secretary of the Army (SA) directed 
     that the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) 
     conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances 
     surrounding the death of PFC Winchell as it related to the 
     Policy (enclosed) [hereinafter referred to as directive]. In 
     addition, the DAIG was tasked to conduct an assessment of the 
     command climate then existing in PFC Winchell's unit prior to 
     his death and an overall assessment of the command climate 
     existing at Fort Campbell prior to PFC Winchell's death, 
     specifically as it related to the Policy. Finally, the DAIG 
     was directed to provide an overall assessment of the 
     Department of the Army's (DA) implementation of the Policy. 
     The Fort Campbell assessment provided the initial data for 
     the Army assessment of the Policy. The Army IG will continue 
     to assess these issues as part of their continuing inspection 
     program.
     Task Force Composition, Training, and Methodology
       A Task Force of 27 individuals was established to conduct 
     the investigation and assessment in accordance with the 
     directive. The Task Force was composed of inspectors general 
     (IGs), one legal advisor, and subject matter experts. During 
     early February, the Task Force received training from the 
     subject matter experts in the areas of the Policy itself, 
     Equal Opportunity (EO), interview techniques, and group 
     dynamics. Further, the Task Force conducted mock individual 
     interviews and group sensing sessions in order to validate 
     the assessment strategy. Finally, at the request of the 
     Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN), key leaders of 
     the Task Force met with representatives of the SLDN to 
     identify specific concerns of the organization. The SLDN is a 
     national legal aid organization that assists soldiers 
     affected by the Policy.
       The scope of the assessment included the following: 
     Interviews with the commanding general, 101st Airborne 
     Division (Air Assault), both assistant division commanders 
     who were occupying those positions in July 1999, and 
     interviews with 47 brigade and battalion-level commanders 
     from both divisional and nondivisional tenant units. 
     In addition, the Task Force conducted 68 sensing sessions 
     composed of soldiers randomly-selected by utilizing the 
     last two digits of the social security number. In these 
     sessions, 568 soldiers were interviewed and 1,385 command 
     climate surveys were administered throughout Fort 
     Campbell. With respect to the sensing sessions, it should 
     be noted that all of these soldiers were assigned to Fort 
     Campbell from the period of April 1999 through February 
     2000. In addition, participants who completed a command 
     climate survey were informed that the responses would be 
     anonymous.
       In addition to interviews conducted on Fort Campbell, the 
     investigation team conducted on-site interviews at Fort 
     Benning and Fort Leonard Wood, as well as telephonic 
     interviews with soldiers assigned to Korea, Fort Drum, Fort 
     Knox, Fort Jackson and the United States Military Academy. 
     Civilian members of the Fort Campbell community as well as 
     former members of the Army were also interviewed by the 
     investigation team.
       Finally, Task Force members gathered relevant data through 
     on-site inspections and additional periodic spot checks of 
     unit recreation centers, public use areas, and barracks 
     living areas. Finally, the Task Force secured information by 
     directly observing on-post soldier events to include physical 
     fitness training sessions.
     History and Background of the Policy
       On 29 January 1993, the President directed the Secretary of 
     Defense (SecDef) to review DOD policy on homosexuals in the 
     military. On 19 July 1993, the SecDef directed the following: 
     applicants for military service as well as current 
     servicemembers would not be asked nor required to reveal 
     their sexual orientation; sexual orientation would not be a 
     bar to entry into the service or continued service unless 
     manifested by homosexual conduct; and commanders and 
     investigating agencies would not initiate investigation 
     solely to determine a member's sexual orientation. On 30 
     November 1993, Congress enacted 10 United States Code (USC), 
     Section 654, policy concerning homosexuality in the armed 
     forces.


                           Assessment Results

     Finding 1
       Objective: Examine alleged violations of the DOD Homosexual 
     Conduct Policy during the period preceding PFC Winchell's 
     death.
       Findings: 1. A preponderance of evidence indicated that two 
     noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in PFC Winchell's chain of 
     command and a fellow private (PVT) inquired into PFC 
     Winchell's sexual orientation. In addition, at least one NCO 
     referred to PFC Winchell as a ``faggot.''
       2. In spite of this, however, the evidence gathered 
     demonstrated that the chain of command was proactive in 
     terminating the sporadic incidents of derogatory or offensive 
     cadences during unit marches and physical training (PT) 
     formations.
       Summary: Evidence obtained from Fort Campbell indicated 
     that in late May 1999 PFC Winchell asked an NCO from his 
     unit, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 
     ``What would happen if a guy in the military was gay?'' In 
     responding to that question, the NCO asked PFC Winchell if he 
     was a homosexual. Testimony revealed that the NCO asked the 
     question in an effort to offer assistance to PFC Winchell in 
     getting professional guidance or assistance in addressing the 
     issue.
       Evidence gathered indicated that an NCO in PFC Winchell's 
     unit referred to PFC Winchell as well as other members of the 
     unit as ``faggots'' in describing those who failed to perform 
     to his standards. On one occasion, the NCO referred to PFC 
     Winchell as a ``faggot'' after PFC Winchell reported to work 
     in what appeared to be an intoxicated state.
       The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that PFC 
     Winchell's chain of command did not condone demeaning or 
     derogatory cadences made during the conduct of unit PT. In 
     those instances where inappropriate remarks were made, 
     company leaders made on-the-spot corrections.
     Finding 2
       Objective: Determine whether the local IG's office 
     responded appropriately to any complaints of violations of 
     the DOD Policy it may have received prior to PFC Winchell's 
     death.
       Finding: The Fort Campbell IG office properly responded to 
     the only known complaint of a violation of the Policy prior 
     to 5 July 1999 when they followed standard Army IG guidance 
     by recommending PFC Winchell provide his commanders the 
     opportunity to resolve his complaint prior to direct IG 
     intervention with the command.
       Summary: Immediately after the NCO called PFC Winchell a 
     ``faggot,'' another NCO escorted PFC Winchell to the IG 
     office to file a complaint. Upon being advised that he should 
     provide his commander the first opportunity to address the 
     issue, PFC Winchell was then escorted to his company 
     commander. Evidence obtained indicated that the company 
     commander counseled the NCO regarding his inappropriate 
     remarks.
     Finding 3
       Objectives: 1. Conduct an overall assessment of the command 
     climate existing at Fort Campbell prior to 5 July 1999, 
     specifically as it relates to the application and enforcement 
     of the DOD Policy.
       2. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's chain of 
     command understood the application and enforcement of the DOD 
     Policy.

[[Page S15035]]

       3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected members 
     at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which members 
     felt they understood the Policy and the degree to which the 
     Policy was being enforced.
       4. Assess the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 
     502nd Infantry Regiment before 5 July 1999.
       Findings: 1. Through sensing sessions, interviews, and 
     surveys across Fort Campbell, it was determined that the 
     command climate at Fort Campbell before 5 July 1999 was a 
     positive environment with exceptions related to medical 
     support, on- and off-post housing, after-duty-hours 
     recreation, and shortages of personnel in authorized grades. 
     Most soldiers indicated satisfaction with their mission, 
     training, and organizational leadership.
       2. With respect to the Policy, it was clear that the chain 
     of command, from commanding general (CG) through company 
     leaders, responded appropriately to matters with respect to 
     enforcement of the Policy.
       3. The specific assessment of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 
     502nd Infantry Regiment's command climate prior to 5 July 
     1999 was determined to be poor due primarily to leadership 
     failure of a senior NCO, perceptions pertaining to underage 
     drinking, and other factors beyond the direct control of the 
     company, such as shortages of personnel in authorized grades 
     and quality of life (QOL) issues.
       Summary: In evaluating the overall command climate at Fort 
     Campbell, personnel were asked to compare the command climate 
     as it existed in February 2000 with the command climate the 
     year prior. Overall, personnel indicated that the command 
     climate was favorable. The majority of personnel questioned 
     believed that the leadership at Fort Campbell was effective 
     and concerned and treated personnel favorably. In addition, 
     the majority of personnel questioned felt that the chain of 
     command responded appropriately to issues presented to them. 
     Finally, personnel believed that the leadership led by 
     example.
       QOL issues contributed to low morale at Fort Campbell. 
     Specifically, issues relating to the conditions in the 
     barracks, problems associated with medical care at Fort 
     Campbell, and treatment received by soldiers from the 
     civilian employees and individuals in the surrounding 
     civilian communities were the major areas of concern to those 
     questioned.
       In general, the application and enforcement of the Policy 
     did not appear to be a problem at Fort Campbell. Most leaders 
     took appropriate action in instances where application of the 
     Policy was warranted and appeared to be operating well within 
     the confines of the Policy. Soldiers acknowledged, however, 
     that the joking and bantering that had occurred prior to July 
     1999 on a regular basis could be viewed as harassment. 
     Following training on the Policy and Consideration of Others 
     (COO), soldiers are now more apt to reconsider uttering 
     phrases that would likely be considered harassment.
       However, the command climate of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 
     502nd Infantry Regiment, in the period prior to PFC 
     Winchell's murder was poor. In addition to the QOL issues 
     identified above, soldiers in PFC Winchell's unit believed 
     that personnel shortages and underage drinking in the 
     barracks to the poor command climate. The most significant 
     factor contributing to the poor command climate, however, was 
     the presence of an abusive NCO in a leadership position in 
     the unit.
     Finding 4
       Objective: Review and resolve allegations by Private Second 
     Class (PV2) Javier Torres and others of specific violations 
     of the Policy.
       Summary of Findings: The preponderance of evidence did not 
     support PV2 Torres' allegation that he was personally 
     harassed at Fort Campbell; however, evidence does support his 
     allegation of routine personal harassment at Fort Benning and 
     occasional personal harassment at Fort Knox. The 
     preponderance of evidence supported PV2 Torres' allegations 
     that during initial entry training (IET) at Fort Benning, one 
     drill sergeant improperly addressed or referred to him as a 
     homosexual, and another PVT provoked a fight with him by 
     routinely taunting him and referring to him as a homosexual. 
     The evidence also supported PV2 Torres' allegation that at 
     Fort Campbell a senior NCO improperly used terms derogatory 
     to homosexuals while trying to motivate male soldiers to 
     perform to standard and two NCOs improperly used terms 
     derogatory to homosexuals while singing cadences during a 
     physical training run. It did not support his allegations 
     that an NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly used 
     anti-homosexual language while conducting training on the 
     Homosexual Conduct Policy, that a soldier at Fort Knox 
     improperly inquired into his sexual orientation, and that an 
     NCO in his unit at Fort Campbell improperly inquired into his 
     sexual orientation.
       The preponderance of evidence supported allegations that an 
     NCO at Fort Campbell read a joke to soldiers that was 
     demeaning to homosexuals; anti-homosexual graffiti was 
     present on a wall of a latrine in a unit area, a latrine 
     in a public recreation area, and a latrine in a work area 
     at Fort Campbell; and a nongovernmental civilian, not a 
     soldier, sent an e-mail containing anti-homosexual 
     language to a former soldier at Fort Campbell. The 
     preponderance of evidence did not support allegations that 
     anti-homosexual comments made by soldiers at Fort Campbell 
     were the ``norm,'' soldiers made threatening and 
     inappropriate comments during training on the Policy, an 
     e-mail with a sound wave file attached that contained 
     language demeaning to homosexuals was circulated at Fort 
     Campbell, and an NCO's chain of command improperly 
     inquired into his sexual orientation.
     Finding 5
       Objectives: 1. Assess the degree to which PFC Winchell's 
     chain of command understood the application and enforcement 
     of the Policy.
       2. Conduct an overall assessment of the command climate 
     that existed then at Fort Campbell, specifically as it 
     relates to the application, enforcement, and training 
     conducted on the Homosexual Conduct Policy.
       3. Conduct sensing sessions with randomly-selected military 
     members at Fort Campbell to determine the degree to which 
     members felt they understood the Policy and the degree to 
     which they believed the Policy was being enforced.
       Finding: There was no sustainment training conducted at 
     Fort Campbell on the Policy before 5 July 1999 because there 
     was no clearly articulated requirement on how often personnel 
     were to be trained and who was to receive the training. The 
     published guidance indicated: ``All officers and enlisted 
     personnel of the Active Army and Reserve Components will 
     receive briefings upon entry and periodically thereafter.'' 
     Institutional training of personnel on the implementation and 
     enforcement of the Policy was ineffective. Most officers, 
     NCOs, and soldiers at Fort Campbell lacked an understanding 
     and working knowledge of the Policy prior to 5 July 1999.
       Summary: Nearly all soldiers, NCOs, and officers at Fort 
     Campbell had received training on the Policy at some point in 
     their military career. The training that was conducted, 
     however, did not contribute meaningfully to an understanding 
     or working knowledge of the Policy.
       As a result, most personnel did not demonstrate a clear 
     understanding of their responsibilities under the Policy and 
     the standards contained within the Policy.
     Finding 6
       Objective: Assess whether current training materials 
     adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
       Findings: 1. Currently, commanders, leaders, and soldiers 
     at Fort Campbell do not have a clear understanding of the 
     Policy because training and informational materials do not 
     adequately convey the substance of the Policy.
       2. Training and informational guidance contain key words 
     (Don't Ask, Don't Tell) that are not defined in doctrine.
       Summary: Based on interviews with commanders, leaders, and 
     soldiers, the results of the command climate survey, and a 
     review of records and files at Fort Campbell, it was 
     determined that the training provided on the Policy is not 
     clearly written, not tailored to specific audiences based on 
     rank and duty positions, fails to adequately convey the 
     substance of the Policy, and is presented in a format which 
     does not foster open and meaningful discussion on the issues.
       Informational materials distributed to Army personnel, to 
     include a Hot Topics pullout in Soldiers Magazine and a 
     trifold pamphlet, suffered from the same defects according to 
     personnel. The use of the terms ``Don't Ask'' and ``Don't 
     Tell'' in the informational materials without providing 
     definitions to explain these phrases created a large amount 
     of anxiety and confusion.
     Finding 7
       Objective: Provide an overall assessment of the DA's 
     implementation of the DOD Policy by assessing:
       1. Whether the Policy is being fairly applied within units.
       2. Whether there are currently any other perceived 
     deficiencies in the Policy which preclude effective training, 
     application, and enforcement of the Policy.
       Findings: 1. The Policy is being fairly applied at Fort 
     Campbell; however, the Policy with respect to discharges and 
     substantial investigations is not being implemented as 
     intended because commanders perceive an unacceptable risk to 
     the unit and soldier by retaining soldiers who make 
     admissions of homosexuality.
       2. Commanders have difficulty in balancing their 
     responsibility to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order, 
     and discipline while enforcing the Policy. They perceive that 
     the current implementing instructions restrain their latitude 
     to conduct inquiries and preclude them from exercising 
     reasonable discretion in initiating inquiries.
       3. AR 600-20 and subsequent Army guidance and messages 
     regarding the reporting of harassment based on homosexual 
     orientation do not adequately advise soldiers where or how to 
     report harassment, and do not adequately advise commanders 
     and agencies how to process these complaints.
       Summary: The Task Force determined that the Policy was 
     being fairly applied by commanders at Fort Campbell. The 
     soldiers discharged under Chapter 15 were overall satisfied 
     with their treatment during the process. The Fort Campbell 
     commanders expressed concern in complying with the Policy. 
     They believe it places them in a professional dilemma by 
     requiring them to choose between retention of a soldier who 
     declares a propensity for homosexual conduct and discharge 
     when the truthfulness of his statement of homosexuality is 
     suspect. They are

[[Page S15036]]

     reluctant to conduct inquiries of the truthfulness of an 
     admission because of the perceived risk to both the unit and 
     the individual soldier.
       Commanders stated to the Task Force that they had 
     difficulty in balancing the enforcement of the Policy and the 
     requirement to maintain morale, unit cohesion, good order, 
     and discipline. Commanders expressed concerns that the Policy 
     precludes them from conducting an inquiry when presented with 
     credible information of behavior that demonstrates a soldier 
     may have a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. They 
     believe the Policy precludes them from exercising reasonable 
     discretion in determining the necessity to conduct an 
     inquiry.
       Information gathered by the Task Force determined that 
     guidance on reporting harassment based on sexual orientation 
     by soldiers and investigation into such harassment by leaders 
     is unclear and confusing. Soldiers and leaders expressed 
     frustration with knowing how and to whom to report harassment 
     and how to handle incidents of this type of harassment. They 
     expressed the belief that all harassment should be dealt with 
     uniformly.
       In summary commanders and leaders at all levels have an 
     inherent responsibility for establishing a command climate 
     that promotes good order and discipline essential to 
     accomplishing the Army's mission. This responsibility 
     includes promoting unit cohesion by identifying and 
     eliminating harassment before it occurs or results in reports 
     of violations of Army Standards.
                                  ____


                               Exhibit II


                                 Office of the Under Secretary

                                                    of Defense

                                   Washington, DC, March 11, 2003.
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in reference to the 
     nomination of Major General Robert T. Clark, United States 
     Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and 
     for assignment as Commanding General, Fifth United States 
     Army that the President recently sent to the Senate. The 
     President previously forwarded Major General Clark's 
     nomination to the Senate on September 10, 2002; however, his 
     nomination was not acted upon by the Senate prior to the 
     Senate's sine die adjournment on November 22, 2002.
       The Secretary of Defense considered reported information 
     concerning Major General Clark. Major General Clark was in 
     command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort 
     Campbell at the time Private First Class Barry Winchell, a 
     member of the command who was perceived to be homosexual, was 
     murdered in his barracks by another member of the command. 
     The Department of the Army Inspector General conducted an 
     investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding 
     the death of Private First Class Winchell and the Inspector 
     General conducted a command climate assessment at Fort 
     Campbell. Neither the investigation nor the command climate 
     assessment determined that Major General Clark was culpable. 
     We previously provided you with a copy of the Department of 
     the Army Inspector General's Report and this incident was 
     addressed in detail at an Executive Session of the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee in the 107th Congress.
       I have attached a copy of the following information for 
     your consideration: chronology of the actions and initiatives 
     taken by the Department of Defense and the Department of the 
     Army immediately following the death of Private First Class 
     Winchell; a detailed chronology of published policies and 
     actions of the dignity and respect for all soldiers directed 
     by Major General Clark while serving as the Commanding 
     General of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell; and 
     a list of initiatives implemented by Major General Clark with 
     respect to Homosexual Conduct Policy subsequent to the death 
     of Private first Class Winchell.
       After careful review of all information, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Secretary of the Army continued to support 
     Major General Clark for appointment to the grade of 
     lieutenant general and for assignment as Commanding General, 
     Fifth United States Army. When considered in light of Major 
     General Clark's past performance and future potential, we 
     believe proceeding with the nomination is clearly in the best 
     interest of the Department of the Army and the Department of 
     Defense.
       The Department appreciates your assistance in facilitating 
     the confirmation of pending nominations.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Charles S. Abell,
                                                 Principal Deputy.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Warner, for all of his courtesies during the 
consideration of this nominee. I mentioned during my comments that we 
wanted to get additional answers. He has been extremely accommodating 
to those of us who raised the questions, as he always is as the 
chairman of the committee. I thank him for his fairness and ensuring 
that all of those who had concerns were able to conduct our concerns in 
accordance with the rules. I thank him very much for all of his 
courtesies.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Senator Bunning I know has a great interest in this. I 
thank him also.
  I will address the Senate briefly on another matter which is of 
importance and consequence to the Senate. Then I will yield the time 
because I know my colleague wants to address this issue. Then we will 
be prepared to move to a vote.
  How much time do I have remaining, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 17 minutes of the 40 minutes.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Chair. If you would let me know when 15 
minutes have been used, I would appreciate it.