[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 164 (Wednesday, November 12, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14818-S14819]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 81--EXPRESSING THE DEEP CONCERN OF 
   CONGRESS REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO 
    ADHERE TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE 
   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE ENGAGEMENT BY IRAN IN 
    ACTIVITIES THAT APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Coleman, Mr. 
Lautenberg, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Fitzgerald, and Mr. Cochran) submitted 
the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations:

                            S. Con. Res. 81

       Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
     5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
       Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has 
     committed itself to permanently abstaining from the 
     development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
       Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was 
     constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of 
     nuclear weapons;
       Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz 
     nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly enriched 
     uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by 
     the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric 
     Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting 
     to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;
       Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of 
     the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government 
     of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its 
     nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential 
     to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in 
     contravention of its obligations under the safeguards 
     agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a 
     resolution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to 
     provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material 
     and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to 
     grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, 
     to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of 
     the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, 
     to provide complete information regarding the conduct of 
     uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other 
     information and explanations and take such other steps as the 
     IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all 
     outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and 
     nuclear activities;
       Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached 
     an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers in which it 
     promised to extend full cooperation to the IAEA, sign the 
     IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification 
     procedures, comport itself in accordance with the provisions 
     of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and 
     voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing 
     activities;
       Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with 
     Iran to ease Iran's access to a variety of modern 
     technologies and supplies once certain international concerns 
     regarding Iran are fully resolved;
       Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the 
     European foreign ministers to suspend enriching and 
     processing uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that it 
     reserves the right to resume this activity at a time of its 
     choosing;
       Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it 
     claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear 
     activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some months to 
     fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and IAEA head 
     Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that the documents 
     show that Iran failed to comply with some of its commitments 
     under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
       Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted 
     access to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are 
     necessary to resolve issues concerning Iran's nuclear 
     program;
       Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran 
     provided the IAEA with a declaration that it described as a 
     complete and accurate history of its nuclear program;
       Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan 
     Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not 
     prepared to abandon its uranium enrichment program, and the 
     Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 26, 2003, that 
     it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but was merely 
     studying the issue;
       Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of 
     the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking 
     to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and
       Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to 
     terrorist groups, will continue to constitute a severe threat 
     to international peace and security and to vital American 
     national interests: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That Congress--
       (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons 
     program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well 
     over a decade to report material, facilities, and activities 
     to the International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of 
     its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in 
     connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
     Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 
     1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in 
     this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty'');
       (2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as 
     delivered in testimony to the U.S.--Israel Joint 
     Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 2003, by the 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance 
     that the explanations provided by the Government of Iran for 
     its nuclear activities are not credible;
       (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
     of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
     Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
     that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
       (4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the 
     Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany, 
     France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it 
     signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of 
     Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program;
       (5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with 
     its obligations;
       (6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to 
     prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
       (A) urging the Government of Iran to end its nuclear 
     weapons program and comply fully and unconditionally with the 
     terms of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 
     (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``IAEA 
     resolution''), that calls on Iran to--
       (i) provide the Agency a full declaration of all imported 
     material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment 
     program;
       (ii) grant unrestricted access, including environmental 
     sampling, to the Agency;
       (iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the 
     Agency experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country;
       (iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of 
     uranium conversion experiments; and
       (v) provide such other information and explanations and 
     take such other steps as the Agency determines necessary to 
     resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving 
     Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities; and
       (B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to 
     encourage other nations, especially Russia, France, Germany, 
     and the United Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to 
     fully and immediately comply with the such resolution;
       (7) calls on Russia to--
       (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in 
     full the IAEA resolution;
       (B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly 
     the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the 
     delivery of fuel for that reactor, until Iran fully and 
     completely complies with the IAEA resolution and fully 
     implements the Model Additional Protocol;
       (C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the Bushehr 
     reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to 
     Russia; and
       (D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran cannot 
     divert any spent fuel;
       (8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent 
     the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop 
     programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear 
     weapons program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, 
     including the provision of dual use items, until Iran 
     complies fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements 
     the Model Additional Protocol;
       (9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and 
     commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by 
     Iran with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to 
     stipulate that any rights

[[Page S14819]]

     that Iran obtains under such agreements will be immediately 
     revoked if Iran interferes with the work of the IAEA or takes 
     any other steps to acquire nuclear weapons;
       (10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own 
     regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, 
     board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations 
     Security Council for further action;
       (11) calls on the United Nations Security Council, 
     immediately upon receiving any violations report from the 
     IAEA, to address the threat to international peace and 
     security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a 
     Security Council resolution, or take such other action that 
     may be necessary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic 
     sanctions against Iran; and
       (12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts 
     to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the 
     enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to 
     provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not 
     engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
       (A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its 
     obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt 
     and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional 
     Protocol; and
       (B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty.

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