[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 159 (Wednesday, November 5, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14033-S14038]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. 
        Kerry, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Dorgan, and Mr. Lautenberg):
  S. 1821. A bill to establish a National Space Commission on 
activities of the United States related to the future of space; to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we have 17 dead astronauts on our 
plate--3 from Apollo I, all preventable; 7 from the Challenger, all 
preventable; and 7 from the Columbia, all preventable.
  What we are trying to do on behalf of myself and these several other 
Senators is get to a good healthy debate on the future of space in the 
United States and, more particularly, on correcting the safety 
features. There is a culture there that prevents safety from being 
adhered to, and, more than anything else, NASA is broke.
  What is not understood is that at the present time we are going in 
all directions. It is like the Navy during World War II: When in 
danger, when in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout.
  We here are saying we ought to take the orbital space station and 
accelerate it. Others on the other side say no, that is should be 
abolished. Some say we ought to go to Mars, and others say what we 
really need is to hire more expert personnel and bring them in. No one 
is going to leave their job and come work for the NASA endeavor at this 
particular time until we get a mixture and a program and a policy. That 
has to come from the President of the United States.
  I introduce the National Space Commission Act to address the range of 
issues that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board--CAIB--identified 
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--NASA--and our 
space program in general, following the tragic loss of the Columbia 
Space Shuttle and its crew of seven astronauts. This bill authorizes 
the creation of a National Space Commission appointed by the President, 
to ensure that the safety reforms and recommendations of the Columbia 
investigation board are fully implemented by NASA. The commission will 
review and make recommendations regarding NASA's return-to-flight 
proposals and institutional changes that NASA will need to make to 
improve safety in the agency and to improve safety of the space 
shuttle, and other actions to assure future safe transportation to 
space and to the International Space Station. The commission will also 
look at the broader question of how the United States is organized for 
the safety of space flight across civilian, military and commercial 
sectors. It will begin to build a consensus on a future vision of space 
exploration that I hope will rekindle enthusiasm for our space program 
and generate the necessary support in the Congress and the 
administration for these endeavors.
  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board shone a laser-sharp 
spotlight upon NASA and its program of human space exploration. Their 
pain-staking work to determine the cause of the loss of the Space 
Shuttle Columbia provides the context and justification for a new 
national agenda for space, a turning point in the history of space. 
Though the board stopped short of laying out this new future, its clear 
expectation is that the President and Congress should take up where the 
board left off.

       The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more 
     than 30 years without a guiding vision, and none seems 
     imminent . . . Recommending the content of this debate goes 
     well beyond the Board's mandate, but we believe that the 
     White House, Congress, and NASA should honor the memory of 
     Columbia's crew by reflecting on the nation's future in space 
     and the role of new space transportation capabilities in 
     enabling whatever space goals the nation chooses to pursue.
     Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume I, 
     August 2003, p. 210

  The legislation I am introducing today, the National Space Commission 
Act, is designed to respond to this challenge. It is a complex 
challenge, and a complex undertaking, that now lies before the Congress 
and the Nation. My bill is not intended to supplant, nor substitute 
for, the President's desire to set a new goal in place for the Human 
Space Flight Program. But as we have seen in the board's report, merely 
setting a far-reaching goal into place for

[[Page S14034]]

NASA and for the Nation is not enough. It will not resolve the many 
complex issues raised by Admiral Harold Gehman and the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board. No, this report, and these challenges, 
run deeper than a rousing call for future missions to Mars on the 
Earth's Moon can resolve. As Admiral Gehman said last week in testimony 
before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee:

       In the course of (our) study, we became convinced how 
     difficult it is to get into and out of low Earth orbit. It is 
     extraordinarily dangerous and very difficult to do . . . We 
     have to do it more safely than 49 out of 50 times, that's not 
     good enough . . . No matter what your vision is for human 
     space flight, whether it's Mars or the L2 or the Moon or 
     whatever it is, it starts in low Earth orbit . . . We need 
     some leadership to say, ``Just getting into and out of low 
     Earth orbit is a goal worthy of itself, without killing a lot 
     of people.'' And that's hard to argue, because it isn't very 
     jazzy.
     Hearing on NASA's Future, October 29, 2003

  Since the inception of the human space flight program, seventeen 
astronauts have lost their lives and all were avoidable. In its 
investigative work, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reached 
several fundamental conclusions that went beyond the specific technical 
and physical causes of the loss of Columbia. The Columbia Board found 
basic flaws in how NASA managers behaved, the belief system that lay 
behind NASA attitudes and behavior, and NASA's understanding of basic 
technical and organizational requirements of safety.

       The attitudes and decision-making of Shuttle Program 
     managers and engineers during the events leading up to this 
     accident were clearly overconfident and often bureaucratic in 
     nature.
     Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume I, 
     August 2003, p. 177

       NASA's bureaucratic culture kept important information from 
     reaching engineers and managers alike. The same NASA whose 
     engineers showed initiative and a solid working knowledge of 
     how to get things done fast had a managerial culture with an 
     allegiance to bureaucracy and cost-efficiency that squelched 
     the engineers' efforts. When it came to NASA managers' own 
     actions, however, a different set of rules prevailed. The 
     Board found that Mission Management Team decision-making 
     operated outside the rules even as it held its engineers to a 
     stifling protocol . . .
       Each decision, taken by itself, seemed correct, routine, 
     and indeed, insignificant and unremarkable. Yet, in 
     retrospect, the cumulative effect was stunning.
     Ibid, p. 202-203

  Most troubling to the Board was the fact that these NASA tendencies 
were not new but existed in full force at the time of both the 
Challenger and the Columbia Shuttle accidents.

       The (Rogers) Commission found that NASA's safety system had 
     been silent . . . (denoted by) a lack of problem reporting 
     requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of 
     criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions 
     . . .
       By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional 
     practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger 
     accident--such as inadequate concern over deviations from 
     expected performance, a silent safety program, and schedule 
     pressure--had returned to NASA.
     Ibid, p. 100-101

  This ``echo'' between the events eighteen years ago and the present 
made the loss of Columbia and its explanation all the more confounding, 
because so many who reviewed the agency, its practices, and its culture 
had sounded an alarm. The fact that these NASA behaviors and beliefs 
were so enduring that they persisted beyond the stunning loss of the 
Challenger and her crew was all the more startling to the Columbia 
Board. So startling, that the Board found it necessary to offer a blunt 
and chilling assessment.

       If these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the 
     scene is set for another accident.
     Ibid, p. 195

  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also found that it was not 
only NASA that was at fault for the loss of Columbia. Rather, the Board 
found that the weaknesses at NASA were just as much a result of the 
Nation's neglect of its human space flight program.

       Post-Challenger policy decisions made by the White House, 
     Congress, and NASA leadership resulted in the agency 
     reproducing many of the failings identified by the Rogers 
     Commission. Policy constraints affected the Shuttle Program's 
     organization culture, its structure, and the structure of its 
     safety system.
     Ibid, p. 197

  The impact of this neglect extended beyond NASA's organizational 
responses, encompassing broad aspects of planning for NASA's future 
missions and the development of its technology.

       There (has been a) lack, over the past three decades, of 
     any national mandate providing NASA a compelling mission 
     requiring human presence in space . . . (and a) lack of 
     sustained government commitment over the past decade to 
     improving U.S. access to space by developing a second-
     generation space transportation system.
     Ibid, p. 209

       It is the view of the Board that previous attempts to 
     develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle represent 
     a failure of national leadership.
     Ibid, p. 211

  The bill I am introducing today establishes a permanent National 
Space Commission to oversee the nation's current and future development 
and use of space. The commission is established with 12 members, 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Commission 
members will be leaders chosen from industry, academia, and other 
professions who have a profound expertise in space flight and safety 
and have worn the mantle of responsibility and challenge in the 
development and use of space.

  The Commission will be independent of NASA and is authorized to hire 
a staff to develop the engineering and technical expertise to carry out 
its work. It will begin its work looking at some of our most vexing 
current problems raised by the Columbia Board's report and provide the 
necessary oversight to ensure that the Board's recommendations are 
implemented in the following areas: (1) the return-to-flight of the 
Space Shuttle and return to assembling the International Space Station, 
(2) replacement of the Space Shuttle, and (3) changes to the culture of 
NASA. We specify a number of detailed questions, criteria, and concerns 
that the Commission should take up in laying out a near-term path 
forward for NASA's Human Space Flight program. In making its 
recommendations, the Commission is directed to consider the safety and 
dignity of human life as its highest priority.
  This specific aspect of the bill is a special clause in my mind, one 
that is not subject redaction--the United States space flight program 
must, above all, be an American approach to the future of space flight 
and, as such, must place the dignity and preservation of human life 
above all other considerations. This assertion is not meant as an 
accusation or indictment of NASA--Admiral Gehman made it clear that the 
fault for the loss of Columbia rests with us all, impressed as we all 
were with space flight and our accomplishments, and naive about its 
risks and challenges.

       If Shuttle operations came to be viewed as routine, it was, 
     at least in part, thanks to the skill and dedication of those 
     involved in the program. They have made it look easy, though 
     in fact it never was. The Board urges NASA leadership, the 
     architects of U.S. space policy, and the American people to 
     adopt a realistic understanding of the risks and rewards of 
     venturing into space.
     Ibid, p.208

  For never again should we have to read in a formal accident report of 
the United States space program:

       Managers failed to fulfill the implicit contract to do 
     whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew.
     Ibid, p.170

  Never again.
  In each of these assessments of current issues in NASA's Human Space 
Flight Program, we intend the commission to provide the President, the 
Congress, and NASA its informed judgment and advice, so that we can 
expeditiously return the program to a condition of stability and adopt 
a NASA culture of safety as soon as possible.
  The second aspect of the bill is to set a long-range view of our 
Nation's participation in and development of space.
  Concurrent with the work on current issues at NASA, but due by late 
2005, are two ground-breaking studies. These studies are intended to go 
beyond defining a destination for humans in space and to address 
broader questions about the goals and methods we use, with a specific 
concern for public and private utilization and investment in space. 
Though we have learned that the economics of space flight should never 
again take precedence over its safety, we also know that, in the past, 
its cost has driven us down pathways that have not resulted in success.

       In all three (Shuttle replacement) projects--National 
     Aerospace Plane, X-33,

[[Page S14035]]

     and X-34--national leaders had set ambitious goals in 
     response to NASA's ambitious proposals. The programs relied 
     on the invention of revolutionary technology, had run into 
     major technical problems, and had been denied the funds 
     needed to overcome these problems--assuming they could be 
     solved. NASA had spent nearly 15 years and several billion 
     dollars, and yet had made no meaningful progress toward a 
     Space Shuttle replacement.
     Ibid, p. 111

       Continued U.S. leadership in space is an important national 
     objective. That leadership depends on a willingness to pay 
     the costs of achieving it.
     Ibid, p. 211

  First, the commission is chartered to provide a sweeping assessment 
of the future of space. Included in that assessment is a review of 
United States capabilities, goals, and uses for space, including the 
state of our Nation's investment in launch capabilities, how space 
could benefit State and local governments and regions, and the role of 
non-governmental, private organizations in the promotion of our space 
endeavors. The review will also take up the difficult issues related to 
public and private investment: the role of private institutions in the 
development and use of space and the business conditions they must 
meet; how Federal Government programs in space science, exploration, 
national security, and public safety support or limit the commercial 
development of space; and how space contributes to the terrestrial 
economy of the United States.
  Given the high cost of space, and the even higher costs of space that 
the Nation is certain to experience in the near and long-term future, 
resolution of these questions of private versus public participation 
and promotion of the development of space is a necessary part of the 
examination of possible technological and economic futures for the 
space sector of the economy.
  Second, and most importantly, the National Space Commission Act is 
directed to perform a comprehensive assessment and inventorying of the 
Nation's programs and practices related to the conduct and safety of 
space flight. This study will assess the state of the Nation's 
acceptance, approval, and commercial licensing practices as they relate 
to the conduct of civil, commercial, and military space flight and 
explore how space launch and high-risk space operations are conducted 
across each of these sectors. This study is intended to result in a 
series of recommendations about the future management of space launch 
and high-risk orbital and sub-orbital space operations in order to 
achieve the highest level of safety and management of these risks. To 
those who question the importance of establishing an authority 
independent of NASA to assess these provisions, the Columbia Accident 
Investigation board stated the case most convincingly:

       (NASA) cultural norms tend to be fairly resilient . . . The 
     norms bounce back into shape after being stretched or bent. 
     Beliefs held in common throughout the organization resist 
     alteration.
     Ibid, p. 101

       Within NASA, the cultural impediments to safe and effective 
     Shuttle operations are real and substantial . . . Leadership 
     will have to rid the system of practices and patterns that 
     have been validated simply because they have been around so 
     long . . . These recommendations will be difficult to 
     initiate, and they will encounter some degree of 
     institutional resistance.
     Ibid. p. 209

       NASA's blind spot is it believes it has a strong safety 
     culture . . . Twice in NASA history, the agency embarked on a 
     slippery slope that resulted in catastrophe . . . A safety 
     team must have equal and independent representation so that 
     managers are not again lulled into complacency by shifting 
     definitions of risk.
     Ibid, p. 203

       Since NASA is an independent agency answerable only to the 
     White House and Congress, the ultimate responsibility for 
     enforcement of the recommended corrective actions must reside 
     with those governmental authorities.
     Ibid, p. 209

  The National Space Commission is established on a permanent basis to 
maintain oversight of the implementation of space flight across all 
sectors of industry and government and vigilance in the management of 
safety in all United States high-risk space operations.
  Let me reiterate. Merely announcing a bold new plan to travel to the 
Earth's Moon or to Mars is not sufficient. If the loss of the Space 
Shuttle Columbia merely results in that proposal, we will have failed 
the memory of our brave astronauts who lost their lives aboard both 
Challenger and Columbia. And we will have failed our own future. 
Unfortunately, our current charge is more difficult. We must challenge 
our assumptions, question our decisions and designs, revisit our 
approaches, and rethink our Nation's ambitions and goals for space. We 
must submit ourselves to the discipline to begin anew. The future of 
space and our Nation's reputation that we carry into history rests in 
the balance.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and an article from 
the New York Times be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1821

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``National Space Commission 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Since the enactment of the National Aeronautics and 
     Space Act of 1958, space has become increasingly important 
     for science, public safety, national defense and intelligence 
     gathering, commercial telecommunications and other Earth 
     applications, and the advancement of international relations 
     tied to the use of space for peaceful purposes.
       (2) The recent loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia 
     highlighted the true condition of space flight: that it is 
     highly prone to risk, fundamentally challenges the laws of 
     nature, is extremely unforgiving of lapses in judgment, and 
     demands the utmost consideration of safety and the dignity of 
     human life.
       (3) The Columbia Accident Investigation Board expressed 
     extreme misgivings about the management and technical culture 
     of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In 
     addition to prescribing a specific menu of recommendations, 
     the Board expressed concerns that the agency may not be able 
     to achieve its own reform, stating that, ``Based on NASA's 
     history of ignoring external recommendations, or making 
     improvements that atrophy with time, the Board has no 
     confidence that the Space Shuttle can be safely operated for 
     more than a few years based solely on renewed post-accident 
     vigilance''.
       (4) Today, American astronauts and International Partner 
     cosmonauts reside in space with limited means of safe rescue 
     and support. The Nation remains dependent on the Space 
     Shuttle as the sole means of International Space Station 
     assembly and human operation in space for the foreseeable 
     future. And the Nation faces a period of greatly in creased 
     expense merely to sustain current space operations.
       (5) Even if new vehicle technologies were available, it is 
     a matter of public discussion whether the historic ideals and 
     prospects for the human exploration and development of space 
     still guide our national program in space or whether the role 
     and purpose of human presence in space has become ambiguous 
     in light of other potential purposes for and uses of space.
       (6) Meanwhile, our national program in space suffers from 
     an aging space workforce and aging, sometimes dilapidated 
     space facilities and systems, an atrophying of expertise, and 
     a general lack of renewal of purposes, objectives, and 
     methods. Commercial markets requiring space launch that are 
     crucial to establishing the firm economic basis for the 
     development of space and for the commercial development of 
     space technology have not emerged but have withered. Although 
     the use of space for science and national security purposes 
     is expanding, the economic and commercial development of 
     space continues to be fledgling. Although the Nation stands 
     on the doorstep of the permanent human habitation of space, a 
     mature agenda for safe, economic operation in space necessary 
     to broaden the Nation's participation and interest in the 
     peaceful development of space is lacking.
       (7) The Nation would benefit by establishing a permanent 
     National Space Commission to advise the President and 
     Congress on issues related to the reflight and future use of 
     the Space Shuttle and on the possibilities for the future 
     development and use of space, and to recommend measures the 
     Nation should take to secure the safety of future space 
     flight.

     SEC. 3. NATIONAL SPACE COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be 
     known as National Space Commission.
       (b) Membership.--
       (1) Appointment.--The Commission shall have 12 Members, who 
     shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate.
       (2) Term.--Members of the Commission shall serve for a term 
     of 5 years and shall be eligible for reappointment, except 
     that the members initially appointed shall be appointed for 
     terms of 3 years each.
       (3) Qualifications.--Members shall be selected from among 
     individuals--
       (A) with national reputations in the conduct of space 
     flight and the development of space systems and technology;
       (B) who are representative of the many views about the 
     future of space and the economic and technical prospects for 
     its use and development; and
       (C) who are or have been employed in space-related 
     activities, including--

[[Page S14036]]

       (i) leaders of aerospace companies and other industries 
     involved in the development and use of space;
       (ii) professionals who have performed in significant 
     capacities in the management of space programs or ventures; 
     and
       (iii) distinguished members of academia.
       (4) Vacancies.--Any vacancy occurring other than by the 
     expiration of a term shall be filled in a manner that best 
     replaces the qualifications of the person vacating the 
     position, unless a person with different qualifications is to 
     be nominated and appointed for the purpose of changing or re-
     directing the activities or objectives of the Commission.
       (5) Status as special government employees.--Members of the 
     Commission are deemed to be special Government employees (as 
     defined in section 202(a) of title 18, United States Code) 
     without regard to the number of days of service during any 
     365-day period while engaged in the business of the 
     Commission.
       (6) Travel expenses.--Members of the Commission shall be 
     allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business.
       (c) Chair.--The President shall designate an individual to 
     serve as Chair of the Commission for a term of 3 years, 
     except that until the Commission has been in operation for 3 
     full years the term of the individual so designated shall be 
     1 year. Any individual designated as chair is eligible for 
     redesignation as chair.
       (d) Meetings--The Commission shall meet at the call of the 
     Chair. A majority of the members shall constitute a quorum, 
     but a lesser number may conduct the business of the 
     Commission.
       (e) Staff.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall appoint and fix the 
     compensation (in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by 
     the Administrator of General Services under section 7(d) of 
     the Federal Advisory Committee Act) of staff comprising--
       (A) staff selected by the Chair as permanent staff of the 
     Commission; and
       (B) staff selected by each Member as staff of the Member 
     for the duration of the Member's appointment to the 
     Commission.
       (2) Qualifications.--Staff shall be selected from among 
     employees of business and professional firms in the business 
     of the development of, manufacture and operation for, or use 
     of space, individuals with entrepreneurial experience, 
     employees of research centers and national laboratories, 
     scholars, professionals, and academics whose work 
     and insights are such that their work in support of the 
     Commission will enhance the Nation's ability to guide and 
     direct the space program.
       (3) Detailing of federal employees.--At the request of the 
     Commission, the head of a Federal department or agency may 
     assign an employee to serve as a member of the Commission 
     staff while employed by the United States.
       (4) Experts and consultants.--
       (A) In general.--The Commission may obtain the services of 
     experts and consultants in the private and nonprofit sectors 
     in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States 
     Code.
       (B) Available arrangements.--In obtaining any service 
     described in subparagraph (A), the Commission may use any 
     available grant, contract, cooperative agreement, or other 
     arrangement authorized by law.
       (C) Notice.--The Commission shall give public notice of any 
     such grant, contract, cooperative agreement, or other 
     arrangement before making any such grant or executing any 
     such contract, cooperative agreement, or other arrangement.

     SEC. 4. GENERAL DUTIES.

       (a) In General.--The Commission shall--
       (1) provide advice and counsel to the President and the 
     Congress of the United States on matters related to the 
     future development and use of space;
       (2) address questions of special merit posed by the 
     President or by the Congress to be addressed by the 
     Commission,
       (3) conduct studies, assessments, and other methods of 
     evaluation, including market, business, and financial 
     assessments, necessary to reach conclusions and to formulate 
     recommendations about the future of space;
       (4) convene and establish public forums, reviews, and other 
     means of public discourse for purposes of gathering and 
     distributing information,facts, opinions, and data related to 
     the future of space;
       (5) confer With Federal, State, and local governments and 
     regional organizations, United States corporations, 
     laboratories, research centers and universities, and 
     appropriate departments, agencies, and enterprises of other 
     Nations on questions related to the development and use of 
     space;
       (6) make other recommendations as necessary to achieve the 
     expanded development and use of space, including assessments 
     of the status, focus, and effectiveness of government and 
     industry pro grams and efforts designed to achieve that 
     purpose;
       (7) propose and establish a national approach for the 
     safety of space flight in support of commercial, military and 
     civilian space and suborbital space programs, including 
     issues related to the commercial licensing and operation of 
     space vehicles, the regulation, management, and control of 
     space flight parts, components, systems, and facilities, and 
     the training and advancement of government and industry 
     personnel necessary, to achieve safe space flight; and
       (8) advise the President and the Congress on any changes in 
     Federal law or international agreements necessary to achieve 
     the recommendations, solutions, and outcomes proposed by the 
     Commission.
       (b) Methods of Space Flight.--In carrying out its duties 
     under subsection (a), the Commission shall consider the 
     potential for the future use of space by human and robotic 
     means and the likely contribution of both to the long-term 
     development and use of space.
       (c) Disclaimer.--Nothing in this Act is intended--
       (1) to prejudice the disposition, or outcome of decisions 
     related to the ownership or institutional operation and 
     support, of Federal laboratories, centers, or bases; or
       (2) to preclude the use of special classes, de signs, or 
     certification rules and standards peculiar to the use of 
     military space vehicles.

     SEC. 5. SPECIFIC REPORTS AND ADVISORY ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Space Shuttle; International Space Station.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall evaluate the 
     findings, recommendations, and observations of the Columbia 
     Accident Investigation Board and the activities of the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration to respond to 
     the Board's report, in eluding issues related to the re-
     flight of the Space Shuttle, alternative near-term crewed 
     vehicle options, and changes in the agency's organization, 
     management, technical administration, and conduct of safety, 
     operations and engineering, and training, and other changes 
     intended to ensure the safety of space operations and the 
     dignity of human life.
       (2) Criteria for return to operations.--The Commission 
     shall make recommendations to the President and the Congress 
     concerning--
       (A) any additional criteria and conditions that the 
     Commission considers critical for the safe operation of the 
     Space Shuttle that war rant demonstration during the initial 
     and subsequent return-to-flight test and demonstration 
     missions; and
       (B) longer-term criteria and conditions necessary for a 
     return to sustained operation and management of human space 
     flight following the initial Space Shuttle re-flight and test 
     and demonstration flights.
       (3) Evaluation of human space flight management reforms.-- 
     Commission shall assess--
       (A) the capability of the National Aeronautic and Space 
     Administration to resolve all findings, recommendations, and 
     observations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to 
     the Commission's satisfaction, including management and 
     technical reforms necessary to achieve safe space flight;
       (B) the relationship of the National Aeronautic and Space 
     Administration to its Industrial, scientific, and commercial 
     partners and the proper role of each party in the selection, 
     design, development, and operation of high risk space flight 
     systems; and
       (C) additional workforce, organization, and management 
     reforms that may be required to enhance further the ability 
     of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration, its 
     partners, or other agencies of the United States to achieve 
     safety of human space flight.
       (4) Consideration of the international space station and 
     alternative space transportation solutions.--In making its 
     evaluation and recommendations under this subsection the 
     Commission shall consider--
       (A) the condition of the International
       Space Station along with the further risk to or security of 
     human life resulting from any decision to accelerate or slow 
     the return to assembly and operation of the International 
     Space Station and sustained human space flight operations;
       (B) alternative space vehicle and crewing options that meet 
     the highest achievable stand and of crew safety and security 
     on-board the international Space Station in the shortest 
     amount of time;
       (C) the modification or purchase of existing space vehicles 
     necessary to achieve a higher standard of heightened crew 
     safety or enhanced ability to conduct safe human space 
     flight operations;
       (D) the acquisition or development of crewed vehicles on a 
     schedule significantly more aggressive that the proposed 
     schedule of the Orbital Space Plane; and
       (E) the contribution of any proposed vehicle options to 
     purposes in space other than servicing and support of the 
     International Space Station.
       (4) Reports to congress.--
       (A) Alternative means of crew transfer.--Within 3 months 
     after the full Commission has taken office, it shall report 
     to the President and the Congress on crewing options for the 
     Space Shuttle during the period of assembly of the 
     International Space Station, alternative interim use of 
     available space vehicles for these operations, and 
     alternative or accelerated United States crewed vehicle 
     modification or development options in lieu of or in addition 
     to the proposed Orbital Space Plane program.
       (B) Space shuttle return-to-flight.--
       (i) Preflight advice.--On a continuous basis from the 
     initial return-to-flight mission of the Space Shuttle through 
     the final such mission, the Commission shall advise the 
     Administrator, the President, and the Congress of the results 
     of its review and assessment of the Space Shuttle return-to-
     flight, including any additional criteria the

[[Page S14037]]

     Commission establishes for return-to-flight missions.
       (ii) Final preflight recommendation.--Within 60 days before 
     the planned date for the first Space Shuttle return-to-
     flight, and within 30 days before each subsequent test or 
     demonstration flight of the Space Shuttle, the Commission 
     shall transmit its final recommendations for return-to-flight 
     to the Administrator, the President, and the Congress. In 
     addition, the Commission shall attach to each such 
     transmittal to the President and the Congress a record of its 
     recommendations to the Administrator and a description of the 
     Administrator's responses and actions in response to those 
     recommendations.
       (iii) Post-resumption analysis.--Within 6 months after the 
     first successful return-to-flight mission of the Space 
     Shuttle, the Commission shall submit a report to the 
     President and the Congress summarizing the Commission's and 
     the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's work on 
     the re-flight of the Space Shuttle and addressing further 
     changes that should be accomplished to ensure safe continuous 
     operation of the Space Shuttle and the International Space 
     Station. The report shall address the status of 
     organizational, management, and technical changes in the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration, their 
     effectiveness in resolving concerns about the safety, 
     operations, engineering, and management cultures of the 
     agency, and their effectiveness in resolving concerns and 
     risks associated with a return-to-normal operations for the 
     Space Shuttle and the International Space Station.
       (b) Future Launch Technology and the Development of and 
     Uses for Space.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall--
       (A) advise the President and the Congress on the state of 
     the Nation's investment in and development of advanced space 
     launch technology, including advanced space lift propulsion 
     systems;
       (B) make recommendations on steps necessary to accelerate 
     the development of technologies and capabilities to advance 
     the economy of space flight and the prospect for the expanded 
     use of space for economic, commercial, and industrial 
     purposes;
       (C) assess how State and local governments and regional 
     authorities might benefit from the expanded use of space;
       (D) evaluate the ability of the Nation's private research 
     centers, laboratories, and private and public universities to 
     contribute to and benefit from the expanded development and 
     use of space;
       (E) assess the future use of space for exploration, 
     science, research, national security, and public safety 
     ensure that such uses are consistent with the long-term 
     economic development of space, and are designed to enhance 
     the industrial and commercial capabilities of space flight 
     whenever possible; and
       (F) make detailed recommendations related to the use of 
     budget, regulatory, and licensing powers and authorities of 
     the United States to enhance, to better plan for, and to 
     coordinate the activities of the United States related to the 
     development and use of space.
       (2) Report to congress.--By September 1, 2005 the 
     Commission shall transmit to the Congress a report that--
       (A) summarizes its recommendations for future national 
     goals for the development and use of space;
       (B) provides a blueprint of capabilities that could and 
     should be achieved by the end of the present decade, by 2015, 
     and by 2025 in order to better position the Nation to achieve 
     those goals; and
       (C) addresses potential markets and uses for space and the 
     means of financing the development and use of space.
       (c) National Approach to the Safety of Space Flight.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall conduct a review and 
     assessment of the Nation's program of safety in space flight 
     as conducted by the United States, the commercial space 
     industry, and other private parties.
       (2) Contents.--The review and assessment shall--
       (A) assess the current use of inspection, acceptance, and 
     commercial licensing to certify the safety, flight 
     worthiness, and flight readiness of space vehicles and their 
     associated launch and ground control facilities;
       (B) evaluate and compare current space launch and flight 
     operations practices, including the promulgation of flight 
     rules and over-flight plans of populated areas;
       (C) assess and compare how Federal agencies, private launch 
     operators, and commercial industry make determinations of 
     flight worthiness and ground and flight system readiness, 
     including the use of tests, analyses, demonstrations, and 
     other means whereby the operational readiness of space 
     vehicles, crew, and ground systems are verified to be ready 
     for launch and operation;
       (D) address current government and industry practices for 
     conducting and coordinating design and decision rules within 
     and among space management agencies, firms, organizations, 
     and ground control and flight operations management centers 
     before, during, and after flight; and
       (E) assess practices and conditions related to the 
     acquisition and sale of parts, components, systems, services, 
     and capabilities among Industry prime and supplier 
     contractors and the Federal Government, including 
     outsourcing, sole source, and other competitive and non-
     competitive forms of relationship, and their impact upon 
     safety.
       (3) Report to congress.--No later than September 1, 2005, 
     the Commission shall transmit to the Congress a report that--
       (A) summarizes the results of the review and assessment 
     required by paragraph (1); and
       (B) makes recommendations for a National program of--
       (i) management of safe commercial, civil, and military 
     space flight; and
       (ii) regulation of the design, certification, or licensing 
     of space flight systems for launch and landing over the 
     United States, or for orbital or suborbital operation using 
     crew or passengers aboard commercial or civil vehicles 
     licensed or operated by the United States.
       (c) Annual Report.--In addition to other reports required 
     or permitted under this Act, within 60 days after the end of 
     each fiscal year, the Commission shall provide an annual 
     report to the Congress that--
       (1) summarizes its activities, reports, findings, 
     conclusions, and recommendations during that fiscal year; and
       (2) contains a year-end financial statement of the 
     Commission's operations, including a detailed statement of 
     the purposes for which funds have been expended by the 
     Commission.
       (d) Other Reports.--The Commission may also report to the 
     President and the Congress on other space related questions 
     and issues raised by the Congress, the President, or on its 
     own initiative.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration.
       (2) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the National 
     Space Commission established by section 3.

     SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission 
     such sums as may be necessary to carry out its duties under 
     this Act.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Nov. 5, 2003]

          NASA Supporters Seek National Debate on Space Goals

                          (By Matthew L. Wald)

       Washington, Nov. 4--After the shuttle Columbia 
     disintegrated on Feb. 1, many supporters of NASA expected a 
     renewed national debate on the goals of the space program. 
     But nine months later, supporters of space exploration and 
     the science program say that the subject appears to be in 
     danger of slipping below the national horizon.
       ``There have been fits and starts of a national debate,'' 
     said Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, the 
     ranking Democrat on the Commerce Committee, which has 
     jurisdiction over NASA.
       Mr. Hollings plans to introduce a bill on Wednesday to 
     create a national space commission to oversee NASA's progress 
     in fixing the hardware and the ``broken safety culture'' 
     identified in the Columbia investigation, and to help set 
     goals.
       Senator Hollings' bill, which has six sponsors, all 
     Democrats, joins a varied flock of measures on the House 
     side, none likely to see major action this year.
       ``It's not commanding anywhere near the level of attention 
     that the Challenger did,'' said a House staff aide who was on 
     Capitol Hill at the time of that accident, in 1986.
       The war in Iraq helps explain the difference, the aide 
     added, but beyond that, ``space is more humdrum now,'' even 
     when astronauts die.
       Sean O'Keefe, the NASA administrator, said in testimony 
     last week that the Bush administration would produce a new 
     plan for space, including a replacement vehicle for the 
     shuttle, now more than 20 years old. He said Congress should 
     wait until that plan is released, but he refused to predict 
     how long that would take.
       The leisurely pace contrasts with the push by the Columbia 
     Accident Investigation Board to complete its work over the 
     summer so members of Congress could digest the report during 
     their recess and be ready for a vigorous debate when they 
     returned.
       The most prominent feature of the debate so far has been a 
     skirmish between NASA and the chairman of the House Science 
     Committee and the ranking Democrat on the panel. The two 
     lawmakers, Representatives Sherwood Boehlert, Republican of 
     New York, and Ralph M. Hall, Democrat of Texas, suggested 
     that NASA hold off on development of an orbital space plane, 
     a crew-transport vehicle that could replace the shuttle, 
     until an ``overall vision for the human spaceflight program'' 
     emerges.
       Mr. Boehlert said at a hearing on Oct. 16 that NASA would 
     be successful ``only if it's pursuing a clear and broad 
     national consensus with sustained and adequate funding,'' and 
     he added, ``That hasn't been the case in three decades.''
       Mr. O'Keefe, responding to the letter on the orbital space 
     plane, argued that the project was still at a conceptual 
     stage and should proceed.
       Beyond establishing a commission to oversee NASA's 
     progress, the Senate bill to be introduced on Wednesday seeks 
     ``to address broader questions about the goals and methods we 
     use,'' with specific concern for public and private 
     investment in spaceflight and use of it. In remarks prepared 
     for delivery on the Senate floor on Wednesday, Mr. Hollings 
     argues that while economics of spaceflight should not take 
     precedence over safety, ``we also know that, in the past, its 
     cost has driven us down pathways that have not resulted in 
     success.''

[[Page S14038]]

       On the House side, Representative Bart Gordon, Democrat of 
     Tennessee, introduced a bill that would have future accidents 
     investigated by a presidential commission independent of 
     NASA. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board began under a 
     charter written after the Challenger accident, with members 
     selected according to positions they held in the Air Force, 
     Federal Aviation Administration and other agencies.
       Mr. Gordon's bill was approved by a subcommittee but has 
     gone no further.
       Mr. Hall, the ranking Democrat on the House Science 
     Committee, introduced a bill on Oct. 1, with 24 sponsors, 
     including 3 Republicans, that would have the National Academy 
     of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering assemble 
     an oversight committee, as was done after the Challenger 
     accident. NASA has generally opposed outside oversight.
       Mr. Hall also introduced an amendment to an appropriations 
     bill that would mandate a $15 million study of shuttle crew 
     escape, to be performed by NASA. The House passed the bill, 
     and it is now in a conference committee.
       Representative Nick Lampson, Democrat of Texas, has 
     introduced a measure that would require NASA to develop 
     reusable spaceships that could sit for long periods balanced 
     between the gravitational pull of Earth and the Sun or the 
     Moon; ships that could reach an asteroid; and, ultimately, 
     ones that could reach Mars. The bill has 24 sponsors but has 
     not yet been taken up in committee.
       Mr. Lampson said in a telephone interview that he was glad 
     that Senator Hollings was focused on the problem, but he 
     added, ``we don't need a commission, we need a commitment for 
     NASA.''
       ``If the goals get set, we will re-energize the academic 
     community, and the space industrial community,'' he said, 
     predicting that missions to Mars would ``do a great deal to 
     move this country forward.''
       Mr. Hollings, in a separate interview, said, ``I want to go 
     to Mars, too, but unless you get the culture changed and 
     fixed, we're not going anywhere.''
                                 ______