[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 158 (Tuesday, November 4, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13843-S13847]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SUPPORT OF AMERICAN TROOPS
Mr. BOND. Madam President, I rise this morning in support of the U.S.
forces in Iraq and all our forces engaged in the war on terrorism. I am
delighted and very pleased that the vast majority of this body voted
overwhelmingly in support of the supplemental and our ongoing efforts
to protect our troops to finish the job so we can bring our troops
home.
Last week, I had the honor of going out to Walter Reed to visit a
number of our wounded soldiers recently returned from Iraq. The spirit
and enthusiasm of our service men and women serving in the war on
terror is inspiring. It should remind all of us that our warfighters
have the will to win as long as the American people have the will to
win.
We cannot be defeated by Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden
militarily. They are engaged in a psychological war to break our will.
This past weekend brought news of the tragic loss of 16 soldiers in a
Chinook helicopter mishap. No one in this body takes that current
conflict lightly. Any loss of life is difficult to bear, particularly
this tragic situation. Yet we must not forget the losses incurred in
the United States on 9/11, and the loss of innocent lives in other
terrorist attacks, from the marine barracks in Lebanon to the disco
bombing in Bali.
The message we must send, if we are to avoid future catastrophic
attacks, is that no price is too great for the freedoms we and other
freedom-loving peoples now hold dear. The message we need to send our
enemies is that we will not cut and run.
There are critics of U.S. foreign policy who now want us to pull out.
They are just dead wrong. Do they think Saddam Hussein was not really
evil, was not really a threat?
Last week, I talked a little bit about the unclassified report
released by Dr. David Kay, the head of the Iraqi Survey Group, who has
been over there looking. He has found a tremendous record of denial,
deception, and destruction, which among other things is likely the
reason we have not found the storehouses of weapons of mass
destruction.
Dr. Kay believes that people have been distorting his record. I will
submit for the record a copy of his November 1, 2003, piece in the
Washington Post. It begins:
The October 26 front-page article ``Search in Iraq Fails to
Find Nuclear Threat,'' is wildly off the mark.
I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record after my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BOND. I am going to quote from just pieces of his report, because
apparently a lot of my colleagues who are saying it confirms that there
were no weapons of mass destruction have not read the report.
Here is what Dr. Kay said:
With regard to biological warfare activities, which has
been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are
uncovering significant information, including research
and development of BW-applicable organisms, the
involvement of Iraqi intelligence service in possible BW
activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of
this suggests Iraq, after 1996, further compartmentalized
its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert
capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the
production of BW agents. Debriefings of IIS officials and
site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of
laboratories and facilities within the security service
apparatus. This network was never declared to the U.N. and
was previously unknown.
Again, he said two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq,
under
[[Page S13844]]
the guise of legitimate activity, developed refinements of processes
and products relevant to BW agents. Iraq concealed equipment and
materials from U.N. inspectors when they returned in 2002. One
noteworthy example is a collection of referenced strains that ought to
have been declared to the U.N. Among them was a vial of live C.
botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced.
ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq
explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as
late as 2003.
Information obtained since OIF has identified several key areas in
which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activities
since 1991, including research on a possible VX stabilizer, research
and development for CW-capable munitions, and procurement concealment
of dual-use materials and equipment.
Officials assert Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons
development at some future point. Iraq did take steps to preserve some
capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
Detainees and cooperative sources indicate that beginning in 2000,
Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at
least 400 kilometers and up to 1,000 kilometers, and that measures to
conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late 2002, ahead
of the arrival of inspectors.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Kay report be
printed in the Record. It talks about several revelations of his
efforts to obtain ballistic missiles and unmanned air vehicles.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
What have we found and what have we not found in the first
3 months of our work?
We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program
activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq
concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that
began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate
concealment efforts have come about both through the
admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning
information they deliberately withheld and through physical
evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered
that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give
you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of
which I will elaborate on later:
A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within
the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment
subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW
research.
A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing
of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN
inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a
scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce
biological weapons.
New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo
Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on
ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that
would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by
centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared
production facility and an admission that they had tested one
of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km
beyond the permissible limit.
Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant
useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a
capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001
and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were
told to conceal from the UN.
Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles
with ranges up to at least 1000 km--well beyond the 150 km
range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range
would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets throughout the
Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
Clandestine attempts between late 1999 and 2002 to obtain
from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range
ballistic missiles--probably the No Dong--300 km range anti-
ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military
equipment.
In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment
efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of
documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices,
laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The
pattern of these efforts to erase evidence--hard drives
destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all
traces of use--are ones of deliberate, rather than random,
acts. For example,
On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement
of the main building contained an archive of documents
situated on well-organized rows of metal shelving. The
basement suffered no fire damage despite the total
destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes.
Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of
ash where individual documents or binders of documents were
intentionally destroyed. Computer hard drives had been
deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had financial
value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than
removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort to
prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their
contents.
All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have
been clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment,
shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal of
nameplates from office doors.
Although much of the deliberate destruction and
sanitization of documents and records probably occurred
during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of
significant continuing destruction efforts have been found
after the end of major combat operations, including entry in
May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party
intelligence building in Baghdad and highly selective
destruction of computer hard drives and data storage
equipment along with the burning of a small number of
specific binders that appear to have contained financial and
intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation
team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the
smoldering ashes from documents that was still warm to the
touch.
I would now like to review our efforts in each of the major
lines of enquiry that ISG has pursued during this initial
phase of its work.
With regard to biological warfare activities, which has
been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are
uncovering significant information--including research and
development of BW applicable organisms, the involvement of
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities,
and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests
Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and
focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that
could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW
agents.
Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to
unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities
within the security service apparatus. This network was never
declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still
working on determining the extent to which this network was
tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons,
but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving
BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D--all
key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming
BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in
sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the
biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS
sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-
applicable research. This was the only area of graduate
work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.
Discussions with Iraqi scientists uncovered agent R&D work
that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving
as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic
agents. Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B.
anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a
similar vein, two key former BW scientists, confirmed that
Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed
refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents.
The scientists discussed the development of improved,
simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the
simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to
anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line
for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if
the seed stock were available.
A very large body of information has been developed through
debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi
documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and
materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One
noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that
ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial
of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent
can be produced. This discovery--hidden in the home of a BW
scientist--illustrates the point I made earlier about the
difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be
used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The
scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has
identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but
refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this
second cache.
Additional information is beginning to corroborate
reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using
chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area
is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel
about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.
We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a
mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of
and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq
in April has yielded a number of explanations, including
hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but
technical limitations would prevent any of these processes
from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said,
nothing we have discovered rules out their potential use in
BW production.
We have made significant progress in identifying and
locating individuals who were reportedly involved in a mobile
program, and
[[Page S13845]]
we are confident that we will be able to get an answer to the
questions as to whether there was a mobile program and
whether the trailers that have been discovered so far were
part of such a program.
Let me turn now to chemical weapons (CW). In searching for
retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend
with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional
weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the
physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons.
For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi
Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50
square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of
artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other
ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain
unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their
chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held
conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort
is enormous.
While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have
developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored
the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as
late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior military
official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to
produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that
after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it
would take six months for mustard. Another senior Iraqi
chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid
2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam
estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard
and two years for Sarin.
We are starting to survey parts of Iraq's chemical industry
to determine if suitable equipment and bulk chemicals were
available for chemical weapons production. We have been
struck that two senior Iraqi officials volunteered that if
they had been ordered to resume CW production Iraq would have
been willing to use stainless steel systems that would be
disposed of after a few production runs, in place of
corrosive-resistant equipment which they did not have.
We continue to follow leads on Iraq's acquisition of
equipment and bulk precursors suitable for a CW program.
Several possibilities have emerged and are now being
exploited. One example involves a foreign company with
offices in Baghdad, that imported in the past into Iraq dual-
use equipment and maintained active contracts through 2002.
Its Baghdad office was found looted in August 2003, but we
are pursuing other locations and associates of the company.
Information obtained since OIF has identified several key
areas in which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or
undeclared activity since 1991, including research on a
possible VX stabilizer, research and development for CW-
capable munitions, and procurement/concealment of dual-use
materials and equipment.
Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have
told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally
controlled CW program after 1991. Information found to date
suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop,
produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced--if not
entirely destroyed--during Operations Desert Storm and Desert
Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections. We are
carefully examining dual-use, commercial chemical facilities
to determine whether these were used or planned as
alternative production sites.
We have also acquired information related to Iraq's CW
doctrine and Iraq's war plans for OIF, but we have not yet
found evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Iraqi
military units were prepared to use CW against Coalition
forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on
Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little
reliable information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent
production, although we continue to receive and follow leads
related to such stocks. We have multiple reports that Iraq
retained CW munitions made prior to 1991, possibly including
mustard--a long-lasting chemical agent--but we have to date
been unable to locate any such munitions.
With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the testimony we
have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government
officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam
still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG
that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring
nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would
have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future
point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of
sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that
by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for
sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program.
The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around
1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and
increased its overall funding levels. This expansion may have
been in initial preparation for renewed nuclear weapons
research, although documentary evidence of this has not been
found, and this is the subject of continuing investigation by
ISG.
Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr.
Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively
unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to
nuclear weapons development. These initiatives did not in-
and-of themselves constitute a resumption of the nuclear
weapons program, but could have been useful in developing a
weapons-relevant science base for the long-term. We do not
yet have information indicating whether a higher government
authority directed Sa'id to initiate this research and,
regretfully, Dr. Sa'id was killed on April 8th during the
fall of Baghdad when the car he was riding in attempted to
run a Coalition roadblock.
Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire
nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that
Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build
nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq
did take steps to preserve some technological capability from
the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists,
some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear
weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on
nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military
Industrial Commission (MIC). Some scientists from the pre-
1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed
that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a
reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of
the scientists could produce official orders or plans to
support their belief.
In some cases, these groups performed work which could help
preserve the science base and core skills that would be
needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear
weapons development.
Several scientists--at the direction of senior Iraqi
government officials--preserved documents and equipment from
their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not
reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently
stated in an interview with ISG that it was a ``common
understanding'' among the scientists that material was being
preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.
The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was
interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge
enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on
activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former
colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that
Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the
centrifuge program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi
intentions, and the evidence does not tie any activity
directly to centrifuge research or development.
Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the
projects and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There
may be more projects to be discovered in research placed at
universities and private companies. Iraqi interest in
reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs to be
better understood through the analysis of procurement records
and additional interviews.
With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has
discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the
Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements
that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically
breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf
War.
Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning
in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles
with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that
measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were
initiated in late 2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors.
Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid
propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to
a point to support initial prototype production of some parts
and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee,
Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-
propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would
take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile
project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam
countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and
built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources
contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles
grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002. ISG has
gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State
Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2
Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range
goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly
underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC.
This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently
seeking additional confirmation and details on this
project. A second cooperative source has stated that the
program actually began in 2001, but that it received added
impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from this
project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad.
This source also provided documentary evidence of
instructions to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface
missiles.
ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and
cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed-range
solid-propellant missile design studies were initiated, or
already underway, at the time when work on the clustered
liquid-propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter
was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm
Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from
over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the
payload mass.
A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002
deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project,
provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher
designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length
[[Page S13846]]
missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was
some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source
believes that these drawings would not have been requested
until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally
beyond the design state. The drawings are in CAD format, with
files dated 09/01/02.
While we have obtained enough information to make us
confident that this design effort was underway, we are not
yet confident which accounts of the timeline and project
progress are accurate and are now seeking to better
understand this program and its actual progress at the time
of OIF.
One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the
new large-diameter solid-propellant missile was intended to
have a CW-filled warhead, but no detainee has admitted any
actual knowledge of plans for unconventional warheads for any
current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion expressed
by the one source about a CW warhead was based on his
assessment of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and
potential survivability problems of biological warfare agent
in ballistic missile warheads. This is an area of great
interest and we are seeking additional information on warhead
designs.
While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one
high-level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a
small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001,
although he subsequently recanted these claims, work
continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend
that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and
oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating
source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to
manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that
nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected
from a bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved,
and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an
inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its
pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of
fear, multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory
would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to
produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and
munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or
material evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued
efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information
with additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating
physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was
produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only
be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong
evidence that the missiles must have been retained until that
date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a
failure to declare prohibited activities to the UN.
Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms
and maintained two UAV programs that were working in
parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al-Rashid Air Force
Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more
traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of
manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to
the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the
RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these
systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several
Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on
autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the
system's range. The al-Rashid group was developing a
competing line of UAVs. This program was never fully
declared to the UN and is the subject of on-going work by
ISG. Additional work is also focusing on the payloads and
intended use for these UAVs. Surveillance and use as
decoys are uses mentioned by some of those interviewed.
Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War in attempting to
convert a MIG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry
spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological
agents, attention is being paid to whether any of the
newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar
purpose. This remains an open question.
ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile
programs. The first appears to have been successfully
implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity
at the time of OIF.
The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense
cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of
testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured
document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing
the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack
missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its
original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were
delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were
fired from Umm Qasr during OIF--one was shot down and one hit
Kuwait. The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more
ambitious effort to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range
land-attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented
to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received what cooperative
sources called an ``unusually quick response'' in little more
than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an HY-2,
strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a
turbine engine from a Russian helicopter--the TV-2-117 or
TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopter. To prevent discovery
by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and testing and
disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design
criteria had been met.
In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's
attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN
150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts
to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology.
Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between
Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included
an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate
Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-
surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong)
and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The document
quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations
imposed by the UN, but being prepared ``to cooperate with
Iraq on the items it specified''. At the time of OIF, these
discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to
Iraq. A high level cooperating source has reported that in
late 2002 at Saddam's behest a delegation of Iraqi officials
was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one
that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in buying an
advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.
The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and
testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to
illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its
missile program. These include:
Significant level of assistance from a foreign company and
its network of affiliates in supplying and supporting the
development of production capabilities for solid rocket
propellant and dual-use chemicals.
Entities from another foreign country were involved in
supplying guidance and control systems for use in the Al-
Fat'h (Ababil-100). The contract was incomplete by the time
of OIF due to technical problems with the few systems
delivered and a financial dispute.
A group of foreign experts operating in a private capacity
were helping to develop Iraq's liquid propellant ballistic
missile RDT&E and production infrastructure. They worked in
Baghdad for about three months in late 1998 and subsequently
continued work on the project from abroad. An actual contract
valued at $10 million for machinery and equipment was signed
in June 2001, initially for 18 months, but later extended.
This cooperation continued right up until the war.
A different group of foreign experts traveled to Iraq in
1999 to conduct a technical review that resulted in what
became the Al Samoud 2 design, and a contract was signed in
2001 for the provision of rigs, fixtures and control
equipment for the redesigned missile.
Detainees and cooperative sources have described the role
of a foreign expert in negotiations on the development of
Iraq's liquid and solid propellant production infrastructure.
This could have had applications in existing and planned
longer range systems, although it is reported that nothing
had actually been implemented before OIF.
Uncertainty remains about the full extent of foreign
assistance to Iraq's planned expansion of its missile systems
and work is continuing to gain a full resolution of this
issue. However, there is little doubt from the evidence
already gathered that there was substantial illegal
procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.
I have covered a lot of ground today, much of it highly
technical. Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in
this first interim report, a number of things have become
clearer already as a result of our investigation, among them:
1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other
insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had
not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior
officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge
of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge
that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the
external restrictions were removed. Several of these
officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from
Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either
restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.
2. In the delivery systems area there were already well
advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF
had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of
missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess
of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities
were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program
about which we have much still to learn.
3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have
confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going
research and development activities that were embedded in the
Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn
about the exact work programs and capabilities of these
activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared
activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and
biological weapons activities and provided a technically
trained cadre.
Let me conclude by returning to something I began with
today. We face a unique but challenging opportunity in our
efforts to unravel the exact status of Iraq's WMD program.
The good news is that we do not have to rely for the first
time in over a decade on the incomplete, and often false,
data that Iraq supplied the UN/IAEA;
Data collected by UN inspectors operating with the severe
constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions
imposed;
Information supplied by defectors, some of whom certainly
fabricated much that they
[[Page S13847]]
supplied and perhaps were under the direct control of the
IIS;
Data collected by national technical collections systems
with their own limitations.
The bad news is that we have to do this under conditions
that ensure that our work will take time and impose serious
physical dangers on those who are asked to carry it out. Why
should we take the time and run the risk to ensure that our
conclusions reflect the truth to the maximum extent that is
possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq? For
those of us that are carrying out this search, there are two
reasons that drive us to want to complete this effort.
First, whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war
intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has
always been, different from intelligence judgments that must
be made under serious constraints of time, distance and
information. It is, however, only by understanding precisely
what those difference are that the quality of future
intelligence and investment decisions concerning future
intelligence systems can be improved. Proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction is such a continuing threat to
global society that learning those lessons has a high
imperative.
Second, we have found people, technical information and
illicit procurement networks that if allowed to flow to other
countries and regions could accelerate global proliferation.
Even in the area of actual weapons there is no doubt that
Iraq had at one time chemical and biological weapons. Even if
there were only a remote possibility that these pre-1991
weapons still exist, we have an obligation to American troops
who are now there and the Iraqi population to ensure that
none of these remain to be used against them in the ongoing
insurgency activity.
Mr. Chairman and Members I appreciate this opportunity to
share with you the initial results of the first 3 months of
the activities of the Iraqi Survey Group. I am certain that I
speak for Major General Keith Dayton, who commands the Iraqi
Survey Group, when I say how proud we are of the men and
women from across the Government and from our Coalition
partners, Australia and the United Kingdom, who have gone to
Iraq and are carrying out this important mission.
Thank you.
Mr. BOND. We are engaged in a monumental fight against terrorism and
tyranny on a global scale, one in which all freedom-loving people have
a stake. Other free countries ought to realize this is a battle in
which we all have a stake. The Middle East region has long been marked
by instability and marred by war, the threat of war and torture,
terrorism, and ruthless dictators. Saddam Hussein was at the heart of
it. On September 11 we lost close to 3,000 citizens when foreign
terrorists attacked innocent civilians. It is a miracle we did not lose
more. But we are now fighting that battle against terrorism in Baghdad,
not in Boston or Boise or Baldwin, MO.
As I said earlier, some argue that Saddam has not been linked to
terrorism. Well, what David Kay has already described puts the lie to
that. Also, tell that to the thousands of Israeli families who have
lost innocent relatives at the hands of Hamas suicide bombers whose
families received $25,000 from the Iraqi dictator for each successful
attack on innocent men, women, and children.
Today, on the good-news side, there are close to 100,000 Iraqis who
are assuming control of essential civil responsibilities such as border
police, civil defense, police facilities protection, and as soldiers.
With each passing day, more and more Iraqis are taking the lead in
security and in protecting Iraq. Over 85 percent of Iraq is relatively
stable, with the exception of the troubled Sunni Triangle.
It is no surprise the Sunni Baathists are putting up the most
resistance, for they have the most to lose. We have seen recently
declassified reports of the Iraqi-sponsored torture, which are too
disturbing even to watch. We found mass graves. We know Saddam
conducted mass chemical attacks against his own people and launched
chemical attacks against Iran.
I believe the President was correct when he said we must take on the
war on terrorism, which would take years, not months. This is a global
conflict against terrorism. The will of the American people is being
tested. We cannot flinch. If we do not pursue terrorists where they
live now, then we will continue to invite more attacks any time U.S.
interests collide with the interests of terrorists.
Exhibit 1
The Oct. 26 front-page article ``Search in Iraq Fails to
Find Nuclear Threat'' is wildly off the mark. Your reporter,
Barton Gellman, bases much of his analysis on what he says
was told to him by an Australian brigadier, Stephen D.
Meekin. Gellman describes Meekin as someone ``who commands
the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, the largest
of a half-dozen units that report to [David] Kay.''
Meekin does not report, nor has he ever reported, to me in
any individual capacity or as commander of the exploitation
center. The work of the center did not form a part of my
first interim report, which was delivered last month, nor do
I direct what Meekin's organization does. The center's
mission has never involved weapons of mass destruction, nor
does it have any WMD expertise.
Gellman's description of information provided by Mahdi
Obeidi, chief of Iraq's pre-1991 centrifuge program, relies
on an unnamed ``U.S. official'' who, by the reporter's own
admission, read only one reporting cable. How Gellman's
source was able to describe reporting that covered four
months is a mystery to me. Furthermore, the source
mischaracterized our views on the reliability of Obeidi's
information.
With regard to Obeidi's move to the United States, Gellman
writes, ``By summer's end, under unknown circumstances,
Obeidi received permission to bring his family to an East
Coast suburb in the United States.'' The reader is left with
the impression that this move involved something manipulative
or sinister. The ``unknown circumstances'' are called Public
Law 110. This mechanism was created during the Cold War to
give the director of central intelligence the authority to
resettle those who help provide valuable intelligence
information. Nothing unusual or mysterious here.
When the article moves to describe the actual work of the
nuclear team, Gellman states that `'frustrated members of the
nuclear search team by late spring began calling themselves
the `book of the month club.' ``But he fails to note that
this was before the establishment of the Iraq Survey Group.
In fact, the team's frustration with the pace of the work is
what led President Bush to shift the responsibility for the
WMD search to the director of central intelligence and to
send me to Baghdad.
One would believe from what Gellman writes that I have sent
home the two leaders of my nuclear team, William Domke and
Jeffrey Bedell, and abandoned all attempts to determine the
state of Iraq's nuclear activities. Wrong again, Domke's
assignment had been twice extended well beyond what the
Department of Energy had agreed to. He and Bedell were
replaced with a much larger contingent of experts from
DOE's National Labs.
Finally, with regard to the aluminum tubes, the tubes were
certainly being imported and were being used for rockets. The
question that continues to occupy us is whether similar
tubes, with higher specifications, had other uses,
specifically in nuclear centrifuges. Why anyone would think
that we should want to confiscate the thousands of aluminum
tubes of the lower specification is unclear. Our
investigation is focused on whether a nuclear centrifuge
program was either underway or in the planning stages, what
design and components were being contemplated or used in such
a program if it existed and the reason for the constant
raising of the specifications of the tubes the Iraqis were
importing clandestinely.
We have much work left to do before any conclusions can be
reached on the state of possible Iraqi nuclear weapons
program efforts. Your story gives the false impression that
conclusions can already be drawn.
____
When Barton Gellman interviewed me last month I stressed on
a number of occasions that my remarks related to Iraqi's
conventional weapons program. I am responsible for aspects of
that program as the commander of the coalition Joint Captured
Materiel Exploitation Center. I did not provide assessments
or views on Iraq's nuclear program or the status of
investigations being conducted by the Iraq Survey Group.
On the issue of Iraq's use of aluminum tubes, I did
confirm, in response to a question by Gellman, that aluminum
tubes form the body of Iraqi 81mm battlefield rockets and
that my teams had recovered some of these rockets for
technical examination. Further, I stated that the empty tubes
were innocuous in view of the large quantities of lethal
Iraqi conventional weapons such as small arms, explosive
ordnance and man-portable air defense systems in this
country. I did not make any judgment on the suitability of
the 81mm aluminum tubes as components in a nuclear program.
In discussing the disbanding of the Joint Captured Materiel
Exploitation Center, I told your reporter that the center's
work was largely complete, and I made clear that its role was
in the realm of Iraq's conventional weapons and technologies.
Gellman attributed to me comments about the effect of U.N.-
imposed sanctions. Again, I referred to Iraqi efforts to
acquire conventional military equipment. I made no assessment
about the effect of U.N. sanctions on Iraq's nuclear program.
Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, I will claim no more than 5 minutes of
the time of the Senator from Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________