[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 156 (Friday, October 31, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13715-S13719]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

                                 ______
                                 

  SENATE RESOLUTION 256--OBSERVING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MUTUAL 
  DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
AFFIRMING THE DEEP COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THANKING THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
  AND TO THE STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

  Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Brownback, Mr. 
Dodd, and Mr. Hagel) submitted the following resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 256

       Whereas October 1, 2003, marked the 50th anniversary of the 
     signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
     States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at 
     Washington October 1, 1953, and entered into force November 
     17, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the ``Mutual Defense 
     Treaty'');
       Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have 
     formed a bond through the common struggle against communist 
     aggression;
       Whereas more than 34,000 Americans lost their lives 
     fighting in the Korean War, and approximately 37,000 men and 
     women of the United States Armed Forces are still deployed on 
     the Korean peninsula, enduring separation from their families 
     and other hardships in the defense of freedom;
       Whereas the Mutual Defense Treaty has been instrumental in 
     securing peace on the Korean peninsula and providing an 
     environment in which the Republic of Korea has become an 
     economically vibrant, free, democratic society;
       Whereas the foundation of the Mutual Defense Treaty rests 
     not only on a common adversary, but more importantly on a 
     shared interest in, and commitment to, peace, democracy, and 
     freedom on the Korean peninsula, in Asia, and throughout the 
     world;
       Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea are 
     working closely together to find a diplomatic solution to the 
     threat posed by North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
     the export by North Korea of ballistic missiles;
       Whereas the Republic of Korea is making valuable 
     contributions to the global war on terrorism, including the 
     contribution of logistics support for international forces 
     operating in Afghanistan;
       Whereas the Republic of Korea has pledged $260,000,000 and 
     has already sent 700 military engineers and medical personnel 
     to assist in the United States-led effort to stabilize and 
     reconstruct Iraq; and
       Whereas South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun pledged on 
     October 18, 2003, to dispatch additional troops to work 
     alongside United States and coalition forces in Iraq: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) observes the 50th anniversary of the Mutual Defense 
     Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic 
     of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953, and entered 
     into force November 17, 1954;
       (2) reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship between 
     the people of the United States and the people of the 
     Republic of Korea; and
       (3) thanks the Republic of Korea for its contributions to 
     the global war on terrorism and to the stabilization and 
     reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this resolution is cosponsored by my 
distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Senator Lugar, as well as Senators Kerry, Brownback, Dodd, 
and Hagel. It recognizes the 50th anniversary of the United States-
Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and is thanking the Republic of 
Korea for its contributions to the global war on terrorism.
  The United States has no better friend in Asia than the Republic of 
Korea. South Koreans have been there for us time and again, just as we 
have been for them.
  Our alliance has paid dividends on and off the Korean Peninsula. Most 
recently, South Korea has aided the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. South Korea has already sent 700 military engineers and medical 
personal to Iraq, and President Roh pledged on October 18 to dispatch 
additional troops to work alongside U.S. forces there. South Korea has 
also pledged $260 million in grants to help reconstruct Iraq.
  The resolution I offer today observes the 50th anniversary of our 
alliance, thanks South Korea for its contributions to the global war on 
terrorism, and reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship that 
exists between our two countries.
  That cooperation and friendship are sorely needed now, given the 
challenges posed by North Korea. North Korea today is on the verge of 
becoming a nuclear bomb factory. The United States needs to redouble 
its diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to change its course.
  President Bush, I note, has repeatedly called for a ``peaceful, 
diplomatic'' solution to this crisis, and has worked with our friends 
and allies in that region toward that goal. I believe President Bush's 
instincts are correct on this issue.
  Last week President Bush told the leaders of Asia that the United 
States is prepared to provide security assurances to North Korea if 
North Korea takes tangible steps to dismantle its nuclear program. I 
find that very encouraging. But in my view we need to do more. That is 
essentially where we left off at the end of the last administration, 
when we were working within the Agreed Framework.
  What we need to do is have more contact with North Korea. There were 
only 40 minutes of one-on-one dialog with North Korea last August in 
Beijing. That, with the translation requirements in such an exchange, 
is barely enough time to clear one's throat.
  Second, we should use the combination of carrots and sticks to 
convince North Korea to change its course. The sticks are in play, 
including the proliferation security initiative and a coordinated 
crackdown on the North's elicit activities, including narcotics 
trafficking and counterfeiting, among others.
  We need to identify as well some incentives for the good behavior 
that would come if, in fact, there is a verifiable North Korean effort 
along the path toward nuclear disarmament. This is not giving in to 
blackmail. It is a positive reinforcement, and there is a huge 
difference between the two.
  Third, we need to sustain and consider increasing humanitarian food 
and medical aid to North Korea. Nothing about this crisis will be 
improved by having more hungry or sick North Korean children. This 
year, the United States provided only 40,000 tons of food aid to the 
North a generous donation, to be sure, but a pittance against the world 
program appeal of more than 600,000 tons is needed, and far below the 
food aid levels the United States has provided in previous years.

  I note there is some dispute about the access of this food aid to the 
people of North Korea, people we need to help. The fact is the World 
Food Program and the director have reported significant progress 
towards monitoring delivery of food and ensuring that the aid reaches 
those most in need. Further, the food aid we have provided we seem 
fairly well assured is in fact getting where it is intended.
  Finally, we need to speak with one voice. The administration has yet 
to fully resolve the deep internal divisions over the direction of the 
President's policy. Some senior officials in the administration 
continue to argue against this policy of engagement. As a matter of 
fact, they seem to occasionally look forward to tweaking the North 
Koreans. I might add there is very little social redeeming value in the 
policies of Kim Jong Il in North Korea. I am not arguing he is a 
particularly reasonable man, but it seems to me there should be one 
voice and one policy coming out of the administration. Prospects for 
diplomatic solutions are in direct proportion to one voice.
  To state the obvious, as I know the Presiding Officer knows, time is 
not our ally in this crisis. The United States needs to communicate 
both the risks of North Korea's current path and the benefits North 
Korea could enjoy if it chooses to verifiably abandon its

[[Page S13716]]

pursuit of nuclear weapons and its export of ballistic missiles. Since 
the United States first confronted North Korea with allegations about 
its illegal program to produce highly enriched uranium last October, 
the North has ended its safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, taken its plutonium reprocessing plant out of mothballs, begun 
to reprocess at least some of its 8,000 spent-fuel rods, and has 
activated its Yongbyon nuclear reactor to produce still more spent 
fuel.
  I am not suggesting we should not have pointed out their violation. I 
am not suggesting their response is remotely approaching anything 
rational. What I am suggesting is a sense of urgency and a requirement 
for us to be on the same page with our South Korean and Japanese 
friends as well as continuing to engage the Chinese and the Russians in 
attempting to come to a resolution here.
  The North's pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a great threat to the 
interests not only of the United States but to the entire region. As 
the North's stockpile of fissile material grows, the likelihood the 
North will test a nuclear weapon and prove the viability of its design 
increases, as does the difficulty of securing the North's fissile 
material in any crisis. Moreover, we have no guarantee North Korea will 
not export fissile material. All we know for certain is if the North 
puts a nuke on the auction block, the bidders are not likely to be our 
friends.
  Finally, the North's nuclear ambitions could prompt other countries 
in the region--notably Japan and South Korea--to rethink their own 
opposition to nuclear arms. I don't only think that is probable but I 
think that is likely. As we all know, once Japan made that decision, it 
would be a matter of months before Japan would be a nuclear armed 
power. We think that would be a very bad idea. That, in my view, is why 
the Chinese have become so engaged now in helping us put some pressure 
on these multilateral talks with South Korea to get them to change 
their behavior. I believe China understands that if North Korea 
continues down this path, there is almost a certainty Japan will. Japan 
becoming a nuclear power would change the dynamic and the equation for 
the Chinese, and the race will be on.
  The President has the right goal--to complete verifiable and 
irreversible dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program. The 
only debate is how do we get there. I think the way we get there is the 
President should either endow Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly 
with more authority to drive North Korean policy or, alternatively, 
appoint a special envoy with access to the President to represent the 
United States in future negotiations. Second, we should strive for a 
noncoercive negotiating environment.
  This means that North Korea should freeze its reactor, cease all 
reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities, and place under 
safeguards any fissile material that it has acquired since the Agreed 
Framework of 1994 was signed. For our part, the United States should 
reiterate that it has no hostile intent toward North Korea and pledge 
not to launch any military strikes or seek new sanctions so long as the 
freeze remains in place and talks to resolve the crisis continue.
  Finally, we should pursue a phased, reciprocal, verifiable agreement 
to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program, terminate its 
export of ballistic missiles, and more closely integrate the North into 
the community of nations.
  Some say North Korea cannot be trusted. They are right. Modifying 
President Reagan's maxim, we should mistrust, and verify.
  But the alternatives to negotiating are grim. Our current approach 
leads to one of two undesirable outcomes: Either the United States will 
essentially acquiesce to the North's serial production of nuclear 
weapons or we may find ourselves in a military confrontation with a 
desperate, nuclear-armed regime. Any preemptive military strike option 
would place millions of South Koreans and tens of thousands of 
Americans at risk.
  How do we go to war with the North if the South does not support it, 
if that were the second option?
  Negotiations with North Korea are not easy, but they offer us the 
best chance--I believe the only chance--to avoid a nuclear nightmare on 
the Korean peninsula.
  I would like to submit a bipartisan staff report by the members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who traveled to North Korea 
immediately following the six-party talks in Beijing in August. I ask 
unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my marks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by saying today's paper 
carries the news that the quixotic and unreliable and often inscrutable 
actions of the North Koreans have brought the Supreme Leader of North 
Korea to the position where he is now saying he will engage in 
multilateral talks again and resume those talks, and that he is ready 
to consider what has been rejected before.
  That is the sense of the article.
  I have no inherent faith that we can rely upon the President of North 
Korea. But it seems to me we have everything to gain and nothing to 
lose by continuing to pursue these talks. We give nothing, and at a 
minimum what we do is put ourselves in the position where the most 
isolated remaining country in the world at least is exposed to the 
notions of other major nations in the world, including China, Russia, 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States as to what we consider to be 
appropriate behavior. Hopefully, that will have a salutary impact on 
the willingness to negotiate an end to these programs.
  The alternative of not pursuing that is bleak. Therefore, I encourage 
the President of the United States to continue down this path and to 
continue down the path more quickly than we have thus far.

                                Exhibit 1

           Six Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Issue

                                                 October 14, 2003.
     Hon. Richard Lugar,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.
       Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: In late August, Keith Luse 
     and Frank Jannuzi traveled to China and North Korea, and Mr. 
     Jannuzi traveled to South Korea, to examine the prospects for 
     a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear 
     issue and to follow-up on an earlier set of visits to North 
     Korea in an effort to gain greater transparency on food aid 
     issues. Throughout the course of the visit, the staff 
     delegation received commendable support from U.S. Diplomatic 
     personnel. The delegation enjoyed high level access to 
     Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean government officials, 
     and also met with numerous academics, think tank specialists, 
     and employees of non-governmental organizations concerned 
     with developments on the Korean Peninsula. Our key findings, 
     including some recommendations for next steps on the Korean 
     Peninsula, are reported below.
           Sincerely,
     Keith Luse,
       Professional Staff Member, Majority Staff, East Asian and 
     Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
     Frank Jannuzi,
       Professional Staff Member, Minority Staff, East Asian and 
     Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.


                                summary

       Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members 
     Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi traveled to Northeast Asia 
     August 21-September 2 to examine the prospects for a peaceful 
     negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to 
     follow-up on their earlier set of visits to North Korea 
     designed to push for greater North Korean transparency and 
     accountability on food aid and humanitarian relief. The 
     delegation expresses its appreciation to U.S. diplomatic 
     personnel at Embassies Beijing and Seoul who helped set up 
     productive meetings and coped with the vagaries of arranging 
     travel to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
     (DPRK).
       Over the course of three days in Pyongyang, the delegation 
     held a variety of meetings with officials representing the 
     DPRK, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations 
     (see list of interlocutors, attached). The delegation told 
     senior DPRK officials that the United States views North 
     Korea's nuclear ambitions as a grave threat to international 
     peace and stability and urged the DPRK to seek a peaceful, 
     negotiated solution to the crisis through multilateral 
     dialogue. The delegation visited select humanitarian relief 
     operations, making

[[Page S13717]]

     the point that such efforts are tangible proof that the 
     United States has no hostile intent toward North Korea. SFRC 
     staff strongly advised DPRK officials that they should permit 
     greater transparency for food aid deliveries under the 
     auspices of the World Food Program and various non-
     governmental organizations. The delegation pressed DPRK 
     officials to adhere to international standards of human 
     rights, including respect for religious freedom, and 
     emphasized that the United States' concern for the human 
     rights situation in North Korea reflects the deeply held 
     convictions of the American people.


                              key findings

       Six party talks in Beijing helped improve coordination 
     among the five nations trying to reign in North Korea's 
     nuclear ambitions, but DPRK officials left the talks 
     unconvinced that the United States genuinely seeks a 
     peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis. DPRK officials 
     told the staff delegation that they believe the true aim of 
     the United States is ``regime change,'' and that de-
     nuclearization is just the first step toward that objective.
       Under pressure from China, the DPRK probably will come to 
     another round of multilateral talks. However, China's 
     encouragement for DPRK's participation will be contingent on 
     the United States outlining specific steps it will take once 
     the DPRK pledges to dismantle/eliminate its nuclear program. 
     Talks could easily be derailed should North Korea decide to 
     launch a ballistic missile or even test a nuclear weapon. 
     Moreover, North Korea might scuttle the talks in response to 
     the appropriate and necessary U.S. efforts to enforce the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 
     Illicit Activities Initiative, both of which the North 
     interprets as attempts to ``strangle'' the regime.
       Some North Korean officials believe that the United States 
     continues to station nuclear weapons in South Korea.
       Decision-making in the DPRK is centralized and ultimate 
     authority rests with Kim Jong-il.
       Top officials in North Korea are carefully monitoring 
     polling data reflecting opinion on domestic politics in the 
     United States, Japan and South Korea.
       The World Food Program has taken some small, but 
     significant steps in recent months to enhance its operations 
     in the DPRK and reduce the likelihood of diversion of food 
     aid. The significant reduction in U.S. food aid to North 
     Korea (from a high of more than 300,000 tons/year to this 
     year's 40,000 tons) may have undercut United States leverage 
     in pressing for greater transparency on food aid. North 
     Korean officials are convinced the United States is using 
     food as a weapon.
       Humanitarian operations run by non-governmental 
     organizations--such as the Nautilus Institute's Village Wind 
     Power Pilot Project and the Eugene Bell Foundation's 
     tuberculosis treatment programs--are making important 
     contributions to the welfare of the North Korean people and 
     help allay DPRK suspicions about the intentions of the United 
     States, thereby contributing to an overall political 
     environment conducive to resolution of sensitive security 
     issues.
       After extensive discussion with the delegation, Vice 
     Minister Kim Gye Gwan advised the DPRK would allow NGO access 
     to some prison camps on a ``case by case'' basis.
       There were two key differences to our earlier trips. While 
     we were not allowed to make purchases, street vendors were 
     present throughout Pyongyang and in Nampo, selling food and 
     other small items. Additionally, the DPRK military appeared 
     to be at a higher state of alert. More soldiers were armed 
     than during our previous visits.


                               discussion

     North Korea isolated . . . 
       Over the course of three days in North Korea, the staff 
     delegation found DPRK officials to be disappointed by the six 
     party Beijing talks, which they described as ``five against 
     one.'' In both formal meetings and informal settings, DPRK 
     officials described the Beijing talks as ``pointless'' and 
     cast doubt upon whether the North would be willing to engage 
     in future rounds of multiparty dialogue. DPRK officials were 
     critical of the fact that they had only 40 minutes of 
     ``direct'' dialogue with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
     James Kelly over the course of three days of talks in 
     Beijing, and said they had been misled into believing the 
     multilateral talks would provide a venue for substantive 
     one-one-one discussions with the U.S. envoy.
       In one particularly blunt exchange, DPRK Vice Foreign 
     Minister Kim Gye Gwan told the staff delegation that the 
     Beijing talks had ``confirmed'' the North's assessment that 
     the United States has no intention of changing its ``hostile 
     policy.'' Kim said the DPRK, ``had no choice but to maintain 
     and reinforce its nuclear deterrent.''
       The SFRC delegation conveyed their personal views that a 
     North Korean decision to enhance its nuclear weapons 
     capabilities would be viewed by the United States as a grave 
     threat to international peace and security and would be 
     interpreted by Americans as a hostile act. The delegation 
     urged the DPRK to proceed with multiparty dialogue and to 
     refrain from any provocative actions.
       DPRK officials were non-committal with respect to any 
     future dialogue, but after the staff delegation's departure, 
     the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that 
     the North remains ``equally prepared for dialogue and for a 
     war.'' This statement represented a slight softening of the 
     stance articulated immediately after the Beijing talks, and 
     certainly leaves the door open to another round of multi-
     party talks in Beijing or some other venue.
       With strong encouragement from China (a senior delegation 
     from China visited the DPRK in late September), the DPRK may 
     agree to another round of six-party talks, if only to avoid 
     being held directly responsible for a breakdown of the 
     diplomatic process. It remains unclear what stance the DPRK 
     will take at any future talks, and at what level they will be 
     represented. Decision-making in the DPRK is highly 
     centralized, with Kim Jong-il wielding the ultimate 
     authority. Junior level DPRK officials such as Kim Yong-il, 
     who represented the DPRK in Beijing in August, often are 
     unable to engage in substantive dialogue, a fact which argues 
     for the United States to try to elevate the talks to engage 
     officials with real authority and the ear of Kin Jong-il.
     . . . and wary of U.S. intentions
       The difficult of communicating with the North Koreans was 
     evident throughout the staff delegation's visit to Pyongyang, 
     highlighting the risk that conflict could arise from 
     miscalculation or mis-communication. North Korean officials 
     with whom we met had an imperfect understanding of United 
     States security policy, especially the recently issued 
     National Security Strategy and Nuclear Force Posture Review. 
     They repeatedly expressed their belief that both documents 
     called for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against North Korea, 
     and said the North's own nuclear program was necessary to 
     counter this United States ``nuclear threat.''
       Sometimes, confusion arose out of the imprecision of 
     different English terms. DPRK officials asked the staff 
     delegation to clarify the different meanings 
     ``simultaneous,'' ``synchronous,'' ``phased,'' and 
     ``reciprocal.'' Attention to such detail suggests the DPRK is 
     actively studying how the nuclear issue might be resolved 
     given what they characterized as the ``zero trust'' which 
     exists between the two parties.
       DPRK officials took note of recent U.S. efforts to curtail 
     North Korean involvement in narcotics trafficking, 
     counterfeiting, and other illicit activities. DPRK officials 
     flatly denied North Korean involvement in such illicit 
     activities, and alleged that the United States had trumped up 
     the charges as part of a more general campaign to ``stifle'' 
     the DPRK.
     Food aid: slow progress on transparency and accountability
       The staff delegation met with the Flood Damage 
     Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) director Jong Yun-hyong, who 
     oversees agricultural reconstruction as well as foreign food 
     aid programs. The delegation explained to Yum that it as 
     essential for the DPRK to enhance transparency for food aid, 
     to open up counties currently off-limits, and to provide 
     random access to WFP monitors seeking to verify food aid 
     deliveries. The delegation told Yum that the level of 
     monitoring requested by WFP was consistent with international 
     norms, and that the DPRK could not expect donors and 
     potential donors to contribute food aid if they did not have 
     high confidence that the aid was reaching its intended 
     recipients.
       Yun said that security issues are paramount for the DPRK, 
     and that the military would not permit international access 
     to certain sensitive regions of the country. He also said 
     that monitoring had greatly improved since food aid began to 
     flow during the North Korean famine of the mid-1990's. Yun 
     specifically cited the recent U.N. nutritional survey, and 
     reported that ``security officials'' had initially objected 
     to the survey, but that FDRC officials had prevailed in an 
     inter-agency battle in order to permit the survey to be 
     conducted. Yun argued that recent significant reductions in 
     WFP food aid--just 300,000 metric tons in 2002, down from 
     811,000 tons in 2001--had made it more difficult for him to 
     push for greater numbers of monitors and greater access for 
     international observers. Nonetheless, Yun promised progress 
     on monitoring in the future, and invited the international 
     community to shift its humanitarian aid strategy away from 
     food donations and toward ``sustainable development,'' 
     including agricultural reforms, new seek varieties and 
     planting techniques, and ``food for work.''
       The delegation met with World Food Program country director 
     Rick Corsino, who reported slow, but significant progress 
     toward enhanced monitoring of food aid and ensuring that aid 
     reaches those most in need. These are the highlights:
       First, WFP has terminated food aid to 17 of 21 districts of 
     the capital city of Pyonghang after concluding that residents 
     of the capital are on average better fed than those of 
     outlying areas. This is an important step, both symbolically, 
     and substantively.
       Second, with the full knowledge and support of DPRK 
     authorities, WFP is conducting Korean language training for 
     food aid personnel stationed inside the DPRK. The DPRK 
     continues to object to WFP bringing in Korean-speaking 
     experts from overseas, but the growing language facility of 
     WFP's foreign staff allows for smoother interaction with DPRK 
     officials and higher quality monitoring in the field.
       Third, WFP has increased the number of monthly inspection 
     visits and now has approximately 50 international staff in 
     residence in Pyongyang and at five sub-offices located in 
     Sinuiju, Wonson, Hamhung, Chongjin, and Hyesan. WFP is the 
     only

[[Page S13718]]

     international agency working in the country with 
     international staff permanently placed outside the capital.
       Fourth, WFP has sustained its access to 162 of 206 total 
     counties in North Korea. WFP does not deliver food aid to 
     those counties that remain off limits, most of which are 
     concentrated along the sparsely populated mountainous 
     ``spine'' of the country and along the DMZ (see attached 
     map).
       Finally, through its inspection visits, WFP is gradually 
     building a detailed database of schools, hospitals, 
     orphanages, and other institutions receiving WFP assistance. 
     Although the DPRK still has not provided a comprehensive list 
     of aid recipients--a list long requested by WFP officials--
     the WFP is essentially building its own list with each 
     inspection visit.
     NGO's making contribution to welfare of average North Koreans
       Although WFP is the largest humanitarian organization 
     working in North Korea, they are not the only international 
     organization operating in North Korea. The staff delegation 
     made a point of visiting two humanitarian operations 
     supported by U.S. non-governmental organizations; the Village 
     Wind Power Pilot Project run by the Nautilus Institute (with 
     significant financial support provided by the W. Alton Jones 
     Foundation) and a tuberculosis treatment hospital and mobile 
     van sponsored by the Eugene Bell Foundation. These 
     initiatives have fostered good will on a ``people-to-people'' 
     basis, and have measurably improved the quality of life for 
     the North Korean beneficiaries.
     Wind power
       The US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project was the first 
     attempt by a United States NGO to work side-by-side with 
     North Koreans in cooperative development. Previously, non-
     governmental organizations had been limited by both 
     Washington and Pyongyang to delivering food aid to North 
     Korea. The project installed seven technologically advanced 
     wind turbine towers in a rural village on the west coast of 
     North Korea near the port of Nampo. This region is known as a 
     bread basket for North Korea, rich in arable land and other 
     natural resources, including steady breezes off of the Korea 
     Bay. The turbines provide clean, renewable energy to the 
     village's medical clinic, kindergarten, and 67 households. 
     In addition, a wind-powered water pump irrigates the 
     village's fields, and has significantly boosted yields, 
     according to villagers. The combined generating capacity 
     of the turbines is 11.5kW.
       Since the wind power project was completed in 1999, it has 
     had its share of ups and downs. At present, the delegation 
     found that the facility was not operating at full capacity 
     due to maintenance problems with two inverters and damaged 
     batteries. North Korea lacks adequately trained technicians 
     to service the equipment, and the nuclear stand-off has 
     disrupted visits by foreign experts needed to assess the 
     maintenance requirements and make needed repairs.
       Despite these difficulties, the DPRK participants in the 
     project remain enthusiastic about it as a model for rural 
     electrification, and hope to press ahead with a major 
     windpower survey project along the west coast in coming 
     months. DPRK authorities told the visiting Senate staff 
     delegation that deciding to proceed with the wind power 
     survey requires approval from military officials worried 
     about the collection of militarily sensitive meteorological 
     information. Notwithstanding the sensitive nature of the data 
     to be collected, DPRK officials believe the project will move 
     ahead. Wind power projects could alleviate severe shortages 
     of power in rural areas, and have the advantage of not 
     requiring major upgrades in North Korea's electric power 
     grid--a grid that experts have found to be in need of major 
     overhaul before it could accommodate the introduction of 
     large new power plants such as the light water nuclear 
     reactors contemplated under the Agreed Framework.
     Tuberculosis treatment
       Since 1995, the Eugene Bell Foundation has been working 
     inside North Korea to fight deadly diseases like tuberculosis 
     (TP). Eugene Bell foundation currently coordinates the 
     delivery of TB medication, diagnostic equipment, and supplies 
     to 1/3 of the North Korean population and approximately 50 
     North Korean treatment facilities (hospitals and care 
     centers). The staff delegation visited one such hospital in 
     Pyongyang, and also inspected one of the 17 mobile x-ray 
     vehicles designed to navigate the North's antiquated road 
     network.
       The delegation found the Eugene Bell project to be 
     characterized by high standards of transparency and 
     efficiency. The foundation conducts regular site visits (more 
     than 60 since 1995) and is able to donate goods directly to 
     recipients rather than through third parties or government 
     intermediaries. Staff at the hospital we visited appeared 
     well trained and highly motivated. They were deeply 
     appreciative of the support they receive from the United 
     States and recognized that this humanitarian outreach occurs 
     even at a time when the two nations do not maintain normal 
     diplomatic relations. The Eugene Bell foundation supports 16 
     TB hospitals and 64 TB care centers in the DPRK. More than 
     200,000 patients have been treated. Moreover, serving as a 
     conduit, the Eugene Bell foundation is currently responsible 
     for sending tuberculosis medicine, medical aid, and equipment 
     for approximately 1/3 of the North Korean population.
     Joint recovery operations
       The staff delegation met with Sr. Col. Kwak Chol-hui of the 
     Korean People's Army, the director of the Joint Recovery 
     Operation searching for the remains of U.S. servicemen left 
     behind after the Korean War. The United States estimates that 
     as many as 8,000 remains of U.S. servicemen are on DPRK soil. 
     So far, only 378 of these remains have been recovered. More 
     than 200 remains were found as the result of unilateral DPRK 
     searches and returned to the United States. Just over 170 
     sets of remains have been recovered through the joint 
     recovery operation.
       The recovery operations are laborious. Historical records 
     can indicate likely search areas, but only eye witnesses can 
     pinpoint the possible locations for remains. As the 
     population ages and the terrain of North Korea is shaped by 
     construction, erosion, flooding, and other forces, it is 
     becoming increasingly difficult to locate remains. Even after 
     likely sites are identified, time-consuming excavations and 
     careful forensic work are necessary to find and identify 
     remains. U.S. and North Korean military personnel work side 
     by side in the field during the recovery operations. 
     According to U.S. participants in the operation, this 
     interaction in the field has been constructive, deepening our 
     understanding of the Korean People's Army.
       Colonel Kwak told the delegation that the DPRK would like 
     to expand the joint recovery operation, employing as many as 
     2,700 investigators to scour the country to conduct 
     interviews with those elderly North Korean who might have 
     knowledge of the location of U.S. remains. He indicated that 
     the DPRK's commitment to the recovery operations is 
     independent of the nuclear issue, and, in his opinion, should 
     remain so. It is unclear, however, what role the DPRK 
     envisions for U.S. forces in such an expanded operation. The 
     staff delegation believes that any expansion should be made 
     contingent on greater U.S. access to those North Korean 
     citizens claiming to have first-hand knowledge of the 
     whereabouts of remains.


                           staff conclusions

       So as to reduce what we believe is a significant risk of 
     conflict arising out of miscalculation or mis-communication, 
     the United States should greatly expand dialogue with North 
     Korea, both within the framework of multi-party talks, as 
     well as through informal or ``Track II'' bilateral 
     negotiations.
       The United States should appoint a senior official to 
     represent the United States solely on issues related to the 
     Korean Peninsula. Alternatively, the Administration should 
     endow the current negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State 
     James Kelly, with greater authority to direct and coordinate 
     the President's North Korea policy and gain access to more 
     senior North Korean officials.
       The United States should acknowledge recent improvements in 
     WFP operations and continue food aid to the DPRK under UN 
     auspices. The United States should also consider funneling a 
     portion of future U.S. food aid through non-governmental 
     organizations, some of which have been able to achieve 
     strong monitoring capability for their humanitarian 
     relief.
       The U.S. should search for ways to expand outreach efforts 
     by NGOs in the fields of rural energy development, 
     agriculture, and public health.
       The Joint Recovery Operation to identify the remains of 
     U.S. servicemen from the Korean War affords the United States 
     valuable contact inside North Korea. Any expansion of the 
     operation, however, should be made contingent upon greater 
     U.S. access to those North Korean citizens claiming to have 
     first-hand knowledge of the whereabouts of remains.


                         list of interlocutors

     In Beijing, China
     Michael Green, Director Asian Affairs, National Security 
         Council
     David Straub, Korea Desk, U.S. Department of State
     Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister, Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
         Affairs
     Fu Ying, Director General, Asian Department, Chinese Ministry 
         of Foreign Affairs
     He Yafei, Director General, North American Department, 
         Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Liu Jinsong, First Secretary, Asian Department, Chinese 
         Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Piao Jianyi, Executive Director, Center for Korean Peninsula 
         Issues, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
     Gu Guoliang, Director, Center for Arms Control and 
         Nonproliferation Studies, Deputy Director, Institute of 
         American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
     Wang Jisi, Director, Institute of International Strategic 
         Studies, Central Party School
     Wu Baiyi, Deputy Director, Research Division, China Institute 
         of Contemporary International Relations
     Yang Mingjie, Director, Division of Arms Control and Security 
         Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International 
         Relations
     Wei Zonglei, Deputy Director, Center of U.S.-European 
         Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International 
         Relations
     Shi Yinhong, Director, Center for American Studies, People's 
         University
     Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of International 
         Studies

[[Page S13719]]

     Liu Xuecheng, Director of American Studies, China Institute 
         of International Studies
     Shen Dingli, Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, 
         Fudan University
     Zhu Feng, Director of International Security Program, Beijing 
         University
     In North Korea
     Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
     Jong Dong-hok, First Secretary, United States Department, 
         Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Lee Yong Chol and Kim Yong Nam, United States Department, 
         Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Jong Yun-hyong, Director Flood Damage, Reconstruction 
         Committee
     Sr. Col. Kwak Chol-hui, Director, Joint Recovery Operation, 
         Korean People's Army
     Lt. Col. Li Jong Sop, Deputy Director, Joint Recovery 
         Operation, Korean People's Army
     Lt. Col. Byon Sol-hok, Joint Recovery Operation
     Kim Song, Secretary General, Korean National Peace Committee
     Richard Corsino, Country Director, World Food Program
     In South Korea
     Wi Sung-lac, Director General, North American Affairs, 
         Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Park Joeong-nam, Deputy Director, North American Affairs, 
         Ministry of Foreign Affairs
     Yang Chang-suk, Director of International Cooperation, 
         Ministry of Unification
     Park Ro-Byug, Chief, Policy Coordination Bureau, National 
         Security Council, Blue House
     Kim Taewoo, Nuclear Policy Specialist, Korean Institute for 
         Defense Analyses
     Pak Yeong-tae, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

                          ____________________