[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 156 (Friday, October 31, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13700-S13702]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RECALL THE IRAQI ARMY
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week a memorandum on the war on
terrorism from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to his top subordinates
was leaked to the press. In that memo, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a
number of questions, including the following: Is our current situation
such that ``the harder we work, the behinder we get?'' Then he asked:
``What else should we be considering?''
Well, I am dismayed that Secretary Rumsfeld says publicly something
so differently than what he has said privately. I am glad he is looking
for new direction since our post-Saddam policy is not working well,
given the sustained and increasing attacks on our forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld asked--again--``What else should we be
considering?'' Well, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council has
made a specific recommendation for us to consider: that the regular
Iraqi Army units be called up to assist our troops in providing
security for the reconstruction of their country.
Surely it is worthy of our consideration, when Iyad Alawi, this
month's serving President of the Iraqi Governing Council--the 25-member
body selected by the United States to represent the Iraqi people--is
making a suggestion to change course.
He wrote an important opinion piece entitled ``America Must Let Iraq
Rebuild Itself,'' which was published by the New York Times on October
19. The main premise of the article is that ``ultimately, only Iraqis
themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a
constitution and elect a democratic government.''
I believe all of us would agree with that premise. For Mr. Alawi, the
vital step is to ``call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force
[for] at least up to the mid-officer level'' to deal with the
insecurity and chaos in the country.
Mr. Alawi believes the Iraqi officer corps will have to be vetted to
remove those who have committed crimes under the old regime. He points
out that most of the Iraqi Army's soldiers are ``Iraqi patriots who
chose not fight for Saddam Hussein'' and ``would probably return to
their units and contribute to their country's future.'' He argues that
it would be ``much easier and quicker to retrain and reequip them
within their existing organizational structure than to start from
scratch.''
Mr. Alawi argues that these steps would not only relieve the burden
on American troops but also would gain substantial good will among
Iraqis.
Tom Friedman, writing in the New York Times, on October 23, is of a
similar mind. He urges the administration to declare the following:
``We thank all the nations who offered troops, but we think the Iraqi
people can and must secure their own country. So we're inviting all
former Iraqi Army soldiers (not Republican Guards) to report back to
duty. For every two Iraqi battalions that return to duty (they can weed
out
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their own bad apples), we will withdraw an American one. So Iraqis can
liberate themselves. Our motto is Iraq for the Iraqis.''
That is from Tom Friedman, who has been a very strong supporter of
the administration's military actions in Iraq and the decision to
attack Iraq.
The administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority have taken
a different tack in reorganizing Iraqi security, particularly with
regard to the Iraqi Army. They are essentially starting from scratch to
build a completely new Army of 40,000 people who are being trained and
equipped as a motorized infantry.
The goal is to form nine brigades by the end of 2004, but thus far
only one battalion of 750 soldiers has been trained and equipped.
Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority is creating an
Iraqi border patrol force, only 5,000 to date, with the need to expand
to more than 20,000 sometime in the future. A 20,000-person Facilities
Protection Service is intended to take over security at fixed site
locations from coalition forces, and an Iraqi civil defense corps of
6,600, expanding to more than 15,000 in 2004, is being integrated into
coalition military units to provide local intelligence and help with
security patrolling.
While I have some questions regarding the need for four distinct
security forces, including a new Iraqi Army, in addition to a new
national police force, I am open to arguments that this approach to
building a new army may be desirable in the long run. A better
educated, trained, equipped, and motivated army, whose members are more
representative of the diverse Iraqi population, and which was created
expressly to serve the people of the new Iraqi state, may be more
ideal.
However, in the short term, I believe Mr. Alawi's recommendation to
reconstitute units of the old regular army is surely worthy of
consideration. No one, including Mr. Alawi, argues for a continued role
for those portions of the old army that were part of the repressive
security apparatus of the Saddam regime--units such as the Special
Security Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fedayeen
Saddam.
In fact, those units were created by Saddam because he did not trust
his regular army. In that portion of the State Department-sponsored
``The Future of Iraq Project,'' dealing with Iraqi Armed Forces, the
Working Group that wrote this part of the report, discussed this issue.
They noted the following: ``Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense
of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of
the army with its varied character in spite of many attempts to purify
or clean the army from the disloyal elements--as he called them--in
order for the army to become an army of ideology to protect the party
and the revolution and defend the nation's values.'' They added that
``Thus the army remained a source of worry, suspicion and threat to
Saddam; in spite of the fact that the army got into its many wars
because Saddam desired it. There are some who think that the army was
pushed into these wars to keep it continuously busy confronting outside
aggressions.'' Finally and in view of these findings, the Woking Group
concluded that ``In any event we think it necessary to keep the basic
structure of the army, which can be easily rehabilitated. . . .''
That regular army, below the midofficer level, after vetting, could
serve a useful role by putting trained Iraqi forces into the field to
more quickly enhance overall security. The regular Iraqi Army was a
sizable force of approximately 80,000 officers, 130,000 noncommissioned
officers, and 400,000 conscript soldiers.''
We probably made a mistake in formally disbanding the Iraqi army in
May. I wonder if Ambassador Bremer doesn't tacitly believe the same,
given the quick decision that was made by him shortly thereafter by
agreeing to pay monthly allowances to officers and noncommissioned
officers after the unrest that was unleashed by that decision.
Beginning in July, monthly payments were made according to a rank-
based scale, ranging from $50 for a noncommissioned officer to $150 for
a general, somewhat below the base pay for the various ranks.
Additionally, a one-time $40 stipend was paid to former conscripts.
Since July, the Coalition Provisional Authority has paid from Iraqi
funds approximately $78 million to about 260,000 individuals and just
over $15 million to approximately 375,000 conscripts. The estimated
cost for the stipend during the next year will be $190 million, if
payments continue throughout the year.
In other words, we know where the men and women--mainly men--in the
Iraqi regular army are located. They came for those payments, and we
know how to locate them, should we make a decision to reconstitute
units of that Iraqi army.
That money was well spent. There is ample evidence from other
conflicts that unemployed former soldiers can be a destabilizing and a
disruptive influence, as some believe is currently the case in Iraq
today. In view of the $156 billion that is likely to be appropriated
for U.S. military forces in Iraqi reconstruction in fiscal years 2003
and 2004, paying those sums to members of the old regular Iraqi army
would be a modest expenditure.
But would it not make more sense to pay those sums to soldiers who
are actually doing something? Would it not make sense to quickly
reconstitute recently disbanded Iraqi regular army units to take on
security tasks that are within their capabilities? Would it not be
possible that recently disbanded Iraqi army units would be able to more
quickly assume duties for which the border patrol, the facilities
protection service, and the civil defense corps are intended, including
patrolling Iraqi streets with our own soldiers? Would this not more
quickly give Iraqis the responsibility for and a stake in securing
their own country? And, more importantly, wouldn't it be better for all
concerned if primarily Iraqi soldiers and not Americans were acting to
restore security in Iraq and dealing with those who would seek to
disrupt it?
The Governing Council President thinks so.
I ask unanimous consent that an article written by the current
President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, entitled
``America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself,'' which appeared in the New
York Times on October 19, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of
my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEVIN. I asked Ambassador Bremer when we met with him: At a
minimum, would he not raise this issue with the Governing Council to
see whether or not the views of the President of the Governing Council,
that the Iraqi army regular units should be reconstituted, represent
the views of the Governing Council itself. We surely should listen to
those views. These are the folks we put in office there as representing
the Iraqi people. At a minimum, I urged Ambassador Bremer to find out
formally from that Governing Council whether or not the President's
views, as represented by this article in the New York Times--that the
regular units of the army, properly vetted to make sure we don't hire
old members of the Saddam leadership--should be reconstituted to help
us maintain order and security in Iraq.
I believe Ambassador Bremer will in fact make that request of the
Governing Council--not the request to reconstitute the army, because I
don't think Ambassador Bremer is there yet, but the request of the
Governing Council to see if they agree that it would be wise for those
units below the mid-level officer level to be reconstituted, properly
vetted, to help us on the streets of Baghdad and in the areas which are
very dangerous, and to take some of the pressure off our troops to make
us less of a target and to have Iraqis gradually but more quickly take
over their own security so that we are not a lightning rod for the
folks who are trying to destroy us.
I look forward to the response of the Governing Council of Iraq to
Ambassador Bremer's request. We know that as a new Iraqi army is
formed, some of the existing units will be retrained and equipped to
expand that army. But it is critically important that we have this
question put before that Governing Council. The creation of a new Iraqi
army is going very slowly. We are at less than a thousand. We must move
more quickly.
The question is, since most of the members who we are hiring for that
[[Page S13702]]
new army are members of the old army in any event, would it not be much
quicker to reconstitute the units of that old army--again, below the
mid-officer level, so we don't have the Saddam regime involved--would
it not be much quicker to follow the suggestion of the President of the
Governing Council, reconstitute the units and move on from there?
The Secretary of Defense asked, in his leaked memorandum, if what the
U.S. is doing is enough and what else should be considered. I am glad
he asked those questions. As I said before, I am sorry he has not said
publicly what he said privately in terms of his doubts and concerns.
But having said that, I am glad he is raising questions. I am glad he
is asking questions about whether we should change course in some way.
I have written to the Secretary of Defense to solicit his views on
Mr. Alawi's proposal. Again, I hope Ambassador Bremer does consult with
the Iraqi Governing Council, seek their recommendations on this issue,
and not only solicit their recommendations but seriously consider ways
to formulate an integrated and comprehensive plan to move more quickly
to involve Iraqis in their own security and in their overall
governance.
Exhibit 1
[From the New York Times, Oct. 19, 2003]
America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself
(By Iyad Alawi)
Baghdad, Iraq.--No Iraqi will ever forget the momentous
April day when a crowd of hundreds of cheering Baghdadis,
helped by an American armored vehicle, pull the huge statue
of Saddam Hussein to the ground. With this act, we tore down
three decades of tyranny and repression and began building in
its place a foundation for freedom, democracy and a better
future for our children.
To see that this goal is achieved, the Bush administration
has challenged me and my colleagues on the Iraqi Governing
Council to draft a permanent constitution within six months
and to move as quickly as possible to hold internationally
monitored, free elections. We gladly accept that challenge,
and welcome the vital assistance of the United Nations,
through the Security Council resolution passed on Thursday,
to see through to completion the enormous task ahead.
But we also realize that there are obstacles on Iraq's
march toward democracy. In the months since Iraq was
liberated, jubilation has given way to insecurity and chaos.
When my fellow Iraqis finally go to the polls to elect their
government, they must have confidence that state institutions
are not only legitimate and independent, but robust enough to
guarantee safety and civil rights. That is why the coalition
and the council must take several immediate steps to
establish these necessary conditions for the constitutional
process to succeed.
First, it is vital to call up the Iraqi Army and the
national police force, at least up to mid-officer level. The
coalition's early decision to abolish the army and police was
well intended, but it unfortunately resulted in a security
vacuum that let criminals, die-hards of the former regime and
international terrorist flourish. And the coalition's plan to
build a 20,000-member lightly armed force mostly responsible
for security and border control could make poor use of a
valuable resource: the 300,000 Iraqi soldiers who simply went
home with their weapons in the face of the American-led
invasion.
Most of these soldiers are Iraqi patriots who chose not to
fight for Saddam Hussein. Americans should not confuse the
Iraqi Army with the hated Republican Guard, which Saddam
Husseim created precisely because he distrusted the
legitimate military. In one simple process, the coalition
authority can support the governing council to call the army
back to its barracks for retraining and, ultimately, for
redeployment. Most soldiers and their officers will proudly
return to their units and contribute to their country's
future.
The coalition and the Iraqi Interior Ministry can vet
officers to remove those who committed crimes under the old
regime, and then rapidly redeploy the most capable units to
work with, and progressively relieve, American troops of
security duties. Iraqi Army units have an established chain
of command and esprit de corps. Not only can they be recalled
to barracks immediately, but it would be much easier and
quicker to retrain and re-equip them within their existing
organizational structure than to start from scratch.
By supporting the recall of army units, the United States
would not only speed the process of relieving the burden on
its troops, it would also gain substantial good will in Iraq.
In contrast, any American-led military presence, even if
complemented by the United Nations, will never have the
credibility and legitimacy that the Iraqi Army has among the
people.
In addition, the Iraqi national police must also be
recalled. Most Iraqi policemen--as opposed to Saddam
Hussein's feared intelligence and security organs--are
dedicated to law and order. The United States does not have
the time or money to create a police force from the ground
up, nor is it necessary, because we have a large, organized
force that is ready and willing to serve.
Many other Iraqi governing institutions should also be
reactivated by the governing council, with the support of the
coalition authority. Special priority must be given to the
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, Oil and Education.
The Iraqi bureaucracy must also be called back to work,
although of course after screening to disqualify serious
offenders of the former regime. Together, the council and the
coalition leaders can modernize the state apparatus, phase
out obsolete policies and practices, and encourage a new
mindset of transparency and efficiency.
Finally, as security improves, Iraqi institutions are re-
established and the constitutional drafting process is
completed, the United States should support international
recognition of Iraqi sovereignty. Then a recognized interim
government could quickly present a popular referendum, under
United Nations monitoring, on the new national constitution.
It would be a grave mistake for the United States to hold out
sovereignty and international recognition as the reward for
passage of a constitution. Rather, making Iraqis once again a
part of the international system is the prerequisite of
successful reconstruction and a durable democratic system.
Iraqis are grateful for the tremendous efforts and
sacrifices the United States is making on our belief. Yet,
ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security,
rebuild national institutions. enact a constitution and elect
a democratic government. America must not rebuff Iraqis who
are eager to have a stake in this intimate national process.
Like any free people, we want to ensure that we are in
control of our own destiny.
Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________