[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 154 (Wednesday, October 29, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H10117-H10121]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 2145
HOW WILL YOU KNOW YOUR VOTE COUNTED ON ELECTION DAY?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Under the Speaker's
announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Holt) is recognized for 30 minutes as the designee of the minority
leader.
General Leave
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
[[Page H10118]]
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
and insert extraneous material on the subject of this special order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be joined this evening by my
colleague the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) and my colleague the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
Let me begin with a question. On Election Day, how will you know if
your vote is properly counted? In many precincts, in many States around
this country, the answer is you will not. Imagine, it is election day
and you enter your polling place to cast your vote on a brand new
electronic touch-screen voting machine. The screen is large; it is well
lit; it is accessible if you have physical disabilities. Your choices
are clearly spelled out before you. In fact, it looks as easy to use as
the ATM at your bank. You breathe a sigh of relief that you no longer
have to figure out a complicated butterfly ballot. It seems more modern
than the old lever machines.
So you make your choice and you touch the submit button and cast your
vote. The screen says your vote has been counted. You exit the polling
place with a sense of satisfaction, and then you begin to wonder. How
do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote the way I intended?
The fact is you do not. You have to trust the software in the machine
to be error free.
After the 2000 election, we in Congress recognized that we had to act
to restore the integrity and reliability of our electoral system by
making dimpled chads and other voting irregularities things of the
past. Last October, we passed the Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA.
It is groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently
helping States throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable
punch cards and other machines.
However, HAVA is having an unintended consequence. HAVA has done some
good things. It is giving people with disabilities access, access that
they have been denied for years. In fact, they have always been denied.
HAVA is doing some great things, but it is leading a headlong rush by
States and localities to purchase computer voting systems that suffer
from a serious flaw. All models, even the most convenient and
accessible, have the problem that once the voter touches the button,
the voter has no way of knowing whether the vote has been counted as
the voter intended. No one will ever know. It is a secret ballot and
must be secret.
This uncertainty, this lack of confidence can be disastrous to voter
confidence and can prevent an accurate recount and can be a step on the
way to the undoing of our democracy. I am not an anti-technology
Luddite. I am a physicist. I am something of a techie. I see real
advantages in these electronic machines.
There are several important advantages such as their accessibility if
you have physical disabilities. Their speed and efficiency, so that the
results will be communicated to the county clerk quickly. They are
probably more reliable than the county clerk. I certainly had an
experience with the clerk in my county when she awarded one precinct to
my opponent by a margin of 9,000 votes when there were not 9,000 people
who lived in that precinct. It was a simple pencil and paper clerical
area. The electronic machines will do away with that, but there is one
fundamental problem. They are inherently unverifiable.
To again make the point that this is not the concern of an anti-
technology Luddite, I would say that hundreds of nationally renowned
computer scientists have raised a cry of alarm, saying that unless
there is an independent verification method to safeguard the accuracy
and the integrity of the voting process there will be, might not might
be, these computer scientists say there will be problems. There might
be accidental software errors. There might be, God forbid, malicious
hacking, and if there are concerns, if the voter is uncertain, if the
candidate is uncertain whether the votes have been recorded the way
they were cast, a recount is meaningless. The computer that has a
faulty tally 2 minutes after the polls closed will have the same faulty
tally a day later when the recount is held or the next month when the
judge opens it up. If there are errors, they will go unnoticed and
unknown.
The history of progress in our system of self-government here in
America is in many ways a history of increasing the franchise,
extending the right to vote and the ability to vote, increasing
accessibility and reliability of the process of voting, but we still
have some problems. We see declining voter turnout, and we have all
heard, my colleagues here from Ohio I am sure have heard, constituents
say, well, my vote does not count. Some people when they say that mean
that special interests dominate the process and overwhelm my vote in
secret back room deals. And we all work hard to see that that concern
is removed, but they often mean something else when they say my vote
does not count. They mean, literally, my vote does not count, my vote
will not be counted.
The level of concern around the country is astounding. The Internet
is burning up with back and forth chat of concerns about our voting
process, and the loss of confidence in the process leads to a loss of
failure to vote, leads to a cheapening and eventual breakdown of our
democracy.
Every voter who stays home, whether it is because the voting places
are physically inaccessible to them or because of a lack of trust in
the voting process is a loss to democracy. We must find, we must find a
way to keep the voter directly connected to the verification process so
the voter knows that her vote or his vote is the vote that is counted.
It is not good enough to give them reassurance that the manufacturer
says the machine works fine. Without taking steps to return the
verification to the voter and to restore trust in the process, we face
a crisis, pure and simple.
I have with me someone who has paid close attention to the electoral
process. My colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), was the
Secretary of State of Ohio, and one of his responsibilities, as I
believe, was to ensure the accuracy and the reliability of the voting
system. And I think he understands, as well as anyone, the potential
crisis we face or maybe it is not even potential anymore. I would be
pleased to yield to my friend from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New Jersey. I
do not have the technical expertise that the gentleman, the physicist,
has.
I, for 8 years, ran Ohio's election system, then the sixth largest
election system in the country, an election system where we saw in
Presidential elections 4.6 million Ohioans go to the polls. In
gubernatorial years, we might see 3.2, 3.3 million people go to the
polls. In primary and special elections, elections in odd number,
mayoral years, township trustee year, we would see fewer people, but
what underlined all of that, and I think my friend from New Jersey (Mr.
Holt) spoke this very well, was how important confidence in the system
is and whether it is everyone for everyone, confidence in an accurate
count is paramount.
The confidence as far as the voter is concerned that my vote will be
counted is paramount. Confidence that the candidates running for office
or the advocates for the issues on the ballot or the opponents to the
issues on the ballot, but all of the stakeholders, the players, the
candidates, the participants they must be confident that the elections
are held fairly and honestly. The media which cover the elections,
which write about the elections, which analyze the elections, it is
equally as important that the media have full confidence in the
electoral process, that every vote is counted.
While the technology is different from my career in the 1980s, from
1983 up through 1990, certainly the technology is different, I also saw
technology evolve during those 8 years I was Secretary of State. In
some counties, when I began, they used a simple paper ballot. Some
counties used a machine. Some counties used that punch card. We began
to see new technologies, counties using different methods of casting
votes and counting votes, but in every one of those cases, in every one
of those counties, what stayed paramount was the confidence that the
votes would be counted properly so that the voter had confidence,
[[Page H10119]]
the candidates had confidence and the media had confidence that this
was a fair operation.
They were confident because we, as election officials, there were
people that ran the State election system, that ran each local
precinct, each polling place, each local board of election, we could
show to them that votes, in fact, were counted fairly. We had paper
trails. No matter how they were voting we were able to show that, yes,
the votes were counted correctly.
We had plenty of people protest. We would have recounts, but during
the recounts, people would be able to watch representatives of both
sides to make sure the votes were counted fairly, and they always were
in the end, and this is what my concern is.
I am not a Luddite anymore than my physicist friend from New Jersey
is. I am not against progress. I do not have any of those fears, but I
am concerned as I hear people in my District in both parties express
those concerns that we are voting on computers, and we do not have
paper trails in some of this equipment.
Then I hear some sort of irresponsible statements made by some
executives from some companies who are active participants in these
elections, and I hear comments from people I know around my State that
that scares a little bit, and I do not think this is a question of
fear, but it is a question of concern, and I am just asking this
Congress to pay special attention to this whole process so that people
can continue to have confidence in the election system.
Every election is a big election. This election next year, I think we
will see the highest voter turnout we have had in decades because I
think people have such strong feelings on all sides about the way the
country is being run today, and I want to be able to say in good
conscience, say next October as we lead into the November election,
that I have full confidence in the way that votes will be cast and full
confidence in the way that votes will be counted. It is what we owe the
people. It is what our republic is based on, one person, one vote, and
one person, one vote only works if every one of those one voters have
the confidence in the election that they need to have.
So I thank my friend from New Jersey for his yeoman's work and
leadership on this.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his insight, and he
makes this important distinction about having confidence in the way the
votes are cast and having confidence in the way the votes are counted,
and it is not necessarily the same thing. It is the electronics inside
the machine that connects those two, and it is that gap which makes
them inherently unverifiable.
{time} 2200
I have legislation that would, I believe, overcome this shortcoming.
But before I talk about the details, and I will not go through all the
details, but before I outline that legislation, I would be pleased to
yield to my friend, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), who has
deep and strong concerns about this.
Ms. KAPTUR. I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt)
for his extraordinary leadership on this very, very important piece of
legislation that he has introduced, H.R. 2239, taking his great
intelligence and experience as a physicist and wedding it to his
legislative experience here in the Congress and trying to help our
Nation improve on the voting systems that we have, but to do so in a
way that every voter will be confident that when they cast their ballot
that their vote is really in there, in that machine.
In fact, I begin with that statement because one of the leading
election officials in my own district said to me, Congresswoman, I do
not have confidence that in what is being done right now that I can
answer to the citizens of this county that their vote will be in there.
How do they know it's in there? Give me the confidence that I know it's
in there. I said, I am supporting Congressman Holt's bill so that we
get an auditable paper trail at every precinct.
I would say that in addition to being a U.S. Representative, which I
was elected to rather later in life, the very first office I was ever
elected to and still hold is precinct committeewoman in my own home
precinct. Ohio is unlike some of the other States in the Union, but we
value every vote at the precinct level. We count the votes at the
precinct level. Under Ohio law when you cast your vote and there is a
paper trail currently in every precinct in our county, over 500 of
these precincts, the votes in that precinct are counted right there.
They are not taken to another location. Both Democrats and Republicans
count these votes together, and there are actual documents that they
have to handle, physically handle and then tally and then those votes
are both sent to the board of elections in a central location, but also
posted on the door outside that precinct. Any voter can go and take
that tally at the end of the day. We have a very transparent system,
one in which our major parties have confidence. Every tally that is
done in the voting logs that are assembled in every precinct, they are
added up. Sometimes mistakes are made in the precincts in terms of the
tallies but then those are caught at the central board of elections,
and we try to really assure that the count is as fair as possible. If
it is not, if people have any concern, if there is a one-vote margin in
an election, you can go back to the paper trail and you can go back and
see what was done in every single precinct in the county.
I wanted to say to the gentleman, I think that this verification is
so extraordinarily important. What happened in Florida at the moment
could not happen in Ohio because in Florida they move their ballots to
a counting station. They do not count in every precinct. Speaking as a
Buckeye, speaking as an Ohioan, I do not want our rights taken away
from us at the precinct level. I also would, if the gentleman will
allow me, wish to place in the Record this evening for every election
official in this country, at every county in the country, at every
precinct, at every board of election, I have found great confusion as
to what the Help America Vote Act actually requires and the Federal
Election Commission on its Web site has what is required by the Federal
law, every single year.
And indeed it is not until January 1, 2006, that every State and
jurisdiction is required to comply with the voting systems requirements
of the Help America Vote Act that we passed last year. Some people are
under the impression that they have to have everything done by next
year. They do not. They can get a waiver that they have to file with
the Federal Election Commission this coming January. The secretaries of
state of our country should have notified counties of this. But I can
tell you, as I go out into my Ohio counties, the local boards of
election simply do not know this. There is great concern and there is
great consternation. I will place this in the Record.
I would also like to say to the gentleman from New Jersey, in
addition to his bill which I hope we can pass expeditiously, I would
urge our State legislatures to adopt no-fault absentee voting, that if
there is any concern next year at any precinct or a doubt about the
integrity of that machine, that voters can have an alternate way of
casting a vote in that county through no-fault absentee voting or
indeed even paper ballots at the same precincts, so that people have
confidence that their vote will be counted.
Mr. HOLT. So that the voter can vote. If there is any question about
eligibility or other questions about the vote, those will be settled
later and the voter will be able to cast the vote on election day. That
is what the gentlewoman means, I believe, by no-fault voting.
Ms. KAPTUR. That is what I mean. If I might just take one additional
moment of the gentleman and then complete my remarks. One of the
reasons I think this is important is when we passed the Help America
Vote Act, the Bush administration was to have appointed an election
commission that would set Federal standards for the development of the
technologies that you know are so critical. They have not done that. In
fact, the commission does not even exist, so there are no Federal
regulations.
Mr. HOLT. The appointments have been made, but the other body has not
acted and the commission does not yet exist.
Ms. KAPTUR. So there are no Federal standards. I can tell the
gentleman
[[Page H10120]]
that in Ohio our secretary of state displayed five different
technologies in our State House. I sent down a computer security team
from our region in the State from all of our major universities and
said, please assess the machines. These were all people involved in
computer security. They came back and reported to me that of the five
systems under review in Ohio, not a single one they would rate either
excellent or very good in terms of both ease of use to the voter and
security. That was a devastating finding to me.
Even though I voted for HAVA, I went back to the drawing boards and
looked at what was going on in my State. My State at this point has
received the $41 million to buy machines, to buy technology which is
probably not enough money to get an optical scanner and a paper trail,
but it has not received the larger amount of money it should have
received, $117 million, to do the voter education and all of the work
that is necessary to bring up these new systems. So even though we
voted for this law, just Ohio is $66 million short in trying to bring
these technologies up by next year. I wanted to place this on the
Record.
Timing is vital.
While communities are waiting to find out exactly how much money they
may be getting, and some others do not want to move on acquiring
equipment until they are sure of how much money they will be receiving,
it is important to keep in mind:
While HAVA does state that new election machines should be in place
for 2004; it is possible to get an extension until the first federal
election held after January 1, 2006;
But in order to get this extension, an application must be submitted
no later than January 1, 2004, at this point, to the General Services
Administration, providing good cause for why the exemption should be
granted;
GSA did send a letter to every governor and state election director
when the initial Title I money was provided last year. However, they
have not yet sent out a reminder of the impending deadline.
So far, only Illinois has applied for the extension, and this request
was approved last week.
Other reasons why the extension should be requested:
Gives more time to make sure that the right machines are acquired, if
new machines are acquired;
Gives more time to test and verify the machines;
More importantly, it gives more time for the vote verification
provisions of the Holt bill to be implemented in a fashion that will be
the most efficient with respect to any new voting machine system.
And it gives more time for people to decide whether or not they
actually want to buy new machines, because while HAVA provides for new
machines, it does not mandate them if current voting systems can
demonstrate that they meet the integrity requirements of HAVA.
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT TIMELINE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Days/months after enactment Date Activity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 days...................... December 13, 2002............................. Section 101: GSA establish grant
program for payments to States
to improve election
administration.
45 days...................... December 13, 2003............................. Section 102: GSA establish grant
program for payments to States
to replace punch card or lever
voting machines.
January 1, 2003............................... States must be ready to accept
materials from individuals who
register by mail. Section
303(b).
90 days...................... January 27, 2003.............................. Chief State election officials
transmit notice to FEC Chair
(and/or EAC) containing name of
State election official and
local election official selected
to serve on Standards Board.
120 days..................... February 26, 2003............................. Appointment of 4 EAC
Commissioners.
March 31, 2003................................ State NVRA Reports for 2001-2002
due to FEC.
6 months..................... April 29, 2003................................ Last date on which States may
submit certification to GSA for
Section 101 payments.
6 months..................... April 29, 2003................................ Last date on which States may
submit certification to GSA for
Section 102 payments.
June 30, 2003................................. 2001-2002 NVRA report submitted
to Congress.
October 1, 2003............................... EAC adopts recommendations and
voluntary guidance on Section
302 Provisional Voting
Requirements.
October 1, 2003............................... EAC adopts recommendations and
voluntary guidance on Section
303 provisions on computerized
statewide voter registration
list requirements and mail
registration requirements.
12 months.................... October 29, 2003.............................. EAC submits Human Factors Report
to the President and Congress.
(Section 243).
12 months.................... October 29, 2003.............................. EAC submits to Congress report on
free absentee ballot postage.
(Section 246).
January 1, 2004............................... Deadline for States to qualify
for waiver of computerized
statewide voter registration
databases.
January 1, 2004............................... Last date for States applying for
waiver of deadline for
replacement of punchcard or
lever voting machines using
Section 102 payments.
January 1, 2004............................... States not participating in the
grant programs shall certify to
the EAC that the State has
established an administrative
complaint procedures (Section
402), or has submitted a
compliance plan to the U.S.
Attorney General.
January 1, 2004............................... Effective date for Section 302
provisional voting and voting
information requirements.
January 1, 2004............................... States and jurisdictions required
to comply with Section 303
requirements pertaining to
computerized statewide voter
registration lists (unless
qualified for a waiver) and 1st
time voters who register by
mail.
January 1, 2004............................... EAC adopts voluntary guidance
recommendations relating to
Section 301 Voting Systems
Standards requirements.
January 1, 2004............................... Effective date of new Section 706
UOCAVA amendments prohibiting
States from refusing to accept
registration and absentee ballot
applications on grounds of early
submission.
January 1, 2004............................... EAC submits first Annual Report
to Congress.
18 months.................... March 29, 2004................................ EAC (in conjunction with FVAP)
submits to the President and
Congress a report and
recommendations for facilitating
military and overseas voting.
(Section 242).
20 months.................... May 29, 2004.................................. EAC submits to House and Senate a
report on the issues and
challenges presented by
incorporating communication and
internet technology into the
election process. (Section 245).
November 2, 2004.............................. All punchcard and lever machines
replaced in States accepting
Section 102 payments, unless
qualified for waiver.
March 31, 2005................................ State NVRA Reports for 2003-2004
due to EAC.
June 1, 2005.................................. EAC submits report to President
and Congress on voters who
register by mail. (Section 244).
June 1, 2005.................................. EAC (in conjunction with SSA)
reports to Congress on the
feasibility and advisability of
using SSN or other such
information to establish
registration or other election
eligibility and ID requirements.
(Section 244).
June 30, 2005................................. 2003-2004 NVRA report submitted
to Congress.
January 1, 2006............................... Each State and jurisdiction
required to comply with the
voting systems requirements in
Section 301.
January 1, 2006............................... Deadline for States to implement
computerized Statewide voter
registration database if
qualified for waiver.
First election for Federal office after All punchcard and lever machines
January 1, 2006. replaced in States accepting
Section 102 payments who
qualified for a waiver of the
original deadline.
January 1, 2007............................... Voting systems purchased with
Title II requirements payments
must meet disability access
standards in section 201.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
____
[From the Washington Times, Oct. 29, 2003]
Touch-Screen Voting Ready, Officials Say
(By Arlo Wagner)
Officials overseeing four of the five municipal elections
Tuesday in Montgomery and Prince George's counties said
yesterday they are confident that their electronic touch-
screen voting machines are secure, despite lingering concerns
that the machines are vulnerable to hackers and tampering.
``It's actually more secure than it was before,'' said
Barry Smith, manager of election technology for Gaithersburg,
one of the cities that used the Diebold AccuVote-TS in its
elections two years ago.
Voters in Gaithersburg had an opportunity to try out the
machines yesterday at three of the city's five polling
places. Few voters, however, came out to the Asbury Methodist
Village polling place, where, historically, the highest
percentage of voters cast paper ballots.
Election officials said the low turnout could indicate that
voters in that precinct were satisfied with the touch-screen
machines last time.
``This is better than the old system,'' said Sarah Paxton,
administrative secretary to Gaithersburg's city manager. ``It
may take a voter only 30 seconds to vote.''
Registered voters must show identification to get a
computerized card, which they then insert into the base of
the machine. Once the card is in the machine, the names of
all candidates are displayed on the screen.
Voters touch the names they are selecting. If they touch
too many names, the screen will go blank and voters will have
to start over. Once the preferred candidates are chosen, the
machine will eject the card. The voters then must turn the
card over to one of the judges who is overseeing the process.
Montgomery was one of three counties in Maryland to use the
computerized voting machines in 2001. In July, a team of
researchers at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore found
that the underlying computer code in the machines was
vulnerable to outside parties.
After the Hopkins analysis, Gov. Robert L. Ehrlich Jr., a
Republican, ordered San Diego-based Science Application
International Corp. (SAIC) to review the system. Last month,
SAIC reported that the system, ``as implemented in policy,
procedure and technology, is at high risk of compromise.''
Mr. Ehrlich and state election officials decided the flaws
identified by SAIC could be corrected before the presidential
primary election in March. Maryland agreed to purchase $55.6
million worth of machines just days before SAIC released its
findings this summer. The machines are expected to be
installed in 19 of Maryland's 23 counties.
Last week, several members of the Maryland's General
Assembly asked for its own ``independent'' analysis that
would, among
[[Page H10121]]
other things, examine issues about the electronic voting
machines. That report is scheduled to be concluded before the
General Assembly convenes in January.
Despite prior reviews of the system, officials in the four
of the five cities that will be using the machines Tuesday
say they had no problems with them last Election Day. Those
cities holding elections are Takoma Park, Rockville,
Gaithersburg, Greenbelt and College Park.
``We had no problems in the last election,'' said Catherine
Waters, city clerk of Takoma Park, where voters next week
will use the touch-screen machines to select a mayor and six
city Council members.
Voters in Greenbelt will use a different computerized
voting machine when they elect all five members to the City
Council.
``I don't think anyone is batting an eye,'' Greenbelt City
Clerk Kathleen Gallagher said.
However, voters in College Park will not use the touch-
screen machines when they go to the polls to choose a mayor
and four council members.
``We will be using paper ballots,'' which might be old-
fashioned but are familiar to about 10,000 registered voters,
said Yvette Allen, of the City Clerk's Office.
The municipal elections in Montgomery and Prince George's
counties are dominated by unopposed incumbents.
In Rockville, voters will decide whether to elect a mayor
and City Council every four years, instead of two. This will
be the 59th city election in the city's 116-year history,
said Neil Greenberger, the city's public information officer.
Voters in Gaithersburg will be electing three of the five
council members.
Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlewoman, and I think her insertions in the
Record will be very useful to people. I thank her for her insightful
comments.
I would make the point that even though HAVA does not require action
immediately, the sooner we implement HAVA, the better. There are many
people with physical disabilities who have been denied the privilege
and the satisfaction of voting in person and in private. HAVA would
correct that. But we must not let HAVA lead us to unverifiable voting.
That is why I am proposing legislation that would, I think, correct
this problem. It would require that all voting systems produce a paper
record, an audit trail that is verified by the voter. In other words,
each voter will see and verify a paper record of the vote. That will
allow manual audits. It will mean that recounts actually mean
something. This would be the vote of record. It would be kept safely
with the election records for recounts.
My legislation would do some other things such as banning undisclosed
software and would accelerate the date by which the provisions for
people with disabilities would have to be met. But the fundamental
point I wanted to make is that voting should not be an act of faith as
my colleagues have said. It should be an act of record. It is also
important to make the point that what I am talking about here is
nonpartisan. It is preserving the sanctity of the ballot. This is not a
Republican matter or a Democratic matter. It is fundamental to the
American system.
I am sorry to say that the Internet is buzzing with conspiracy
theories. In other words, voters are afraid that something is afoot. It
was reported in this week's Newsweek by Steven Levy that suspicions, as
he says, run even higher when people learn that some of those in charge
of the voting technology, the manufacturers of the voting machines, are
themselves partisan. The CEO of a major company is a major fund-raiser
for the Presidential reelection campaign. He recently said that he was
``committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes for the
President next year.'' According to this article, he later clarified
that he was not talking about rigging the machines.
Whew. That is actually Mr. Levy's expression. Whew.
By the proposal that I have, the legislative proposal I have, the
printout would be at the voting machine at the time that the voter
votes, available for the voter's inspection and verification. And it
would go into a secure lockbox. If there is a need for a recount, the
paper ballots would be tallied. It may not be a perfect system, but it
is a way to assure the voters that the process is honest.
It is troubling that this is not getting as much attention here in
this body as it should. An article appeared in the New Zealand Herald a
few days ago. The article begins, ``The possibility of flaws in the
electoral process is not something that gets discussed much in the
United States Congress. The attitude seems to be, we are the greatest
democracy in the world, so the system must be fair.''
That is not good enough. We are a great country because we constantly
try to do better, because we constantly try to increase the franchise,
increase accessibility to democracy, increase the reliability of the
process. That is what we need to do. Yet from all over the country, I
get e-mails. For instance, from Georgia: ``If we can't verify our
elections, then we can't verify our freedom.''
From Idaho someone writes: ``Those who cast the votes decide nothing.
Those who count the votes decide everything.''
From Michigan: ``The act of voting is the most essential issue. This
issue is the most essential issue our representatives will vote on and
they should be judged accordingly.''
From North Carolina: ``A paper trail is the only reasonable solution
to any computer-mediated transaction. As a corporate system security
analyst, I find the electronic devices as they now stand without this
verifiable backup simply irresponsible.''
From North Dakota: ``There is no confidence nor integrity without
it.''
From Ohio: ``I work with computers every day. We need to check that
what goes in is what comes out.''
From Oregon: ``Without this, I will no longer view this country as a
democracy.''
From Tennessee: ``If there is no accountability in election, there is
no reason to vote and we descend into anarchy.''
From Wisconsin: ``If voters perceive,'' the key word here is
perceive, ``that their votes are being miscounted and are meaningless,
they will simply stop voting.''
That gives you some sense of the seriousness that voters assign to
this issue. It is very important. This body should turn its attention
to restoring the voters' trust in every way we can. One important way
we can do that is by making sure that they have confidence in the
process that makes this democracy work, the process of voting and then,
of course, the process by which we fulfill the trust that they place in
us.
As I have talked about this with people, I have run into a number of
opinions. I was talking with an election official from another State
who said, Well, we've had these electronic machines for several years
now and we've had no problems. To which I said, How do you know?
{time} 2215
He did not have an answer. We have to help him get that answer.
Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of every
American's basic right to vote and to have that voted counted.
As it stands, voters have no way of knowing what is actually
recorded, once they vote. H.R. 2239, the bill introduced by my
colleague from New Jersey, would make certain the process of voting is
not in any way a leap of faith.
This act would ensure our constituents see a record of verification
for the votes they cast. When Americans go to the bank, they receive
some manner of documented record, ensuring that their money is going
where they intended. Likewise, Americans who use voting machines
deserve a documented record confirming their vote was recorded
correctly.
Nine percent of the U.S. population records their votes
electronically. These numbers greatly vary from State to State. Twelve
percent of Ohio votes are recorded electronically. Eighty percent of
Kentucky voters use electronic ballots. Without an adequate
confirmation method, mechanical misvotes could have a drastic impact on
close elections. The problem would go unnoticed.
H.R. 2239 would also accelerate the deadline for compliance with
voting systems standards from January 1, 2006 to the regularly
scheduled November 2004 general Federal election. In order to guarantee
accurately recorded votes for next year's election cycle, Congress must
act now. We cannot put the basic rights of our constituents on hold.
The right to vote is a right every citizen of this country deserves.
As Members of Congress, we all have an obligation to make sure all of
our constituents' votes are counted through the most fair and accurate
means available. Not just the blacks. Not just the whites. Not just the
browns. Not just the yellows. Not just the Christians. Not just the
Jews. Not just the Muslims. Not just the Atheists. Not just the
Republicans. Not just the Democrats. The right to vote should not be
reserved for just most of our constituents, but for all of our
constituents.
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