[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 145 (Thursday, October 16, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12638-S12643]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, nearly 6 months have elapsed since 
President Bush flew out to the aircraft carrier and declared ``mission 
accomplished'' in Iraq. Today, we all know all too well that the war is 
not over: The war goes on; the mission is not accomplished. An 
unnecessary war, based on unreliable and inaccurate intelligence, has 
not brought an end to danger. Instead, it has brought new dangers, 
imposed new costs, and taken more and more American lives each week.
  We all agree that Saddam Hussein was a murderous tyrant, and his 
brutal regime was an affront to basic human decency. But Iraq was not a 
breeding ground for terrorism. Our invasion has made it one.
  The trumped-up reasons for going to war have collapsed. All the 
administration's rationalizations as we prepared to go to war now stand 
revealed as ``double-talk.'' The American people were told Saddam 
Hussein was building nuclear weapons. He was not. We were told he had 
stockpiles of other weapons of mass destruction. He did not. We were 
told he was involved in 9/11. He was not. We were told Iraq was 
attracting terrorists from al-Qaida. It was not. We were told our 
soldiers would be viewed as liberators. They are not. We were told Iraq 
could pay for its own reconstruction. It cannot. We were told the war 
would make America safer. It has not.
  Before the war, week after week after week after week, we were told 
lie after lie after lie after lie.
  And now, despite the increasingly restless Iraqi population, despite 
the continuing talk of sabotage, despite the foreign terrorists 
crossing thousands of miles of border to attack U.S. service men and 
women in Iraq, the administration still refuses to face the truth or 
tell the truth. Instead the White House responds by covering up its 
failures and trying to sell its rosy

[[Page S12639]]

version of events by repeating it with maximum frequency and volume, 
and minimum regard for realities on the ground.
  No PR campaign by the increasingly desperate White House can redress 
the painful loss of a young American soldier almost every day. Instead 
of greater stability and order, the forces arrayed against us are 
steadily increasing the intensity and sophistication of their assaults 
on our troops. Bombs that were once set off by trip wires are now being 
set off by remote control. The threat of shoulder fired missiles makes 
it unsafe for civilian planes to land at Baghdad Airport.
  No foreign policy in our free society can succeed for long unless it 
is supported by our people. Our men and women in uniform fought bravely 
and brilliantly, but the President's war has been revealed as mindless, 
needless, senseless, and reckless. The American people know all this. 
Our allies know it. Our soldiers know it. We should never have gone to 
war in Iraq when we did, in the way we did, for the false reasons we 
were given. But now that we are there, two imperatives are absolutely 
clear: America cannot withdraw now, leaving Iraq to chaos or civil war, 
becoming a danger to us far greater than it did before. The misguided 
policy of the past is no excuse for a misguided policy for the future.
  We need a realistic and specific plan to bring stability to Iraq, to 
bring genuine self-government to Iraq, to bring our soldiers home with 
dignity and honor.
  Until the administration genuinely changes course, I cannot in good 
conscience vote to fund a failed policy that endangers our troops in 
the field and our strategic objectives in the world instead of 
protecting them. The greatest mistake we can make in Congress as the 
people's elected representatives is to support and finance a ``go-it-
alone, do-it-because-I-say-so'' policy that leaves young Americans 
increasingly at risk in Iraq.
  So when the roll is called on this $87 billion legislation, which 
provides no effective conditions for genuine international 
participation and a clear change in policy in Iraq, I intend to vote 
no. A no vote is not a vote against supporting our troops. It is a vote 
to send the administration back to the drawing board. It is a vote for 
a new policy--policy worthy of the sacrifice our soldiers are making, a 
policy that restores America as a respected member of the family of 
nations, a policy that will make it easier, not far more difficult, to 
win the war against terrorism.
  The amount of money is huge.
  It is 87 times what the Federal Government spends annually on 
afterschool programs.
  It is 7 times what President Bush proposed to spend on education for 
low-income schools in 2004.
  It is 9 times what the Federal Government spends on special education 
each year.
  It is 8 times what the Government spends to help middle and low-
income students go to college.
  It is 15 times what the Government spends on cancer research.
  It is 27 times what the Government spends on substance abuse and 
mental health treatment.
  It is 58 times what the Government spends on community health 
centers.
  If our Iraq policy is to be successful, it must take into account 
what history teaches us about the use of military power to solve 
politically inspired violence. A new policy must provide the security 
that is essential for any nation-building effort. A new policy must 
genuinely internationalize the reconstruction of Iraq and end our 
occupation. And a successful new policy must give ownership to Iraqis 
for their political future.
  Surely, in this day and age, at the beginning of the 21st century, we 
do not have to re-learn the lesson that every colonial power in history 
has learned. We do not want to be--we cannot afford to be--either in 
terms of character or in terms of cost, an occupier of other lands. We 
must not become the next failed empire in the world.
  The administration seeks to write a new history that defies the 
lessons of history. The most basic of those lessons is that we cannot 
rely primarily on military means as a solution to politically-inspired 
violence. In those circumstances, the tide of history rises squarely 
against military occupation.
  The British learned that lesson in Northern Ireland. The French 
learned it in Algeria. The Russians learned it in Afghanistan and are 
re-learning it every day in Chechnya. America learned it in Vietnam, 
and we must not re-learn it in Iraq.
  Our men and women in uniform are the finest in world, and all 
Americans admire and honor their ability and their courage. In Iraq, 
they are now being forced to do an extraordinary job they were never 
trained for, and they are doing it under extreme and unpredictable 
circumstances.
  Even with the best forces in the history of the world, our military 
cannot succeed if the mission is not achievable, if they are viewed as 
occupiers, and if we do not have a clearly defined and realistic 
strategy.
  In recent weeks, in Massachusetts, at Fort Stewart in Georgia, and at 
Walter Reed Hospital, I have met with American troops who fought in 
Iraq. I am profoundly moved by the price they pay to serve our country, 
and profoundly impressed by their professionalism and commitment. They 
are willing to endure great hardship and great danger in Iraq to 
complete their mission. But they want to know when their mission will 
be complete, and when they will be able to come home.
  They are resourceful and strong. But more and more they are 
frustrated--especially by the faceless nature of the threat. 
Individuals intent on killing Americans are firing from behind the 
cover of crowds, to provoke our soldiers into firing back on civilians. 
Many of our troops say they were never trained to be police officers or 
to fight a guerrilla war.
  They want to help the Iraqi people. But the increasing casualties 
make them feel unsafe. They want to respond militarily to attacks. But 
they often don't know who the attacker is.
  They tell me that at first, their convoys were welcomed. But after 
time, children began to throw rocks at them, and then came the bullets. 
They tell me that far too many in Iraq believe we are there to take 
their oil, and that we will stay forever.
  They have no clear sense about their post-war mission. Some see it as 
winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Some believe it is 
security. Some feel it is to obtain intelligence about opposition 
forces and weapons caches. Others think it is to prevent sabotage of 
the oil pipelines and other vital infrastructure. Still others say it 
is to build sidewalks and soccer fields and schools and hospitals, and 
other local facilities. Not one of the soldiers told me their mission 
was to achieve Iraq's transition to democracy.
  We read today in the Washington Post about a survey of our troops. 
Their morale is low. They believe their mission lacks clear definition. 
They are getting worn down.
  The ongoing occupation of Iraq has imposed a heavy burden on our 
forces and created a crisis for the military. It is now stretched 
precariously thin. We do not have enough active duty soldiers to 
sustain their presence in Iraq and also meet security needs in 
Afghanistan and other parts of the world.
  The crisis is coming to a head now. Two of our divisions are 
scheduled to return from Iraq in the spring. If the administration is 
unsuccessful in recruiting forces from other nations, it will have to 
send in at least another division of American troops--and we don't have 
enough active duty forces to do the job. That means even more call-ups 
from the National Guard and Reserves. In fact, if international troops 
aren't coming, the administration must notify reservists by the end of 
this very month to guarantee that they will be available by spring.
  Already, close to half our troops in Iraq are members of the Guard or 
Reserves; 13,000 have been on active duty for at least a year. Others 
have recently returned home from deployments, only to turn around and 
head overseas for another tour.
  One reservist I recently spoke to had only 17 days off between tours 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average reservist now spends 13 times 
longer on active duty today than during the 1990s. Many cannot go home 
when their scheduled time is finished, and are repeatedly sent instead 
on new deployments overseas.
  In Iraq, our reservists are being pressed into duty as the first line 
of defense. They need 120 to 150 days to

[[Page S12640]]

train before being sent to Iraq. The Army needs to let them know now to 
begin this crucial training. It typically takes 8 years under the 
current peacetime system for a Reserve combat unit to reach the level 
of readiness of an active unit. But we don't have 8 years. They are 
needed in Iraq this spring.
  Even worse, reservists are being sent into combat with inferior 
equipment. They have told me they had to rely on Vietnam-era night 
vision goggles that obscure more than they reveal, even though the 
latest technology is used by the regular military. They told me they 
had to use outdated and less-effective flak jackets, not the latest 
models with bulletproof ceramic inserts. They told me they had to wait 
three months for other current gear. Many units did not have armored 
Humvees. Instead, they had to hang flak jackets in the windows to 
protect themselves from attack.
  I visited some of our wounded soldiers last week at Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center. More than 1,800 American service men and women have 
been wounded in this war, and an average of 7 new patients arrive at 
Walter Reed from Iraq each day. Many were ambushed driving along a 
road. Many lost limbs because their Humvees did not have the armor to 
protect them from the blast of a rocket-propelled grenade or a booby 
trap in the road.
  Their families feel the strain of their deployment both emotionally 
and financially. Many members of the Guard or Reserves give up higher 
civilian salaries when they go on active duty. Even though the law 
prohibits discrimination against reservists, increasingly, they are 
unwilling to tell possible employers about their military obligation, 
for fear they will not be hired or kept on the job. It is a sad day for 
patriotism when service to our Nation is a negative factor in civilian 
employment.
  Far more American soldiers and marines have been killed since the end 
of major combat operations in May than during the 3-week war itself. 
These are not just statistics. Each name on the list has many who 
mourn, whether parents, spouses, children, brothers or sisters.
  We cannot go on this way. We should have known that military victory 
would be quick, and that winning the peace would be the challenge.
  I support our troops. It is the administration's policy that has 
failed them. Their perceptions demonstrate the wider failure of our 
policy and the need for the administration to move in a decisively 
different direction.
  The administration ignores the lesson of history that nation building 
cannot succeed in a cauldron of insecurity. Iraq is America's sixth 
major nation-building challenge in the past 10 years--Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq.
  Security was indispensable to nation building in each case. But in 
Iraq, we seem incapable of meeting the basic security needs of our own 
Armed Forces, let alone the Iraqi people.
  When America intervened in Haiti in 1994, large numbers of 
international armed police were brought in to support our military and 
achieve a greater measure of safety for the Haitian people. The first 
task was to establish security in a country that did not even have a 
civilian police force. We responded by recruiting a large multinational 
police force from 20 different countries.
  When America intervened in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1998 we 
understood that security for local citizens was essential for resuming 
economic growth and reaching our nation-building goals. In Kosovo, our 
allies offered highly trained police, including some heavily armed, 
which were critical to minimizing violence after the conflict ended and 
enabling reconstruction and political progress to be made.
  In Kosovo, our soldiers were given training in controlling crowds, 
establishing security cordons, and searching vehicles. But when I 
visited the soldiers of the Third Infantry Division last week, they 
told me they did not receive such training, even though it would have 
served them well in the cities of Iraq.
  The Pentagon assumed we would be able to draw on thousands of 
Saddam's police officers to provide security, but in the critical early 
weeks that followed the war, they were nowhere to be found, and too 
many of them were thugs and torturers.
  Six months later, there is still confusion. At the end of August, the 
former New York City Police Commissioner in charge of police training 
program in Iraq announced that he had reached an agreement to train 
28,000 Iraqi police in a camp in Hungary. Within a week, the Prime 
Minister of Hungary announced that he knew of no such agreement. He 
said that Hungary had no appropriate training facility, and that 
someone should inform his government of what was going on. Now, we hear 
that the administration has organized a training camp in Jordan.

  The Pentagon also assumed that the bulk of the Iraqi armed forces 
could be used to supplement our forces. But soon after the war began, 
the Iraqi army melted away. Its members went home, and the army was 
formally disbanded by our Government before they were screened and 
before they were disarmed. We lost the decent ones who could have 
helped provide security, and we let Hussein's true believers get away 
with their weapons.
  Countries such as France, Germany, Sweden, Argentina, the European 
Union, or Spain could provide well-trained police to prevent saboteurs 
from undermining the extensive reconstruction effort and to advance our 
broader nation-building objectives. But so far, we have been unable to 
persuade additional nations to share the burden and the cost.
  The Bush administration's continuing arrogance in Iraq has forced the 
best-trained military in the world to act as police officers in a 
shooting gallery, to carry out police functions for which they are ill-
prepared and ill-equipped. For Iraq now and for future crises 
elsewhere, we need to build support in the international community for 
a reserve police identified and trained for post-conflict deployments.
  It is shocking that the White House is only now beginning to 
coordinate which agency should be responsible for various tasks. This 
should not have waited 6 months. It should have been standard operating 
procedure from the outset to outline an integrated strategy that meets 
our military needs, the needs for local policing and reconstruction, 
and the need for progress in achieving a free and legitimate Iraqi 
government. They go hand-in-hand. But none can succeed unless basic 
security is guaranteed.
  The administration's policy of rushing to put large multibillion-
dollar contracts in the hands of American firms ignores not only the 
lesson of history but also the lesson of human nature--the Iraqi people 
need to be the real partners in the reconstruction effort.
  The administration is wrongly working from the top down, rather than 
the bottom up, to rebuild Iraq. A new Iraq will emerge neighborhood by 
neighborhood, town by town, province by province. How can any 
Republican President of the United States disagree that government must 
be of the people, by the people, and for the people?
  We need closer alignment between military units working on 
reconstruction and the civilians working at the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. Our soldiers in the field are surveying the damage and 
identifying priorities for repair. They need local counterparts. We 
cannot solve every problem from Saddam's palace in Baghdad.
  Why not scale back the lavish resources being provided to U.S. 
contractors and consultants and provide larger sums directly to the 
Iraqi people? We could do so in many cases by developing ties between 
local councils and the Iraqi Governing Council. We could work more with 
local non-governmental organizations and local businesses. In all 
cases, we need to insist on transparency in the process, so we know 
where the funding is going.
  It is the Iraqi people's country. They have the greatest stake in the 
success of the reconstruction, and involving them now will enhance the 
prospects for success.
  In some areas of Iraq, we already have been able to achieve 
impressive results with small amounts of money. In one case, we funded 
the building of a cement factory for less than $100,000, when the bid 
by an American contractor for the same project was in the millions. Why 
not do more of this with schools, medical clinics, roads and countless 
other projects?
  Iraq has many of the best-trained petroleum engineers in the world. 
Why

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not give them--rather than American companies--a larger role in 
rebuilding the industry? Why not create jobs for Iraqis and give them 
ownership of their reconstruction?
  If we insist on saying Halliburton rules, because to the victor 
belong the spoils, we won't be the victor for very long.
  The administration's policy in Iraq ignores the indisputable lesson 
of history that building democracy is complex and difficult.
  When the British accepted responsibility for the new nation of Iraq 
after the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, they 
encountered enormous difficulties in creating a stable government 
across Sunni, Shia, Kurd and other ethnic and religious groups. Many 
Kurds wanted their own state--and still do. Tensions have existed 
between Sunni and Shia for 13 centuries. Iraq had no history of unity.
  In the words of one tribal chieftain, ``History did not die; the 
tribes and notables who emerged in 1920 and created our modern state in 
1921 are here to stay with all the others who came into being 
thereafter.''
  Instead of learning from this painful history, we condemned ourselves 
to repeat it. Instead of anticipating the obviously similar and 
predictable divisions and demands when Saddam's regime fell, the Bush 
administration believed that a few favored Iraqi exile leaders, many of 
them in exile for years, could return to Iraq, rally the population and 
lead the new government. That was another failure. The Iraqi people 
rejected them from the start and resisted their domination.
  The administration believed that once a few hundred top advisers to 
Saddam were removed from power, large numbers of local officials would 
remain to run the government. Instead the collapse of government in 
Baghdad rippled across the country.
  If history is any guide, America will not be able to impose our 
vision of democracy on the Iraqi people on our current terms and our 
timetable. Our overarching interest is the development of a government 
that has legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, so that the longer 
process of building durable democratic institutions can proceed 
effectively in the years to come. This process will not be finished 
swiftly, or easily, and it will not take place according to our will.
  Iraq is a society where, for the full 30 years of Saddam's rule, 
politics ruled from the top. It will take time for the Iraqi people to 
adjust to the new decentralization of power and to understand how the 
multiple levels of a working democratic government can function 
effectively.
  The administration clings to the hope that the Iraqi Governing 
Council--25 people, many of whom have never worked together before--can 
adopt a constitution in time to hold successful elections next year.
  On July 23, Ambassador Bremer said that it ``should be possible'' to 
have elections next year.
  On September 26, Secretary of State Powell gave the Iraqis 6 months 
to write a constitution.
  In Bosnia, the United States pressed for national elections the first 
year, before viable local democratic political institutions were 
developed, and it made the development of democracy more difficult. 
Based on the historical precedents, a recent RAND publication suggests 
holding national elections roughly 2 years after reconstruction begins. 
The International Crisis Group also reached the conclusion that it 
could take 2 years before national elections should be held.
  The lesson is clear. We cannot rush. It is not surprising that our 
insistence on such speed is alienating the many Iraqis who know the 
process needs more time. The date of their national election should not 
be determined by the date of ours.
  Imposing our will and our timetable on the Iraqi people will 
undermine our all-important long-term goal of achieving a legitimate 
Iraqi government committed to remaining on the path to democracy. 
Already, the Interim Governing Council lacks credibility in the eyes of 
many Iraqis. On paper, it has broad power, but that fools no one. It is 
controlled by the United States, and it lacks sufficient power to meet 
the Iraqi people's needs.
  The administration needs to give greater priority to restoring 
sovereignty and help lay the groundwork for approving a constitution 
and holding national elections. In Afghanistan, we obtained the support 
of the international community for an interim government that was not 
under American occupation. That process can still work in Iraq, 
although it would have clearly worked better from the start. As we did 
in Afghanistan, we need a process to transfer sovereignty to the 
Iraqis, who in turn, can ask the U.S. and U.N. for assistance.
  If the United States is seen as controlling the new government in 
Baghdad, it will fail--if not now, then later; if not while our forces 
are still there, then as soon as they are gone. Those who work with 
such a government are easily dismissed by the Iraqi people as American 
puppets. We must take the time necessary to give Iraqis the ownership 
of their government, if we expect it to have any credibility and 
staying power.
  Whether the Bush administration likes it or not, they need a central 
role for the United Nations to help accomplish this goal. Before 
becoming National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice seemed to 
understand this.
  In a January 2000 article in Foreign Affairs, she wrote: ``U.S. 
interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted 
within the U.N. and other multilateral organizations . . . ''.
  She wrote: ``The president must remember that the military is a 
special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a 
civilian police force. It is not a political referee, and it is most 
certainly not designed to build a civilian society.''

  Condi Rice's words indict the administration's own policy now. It is 
essential to involve the international community as an active and equal 
partner in the political transition of Iraq.
  We need to give the U.N. a central role. The administration's 
decision to go back to the United Nations is a first step, but it is 
meaningful only if the administration is genuinely changing its policy. 
The real test will be whether the administration is now willing to make 
the compromises necessary to persuade other countries to contribute 
troops to relieve our soldiers and to bring stability to Iraq. The jury 
is still out on whether the U.N. resolution will mark a real shift by 
the administration.
  We know from experience of the past decade in this post-cold war 
world, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in other devastated lands, that we can 
enlist the international community in a major way. We can share 
responsibility and authority, draw on the strengths and the diversity 
of the United Nations, achieve security and reconstruction, and an end 
to the occupation. For many months, the administration has been wrong 
to try to bypass the United Nations by enticing a few receptive nations 
to join us if the price is right.
  No one doubts that the United States should remain in charge of the 
military operation. But internationalizing the reconstruction is not a 
luxury; it is an imperative. Sharing authority with the United Nations 
to manage the transition to democracy will give the process legitimacy 
and gradually dispel the current stigma of occupation--especially if it 
is accompanied by the creation of a more fully representative interim 
governing council to deal with day-to-day administrative 
responsibilities.
  As soon as possible, we need to redouble the effort to bring in 
forces with regional faces--especially Muslim faces. Nations such as 
Jordan, Pakistan, and Egypt could immediately transform this mission 
with both their diversity and their expertise. The United Arab Emirates 
contributed effectively to the effort in Kosovo. Morocco and Albania 
have worked with us in Bosnia. That strategy can work for us in Iraq 
now as well.
  In their joint memoir, ``A World Transformed,'' President George H.W. 
Bush and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, reflected on 
their own experiences with Iraq and the Gulf War in 1991. They had been 
criticized in some quarters for halting that war after their dramatic 
victory in Kuwait, instead of going on to Baghdad to depose Saddam 
Hussein.
  Here is what they wrote:

       Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into 
     an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline 
     about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in

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     `mission creep,' and would have incurred incalculable human 
     and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible 
     . . . We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in 
     effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have 
     collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies 
     pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, there was no 
     viable `exit strategy' we could see . . . Had we gone the 
     invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be 
     an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have 
     been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

  They were right.
  It is time for this administration to admit that it was wrong, and 
turn in a new direction. We need a genuine plan that acknowledges the 
realities on the ground. We need a plan that gives real authority to 
the United Nations, so that other nations truly will share the burden. 
We need to actively engage the Iraqi people in governing and rebuilding 
their country. Our soldiers now risking their lives in Iraq deserve no 
less.
  Here at home, all Americans are being asked to bear the burden, too--
and they deserve more than a phony summons to support our troops by 
pursuing policies that will only condemn them to greater and greater 
danger. Yes, we must stay the course--but not the wrong course.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I understand there are 2 minutes left 
for morning business on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes fifteen seconds.
  Mr. SPECTER. Parliamentary inquiry: At that point, does the schedule 
call for going to the bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 50 seconds remaining on the 
Democratic side.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when we go 
to the bill, I be recognized to speak first on the bill.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I object. I say this respectfully: We 
worked very hard last night to get a routine set up here this morning. 
Senators Stevens and Byrd agreed to it. Senator Byrd is coming to speak 
and to offer an amendment. I would be happy to yield our 50 seconds, 
and after the 3 minutes expires, we should call on Senator Byrd.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that morning 
business be extended so that I might speak for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, that would be extended by 7 minutes on 
their side; is that true?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. REID. We will extend it by 7 minutes on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment on 
a vote that will be coming up on the $20 billion in the form of loans 
or grants.
  Two weeks ago yesterday, on October 1, I spoke at some length in 
favor of having loans. I believe that is the correct position and focus 
on the $20 billion in the context of viewing what is happening in Iraq, 
which is essentially a bankrupt country where in general bankruptcy 
proceedings all existing debt would be extinguished and the activities 
of rebuilding Iraq would be a new day; and, in light of the United 
Nations resolution in May of this year authorizing the United States 
and the United Kingdom to use Iraqi oil to rebuild Iraq, that is the 
appropriate course with the narrow focus on this $20 billion.
  In the intervening 2 weeks, I have consulted with my colleagues and 
with members of the administration and have rethought the issue. It is 
my view that in a broader context there ought to be a grant instead of 
loans. I have come to that conclusion after having, as I said, talked 
to my colleagues and having met with a group on a bipartisan basis, 
Republicans and Democrats, who are looking for a structure at least in 
part for loans, and having talked to the President the day before 
yesterday and Secretary of State Powell and other members of the 
administration.
  As I am viewing this $20 billion in the much broader context of the 
overall strategy, it is my judgment that we ought to give the President 
leeway to carry out his plan.
  The day before yesterday, a group of Senators, both Democrats and 
Republicans, met with President Bush and with Secretary of State Colin 
Powell. I have not seen the President with such fervor and such 
determination and such intensity since I saw him 2 days after 9/11 when 
he called in some Members from the impacted States. One of the planes 
went down in Pennsylvania. And he had blood in his eye when he said he 
was not going to send a $1 million missile to an empty tent.
  The President and the Secretary of State spoke in terms of the 
broader objectives of the administration beyond this $20 billion. The 
Secretary of State talked about the efforts to get a United Nations 
resolution which would give broader support to the United States' 
position in an effort to bring in Pakistan, Turkey, and Muslim 
countries to give the Arabs more confidence. I believe this type of 
multilateral approach is really necessary.
  I tried back on October 11 of last year to carry forward the Lugar-
Biden amendment which would have done more to have a multilateral 
approach before the use of force. But that was yesterday. Today, we are 
looking at a very different picture.
  The funds for the rebuilding of Iraq could be necessary far beyond 
this $20 billion. I believe the narrow focus of using the Iraqi oil as 
authorized by the United Nations resolution is sound. Ambassador Bremer 
is considering the long-range plan. I think the sentiment which is 
fairly strong in this body for loans as opposed to grants ought to be 
taken into consideration and, if the President's policy is successful 
on having this as a grant, that there is a strong underlying fervor 
that there ought to be a repayment and a funding of the rebuilding of 
Iraq from the Iraqi resources, which is the second biggest pool of oil 
in the world.
  I am not unmindful of the arguments about how much money will be 
spent by the Federal Government on rebuilding schools in Iowa 
contrasted to rebuilding schools in Iraq; or how much money will be 
spent in Vermont building hospitals as opposed to spending money in 
Baghdad. I am not unmindful of the role of the Congress and the primacy 
under the Constitution on the appropriations process. In listening to 
the President as he outlines his broader strategy, I do believe he 
bears the lion's share of the responsibility.
  We are going to have the donor's conference in Madrid later this 
month. The President is emphatic in his view that we will have a better 
chance to get more donors if we make a grant instead of a loan, that 
there will be a better chance to have other countries forgive debt and 
that, as he is setting out to a trip to the Far East, we ought to be in 
a position to be supportive as to where he thinks he can best lead the 
country.
  In so doing, I do not relinquish my vote and the authority which I 
have as a Senator, a Member of Congress, on our appropriations process 
as we will be looking at very substantial funding in the future. When I 
think about the issue and reflect on it and rethink beyond the narrower 
focus of the $20 billion to the broader strategy, I think of the 
metaphor of too many cooks spoil the broth. The President has a very 
heavy responsibility as he moves ahead to the donor's conference 
through his representatives and on his trip to the Far East.
  When I look at the delegation of authority which we have given him on 
appropriations, the defense budget, the foreign operations budget, and 
the State Department budget, it proximates in excess of $400 billion. 
This is about 5 percent. As I take a look at our overall Federal budget 
of $2.2 trillion, the $20 billion is less than 1 percent. I believe 
this vote, which we will cast later today, is a very important vote as 
to how the administration and how Secretary Powell will approach the 
United Nations and multilateralisism. We cast a great many votes in 
this body but relatively few are really important votes. This is an 
important vote.
  That is why I believe the validity of treating this as a loan is 
solid on the narrow focus for the $20 billion as a loan, but on the 
broader picture of the strategy which the President is trying to carry 
forward, I am prepared today to defer to him on this and to vote for a 
grant instead of a loan.

[[Page S12643]]

  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, the Senator from Pennsylvania is still on 
the floor, and I wonder how long he wishes to speak on the bill. 
Senator Byrd is here.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Nevada for his inquiry.
  During the course of my remarks, I abbreviated them and cut them 
short. As I have said to the Senator, I do not appear very often to ask 
for time. I see Senator Byrd approaching.
  In response to the Senator from Nevada, there was one other line of 
contention which I had intended to make. I can make it in a moment or 
two.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania 4 
minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. That will do it. When the Senator says a minute or 2--my 
remarks are easily in excess of 4 minutes but I can limit them to 4 
minutes.
  The other consideration which I had intended to offer in the course 
of the remarks I have just made, in a broader focus beyond the confines 
of the $20 billion debt, is the issue of what is happening day in and 
day out in Iraq where we are spending, it is estimated, some $4 billion 
a month and we are sustaining casualties and fatalities which are very 
devastating for our country, the men and women in the armed services 
who are being wounded, suffering fatalities, their relatives and 
friends.
  If we move ahead with greater speed, which we will be able to do on a 
grant instead of a loan, it may well be that we can cut down the time 
we will be in Iraq, that it will facilitate the starting of electricity 
and the infrastructure of Iraq so we can move out and allow the Iraqi 
Government to take over. With the very heavy costs in casualties, 
fatalities and dollars, the speed that these grants can help is another 
factor in consideration so that on the totality of the matter in the 
broader picture, I am prepared to defer to the President's judgment on 
this matter, on this vote.
  The issue has created enough focus so that the administration will 
know when the additional funding is to be undertaken that there will be 
a very strong sentiment in the Congress that Iraqi resources ought to 
pay for the rebuilding of Iraq and that this decision to have grants 
instead of loans will further support the good faith and bona fides of 
the United States that we have not gone into Iraq for their oil but 
have gone into Iraq to liberate the Iraqi people from the despotism of 
Saddam Hussein and to build a democracy in that country.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I yield back our time for morning business 
so we can get to the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back.

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