[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 144 (Wednesday, October 15, 2003)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12623-S12624]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S12623]]
    SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 73--EXPRESSING THE DEEP CONCERN OF 
   CONGRESS REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO 
    ADHERE TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE 
   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE ENGAGEMENT BY IRAN IN 
    ACTIVITIES THAT APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. Kyl) submitted the following 
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations:

                            S. Con. Res. 73

       Whereas environmental sampling by the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility 
     revealed the presence of 2 types of highly enriched uranium 
     that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;
       Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by 
     the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric 
     Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting 
     to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;
       Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the IAEA announced 
     that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a 
     key component of advanced nuclear weapons;
       Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
     5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
       Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of 
     the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government 
     of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its 
     nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential 
     to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in 
     contravention of its obligations under the safeguards 
     agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a 
     resolution on September 12, 2003, that calls on Iran to 
     provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material 
     and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to 
     grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, 
     to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of 
     the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, 
     to provide complete information regarding the conduct of 
     uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other 
     information and explanations and take such other steps as the 
     IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all 
     outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and 
     nuclear activities;
       Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of 
     the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking 
     to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile;
       Whereas the construction by Iran of nuclear facilities, 
     coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, constitutes a 
     threat to international peace and security; and
       Whereas, by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
     signatories such as Iran that are not declared nuclear powers 
     commit themselves to abstaining from the acquisition of 
     nuclear weapons, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
     weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful 
     uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament: 
     Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That Congress--
       (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons 
     program and the failure of the Government of Iran to report 
     material, facilities, and activities to the International 
     Atomic Energy Commission in contravention of its obligations 
     under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with 
     the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done 
     at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered 
     into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution 
     referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'');
       (2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as 
     delivered in testimony to the U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary 
     Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary 
     of State for Verification and Compliance that the 
     explanations provided by the Government of Iran for its 
     nuclear activities are not credible;
       (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
     of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
     Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments 
     that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
       (4) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to 
     prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
       (A) urging the Government of Iran to accept in full the 
     resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 
     (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``IAEA 
     resolution''), that calls on Iran to--
       (i) provide the Agency a full declaration of all imported 
     material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment 
     program;
       (ii) grant unrestricted access, including environmental 
     sampling, to the Agency;
       (iii) resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the 
     Agency experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country;
       (iv) provide complete information regarding the conduct of 
     uranium conversion experiments; and
       (v) provide such other information and explanations and 
     take such other steps as the Agency determines necessary to 
     resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving 
     Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities;
       (B) taking such diplomatic measures as are necessary to 
     encourage other nations, especially Russia, to urge the 
     Government of Iran to fully and immediately comply with the 
     such resolution; and
       (C) working with the United Nations and other nations to 
     urge the Government of Iran to sign the Model Additional 
     Protocol to give the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     greater access in Iran to ensure that--
       (i) no undeclared facilities exist in Iran; and
       (ii) no materials or technologies have been diverted from 
     safeguarded facilities in Iran;
       (5) calls on Russia to--
       (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to accept in 
     full the IAEA resolution; and
       (B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran 
     fully and completely complies with the IAEA resolution;
       (6) calls on member states of the United Nations to join 
     the United States in preventing the Government of Iran from 
     continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that 
     could be used in a nuclear weapons program;
       (7) calls on the United Nations Security Council to 
     immediately undertake consideration of--
       (A) the threat to international peace and security posed by 
     Iran's nuclear weapons program; and
       (B) the passage of a Security Council resolution or the 
     taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose 
     diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to 
     meet its obligations to the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency by October 31, 2003; and
       (8) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts to 
     acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities until it is able to 
     provide specific assurances that it is not engaged in a 
     clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
       (A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its 
     obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt 
     and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional 
     Protocol; and
       (B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today with my good friend and 
colleague Senator Kyl, to introduce a resolution to express deep 
concern about Iran's nuclear program. The time has come for the 
international community to speak with one voice and urge Iran to 
abandon its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.
  With the fall of the Hussein regime in Iraq, attention has turned to 
the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the recent 
revelations about its nuclear program. I am increasingly concerned that 
Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons and substantially alter 
the balance of power in the Middle East.
  In December 2002, Iran admitted that--in addition to the known 
construction of a light water reactor complex in Bushehr with Russian 
assistance--it is building two facilities that could be used to develop 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment facility at 
Nantanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.
  According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Nantanz large-scale commercial plant, scheduled for completion in 2005, 
``could produce approximately 400 to 500 kilograms of weapon-grade 
material annually, or enough for 15 to 20 nuclear weapons a year.'' The 
Arak facility, scheduled to begin in 2004, ``could produce between 8 
and 10 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for one or two nuclear 
weapons a year.''
  The revelations are serious and deeply troubling.
  As Professor Gary Mihlhollin testified before the U.S.-Israel Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 2003: ``Adding an Iranian 
nuclear weapon capability runs the risk of joining terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction--a combination that our government 
considers the greatest security challenge of the 21st century.''
  Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons demands the full attention of the 
United States and the international community, and a concerted and 
clear response to bring Iran into compliance with its obligations under 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

[[Page S12624]]

  Iran's assertion that its nuclear program is peaceful and is aimed at 
producing 6,000 megawatts of electricity is highly dubious given the 
efforts to conceal construction of the Nantanz and Arak facilities and 
its plentiful supplies of oil and gas reserves. In her testimony before 
the U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Verification and Compliance, Paula A. DeSutter agreed and 
stated: ``Iran's attempts to explain why it needs an indigenous nuclear 
fuel cycle are simply not credible.''
  In fact, United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspectors have found traces of highly enriched, weapons grade uranium 
on Iranian nuclear equipment at two sites.
  I am pleased that the IAEA Board of Governor's passed resolution last 
week setting a deadline of October 31 for Iran to come clean about its 
nuclear program. As IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming stated:

       What the IAEA inspectors need is accelerated cooperation, 
     full transparency on the part of Iran, so that we can clear 
     up these questions in a matter of weeks, and not months and 
     months.

  Talks have begun between the IAEA and Iranian authorities about 
Iran's nuclear program and the October 31 deadline. Our resolution 
supports the IAEA efforts to bring Iran into compliance with its 
international obligations. Among other things, it: deplores the Islamic 
Republic of Iran's development of a nuclear weapons program and for its 
failures to report material, facilities, and activities to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency as it is obligated to do pursuant to 
its safeguards agreement; concurs with the conclusion reached in the 
U.S. Department of State's Annual Noncompliance Report that Iran is 
pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons; calls on the President 
of the United States to urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to accept in 
full the International Atomic Energy Agency's September 12, 2003 
resolution; calls on member states of the United Nations to join the 
United States in preventing the Islamic Republic of Iran from 
continuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities that could be 
used in a nuclear weapons program; and calls on the United Nations 
Security Council to immediately undertake consideration of the threat 
to international peace and security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons 
program as well as such action as may be necessary, including a 
Security Council resolution, that would impose diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against Iran should Iran fail to live up to its obligations 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency by October 31, 2003.
  In addition, its calls on the Government of Iran to: to come into 
verifiable compliance with its obligations under the September 12, 2003 
resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency; to come into 
verifiable compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and to immediately sign the Model 
Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which 
would allow inspectors freer access to nuclear sites.
  The international community must stand together to put pressure on 
Tehran to live up to its commitments and, in particular, sign the 
additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to permit 
snap, short-notice inspections of Iran's declared and undeclared 
nuclear facilities.
  I, for one, had been hopeful that Iran in recent years had begun to 
take the necessary steps to rejoin international community. The 
election of President Mohammad Katemi in May, 1997 appeared to be a 
vote for moderation and engagement with the outside world.
  Yet, the clandestine nuclear weapons program, the continued support 
for terror, the numerous human rights abuses against religious 
minorities including Iranian Jews, the suppression of the student lead 
pro-democracy movement, and the continued uncompromising influence of 
the unelected hardliners in the Council of Guardians and the military 
lead me to conclude that we still have a long ways to go before we see 
a peaceful, stable, democratic Iran.
  I firmly believe that the Iranian people desire to see their country 
break its ties with the past and commit itself to a future based on 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
  If they are to realize that dream, the United States must work 
closely with our friend and allies in the international community to 
put pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program, cease its 
support for terror, and become a positive force for change in the 
Middle East. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.

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