[Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 30, 2003)]
[House]
[Pages H8991-H8996]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 3, PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT OF 2003

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER submitted the following conference report and 
statement on the bill (S. 3) to prohibit the procedure commonly known 
as partial-birth abortion:

                  Conference Report (H. Rept. 108-288)

       The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 3), 
     to prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth 
     abortion, having met, after full and free conference, have 
     agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective 
     Houses as follows:
       That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the 
     amendment of the House and agree to the same with an 
     amendment as follows:
       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House 
     amendment, insert the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
     Act of 2003''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds and declares the following:
       (1) A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the 
     practice of performing a partial-birth abortion--an abortion 
     in which a physician deliberately and intentionally vaginally 
     delivers a living, unborn child's body until either the 
     entire baby's head is outside the body of the mother, or any 
     part of the baby's trunk past the navel is outside the body 
     of the mother and only the head remains inside the womb, for 
     the purpose of performing an overt act (usually the 
     puncturing of the back of the child's skull and removing the 
     baby's brains) that the person knows will kill the partially 
     delivered infant, performs this act, and then completes 
     delivery of the dead infant--is a gruesome and inhumane 
     procedure that is never medically necessary and should be 
     prohibited.
       (2) Rather than being an abortion procedure that is 
     embraced by the medical community, particularly among 
     physicians who routinely perform other abortion procedures, 
     partial-birth abortion remains a disfavored procedure that is 
     not only unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, 
     but in fact poses serious risks to the long-term health of 
     women and in some circumstances, their lives. As a result, at 
     least 27 States banned the procedure as did the United States 
     Congress which voted to ban the procedure during the 104th, 
     105th, and 106th Congresses.
       (3) In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000), the 
     United States Supreme Court opined ``that significant medical 
     authority supports the proposition that in some 
     circumstances, [partial birth abortion] would be the safest 
     procedure'' for pregnant women who wish to undergo an 
     abortion. Thus, the Court struck down the State of Nebraska's 
     ban on partial-birth abortion procedures, concluding that it 
     placed an ``undue burden'' on women seeking abortions because 
     it failed to include an exception for partial-birth abortions 
     deemed necessary to preserve the ``health'' of the mother.
       (4) In reaching this conclusion, the Court deferred to the 
     Federal district court's factual findings that the partial-
     birth abortion procedure was statistically and medically as 
     safe as, and in many circumstances safer than, alternative 
     abortion procedures.
       (5) However, substantial evidence presented at the Stenberg 
     trial and overwhelming evidence presented and compiled at 
     extensive Congressional hearings, much of which was compiled 
     after the district court hearing in Stenberg, and thus not 
     included in the Stenberg trial record, demonstrates that a 
     partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the 
     health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman 
     upon whom the procedure is performed and is outside the 
     standard of medical care.
       (6) Despite the dearth of evidence in the Stenberg trial 
     court record supporting the district court's findings, the 
     United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the 
     Supreme Court refused to set aside the district court's 
     factual findings because, under the applicable standard of 
     appellate review, they were not ``clearly erroneous''. A 
     finding of fact is clearly erroneous ``when although there is 
     evidence to

[[Page H8992]]

     support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
     left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
     been committed''. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North 
     Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Under this standard, ``if 
     the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in 
     light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of 
     appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it 
     been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 
     evidence differently''. Id. at 574.
       (7) Thus, in Stenberg, the United States Supreme Court was 
     required to accept the very questionable findings issued by 
     the district court judge--the effect of which was to render 
     null and void the reasoned factual findings and policy 
     determinations of the United States Congress and at least 27 
     State legislatures.
       (8) However, under well-settled Supreme Court 
     jurisprudence, the United States Congress is not bound to 
     accept the same factual findings that the Supreme Court was 
     bound to accept in Stenberg under the ``clearly erroneous'' 
     standard. Rather, the United States Congress is entitled to 
     reach its own factual findings--findings that the Supreme 
     Court accords great deference--and to enact legislation based 
     upon these findings so long as it seeks to pursue a 
     legitimate interest that is within the scope of the 
     Constitution, and draws reasonable inferences based upon 
     substantial evidence.
       (9) In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the 
     Supreme Court articulated its highly deferential review of 
     Congressional factual findings when it addressed the 
     constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act 
     of 1965. Regarding Congress' factual determination that 
     section 4(e) would assist the Puerto Rican community in 
     ``gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public 
     services,'' the Court stated that ``[i]t was for Congress, 
     as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh 
     the various conflicting considerations * * *. It is not 
     for us to review the congressional resolution of these 
     factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis 
     upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it 
     did. There plainly was such a basis to support section 
     4(e) in the application in question in this case.''. Id. 
     at 653.
       (10) Katzenbach's highly deferential review of Congress' 
     factual conclusions was relied upon by the United States 
     District Court for the District of Columbia when it upheld 
     the ``bail-out'' provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
     (42 U.S.C. 1973c), stating that ``congressional fact finding, 
     to which we are inclined to pay great deference, strengthens 
     the inference that, in those jurisdictions covered by the 
     Act, state actions discriminatory in effect are 
     discriminatory in purpose''. City of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 
     472 F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979) aff'd City of Rome, Georgia v. 
     U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
       (11) The Court continued its practice of deferring to 
     congressional factual findings in reviewing the 
     constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the Cable 
     Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. 
     See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
     Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and 
     Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
     Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). At issue in the 
     Turner cases was Congress' legislative finding that, absent 
     mandatory carriage rules, the continued viability of local 
     broadcast television would be ``seriously jeopardized''. The 
     Turner I Court recognized that as an institution, ``Congress 
     is far better equipped than the judiciary to `amass and 
     evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as 
     complex and dynamic as that presented here''. 512 U.S. at 
     665-66. Although the Court recognized that ``the deference 
     afforded to legislative findings does `not foreclose our 
     independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of 
     constitutional law,' '' its ``obligation to exercise 
     independent judgment when First Amendment rights are 
     implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, 
     or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own. 
     Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
     Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
     evidence.'' Id. at 666.
       (12) Three years later in Turner II, the Court upheld the 
     ``must-carry'' provisions based upon Congress' findings, 
     stating the Court's ``sole obligation is `to assure that, in 
     formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable 
     inferences based on substantial evidence.' '' 520 U.S. at 
     195. Citing its ruling in Turner I, the Court reiterated that 
     ``[w]e owe Congress' findings deference in part because the 
     institution `is far better equipped than the judiciary to 
     ``amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data'' bearing upon' 
     legislative questions,'' id. at 195, and added that it 
     ``owe[d] Congress' findings an additional measure of 
     deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the 
     legislative power.'' Id. at 196.
       (13) There exists substantial record evidence upon which 
     Congress has reached its conclusion that a ban on partial-
     birth abortion is not required to contain a ``health'' 
     exception, because the facts indicate that a partial-birth 
     abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a 
     woman, poses serious risks to a woman's health, and lies 
     outside the standard of medical care. Congress was informed 
     by extensive hearings held during the 104th, 105th, 107th, 
     and 108th Congresses and passed a ban on partial-birth 
     abortion in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses. These 
     findings reflect the very informed judgment of the Congress 
     that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve 
     the health of a woman, poses serious risks to a woman's 
     health, and lies outside the standard of medical care, and 
     should, therefore, be banned.
       (14) Pursuant to the testimony received during extensive 
     legislative hearings during the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 
     108th Congresses, Congress finds and declares that:
       (A) Partial-birth abortion poses serious risks to the 
     health of a woman undergoing the procedure. Those risks 
     include, among other things: an increase in a woman's risk of 
     suffering from cervical incompetence, a result of cervical 
     dilation making it difficult or impossible for a woman to 
     successfully carry a subsequent pregnancy to term; an 
     increased risk of uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid 
     embolus, and trauma to the uterus as a result of converting 
     the child to a footling breech position, a procedure 
     which, according to a leading obstetrics textbook, ``there 
     are very few, if any, indications for * * * other than for 
     delivery of a second twin''; and a risk of lacerations and 
     secondary hemorrhaging due to the doctor blindly forcing a 
     sharp instrument into the base of the unborn child's skull 
     while he or she is lodged in the birth canal, an act which 
     could result in severe bleeding, brings with it the threat 
     of shock, and could ultimately result in maternal death.
       (B) There is no credible medical evidence that partial-
     birth abortions are safe or are safer than other abortion 
     procedures. No controlled studies of partial-birth abortions 
     have been conducted nor have any comparative studies been 
     conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy compared to 
     other abortion methods. Furthermore, there have been no 
     articles published in peer-reviewed journals that establish 
     that partial-birth abortions are superior in any way to 
     established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike other more 
     commonly used abortion procedures, there are currently no 
     medical schools that provide instruction on abortions that 
     include the instruction in partial-birth abortions in their 
     curriculum.
       (C) A prominent medical association has concluded that 
     partial-birth abortion is ``not an accepted medical 
     practice'', that it has ``never been subject to even a 
     minimal amount of the normal medical practice development,'' 
     that ``the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
     procedure in specific circumstances remain unknown,'' and 
     that ``there is no consensus among obstetricians about its 
     use''. The association has further noted that partial-birth 
     abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical experts and 
     the public, is ``ethically wrong,'' and ``is never the only 
     appropriate procedure''.
       (D) Neither the plaintiff in Stenberg v. Carhart, nor the 
     experts who testified on his behalf, have identified a single 
     circumstance during which a partial-birth abortion was 
     necessary to preserve the health of a woman.
       (E) The physician credited with developing the partial-
     birth abortion procedure has testified that he has never 
     encountered a situation where a partial-birth abortion was 
     medically necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, thus, 
     is never medically necessary to preserve the health of a 
     woman.
       (F) A ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure will 
     therefore advance the health interests of pregnant women 
     seeking to terminate a pregnancy.
       (G) In light of this overwhelming evidence, Congress and 
     the States have a compelling interest in prohibiting partial-
     birth abortions. In addition to promoting maternal health, 
     such a prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly 
     distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that preserves the 
     integrity of the medical profession, and promotes respect for 
     human life.
       (H) Based upon Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned 
     Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), a governmental 
     interest in protecting the life of a child during the 
     delivery process arises by virtue of the fact that during a 
     partial-birth abortion, labor is induced and the birth 
     process has begun. This distinction was recognized in Roe 
     when the Court noted, without comment, that the Texas 
     parturition statute, which prohibited one from killing a 
     child ``in a state of being born and before actual birth,'' 
     was not under attack. This interest becomes compelling as the 
     child emerges from the maternal body. A child that is 
     completely born is a full, legal person entitled to 
     constitutional protections afforded a ``person'' under the 
     United States Constitution. Partial-birth abortions involve 
     the killing of a child that is in the process, in fact mere 
     inches away from, becoming a ``person''. Thus, the government 
     has a heightened interest in protecting the life of the 
     partially-born child.
       (I) This, too, has not gone unnoticed in the medical 
     community, where a prominent medical association has 
     recognized that partial-birth abortions are ``ethically 
     different from other destructive abortion techniques because 
     the fetus, normally twenty weeks or longer in gestation, is 
     killed outside of the womb''. According to this medical 
     association, the `` `partial birth' gives the fetus an 
     autonomy which separates it from the right of the woman to 
     choose treatments for her own body''.
       (J) Partial-birth abortion also confuses the medical, 
     legal, and ethical duties of physicians to preserve and 
     promote life, as the physician acts directly against the 
     physical life of a child, whom he or she had just delivered, 
     all but the head, out of the womb, in order to end that life. 
     Partial-birth abortion thus appropriates the terminology and 
     techniques used by obstetricians in the delivery of living 
     children--obstetricians who preserve and protect the life of 
     the mother and the child--and instead uses those techniques 
     to end the life of the partially-born child.
       (K) Thus, by aborting a child in the manner that 
     purposefully seeks to kill the child after he or she has 
     begun the process of birth, partial-birth abortion undermines 
     the public's perception of the appropriate role of a 
     physician during the delivery process, and perverts a process 
     during which life is brought into the world, in order to 
     destroy a partially-born child.
       (L) The gruesome and inhumane nature of the partial-birth 
     abortion procedure and its disturbing similarity to the 
     killing of a newborn infant promotes a complete disregard for 
     infant human life that can only be countered by a prohibition 
     of the procedure.

[[Page H8993]]

       (M) The vast majority of babies killed during partial-birth 
     abortions are alive until the end of the procedure. It is a 
     medical fact, however, that unborn infants at this stage can 
     feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their 
     perception of this pain is even more intense than that of 
     newborn infants and older children when subjected to the same 
     stimuli. Thus, during a partial-birth abortion procedure, the 
     child will fully experience the pain associated with piercing 
     his or her skull and sucking out his or her brain.
       (N) Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane 
     procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen 
     society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all 
     vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly 
     difficult to protect such life. Thus, Congress has a 
     compelling interest in acting--indeed it must act--to 
     prohibit this inhumane procedure.
       (O) For these reasons, Congress finds that partial-birth 
     abortion is never medically indicated to preserve the health 
     of the mother; is in fact unrecognized as a valid abortion 
     procedure by the mainstream medical community; poses 
     additional health risks to the mother; blurs the line between 
     abortion and infanticide in the killing of a partially-born 
     child just inches from birth; and confuses the role of the 
     physician in childbirth and should, therefore, be banned.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by inserting after chapter 73 the following:

                 ``CHAPTER 74--PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS

``Sec.
``1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited.

     ``Sec. 1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited

       ``(a) Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or 
     foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion 
     and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this 
     title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. This 
     subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is 
     necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is 
     endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or 
     physical injury, including a life-endangering physical 
     condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 
     This subsection takes effect 1 day after the enactment.
       ``(b) As used in this section--
       ``(1) the term `partial-birth abortion' means an abortion 
     in which the person performing the abortion--
       ``(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a 
     living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, 
     the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, 
     in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal 
     trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for 
     the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows 
     will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and
       ``(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of 
     delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus; 
     and
       ``(2) the term `physician' means a doctor of medicine or 
     osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine and 
     surgery by the State in which the doctor performs such 
     activity, or any other individual legally authorized by the 
     State to perform abortions: Provided, however, That any 
     individual who is not a physician or not otherwise legally 
     authorized by the State to perform abortions, but who 
     nevertheless directly performs a partial-birth abortion, 
     shall be subject to the provisions of this section.
       ``(c)(1) The father, if married to the mother at the time 
     she receives a partial-birth abortion procedure, and if the 
     mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time of 
     the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus, may in 
     a civil action obtain appropriate relief, unless the 
     pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct or 
     the plaintiff consented to the abortion.
       ``(2) Such relief shall include--
       ``(A) money damages for all injuries, psychological and 
     physical, occasioned by the violation of this section; and
       ``(B) statutory damages equal to three times the cost of 
     the partial-birth abortion.
       ``(d)(1) A defendant accused of an offense under this 
     section may seek a hearing before the State Medical Board on 
     whether the physician's conduct was necessary to save the 
     life of the mother whose life was endangered by a physical 
     disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a 
     life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from 
     the pregnancy itself.
       ``(2) The findings on that issue are admissible on that 
     issue at the trial of the defendant. Upon a motion of the 
     defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial 
     for not more than 30 days to permit such a hearing to take 
     place.
       ``(e) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is 
     performed may not be prosecuted under this section, for a 
     conspiracy to violate this section, or for an offense under 
     section 2, 3, or 4 of this title based on a violation of this 
     section.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to chapter 73 the following new item:
``74. Partial-birth abortions...................................1531''.
       And the House agree to the same.

     F. James Sensenbrenner,
     Henry Hyde,
     Steve Chabot,
                                Managers on the Part of the House.

     Orrin Hatch,
     Rick Santorum,
     Mike DeWine,
                               Managers on the Part of the Senate.

       JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

       The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the 
     conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the 
     amendment of the House to the bill (S. 3), to prohibit the 
     procedure commonly known as partial-birth abortion, submit 
     the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in 
     explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the 
     managers and recommended in the accompanying conference 
     report:
       The House amendment struck all the Senate bill after the 
     enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
       The Senate recedes from its disagreement to the amendment 
     of the House with an amendment that is a substitue for the 
     Senate bill and the House amendment. The differences between 
     the Senate bill, the House amendment, and the substitute 
     agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical 
     corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements 
     reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying 
     changes.
     Section 1. Short title
       Section 1 of the conference report is identical to Section 
     1 of the House amendment and Section 1 of the Senate bill. 
     Section 1 states that the short title of this measure is the 
     ``Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.''
     Section 2. Findings
       Paragraph (1) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     substantially similar, with clarifications, to paragraph (1) 
     in Section 2 of the House passed bill and paragraph (1) in 
     Section 2 of the Senate passed bill. In paragraph (1) 
     Congress finds that a moral, medical, and ethical consensus 
     exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth 
     abortion--an abortion in which a physician deliberately and 
     intentionally vaginally delivers a living, unborn child's 
     body until either the entire baby's head is outside the body 
     of the mother, or, any part of the baby's trunk past the 
     navel is outside the body of the mother and only the head 
     remains inside the womb, for the purpose of performing an 
     overt act (usually the puncturing of the back of the child's 
     skull and removing the child's brains) that the person knows 
     will kill the partially delivered living infant, performs 
     this act, and then completes delivery of the dead infant--is 
     a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically 
     necessary and should be prohibited.
       Paragraph (2) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (2) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (2) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (2), Congress finds that rather than being an 
     abortion procedure that is embraced by the medical community, 
     particularly among physicians who routinely perform other 
     abortion procedures, partial-birth abortion remains a 
     disfavored procedure that is not only unnecessary to preserve 
     the health of the mother, but in fact poses serious risks to 
     the long-term health of women and in some circumstances, 
     their lives. Congress also finds that as a result, at least 
     27 States banned the procedure as did the United States 
     Congress which voted to ban the procedure during the 104th, 
     105th, and 106th Congresses.
       Paragraph (3) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (3) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (3) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (3), Congress finds that in Stenberg v. Carhart, 
     530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000), the United States Supreme Court, 
     which did not have in front of it the extensive factual 
     record compiled by Congress, construed the record in that 
     case to support ``the proposition that in some circumstances, 
     [partial-birth abortion] would be the safest procedure'' for 
     pregnant women who wish to undergo an abortion. Congress also 
     finds that as a result of having reached this conclusion the 
     Court struck down the State of Nebraska's ban on partial-
     birth abortion procedures, concluding that it failed to 
     include an exception for partial-birth abortions deemed 
     necessary to preserve the ``health'' of the mother, and 
     placed an ``undue burden'' on women seeking abortions.
       Paragraph (4) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (4) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (4) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (4), Congress finds that the Court's decision 
     was based on the Federal district court's factual findings 
     that the partial-birth abortion procedure was 
     statistically and medically as safe as, and in many 
     circumstances safer than, alternative abortion 
     procedures--findings which are contradicted by Congress's 
     extensive factual record presented and compiled during the 
     104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses.
       Paragraph (5) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     substantially similar, with clarifications, to paragraph (5) 
     in Section 2 of the House passed bill and paragraph (5) in 
     Section 2 of the Senate passed bill. In paragraph (5) 
     Congress finds that substantial evidence presented at the 
     Stenberg trial, and the overwhelming evidence that was 
     presented and compiled at extensive Congressional hearings, 
     much of which was compiled after the district court hearing 
     in Stenberg, and thus not included in the Stenberg trial 
     record, demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion is never 
     necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses 
     significant health risks to a woman upon whom the procedure 
     is performed, and is outside of the standard of medical care.

[[Page H8994]]

       Paragraph (6) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (6) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (6) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (6), Congress finds that despite the dearth of 
     evidence in the Stenberg trial court record supporting the 
     district court's findings, the United States Court of Appeals 
     for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court refused to set 
     aside the district court's factual findings because, under 
     the applicable standard of appellate review, they were not 
     ``clearly erroneous.'' Congress also finds that a finding of 
     fact is clearly erroneous ``when although there is evidence 
     to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
     left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
     been committed'' Anderson v. City of Bessemer, North 
     Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Congress also finds that 
     under this standard, ``if the district court's account of the 
     evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
     entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though 
     convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it 
     would have weighed the evidence differently.'' Id. at 574.
       Paragraph (7) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (7) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (7) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (7), Congress finds that in Stenberg, the United 
     States Supreme Court was required to accept the very 
     questionable findings issued by the district court judge--the 
     effect of which was to render null and void the reasoned 
     factual findings and policy determinations of the United 
     States Congress and at least 27 State legislatures.
       Paragraph (8) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (8) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (8) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (8), Congress finds that under well-settled 
     Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is not bound to accept the 
     same factual findings that the Supreme Court was bound to 
     accept in Stenberg under the ``clearly erroneous'' standard. 
     Congress also finds that it is entitled to reach its own 
     factual findings--findings that the Supreme Court accords 
     great deference--and to enact legislation based upon these 
     findings so long as it seeks to pursue a legitimate interest 
     that is within the scope of the Constitution, and draws 
     reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence.
       Paragraph (9) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (9) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (9) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (9), Congress finds that in Katzenbach v. 
     Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Supreme Court articulated 
     its highly deferential review of Congressional factual 
     findings when it addressed the constitutionality of section 
     4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Regarding Congress' 
     factual determination that section 4(e) would assist the 
     Puerto Rican community in ``gaining nondiscriminatory 
     treatment in public services,'' the Court stated that ``[i]t 
     was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to 
     assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations. * * 
     * It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of 
     these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a 
     basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as 
     it did. There plainly was such a basis to support section 
     4(e) in the application in question in this case.'' Id. at 
     653.
       Paragraph (10) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     substantively identical, with technical clarifications, to 
     paragraph (10) in Section 2 of the House amendment and 
     paragraph (10) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. In paragraph 
     (10), Congress finds that Katzenbach's highly deferential 
     review of Congress's factual conclusions was relied upon by 
     the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
     when it upheld the ``bail-out'' provisions of the Voting 
     Rights Act of 1965, (42 U.S.C. 1973c), stating that 
     ``congressional fact finding, to which we are inclined to pay 
     great deference, strengthens the inference that, in those 
     jurisdictions covered by the Act, state actions 
     discriminatory in effect are discriminatory in purpose.'' 
     City of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 472 F. Supp. 221 (D. D.C. 
     1979), affd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
       Paragraph (11) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (11) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (11) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. 
     In paragraph (11), Congress finds that the Court continued 
     its practice of deferring to congressional factual findings 
     in reviewing the constitutionality of the must-carry 
     provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
     Competition Act of 1992. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
     v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 
     (Turner I) and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
     Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). 
     Congress finds that at issue in the Turner cases was 
     Congress' legislative finding that, absent mandatory carriage 
     rules, the continued viability of local broadcast television 
     would be ``seriously jeopardized.'' Congress finds that the 
     Turner I Court recognized that as an institution, ``Congress 
     is far better equipped than the judiciary to `amass and 
     evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as 
     complex and dynamic as that presented here.'' 512 U.S. at 
     665-66. Although the Court recognized that ``the deference 
     afforded to legislative findings does `not foreclose our 
     independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of 
     constitutional law,' '' its ``obligation to exercise 
     independent judgment when First Amendment rights are 
     implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, 
     or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own. 
     Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
     Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
     evidence.'' Id. at 666.
       Paragraph (12) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (12) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (12) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (12), Congress finds that three years 
     later in Turner II, the Court upheld the ``must-carry'' 
     provisions based upon Congress' findings, stating the 
     Court's ``sole obligation is `to assure that, in 
     formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable 
     inferences based on substantial evidence.' '' 520 U.S. at 
     195. Congress finds that, citing its ruling in Turner I, 
     the Court reiterated that ``[w]e owe Congress' findings 
     deference in part because the institution `is far better 
     equipped than the judiciary to ``amass and evaluate the 
     vast amounts of data'' bearing upon' legislative 
     questions,'' Id. at 195, and added that it ``owe[d] 
     Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out 
     of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative 
     power.'' Id. at 196.
       Paragraph (13) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     substantively identical, with technical clarifications, to 
     paragraph (13) in Section 2 of the House amendment and 
     paragraph (13) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. In paragraph 
     (13), Congress finds that there exists substantial record 
     evidence upon which Congress has reached its conclusion that 
     a ban on partial-birth abortion is not required to contain a 
     ``health'' exception, because the facts demonstrate that a 
     partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the 
     health of a woman, poses serious risks to a woman's health, 
     and lies outside the standard of medical care. Congress also 
     finds that it has been informed by extensive hearings held 
     during the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses and 
     passed a ban on partial-birth abortion in the 104th, 105th, 
     and 106th Congresses. Congress finds that these findings 
     reflect its very informed judgment that a partial-birth 
     abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a 
     woman, poses serious risks to a woman's health, and lies 
     outside the standard of medical care, and should, therefore, 
     be banned.
       Paragraph (14) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     substantively identical, with technical clarifications, to 
     paragraph (14) in Section 2 of the House amendment and 
     paragraph (14) in Section 2 of the Senate bill. In paragraph 
     (14), Congress, pursuant to the substantial and credible 
     testimony received during extensive legislative hearings 
     during the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses, lists 
     its declarations regarding the partial-birth abortion 
     procedure:
       Paragraph (14)(A) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(A) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(A) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(A), Congress declares that a partial-
     birth abortion poses serious risks to the health of a woman 
     undergoing the procedure. Those risks include, among other 
     things: an increase in a woman's risk of suffering from 
     cervical incompetence, a result of cervical dilation making 
     it difficult or impossible for a woman to successfully carry 
     a subsequent pregnancy to term; an increased risk of uterine 
     rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embolus, and trauma to the 
     uterus as a result of converting the child to a footling 
     breech position, a procedure which, according to a leading 
     obstetrics textbook, ``there are very few, if any, 
     indications for * * * other than for delivery of a second 
     twin''; and a risk of lacerations and secondary hemorrhaging 
     due to the doctor blindly forcing a sharp instrument into the 
     base of the unborn child's skull while he or she is lodged in 
     the birth canal, an act which could result in severe 
     bleeding, brings with it the threat of shock, and could 
     ultimately result in maternal death. Therefore, Congress 
     concludes that those who express the view that partial-birth 
     abortion may be a safer method of abortion in some 
     circumstances have never examined the severe risks of the 
     procedure to the health of the mother and have not 
     demonstrated that this procedure is a safe, medically 
     accepted, standard of care.
       Paragraph (14)(B) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(B) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(B) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(B), Congress declares that there is 
     no credible medical evidence that partial-birth abortions are 
     safe or are safer than other abortion procedures. Congress 
     also declares that no controlled studies of partial-birth 
     abortions have been conducted nor have any comparative 
     studies been conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy 
     compared to other abortion methods. Congress further declares 
     that there have been no articles published in peer-reviewed 
     journals that establish that partial-birth abortions are 
     superior in any way to established abortion procedures. 
     Congress also declares that unlike other more commonly used 
     abortion procedures, there are currently no medical schools 
     that provide instruction on abortions that include the 
     instruction in partial-birth abortions in their curriculum.
       Paragraph (14)(C) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(C) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(C) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(C), Congress declares that a 
     prominent medical association has concluded that partial-
     birth abortion is ``not an accepted medical practice,'' that 
     it

[[Page H8995]]

     has ``never been subject to even a minimal amount of the 
     normal medical practice development,'' that ``the relative 
     advantages and disadvantages of the procedure in specific 
     circumstances remain unknown,'' and that ``there is no 
     consensus among obstetricians about its use.'' The 
     association has further noted that partial-birth abortion is 
     broadly disfavored by both medical experts and the public, is 
     ``ethically wrong,'' and ``is never the only appropriate 
     procedure.''
       Paragraph (14)(D) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(D) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(D) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(D), Congress declares that those who 
     espouse the view that partial-birth abortion ``may'' be the 
     most appropriate abortion procedure for some women in 
     ``some'' circumstances, such as the plaintiff in Stenberg v. 
     Carhart and the experts who testified on his behalf, have 
     failed to identify such circumstances and base their opinion 
     on theoretical speculation, not actual evidence that 
     demonstrates the relative safety of this abortion procedure.
       Paragraph (14)(E) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(E) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(E) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(E), Congress declares that the 
     physician credited with developing the partial-birth abortion 
     procedure has testified that he has never encountered a 
     situation where a partial-birth abortion was medically 
     necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, thus, is never 
     medically necessary to preserve the health of a woman.
       Paragraph (14)(F) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(F) in the House amendment and 
     paragraph (14)(F) in the Senate bill. In paragraph (14)(F), 
     Congress declares that a ban on the partial-birth abortion 
     procedure will advance the health interests of pregnant women 
     seeking to terminate a pregnancy.
       Paragraph (14)(G) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(G) in the House amendment and 
     paragraph (14)(G) in the Senate bill. In paragraph (14)(G), 
     Congress declares that in light of this overwhelming 
     evidence, Congress and the States have a compelling interest 
     in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. Congress also 
     declares that in addition to promoting maternal health, such 
     a prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly 
     distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that preserves the 
     integrity of the medical profession, and promotes respect for 
     human life.
       Paragraph (14)(H) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(H) in the House amendment and 
     (14)(H) in the Senate bill. In paragraph (14)(H), Congress 
     declares that based upon Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), 
     and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), a 
     governmental interest in protecting the life of a child 
     during the delivery process arises, in part, by virtue of the 
     fact that during a partial-birth abortion, labor is induced 
     and the birth process has begun. Congress further declares 
     that this distinction was recognized in Roe when the Court 
     noted, without comment, that the Texas parturition statute, 
     which prohibited one from killing a child ``in a state of 
     being born and before actual birth,'' was not under attack. 
     Congress declares that this interest becomes compelling as 
     the child emerges from the maternal body. Congress declares 
     that a child that is completely born is a full, legal person 
     entitled to constitutional protections afforded a ``person'' 
     under the United States Constitution. Congress declares that 
     partial-birth abortions involve the killing of a child that 
     is in the process, in fact mere inches away from, becoming a 
     ``person.'' Partial birth gives the fetus an autonomy that is 
     separate and distinct from that of the mother. Thus, the 
     government has a heightened interest in protecting the life 
     of the partially-born child.
       Paragraph (14)(I) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(I) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(I) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(I), Congress declares that the 
     distinction between a partial-birth abortion and other 
     abortion methods has been recognized by the medical 
     community, where a prominent medical association has 
     recognized that partial-birth abortions are ``ethically 
     different from other destructive abortion techniques because 
     the fetus, normally twenty weeks or longer in gestation, is 
     killed outside of the womb.'' According to this medical 
     association, the `` `partial birth' gives the fetus an 
     autonomy which separates it from the right of the woman to 
     choose treatments for her own body.''
       Paragraph (14)(J) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(J) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(J) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(J), Congress declares that a partial-
     birth abortion also confuses the medical, legal, and ethical 
     duties of physicians to preserve and promote life, as the 
     physician acts directly against the physical life of a child, 
     whom he or she had just delivered, all but the head, out of 
     the womb, in order to end that life. Congress further 
     declares that a partial-birth abortion thus appropriates the 
     terminology and techniques used by obstetricians in the 
     delivery of living children--obstetricians who preserve and 
     protect the life of the mother and the child--and instead 
     uses those techniques to end the life of the partially-born 
     child.
       Paragraph (14)(K) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(K) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(K) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(K), Congress declares that by 
     aborting a child in the manner that purposefully seeks to 
     kill the child after he or she has begun the process of 
     birth, partial-birth abortion undermines the public's 
     perception of the appropriate role of a physician during the 
     delivery process, and perverts a process during which life is 
     brought into the world, in order to destroy a partially-born 
     child.
       Paragraph (14)(L) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(L) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(L) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(L), Congress declares that the 
     gruesome and inhumane nature of the partial-birth abortion 
     procedure and its disturbing similarity to the killing of a 
     newborn infant promotes a complete disregard for infant human 
     life that can only be countered by a prohibition of the 
     procedure.
       Paragraph (14)(M) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(M) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(M) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(M), Congress declares that the vast 
     majority of babies killed during partial-birth abortions are 
     alive until the end of the procedure. Congress further 
     declares that it is a medical fact, however, that unborn 
     infants at this stage can feel pain when subjected to painful 
     stimuli and that their perception of this pain is even more 
     intense than that of newborn infants and older children when 
     subjected to the same stimuli. Evidence compiled by Congress 
     demonstrates that fetuses on whom in utero surgery is 
     performed for medical reasons feel pain from needles and 
     instruments and are provided anesthesia. Pain management is 
     an important part of care provided to infants cared for in 
     neonatal units who are of the same gestational ages as those 
     subject to partial-birth abortion. Partial-birth abortion is 
     an extremely painful procedure for the fetus and, during a 
     partial-birth abortion procedure, the child will fully 
     experience the pain associated with piercing his or her skull 
     and sucking out his or her brain.
       Paragraph (14)(N) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(N) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(N) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(N), Congress declares that 
     implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure 
     by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen 
     society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all 
     vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly 
     difficult to protect such life. Congress further declares 
     that as a result it has a compelling interest in acting--
     indeed it must act--to prohibit this inhumane procedure.
       Paragraph (14)(O) in Section 2 of the conference report is 
     identical to paragraph (14)(O) in Section 2 of the House 
     amendment and paragraph (14)(O) in Section 2 of the Senate 
     bill. In paragraph (14)(O), Congress declares that for these 
     reasons, it finds that partial-birth abortion is never 
     medically indicated to preserve the health of the mother; is 
     in fact unrecognized as a valid abortion procedure by the 
     mainstream medical community; poses additional health risks 
     to the mother; blurs the line between abortion and 
     infanticide in the killing of a partially-born child just 
     inches from birth; and confuses the role of the physician in 
     childbirth and should, therefore, be banned.
     Section 3. Prohibition on partial-birth abortions
       Subsection (a) in Section 3 of the conference report is 
     identical to subsection (a) in Section 3 of the House 
     amendment and subsection (a) in Section 3 of the Senate bill. 
     In subsection (a) of Section 3 Congress amends title 18 of 
     the United States Code by inserting a new chapter 74 
     consisting of a new 18 U.S.C. 1531:
       Subsection (a) of the new section 1531 contained in Section 
     3(a) of the conference report is identical to subsection (a) 
     of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the House 
     amendment and subsection (a) of the new section 1531 proposed 
     in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. Subsection (a) prohibits 
     any physician from, in or affecting interstate or foreign 
     commerce, knowingly performing a partial-birth abortion and 
     thereby killing a human fetus. A physician who does so shall 
     be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 
     years, or both. This paragraph does not apply to a partial-
     birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother 
     whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical 
     illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering 
     physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 
     itself. This paragraph takes effect 1 day after the 
     enactment.
       Subsection (b)(1) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is substantively 
     identical, with technical clarifications, to subsection 
     (b)(1) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of 
     the House amendment and subsection (b)(1) of the new section 
     1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. Subsection 
     (b)(1) states that a partial-birth abortion means an abortion 
     in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and 
     intentionally vaginally delivers an intact living fetus 
     until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire 
     fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case 
     of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the 
     navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of 
     performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the 
     partially delivered living fetus and the person performing 
     the abortion performs the

[[Page H8996]]

     overt act (such as the removal of the intracranial contents), 
     other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially 
     delivered intact living fetus.
       Subsection (b)(2) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is identical to 
     subsection (b)(2) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 
     3(a) of the House amendment and subsection (b)(2) of the new 
     section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (b)(2) defines the term ``physician'' as a doctor 
     of medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice 
     medicine and surgery by the State in which the doctor 
     performs such activity, or any other individual legally 
     authorized by the State to perform abortions: Provided, 
     however, that any individual who is not a physician or not 
     otherwise legally authorized by the State to perform 
     abortions, but who nevertheless directly performs a partial-
     birth abortion, shall be subject to the provisions of this 
     section.
       Subsection (c)(1) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is identical to 
     subsection (c)(1) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 
     3(a) of the House amendment and subsection (c)(1) of the new 
     section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (c)(1) provides for a civil cause of action for 
     the father, if married to the mother at the time she receives 
     a partial-birth abortion procedure, and if the mother has not 
     attained the age of 18 years at the time of the abortion, the 
     maternal grandparents of the fetus, unless the pregnancy 
     resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the 
     plaintiff consented to the abortion.
       Subsection (c)(2) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is identical to 
     subsection (c)(2) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 
     3(a) of the House amendment and paragraph (c)(2) of the new 
     section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (c)(2), in paragraph (A) provides that such relief 
     shall include money damages for all injuries, psychological 
     and physical, occasioned by the violation of this section; 
     and in paragraph (B) that statutory damages equal to three 
     times the cost of the partial-birth abortion.
       Subsection (d)(1) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is identical to 
     subsection (d)(1) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 
     3(a) of the House amendment and subsection (d)(1) of the new 
     section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (d)(1) allows a defendant accused of an offense 
     under this section to seek a hearing before the State Medical 
     Board on whether the physician's conduct was necessary to 
     save the life of the mother whose life was endangered by a 
     physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, 
     including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or 
     arising from the pregnancy itself.
       Subsection (d)(2) of the new section 1531 contained in 
     Section 3(a) of the conference report is identical to 
     subsection (d)(2) of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 
     3 (a) of the House amendment and subsection (d)(2) of the new 
     section 1531 proposed in Section 3 (a) of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (d)(2) provides that the findings on that issue 
     are admissible on that issue at the trial of the defendant. 
     It also provides that upon a motion of the defendant, the 
     court shall delay the beginning of the trial for not more 
     than 30 days to permit such a hearing to take place.
       Subsection (e) of the new section 1531 contained in Section 
     3(a) of the conference report is identical to subsection (e) 
     of the new section 1531 proposed in Section 3(a) of the House 
     amendment and subsection (e) of the new section 1531 proposed 
     in Section 3(a) of the Senate bill. Subsection (e) provides 
     that a woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed 
     may not be prosecuted under this section, for a conspiracy to 
     violate this section, or for an offense under section 2, 3, 
     or 4 of this title based on a violation of this section.
       Subsection (b) in Section 3 of the conference report is 
     identical to subsection (b) in Section 3 of the House 
     amendment and subsection (b) in Section 3 of the Senate bill. 
     Subsection (b) is a clerical amendment to insert the new 
     chapter in the table of chapters for part I of title 18, 
     after the item relating to chapter 73.
       Section 4 of the Senate bill had no counterpart in the 
     House amendment, and it is not included in the substitute 
     agreed to by the managers.

     F. James Sensenbrenner,
     Henry Hyde,
     Steve Chabot,
                                Managers on the Part of the House.

     Orrin Hatch,
     Rick Santorum,
     Mike DeWine,
     Managers on the Part of the Senate.

                          ____________________